HEIRS OF GABATAN V CA G.R.

NO 150206 MARCH 13, 2009

FACTS: Subject parcel of land is named under Juan Gabatan. Respondent Lourdes Pacana claims that
she is the owner of the said lot, having inherited it from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan
Evero. She alleged that her mother is the only child of Juan Gabatan and Laureana Clarito. That after
the death of Juan, the lot was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan and his wife Rita Gabatan, for
administration. She also claimed that prior to the death of Hermogena, she demanded for the return of
the land but to no avail. After Hermogenas death, respondent did the same but petitioners refused to
heed the demands to surrender the lot. When Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and
Catalino took possession of the land despite her demands for the two to vacate the said property.
Petitioners denied that respondents mother is the daughter of Juan and Laureana. Petitioners
claimed that Juan died single in 1934 and was survived by his brother and 2 sisters (Teofilo,
Macaria and Justa). Said siblings inherited the land and have been in possession of it for more
than 50 years. Respondents further alleged that a similar case was filed against Teofilos wife
was later dismissed due to lack of interest
October 20, 1995 RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent ordering the reconveyance of
the land to Pacana
April 28, 2000 CA affirmed RTC decision citing that respondent was able to sufficiently
establish her filiation with Juan and also CA gave weight to the deed of absolute sale executed
by Macaria Gabatan Abrogar, Teofilo Hermogena and the heirs of Justa Gabatan where it
identified Hermogena as the heir of Juan

ISSUE: Whether or not Hermogena is the daughter of Juan

HELD: Under NCC, filiation of illegitimate children is established by any of the following:

Art. 265. The filiation of children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an
authentic document or a final judgment.

Art. 266. In the absence of titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the
continuous possession of status of a legitimate child

Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of
status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means followed by ROC and special laws.

In the present case, two conflicting birth certificates of the respondent were presented at RTC.
Respondent, presented and identified a certified true copy of her birth certificate which indicated that
her mothers maiden name was Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. On the other hand, petitioners
presented a certified true copy of respondents birth certificate which indicated that her mothers
maiden name was Hermogena Clarito.

The birth certificate presented by the petitioner, although handwritten, seems very unusual and of
dubious source. The entry space for mothers maiden name is Hermogena Clarito, which is unusual
during that time. It seems to be an apparent attempt to thwart the plaintiffs mother filiation with the
omission of the surname Gabatan. What the respondents birth certificate ultimately proves is her
filiation with Hermogena.

To prove filiation, Hermogenas birth certificate should have been presented as the best evidence of
Hermogenas relationship to Juan. Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final
judgment categorically evidencing Hermogenas relationship to Juan.

Respodent merely relied on her witnesses who testified that they personally knew Hermogena and/or
they knew Juan was married to Laureana but none of the witnesses had personal knowledge of the fact
of marriage between Juan and Laureana as they were not born or were very young at the time of
marriage. The witnesses based their testimony on MERE HEARSAY.

Furthermore, the deed of absolute sale presented by the respondent was a mere photocopy and was
not authenticated. Respondent failed to present original copy which was kept by the notary public.

The respondent failed to substantiate with convincing, credible and independently verifiable proof, her
assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the disputed property.
Aggravating the weakness of her evidence were the circumstances that:
a. She did not come to court with clean hands for she presented a tampered/altered, if not
outright spurious, copy of her birth certificate
b. She unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action

PETITION GRANTED. CA DECISION REVERED AND DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

SOLINAP V LOCSIN 371 SCRA 711
FACTS: On November 11, 1991, 11 months after Johnny Locsin died intestate (Died, December 11,
1990), respondent Juan Locsin Jr. filed a petition praying that he be appointed administrator of the
intestate estate of the deceased, alleging that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased;
during his lifetime, the deceased owned several assets and properties and 1/6 of the mass of real
properties were owned by respondent and his siblings: Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin
and Ester Locsin
January 10, 1992 heirs of Locsin Jr., Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, filed an
opposition to respondents petition for letters of administration citing that that respondent is a
not a child or an acknowledged child of the deceased, who during his lifetime, never affixed
SR. in his name
January 5, 1993 petitioner (who is the sole heir of the late Maria Locsin vda. De Araneta) filed
another opposition alleging that respondents claim as a natural child is barred by prescription
of the statute of limitations.
To support his claim, respondent presented the following:
1. a photocopy of his birth certificate, indicating that his father is Juan Locsin Sr. and also
presented the local civil registrar to verify the same.
2. Pictures showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of the coffin bearing Juan
Locsins body showing that he and his mother have been recognized as family members
Petitioners alleged that the birth certificate presented did not indicate the signature of the
deceased. Petitioners also presented a handwriting expert who testified that the signatures
appeared forged.
September 1996 RTC ruled in favor of respondent and appointed him as administrator of the
intestate estate of the deceased
CA affirmed RTC decision in toto

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is an illegitimate child of the deceased

HELD: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in
any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further
court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to
prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to
establish the child's acknowledgment.

In the instant case, the birth certificate which was reported on January 30, 1957 was recorded on a
December 1, 1958 revised form. Furthermore, of all the documents bound in the same volume, only the
alleged birth certificate is a carbon copy of the original and that the leaves seem to have been detached
from the volume itself. The birth certificate was forged.

A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both NCC and Art. 172 FC for purposes
of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate only offers prima facie evidence of filiation and
may be refuted by contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, the respondents birth
certificate entered in the records of the local civil registry has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt,
the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified certificate of live
birth.

Respondent failed to prove his filiation with the deceased. Indeed, he is not an interested person within
the meaning of Section 2 Rule 79 ROC, entitled to the issuance of letters of administration. CA DECISION
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

GAPUSAN V CA 183 SCRA 160
FACTS: Felisa Gapusan Parcon died intestate and without legitimate issue on April 6, 1966 but her
spouse and other known relatives (3 sisters and a nephew) did not make any move to settle her estate
judicially
Ligaya Gapusan Chua, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased,
instituted the proceedings and prayed for administratorship. On January 16, 1968, RTC ruled in
her favor
April 22, 1968 the deceaseds spouse, Prospero Parcon, filed a motion for reconsideration,
denying that petitioner was an acknowledged natural child of his deceased wife and applied for
his own appointment as administrator.
Petitioner presented the following to prove her filiation with the deceased:
1. The deceaseds sworn statement of assets and liabilities where Ligaya is named and
described as her daughter
2. Felisas application for GSIS life insurance in which the petitioner is set out as her daughter
3. GSIS check paid to the petitioner as her share in the benefits due the heirs of the deceased
4. a family photograph showing the petitioner beside the deceased
Husband alleged that the petitioners exhibits did not constitute conclusive proofs of her
claimed status as an acknowledged natural child:
1. The deceased application for membership in Negros Occidental Teachers Federation merely
named the petitioner as an adopted daughter
2. The distribution of death benefits pursuant to the deceased GSIS insurance policy only
allocated P500 for the petitioner whereas the respondent received P1000
3. The deceaseds sister and Vice Mayor testified before the court that in 1942 an unknown
drifter sold the petitioner, then an infant, to the deceased
Probate court ruled in favor of the petitioner and appointed her as the administratrix
April 1977 CA reversed probate courts decision in favor of the respondent, appointing the
respondent as the administrator of his wifes estate and that the petitioners evidence did not
constitute acknowledgment but only a ground to compel recognition in accordance with Art.278
NCC

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner are authentic writings which
effectively operated as a recognition of the petitioner as natural child of the deceased, even if no action
was brought to compel Felisa (during her lifetime) to recognize her as such

HELD: Petitioner contends that the sworn statement of assets and liabilities, a public document, and the
deceaseds application for life insurance were indubitable recognition by the deceased of her status as
an acknowledged natural child pursuant to Art. 278 NCC which states:

Art. 278. Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or
in any authentic writing.

Respondent argues that the evidence presented merely established ground for her to compel
recognition by action, which should have been raised during the lifetime of the putative parent pursuant
to Art. 285 NCC which states:

Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
1. If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file
the action before the expiration of 4 years from the attainment of his majority
2. If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had
been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child
In this case, the action must be commenced within 4 years from the finding of the document.

Since no action was instituted prior to the death of Felisa, proof of the authentic document in the
proceedings for the settlement of the deceaseds estate is not valid as a basis for declaration of filiation
or heirship.

Recognition of natural children may be voluntary or compulsory. Voluntary recognition is an admission
of the fact of paternity or maternity by the presumed parent, expressed in the form prescribed by NCC.
Its essence lies in the avowal of the parent that the child is his/hers; the formality is added to make the
admission incontestable. The form is prescribed by Art. 278 NCC that voluntary recognition should be
made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.

Compulsory recognition (judicial recognition) is recognition decreed by final judgment of a competent
court. It is governed by Art. 283 and 284 NCC setting forth the cases in which the father or mother is
obliged to recognize a natural child and Art. 285 providing generally, the action for recognition of
natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parent/s.

Judicial approval is not needed if recognition is voluntarily made
1. Of a person who is of age, only his consent being necessary; or
2. Of a minor whose acknowledgment is effected in a record of birth or in a will

Judicial approval is needed if the recognition of the minor is effected, not through a record of birth or in
a will but through a statement in a court of record or an authentic document. In any case the individual
recognized can impugn the recognition within 4 years following the attainment of his majority.

The SC held that the documents presented by the petitioner falls under the category of authentic writing
within the contemplation of Art. 278 NCC and Section 20, Rule 132 ROC. Although in one of the
documents, the deceased described the petitioner as her adopted child, it may have been due to her
reluctance to confess that she had borne a child out of wedlock.

The consent required by Art. 281 NCC of a person of age who has been voluntarily recognized may be
given expressly or tacitly. Assuming that the petitioner was of age at the time of her voluntary
recognition, evidence shows that she consented to it. This is evident in the fact that she did not impugn
her status at any time before her mothers death and even asserted the recognition of her status in the
judicial proceeding for the settlement of the deceaseds estate. Even if we were to assume that she was
only a minor at the time of her recognition, the absence of judicial approval was ratified upon her
reaching the age of majority and her initiation of the proceedings for the settlement of her mothers
estate. The judicial approval imposed by Art. 281 is intended to benefit the minor against any
acknowledgment made to his prejudice. As such, the lack or insufficiency of such approval is not a
defect available in recognizing the parent but one which the minor may raise or waive. If after reaching
majority, the person consents to the acknowledgment, lack of judicial approval should make no
difference.

The petitioner must be held to be a voluntarily acknowledged natural child of the deceased and is
entitled, in accordance with Art. 282 NCC to bear her mothers surname and to receive the hereditary
portion accorded to her by the law.

PEOPLE V BAYANI G.R. NO 120894 OCTOBER 3, 1996
FACTS: On June 28, 1992, the accused Moreno Bayani used force and intimidation (at gun point) to have
carnal knowledge of the complainant Maria Elena Nieto against her will.
The accused threatened the complainant to kill her and her family if she will tell about the rape
incident. She only admitted it when she was already showing signs of pregnancy
March 21, 1993 the complainant gave birth
The accused alleged that the complainant was his mistress and that further acts of sexual
intercourse after the said date were with her consent, and that he promised to support the
child if the complainant will leave her boyfriend (which did not happen as the accused alleged)

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is required to support the complainants child borne out of his
having carnal knowledge of her

HELD: The accused failed to prove his sweetheart defense as he failed to present any love letters,
pictures, or mementos proving their relationship.

While it has been held that recognition of offspring of rape cannot be ordered in the absence of
evidence, in this instance, the accused expressly admitted before the Court the paternity of the
complainants child thus giving rise to the obligation to provide support.

Art. 176 FC confers parental authority over illegitimate children on the mother and provides for their
entitlement to support in conformity with the provisions of the Family Code. Under Art. 345 RPC, the
offender in the rape case who is married is sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the
offspring, if there be any. In the instant case, the accused should be ordered to support the illegitimate
offspring and the complainant but the amount and terms should be determined by the trial Court
pursuant to Art. 201 FC.

The accused is ordered to support his illegitimate child in an amount to be determined by the trial court
of after hearing.

ABADILLA V TABILIRAN 249 SCRA 447
FACTS: Repondent Judge Tabiliran was married to Teresita Banzuela. Sometime in 1965, Banzuela left
and abandoned their family home in Zamboanga del Norte and thereafter her whereabouts could not be
known. In 1970, Tabiliran began cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan, with whom he had three children
born in 1970, 1971 and 1975, respectively. Tabiliran and Baybayan got married in 1986. In the marriage
contract, Tabiliran represented himself as SINGLE. Petitioner is a clerk of court assigned in the sala of
respondent, charging Tabiliran for gross immorality.
Respondent judged claimed that his cohabitation with Baybayan was not bigamous nor immoral
since he only started cohabiting with Baybayan after his first wife had already left and
abandoned their home in 1966 and since then and up to the present, her whereabouts is not
known. He further averred that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of his first
wife when he married Baybayan in 1986.
He also admitted that he indicated in his marriage contract that he was then SINGLE but denied
that he acted with deceit or false representation claiming that there were only 3 options to
choose from (single, widow or divorced) and preferred to choose the word SINGLE, it being most
appropriate and that he and Baybayan executed a joint affidavit wherein his former marriage to
Banzuela was honestly divulged.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Tabilirans marriage to Baybayan was valid;
2. Whether or not their children were legitimated by their subsequent marriage.

HELD:
(1) The Supreme Court held Tabiliran culpable for gross immorality, having scandalously and openly
cohabited with Baybayan during the existence of his marriage to Bazuela. Evidently, respondent and
Baybayan had openly lived together even while respondents marriage to his (first) wife was still valid
and subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court and Article 390 of the Civil Code which
provide that after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives,
the absent spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession, cannot be
invoked by respondent. From the time Banzuela left the conjugal home in 1966 until the time that
respondent started to cohabit with Baybayan in 1970, only four years had elapsed. Respondent had no
right to presume therefore that Banzuela was already dead for all purposes.
As to respondents act of eventually marrying Baybayan in 1986, the Supreme Court (SC) declared to be
not in the position to determine the legality thereof, absent all the facts for proper determination. The
SC considered the finding of the Investigating Judge that said marriage is authorized under Article 83 (2)
of the Civil Code.
(2) As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to
Priscilla, the three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the
time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and Banzuela. The
applicable provision in this case is Article 269 of the Civil Code, which states that: Only natural children
can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of
the former, were not disqualified by an impediment to marry each other, are natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations. The
reasons for this limitation are as follows:
1. Rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2. It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
3. There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4. It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy
the sanctity of the marriage; and
5. It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the
child.

CERVANTES V FAJARDO 169 SCRA 575
FACTS: The minor was born to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law
husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-
law, the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care
and custody of the child when she was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption
of the child by herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon.

The adoptive parents received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of
P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand.
Subsequently, the respondents took the child and refused to return her, stating that she affidavit of
consent was not fully explained to her but she will return the child to the petitioners if she was paid
P150,000.

ISSUE: Can respondents take back their child?

HELD: In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is
paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will
not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the
custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending
parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion

It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent
Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His
open cohabitation with correspondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable
atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides,
respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another married man with
whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. Upon the other
hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially
capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not
only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.

Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in
natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural
parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by
both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and
exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.

IN RE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM G.R. 168992 MAY 21, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner Monina Lim is an optometrist; On June 23, 1974, she married Primo Lim and were
childless. 2 Minor children (Michelle, born March 15, 1977; Michael, born August 1, 1983) whose
parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by Lucia Ayuban. Petitioner and husband Primo
registered the children to make it appear they were the childrens parents
The children were raised by the petitioner as if they were their own, i.e. used the surname Lim.
November 28, 1998 Husband Primo Lim died
December 27, 2000 petitioner married Angel Olario, an American citizen
Petitioner decided to adopt the children under RA 8552 and filed separate petitions for the
adoption of Michelle and Michael. At the time of the filing, Michelle was already 25 years old,
married and Michael was 18 years old
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption (affidavit of consent) as well as
Michael. Petitioners husband Olario executed an affidavit of consent for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael
September 15, 2004 Trial court dismissed both petitioners, holding that since the petitioner
had remarried, she should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband as required by
Section 7 (c), Art. III of RA 8552 and Art. 185 FC
Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration but was denied since the petitioner did not fall under
any of the exceptions of Section 7 (c), Art. III of RA 8552. Mere consent of the husband did not
suffice since there were additional requirements (residency and certification of his qualification)
which must be complied. Furthermore, the joint adoption is not only for the purpose of
exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his
parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt

HELD: It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. Section 7,
Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good
moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and
psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee,
and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of
the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and
adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the
spouse of the adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided,
That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she
has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that
he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that
his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the
aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree
of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her
spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
The use of the word shall means that joint adoption by the husband and wife is mandatory.

Neither does the petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7:
1. The children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of Olario
2. Children are not the illegitimate children of the petitioner
3. Petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other

The affidavit of consent is not enough for the adoption of the children as there are other requirements
which Olario must comply with being an American citizen:
1. He must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Philippines
2. He must have been living in the Philippines for at least 3 continuous years prior to the filing of
the application
3. He must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered
4. He has the legal capacity to adopt in his own country
5. The adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child

None of these were proven during the trial. Such requirements cannot be waived pursuant to Section 7.
PETITION DENIED.

DUNCAN V CFI 69 SCRA 298
FACTS: Petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan (British) and Maria Lucy Christensen (American) are
husband and wife residing in the Philippines for the last 17 years. Having no children but previously
adopted another child, spouses Duncan filed a petition to adopt Colin Bery Christensen Duncan
May 1967 a child (3 days old) was given to the petitioners for adoption by Atty. Corazon de
Leon Velasquez. The child was baptized as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan
Atty. Velasquez received the infant from an unwed mother who wished to keep her identity a
secret because she wanted to get married and did not want to destroy her future. The mother
instructed Atty. Velasquez to look for a suitable couple who will adopt the child; the mother did
not provide for the maintenance and support of the child
In the petition for adoption, Atty. Velasquez, as the de facto guardian (loco parentis) gave
consent to the adoption
CFI required Atty. Velasquez to reveal the identity of the said mother but refused to on the
ground that there existed an attorney-client relationship between them.
June 27, 1968 CFI dismissed petition citing that the consent is improper since it was not
obtained from the natural mother of the child. CFI cited: Art. 340 (of the Civil Code) provides
that the written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
2. The guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted.

"Under the law aforementioned, it will be noted that the law is couched in mandatory terms by the
word SHALL be necessary, and it enumerates the persons who will give the consent to the adoption in
the order as follows: parents, guardian, or the person in charge of the person to be adopted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the person who gave the consent for adoption (Atty. Velasquez) is the proper
person required by law to give such consent

HELD: Under Art. 340 of the Civil 'Code, the "parent, guardian or person in charge of the person to be
adopted" while the other one is that mentioned in Section 3, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, describing it
as each of the known living parents "who has not abandoned such child." The father's consent here is
out of the question as the child is illegitimate and unrecognized.

It is undisputed that the child in question, was only 3 days old when it was turned over by its mother to
Atty. Velasquez and that has not inquired into the condition of the child ever since much less provided
support and maintenance. The SC held that such actuation constitutes abandonment and as such, there
is njo need to require the consent of such parent of the child to the adoption. Parental consent is
required bby the law in cases where the parents did not abandon their child.
Whether or not Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the undisputed custodian of the abandoned waif may
be considered as the guardian under Art. 340 or the person standing in loco parentis of said infant
contemplated in Art. 349 of the Civil Code. Although there was no guardian ad litem appointed by the
court and the child was not in the custody of an institution, the SC considered Atty. Velasquez as the
guardian of the said infant, being in physical custody of the child she acted like a good Samaritan when
she took the child under her care.

Petitioners showed that they are capable and had the means to provide the child with the proper
support s/he needs. REVERSED CFI DECISION. CHILD IS ADOPTED SON OF PETITIONERS

PARDO DE TAVERA V CACDAC 167 SCRA 626
FACTS: On June 19, 1986, spouses Gordon (respondents) sought to adopt minor Anthony Gandhi
Custudio, natural son of Adoracion Custodio. Notice for hearing was published in the newspapers for 3
weeks but no one arrived on the date of the hearing to oppose the petition.
During the trial, it was shown that the spouses Gordon possessed all the requirements specified
by the laws on adoption (legal capacity, financial support etc.) and declared the Anthony as the
lawful adopted child of the Gordons with the decree of adoption taking effect on June 19, 1986
August 11, 9186 spouses Gordon wrote to MSSD for a travel clearance for Anthony (denied);
they, then, submitted an urgent ex-parte stating that the MSSD refused to issue a passport to
Anthony without a case study of MSSD and prayed that it be required to issue a passport
MSSD opposed the issuance of travel clearance on the grounds that the report of the Court
social worker and pastor cannot replace the MSSD report; that the required 6-month trial
custody has not been met as required by Art 35 Child and Youth Welfare Code; that the spouses
gave P10,000 to the natural mother as if they were shopping for kids; under Dubai Law adopted
children cannot inherit from adopting parents and that there was no memorandum of
agreement between Dubai and Philippines so there is no guarantee that the adopted child will
not be sold, exchanged, neglected or abused
Despite MSSDs opposition, RTC still ordered to issue a travel clearance for Anthony; order
became final and executor y

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Gordon complied with all the requirements for adoption pursuant to
PD 603

HELD: Respondent judge did not comply strictly with the provisions on PD 603 as it was satisfied with
the case study report submitted by the court social worker. Prior to the EO 91, amending the child and
youth welfare code, the MSSD did not have the exclusive authority to make a case study in adoption
cases. MSSD did not find the court case study fault or incorrect as its objective was to assess whether
the adoptive parents were emotionally ready for the adoption

The objection lies in the fact that the spouses Gordon were making the adoption case a commercial
venture by giving the natural mother P10,000. And that the Gordons initially wanted to adopt a baby
girl before the proceedings but the said infant was Mongoloid so the coup surrendered it to an
institution where she eventually died. This is was raised belatedly and had yet to be proven and should
not be made to prejudice Anthony. In the final analysis, it should the best interest of the child that
should be considered and not the technicalities surrounding the adoption.

The MSSD should have appealed to the OSG when it learned of the decision but it did not. Its present
petition for certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal.
The understandable concern of the MSSD for Filipino children up for adoption by foreigners is
recognized and appreciated; the prerogative of the Courts to render judgments based upon their
assessment of the evidence inclusive of Case Study Reports that may be submitted is fully upheld; the
guidelines for a modus vivendi in adoption cases between the executive and judicial departments of
government, even with the advent of Executive Order No. 91 dated 17 December 1986, have been
adequately laid down-all in proper fealty to the Constitutional mandate that the protection of minors is
a paramount duty of the State (Section 3[2], Article XV, 1987 Constitution). RTC DECISION AFFIRMED

TAMARGO V CA 209 SCRA 58
FACTS: On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle which caused her death. A civil case was filed by Tamargos adoptive parents against spouses
Bundoc (Adelbertos natural son). Also, a criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence was
filed but he was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability as he acted without discernment.
December 10, 1982 spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt Adelberto
Bundo
Spouses Bundoc that the adopting parents, spouses Sabas were indispensable parties to the
action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
petition for adoption was field
Spouses Sabas replied that since the minor was living with his natural parents at the time of the
act, parental authority had not ceased nor has been relinquished by mere filing and granting of
petition for adoption
December 1987 RTC dismissed case in favor of spouses Sabas
CA dismissed petition holding that spouses Tamargo lost their right to appeal (beyond 15 day
reglementary period)

ISSUE: Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned, may be given
retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed
against the adopted child when actual custody was still with the biological parents

HELD: The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them is
based on the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that
when an unemancipated child living with his parents commits a criminal act, the parents were negligent
in the performance of their legal and natural duty to supervise the child who is in their custody and
control.

In the instant case, the shooting of the child occurred when the parental authority was still within the
spouses Bundoc. It follows that the natural parents who had then actual custody over the minor are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child,
doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for
the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable
for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The parental authority should not be regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in
the adopting parents, at the time the air rifle shooting happened so as to impose a liability upon the
adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the
adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption
where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.
In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen
and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no
physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover,
would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious
liability. No presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, could have arisen
since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

LAHOM V SIBULO G.R. NO 143989 JULY 14, 2003