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People v De Vera (accomplice)

Facts: About 1:30 in the afternoon of June 8, 1992, while bringing out the garbage, the witness, Bernardino Cacao saw a car passing by,
driven by victim Frederick Capulong together with four (4) other passengers (Edwin de Vera, Roderick Garcia Deo, Kenneth Florendo and
Elmer Castro) . He knew the victim by name who was a resident of the subdivision. He recognized and identified two of the passengers as
Kenneth Florendo and Roderick Garcia, both familiar in the subdivision. "Cacao did not at first notice anything unusual inside the car while it
passed by him, but then he heard unintelligible voices coming from the car as it was cruising around Denver Loop Street, a circular road whose
entrance and exit were through the same point. His curiosity taking the better part of him, Cacao walked to the opposite side of the road from
where he saw the car already parked. Moments later, he saw the victim dragged out of the car by Florendo and brought to a grassy place.
Florendo was holding a gun. Upon reaching the grassy spot, Florendo aimed and fired the gun at the victim, hitting him between the eyes. After
the shooting, Florendo and his companions fled in different directions. Cacao identified Garcia and pointed to appellant as among the
companions of Florendo.
Frederick Capulong suffered from 5 caliber shots in between his eyes and was stroke with the use of a baseball bat in the mouthwhich lead to
his immediate death.
The security guard reported the incident to the police and the policemen went around the subdivision to look for possible suspects. They came
upon a person wearing muddied maongpants and white t-shirt `standing and walking around' near the clubhouse of the subdivision. When
asked his name, the person identified himself as Edwin de Vera, herein appellant. Suspicious of his conduct, the policemen brought appellant
to Station 5 and turned him over to the desk officer for investigation.
Florendo and Garcia had guns, and Castro had a baseball bat. Appellant claims that he had no part in the killing, and that it was Kenneth
Florendo who had shot the victim. Moreover according to him, he heard the voices of Kenneth and his friend and they appeared to be arguing.
The voices came from some twenty-two (22) meters away. Not before long, Edwin also heard a gunshot which came from where Kenneth and
Elmer had gone to. He was shocked because he was not used to hearing gunfire. Frightened, he panicked and ran away from the place. His
singular thought while running was to get out of Filinvest.
Trial Court of Quezon City found Appellant Edwin De Vera and Accused Roderick Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and
sentencing them to reclusion perpetua, while the other two accused were at large.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant is deemed to be an accomplice or a conspirator?
Held: Appellant should be convicted only as an accomplice, not as a principal. Appellant's presence was not innocuous. Knowing that
Florendo intended to kill the victim and that the three co-accused were carrying weapons, he had acted as a lookout to watch for passersby. He
was not an innocent spectator; he was at the locus criminisin order to aid and abet the commission of the crime. These facts, however, did not
make him a conspirator; at most, he was only an accomplice.
The Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when "two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it."[17] To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three requisites: "(1) that two or more
persons came to an agreement, (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) that the execution of the felony [was]
decided upon."[18] Except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that the accused performed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy.[19] The Court has held that in most instances, direct proof of a previous agreement need not be established, for
conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of interest.[20] On the
other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons who, not being included in Article 17,[21] cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts."[22] The Court has held that an accomplice is "one who knows the criminal design
of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime would be committed just the
same." To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must be present: (1) the "community of criminal design; that is, knowing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;" and (2) the performance of previous or
simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the
criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals
have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed;
accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and
cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not
essential to the perpetration of the offense.
In the present case, Appellant De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had intended to kill Capulong at the time, and he cooperated with the
latter. But he himself did not participate in the decision to kill Capulong; that decision was made by Florendo and the others. He joined them
that afternoon after the decision to kill had already been agreed upon; he was there because "nagkahiyaan na."
"[L]ack of complete evidence of conspiracy, that creates the doubt whether they had acted as principals or accomplices in the perpetration of
the offense, impels this Court to resolve in their favor the question, by holding x x x that they were guilty of the `milder form of responsibili ty,'
i.e., guilty as mere accomplices."
WHEREFORE, the appeal was partially GRANTED. Appellant De Vera wass CONVICTED as an accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of
murder.

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