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By Guilherme Casares
brazils Ministry of External Relations, a Pillar of the nation,
Struggles Toward a democratic Foreign Policy
Itamaratys Mission
O
ne of the few certainties about Brazils political landscape is the timeless
quality of its foreign service. The Brazilian Ministry of External Rela-
tions (also known as Itamaraty, the Modernist palace designed by Oscar
Niemeyer where it is housed in Braslia) often prides itself on having some of the
worlds most professional diplomats. Over the past century, the ministry has been
responsible for constructing a sound foreign policy repertoire built upon principles
such as pacism, multilateralism, and realismwith Jos Maria da Silva Paranhos
Jnior, the Baro do Rio Branco, one of Brazils national heroes, as their main inspi-
ration. Some would even go as far as to claim that the evolution of Itamaraty, both
as an institution and as the centerpiece of foreign policymaking, has walked hand in
hand with the formation of Brazils national identity.
In recent years, however, Brazilian foreign policy and its admirable operators
have fallen under heavy public scrutiny. Common sense has it that it all started with
the allegedly controversial diplomatic choices made by president Luiz Incio Lula
da Silva and his party, the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT) in the
last decade. Lulas foreign policy, by detaching itself from the traditional guidelines
of the countrys diplomacy, would have put our international credibility at risk by
courting leftist dictators and insisting on an ideology-driven, third-worldish ori-
entation. Surprised and enraged at the attempt to break with the past, a number of
diplomats and scholars, backed by some important business sectors and opposition
parties, have come to the fore to denounce the perils of that new global strategy.
Some analysts, on the other hand, claim that debate over foreign policy is just a
natural outcome of Brazils democratic maturity. One
thing is certain: while public debate on foreign affairs
in Brazil was no novelty, never before did it take such
signicant proportions.
v Itamaraty Palace,
Braslia, March 22, 2010.
Andr Vieira
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At rst, criticism focused only on international options, opportunities, and out-
comes. The president and his close aidesForeign Minister Celso Amorim and Lulas
personal advisor, Marco Aurlio Garciawere the ones to blame. However, rifts within
Itamaraty and between diplomats, organized public and private sectors, and the general
public, became deeper to the point of lling pages of editorials and Op-Eds and hitting
the headlines on the countrys leading newspapersO Estado de So Paulo (OESP),
Folha de So Paulo (FSP), and O Globo. What started as a purported crisis of foreign
policy developed into a crisis within foreign policymaking. Brazilian diplomacy now,
unlike any other moment in its history, is being put up against the wall. One respected
Brazilianist, Sean Burges, of the Australian National University, recently posed the
most sensitive of questions: Is Itamaraty a problem for Brazilian foreign policy?

What exactly is happening to Itamaraty, and what to do about it? The extent of
the public debate and the harm it may cause to one of Brazils most prestigious insti-
tutions is yet to be assessed. What is possible to say about it so far is that it has at
least three different sourcesa triple crisis therefore. The common denominator
between the three is, above all, the fact that they have been identied (and amplied)
in the pages of newspapers. Let us call those processes a crisis of ideological neutrality;
a crisis of cognitive dissonance; and a crisis of social legitimacy. All changes are the
natural outcome of democratic processes that have intensied in the past decades and
have taken their toll on the logic of Brazils diplomatic structures. While it may pose
challenges to Itamaraty and, ultimately, to Brazilian foreign policy, it also offers some
opportunities for the future.
I Come to Serve Brazil
There are several reasons why diplomacy has become so central to the development
of Brazils national characterwhich sometimes seems to be a work in progress that
does not coincide with independence. Diplomacy has literally shaped our borders.
Modern Brazil originates from two treaties signed between Portugal and Spain under
the auspices of the Catholic Church: the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), brokered right
after the rst Iberian mission to the New World, and the Treaty of Madrid (1750),
which acknowledged the Portuguese rights to territory at the heart of South America,
based on the long-standing custom of Uti Possidetis. According to the notable thesis of
Ambassador Synsio Goes Filho, Brazil has been founded by sailors, bandeirantes (the
Brazilian pioneers), and diplomats.

While the rst two agents are common to many
countries in their path toward territorial consolidation, wars often replaced diplomacy
in shaping modern statehood, particularly among former colonies. Brazil, on the other
hand, is a country that has been almost entirely forged by diplomacyto the extent
that our rejection of the use of force has become part of our national identity

.
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Diplomacy has always been the ticket to Brazils international recognition.
Among the continental-sized nations of the globe, which George Kennan pictured
as monster countries, Brazil has never been able to match its territorial assets with
military or economic might.

Only by mimicking the behavior and style of traditional
European diplomatic services from the earliest days of the nineteenth century would
the Brazilian Empire be accepted in the foreign circles in the Old World. The country
paved its way into becoming, at the turn of that century, a champion of parliamentary
diplomacy, embodied in multilateral initiatives such as the Pan-American Conferences
and the League of Nations. As the country and its foreign policy grew in maturity,
it would become a norm entrepreneur on its own, helping devise rules for global
regimes in issue-areas as diverse as free trade or environmental protection.
Finally, diplomacy has been the motor of development since the early days of indus-
trialization. Most of the policies that have been played out along Brazils path toward
industry represent an intricate equation between resource allocation and international
bargaining. Although the domestic-foreign nexus has taken many different forms, it is
possible to argue that, from Getlio Vargas in the 1930s to Ernesto Geisel in the 1970s,
or even to Lula in the past decade, a great share of Brazilian development has relied on
foreign strategies to build the countrys base industry, attract investments for infrastruc-
ture, or boost trade globally. Economic pragmatism has been the guideline of Brazils
foreign relations, and is often regarded as one of the main assets of its diplomacy.
It therefore comes as no surprise that Itamaraty has, in many ways, become greater
than governments themselves. More than just an element of Brazils national construc-
tion, the Ministry of External Relations boldly claims to be the champion of the national
interest. Foreign policy, unlike many other public policies, is presented as a state policy
and does not subject itself to partisan incongruities. Diplomats and scholars often quote,
as the foundation stone of such claim, Baro do Rio Brancos inaugural speech upon
taking ofce as foreign minister in 1902: I come not to serve a political party; I come to
serve Brazil, which we all want to see united, integrated, strong, and respected.


Over the course of the twentieth century, the success of Brazils diplomacy was
cherished as an island of tranquility in a sea of turbulence, given the numerous upheav-
als the political system had gone through. It seemed to many as if Itamaraty remained
as the only stable institution in a nation torn by opposing social forces, having survived
several coups dtat and economic breakdowns, thus revealing the genuine identity of
a people struggling to make sense of its past with an eye on the future. Indeed, in that
same speech, Rio Branco went on to say that in his past diplomatic deeds he received
the support of the entire Brazilian people, having completely identied with it.
That feeling apparently remained for the next hundred years. The moral author-
ity of Brazilian diplomacy was kept largely unchallenged among social actors and
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political institutions. Foreign policymaking in the second half of the twentieth century
witnessed a slow yet consistent move towards bureaucratic insulation. Congressional
activism on foreign affairs, which helped shape international outcomes in the hectic
postwar years, was replaced by Itamaratys virtual monopoly over policymaking as
the military took over in March 1964. While it did not represent any major change of
courseafter all, Brazilian foreign policy is known for its continuityit empowered
diplomats to dene and implement, to an unprecedented extent, what they thought
best suited Brazils national aspirations. By the mid-1970s, there were few doubts
among domestic and international spectators that the countrys sound foreign policy
strategy was the key for Brazil to become a global power on its own.
In spite of all the economic and political setbacks that marked Brazils entry into
the next decade (the lost decadedue to slow growth rates and escalating ination),
diplomatic orientations still enjoyed a great deal of popular acceptance. The deepening
rift between the incumbent military and the civilian opposition in the early 1980s only
revealed the strength of Brazilian foreign policy and of diplomats, widely acclaimed
for their deeds on both sides of the political struggle. When Tancredo Neves, the rst
civilian candidate for president after a long military rule, was elected in early 1985, he
is said to have decided to keep foreign policy untouched for it represented a supra-
partisan consensus.

While the late president-electNeves passed away even before
taking ofce, but his diplomatic legacy remainedwas referring to unanimity around
the content of foreign policy, his statement reveals a second, and deeper, consensus:
that Itamaraty is the backbone of foreign policymaking.
Transition to democracy did not challenge, at rst, the notion that the national
interest was a reality and that it would still be dened by one single group of states-
people. Not even the new constitution, which was adopted in 1988 and granted
enlarged powers and duties to the congress, changed diplomats de facto monopoly
over foreign affairs. To the contrary, yet another tradition was born: the diplo-
matic posts which could erstwhile be lled by politiciansthose of ambassador and
the foreign minister itselfwere progressively given to career diplomats, to the point
that no high-level foreign policy position today is out of Itamaratys domain. One
exception is that of Ambassador Laercio Vinhas, Brazils permanent representative
to the International Atomic Energy Agency, who is a long-time public servant and
renowned scholar in the eld of nuclear energy.
Ruinous Attacks
As Brazils foreign relations became more complex, mostly thanks to growing economic
interdependence and to greater activism of organized civil society, diplomacy was faced
with numerous challenges to its traditional role. Issues relating to trade and regional
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integration were progressively scattered across several federal institutions, most notably
at the Brazilian Foreign Trade Chamber (Cmara de Comrcio Exterior, or CAMEX)
within the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade (which incorporated
the adjective foreign as late as 1999). Modalities of cooperation, such as technical
cooperation or cooperation for development, have become particularly intense in issues
as diverse as health, tourism, agriculture, and education, and have been carried out by
their respective ministries. Even though the Brazilian government had already created
an ofcial cooperation agency (Agncia Brasileira de Cooperao, or ABC) under the
auspices of Itamaraty in 1987, inter-ministerial coordination around the foreign policy
agenda has been relatively low, irrespective of (or due to) several attempts by the foreign
ministry to retain its centrality in those key areas of foreign policymaking.
Moreover, the last three decades marked a watershed in state-society relations in
Brazil, with the rise of social movements and organized interest groups. This has also
caused turbulence in foreign policymaking in two different aspects.
First of all, in the wake of a new democratic regime, Itamaraty had to engage with
societal demands at an unprecedented level, being pressured by what they understood
as a democratic circumstance.

Having realized the inevitability of addressing such
demands, the ministry took up the duty of devising new channels of dialogue. One of
the most crucial moments in this process was the launching of a government-spon-
sored cycle of seminars on the future of Brazils foreign policy in 1993, which paved the
way for more intense talks between Itamaraty diplomats, businesspeople, labor union
leaders, and scholars. However, despite some concrete changessuch as the deepening
of relations between the ministry and subnational units, or the strengthening of dia-
logue with business sectors through permanent committees or working groupsthe
declared goal of making foreign policy more democratic is yet to be fully attained.
Surveys conducted by Professor Amaury de Souza between 2001 and 2008 with several
interest groups (business associations, government ministries, communication media,
the congress, universities, NGOs, labor unions) show that they consider that Itamaraty
does not give them enough attention.

Secondly, public debate over foreign policy in Brazil has grown considerably in
recent times. This was, in a way, propelled by the expansion of international rela-
tions undergraduate courses and graduate programs (from two in 1985 to more than
a hundred today). The number of specialized journals, masters theses, and doctoral
dissertations in the elds of international politics and foreign policy also has risen
sharply in the last two decades.

Yet, recent academic developments may not sufce
when attempting to grasp the broader picture of Brazils international choices among
the general public. Considering that the electoral impact of foreign affairs on voters
and candidates is still rather low, salience in public opinion seems to be best measured
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by the growing number of editorials, Op-Eds, and analyses on foreign policy issues
in Brazils leading newspapers. Indeed, mass media has become the main battleeld
of ideas regarding Brazilian diplomatic choices and orientations, not rarely opposing
the incumbent governmentand offering plenty of room for critics, from scholars to
businesspeople to retired diplomats. However limited the agenda-setting capacity of
print news media is, their readership is far from negligible.
Curiously enough, during most of the Lula administration, when public attacks
against his foreign choices became commonplace, Itamaraty was spared from harsher
criticism. One thing critics were cautious about was to dissociate the foreign ministry
as an institution from the specic policymakers in charge of foreign affairs. In the last
four years, however, public debate in mass media shifted from criticism against Lulas
foreign policy to severe slings and arrows directed at diplomats and their century-
old institution. Even though there have always been critics of Itamaraty (particularly
among business sectors, non-governmental organizations, and scholars), the ministry
was able to shield itself against public bickering, responding to the discontent on a
case by case basis and controlling the opening of channels of dialogue. The strat-
egy, however, did not survive the mounting rhetorical attacks that intensied in the
last years of the Lula administration, and that have become ruinous under President
Dilma Rousseff, leading to the triple crisis at the heart of Brazilian public service.
National Interest or Party Interest?
The crisis of ideological neutrality refers to the alleged inuence of partisan interests
on foreign policymaking. Partidarization, as it is often called, is associated with the
Lula administration and is said to represent an unprecedented rollback of Brazils for-
eign policy. It contradicts, all at once, the most basic tenet of Brazilian diplomacythe
monolithic unity of the national interest, and its most important characteristic, its linear-
ity and continuity over time. Having initially been formulated as a mere change in tone
and emphasis, it developed into a grave disruption of diplomatic tradition. When Lula
took ofce in 2003, backed by a left-wing coalition, he is said to have used foreign policy
to counterbalance the orthodox macroeconomic policies he had promised to undertake.
While change, at that point, was more of rhetoric than of substance, it seems to
have deepened old cleavages within Itamaraty that became visible some years later. In
a 2007 interview with leading news magazine Veja, Roberto Abdenurwho had been
secretary-general of Itamaraty and ambassador to the United Statescharged the
government with promoting ideological indoctrination in the ministry. Young dip-
lomats were being brainwashed and forced to read biased literature while older civil
servants were promoted according to political afnities and ideologies. Itamaraty
needs to restore its professionalism free from ideological postures, intolerant attitudes,
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and partisan identication, concluded Abdenur.

He was promptly seconded by
former Foreign Minister Mrio Gibson Barboza and by other senior diplomats in
other leading newspapers, who attacked the political adhesion imposed by the new
chiefs. Nevertheless, the thesis of partisan interferenceor the crisis of ideological
neutralitywould be penned by former Foreign Minister Celso Lafer, who served
under presidents Fernando Collor de Mello and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in the
pages of O Estado de So Paulo in late 2009.
His thesis ows from three logically connected arguments. The rst one suggests
that, if the state apparatus was taken over by the Workers Partys rank and le to
fulll long-term political aspirations, then the same logic would apply for Itamaraty,
albeit at a slower pace. The key role played in the bureaucratic structure by openly
left-wing diplomats, such as the then-Secretary-General Samuel Pinheiro Guimares
(20032009) or Foreign Minister Amorim himself (who joined the PT in 2008) pro-
vides good evidence that the diplomatic agenda was being hijacked by the incumbent
political group. That would break with the (otherwise unshakable) notion that dip-
lomats serve the Brazilian state, not specic governments. The second argument is
built upon the idea that there have been consistent efforts to put Itamaraty on the
sidelines of foreign policymaking in key areas, such as relations with Latin American
countriesthe most visible of those being the appointment of Marco Aurlio Garcia,
a longtime party gure, to the position of special advisor for international affairs to
President Lula. Finally, partidarization was being noticed in preferences and out-
comes of Brazils foreign agenda. In the eyes of the critics, the countrys helmsmen
were responsible for leading Brazil to an atypical position of subservience to neigh-
boring caudillos such as Venezuelas Hugo Chvez or Bolivias Evo Morales. Globally,
spectators were taken aback by the enthusiasm with which Lula shook hands with
controversial leaders such as Muammar Gadha, Bashar Al-Assad, or Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad. The natural conclusion was that from the standpoint of the conduc-
tion of foreign policy, partidarization has been leading to mistakes in diplomacy.


Following Lafers Op-Ed, several versions of the same thesis were published in
newspapers by high-ranked retired diplomats identied with the Cardoso adminis-
tration, or by scholars who have become known by their objections to the Workers
Party. Interestingly, the discussion has not received much academic attention, nor has
it been taken seriously by members of the governmentwho, despite having been
constantly asked about the phenomenon of partidarization in interviews with
newspapers and magazines, did not show much interest in developing on the sub-
ject. We may look at it in two different ways. If the point of the criticism is valid,
then it is natural that policymakers will avoid talking about it publicly. On the other
hand, silence about partidarization may reveal that there are more important issues
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one should address when it comes to Brazils foreign policy challenges. An interview
given by Special Advisor Marco Aurlio Garcia to Folha de So Paulo in late 2013 is
quite telling in this sense. In an attempt to dodge the question about the relationship
between party politics and the national interest, he afrms that the main lines of for-
eign policy [in Brazil] are established by the president. Even if partisan interests are
not a problem, it seems that the traditional narrative is being challenged by actors that
had seldom taken part in foreign policy making in the past.
Diplomacy and the Presidency
The second crisis of Brazilian diplomacy has to do with the growing divergence
between the president and the foreign ministry. This is often attributed to the develop-
ment of a phenomenon called presidential diplomacy, according to which the head
of state would take on a more prominent role in foreign policymaking. While there
may be specic constitutional provisions for those roles, many of the activities con-
ducted by the president take place in an informal and voluntarist fashion. Therefore,
presidential diplomacy is usually identied with strong chiefs of executive, as in the
postwar United States or in the French Fifth Republic. In Brazil, it only gained force
in the early 1990s, and most of the diplomatic efforts undertaken by the presidents at
that moment were related to the need to restore international credibility by reafrm-
ing our democratic credentials.
The new diplomatic reality, in which presidents are active international stakeholders
and multilateral summits take place quite often, has also transformed the relationship
between public opinion, the mass media, and international affairs in Brazil. As long
as the presidents actions abroad naturally receive more media attention, diplomacy is
forced to become more accountable, which also contributes to the political salience of
world issues. In a nutshell, Brazilian heads of state may use the countrys global standing
to boost their own popularity at home; conversely, the center of gravity of popu-
lar support to international choices shifts from a vague identication with Itamaraty
towards a more specic relationship with the president. In any event, for good or ill, the
otherwise linear diplomatic orientation put forth by the Ministry of External Relations
becomes more complex and intertwined with domestic forces and partisan interests.
With an eye on the public, the president helps turn foreign policy into a public policy,
which may endanger Brazils long-standing diplomatic orientations. At the same time,
tradition should be preserved to some degree for the sake of coherence.
If coherence is something to be sought after, then the president and diplomats must
establish a good working relationship, with the foreign minister as the link between
them. This has been generally true for the Cardoso and Lula administrations, and
some even claim that their success abroad was made possible by the harmony between
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the strategies forged by the presidents and the idea of national interest secured by the
ministry. When Dilma Rousseff was elected in 2010, many thought she would return
foreign policymaking to Itamaraty, given her apparent lack of interest in global ques-
tionsexcept for the defense of human rights, which was part of the presidents own
biography. The nomination of Ambassador Antonio Patriota as foreign minister, who
had a lower and more technical prole than his predecessor, also pointed towards a
risk-averse foreign policy. In any case, expectations were high that traditional diplo-
matic guidelines would be maintained, building on the achievements of previous years.
President Rousseffs relationship with the diplomatic institution, however, did
not turn out as imagined by several analysts and policymakers. It was clear, on the
one hand, that she would retreat from the active presidential diplomacy of the prior
heads of state. But rather than simply transfer some political prerogatives back to
Itamaraty, she decided to impose her own worldview on how foreign policy should
be made, dramatically constraining diplomats room for action. While it seemingly
had to do with her personal traits and leadership style, with a more centralized
and straightforward touch (as opposed, for instance, to Lulas largely consensual
style), it ended up revealing an insurmountable cognitive divergence between the
president and the foreign ministry. Ever since President Rousseff took ofce there
have been several accounts of public and private disagreements between herself and
Foreign Minister Patriota; and other ministers were placed at the center of foreign
policymaking. To one journalist, the problem was that diplomats were not able to
adapt themselves to the presidents demands, which led Brazil to have weaker global
positions.

To another, quoting a senior diplomat, there is a growing sensation that
the president deems diplomacy irrelevant and diplomats as a hindrance to her
foreign policy goals.

The unwanted but expected outcome is instability at the core
of foreign policymaking.
Indeed, some of Brazils major initiatives abroad in the last three years were under-
taken without greater engagement, or even prior knowledge, of the foreign ministry.
The ambitious Science without Borders program, aimed at sending undergraduate and
graduate students to top-notch universities in the elds of science, technology, and
innovation, was almost entirely devised and carried out by the ministries of educa-
tion and of science and technologyeven though it partially changed the countrys
international priorities. Infrastructure projects connecting Brazil and its neighbors,
whose goal is to overcome some persistent economic bottlenecks, gained priority over
regional political agreements that marked previous administrations. Itamaraty played
a secondary role in the diplomatic maneuver that admitted Venezuela to Mercosur,
after suspending Paraguays membership due to an alleged breach of democracy. It fell
to Lus Incio Adams, attorney general of the Union, not Patriota, to make a public
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case for the Brazilian government in Folha de So Paulowhich raised doubts as to
whether the decision was made with the consent of diplomatic ofcers.


Finally, the most celebrated diplomatic achievement of the Rousseff administra-
tionthe election of Brazilian Ambassador Roberto Azevdo as director-general of
the World Trade Organizationwas claimed to be the fruit of the personal engage-
ment in negotiations of President Rousseff and of Development, Industry and Foreign
Trade Minister Fernando Pimentel. In the governments ofcial narrative, no word
has been said about the diplomatic contacts built by Itamaraty in the previous years
and which were key to Azevdos victory. The foreign ministry has been portrayed as
unimportant even in the most central foreign policy issues. This weakens Itamaraty
within the government (already the ministry receives the second smallest budget allo-
cation out of thirty-nine ministries) and undermines the prestige of diplomacy in the
eyes of the public.
Occupy Itamaraty
The third crisis is the growing incompatibility between foreign policy and social
demands. There are several reasons why foreign policy remained unchallenged over
the decades, most of which related to the notion that diplomatic orientations under-
taken by Itamaraty enjoyed broad consensus along party lines. It may be argued
that this agreement has been eroding from the moment foreign policy became a
distributive issue. Democratization on the one hand and economic opening on the
other, have been major forces in shaping the political process in post-authoritarian
Brazil. One of the outcomes was the progressive transformation of foreign policy
into a public policy. Both international and societal demands had become more
complex, with the potential to undermine the longtime understanding that Brazils
international affairs were driven by a monolithic national interest dened exclu-
sively by Itamaraty. Professor Matias Spektor, who writes a fortnightly column on
foreign affairs in Folha de So Paulo, has wisely pointed out that the greatest foreign
policy challenge for the next years will be meeting the demands of the newand
growingworking class in Brazil.

Signs of divided opinion on diplomatic paths have been quite evident ever since
President Cardoso took ofcethey intensied under President Lula. The interesting
aspect of the struggle is that most of the criticism was red at the presidents them-
selves and their foreign policy choices, leaving Itamaraty untouched. It leads us to
the necessary distinction, which is particularly critical in the Brazilian case, between
diplomacy and foreign policy. While the former is often related to the work of diplo-
mats on behalf of the foreign ministry, the latter encompasses a broader set of policies
which are directed to foreign countries, regional blocs, or multilateral institutions. As
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already mentioned, the two concepts converged for most of the twentieth century,
given Itamaratys enlarged role and prerogatives in foreign policymaking. Thanks to
the greater complexity of Brazils global agenda, diplomacy went on to become, in
the last two decades, a subset of foreign policysurely, the most important one, but
struggling to maintain its centrality in a context of rapid social, economic, and politi-
cal transformations at home and abroad.
Guided by the long-standing motto the best tradition of Itamaraty is to be able
to renew itself, several institutional adaptations were undertaken within the ministry
to keep up with these changes, such as increasing the number of diplomatic positions,
improving recruitment mechanisms and bureaucratic structures, as well as enhancing
transparency through public diplomacy, social media, and academic publishing.

For
many years, the ministrys slow but inevitable opening to democratic forces was enough
to shield diplomacy from public attack, mostly so because Itamaraty still enjoyed a great
deal of prestige among presidents and within the public administration. Nevertheless,
with the dramatic weakening of the foreign ofce in the Rousseff years, it is possible to
suggest that the ministry could not live up to the growing pressure to which it has been
subjectedirrespective of the achievements of the institutional reforms.
The symptoms were many: from high-ranked ofcers being charged with mis-
conduct to allegations of unconstitutional super salaries being paid to ambassadors
overseas, Itamaraty has been exposed like never before. In the most vehement criticism
of the current state of Brazilian diplomacy, veteran journalist Fernando Rodrigues calls
diplomatic excellence a mirage, describes the ministry as a snakepit inhabited by
gossipers, and claims that the foreign ministry possibly has the worst cost/benet
ratio for the Brazilian taxpayers.

While it is not hard to dismiss the overstatements of
a long-standing foe of the diplomatic careerRodrigues published, as early as 2000,
an Op-Ed entitled Privatize Itamaraty

the growing number of scandals that have
hit the headlines is indicative of turbulent times. Things only got worse when Justice
Joaquim Barbosa declared, in an interview with O Globo in August 2013, that the
foreign ministry was one of Brazils most discriminatory institutions. Barbosa, the
countrys rst black Supreme Court president, had been turned down for a diplomatic
career because he did not t into the ideal prole supposedly due to his skin color.
Although Barbosas declaration was quickly disavowed by the ministrys spokesper-
son, his words were a blow to an institution that had been investing in afrmative
action policies for more than a decade.
But perhaps the most eye-catching example of estrangement took place during
the massive popular demonstrations all around Brazil in June 2013. In the countrys
capital, protesters broke into the Itamaraty Palace and left a trace of damage along
the buildings main faade. The palace has long been the greatest symbol of national
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diplomacy and a monument of Brazils republican virtues. The act of vandalism led
Professor Dawisson Lopes to draw a comparison between popular discontent in
Brazil and the United States. In his Op-Ed Occupy Itamaraty (in a clear parallel
with the events in Wall Street), he argues that the excessive formalism of Brazilian
diplomacy is incompatible with political practices of the twenty-rst century. His
conclusion points out to a structural problem which relates to the very nature of the
diplomatic activity: in a time of instant and massive communication, in which indi-
viduals, making use of their portable devices, exchange information from any point
of the planet it becomes less sensible for the taxpayer to fund public ofcers to
perform apparently simple tasks such as sending ofcial telegrams or promoting cour-
tesy among nations.

It seems high time that a thorough public relations reform is
undertaken to bring Itamaraty closer to the general public (not to mention to the key
interest groups). Only by restoring its legitimacy and popular support will the minis-
try be able to regain ground as the pillar of foreign policymaking in Brazil.
In Search of Renewal
Even though the word crisis is often employed in its negative sense, one of Merriam-
Websters denitions is an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a
decisive change is impending. There is no denying that Brazilian diplomacy is going
through difcult moments, and that a major transformation is being demanded from
many different sides. After all, Brazilian democracy has come of age. But it is impor-
tant to assess the depth and extent of the three crises, for they do not represent equal
challenges to the future of Itamaraty and of Brazils foreign policy as we know it.
While the crisis of ideological neutrality is the most commonly mentioned in the
pages of newspapershaving become a staple among journalists and politiciansit is
probably the least perilous to the foreign service. Partisan interference in diplomatic
affairs is relatively low, and strategies played out by specic administrations rarely
contradict the goals and traditions set forth by Itamaraty. As long as foreign policy
remains salient in the public agenda, debates over the ideological leanings of foreign
policymakers will eventually surface. Judging by the last two decades, however, the
impact of such discussions will be triing.
The second and third crises should be of greater concern. If presidential diplomacy
is not necessarily antithetical to the traditional foundations of Brazilian diplomacy, it
becomes a problem when the relationship between the chief executive and the dip-
lomatic body is marked by divergent worldviews. That seems to be the case of the
current administration, and one of the most daunting tasks of the new foreign minister,
Luiz Alberto Figueiredo, is to build stronger bridges between the president (and all
political imperatives that come with the ofce) and the long-standing role of Itamaraty.
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In any event, cognitive dissonance is a short-term issue; power shifts at the top of
the executive branch may open up opportunities for new equilibria between politi-
cians and diplomats. Societal demands, on the other hand, are a much stronger force,
but its impacts are only felt in the long run. Apparently, given the conuence of chal-
lenges the Brazilian diplomatic structure has to face, the time has arrived for a decisive
change in how Itamaraty addresses the idea of a democratic foreign policy. With
improved accountability mechanisms and a renewed reputation among the general
public, the Ministry of External Relations may nd the necessary leverage to over-
come the so-called crises and to live up to the challenges of this new century, while
remaining the cornerstone of our national aspirations.