B.

Authonomy of Local Government

1) MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF
CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. &
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION,respondents

FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlunsod enacted
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the operation of casino
followed by Ordinance No. 3375-93 providing penalty
therefor. Petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically
harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution
and several decisions of this Court expressive of the
general and official disapprobation of the vice. They
invoke the State policies on the family and the proper
upbringing of the youth.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinace No. 3355 and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlunsod of Cagayan de Oro City are valid.

HELD:
NO. Petition was denied. Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals was affirmed. Local
Government Code, local government units are
authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by
law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances
should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino
gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has
the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not
competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a
casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives,
these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the
public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra
vires and void.

RATIO:
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable
issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of the
people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter,
even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal
with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own
discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling
altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit
some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever
reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,
cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices,
Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this
Court has no authority to review, much less reverse.
Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the
merits of conflicting theories.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A
long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an
ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances
should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal
governments are only agents of the national
government. Local councils exercise only delegated
legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as
the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be
superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from
which they have derived their power in the first place,
and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
PADILLA, concurring
[I]t is my considered view that the national
government (through PAGCOR) should re-examine and
re-evaluate its decision of imposing the gambling casino
on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City; for it is
abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is very
much against it, and again the question must be
seriously deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to
be realized from the casino outweigh the further
destruction of the Filipino sense of values?

DAVIDE, concurring
The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the
challenged ordinances as unconstitutional primarily
because it is in contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is
unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not necessarily
a contravention of the constitution. In any case, the
ordinances can still stand even if they be conceded as
offending P.D. No. 1869. They can be reconciled, which
is not impossible to do. So reconciled, the ordinances
should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR.



San Juan v. CSC
Facts: When the Provinicial Board Officer position was
left vacant, Rizal Governor San Juan informed Director
Abella of the Department of Budget and Management
that a certain Santos had assumed office as acting PBO
and requested Abella to endorse Santos appointment.
Abella, however recommended Almajose on the basis
of a comparative study of all MBOs which included San
Juans nominees. According to Abella, Almajose was
the most qualified since she was the only CPA among
the contenders. DMB Usec Cabuquit signed Almajoses
appointment papers upon Abellas recommendation.
Unaware of Almajoses appointment, San Juan
reiterated his request for Santos appointment in a letter
to Sec. Carague. DBM Reg. Dir. Galvez wrote San Jose
that Santos and his other recommendees did not meet
the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular
31 for the position of local budget officer and required
San Jose to submit at least three other nominees. After
finding out about Almajoses appointment San Juan
wrote Carague protesting against the said appointment
on the grounds that Cabuquit is not legally authorized to
appoint the PBO; that Almajose lacks the required three
years work experience as provided in LBC 31; and that
under EO 112, it is the Gov., not the RD or a
Congressman, who has the power to recommend
nominees for the position of PBO. DBM, through its
Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs
(BLLA) Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the
San Juan's letter-protest is not meritorious considering
that DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up
the contested position since none of the his nominees
met the prescribed requirements. San Juan then moved
for a reconsideration of the BLLA ruling. Such was
denied. He then wrote the CSC which issued
resolutions upholding Almajoses appointment.
Issue: WON the DBM can appoint anyone in the event
that the Governor recommends unqualified persons.
NO.
issue is not merely about validity of
appointment of PBO, but involves the
application of a most important constitutional
policy and principle, local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations,
one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang
and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the
scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
McKinley's Instructions: establishment of
municipal governments, natives afforded the
opportunity to manage their own local officers to
the fullest extent of which they are capable and
subject to the least degree of supervision and
control 1935 Constitution: limited the executive
power over local governments to "general
supervision . . . as may be provided by law."
Tecson v. Salas: presidential competence is not
even supervision in general, but general
supervision as may be provided by law. He
could not thus go beyond the applicable
statutory provisions, which bind and fetter his
discretion on the matter.
o Supervision goes no further than
"overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties."
o Control "means the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate had done in the performance of
their duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter."
RA 2264, "An Act Amending the Law Governing
Local Governments by Increasing Their
Autonomy and Reorganizing Local
Governments" was passed. It was followed in
1967 when Republic Act No. 5185, the
Decentralization Law was enacted, giving
"further autonomous powers to local
governments governments."
1973 Constitution: the state shall guarantee and
promote the autonomy of LGUs, especially the
barangay to ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities.
article on Local Government was incorporated
into the Constitution. It called for a LGC defining
more responsive and accountable local
government structures.
The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more
marked in the present Constitution. Article II, Section 25
on State Policies provides: Sec. 25. The State shall
ensure the autonomy of local governments The 14
sections in Article X on Local Government not only
reiterate earlier doctrines but give in greater detail the
provisions making local autonomy more meaningful.
Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Article X provide:
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions
shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a LGC which
shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum, allocate among the different
LGUs their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of
local officials, and all other matters relating to
the organization and operation of the local units.
When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the
recommending power of the Provincial Governor as
purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of
the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the
DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of
budgetary powers and ignores the right of local
governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness
in the handling of their own funds, the goal of
meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.
The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which
states:
Sec. 6.0 The DBM reserves the right to fill up
any existing vacancy where none of the
nominees of the local chief executive meet the
prescribed requirements. is ultra vires and is,
accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint
only from the list of qualified recommendees
nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified,
he must return the list of nominees to the
Governor explaining why no one meets the
legal requirements and ask for new
recommendees who have the necessary
eligibilities and qualifications.
The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM.
More important, however, is the proper administration of
fiscal affairs at the local level. Provincial and municipal
budgets are prepared at the local level and after
completion are forwarded to the national officials for
review. They are prepared by the local officials who
must work within the constraints of those budgets. They
are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all
knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed on local
governments whether or not they are relevant to local
needs and resources. It is for this reason that there
should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints,
and a harmonization of proposals from both the local
and national officials. It is for this reason that the
nomination and appointment process involves a sharing
of power between the two levels of government.
It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the
procedure followed in the appointments of Justices and
Judges. Under Article VIII of the Constitution,
nominations for judicial positions are made by the
Judicial and Bar Council. The President makes the
appointments from the list of nominees submitted to her
by the Council. She cannot apply the DBM procedure,
reject all the Council nominees, and appoint another
person whom she feels is better qualified. There can be
no reservation of the right to fill up a position with a
person of the appointing power's personal choice. The
public respondent's grave abuse of discretion is
aggravated by the fact that Director Galvez required the
Provincial Governor to submit at least three other
names of nominees better qualified
than his earlier recommendation. It was a meaningless
exercise. The appointment of the private respondent
was formalized before the Governor was extended the
courtesy of being informed that his nominee had been
rejected. The complete disregard of the local
government's prerogative and the smug belief that the
DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, and discretion are
manifest. In his classic work "Philippine Political Law"
Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that the value of local
governments as institutions of democracy is measured
by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy. Citing
Tocqueville, he stated that "local assemblies of citizens
constitute the strength of free nations. . . . A people may
establish a system of free government but without the
spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of
liberty." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Eleventh
Edition, pp. 705-706). Our national officials should not
only comply with the constitutional provisions on local
autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty
upon which these provisions are based.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA
Facts: RA 4850 was enacted creating the LLDA to
carry out environmental protection and ecology,
navigational safety, and sustainable development. PD
813 amended the RA because of the concern for the
rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs
and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined
with current and prospective uses of the lake for
municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries,
and the like. To more effectively perform the role of the
Authority, EO 927 further defined and enlarged the
functions and powers of the Authority and named and
enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region".
Section 29 of PD 813 defined the term "Laguna Lake" in
this manner: Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in
this Act, the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is
that area covered by the lake water when it is at the
average annual maximum lake level of elevation 12.50
meters, as referred to a datum 10.00 meters below
mean lower low water (M.L.L.W).
Lands located at and below such elevation are public
lands which form part of the bed of said lake.Then
came Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991. The
municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted
the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed
law gave municipal governments the exclusive
jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their
municipal waters because of R.A. 7160. Municipal
governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue
fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen
operators took advantage of the occasion to establish
fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the
Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of
July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake
water surface area, increasing the occupation
drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost
21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to
construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in
violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on
fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity.
To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore
municipalities of separate independent policies in the
operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed
territorial municipal waters in the lake and their
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already
saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby
aggravating the current environmental problems and
ecological stress of Laguna Lake. Ramos then issued
instructions that all structures in the LdB not registered
with the LLDA are illegal. Reacting thereto, the affected
fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the
Authority before various RTCs. The Authority filed
motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional
grounds. The motions to dismiss were invariably denied.
Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of
preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in Civil
Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority
from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in
question. Hence, the herein petition for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were
filed by the Authority with this court. CA: dismissed the
Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court of Appeals
holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial
agencies of government whose decision or order are
appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA
charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions
insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of
the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna
de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the LGC
of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power
to grant permits devolved to and is now vested with
their respective local government units concerned.
Issue: Which agency of the Government the Laguna
Lake Development Authority or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region should exercise
jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs
insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges
is concerned?
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850,
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813,
and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited
above, specifically provide that the Laguna
Lake Development Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
use of all surface water for any projects or
activities in or affecting the said region,
including navigation, construction, and
operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish
corrals and the like. On the other hand,
Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991, has
granted to the municipalities the exclusive
authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal
waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant
fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster,
mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry
area within a definite zone of the municipal
waters.
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No.
7160 do not necessarily repeal the
aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake
Development Authority and granting the latter
water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and
the lake region.
The LGC of 1991 does not contain any express
provision which categorically expressly repeal
the charter of the Authority. It has to be
conceded that there was no intent on the part of
the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850
and its amendments. The repeal of laws should
be made clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the
Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes
a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC
of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory
construction that the enactment of a later
legislation which is a general law cannot be
construed to have repealed a special law. It is a
well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a
special statute, provided for a particular case or
class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent
statute, general in its terms, provisions and
application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is
manifest, although the terms of the general law
are broad enough to include the cases
embraced in the special law."
Where there is a conflict between a general law
and a special statute, the special statute should
prevail since it evinces the legislative intent
more clearly than the general statute. The
special law is to be taken as an exception to the
general law in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
This is because implied repeals are not favored
and as much as possible, effect must be given
to all enactments of the legislature. A special
law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by
a subsequent general law by mere implication.
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of
the Authority should prevail over the LGC of
1991.
Considering the reasons behind the
establishment of the Authority, which are
environmental protection, navigational safety,
and sustainable development, there is every
indication that the legislative intent is for the
Authority to proceed with its mission.
We are on all fours with the manifestation of
petitioner Laguna Lake Development Authority
that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body
of water has its own unique natural ecosystem.
The 900 km lake surface water, the eight (8)
major river tributaries and several other smaller
rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km
basin or watershed transcending the
boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces,
greater portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite,
Batangas, and Quezon provinces, constitute
one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that
needs to be protected with uniform set of
policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of
attaining sustainable development. This is an
exhaustible natural resource a very limited
one which requires judicious management
and optimal utilization to ensure renewability
and preserve its ecological integrity and
balance." "Managing the lake resources would
mean the implementation of a national policy
geared towards the protection, conservation,
balanced growth and sustainable development
of the region with due regard to the
intergenerational use of its resources by the
inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors
of Republic Act 4850 haveforeseen this need
when they passed this LLDA law the special
law designed to govern the management of our
Laguna de Bay lake resources." "Laguna de
Bay therefore cannot be subjected to
fragmented concepts of management policies
where lakeshore local government units
exercise exclusive dominion over specific
portions of the lake water. The garbage thrown
or sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction
of water therefrom or construction of fishpens
by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that
specific portion but the entire 900 km of lake
water. The implementation of a cohesive and
integrated lake water resource management
policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve,
protect and sustainably develop Laguna de
Bay."
The power of the local government units to
issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for
revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact
that Section 149 of the New LGC empowering
local governments to issue fishing permits is
embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act
No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific
Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue
Raising Power Of Local Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to
grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of
effectively regulating and monitoring activities in
the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive
Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and
management. 6 It does partake of the nature of
police power which is the most pervasive, the
least limitable and the most demanding of all
State powers including the power of taxation.
Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which
embodies a valid exercise of police power
should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters
affecting Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3
of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the
proper sharing of fees collected.
**LLDA: regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to
pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease and
desist order" and on matters affecting the construction
of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense,
however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts
such that all actions against it may only be instituted
before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. On
actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions
affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in
its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.
Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the LGC of 1991, has not
repealed the provisions of the charter of the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic
Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority
has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits
for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna
de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities
situated therein and the authority to exercise
such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid
licensing authority will render nugatory its
avowed purpose of protecting and developing
the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the
abrogation of this power would render useless
its reason for being and will in effect denigrate,
if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development
Authority. This, the LGC of 1991 had never
intended to do.

Pelaez v. Auditor General
Facts: Pursuant to Sec 68 of the RAC, the President
issued EOs 93- 121, 124, and 126-129 which created
33 provinces. Pelaez instituted the present special civil
action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction,
against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as
his representatives and agents, from passing in audit
any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
said Eos and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities. Pelaez claims that RA 2370 had already
impliedly repealed Sec 68. RA 2370, Sec 3:Barrios shall
not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed except under the provisions of this Act
or by Act of Congress; All barrios existing at the time of
the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions
hereof. When RA 2370 became effective, barrios may
"not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a
majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated."
ISSUE: If the President, under this new law, cannot
even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which
is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units
of municipalities? NO.
The statutory denial of the presidential authority
to create a new barrio implies a negation of the
bigger power to create municipalities, each of
which consists of several barrios.
On delegation of legislative power:
While the power to fix such common boundary,
in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction
between adjoining municipalities, may partake
of an administrative nature involving, as it
does, the adoption of means and ways to carry
into effect the law creating said
municipalities the authority to create
municipal corporations is essentially legislative
in nature. In the language of other courts, it is
"strictly a legislative function" or "solely and
exclusively the exercise of legislative power. "
Municipal corporations are purely the creatures
of statutes.
Although Congress may delegate to another
branch of the Government the power to fill in
the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation
of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
does not meet these well settled requirements
for a valid delegation of the power to fix the
details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it
give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the
evil effects above referred to.
Schechter case: NIRA unconstitutional. It
supplies no standards for any trade, industry or
activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules
of conduct to be applied to particular states of
fact determined by appropriate administrative
procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of
conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to
prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking,
Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the
statement of the general aims of rehabilitation,
correction and expansion described in Sec. 1.
In view of the scope of that broad declaration,
and of the nature of the few restrictions that are
imposed, the discretion of the President in
approving or prescribing codes, and thus
enacting laws for the government of trade and
industry throughout the country, is virtually
unfettered. We think that the code making
authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to
vest in the President a discretion that is
"virtually unfettered." and, consequently,
tantamount to a delegation of legislative power,
it is obvious that "public welfare," which has
even a broader connotation, leads to the same
result. In fact, if the validity of the delegation of
powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there
would no longer be any legal impediment to a
statutory grant of authority to the President to
do anything which, in his opinion, may be
required by public welfare or public interest.
Such grant of authority would be a virtual
abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of
the Executive, and would bring about a total
collapse of the democratic system established
by our Constitution, which it is the special duty
and privilege of this Court to uphold.
the executive orders in question were issued
after the legislative bills for the creation of the
municipalities involved in this case had failed to
pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that
the issuance of said executive orders entails
the exercise of purely legislative functions can
hardly be given.
On the Presidents power of control: Sec 10 (1), Art. VII,
Consti: The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may
be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision
implies the right of the President to interfere in
the exercise of such discretion as may be
vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such
officers. This power is denied by the
Constitution to the Executive, insofar as
local governments are concerned.
LGUs: fundamental law permits him to wield no
more authority than that of checking whether
said local governments or the officers thereof
perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments. The President cannot interfere with
local governments, so long as the same or its
officers act Within the scope of their authority.
Upon the other hand if the President could
create a municipality, he could, in effect,
remove any of its officials, by creating a new
municipality and including therein the barrio in
which the official concerned resides, for his
office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by
merely brandishing the power to create a new
municipality (if he had it), without actually
creating it, he could compel local officials to
submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect,
exercising over them the power of control
denied to him by the Constitution.
Then, also, the power of control of the
President over executive departments, bureaus
or offices implies no more than the authority to
assume directly the functions thereof or to
interfere in the exercise of discretion by its
officials. Manifestly, such control does not
include the authority either to abolish an
executive department or bureau, or to create a
new one. As a consequence, the alleged power
of the President to create municipal
corporations would necessarily connote the
exercise by him of an authority even greater
than that of control which he has over the
executive departments, bureaus or offices. In
other words, Sec 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not merely fail to
comply with the constitutional mandate above
quoted. Instead of giving the President less
power over local governments than that vested
in him over the executive departments, bureaus
or offices, it reverses the process and does the
exact opposite, by conferring upon him more
power over municipal corporations than that
which he has over said executive departments,
bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation
of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said
Section 68, as part of the Revised
Administrative Code, approved on March 10,
1917, must be deemed repealed by the
subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in
1935, which is utterly incompatible and
inconsistent with said statutory enactment.

Drilon v. Lim
Facts: Pursuant to Sec 187, LGC
1
, the Secretary of
Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and
a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise
known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for
non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public policy. In Manilas
petition for certiorari, the Manila RTC sustained the
ordinance. It also declared Section 187 of the LGC as
unconstitutional since it vests in the Justice Secretary
the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy
of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. Justice
Secretary: It is constitutional and the procedural
requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as
specified in the LGC had indeed not been observed.
Issue: WON Sec 187 of the LGC is constitutional. YES.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice
to review only the constitutionality or legality of
the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it
on either or both of these grounds. When he
alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance,
he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure.
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila
Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his
own version of what the Code should be. He did
not pronounce the ordinance unwise or
unreasonable as basis for its annulment. He
didnot say that in his judgment it was a bad law.
What he found only was that it was illegal. All
he did in reviewing the said measure was
determine if the petitioners were performing
their functions in accordance with law, that is,
with the prescribed procedure for the enactment
of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the
city government under the LGC. As we see it,
that was an act not of control but of mere
supervision.
1. Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances
And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings.
The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and
revenue measures shall be in accordance with the
provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall
be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof;
Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality
or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be
raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity
thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a
decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of
the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not
have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the
ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or
charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30)
days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-
day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the
appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate
proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

An officer in control lays down the rules in
the doing of an act. If they are not followed,
he may, in his discretion, order the act
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he
may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority.
The supervisor or superintendent merely
sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor
does he have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed,
he may order the work done or re-done but
only to conform to the prescribed rules. He
may not prescribe his own manner for the
doing of the act. He has no judgment on
this matter except to see to it that the rules
are followed. In the opinion of the Court,
Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no
more nor less than this, and so performed
an act not of control but of mere
supervision.
Taule v. Santos cited in the decision has no
application here because the jurisdiction
claimed by the Secretary of Local
Governments over election contests in the
Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to
belong to the Commission on Elections by
constitutional provision. The conflict was
over jurisdiction, not supervision or control.
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187
appeared in the Local Autonomy Act, which
provided in its Section 2 as follows: A tax
ordinance shall go into effect on the
fifteenth day after its passage, unless the
ordinance shall provide otherwise:
Provided, however, That the Secretary of
Finance shall have authority to suspend the
effectivity of any ordinance within one
hundred and twenty days after receipt by
him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the
tax or fee therein levied or imposed is
unjust, excessive, oppressive, or
confiscatory, or when it is contrary to
declared national economy policy, and
when the said Secretary exercises this
authority the effectivity of such ordinance
shall be suspended, either in part or as a
whole, for a period of thirty days within
which period the local legislative body may
either modify the tax ordinance to meet the
objections thereto, or file an appeal with a
court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise,
the tax ordinance or the part or parts
thereof declared suspended, shall be
considered as revoked. Thereafter, the
local legislative body may not reimpose the
same tax or fee until such time as the
grounds for the suspension thereof shall
have ceased to exist.
That section allowed the Secretary of
Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax
ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee
levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory. Determination of these flaws
would involve the exercise of judgment or
discretion and not merely an examination
of whether or not the requirements or
limitations of the law had been observed;
hence, it would smack of control rather
than mere supervision. That power was
never questioned before this Court but, at
any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not
given the same latitude under Section 187.
All he is permitted to do is ascertain the
constitutionality or legality of the tax
measure, without the right to declare that,
in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive,
oppressive or confiscatory. He has no
discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary
Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code
only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion
therein of certain ultra vires provisions and
noncompliance with the prescribed
procedure in its enactment. These grounds
affected the legality, not the wisdom or
reasonableness, of the tax measure.
The issue of non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure in the enactment of
the Manila Revenue Code is another
matter. In his resolution, Secretary Drilon
declared that there were no written notices
of public hearings on the proposed Manila
Revenue Code that were sent to interested
parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the
Implementing Rules of the LGC nor were
copies of the proposed ordinance
published in three successive issues of a
newspaper of general circulation pursuant
to Art. 276(a). No minutes were submitted
to show that the obligatory public hearings
had been held. Neither were copies of the
measure as approved posted in prominent
places in the city in accordance with Sec.
511(a) of the LGC. Finally, the Manila
Revenue Code was not translated into
Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated
among the people for their information and
guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the
Code.
Judge Palattao found otherwise. He
declared that all the procedural
requirements had been observed in the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code
and that the City of Manila had not been
able to prove such compliance before the
Secretary only because hehad given it only
five days within which to gather and
present to him all the evidence (consisting
of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial
court.
To get to the bottom of this question, the
Court acceded to the motion of the
respondents and called for the elevation to
it of the said exhibits. We have carefully
examined every one of these exhibits and
agree with the trial court that the procedural
requirements have indeed been observed.
Notices of the public hearings were sent to
interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits
G-1 to 17. The minutes of the hearings are
found in Exhibits M, M- 1, M-2, and M-3.
Exhibits B and C show that the proposed
ordinances were published in the Balita
and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25,
1993, respectively, and the approved
ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5,
1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in
the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown
by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.
The only exceptions are the posting of the
ordinance as approved but this omission
does not affect its validity, considering that
its publication in three successive issues of
a newspaper of general circulation will
satisfy due process. It has also not been
shown that the text of the ordinance has
been translated and disseminated, but this
requirement applies to the approval of local
development plans and public investment
programs of the local government unit and
not to tax ordinances.

Basco v. PAGCOR
Facts: PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to
enable the Government to regulate and centralize
all games of chance authorized by existing
franchise or permitted by law. To attain its
objectives (centralize and integrate the right and
authority to operate and conduct games of chance,
generate additional revenue to fund infrastructure
and socio-civic project, expand tourism, minimize
evils prevalent in conduct and operation of
gambling clubs) PAGCOR is given territorial
jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its
Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees,
executive orders, rules and regulations,
inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed,
amended or modified.
Issues:
1. WON PD 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right
of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal
fees. NO
The City of Manila, being a mere
Municipal corporation has no inherent
right to impose taxes. Thus, "the Charter
or statute must plainly show an intent to
confer that power or the municipality
cannot assume it." Its "power to tax"
therefore must always yield to a legislative
act which is superior having been passed
upon by the state itself which has the
"inherent power to tax"
The Charter of the City of Manila is subject
to control by Congress. It should be
stressed that "municipal corporations are
mere creatures of Congress" which has the
power to "create and abolish municipal
corporations" due to its "general legislative
powers." Congress, therefore, has the
power of control over LGs. And if Congress
can grant the City of Manila the power to
tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power.
The City of Manila's power to impose
license fees on gambling, has long been
revoked. As early as 1975, the power of
LGs to regulate gambling thru the grant of
"franchise, licenses or permits" was
withdrawn by PD 771 and was vested
exclusively on the NG. Only the NG has the
power to issue "licenses or permits" for the
operation of gambling. Necessarily, the
power to demand or collect license fees
which is a consequence of the issuance of
"licenses or permits" is no longer vested in
the City of Manila.
LGs have no power to tax instrumentalities
of the NG. PAGCOR is a government
owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares
of stocks are owned by the NG. In addition
to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD
1869) it also exercises regulatory powers.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to
regulate gambling casinos. The latter role
is governmental, which places it in the
category of an agency or instrumentality of
the Government. Being an instrumentality
of the Government, PAGCOR should be
and actually is exempt from local taxes.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened,
impeded or subjected to control by a mere
LG.
The states have no power by taxation or
otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in
any manner control the operation of
constitutional laws enacted by Congress to
carry into execution the powers vested in
the federal government.--> "supremacy" of
the NG over LGs.
Holmes: absence of power on the part of
the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at
least, the instrumentalities of the United
States
mere creatures of the State can defeat
National policies thru extermination of what
local authorities may perceive to be
undesirable activities or enterprise using
the power to tax as "a tool for regulation"

2. WON the Local Autonomy Clause of the
Constitution will be violated by PD 1869. NO.

Art x Sec 5, Consti: Each LG unit shall
have the power to create its own source of
revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other
charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges
shall accrue exclusively to the LG.
power of LG to "impose taxes and fees" is
subject to "limitations" which Congress may
provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an
"operative" law until "amended, repealed or
revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987
Constitution), its "exemption clause"
remains as an exception to the exercise of
the power of LGs to impose taxes and fees.
It cannot therefore be violative but rather is
consistent with the principle of local
autonomy.
principle of local autonomy under the 1987
Constitution simply means
"decentralization." It does not make LGs
sovereign within the state or an "imperium
in imperio."
LG: political subdivision of a nation or
state which is constituted by law and
has substantial control of local affairs.
In a unitary system of government, such as
the government under the Philippine
Constitution, LGs can only be an intra
sovereign subdivision of one sovereign
nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio.
LG in such a system can only mean a
measure of decentralization of the function
of government.

Lonzanida v. COMELEC
Facts: Lonzanida was duly elected and served two
consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995
elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran
for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was
again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and
discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in
1995 was however contested by his then opponent
Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the
Regional Trial Court of Zambales, which in a
decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure
of elections. Accordingly, the office of the mayor of
the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is
hereby declared vacant. On appeal, the
COMELEC declared Alvez the duly elected mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales by plurality of votes cast
in his favor totaling 1,720 votes as against 1,488
votes for Lonzanida. On February 27, 1998 the
COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering
Lonzanida to vacate the post, which he obeyed,
and Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the
term. In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida
again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of
San Antonio. On April 21, 1998 his opponent
Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify
Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio
in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had
served three consecutive terms in the same post.
On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was
proclaimed winner. On May 21, 1998 the First
Division of the COMELEC issued the questioned
resolution granting the petition for disqualification
upon a finding that Lonzanida had served three
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and he is therefore disqualified to run for
the same post for the fourth time. The COMELEC
found that Lonzanida's assumption of office by
virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although
he was later unseated before the expiration of the
term, should be counted as service for one full
term in computing the three term limit under the
Constitution and the LGC. The finding of the
COMELEC First Division was affirmed by the
COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated August
11, 1998.
Issue:
1) WON Lonzanida's assumption of office as
mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May
1995 to March 1998 may be considered as
service of one full term for the purpose of
applying the three-term limit for elective local
government officials.
Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides:
The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law shall be three years and
no such officials shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected.
Sec. 43 of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160)
restates the same rule: No local elective
official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
The records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission show that the three-term limit
which is now embodied in section 8, Art. X
of the Constitution was initially proposed to
be an absolute bar to any elective local
government official from running for the
same position after serving three
consecutive terms. The said disqualification
was primarily intended to forestall the
accumulation of massive political power by
an elective local government official in a
given locality in order to perpetuate his
tenure in office. The delegates also
considered the need to broaden the
choices of the electorate of the candidates
who will run for office, and to infuse new
blood in the political arena by disqualifying
officials from running for the same office
after a term of nine years. The mayor was
compared by some delegates to the
President of the Republic as he is a
powerful chief executive of his political
territory and is most likely to form a political
dynasty. The drafters however, recognized
and took note of the fact that some local
government officials run for office before
they reach forty years of age; thus to
perpetually bar them from running for the
same office after serving nine consecutive
years may deprive the people of qualified
candidates to choose from. As finally voted
upon, it was agreed that an elective local
government official should be barred from
running for the same post after three
consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least
one term, he may again run for the same
office.
Borja Case: This Court held that the two
conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: 1) that the
official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and 2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms. It stated:
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective
local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.
It is not disputed that the petitioner was
previously elected and served two
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio
Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral
elections. In the May 1995 elections he
again ran for mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He
assumed office and discharged the rights
and duties of mayor until March 1998 when
he was ordered to vacate the post by
reason of the COMELEC decision dated
November 13, 1997 on the election protest
against the petitioner which declared his
opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected
mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served the
remaining portion of the 1995-1998
mayoral term.
The two requisites for the application of the
three term rule are absent. - - First, the
petitioner cannot be considered as having
been duly elected to the post in the May
1995 elections, and second, the petitioner
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office. After a re-
appreciation and revision of the contested
ballots the COMELEC itself declared by
final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost
in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his
previous proclamation as winner was
declared null and void. His assumption of
office as mayor cannot be deemed to have
been by reason of a valid election but by
reason of a void proclamation. It has been
repeatedly held by this court that a
proclamation subsequently declared void is
no proclamation at all 5 and while a
proclaimed candidate may assume office
on the strength of the proclamation of the
Board of Canvassers he is only a
presumptive winner who assumes office
subject to the final outcome of the election
protest. 6 Petitioner Lonzanida did not
serve a term as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998
because he was not duly elected to the
post; he merely assumed office as
presumptive winner, which presumption
was later overturned by the COMELEC
when it decided with finality that Lonzanida
lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed
to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term
because he was ordered to vacate his post
before the expiration of the term. The
respondents' contention that the petitioner
should be deemed to have served one full
term from May 1995-1998 because he
served the greater portion of that term has
no legal basis to support it; it disregards the
second requisite for the application of the
disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served
three consecutive terms. The second
sentence of the constitutional provision
under scrutiny states, "Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term
for which he was elected. "The clear intent
of the framers of the constitution to bar any
attempt to circumvent the three-term limit
by a voluntary renunciation of office and at
the same time respect the people's choice
and grant their elected official full service of
a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the
three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. The petitioner vacated his post a
few months before the next mayoral
elections, not by voluntary renunciation but
in compliance with the legal process of writ
of execution issued by the COMELEC to
that effect. Such involuntary severance
from office is an interruption of continuity of
service and thus, the petitioner did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
Petitioner was not the duly elected mayor
and that he did not hold office for the full
term; hence, his assumption of office from
1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as
a term for purposes of computing the three
term limit. The Resolution of the
COMELEC finding him disqualified on
thisground to run in the May 1998 mayoral
elections should therefore be set aside.
2) WON the delay in resolving the election protest
between petitioner and his then opponent
Alvez which took roughly about three years
and resultantly extended the petitioners
incumbency in an office to which he was not
lawfully elected.
Such delay cannot be imputed to the
petitioner. There is no specific allegation
nor proof that the delay was due to any
political maneuvering on his part to prolong
his stay in office. Moreover, protestant
Alvez, was not without legal recourse to
move for the early resolution of the election
protest while it was pending before the
regional trial court or to file a motion for the
execution of the regional trial court's
decision declaring the position of mayor
vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to
assume office while the appeal was
pending with the COMELEC. Such delay
which is not here shown to have
intentionally sought by the petitioner to
prolong his stay in office cannot serve as
basis to bar his right to be elected and to
serve his chosen local government post in
the succeeding mayoral election.
3) WON the COMELEC ceased to have
jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification
after he was proclaimed winner.
The instant petition for disqualification was
filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May
1998 elections and was resolved on May
21, 1998 or after the petitioner's
proclamation. It was held in the case of
Sunga vs. COMELEC and Trinidad that the
proclamation nor the assumption of office
of a candidate against whom a petition for
disqualification is pending before the
COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC
of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case
and to resolve it on the merits.
Sec. 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates
that: any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the court
or commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong.
This court held that the clear legislative
intent is that the COMELEC should
continue the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case to its conclusion i.e.,
until judgment is rendered. The outright
dismissal of the petition for disqualification
filed before the election but which remained
unresolved after the proclamation of the
candidate sought to be disqualified will
unduly reward the said candidate and may
encourage him to employ delaying tactics
to impede the resolution of the petition until
after he has been proclaimed. The fact that
Trinidad was already proclaimed and had
assumed the position of mayor did not
divest the COMELEC of authority and
jurisdiction to continue the hearing and
eventually decide the disqualification case.
Aguam v. COMELEC: Time and again this
Court has given its imprimatur on the
principle that COMELEC is with authority to
annul any canvass and proclamation which
was illegally made. The fact that a
candidate proclaimed has assumed office,
we have said, is no bar to the exercise of
such power. It of course may not be availed
of where there has been a valid
proclamation. Since private respondent's
petition before the COMELEC is precisely
directed at the annulment of the canvass
and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry
into this issue is within the area allocated
by the Constitution and law to
COMELEC . . . Really, were a victim of a
proclamation to be precluded from
challenging the validity thereof after that
proclamation and the assumption of office
thereunder, baneful effects may easily
supervene.
Purpose of a disqualification proceeding :
to prevent the candidate from running or, if
elected, from serving, or to prosecute him
for violation of the election laws. Obviously,
the fact that a candidate has been
proclaimed elected does not signify that his
disqualification is deemed condoned and
may no longer be the subject of a separate
investigation.

Adormeo v. COMELEC
Facts: Adormeo and Talaga were the only
candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy
for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001
elections. Talaga was then the incumbent mayor.
Talaga was elected mayor in May 1992. He served
the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-
1998. In the election of 1998, he lost to Tagarao.
In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again
won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao
until June 30, 2001. On March 2, 2001, Adormeo
filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
and/or Disqualification of Talaga on the ground
that the latter was elected and had served as city
mayor for three (3) consecutive terms as follows:
(1) in the election of May 1992, where he served
the full term; (2) in the election of May 1995, where
he again served the full term; and, (3) in the recall
election of May 12, 2000, where he served only
the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to
Tagarao in the 1998 election. Petitioner contended
that Talagas candidacy as Mayor constituted a
violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution which provides that the term of office
of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was
elected. Talaga responded that he was not elected
City Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms but only
for two (2) consecutive terms. He pointed to his
defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because
of his defeat the consecutiveness of his years as
mayor was interrupted, and thus his mayorship
was not for three consecutive terms of three years
each. Respondent added that his service from May
12, 2001 until June 30, 2001 for 13 months and
eighteen (18) days was not a full term, in the
contemplation of the law and the Constitution.
The COMELEC found Talaga disqualified for the
position of city mayor on the ground that he had
already served three (3) consecutive terms, and
his Certificate of Candidacy was ordered
withdrawn and/or cancelled. MR reversed
COMELEC ruling and held that 1) respondent was
not elected for three (3) consecutive terms
because he did not win in the May 11, 1998
elections; 2) that he was installed only as mayor by
reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that
his victory in the recall elections was not
considered a term of office and is not included in
the 3-term disqualification rule, and 4) that he did
not fully serve the three (3) consecutive terms, and
his loss in the May 11, 1998 elections is
considered an interruption in the continuity of his
service as Mayor of Lucena City. On May 19, 2001,
after canvassing, private respondent was
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Lucena
City.
Issue: WON COMELEC Talaga is qualified to run
forMayor in Lucena City for the 2001 elections.
Petitioner contends that private respondent
was disqualified to run for city mayor by
reason of the three-term rule because the
unexpired portion of the term of office he
served after winning a recall election,
covering the period May 12, 2000 to June
30, 2001 is considered a full term. He
posits that to interpret otherwise, private
respondent would be serving four (4)
consecutive terms of 10 years, in violation
of Section 8, Article X of 1987
Constitution[4] and Section 43 (b) of R.A.
7160, known as the LGC.
Private respondent, in turn, maintains that
his service as city mayor of Lucena is not
consecutive. He lost his bid for a second
re-election in 1998 and between June 30,
1998 to May 12, 2000, during Tagaraos
incumbency, he was a private citizen, thus
he had not been mayor for 3 consecutive
terms.
In its comment, the COMELEC restated its
position that private respondent was not
elected for three (3) consecutive terms
having lost his third bid in the May 11, 1998
elections, said defeat is an interruption in
the continuity of service as city mayor of
Lucena.
Borja Case: Case No. 2. Suppose B is
elected mayor and, during his first term, he
is twice suspended for misconduct for a
total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after
that, can he run for one more term in the
next election? Yes, because he has served
only two full terms successively. To
consider C as eligible for reelection would
be in accord with the understanding of the
Constitutional Commission that while the
people should be protected from the evils
that a monopoly of political power may
bring about, care should be taken that their
freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
Lonzanida Case: Two conditions for the
application of the disqualification must
concur: a) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post and 2) that
he has fully served three consecutive terms.
COMELECs ruling that private respondent
was not elected for three (3) consecutive
terms should be upheld. For nearly two
years he was a private citizen. The
continuity of his mayorship was disrupted
by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
Patently untenable is petitioners contention
that COMELEC in allowing respondent
Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998 election
violates Article X, Section 8 of 1987
Constitution.
To bolster his case, respondent adverts to
the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a
Constitutional Commission member, stating
that in interpreting said provision that if
one is elected representative to serve the
unexpired term of another, that unexpired,
no matter how short, will be considered one
term for the purpose of computing the
number of successive terms allowed. As
pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr.
Bernas comment is pertinent only to
members of the House of Representatives.
Unlike local government officials, there is
no recall election provided for members of
Congress.
Neither can respondents victory in the
recall election be deemed a violation of
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as
voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not.
In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said: The
second sentence of the constitutional
provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term
for which he was elected. The clear intent
of the framers of the constitution to bar any
attempt to circumvent the three-term limit
by a voluntary renunciation of office and at
the same time respect the peoples choice
and grant their elected official full service of
a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the
three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. The petitioner vacated his post a
few months before the next mayoral
elections, not by voluntary renunciation but
in compliance with the legal process of writ
of execution issued by the COMELEC to
that effect. Such involuntary severance
from office is an interruption of continuity of
service and thus, the petitioner did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.