12 SCRA 648 Civil Law Torts and Damages Article 21 of the Civil Code Moral Damages Exemplary

Damages - Breach of Promise to Marry

Facts:

In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it on
September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding invitations,
bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days before the scheduled
day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be able to attend the wedding
because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to
Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon. However, he never returned.

This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually judgment
was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of Wassmer.

On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous events. He
further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is
no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and moral
damages against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.

HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is true
that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was not a simple
breach of promise to marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velezs
unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmers
cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides in part any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral damages as
properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here,
the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless,
and oppressive manner this warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him.

November 28, 1933
Facts:
This is an appeal by plaintiff and defendant regarding the trial court's decision of denying part
of the relief sought by plaintiffs, where Antonia compels Cesar to recognize Ismael and Pacita,
and of requiring defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.
Cesar Syquia, twenty-three years old, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila,
courted Antonia de Jesus who was 20 years old. Amorous relations between them resulted in de
Jesus giving birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931. They lived together for one year until Antonia
got pregnant again. Cesar left to marry another woman, but he recognized his paternity of the first
child in writing with a letter to the priest and uninterrupted possession of natural child status for
one year. Regarding Pacita, no recognition mentioned.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and
that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said
Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
Held:
The trial court was right in refusing to give damages to de Jesus for supposed breach of
contract. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach
of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or
property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the
features necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a
judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, PacitaLoanco.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

Actions for Breach of promise to marry

Bunag v. CA

Facts: ConradoBunag, Jr. brought ZenaidaCirilo to a motel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said Bunag
brought Cirilo to the house of his grandmother in Las Pias, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21
days. Soon, Bunag and Cirilo filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Bacoor, Cavite. However, Bunag left Cirilo and soon filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license.

Cirilo claims that she was abducted and raped. One of the cases she filed was a suit for damages based on a breach of a
promise to marry. The trial court decided in her favor. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Should damages be awarded based on a breach of a promise to marry?

Decision: No.

In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the
civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Generally,
therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses f or the
wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.

In this case however, moral damages were awarded based on art. 21 of the Civil Code which states that any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for moral damages. As such, the act of Bunag forcibly abducting Cirilo and having carnal knowledge with her against her will,
and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting
with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs.

Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for
that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. Thus, the
damages awarded to Cirilo were proper.






Baksh vs. Court of Appeals (219 SCRA 115)

Facts: Baksh, an Iranian citizen, courted respondent Gonzales. She accepted his love on the condition that they will get married,
so he promised her that he will marry her. Gonzales parents made preparations by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends
and relatives and contracting sponsors. Without getting married, Baksh and Gonzales lived together. Gonzales cherry got popped.
Thereafter, Baksh began maltreating Gonzales and eventually told her that he no longer wanted to marry her and that he was
already married to another woman. Gonzales filed a complaint for damages.

Issue: W/N Article 21 of the New Civil Code is applicable such that damages may be awarded?

Held: Yes! Article 21 applies! SC said that Article 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold moral wrongs which are impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and puni sh
in the statute books.
Where a mans promise to marry is the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation
to fulfil that promise thereafter become the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle
her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honor and reputation
which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs, or public policy.