STO TOMAS v SALAC

F: On June 7, 1995, Congress enacted RA 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filip
ino Act of 1995) that set policies on overseas employment and establishes a high
er standard of protection of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and
overseas Filipinos in distress.
The respondents in this case filed petitions praying to declare certain sections
in the law unconstitutional.
I: Whether or not Secs. 29 and 30 of the law are unconstitutional.
H/R: NOT AN ISSUE. MOOT AND ACADEMIC BY THE PASSAGE OF RA 9422.
Filed: Salac, Arcophil
- These sections deal with the deregulation of the business of handling the recr
uitment and migration of OFWs, leading to the phasing out of the regulatory func
tions of the POEA within 5 years.
- In addition to these, petitioners also argue to nullify DOLE DO 10 and POEA MC
15.
- Args: Would lead to less protection for migrant workers, contrary to the Const
itutional mandate.
>> Petition was granted by the QC RTC [though the sections were not declared unc
onstitutional in the RTC]. (actually 2 parallel petitions, including the Salac g
roup)
>> Several other groups intervened in the case, primarily arguing that the RTC d
ecision gravely affected the deployment of OFWs and performing artists. A TRO wa
s issued for this purpose.
>> However, RA 9422 was signed into law, which expressly repealed Secs. 29 and 3
0 of RA 8042 and adopted a new policy of close government regulation.
In particular: Regulation through a licensing and registration system, a system
for promotion and monitoring overseas employment, increased human rights protect
ion, and limitation of deployment to countries with bilateral labor agreements.
I: Whether or not Secs. 6, 7, and 9 of RA 8042 are unconstitutional.
H/R: NONE OF THEM ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Filed: PASEI
- These sections deal with crimes and prohibited acts under RA 8042. Sec. 6 defi
nes illegal recruitment, 7 deals with penalties for prohibited practices as defi
ned under the law, and 9 allows for the filing of criminal actions arising from
illegal recruitment before the RTC of the province/city where the offense was co
mmitted or where the offended party actually resides.
- Arg/MLA RTC: Sec. 6 is vague (fails to distinguish between licensed and non-li
censed recruiters -- gives undue advantage to non-licensed recruiters)
- SC: Clear and unambiguous; actually makes a distinction-- the mere act of enga
ging in certain acts without the appropriate license/authority are guilty of IR
whether or not they actually commit the wrongful acts. Licensed ones are only gu
ilty if they commit wrongful acts under Sec. 6.
- Arg/MLA RTC: Sec. 7 makes a sweeping application of penaltiies that do not dis
tinguish as to the seriousness of the act. [failure to render a report has a pen
alty ranging from 6y1d to life imprisonment depending on the number of persons w
ho commit it]
- SC: Congress was acting on its own prerogative to determine what acts are equa
lly reprehensible, consistent with the State policy on protection labor. Congres
s considered that OFWs work outside the country and beyond immediate protection-
- law must make an effort to protect them from illegal recruiters, etc. Valid ex
ercise of police power. [and also a political question]
- Arg/MLA RTC: Sec. 9 negates the general rule on venue of criminal cases: place
where the crime or any essential elements were committed. Venue is jurisdiction
al in penal laws-- otherwise, there would be a violation of due process.
- SC: Sec. 15(a), Rule 110 ROC allows exceptions for venue as provided by law. I
t is an exception.
I: Whether or not Sec. 10 para. 2 is unconstitutional.
H/R: NO. LIABILITY NOT AUTOMATIC; NO VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.
Filed: Cuaresmas - began from a claim for death and insurance benefits and damag
es against Becmen/White Falcon for the death of the petitioner's daughter while
working in RIyadh. (LA dismissed claim-- OWWA already released insurance benef
its; suicide considered ;; NLRC reversed ;; CA affirmed ;; SC affirmed partially
, deleting some awards but ruling that even the foreign employer is solidarily l
iable alongside the local agencies) ;; Officers of the agencies filed this prese
nt case
- Sec. 10 holds corporate directors solidarily liable with the company for money
claims filed by OFWs vs their employers and recruitment firms.
- QC RTC: Unconstitutional. Absent sufficient proof that officers had knowledge
of and allowed the IR, making them automatically liable would violate their righ
t to due process.
- SC: Liability is not automatic. They may excuse themselves by showing they wer
e not remiss in directing the affairs of the company [similar to vicarious liabi
lity]. In this case, Becmen's officers were at fault because they failed to inve
stigate Cuaresma's cause of death.
--
HORNALES v NLRC
F: The respondent agency sent Hornales, together with other Filipinos, to Singap
ore for work there. They were welcomed by Victor Lim, the owner of Step-Up Agenc
y, who informed them they would be working as fishermen with a monthly salary of
USD200, and on the Ruey Hom #3. [Oct 1991]
The vessel's conditions were substandard-- inadequate supplies, maltreatment by
the captain, and lack of medical attendance. Worse, the petitioners were overwor
ked: 22 hrs. / day without pay. Unable to bear this, he joined the other workers
in leaving the vessel while it was docked at the Mauritius Islands on Jul 1992.

Upon returning to the Philippines, Hornales asked the private respondents to pay
his salaries. They didn't-- they required him to surrender his passport promisi
ng another job, and only gave him P500. Hornales filed with the POEA a complaint
for non-payment of wages and recovery of damages against JEAC and its owner; it
s surety, Country Bankers was later impleaded.
Ans: Hornales, Lim and co. are total strangers to them. According to a Joint Aff
idavit by Hornales' co-workers, they were direct hires in Singapore as Hornales
was a tourist.
Rep: Not a stranger-- he knew Cayanan since 1990 from the San Lazaro horse races
. In fact, while the vessel was docked in the Mauritius Islands, Cayanan reminde
d him and his co-workers of their loan obligations and agreements to deduct from
their salaries the amount of their loans.
POEA: Favored petitioner. Only local agency was liable.
NLRC: Reversed. No e-er. Was a tourist in Singapore, who obtained employment dir
ectly. The agency merely obtained a tourist passport and plane ticket as a trave
l agent.
I: Whether or not the respondents were responsible for petitioners' recruitment
and deployment to Singapore.
H/R:
- The Court weighed the evidence presented by both parties to determine the rela
tionship between the petitioners and respondents. These are:
- Petitioner: Checks and agreements
- Respondents: Joint affidavit, certification by Step-Up
- Joint affidavit: In labor cases, the Court held that where the adverse party i
s deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are trea
ted as hearsay evidence unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to tes
tify on. Here, the necessary requirements for the affidavit to be treated as tes
timonial evidence were not present-- the joint affidavits have no probative valu
e.
- Certification: Victor Lim was not cross-examined, and the certification was no
t verified under oath. It must also be noted that Lim and Step-Up, acted in conc
ert in his deployment. Self-serving.
- PNB Checks: Disprove total stranger theory. These documents show that Cayanan
and Lim acted in tandem. They show a joint account, and a contract of agency.
- Photocopy: Best evidence rule admits of exceptions. When the document
cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the part of the offeror, or whe
n the original is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party and t
he adverse party fails to produce it after reasonable notice, or when the origin
al is lost/destroyed, the photocopies will do. [Original checks: Surrender to ba
nk; Agreements: Cayanan has them]. At any rate, POEA proceedings are not litigat
ions-- technicalities may not apply.
Effect: JEAC was no mere travel agency-- JEAC was even pleaded as a licensed rec
ruitment agency. [there is a possibility now that JEAC was responsible]
- The agreements further prove that there is an internal arrangement between JEA
C and Lim. Why else would there be an agreement?
- No employment contract: this will go against JEAC itself! This cannot absolve
them. In fact, it may lead to cancellation/suspension of license under the POEA
Rules and Regulations (Sec. 2, Rule I, Bk VI).
- Liability: Solidary with the insurance company. Sec. 1-f-3 of Rule II Bk II fo
r JEAC, Sec. 4 Rule II Bk II for insurance company.
--
SAGUN v SUNACE
F: Petitioner claimed that sometime in Aug 1998, she applied with respondent for
the position of caretaker in Taiwan; in consideration for her placement and emp
loyment, she paid P30,000 cash-- P10k in the form a promissory note, and NTD60k
through salary deduction, in violation of the prohibition on excessive fees. She
also claimed that the respondent promised to employ her as a caretaker, but at
the job site, she worked as a DH and in a poultry-farm.
Ans: Only collected P20840, the amount authorized by POEA-- receipt was issued f
or this purpose. Did not furnish/publish any false notice or information/documen
t.
POEA: Dismissed for lack of merit. Must establish facts through evidence-- respo
ndent had an official receipt to counter the allegation.
SOL: Partially granted. Liable for excessive placement fee. OP affirmed [issuanc
e of receipt could not be expected]
CA: Reversed for lack of sufficient evidence.
I: Whether or not Sunace collected excessive fees, contrary to the POEA regulati
ons.
H/R: NO.
- The quantum of evidence required to establish a fact is substantial evidence--
that level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequat
e to justify a conclusion. Based on the evidence presented:
- acknowledgment receipt v. photocopy of promissory note and testimonies on purp
orted deductions. -- receipts are written and signed acknowledgment of delivery.
Not conclusive, but there does not seem to be enough evidence to refute the amo
unt in the receipt.
- Promissory note not adequate -- it acknowledges a debt, but it does not necess
arily refer to placement fees. Further, the fact that respondent is not a lendin
g company does not preclude it from extending a loan for personal use.
- Deductions -- no documents showing this.