G.R. No. 193636. July 24, 2012.

*
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, petitioner, vs. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS THE PNP-PROVINCIAL DIRECTOR OF ILOCOS NORTE, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM O.
FANG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, PNP PROVINCIAL
OFFICE, ILOCOS NORTE, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than
freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a
repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.The
right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional
right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968), thus enunciated: The due process
question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in
disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of
a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy.
There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: Liberty in the constitutional sense
must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy
as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of
all freedom. As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. The concept of
liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a
unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.
Same; Same; The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from
intrusion or constraint.Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that
must be protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate
Committee on Banks, 541 SCRA 456 (2007),
_______________
* EN BANC.
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Gamboa vs. Chan
this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz.: With respect to the right of
privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an
absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect
for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the
right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v.
Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public
concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that
case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding
compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe
v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to
disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government
agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest
in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough
to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.
Same; Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational
privacy.The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect
the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must
exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or
security on the other.
Same; Private Armies; The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies
and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.The Constitution
explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not
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Gamboa vs. Chan
recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one
police force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and
administered by a national police commission.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Br.
13.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ferdinand P. Ignacio and Hidalgo, Estepa and Associates Law Offices for petitioner.
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) filed
pursuant to Rule 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,2 seeking a review of the 9
September 2010 Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3 The questioned Decision denied petitioner the
privilege of the writ of habeas data.4
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the
Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior Superintendent
(P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and
_______________
1 Sec. 19. Appeal.Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme
Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the judgment or
final order.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases.
2 A.M. No. 08-1-06-SC, 22 January 2008.
3 Rollo, pp. 36-47; Decision dated 9 September 2010.
4 Id., at p. 47.
5 Id., at p. 4, Appeal by Certiorari.
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respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the Provincial
Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial
Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order
No. 275 (A.O. 275), Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of
Private Armies in the Country.7 The body, which was later on referred to as the Zearosa
Commission,8 was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the
country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them
permanently in the future.9 Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zearosa Commission
released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled A Journey
Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies Report to the
President (the Report).10
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNPIlocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides,11 and classified
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 39-40, Decision; id., at pp. 142-143, Affidavit of P/SSupt. Chan dated 21 July 2010;
id., at pp. 144-145, Affidavit of P/Supt. Fang dated 21 July 2010.
7 108 O.G. 310 (Jan., 2010).
8 Named after the Chairperson, retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-
Zearosa. The other members of the body included Bishop Juan de Dios Pueblos, D.D., Alleem
Mahmod Mala L. Adilao, (Ret.) General Virtus V. Gil, (Ret.) Lieutenant General Edilberto Pardo
Adan, (Ret.) Herman Zamora Basbao, Dante Lazaro Jimenez, and General Jaime Callada
Echeverria(+). Rollo, pp. 292-299.
9 Supra note 7.
10 Rollo, pp. 287-563; Rollo, p. 20, Appeal by Certiorari; Rollo, p. 591, Comment.
11 Id., at p. 6, Appeal by Certiorari; id., at pp. 51-52, Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data.
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her as someone who keeps a PAG.12 Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP-
Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zearosa Commission,13
thereby causing her inclusion in the Reports enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.14
More specifically, she pointed out the following items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of PAGs in the
Philippines.15
(b) The Report stated that x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task Group (STG)
for each private armed group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their activities.16
(c) Attached as Appendix F of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP and
captioned as Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010, which classifies PAGs
in the country according to region, indicates their identity, and lists the prominent personalities
with whom these groups are associated.17 The first entry in the table names a PAG, known as
the Gamboa Group, linked to herein petitioner Gamboa.18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in Malacaang on March
24, 2010 at which time, the Commission was also asked to comment on the PNP report that out
of one hundred seventeen (117) partisan armed groups validated,
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 20-23, Appeal by Certiorari; id., at p. 52, Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data.
13 Id.
14 Id., at pp. 20-23, Appeal by Certiorari.
15 Id., at p. 20, Appeal by Certiorari; id., at p. 337, Report.
16 Id., at pp. 20-21, Appeal by Certiorari; id., at p. 338, Report.
17 Id., at p. 21, Appeal by Certiorari; id., at pp. 430-463, Appendix F of the Report.
18 Id., at p. 431, Appendix F of the Report.
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Gamboa vs. Chan
twenty-four (24) had been dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members apprehended and more
than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.
Commissioner Herman Basbao qualified that said statistics were based on PNP data but that
the more significant fact from his report is that the PNP has been vigilant in monitoring the
activities of these armed groups and this vigilance is largely due to the existence of the
Commission which has continued communicating with the [Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP)] and PNP personnel in the field to constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs.
Commissioner Basbao stressed that the Commissions efforts have preempted the formation of
the PAGs because now everyone is aware that there is a body monitoring the PAGs[]
movement through the PNP. Commissioner [Lieutenant General Edilberto Pardo Adan] also
clarified that the PAGs are being destabilized so that their ability to threaten and sow fear
during the election has been considerably weakened.19
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective of the
situation in the field, the PNP complied with the Commissions recommendation that they
revise their validation system to include those PAGs previously listed as dormant. In the most
recent briefing provided by the PNP on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107)
existing PAGs. Of these groups, the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have been
reorganized.20
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the
Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 21-22, Appeal by Certiorari; id., at pp. 348-349, Report.
20 Id., at p. 22, Appeal by Certiorari; id., at p. 364, Report.
21 The records refer to two different television news programs: the Position Paper indicates TV
Patrol World, while the Return of the Writ mentions Bandila; id., at pp. 6-7, Appeal by
Certiorari; id.,
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Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media.22 Thus, she
was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified
information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zearosa Commission.23
As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of
personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her
supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police
surveillance operations.24
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed,
Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed
for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP- Ilocos Norte
database; (b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of
the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified
reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless reports.26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which issued
the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition meritorious on its face.27 Thus,
the trial court (a) instructed respondents to sub-
_______________
at p. 37, Decision; id., at p. 59, Affidavit of Demijon Castillo dated 9 July 2010; id., at p. 133,
Return of the Writ; id., at pp. 147-148, Position Paper of Gamboa; id., at p. 591, Comment.
22 Id., at pp. 6-7, Appeal by Certiorari; id., at p. 166, Position Paper of Gamboa.
23 Id., at pp. 52-53, Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data.
24 Id., at pp. 52-54.
25 Id., at pp. 48-58.
26 Id.
27 Id., at pp. 113-114, Writ of Habeas Data dated 14 July 2010; id., at pp. 115-117, Order dated 14
July 2010.
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Gamboa vs. Chan
mit all information and reports forwarded to and used by the Zearosa Commission as basis to
include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed respondents, and any person
acting on their behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding to the Zearosa Commission, or to
any other government entity, information that they may have gathered against her without the
approval of the court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written return of the writ together with
supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23 July 2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds of their
mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa.29 The information stored
in their database supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which she was implicated,
namely: (a) a Complaint for murder and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-
INQ-091-00077, and (b) a Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a
person in authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple attempted murder, docketed as NPS
DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the
following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the
right to privacy was violated or threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life,
liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and recourses she took to secure the data or
information; and (c) the location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and
the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information.31 They also
contended that the Petition for Writ of Ha
_______________
28 Id.
29 Id., at pp. 118-145, Return of the Writ dated 22 July 2010.
30 Id., at p. 125.
31 Id., at pp. 126-131.
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beas Data, being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not
the proper remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.32
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the Petition.33 The trial
court categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs,
as published in the Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy, to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining
PAGs, [Gamboa]s right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The violation understandably
affects her life, liberty and security enormously. The untold misery that comes with the tag of
having a PAG could even be insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she
fears for her security that at any time of the day the unlimited powers of respondents may likely
be exercised to further malign and destroy her reputation and to transgress her right to life.
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed that there
was certainly intrusion into [Gamboa]s activities. It cannot be denied that information was
gathered as basis therefor. After all, under Administrative Order No. 275, the Zearosa
Commission was tasked to investigate the existence of private armies in the country, with all
the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987.
x x x x x x x x x
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, [Gamboa] alleged as she accused
respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and provided information that made
the Zearosa Commission to include her in the list. Obviously, it was this gathering and
forwarding of information supposedly by respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x
x.34


_______________
32 Id., at pp. 131-132.
33 Id., at pp. 36-47, Decision.
34 Id., at pp. 41-42.
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Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the ground
that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject information
originated from respondents, and that they forwarded this database to the Zearosa
Commission without the benefit of prior verification.35 The trial court also ruled that even
before respondents assumed their official positions, information on her may have already been
acquired.36 Finally, it held that the Zearosa Commission, as the body tasked to gather
information on PAGs and authorized to disclose information on her, should have been
impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to the Petition.37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010,38 raising the
following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zearosa Commission be impleaded as either a
necessary or indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that [Gamboa] failed to present sufficient proof to link
respondents as the informant to [sic] the Zearosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zearosa Commission to [sic]
the PNP as alleged by [Gamboa] is an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa failed to present
substantial evidence to
_______________
35 Id., at p. 44.
36 Id., at pp. 44-46.
37 Id., at p. 47.
38 Id., at pp. 3-34.
39 Id., at pp. 7-8, Appeal by Certiorari.
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show that her right to privacy in life, liberty or security was violated, and (b) the trial court
correctly dismissed the Petition on the ground that she had failed to present sufficient proof
showing that respondents were the source of the report naming her as one who maintains a
PAG.40
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the mandate to
dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in accordance with due process, such that the
gathering and forwarding of unverified information on her must be considered unlawful.41 She
also reiterates that she was able to present sufficient evidence showing that the subject
information originated from respondents.42
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, this
Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to privacy; second, explain the writ
of habeas data as an extraordinary remedy that seeks to protect the right to informational
privacy; and finally, contextualize the right to privacy vis--vis the state interest involved in the
case at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a
constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a
long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical
submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to
privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: Liberty in the constitutional
sense must
_______________
40 Id., at pp. 589-622, Comment dated 3 January 2011.
41 Id., at pp. 647-656, Reply dated 29 January 2012.
42 Id.
43 130 Phil. 415; 22 SCRA 424 (1968).
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mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as
well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all
freedom. As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his
personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. x
x x.
x x x x x x x x x
x x x [I]n the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for five
members of the Court, stated: Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of
association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The
Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers in any house in time of
peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment
explicitly affirms the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not
force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people. After referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, Justice Douglas
continued: These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a
legitimate one.
x x x x x x x x x
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions
between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in
all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the indi-
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vidual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of
this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual
has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a
technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the
area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and
support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian
society.44 (Emphases supplied)
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the right to
privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and
enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of
the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by
law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz.:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
_______________
44 Id., at pp. 433-436; pp. 444-445.
45 354 Phil. 948; 293 SCRA 141 (1998).
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particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be
provided by law.
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides
that [e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of
meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or
any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another
person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised
Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and
industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like
the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code.
The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain
information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O.
No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x.46
(Emphases supplied)
_______________
46 Id., at pp. 972-975; pp. 148-149.
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Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from
intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,47
this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz.:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it
to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative
investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a
legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people
to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of
ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute
where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship
test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individuals right to
privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to
ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately
protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes
a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts
are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the
right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed
legitimate and compelling.
_______________
47 G.R. No. 167173, 27 December 2007, 541 SCRA 456.
48 Id., at pp. 475-476 [citing Morfe v. Mutuc, supra note 43; Gordon v. Sabio, 535 Phil. 687; 504
SCRA 705 (2006).
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The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a
forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy.49 It seeks to protect a
persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.50 It
must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on
the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data.The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and jurisprudence.
Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European tradition of data protection,51 this
Court can be guided by cases on the protection of personal data decided by
_______________
49 Manila Electric Co. v. Lim, G.R. No. 184769, 5 October 2010, 632 SCRA 195, 202.
50 Roxas v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, 7 September 2010, 630 SCRA 211, 239.
51 Guadamuz, A. Habeas Data vs. the European Data Protection Directive, 2001 (3) The
Journal of Information, Law and Technology (JILT).
<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2001_3/guadamonz>.
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the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v. Sweden,52 in
which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs
with the right of the state to protect its national security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander),
a Swedish citizen, worked as a temporary replacement museum technician at the Naval
Museum, which was adjacent to a restricted military security zone.53 He was refused
employment when the requisite personnel control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the
basis of information in the secret police register, which was kept in accordance with the
Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was prevented access.54 He claimed, among
others, that this procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the European Convention of
Human Rights55 on the right to privacy, as nothing in his personal or political background
would warrant his classification in the register as a security risk.56
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating to the
private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute the
same, amounted to an interference in his right to respect for private life.57 However, the ECHR
held that the interference was justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control
system had a legitimate aim, which was the protection
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52 26 March 1987, 9 EHRR 433.
53 Para. 10.
54 Paras. 12-13, 15-17, 19.
55 Article 8. 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except
such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
56 Para. 47.
57 Para. 48.
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of national security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate
indication as to the scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording
and release of information by the authorities.59 The following statements of the ECHR must be
emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need
and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia, the
Gillow judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, 55).
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation,
the scope of which will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on
the particular nature of the interference involved. In the instant case, the interest of the
respondent State in protecting its national security must be balanced against the seriousness of
the interference with the applicants right to respect for his private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national security, for the
Contracting States to have laws granting the competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to
collect and store in registers not accessible to the public information on persons and, secondly,
to use this information when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in posts of
importance for national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leanders legitimate interests
through the consequences it had on his possibilities of access to certain sensitive posts within
the public service. On the other hand, the right of access to public service is not as such
enshrined in the Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A
no. 105, p. 20, 34-35), and, apart from those consequences, the interference did not constitute
an obstacle to his leading a private life of his own choosing.
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58 Para. 49.
59 Para. 56.
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In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available to the
respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the present case, and in particular in
choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide
one.
x x x x x x x x x
66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not communicated to
Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the interference was not necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security, as it is the very absence of such
communication which, at least partly, ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure
(see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27,
58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of the Ordinance
of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it
desirable that the rule of communication to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of
the Ordinance, should be effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the
control (see paragraph 31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the safeguards contained
in the Swedish personnel control system meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art.
8-2). Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State was
entitled to consider that in the present case the interests of national security prevailed over the
individual interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The interference to which Mr.
Leander was subjected cannot therefore be said to have been disproportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right
to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the
determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary
remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon
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the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.
The collection and forwarding of
information by the PNP vis--vis the
interest of the state to dismantle
private armies
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups
not recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also provides for the establishment of one
police force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and
administered by a national police commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates
a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective
of dismantling them permanently.
To enable the Zearosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of
an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take
testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes to produce
documents, books, and records.62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zearosa Commission to
deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the
Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the commission
in the performance of its functions.63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce all laws
and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b) maintain peace
_______________
60 Constitution, Art. XVIII, Sec. 24.
61 Constitution, Art. XVI, Sec. 6.
62 A.O. 275, Sec. 5(a).
63 A.O. 275, Sec. 5(f).
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and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent
crimes.64
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and
functions accorded to the Zearosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information
on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their
activities.65 One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the
Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court,
however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zearosa Commission was not an
unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the
body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious
groups. Moreover, the Zearosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police
force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance
from the latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP released
information to the Zearosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without
affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to
her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence- gathering
and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation
system, which was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to
ensure that the data mirrored the
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64 Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the Department of Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990, Sec. 24(a), (b), (c).
65 Rollo, p. 338; Report.
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situation on the field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information
collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make any further
determination as to the propriety of sharing information during specific stages of intelligence
gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the discretion of investigative bodies in the
accomplishment of their functions, resulting in an undue encroachment on their competence.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law
and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating
entities that information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must
be released exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After
all, inherent to the right to privacy is the freedom from unwarranted exploitation of ones
person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a
persons ordinary sensibilities.67
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential
nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting
reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were
responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her
to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary
remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters
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66 Id., at pp. 21-22, Appeal by Certiorari; id., at p. 364, Report.
67 Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, 3
November 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 431.
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susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents
sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the
criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of
regularity, which she failed to overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far
outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection
and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in Special Proc.
No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it
denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., On Official Leave.
Brion and Mendoza, JJ., On Leave.
Peralta, J., On official business.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to
privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ operates to
protect a persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances
where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends. (Roxas vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 630 SCRA 211 [2010])
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The writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a persons right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. (Rodriguez vs.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 660 SCRA 84 [2011])
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