Supreme Court of the United States

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137; 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the order in which the court has viewed this subject, the following questions have been considered and decided.
1. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?
2. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?
3. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court?
. . . It is . . . the opinion of the court,
That, by signing the commission of Mr. Marbury, the President of the United States appointed him a justice of peace,
for the county of Washington in the District of Columbia; and that the seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the
Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment;
and that the appointment conferred on him a legal right to the office for the space of five years.
That, having this legal title to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which, is a
plain violation of that right, for which the laws of this country afford him a remedy.
It remains to be enquired whether,
3. He is entitled to the remedy for which applies. This depends on,
1. The nature of the writ applied for and
2. The power of this court.
. . . This, then, is a plain case for mandamus, either to deliver the commission, or a copy of it from the record; and it
only remains to be enquired, whether it can issue from this court.
The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the Supreme Court "to issue writs of mandamus
in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the
authority of the United States."
The Secretary of State, being a person holding an office under the authority of the United States, is precisely within the
letter of the description and if this court is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be
because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore absolutely incapable of conferring the authority, and assigning the
duties which its words purport to confer and assign.
The Constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as
Congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the
laws of the United States; and, consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the right
claimed is given by a law of the United States.
In the distribution of this power it is declared that "the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases,
the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction."
It has been insisted at the bar, that, as the original grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme and inferior courts, is general,
and the clause assigning original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court contains no negative or restrictive words, the power
remains to the legislature to assign original jurisdiction to that court in other cases than those specified in the article
which has been recited; provided those cases belong to the judicial power of the United States.
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the
Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded
further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of
the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate
jurisdiction, where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution is form without
substance.
Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a
negative or exclusive sense must be given to them, or they have no operation at all.
It cannot he presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a
construction is inadmissible unless the words require it.
. . . To enable this court, then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to
be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and that, if it be the
will of the legislature that a mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This is true, yet the
jurisdiction must be appellate, not original.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already
instituted, and does not create that cause. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue
such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is in effect the same as to sustain an original action for that paper,
and, therefore, seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction. Neither is it necessary, in such a case as
this, to enable the court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.
The authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to
issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the Constitution; and it becomes necessary
to inquire whether a jurisdiction so conferred can be exercised.
The question, whether an act repugnant to the Constitution can become the law of the land, is a question deeply
interesting to the United States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to
recognize certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it.
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall
most conduce to their own happiness is the basis on which the whole American fabric had been erected. The exercise
of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated. The principles,
therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can
seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their respective powers.
It may either stop here, or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the legislature are defined and limited;
and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers
limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by
those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished
if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of
equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the Constitution controls any legislative act
repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the Constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The Constitution is either a superior paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when
the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law: if the latter
part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the people to limit a power in its own
nature illimitable.
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation, and consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is, consequently, to be considered by this court as one
of the fundamental principles of our society. It is not therefore to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this
subject.
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts,
and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it
was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem at first view, an
absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more attentive consideration.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts
must decide on the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the Constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that
the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution; or conformably to the
Constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is
of the very essence of judicial duty.
If, then, the courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature,
the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
Those, then, who controvert the principle that the Constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are
reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution, and see only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It would declare that an act which,
according to the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void, is yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It
would declare that if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express
prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same
breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits and declaring that those
limits may be passed at pleasure.
That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions a written
constitution would of itself be sufficient, in America, where written constitutions have been viewed with so much
reverence, for rejecting the construction. But the peculiar expressions of the Constitution of the United States furnish
additional arguments in favor of its rejection.
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the Constitution.
Could it be the intention of those who gave this power to say that, in using it, the Constitution should not be looked
into? That a case arising under the Constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under which it
rises?
This is too extravagant to be maintained.
In some cases then, the Constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are
they forbidden to read or to obey?
There are many other parts of the Constitution which serve to illustrate this subject.
It is declared that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state." Suppose a duty on the export of
cotton, of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought judgment to be rendered in such a case? Ought
the judges to close their eyes on the Constitution, and see only the law?
The Constitution declares that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."
If, however, such a bill should be passed and a person should be prosecuted under it; must the court condemn to death
those victims who the Constitution endeavours to preserve?
"No person," says the Constitution, "shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the
same overt act, or on confession in open court."
Here the language of the Constitution is addressed especially to the courts. It prescribes, directly for them, a rule of
evidence not to be departed from. If the legislature should change that rule, and declare one witness, or a confession
out of court, sufficient for conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the legislative act?
From these, and many other selections which might be made, it is apparent that the framers of the Constitution
contemplated that instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.
Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath certainly applies in an especial manner
to their conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as the
instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to support?
The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is completely demonstrative of the legislative opinion on this
subject. It is in these words: "I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal
right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as ,
according to the best of my abilities and understanding agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States."
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the Constitution of the United States, if that Constitution
forms no rule for his government? If it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him?
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or take this oath, becomes equally a
crime.
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation that, in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land,
the Constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall he
made in pursuance of the Constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void; and that courts,
as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
The rule must be
Discharged.














Marbury v. Madison Case Brief Summary

Facts
On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court
justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take
control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later
became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the
expiration of Adamss term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were
invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adamss term.
William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to
the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jeffersons Secretary of State, James
Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
to issue writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United
States.
Issues
1. Does Marbury have a right to the commission?
2. Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
3. Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void?
4. Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III
of the Constitution?
5. Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
1. Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.

The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executives constitutional power of appointment has
been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the
power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President
Adams.
2. Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of
government is to afford that protection.

Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the
individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing
the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United
States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the
completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission,
a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.
3. Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void.

It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court
must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to
any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which
they both apply.
4. No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified
in Article III of the Constitution.

The Constitution states that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to
apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, this
section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court
appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original
jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the
Constitution, is form without substance.
5. No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.

To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to
be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already
instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to
issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for
that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.
Disposition
Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesnt get the commission.










Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance
of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the
National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of
the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE
HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere
presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean,
como por la presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed
after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be
declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said
position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid
protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution
No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the
election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the
accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the
prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest
against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer
to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said election
contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the National
Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive
jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for decision and to
matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the
National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of
article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under
section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral
Commission interposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935,
fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted
it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the power and functions
conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936,
overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself with
jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a
an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is
beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the members
of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not deprive the
electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the time that might
be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the Constitution
as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board,
or person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition
would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting
forth the following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there was
no existing law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of the National
Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against the
election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly
conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9,
1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and
over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not
reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of
its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests should be
filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-
judicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board
or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the
provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of
section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions
to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united
States) has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the
issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was denied
"without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However, the question of
jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case prim impressionis, it
would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it
undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the
question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under
our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws.
This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President
to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has
also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments
is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to
the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the
judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And
the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions
and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off
and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are
apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression
of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a
harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided
in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if
the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment,
and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in
our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak
of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than
one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from
section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such
powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments;
it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after
full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution
but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to
be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional
liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to
mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis,
then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and
hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the
herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on
December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National
Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of
cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral
Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the
Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then
the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests
against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the
National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the
republican government established in our country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional
organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral
Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under
the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the
judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional
government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted
and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American example,
provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the
fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct
prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of
1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The
former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect,
courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia
(arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain
(arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass
upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were
we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left
undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long
run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so
must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the
opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second proposition and
determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution
of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein
petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able
counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party
having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is imperative,
therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its
framers and the people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule
that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from
clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of
the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18,
par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein
specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919],
39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested elections to the
legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the
Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation
of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but also against the election of executive officers
for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against
specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed
of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest
corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to be presided over by
the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside. The foregoing
proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934,
with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two
senators to be designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated
one each from the two major parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive
department in the persons of two representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on
September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting the election
of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three
members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of votes therein, three elected by
the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the
Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to
create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral
Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect to
the composition of the Electoral Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a
unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934,
reads as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting
the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members
elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the
members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike
out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly shall
be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following
illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of
the said draft:
x x x x x x x x x
Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines,
paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and qualification of
the member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is
why the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election of a
member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election
of those whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of
Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not
constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient,
unless his election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the auditor,
in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What happens with
regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The municipal council does
this: it makes a canvass and proclaims in this case the municipal council proclaims who has been elected,
and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part of the Electoral
Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the gentleman from
Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another who was declared elected. From example, in a
case when the residence of the man who has been elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the man
who has been elected is in question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers
upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral
Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of
the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte
when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz. This paragraph
6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first part of the sections
which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already included in
the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections" was inserted
merely for the sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the
elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the assembly,
the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and qualification of its
members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of
the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him for
that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the eligibility of
its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and make
the question before the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not
contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and authority to
pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though that question has not
been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response to an amendment
introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference
between the original draft and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:
x x x x x x x x x
Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios
Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar
tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la
enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases
contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos
en que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon
the following interpellation also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la
Corte Suprema, no cree Su Seoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del
Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la
cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria
como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.
x x x x x x x x x
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to decide contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to the National Assembly itself,
was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the representation
of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to accord more
representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against
forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly shall
be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest
number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second
largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated
by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated
by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of
votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be
the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President
Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating to"
between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections", which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislature long
lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere
experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account
of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition of contests by the House of
Commons in the following passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14,
1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the
determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of the standing committees
appointed at the commencement of each session, was denominated the committee of privileges and
elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate all questions of this description which might be
referred to them, and to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to
time. When an election petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses and
other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the form of
resolutions, which were considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding
was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court was adopted, the case was heard and decided
by the house, in substantially the same manner as by a committee. The committee of privileges and elections
although a select committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a select committee was
usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the
members named was required to be present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the
committee and vote if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of membership gradually
assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had
been tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere party questions, upon which the strength of
contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks
upon his government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election.
Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every principle of
decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house
were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters,
and in questions of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of
the house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained
the unanimous leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns
of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville
alluded to the existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective
causes, the principal dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is scandalously
notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly
self-elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own
inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election, many members of this house, who are
ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as parties in the
contention, and take upon themselves the partial management of the very business, upon which they should
determine with the strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with
the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the
celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of
the nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the security of the constitution, that was ever
devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success
of the remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the information of a judgement,
which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not been entirely
confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief
justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James
Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an essential alteration of the
constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most important rights and jurisdictions of the
house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of the
controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court
of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the
practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as
amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal
Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22];
Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally
heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth
of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court.
In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the election of members of the Upper House of the Diet
are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of
Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the
authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of
deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the
Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art.
43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is
by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number
of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision
for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37,
pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members
elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the
four designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting
separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this regard,
judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body on the part of the Supreme Court
(Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913]
Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men mature in
years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other
countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional
organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own
experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the
Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant.
Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove
stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the
constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the
people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all
the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary
constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body
known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority
parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with
judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and
execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our
tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the
provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of
the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in
the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of
that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express
prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1).
If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of
the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should
be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be
invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only
would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be
frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad
spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of
cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and
whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the
framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will
inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by
indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance
and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a coordinate department of the
government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited
power of the commission in the admission of protests against members of the National Assembly. But as we have
pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative
in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of
construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol.
I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the
proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its
regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace
of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession
of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been
committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial,
and must be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not
intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission
reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they
have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government
were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own
particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in
accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these
constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human
institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of
its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in
appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations of equitable
character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The
Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the
provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened on
November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved
by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was
formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and
approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protest. When, therefore, the National
Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National
Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been
organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives division of the
National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the
Supreme Court the six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively
designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested
elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of
protests, the result would be that the National Assembly on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power
of regulation in such cases had already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had
time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive
jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom no
protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the
time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of
confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests was
still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral
Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said
election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no
protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the
respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can
discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is
sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said
body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United States,
confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election
officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the
time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2,
secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections where the decision is adverse to the
claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker
of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required
to enter the same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of
a writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict.,
c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular house itself is generally
regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and Practice of
Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the
time when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section
18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the election, return and qualifications of its members, as well
as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the time and
manner of filing contest in the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its
rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns
of such members against whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as
cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs.
Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu],
Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 637-
640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 1121, 1122;
Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The
Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been
impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contest relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for
the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions which authorized the National
Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the
election of its members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through
the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of
power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult
the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the
conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends
the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions
to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the
legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with
respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral
Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete,
and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the
time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional
organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National
Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said
contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each
house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its
elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the
time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the
adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had
been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental
power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the National
Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of
the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in
any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional
creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it
unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person
within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.


Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur in the result and in most of the views so ably expressed in the preceding opinion. I am, however, constrained
to withhold my assent to certain conclusions therein advanced.
The power vested in the Electoral Commission by the Constitution of judging of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, is judicial in nature. (Thomas vs. Loney, 134 U.S.,
372; 33 Law. ed., 949, 951.) On the other hand, the power to regulate the time in which notice of a contested election
may be given, is legislative in character. (M'Elmoyle vs. Cohen, 13 Pet., 312; 10 Law. ed., 177; Missouri vs. Illinois, 200
U. S. 496; 50 Law. ed., 572.)
It has been correctly stated that the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of
the separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial. Legislative power is vested in the National Assembly.
(Article VI, sec. 1.) In the absence of any clear constitutional provision to the contrary, the power to regulate the time
in which notice of a contested election may be given, must be deemed to be included in the grant of legislative power
to the National Assembly.
The Constitution of the United States contains a provision similar to the that found in Article VI, section 4, of the
Constitution of the Philippines. Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the United States provides that each house of
the Congress shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members. Notwithstanding this
provision, the Congress has assumed the power to regulate the time in which notice of a contested election may be
given. Thus section 201, Title 2, of the United States Code Annotated prescribes:
Whenever any person intends to contest an election of any Member of the House of Representatives of the
United States, he shall, within thirty days after the result of such election shall have been determined by the
officer or board of canvassers authorized by law to determine the same, give notice, in writing, to the Member
whose seat he designs to contest, of his intention to contest the same, and, in such notice, shall specify
particularly the grounds upon which he relies in the contest. (R. S., par. 105.)
The Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law, also contained a provision to the effect that the
Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications
of their elective members. Notwithstanding this provision, the Philippine Legislature passed the Election Law, section
478 of which reads as follows:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall by resolution respectively prescribe the time and manner
of filing contest in the election of members of said bodies, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party,
and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and shall fix the costs and expenses of contest which may be paid
from their respective funds.
The purpose sought to be attained by the creation of the Electoral Commission was not to erect a body that would be
above the law, but to raise legislative elections contests from the category of political to that of justiciable questions.
The purpose was not to place the commission beyond the reach of the law, but to insure the determination of such
contests with the due process of law.
Section 478 of the Election Law was in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, Article XV, section 2, of
which provides that
All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until
amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution.
The manifest purpose of this constitutional provision was to insure the orderly processes of government, and to
prevent any hiatus in its operations after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. It was thus
provided that all laws of the Philippine Islands shall remain operative even after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, unless inconsistent with the Constitution, and that all references in such laws to the
government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the government
and corresponding officials under the Constitution. It would seem to be consistent not only with the spirit but the letter
of the Constitution to hold that section 478 of the Election Law remains operative and should now be construed to
refer to the Electoral Commission, which, in so far as the power to judge election contests is concerned, corresponds to
either the Senate or the House of Representative under the former regime. It is important to observe in this connection
that said section 478 of the Election Law vested the power to regulate the time and manner in which notice of a
contested election may be given, not in the Philippine Legislature but in the Senate and House of Representatives
singly. In other words, the authority to prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in the elections of members of
the Philippine Legislature was by statute lodged separately in the bodies clothed with power to decide such contests.
Construing section 478 of the Election Law to refer to the National Assembly, as required by Article XV, section 2, of the
Constitution, it seems reasonable to conclude that the authority to prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in
the election of members of the National Assembly is vested in the Electoral Commission, which is now the body clothed
with power to decide such contests.
In the light of what has been said, the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, could not have the
effect of barring the right of the respondent Pedro Ynsua to contest the election of the petitioner. By the same token,
the Electoral Commission was authorized by law to adopt its resolution of December 9, 1935, which fixed the time with
in which written contests must be filed with the commission.
Having been filed within the time fixed by its resolutions, the Electoral Commission has jurisdiction to hear and
determine the contest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the petitioner Jose A. Angara.
























63 Phil. 139 Political Law Judicial Review Electoral Commission

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for
the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7,
1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took
his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the
election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8,
1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On
Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation,
Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC
can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the
SC.

ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only
constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies,
and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to
execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the government.

That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.






















EN BANC
[G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003]
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-
intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,petitioner-
in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE
G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents, J AIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
[G.R. No. 160262. November 10, 2003]
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-
ABAD, petitioners, ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO
QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.,petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE
G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-
intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
[G.R. No. 160263. November 10, 2003]
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention, vs. FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N.
SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
[G.R. No. 160277. November 10, 2003]
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO,
JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-
LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE,
ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-
JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE
CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO
SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO
BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO
BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO
TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS
NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN
PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH
DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS
ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN
DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO,
ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA,
ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR.,
JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA,
ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS,
RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents, JAIME
N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
[G.R. No. 160292. November 10, 2003]
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES,
ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.
MALLARI, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO
P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N.
SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
[G.R. No. 160295. November 10, 2003]
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners, WORLD WAR II
VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO
Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
[G.R. No. 160310. November 10, 2003]
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS,
RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE,
LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO
CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN
VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO,
MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR.
BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO
BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA,
SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO
LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND
NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO
GALLOR, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY
HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
[G.R. No. 160318. November 10, 2003]
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners, vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160342. November 10, 2003]
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160343. November 10, 2003]
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE
G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE
FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160360. November 10, 2003]
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER,
AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160365. November 10, 2003]
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ,
GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON,
ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-
ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF
OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA
AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP
OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE
IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.
DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
[G.R. No. 160370. November 10, 2003]
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE,
THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160376. November 10, 2003]
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO,
IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT
AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA,respondents.
[G.R. No. 160392. November 10, 2003]
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160397. November 10, 2003]
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
[G.R. No. 160403. November 10, 2003]
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160405. November 10, 2003]
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON,
PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD
MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU,
YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL
LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
[CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,
[MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE
ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF
CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO,
PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO-MORALES, J .:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly
irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of the
nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the
means and bases for its resolution.
Our nations history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of
the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the
legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our
countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the
instant petitions whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and
whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more
truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues
which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared
resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its
resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial
branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part
of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by
the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without
destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to
insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of
interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting,
interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in
the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from
such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each
Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold
any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12
th
Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House
Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment
Rules
[1]
approved by the 11
th
Congress. Therelevant distinctions between these two Congresses House
Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:

11
TH
CONGRESS RULES 12
TH
CONGRESS NEW RULES
RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT



Section 2. Mode of Initiating
Impeachment. Impeachment shall
be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by
any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House.



RULE V
BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF
IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE
SAME OFFICIAL

Section 16. Impeachment
Proceedings Deemed I nitiated.
In cases where a Member of
the House files a verified
complaint of impeachment or a
citizen files a verified complaint
that is endorsed by a Member of
the House through a resolution
of endorsement against an
impeachable
officer,impeachment
proceedings against such official
aredeemed initiated on the day
the Committee on Justice finds
that the verified complaint
and/or resolution against such
official,as the case may be, is
sufficient in substance, or on the
date the House votes to overturn
or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified
complaint and/or resolution, as
the case may be, is not sufficient
in substance.
In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed,
as the case may be, by at least
one-third (1/3) of the Members of
the House,impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with
the Secretary General.

RULE V
BAR AGAINST
IMPEACHMENT

Section 14. Scope of Bar. No
impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more
than once within the period of one (1)
year.



Section 17. Bar Against I nitiation
Of I mpeachment Proceedings. Within
a period of one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated as provided in Section 16
hereof, no impeachment proceedings,
as such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
[2]
sponsored by Representative
Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
[3]

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
[4]
(first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices
[5]
of this
Court for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.
[6]
The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen,
[7]
and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003
[8]
in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from
such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice

ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
sufficient in form,
[9]
but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.
[10]
To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint
[11]
was filed with the Secretary General of the House
[12]
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
(First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
[13]

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional
impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12
th
Congress,
[14]
posits that his right to
bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the
capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28,
2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections
5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing
respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the
Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of
Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court
permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that
the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the
issuance of a writ perpetually prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ perpetually prohibiting
respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment
against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers,
lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition
involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on
the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from
conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he
has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG
[15]
and Chavez v. PEA-Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation,
[16]
prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment
complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal
profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives
from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and
respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M.
Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring
that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected
against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers money and that they have an obligation to protect the
Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that it is instituted as a class suit and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second
impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this
Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the
second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and
agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers,
and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in
their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and
the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine
Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a
taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to
enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code
of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be
declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding
with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for
Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v.
Factoran
[17]
which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ
prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the
second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment
complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the
Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his
petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine
Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court
and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ
prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the
Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition
that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were
absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of
Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF).
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that as
professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their
students, pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the
Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging
that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development
Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive
jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition To Declare Complaint Null and Void for
Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of
the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be
declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles
of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of
Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of
endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and
(2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be
prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen
which were filed before this Court,
[18]
prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No.
160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October
28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that
House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the
JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the
constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put
forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried
because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,
[19]
and as reflected above, to date, the
Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse
themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed
him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003,
resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as
well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c)
set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal
experts as amici curiae.
[20]
In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain thestatus
quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that
would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De
Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting
that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is
an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its
constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel,
Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)
[21]
and Comment, praying that the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the
impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the
respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution.
[22]

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them
with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a
Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in
law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before
it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt
of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain
exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a Petition for Leave to Intervene in G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on
October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a constitutional
deadlock and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial
determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No.
160262 a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in
Intervention.
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentels Comment and Attorneys
Macalintal and Quadras Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners,
intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal
issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what
time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) Houses exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senates sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as
well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this
Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the
power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the
essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the
substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
J udicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine
the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Courts power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1,
Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis
supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the
definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission
[23]
after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose
provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par.
2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten
or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of
their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a
harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in
the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable
if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions
of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution,the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of
its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one
and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section
2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of
such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does
not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of
the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.
[24]
(Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this moderating power to determine the proper allocation of powers
of the different branches of government and to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels is inherent in all courts
[25]
as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is the
power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.
[26]

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the
courts by its Constitution, such power has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than
one and a half centuries. To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison
[27]
that the
power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land,
the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be
made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and
that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
[28]
(Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the
power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.
[29]
And as
pointed out by noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,
[30]
the
executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial
review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws
or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,
[31]
judicial review is indeed an integral component of the
delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers,
forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for
the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with
the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
[32]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, x x x judicial review is
essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries
of authority and control between them.
[33]
To him, [j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that balancing operation.
[34]

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by any branch
or instrumentalities of government, the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves,
for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called expanded certiorari jurisdiction of this
Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech
of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
x x x
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of
fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal
defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence,
certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of
political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set
up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: Well, since it is political, we have no authority to
pass upon it. The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved.
It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x
x x x
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well
as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
[35]
(Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to
the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land
Tenure Administration,
[36]
this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but
that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyers document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptanceand negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the
need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
[37]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
[38]
in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it
has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of
the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to
that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
[39]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue
[40]
where, speaking through Madame Justice
Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.
The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
[41]
(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus,
in Chiongbian v. De Leon,
[42]
this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution
merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted
subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance
and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.
[43]
(Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
[44]
this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be
separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject
are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render
every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.
[45]
(Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In
still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk,
much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.
[46]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of
the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel
raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of
judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political
action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage
of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.
[47]

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senates sole power to try impeachment
cases
[48]
(1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the
Senates power to determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.
[49]

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of
judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on
American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.
[50]
Thus, they
contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs
counter to the framers decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes;
it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the
judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.
[51]
Respondents likewise point
to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of
impeachment.
Respondents and intervenors reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and
American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senates sole power to try and
decide impeachment cases, as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total
exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment
process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious
application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit
insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,
[52]
[i]n
resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which
are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and
needs.
[53]
Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their
paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, [w]e have cut the
umbilical cord.
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S.
Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedlygranted to the U.S. Supreme Court
and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly
provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded
definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch
or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with
respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation,
[54]
our
Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment
cases,
[55]
provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4)
and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the
one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may
also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial
statesmanship on the principle that whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people
expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride.
[56]

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr,
[57]
judicially discoverable standards for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion,
through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez
[58]
and Alejandrino v. Quezon,
[59]
cited by respondents in support of the
argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases
concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts,
and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,
[60]
this Court ruled that it is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v.
Angara,
[61]
in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the
Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty
of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,
[62]
this Court declared null and void a resolution of
the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as
a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,
[63]
it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,
[64]
it held that the act
of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject
to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,
[65]
it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is
vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,
[66]
it ruled that confirmation by the
National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not
essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the
National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another.
[67]
Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts power of judicial review, like almost all
powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing
to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of
the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.
[68]
(Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[69]

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have
standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus
curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in
the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount
public interest
[70]
and transcendental importance,
[71]
and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need
to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of
the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.
[72]
Amicus
curiaeDean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental
importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate
his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot
himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the
former is a concept of civil procedure
[73]
while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.
[74]
In view of the
arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato
[75]
to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: It is important
to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions
relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements
are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial
consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters
who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
x x x
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured
by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.
[76]
(Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of
the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of
the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers;
members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal
profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific
requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be
direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also
that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
[77]
In fine, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,
[78]
the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
[79]
Before he can invoke the power
of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest
common to all members of the public.
[80]

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.
[81]
This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any
impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice
will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims
infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.
[82]
Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing
to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.
[83]

While an association has legal personality to represent its members,
[84]
especially when it is composed of
substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,
[85]
the mere invocation by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too
general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it
has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents.
[86]
It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to
resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be
sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned
[87]
to enable the court to deal properly with
all interests involved in the suit,
[88]
for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before
the court.
[89]
Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the
divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to
fail. Since petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental
importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the
funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of
any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.
[90]
Applying these
determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues
raised are of paramount importance to the public.
[91]
Such liberality does not, however, mean that the
requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very
least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In
petitioner Vallejos case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an
intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may
be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing intervention.
[92]

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadras case, they seek to join petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and
the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this
Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join
petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that they will
suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful, this
Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292,
160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. filed a Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene to raise the additional issue of
whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the
grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and
World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation
the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of
record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilons. He alleges that submitting to
this Courts jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which
will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of
Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a
member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all
substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier
stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Sorianos motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an
interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayers suits as set forth
in Dumlao v. Comelec,
[93]
to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do
said petitioners allege that their tax money is being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection
against abuses of legislative power, or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
[94]
(Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in
illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally,
his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,
[95]
this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture.
[96]
Only then may the courts pass on the validity of
what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12
th
Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e.,
the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules
have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act
should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus
curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to
render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus
recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court
to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to
withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for
members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a
motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are
transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a
motion to dismiss.
The deans position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures
would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it
under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution
[97]
and, therefore, petitioners would
continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress
before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of
Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of
constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively
vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be
sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
J usticiability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,
[98]
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term political
question, viz:
[T]he term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
[99]
(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this
Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some
cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of
judicial review.
[100]
In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved,
this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies.
[101]
Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive
Secretary
[102]
which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court
shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a
Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction
over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a
Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Courts power of judicial review and its application on issues
involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the
weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the
sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal
to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x
x x And so, with the bodys indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact,
it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably
by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of
political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: Well, since it is political, we have
no authority to pass upon it. The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar
with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I
will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not
mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The
obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent
newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published
anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our main writers were already
incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of
wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22
had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon
the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked
up. One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was
taken over by representatives of Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the
President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the
operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of
certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the
Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our
colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and
criticized with such a telling effect that Malacaang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended
indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from
January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its
scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then
designated as citizens assemblies or barangays. Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be
propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because
the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was
filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being
heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring
that the new Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum
favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room
where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that
the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense put
up by the government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the case.
x x x
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the
Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified
of any referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None
of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that there had
been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum and a
plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon,
they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of political question was set
up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.
x x x
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions: What is
judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of
rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a
judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a
wife. The Court said: We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but
we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by
law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity.
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or
enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of
government, the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government are generally
considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme
within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a
given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well
as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty
to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the
subject of the judiciary.
[103]
(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the
concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term judicial power but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme
Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with
jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression judicial power?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to
whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess
of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
x x x
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the new
numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. .
.
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political question
doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will
notice it says, judicial power includes and the reason being that the definition that we might make may not
cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond the pale of
judicial power.
[104]
(Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that
judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of
this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however,
that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with truly political questions. From this clarification it
is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) truly political questions and (2) those which
are not truly political questions.
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in
fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity
of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,
[105]
this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into
areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to
decide.
[106]
x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,
[107]
through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as
held in a recent case, (t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of
the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot
abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with
the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.
[108]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,
[109]
speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if
we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question.
[110]
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-
justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be
problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr
[111]
attempts to provide
some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or thepotentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
[112]
(Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct
concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others
are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is
radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts
with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question
lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch
or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this
standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI
of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12
th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination
of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission.
[113]

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of
these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an
examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better
way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both
positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard
therefor.
[114]
Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is
beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act
should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,
[115]
this Court
held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also
presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will
be unavoidable.
[116]
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
[117]
where this Court
invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process,
to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that
the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual
case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question
must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to
the decision of the case itself.
[118]
[Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the
very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second
impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this
controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining
substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that the
court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
applied.
[119]

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second
impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution
[120]
calling for a legislative inquiry
into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for
being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach
of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary.
[121]

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court
that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed
from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue
would, in the Courts opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and
distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of
these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised
other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Courts ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been
enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,
[122]
viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the
investigation must be in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure and that the rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It follows then that the right rights of persons
under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify
against ones self.
[123]

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original
petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment
complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella,
the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned
section in that the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment was not filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House. With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories
to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a Resolution of Endorsement.
Intervenors point to the Verification of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives
Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x
[124]

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said
second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the
Senate to begin forthwith, is that the verified complaint be filed, not merely endorsed, by at least one-third
of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they concede
that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee
on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from
such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article
XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the
second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of
impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment
signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the
resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being
necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope
of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against
its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys
Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the
second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant
consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No.
160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the
instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the
petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latters arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are
not unduly prejudiced by this Courts decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the
very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules adopted by the 12
th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of
the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
J udicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as
an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court
reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that [t]here is a moral compulsion for
the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment.
[125]
But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to
pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication
may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there
is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred.
[126]
Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from
its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this
Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.
[127]
In the august words of amicus curiaeFather
Bernas, jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it,
even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty.
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit
itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so.
[128]
On the occasion
that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter not with
officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and
fairness.
[129]
After all, by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary]
their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For
this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any
person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking
in [his] office.
[130]

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case
of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.
[131]
In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate
Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing
and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as
respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunals membership to only its three Justices-Members
whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his
other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other
court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership
of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it
alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being
expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been
unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably
have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once
more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode
for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification
may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and
sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify
himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases
would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and
that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,
[132]
it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro
tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a
deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction
of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the
deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot
lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.
[133]
(Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of
judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,
[134]
this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the seven pillars of limitations
of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v.
TVA
[135]
as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining
because to decide such questions is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real,
earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party
beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.
2. The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. . . . It is
not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the
case.
3. The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
to be applied.
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if
a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory
construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its
decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on
an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by
its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to
one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of
his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a
citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its
citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its
benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible
by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing pillars of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial
review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
[136]

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that
judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the
[J]udiciary. They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial
hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at
home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable
official.
[137]
Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its
Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence
and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General,
the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding
the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because
their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme
Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also
political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioners
prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the
other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows.
[138]

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary
[139]
where this Court was split and in the end there were not
enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondents claims,
[140]
the pre-existing constitutional
order was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the
government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution
and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will
behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging
disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v.
Veneracion, to wit:
[141]

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious
or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to
exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the
exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are
guided by the Rule of Law, and ought to protect and enforce it without fear or favor, resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.
[142]

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of
Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution,
contending that the term initiate does not mean to file; that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of
Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean to file because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of
the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for
impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of
Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as
the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term initiate. Resort to statutory
construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado,
who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of initiate as to file, as
proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission
proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the
instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of initiating included the act of
taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word initiate as it twice appears in
Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
Initiate of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or
set going. As Websters Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means
to perform or facilitate the first action, which jibes with Justice Regalados position, and that of Father
Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle
and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those
deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the
filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that
impeachment is deemed initiated when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House
reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say impeachment proceedings are initiated but
rather are deemed initiated. The language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is
an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the
law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on
impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for Committee
action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings,
copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed
before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in
the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of
report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment
submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing
of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation
starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on
the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard
Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of
Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It
only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in
rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the
House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard
Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to
indicate this on record.
x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the
House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from
lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: to initiate impeachment proceedings and the comma (,) and insert
on line 19 after the word resolution the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter i in
impeachment and replace the word by with OF, so that the whole section will now read: A vote of at least one-
third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with
it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words Articles of Impeachment are mentioned on line 25 in the
case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again,
Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform
procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.
[143]
(Italics in
the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee
on the Accountability of Public Officers.
[144]

It is thus clear that the framers intended initiation to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus
curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that the obvious reason in deleting the phrase to initiate
impeachment proceedings as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and
make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the
filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not
initiatethe impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint
under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution.
[145]

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was
also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word initiate as used in Article XI, Section
3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the
complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word initiate, appearing in
the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
x x x
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, impeachment case and impeachment proceeding.
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is to initiate. The object in the
first sentence is impeachment case. The object in the second sentence is impeachment
proceeding. Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term cases must be distinguished
from the term proceedings. An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the
Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can
bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate,
a proceeding must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be initiated. To initiate, which
comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It
has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of
several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either
reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint,
the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the
same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the
Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of
all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the
Senate. It is at this point that the House initiates an impeachment case. It is at this point that an
impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment case before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of
another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the impeachment proceeding initiated when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already
been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or
beginning. Rather,the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal
reached the floor proposing that A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings, this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a
complaint does.
[146]
Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year, it means that no second verified
complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this
interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of to initiate which means to begin.
He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand
it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify
words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
proceedings because Section 3 (1) says The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment, This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle
of reddendo singula singulis by equating impeachment cases with impeachment proceeding.
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term to initiate refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3
(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the
filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or
a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene
Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term initiate a meaning different meaning from filing and
referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous
construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citingVera v. Avelino
[147]
wherein this
Court stated that their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution
Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Courts our deliberations stand on a different footing
from the properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings. Further citing said case, he states that
this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their
emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latters
balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.
[148]

Justice Gutierrezs statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only
two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission Chief Justice Davide
and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious
reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the
Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and
unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its
argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This
assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is
limited by the phrase to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Hence, these rules cannot
contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry
out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make
rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution
with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall
be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or
amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun,
[149]
this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to
interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted disorderly behavior of its
members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,
[150]
Justice (later Chief
Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v.
Smith,
[151]
declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of
the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,
[152]
quoting United States v.
Ballin, Joseph & Co.,
[153]
Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation between the
mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only
within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the
same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was
even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to
inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we
will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United
States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial
power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is
in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional
rules. It held:
x x x
The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings. It appears
that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a
quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to
the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a
quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and
not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what
matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the
question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. I t may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection
to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make
rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the
House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether
they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not
ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable
relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to
be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.
[154]

x x x
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political question
defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution
was intentionally cobbled to empower courts x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also
xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power
to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded
from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis--vis the
Executive and the Legislative departments of government.
[155]

x x x
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can decline to
exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any
act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court
against the other branches of government despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators
being elected by the people.
[156]

x x x
The provision defining judicial power as including the duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade
the powers of this court vis--vis the other branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience under
martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x
x
x x x
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of
discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our
distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions,
this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution,
there is a shift in stress this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it
should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies
the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at
bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not
be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we
wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our
courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of
judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable
foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.
[157]
(Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties
alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives rely on Nixon v. US
[158]
as basis for arguing that this
Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As
already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that the House of Representatives shall
have the sole power of impeachment. It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this sole
power is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that
there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of
Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how
that exclusive power is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice
that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient
in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the
House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term initiate a meaning different
from filing.
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October
23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the
same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the
center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human
drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the
Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and
emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what
they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as
demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with
their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the
business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith offered suggestions for a return to a
state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived
resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this
Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the
prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent
public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same
clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of lack of jurisdiction, non-
justiciability, and judicial self-restraint aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on
the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality
of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has
been already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its
constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for
the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an
issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and
adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-
face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Courts jurisdiction, no other course of action
can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has
effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main
issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it
had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at
all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the
government. Rather, the raison detre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and
legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered
our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a
brethren. That the members interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief
Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted
with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or
actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit
or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it
rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power
in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an
incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branchs official act
as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of
the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from
the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a
party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which
recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the laws moral authority and that of its agents to
secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or
instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court
which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially
of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is
any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have
less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individuals rights irrespective of his station in
life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this
impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than
the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But
though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal
principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover
that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.





























ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court
for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint
was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and
was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the
first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for
being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the
House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and
three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the
House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June
2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this
creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that
Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which
"are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for
respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.



[G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998]
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S.
TATAD, petitioners, vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN.
MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere.
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch
prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. Where no provision of the
Constitution or the laws or even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been violated,
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts
done within their competence and authority. This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it
will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
The Case

On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an
original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator
Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents and the
solicitor general to file COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days
from notice. On August 25, 1998, both respondents and the solicitor general submitted their
respective Comments. In compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated September 1, 1998,
petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply on September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this Court
gave due course to the petition and deemed the controversy submitted for decision, without need of
memoranda, on September 29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent jurisdiction
[1]
to
hear and decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and a
basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such petitions in the lower
tribunals.
[2]
However, for special and important reasons or for exceptional and compelling
circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine.
[3]
In fact,
original petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of
legislative officers like the Senate President
[4]
and the Speaker of the House
[5]
have been recognized
as exceptions to this rule.
The Facts

The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer, convened on
July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. At the time, in terms of party
affiliation, the composition of the Senate was as follows:
[6]

10 members -Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members - Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United Muslim
Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)
1 member - Liberal Party (LP)
1 member - Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member - Peoples Reform Party (PRP)
1 member - Gabay Bayan
2 members - Independent
----------
23 - total number of senators
[7]
(The last six members are all classified by petitioners as
independent.)
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the
position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also
nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2,
[8]
Senator
Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin
M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the
only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained
that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who
had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority.
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate minority, Sen. Juan M. Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party -- numbering seven (7)
and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on
the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with
Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met
in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed
by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators,
[9]
stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as
the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition
for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding
and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully
belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues

From the parties pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader?
The Courts Ruling

After a close perusal of the pleadings
[10]
and a careful deliberation on the
arguments, pro and con, the Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse of
discretion attended the recognition of and the assumption into office by Respondent Guingona as the
Senate minority leader.
First Issue: The Courts Jurisdiction

Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco
[11]
in arguing that this Court has jurisdiction to
settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit that the definitions of
majority and minority involve an interpretation of the Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1),
Article VI thereof, stating that [t]he Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in common that the
issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal matter pertaining exclusively to the
domain of the legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction without transgressing the
principle of separation of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved, as the fundamental
law does not provide for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. The legislature alone has the
full discretion to provide for such office and, in that event, to determine the procedure of selecting its
occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no question involving
an interpretation or application of the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of the Senate; neither
are there peculiar circumstances impelling the Court to assume jurisdiction over the petition. The
solicitor general adds that there is not even any legislative practice to support the petitioners theory
that a senator who votes for the winning Senate President is precluded from becoming the minority
leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated on the various
important cases involving this very important and basic question, which it has ruled upon in the past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Courts power of judicial
review; that is, questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution
or the law, including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of
the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in nature,
whenever the tribunal finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies.
[12]

In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the
rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the
domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed
jurisdiction (1) in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention; and (2) because the
resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of
a quorum to hold a session
[13]
and therein elect a Senate President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: [I] concur with
the majority that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the present x x x so as to establish in
this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one
branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political
questions as well.
[14]

Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:
Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber of
Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of Representatives. It has
already involved the President of the Philippines. The situation has created a veritable
national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from any quarter other
than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an effective settlement
are pinned.
[15]

x x x This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or decide if
this Court should refuse to decide them.
[16]

x x x The constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered.
[17]

In Taada v. Cuenco,
[18]
this Court endeavored to define political question. And we said that it
refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not [the] legality, of a particular measure.
[19]

The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by
the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the
Senates full discretionary authority, but was subject to mandatory constitutional
limitations.
[20]
Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia,
[21]
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote that
the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the
Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ [of habeas corpus]. This ruling was
made in spite of the previous pronouncements in Barcelon v. Baker
[22]
and Montenegro v.
Castaeda
[23]
that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of
the privilege x x x) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the
courts and upon all other persons. But the Chief Justice cautioned: the function of the Court is
merely to check -- not to supplant --- the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he
has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power
vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive Secretary:
[24]

The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character are
justiciable, not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the non-
justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of separation of powers --
characteristic of the presidential system of government -- the functions of which are
classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3) categories, namely, 1) those
involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative department; 2) those
concerning mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions applying
and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those
dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties
or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to
courts of justice. Within its own sphere -- but only within such sphere each department
is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to
encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other departments, but
also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed,
measures taken or decisions made by the other departments -- provided that such acts,
measures or decision are within the area allocated thereto by the Constitution."
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations,
the issue of whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or
the limitations respected is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one
of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications,
conditions or limitations -- particularly those prescribed by the Constitution -- would be
set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement
thereof are the main functions of the courts of justice under the presidential form of
government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances,
one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority nor the
discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation --
made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest
Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution -- to settle it. This explains
why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522, 523], it was held that courts have a
duty, rather than a power, to determine whether another branch of the government has
keptwithin constitutional limits.
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of
judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial
prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
[25]

This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements of the
Court. Daza v. Singson,
[26]
Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.
[27]
and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales
[28]
similarly
resolved issues assailing the acts of the leaders of both houses of Congress in apportioning among
political parties the seats to which each chamber was entitled in the Commission on
Appointments. The Court held that the issue was justiciable, even if the question were political in
nature, since it involved the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on
Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI of] the Constitution.
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Taada v. Angara,
[29]
wherein the petitioners
sought to nullify the Senates concurrence in the ratification of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement. The Court ruled: Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. The Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over
petitions questioning an act of the political departments of government, it will not review the
wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and will strike it down only on either of two
grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.
Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives
[30]
(HRET), the Court refused
to reverse a decision of the HRET, in the absence of a showing that said tribunal had committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court ruled that full authority had
been conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and of the Senate as sole
judgesof all contests relating to
the election, the returns, and the qualifications of their respective members. Such
jurisdiction is original and exclusive.
[31]
The Court may inquire into a decision or resolution of said
tribunals only if such decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion.
[32]

Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia,
[33]
was asked to reexamine the enrolled bill
doctrine and to look beyond the certification of the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the
bill, which was later enacted as Republic Act 8240, was properly approved by the legislative
body. Petitioners claimed that certain procedural rules of the House had been breached in the
passage of the bill. They averred further that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House
rules was a violation of the Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of concerned the
internal procedures of the House, with which the Court had no concern. It enucleated:
[34]

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this
Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House
has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political
arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in
that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to
inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting
in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of discretion were it to do
so. x x x In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was
permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that
body.
In the instant controversy, the petitioners -- one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known
constitutionalist -- try to hew closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They claim that Section 16
(1), Article VI of the Constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority
leader. They also invoke the Courts expanded judicial power to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdiction
over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff
or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted.
[35]
In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is
clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of
the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial question: In
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its officials,
particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the constitutional
provision requiring the election of the Senate President by majority vote of all its members carries
with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of majority and minority, as well as who may
elect a minority leader. They argue that majority in the aforequoted constitutional provision refers
to that group of senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee
chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such
chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the right to determine the minority leader
belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority
leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore,
the members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not
belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from
the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.
The term majority has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain
number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half
of any total.
[36]
The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean
that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any
construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the majority, much less the minority, in the
said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the
usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby
elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
The Comment
[37]
of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which were not
contested in petitioners Reply. During the eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R. Salonga as Senate President
was seconded by a member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada.
[38]
During the ninth regular
session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was
reached to assign committee chairmanships to all senators, including those belonging to the
minority.
[39]
This practice continued during the tenth Congress, where even the minority leader was
allowed to chair a committee.
[40]
History would also show that the majority in either house of
Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while
the minority normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms majority and minority. Majority may also
refer to the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,
[41]
not necessarily more than
one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is a group, party, or
faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.
[42]
Between two unequal parts
or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority,
while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is
not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In
a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners
themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the
Comelec as the dominant minority party for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing
composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups
or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of
Congress. All that the Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary.
[43]
To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely
a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power to determine the
rules of its proceedings.
[44]
Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to
govern its internal affairs.
[45]
Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:
Rule I
ELECTIVE OFFICERS
SECTION 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a
President Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms.
These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge of their
duties.
Rule II
ELECTION OF OFFICERS
SEC. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its
Members. Should there be more than one candidate for the same office, a nominal vote
shall be taken; otherwise, the elections shall be by viva voce or by resolution.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the
manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition
and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or
specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of
the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers,
courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of
courts to direct Congress how to do its work.
[46]
Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.
[47]

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of
permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.
[48]
Being merely matters of
procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body
[49]
at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such
officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the
parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional
principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the Courts
being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal
branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat,
this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in
upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial
legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this
argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the
Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative department, this Court may still inquire
whether an act of Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion.
[50]
This is
the plain implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers upon the
judiciary the power and the duty not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but likewise to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a member of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, said in part:
[51]

xxx the powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within
its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy[, the] power to
determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices
of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions, first, of
Respondent Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power
[52]
by
one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto.
[53]
A quo warranto proceeding is the
proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the
holder from its enjoyment.
[54]
The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public
prosecutor
[55]
or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another.
[56]
The action shall be brought against the person who
allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding or exercising such office.
[57]

In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or
she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly
usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent.
[58]
In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof
of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may
lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the
Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be
said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption and exercise of the
powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been
shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernans Recognition of Guingona

The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government is restricted only by the definition and confines of the
term grave abuse of discretion.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.
[59]

By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as
Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the
latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous
resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by
the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two
Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their
standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility. Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the
Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse
of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and
authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa CJ., Davide, Jr., Melo, Puno, Martinez, Quisumbing, and Pardo JJ., concur.
Romero, J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Bellosillo, J., No part. Did not take part in deliberation.
Vitug, J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Kapunan. J., concur with Justice Mendoza, see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., Please see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Purisima, J., concur and dissent with the opinion of Justice Mendoza.



[1]
21 (1), BP 129; 5 (1), Art. VIII, Constitution.
[2]
See Manalo v. Gloria, 236 SCRA 130, 138-139, September 1, 1994; citing People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415, 423-
24, April 18, 1989, and Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633, 651-652, January 27, 1993.
[3]
Uy v. Contreras, 237 SCRA 167, September 26, 1994; Vergara Sr. v. Suelto, 156 SCRA 753, December 21, 1987.
[4]
Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949); Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789, October 20, 1992.
[5]
Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, August 14, 1997.
[6]
The solicitor general, in his Comment dated August 21, 1998, attributed to the 23 members of the Senate the
following party affiliations:
Senate President Marcelo B. Fernan - Laban ng Masang Pilipino
(LAMP)
Sen. Raul S. Roco - Aksyon Demokratiko
Sen. Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr. - Lakas-National Union of
Christian Democrats-
United Muslim Democrats
of the Philippines (Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP)
Sen. Franklin M. Drilon - LAMP
Sen. Juan M. Flavier - Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago - Peoples Reform Party
(PRP)
Sen. Sergio R. Osmea III - Liberal Party (LP)
Sen. Francisco S. Tatad - PRP
Sen. Gregorio B. Honasan - LP (Independent)
Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile - LP (Independent)
Sen. Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng - LAMP
Sen. Loren Legarda-Leviste - Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Sen. Renato L. Cayetano - Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III - LAMP
Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. - LAMP
Sen. Robert Z. Barbers - Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Sen. Rodolfo G. Biazon - LAMP
Sen. Blas F. Ople - LAMP
Sen. John Henry R. Osmea - LAMP
Sen. Robert S. Jaworski - LAMP
Sen. Ramon B. Revilla - Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. - Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Sen. Tessie Aquino-Oreta - LAMP
(Rollo, pp. 63-64. See also Comment of Respondent Guingona, Jr., rollo, p. 41.)
[7]
One position was vacant, because of the election of the incumbent, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, as the Vice President of
the Philippines.
[8]
Senator Fernan abstained from voting. (Petition, p. 4; rollo, p. 6. Comment of the solicitor general, p. 2; rollo, p. 63.)
[9]
Senators Robert Z. Barbers, Renato L. Cayetano; Juan M. Flavier, Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., Loren Legarda-Leviste,
Ramon B. Magsaysay Jr., and Ramon B. Revilla.
[10]
The Petition was signed by both petitioners; the Comment of Senate President Fernan, by Senator Fernan himself and
Attys. Mary Jane L. Zantua and Lani Grace R. Songco; the Comment of Senator Guingona, by Atty. Ricardo G.
Nepomuceno Jr.; the Comment of the OSG, by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Carlos N. Ortega and
Associate Solicitor Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag; while the Consolidated Reply, by Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago.
[11]
83 Phil 17 (1949).
[12]
Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, Vol. II, 1988 ed., p. 282.
[13]
10 (2), Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution, reads:
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to
day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may
provide.
[14]
Supra, p. 72.
[15]
At p. 76.
[16]
At p. 78.
[17]
At p. 79.
[18]
103 Phil 1051, 1068 (1957), per Concepcion, J.
[19]
Ibid., p. 1067, citing 16 CJS 413.
[20]
11, Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution.
[21]
42 SCRA 448, December 11, 1971.
[22]
5 Phil 87 (1905).
[23]
91 Phil 882 (1952).
[24]
50 SCRA 30, 84, 87, March 31, 1973.
[25]
Art. VIII, 1, par. 2.
[26]
180 SCRA 496, December 21, 1989, per Cruz, J.
[27]
187 SCRA 377, July 12, 1990, per Grio-Aquino, J.
[28]
214 SCRA 789, October 20, 1992, per Campos Jr., J.
[29]
272 SCRA 18, 47, May 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
[30]
199 SCRA 692, July 30, 1991, per Gutierrez Jr., J.
[31]
Citing Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391, 1988.
[32]
Citing Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780, 1990.
[33]
277 SCRA 268, August 14, 1997, per Mendoza, J.
[34]
At p. 299.
[35]
Alleje v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 495, January 25, 1995; Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 108,
November 16, 1995; Times Broadcasting Network v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 366, June 19, 1997; Chico v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 122704, January 5, 1998.
[36]
Perez v. De la Cruz, 27 SCRA 587, 603 (1969), citing Websters International Dictionary, Unabridged; Concurring
Opinion of J. Perfecto in Avelino v. Cuenco, supra, p. 80. See also Petition, rollo, p. 12, citing Blacks Law Dictionary,
6th ed., 1990.
[37]
P. 15; rollo, p. 55.
[38]
Citing Record of the Senate, 8th Congress, Vol. I, No. 14, p. 9.
[39]
Citing Record of the Senate, 9th Congress, Vol. III, No. 47-A, pp. 88-94.
[40]
Then Minority Leader Ernesto C. Maceda chaired the Committees on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes
and Laws; and on Foreign Relations. Senator Honasan chaired the Committees on Agrarian Reform; on Peace,
Unification and Reconciliation; and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement. Senator Coseteng was the chair of
the Committees on Civil Service and Government Reorganization; and on Labor, Employment and Human
Resources. (See footnote 40 of Respondent Guingonas Comment, supra.)
[41]
Websters New World Dictionary, 2nd college ed., 1972.
[42]
Ibid.
[43]
16 (1), second par., Art. VI of the Constitution.
[44]
16 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution.
[45]
Rules of the Senate (see Appendix A, Guide to the Senate by Reginald M. Pastrana and Demaree J.B. Raval).
[46]
New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Steingut, 353 NE2d 558.
[47]
Concurring Opinion in Oposa v. Factoran Jr., 224 SCRA 792, 818, July 30, 1993.
[48]
Osmea Jr. v. Pendatun, 109 Phil 863, 870-871 (1960), citing 76 CJS 870. See also Arroyo v. De Venecia, supra.
[49]
Ibid. See also Enrique M. Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines Annotated, 1977, pp. 188-189.
[50]
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656, 681, September 5, 1997.
[51]
I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436.
[52]
91 CJS 551, citing State ex rel Danielson v. Village of Mound, 48 NW2d 855, 863.
[53]
67 CJS 317, citing Wheat v. Smith, 7 SW 161.
[54]
Lota v. Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 715, 718, June 30, 1961.
[55]
2, Rule 66, Rules of Court.
[56]
5, ibid. See also Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez Sr., 239 SCRA 11, 18, December 6,1994;
Tarrosa v. Singson, 232 SCRA 553, 557, May 25, 1994.
In this regard, the Court notes that Petitioner Santiago has no standing to bring the instant petition for quo
warranto, for she does not claim to be rightfully entitled to the position of Senate minority leader. We have ruled in the
past:
Nothing is better settled than that a petitioner, in a quo warranto proceeding to try title to a public office,
must be able to show that he is entitled to said office. Absent such an element, the petition must be dismissed. This is a
principle that goes back to Acosta v. Flor [5 Phil 18, 22], a 1905 decision. There, the doctrine has been laid down
that: No individual can bring a civil action relating to usurpation of a public office without averring that he has a right
to the same; and at any stage of the proceedings, if it be shown that such individual has no right, the action may be
dismissed because there is no legal ground upon which it may proceed when the fundamental basis of such action is
destroyed. This has been the exacting rule, since then, followed with stricter firmness in Cuyegkeng v. Cruz [108 Phil
1147], where this Court held that one who does not claim to be entitled to the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held
or exercised by another, but who merely asserts a right to be appointed thereto, cannot question the latters title to the
same by quo warranto. In other words, one whose claim is predicated solely upon a more or less remote possibility, that
he may be the recipient of the appointment, has no cause of action against the office holder. (Garcia v. Perez, 99 SCRA
628, 633-34, September 11, 1980, per De Castro, J.)
However, any question on standing has been rendered moot by the inclusion of Petitioner Tatad, who claims to
have the right to the contested office.
[57]
1, Rule 66, Rules of Court. In relation to this rule, Respondent Fernan claims that he is not a proper party to the
case, because he did not usurp nor is he unlawfully holding or exercising the office of minority leader. While the action
commenced by petitioners was denominated a quo warranto petition under Rule 66, the Court notes that among the
principal averments made was that Respondent Fernan committed grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the Senate minority leader. Such averment brings the petition within the purview of a certiorari proceeding
under Rule 65. A basic principle in remedial law states that it is not the title given by the parties to the action which
determines its nature, but the averments made in the pleadings. The case may, thus, be treated as a
joint certiorari and quo warranto action and, as such, Respondent Fernan is a proper, if not necessary, party thereto.
[58]
Batario Jr. v. Parentela Jr., 9 SCRA 601, November 29, 1963; Caraon-Medina v. Quizon, 18 SCRA 562, October 29,
1966.
[59]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 200, 209, June 4, 1996, per Kapunan, J.; citing
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Confesor, 231 SCRA 41, March 10, 1994, and other cases. See also Imutan v. Court of
Appeals, 102 SCRA 286, 292, January 27, 1981.












G.R. No. 134577, Nov. 18, 1998

While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting
more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him
shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation
states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and House
Speaker
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation, modification
and waiver by the body adopting them




FACTS:

During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the
position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate
President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only
other member of the minority, he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those who had
voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee,
belonged to the minority. However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party number 7 and,
thus, also a minority had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for
quo warranto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate
minority leader
Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure

RULING:

The petition fails.

The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority

The term majority has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a
total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain
the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who
comprise the majority, much less the minority, in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of
our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not
vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no
law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

xxx

Majority may also refer to the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes, not necessarily more
than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is a group, party, or faction with
a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority. Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising
a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority.
But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to
select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the
Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which
has to be identified by the Comelec as the dominant minority party for purposes of the general elections. In
the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the
independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and House
Speaker

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the
Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. To our mind,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power to determine the rules of its
proceedings. xxx

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is
there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of
choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But,
in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon
which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic
concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not
within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate
as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.

Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation, modification
and waiver by the body adopting them

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them. Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern
to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence
of a majority.

In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may
deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise
of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm,
without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that
justifies the Courts being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal
branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be
neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of
the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear
breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would
easily fail.















































Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962).
Facts
Charles Baker (P) was a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. Baker filed suit against Joe Carr, the
Secretary of State of Tennessee. Bakers complaint alleged that the Tennessee legislature had not redrawn
its legislative districts since 1901, in violation of the Tennessee State Constitution which required redistricting
according to the federal census every 10 years. Baker, who lived in an urban part of the state, asserted that
the demographics of the state had changed shifting a greater proportion of the population to the cities,
thereby diluting his vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections, and sought the remedy of reapportionment or at-large
elections. The district court denied relief on the grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a political
question and would therefore not be heard by the court.
Issues
1. Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment?
2. What is the test for resolving whether a case presents a political question?
Holding and Rule (Brennan)
1. Yes. Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment.
2. The factors to be considered by the court in determining whether a case presents a political question
are:
1. Is there a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department (i.e. foreign affairs or executive war powers)?
2. Is there a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue?
3. The impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion.
4. The impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government.
5. Is there an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made?
6. Would attempting to resolve the matter create the possibility of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question?
The political question doctrine is based in the separation of powers and whether a case is justiciable is
determined on a case by cases basis. In regards to foreign relations, if there has been no conclusive
governmental action regarding an issue then a court can construe a treaty and decide a case. Regarding the
dates of the duration of hostilities, when there needs to be definable clarification for a decision, the court may
be able to decide the case.
The court held that this case was justiciable and did not present a political question. The case did not present
an issue to be decided by another branch of the government. The court noted that judicial standards under
the Equal Protection Clause were well developed and familiar, and it had been open to courts since the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine if an act is arbitrary and capricious and reflects no
policy. When a question is enmeshed with any of the other two branches of the government, it presents a
political question and the Court will not answer it without further clarification from the other branches.





NIXON v. UNITED STATES et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

No. 91-740. Argued October 14, 1992 -- Decided January 13, 1993

After petitioner Nixon, the Chief Judge of a Federal District Court, was convicted of federal crimes and
sentenced to prison, the House of Representatives adopted articles of impeachment against him and
presented them to the Senate. Following proceedings pursuant to Senate Rule XI--which allows a committee
of Senators to hear evidence against an impeached individual and to report that evidence to the full Senate--
the Senate voted to convict Nixon, and the presiding officer entered judgment removing him from his
judgeship. He then commenced the present suit for a declaratory judgment and reinstatement of his judicial
salary and privileges, arguing that, because Senate Rule XI prohibits the whole Senate from taking part in the
evidentiary hearings, it violates the first sentence of the Constitution's Impeachment Trial Clause, Art. I, 3,
cl. 6, which provides that the "Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." The District Court
held that his claim was nonjusticiable, i. e., involved a political question that could not be resolved by the
courts. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: Nixon's claim that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause is nonjusticiable. Pp. 3-13.

(a) A controversy is nonjusticiable where there is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it . . . ." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217. These two concepts are not completely separate; the lack
of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable
commitment to a coordinate branch. Pp. 3-4.

(b) The language and structure of Art. I, 3, cl. 6, demonstrate a textual commitment of impeachment to the
Senate. Nixon's argument that the use of the word "try" in the Clause's first sentence impliedly requires a
judicial style trial by the full Senate that is subject to judicial review is rejected. The conclusion that "try" lacks
sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review is compelled by older and modern
dictionary definitions, and is fortified by the existence of the three very specific requirements that the Clause's
second and third sentences do impose--that the Senate's members must be under oath or affirmation, that a
two thirds vote is required to convict, and that the Chief Justice presides when the President is tried--the
precise nature of which suggests that the Framers did not intend to impose additional limitations on the form
of the Senate proceedings. The Clause's first sentence must instead be read as a grant of authority to the
Senate to determine whether an individual should be acquitted or convicted, and the common sense and
dictionary meanings of the word "sole" indicate that this authority is reposed in the Senate alone. Nixon's
attempts to negate the significance of "sole" are unavailing, while his alternative reading of the word as
requiring impeachment only by the full Senate is unnatural and would impose on the Senate additional
procedural requirements that would be inconsistent with the three express limitations that the Clause sets out.
A review of the Constitutional Convention's history and the contemporary commentary supports a reading of
the constitutional language as deliberately placing the impeachment power in the Legislature, with no judicial
involvement, even for the limited purpose of judicial review. Pp. 4-11.

(c) Justiciability is also refuted by (1) the lack of finality inherent in exposing the country's political life--
particularly if the President were impeached--to months, or perhaps years, of chaos during judicial review of
Senate impeachment proceedings, or during any retrial that a differently constituted Senate might conduct if
its first judgment of conviction were invalidated, and by (2) the difficulty of fashioning judicial relief other than
simply setting aside the Senate's judgment of conviction. See Baker, supra, at 210. Pp. 11-12.

(d) A holding of nonjusticiability is consistent with this Court's opinion in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486.
Unlike the situation in that case, there is no separate constitutional provision which could be defeated by
allowing the Senate final authority to determine the meaning of the word "try" in Art. I, 3, cl. 6. While courts
possess power to review legislative action that transgresses identifiable textual limits, the word "try" does not
provide such a limit on the authority committed to the Senate. Pp. 12-13.

290 U. S. App. D. C. 420, 938 F. 2d 239, affirmed.

Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, in which Blackmun, J., joined. Souter, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.




























444 U.S. 996
100 S.Ct. 533
62 L.Ed.2d 428
Barry GOLDWATER et al.
v.
James Earl CARTER, President of the United States, et al
No. 79-856
Supreme Court of the United States
December 13, 1979
On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
ORDER
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is
remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint.
Mr. Justice POWELL, concurring.
Although I agree with the result reached by the Court, I would dismiss the complaint as not ripe for judicial
review.
* This Court has recognized that an issue should not be decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113-114, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam ). Prudential considerations
persuade me that a dispute between Congress and the President is not ready for judicial review unless and
until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional authority. Differences between the President and
the Congress are commonplace under our system. The differences should, and almost invariably do, turn on
political rather than legal considerations. The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation
of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse.
Otherwise, we would encourage small groups or even individual Members of Congress to seek judicial
resolution of issues before the normal political process has the opportunity to resolve the conflict.
Mr. Justice MARSHALL concurs in the result.
Mr. Justice POWELL concurs in the judgment and has filed a statement.
Mr. Justice REHNQUIST concurs in the judgment and has filed a statement in which Mr. Chief Justice BURGER,
Mr. Justice STEWART, and Mr. Justice STEVENS join.
Mr. Justice WHITE and Mr. Justice BLACKMUN join in the grant of the petition for a writ of certiorari but would
set the case for argument and give it plenary consideration. Mr. Justice BLACKMUN has filed a statement in
which Mr. Justice WHITE joins.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN would grant the petition for certiorari and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and has filed a statement.
1
In this case, a few Members of Congress claim that the President's action in terminating the treaty
with Taiwan has deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to a change in the supreme
law of the land. Congress has taken no official action. In the present posture of this case, we do not
know whether there ever will be an actual confrontation between the Legislative and Executive
Branches. Although the Senate has considered a resolution declaring that Senate approval is
necessary for the termination of any mutual defense treaty, see 125 Cong.Rec. S7015, S7038-S7039
(June 6, 1979), no final vote has been taken on the resolution. See id., at S16683-S16692 (Nov. 15,
1979). Moreover, it is unclear whether the resolution would have retroactive effect. See id., at
S7054-S7064 (June 6, 1979); id., at S7862 (June 18, 1979). It cannot be said that either the Senate
or the House has rejected the President's claim. If the Congress chooses not to confront the
President, it is not our task to do so. I therefore concur in the dismissal of this case.
II
2
Mr. Justice REHNQUIST suggests, however, that the issue presented by this case is a
nonjusticiable political question which can never be considered by this Court. I cannot agree. In my
view, reliance upon the political-question doctrine is inconsistent with our precedents. As set forth
in the seminal case ofBaker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), the
doctrine incorporates three inquiries: (i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed
by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of Government? (ii) Would resolution of the
question demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential
considerations counsel against judicial intervention? In my opinion the answer to each of these
inquiries would require us to decide this case if it were ready for review.
3
First, the existence of "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department," ibid., turns on an examination of the constitutional provisions
governing the exercise of the power in question. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519, 89 S.Ct.
1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). No constitutional provision explicitly confers upon the President the
power to terminate treaties. Further, Art. II, 2, of the Constitution authorizes the President to
make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. Article VI provides that treaties shall be a
part of the supreme law of the land. These provisions add support to the view that the text of the
Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to terminate treaties to the President
alone. Cf. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973); Luther v. Borden,
7 How. 1, 42, 12 L.Ed. 581 (1849).
4
Second, there is no "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" this
case; nor is a decision impossible "without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion." Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S., at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691. We are asked to decide
whether the President may terminate a treaty under the Constitution without congressional
approval. Resolution of the question may not be easy, but it only requires us to apply normal
principles of interpretation to the constitutional provisions at issue. See Powell v. McCormack,
supra, 395 U.S., at 548-549, 89 S.Ct. 1944. The present case involves neither review of the
President's activities as Commander in Chief nor impermissible interference in the field of foreign
affairs. Such a case would arise if we were asked to decide, for example, whether a treaty required
the President to order troops into a foreign country. But "it is error to suppose that every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Baker v. Carr, supra,
369 U.S., at 211, 82 S.Ct. 691. This case "touches" foreign relations, but the question presented to us
concerns only the constitutional division of power between Congress and the President.
5
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I find inherent in Mr. Justice
REHNQUIST's opinion concurring in the judgment. Assume that the President signed a mutual
defense treaty with a foreign country and announced that it would go into effect despite its rejection
by the Senate. Under Mr. Justice REHNQUIST's analysis that situation would present a political
question even though Art. II, 2, clearly would resolve the dispute. Although the answer to the
hypothetical case seems self-evident because it demands textual rather than interstitial analysis, the
nature of the legal issue presented is no different from the issue presented in the case before us. In
both cases, the Court would interpret the Constitution to decide whether congressional approval is
necessary to give a Presidential decision on the validity of a treaty the force of law. Such an inquiry
demands no special competence or information beyond the reach of the Judiciary. Cf. Chicago &
Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948).1
6
Finally, the political-question doctrine rests in part on prudential concerns calling for mutual
respect among the three branches of Government. Thus, the Judicial Branch should avoid "the
potentiality of embarrassment [that would result] from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question." Similarly, the doctrine restrains judicial action where there is an
"unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made."Baker v. Carr,
supra, 369 U.S., at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691.
7
If this case were ripe for judicial review, see Part I supra, none of these prudential considerations
would be present. Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply lack of respect for a coordinate
branch. Powell v. McCormack, supra, 395 U.S., at 548, 89 S.Ct. 1944. If the President and the
Congress had reached irreconcilable positions, final disposition of the question presented by this
case would eliminate, rather than create, multiple constitutional interpretations. The specter of the
Federal Government brought to a halt because of the mutual intransigence of the President and the
Congress would require this Court to provide a resolution pursuant to our duty " 'to say what the law
is.' " United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974),
quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
III
8
In my view, the suggestion that this case presents a political question is incompatible with this
Court's willingness on previous occasions to decide whether one branch of our Government has
impinged upon the power of another. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 138, 96 S.Ct. 612; United
States v. Nixon, supra,418 U.S., at 707, 94 S.Ct. 3090; The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 676-678,
49 S.Ct. 463, 73 L.Ed. 894 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21, 71 L.Ed. 160
(1926).2 Under the criteria enunciated in Baker v. Carr, we have the responsibility to decide
whether both the Executive and Legislative Branches have constitutional roles to play in
termination of a treaty. If the Congress, by appropriate formal action, had challenged the
President's authority to terminate the treaty with Taiwan, the resulting uncertainty could have
serious consequences for our country. In that situation, it would be the duty of this Court to resolve
the issue.
9
Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice STEWART, and Mr.
Justice STEVENS join, concurring in the judgment.
10
I am of the view that the basic question presented by the petitioners in this case is "political" and
therefore nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our
country's foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to
negate the action of the President. In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385
(1939), a case in which members of the Kansas Legislature brought an action attacking a vote of the
State Senate in favor of the ratification of the Child Labor Amendment, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
wrote in what is referred to as the "Opinion of the Court":
11
"We think that . . . the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, in the light of
previous rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as a political question pertaining to
the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control
over the promulgation of the adoption of the Amendment.
12
"The precise question as now raised is whether, when the legislature of the State, as we have
found, has actually ratified the proposed amendment, the Court should restrain the state officers
from certifying the ratification to the Secretary of State, because of an earlier rejection, and thus
prevent the question from coming before the political departments. We find no basis in either
Constitution or statute for such judicial action. Article V, speaking solely of ratification, contains no
provision as to rejection. . . ." Id., at 450, 59 S.Ct. 972.
13
Thus, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' opinion concluded that "Congress in controlling the
promulgation of the adoption of a constitutional amendment has the final determination of the
question whether by lapse of time its proposal of the amendment had lost its vitality prior to the
required ratifications." Id., at 456, 59 S.Ct. 972.
14
I believe it follows a fortiori from Coleman that the controversy in the instant case is a
nonjusticiable political dispute that should be left for resolution by the Executive and Legislative
Branches of the Government. Here, while the Constitution is express as to the manner in which the
Senate shall participate in the ratification of a treaty, it is silent as to that body's participation in the
abrogation of a treaty. In this respect the case is directly analogous to Coleman, supra. As stated
in Dyer v. Blair, 390 F.Supp. 1291, 1302 (N.D.Ill.1975) (three-judge court):
15
"A question that might be answered in different ways for different amendments must surely be
controlled by political standards rather than standards easily characterized as judicially
manageable."
16
In light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the termination of a treaty, and
the fact that different termination procedures may be appropriate for different treaties (see, e. g., n.
1, infra ), the instant case in my view also "must surely be controlled by political standards."
17
I think that the justifications for concluding that the question here is political in nature are even
more compelling than in Coleman because it involves foreign relationsspecifically a treaty
commitment to use military force in the defense of a foreign government if attacked. In United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936), this Court said:
18
"Whether, if the Joint Resolution had related solely to internal affairs it would be open to the
challenge that it constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the Executive, we find it
unnecessary to determine. The whole aim of the resolution is to affect a situation entirely external to
the United States, and falling within the category of foreign affairs. . . ." Id., at 315, 57 S.Ct. 216.
19
The present case differs in several important respects from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952), cited by petitioners as authority both for
reaching the merits of this dispute and for reversing the Court of Appeals. In Youngstown, private
litigants brought a suit contesting the President's authority under his war powers to seize the
Nation's steel industry, an action of profound and demonstrable domestic impact. Here, by contrast,
we are asked to settle a dispute between coequal branches of our Government, each of which has
resources available to protect and assert its interests, resources not available to private litigants
outside the judicial forum.1 Moreover, as in Curtiss-Wright, the effect of this action, as far as we can
tell, is "entirely external to the United States, and [falls] within the category of foreign affairs."
Finally, as already noted, the situation presented here is closely akin to that presented
in Coleman, where the Constitution spoke only to the procedure for ratification of an amendment,
not to its rejection.
20
Having decided that the question presented in this action is nonjusticiable, I believe that the
appropriate disposition is for this Court to vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand
with instructions for the District Court to dismiss the complaint. This procedure derives support
from our practice in disposing of moot actions in federal courts.2 For more than 30 years, we have
instructed lower courts to vacate any decision on the merits of an action that has become moot prior
to a resolution of the case in this Court. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 71 S.Ct.
104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950). The Court has required such decisions to be vacated in order to "prevent a
judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal consequences." Id., at 41, 71
S.Ct. 104. It is even more imperative that this Court invoke this procedure to ensure that resolution
of a "political question," which should not have been decided by a lower court, does not "spawn any
legal consequences." An Art. III court's resolution of a question that is "political" in character can
create far more disruption among the three coequal branches of Government than the resolution of
a question presented in a moot controversy. Since the political nature of the questions presented
should have precluded the lower courts from considering or deciding the merits of the controversy,
the prior proceedings in the federal courts must be vacated, and the complaint dismissed.
21
Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Mr. Justice WHITE joins, dissenting in part.
22
In my view, the time factor and its importance are illusory; if the President does not have the
power to terminate the treaty (a substantial issue that we should address only after briefing and oral
argument), the notice of intention to terminate surely has no legal effect. It is also indefensible,
without further study, to pass on the issue of justiciability or on the issues of standing or ripeness.
While I therefore join in the grant of the petition for certiorari, I would set the case for oral
argument and give it the plenary consideration it so obviously deserves.
23
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, dissenting.
24
I respectfully dissent from the order directing the District Court to dismiss this case, and would
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it rests upon the President's well-established
authority to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign governments. App. to Pet. for Cert.
27A-29A.
25
In stating that this case presents a nonjusticiable "political question," Mr. Justice Rehnquist, in
my view, profoundly misapprehends the political-question principle as it applies to matters of
foreign relations. Properly understood, the political-question doctrine restrains courts from
reviewing an exercise of foreign policy judgment by the coordinate political branch to which
authority to make that judgment has been "constitutional[ly] commit[ted]." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 211-213, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). But the doctrine does not pertain when a court
is faced with the antecedent question whether a particular branch has been constitutionally
designated as the repository of political decisionmaking power. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 519-521, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). The issue of decisionmaking authority must be
resolved as a matter of constitutional law, not political discretion; accordingly, it falls within the
competence of the courts.
26
The constitutional question raised here is prudently answered in narrow terms. Abrogation of the
defense treaty with Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking
Government, because the defense treaty was predicated upon the now-abandoned view that the
Taiwan Government was the only legitimate political authority in China. Our cases firmly establish
that the Constitution commits to the President alone the power to recognize, and withdraw
recognition from, foreign regimes. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410, 84
S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964); Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S., at 212, 82 S.Ct. 691; United States
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228-230, 62 S.Ct. 552, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942). That mandate being clear, our
judicial inquiry into the treaty rupture can go no further. See Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S., at 212,
82 S.Ct. 691; United States v. Pink, supra, 315 U.S., at 229, 62 S.Ct. 552.
1
The Court has recognized that, in the area of foreign policy, Congress may leave the President with wide
discretion that otherwise might run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine. United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936). As stated in that case, "the President alone has
the power to speak or listen as a representative of the Nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent
of the Senate; but he alone negotiates." Id., at 319, 57 S.Ct. 216 (emphasis in original). Resolution of this case
would interfere with neither the President's ability to negotiate treaties nor his duty to execute their
provisions. We are merely being asked to decide whether a treaty, which cannot be ratified without Senate
approval, continues in effect until the Senate or perhaps the Congress take further action.
2
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939), is not relevant here. In that case, the
Court was asked to review the legitimacy of a State's ratification of a constitutional amendment. Four
Members of the Court stated that Congress has exclusive power over the ratification process. Id., at 456-460,
59 S.Ct. 972 (Black, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, Frankfurter, and Douglas, JJ.). Three Members of the
Court concluded more narrowly that the Court could not pass upon the efficacy of state ratification. They also
found no standards by which the Court could fix a reasonable time for the ratification of a proposed
amendment. Id., at 452-454, 59 S.Ct. 972.
The proposed constitutional amendment at issue in Coleman would have overruled decisions of this Court.
Compare id., at 435, n. 1, 59 S.Ct. 972, withChild Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 42 S.Ct. 449, 66 L.Ed. 817
(1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 38 S.Ct. 529, 62 L.Ed. 1101 (1918). Thus, judicial review of the
legitimacy of a State's ratification would have compelled this Court to oversee the very constitutional process
used to reverse Supreme Court decisions. In such circumstances it may be entirely appropriate for the Judicial
Branch of Government to step aside. See Scharpf, Judicial Review and The Political Question: A Functional
Analysis, 75 Yale L.J. 517, 589 (1966). The present case involves no similar principle of judicial
nonintervention.
1
As observed by Chief Judge Wright in his concurring opinion below:
"Congress has initiated the termination of treaties by directing or requiring the President to give notice of
termination, without any prior presidential request. Congress has annulled treaties without any presidential
notice. It has conferred on the President the power to terminate a particular treaty, and it has enacted statutes
practically nullifying the domestic effects of a treaty and thus caused the President to carry out termination. . .
.
"Moreover, Congress has a variety of powerful tools for influencing foreign policy decisions that bear on treaty
matters. Under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, it can regulate commerce with foreign nations, raise
and support armies, and declare war. It has power over the appointment of ambassadors and the funding of
embassies and consulates. Congress thus retains a strong influence over the President's conduct in treaty
matters.
"As our political history demonstrates, treaty creation and termination are complex phenomena rooted in the
dynamic relationship between the two political branches of our government. We thus should decline the
invitation to set in concrete a particular constitutionally acceptable arrangement by which the President and
Congress are to share treaty termination." App. to Pet. for Cert. 44A-45A (footnotes omitted).
2
This Court, of course, may not prohibit state courts from deciding political questions, any more than it may
prohibit them from deciding questions that are moot, Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 434, 72
S.Ct. 394, 96 L.Ed. 475 (1952), so long as they do not trench upon exclusively federal questions of foreign
policy. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441, 88 S.Ct. 664, 19 L.Ed.2d 683 (1968).