Remedial Law

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2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
Source: U.P. Law Center
EFFECT OF AMENDMENT TO A PLEADING
Ingr an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land filed in the Regional Trial Court, the
defendanDefendant through his lawyer, filed an answer therein admitting the averment in the
complaint that the land was acquired y the plaintiff through inheritance from his parents, the
former owners thereof.
Susequently, the defendant changed his lawyer and, with leave of court, amended the
answer. !n the amended answer, the aovementioned admission no longer appears" instead, the
alleged ownership of the land y the plaintiff was denied coupled with the allegation that the
defendant is the owner of the land for the reason that he ought the same from the plaintiff#s
parents during their lifetime.
$fter trial, the %egional &rial Court rendered a decision upholding the defendant#s
ownership of the land.
'n appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendant is ound y the admission contained
in his original answer.
!s the contention of plaintiff correct( )hy(
SUGGESTED ANSWER
NO, ecause pleadings that have een amended disappear from the record, lose their
status as pleadings and cease to e *udicial admissions. )hile they may nonetheless e utili+ed as
against the pleader as e,tra*udicial admissions, they must, in order to have such effect, e
formally offered in evidence. -Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 94)
A!TERNATI"E ANSWER
YES, ecause an admission in the original pleading does not cease to e a *udicial admission
simply ecause it was deleted in an amended pleading. &he original answer, although replaced y
an amended answer does not cease to e part of a *udicial record, not having een e,punged
therefrom. -Dissenting opinion in Torres vs. Court of Appeals, 11 SCRA !4)
REMEDIES OF A PARTY DECLARED IN DEFAULT
)hat are the availale remedies of party declared in default:
../ 0efore the rendition of *udgment" .1
2./ $fter *udgment ut efore its finality" and 21
3./ $fter finality of *udgment( 21
SUGGESTED ANSWER
&he availale remedies of a party declared in default are as follows:
../ 0efore the rendition of *udgment
-a/ he may file a motion to dismiss under oath to set aside the order of default on
the grounds of fraud, accident, mista4e or e,cusale negligence and that he
has a meritorious defense - Sec. 356 of %ule 7 /" and if reconsideration is
denied, he may file the special civil action of certiorari for grave ause of
discretion tantamount to lac4 or e,cess of *urisdiction - Sec. . of %ule 89 /" or
-/ he may file a petition for certiorari if he has een illegally declared in derfault
e.g. during the pendency of his motion to dismiss or efore the e,piration of
the time to answer. - :atute v. C$, 28 SC%$ ;8<" $costa='falia v. Sundial, <9
SC%$ >.2 /.
2./ $fter *udgment ut efore its finality, he may file a motion for new trial on the
grounds of fraud, accident, mista4e, e,cusale negligence or a motion for

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reconsideration on gh ground of e,cessive damages, insufficient evidence or the
decision or final order eing contrary to law - Sec. 2 of %ule 3;/" and thereafter, if
the motion is denied, appeal is availale under %ules >? or >., whichever is
applicale.

3./ $fter finality of the *udgment, there are three ways to assail the *udgment, which
are:
-a/ a petition for relied under %ule 3< on the grounds of fraud, accident, mista4e
or e,cusale negligence"
-/ annulment of *udgment under %ule >; for e,trinsic fraud or lac4 of *urisdiction"
-c/ certiorari if the *udgment is void on its face or y the *udicial record. -
0alangcad vs. @ustices of the Court of $ppeals, A.%. Bo. <3<<<, Ceruary
.2,.772, 2?8 SC%$ .;. /
DEATH OF A PARTY
)hat is the effect of the death of a party upon a pending action(
SUGGESTED ANSWER
)hen the claim in a pending action is purely personal, the death of either of the parties
e,tinguishes the claim and the action is dismissed. )hen the claim is not purely personal and is not
therey e,tinguished, the party should e sustituted y his heirs or his e,ecutor or administrator. -
Sec. .8 of %ule 3/. !f the action for recovery of money arising from contract, e,press or implied,
and the defendant dies efore the entry of final *udgment in the court in which the action was
pending at the time of such death, it shall not e dismissed ut shall instead e allowed to
continue until entry of final *udgment. $ favorale *udgment otained y the plaintiff shall e
enforced in the manner provided in the rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a
deceased person. - Sec. 2? of %ule 3/
THIRD PARTY CLAIM; WRIT OF INJUNCTION
Dnforcing a writ of e,ecution issued y the Pasig %egional &rial Court in a civil action, the
sheriff attached several pieces of machinery and equipment found in defendant#s place of usiness.
$ntonio Sadalay filed with the sheriff an affidavit of third=party claim stating that the attached
properties elong to him, not to the defendant.
-a/ Can Sadalay intervene in the case and as4 the Pasig %&C to resolve his third=party claim(
-/ !f Sadalay decides to file a separate action in the %egional &rial Court in :a4ati to
vindicate his claim, may he validly otain a writ of in*unction from the :a4ati %&C to en*oin the
sale in e,ecution of the levied properties(
SUGGESTED ANSWER
a./ NO, Sadalay may not intervene in the case ecause intervention is allowed only
efore or during the trial of the case. !n this case there is already a final and e,ecutory
*udgment. -Sec. 2, %ule .7" 0ayer Phils. Es. $gana, 83 SC%$ 399/ Fowever, he may as4 the
Pasig %&C to resolve preliminarily whether the sheriff acted rightly or wrongly in levying
e,ecution on the properties in question. -'ng vs. &ating, .>7 SC%$ 289/
./ YES, ecause a *udgment rendered in his favor y the :a4ati court declaring him to
e the owner of the properties levied on would not constitute interference with the powers
or processes of the Pasig Court which rendered the *udgment to enforce the e,ecution. !f that
is so, an interlocutory order such as the writ of preliminary in*unction against the sheriff,
upon a claim and prima facie showing of ownership, cannot e considered as such
interference. -A"iera vs. CA, 4# SCRA 14$ S% vs. Disca%a, 1&1 SCRA '&)

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WRIT OF EXECUTION
Plaintiff sued to recover an unpaid loan and was awarded P333,???.?? y the %&C of
:anila. Defendant did not appeal within the period allowed y law. Fe died si, days after the
lapse of the period to appeal. Corthwith, a petition for the settlement of his estate was properly
filed with the %&C of Pampanga where an inventory of all his assets was filed and correspondingly
approved. &hereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for e,ecution with the :anila court, contending
therein that the motion was legally *ustified ecause the defendant died after the *udgment in the
:anila court had ecome final. %esolve the motion and state your reasons.
. /Under the same set of facts as -a/, a writ of e,ecution was issued y the :anila court
upon proper motion three days after the lapse of the period to appeal. &he corresponding
levy on e,ecution was duly effected on defendant#s parcel of land worth P888,???.?? a day
efore the defendant died. )ould it e proper, on motion, to lift the levy on defendant#s
property( State the reasons for your answer.
SUGGESTED ANSWER
-a/ :otion for e,ecution denied.
$lthough the defendant died after the *udgment had ecome final and e,ecutory, it
cannot e enforced y a writ of e,ecution against the estate of the deceased which is in custodia
legis. &he *udgment should e filed as a proven money claim with the %&C of Pampanga. -(aredes
vs. )o%a, 61 SCRA #!')
-/ Bo, since the levy on e,ecution was duly effected on defendant#s parcel of land a day
efore the defendant died, it was valid. &he land may e sold for the satisfaction of the *udgment
and the surplus shall e accounted for y the sheriff to the corresponding e,ecutor or
administrator. -Sec. '*c) of Rule 9)
COUNTERCLAIM
G filed an action for damages against & arising from the latter#s tortuous act. H filed his
$nswer with a counterclaim for damages suffered and e,penses incurred on account of G#s suit.
&hereafter, G moves to dismiss the case since he lost interest in the case. H did not o*ect. &he
court dismissed the action without pre*udice. H moved the to set the reception of his evidence to
prove his counterclaim. !f you were the *udge, how would you resolve the motion( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER
! would deny the motion. !nasmuch as H#s counterclaim for damages incurred on account of
G#s suit cannot remain pending for independent ad*udication, H should have o*ected to the
dismissal of the complaint. Fis failure to o*ect deprived him of the right to present evidence to
prove his counterclaim. - Sec. ! of Rule 1'$ +notorio v. Lira, 1! SCRA 69 ).
ADJUDICATION OF CASES WITHOUT TRIAL
Can civil and criminal cases e ad*udicated without trial( D,plain
SUGGESTED ANSWER
Civil Cases may e ad*udicated without trial, such as in the following rules:
a./ Summary @udgment
./ @udgment on the Pleadings
c./ Summary Procedure
d./ Sec. 3 of %ule .;

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Criminal cases as a rule may not e ad*udicated without trial. Some
e,ceptions are the following:
a./ Plea of guilty
./ :otion to quash on the ground of doule *eopardy or e,tinction of criminal action
or liaility
c./ :otion to dismiss on the ground of violation of the right to a speedy trial.
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; WHEN MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION NOT NECESSARY
!s the failure to file a motion for reconsideration in the lower court as a condition
precedent for the granting of the writ of certiorari or prohiition always fatal( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER
NO, ecause there are e,ceptions, such as the following:
a./ &he question of *urisdiction was squarely raised efore and decided y the
respondent court
./ Pulic interest is involved
c./ Case of urgency
d./ 'rder is patent nullity
e./ !ssue is purely of law
f./ Deprivation of right to due process
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SERICE OF SUMMONS
)hen is e,tra=territorial service of summons proper(
SUGGESTED ANSWER
D,traterritorial service of summons is proper when the defendant does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or
the su*ect of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien
or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in
e,cluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has een
attached within the Philippines. -Sec. .; of %ule .>/ !t is also proper when the defendant
ordinarily resides within the Philippines, ut is temporarily out of it. -Sec. 1& of Rule 14)
RES JUDICATA
Dvelyn filed a complaint for a sum of money against @oan ut the complaint was later
dismissed for failure to prosecute Iwithin a reasonale length of time.J &hereafter, Dvelyn filed
another case ased on the same facts against @oan. @oan moved to dismiss the same on the ground
that the cause of action therein is arred y a prior *udgment -res *udicata/. Dvelyn opposed the
motion claiming that re *udicata has not set in since @oan was not served with summons and the
complaint in the first case was earlier dismissed, so that the trial court never acquired *urisdiction
over her person and, consequently, over the case. Fow would you decide the motion of @oan(
D,plain.
SUGGESTD ANSWER
&he motion to dismiss is denied. 'ne of the essential requisites of res *udicata is
*urisdiction over the parties. !nasmuch as @oan was not served with the summons in the first case
which was earlier dismissed, the court did not acquire *urisdiction over her person and, hence, the
dismissal was without pre*udice to the filing of another action against her. -%epulic Planters 0an4
vs. :olina, Septemer 2<, .7<</

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LIFE SPAN OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
)hat is the life span of a temporary restraining order issued y a trial court( :ay this life
span e e,tended( D,plain fully
SUGGESTED ANSWER
&he life span of a restraining order is twenty days. &his life span may not e e,tended.
$ preliminary in*unction may no longer e granted without notice to the adverse party.
Fowever, if it appears that great or irreparale in*ury would result to the applicant efore his
application for preliminary in*unction could e heard on notice, the *udge may issue a temporary
restraining order with a limited life span of twenty days from date of issue. !f no preliminary
in*unction is granted within said period, the temporary restraining order would automatically
e,pire on the 2?
th
day. !f efore the e,piration of the 2?=day period, the application for
preliminary in*unction is denied, the temporary restraining order would also e deem automatically
vacated. -Sec. 9 of %ule 9<" Dionisio vs. CC! of South Cotaato, .2> SC%$ 222/
ERROR OF JUDGMENT S! ERROR OF JURISDICTION
Distinguish etween error of *udgment and error of *urisdiction.
SUGGESTED ANSWER
$n error of *udgment is one which the court may commit in the e,ercise of its *urisdiction.
Such an error does not deprive the court of *urisdiction and is correctile only y appeal" whereas
an error of *urisdiction is one which thcourt acts without or in e,cess of its *urisdiction. Such an
error renders an orde *udgment void or voidale and is correctile y the special civil action of
certiorari.-De la Cru+ vs. :oir, 38 Phil. 2.3" Cochingyan vs. Cloriel, ;8 SC%$
SETTING ASIDE A FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT
:ay a *udgment which has ecome final and e,ecutory still e questioned, attac4ed or set
aside( !f so, how( !f not, why( Discuss fully.
SUGGESTED ANSWER
&here are three ways y which a final and e,ecutory *udgment may e attac4ed or set aside,
namely:
a./ 0y petition for relief from *udgment under %ule 3< on the grounds of fraud,
accident, mista4e or e,cusale negligence within si,ty days from learning of the
*udgment and not more than si, months from its entry#
./ 0y direct to annul or en*oin the enforcement of the *udgment when the defect is
not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained in the *udgment"
c.) 0y direct action, such as certiorari, or y a collateral attac4 against the *udgment
which is void on its face or when the nullity of the *udgment is apparent y virtue
of its own recitals. - M"#"$%&'#%( )! P*+,(*-. H+/*.%0* "&1 H+2.%&' C+3,!, 42
SCRA 5267
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; SELF-ADJUDICATION; SUMMARY SETTLEMENT
%ene died intestate, leaving several heirs and sustantial property here in the Philippines.
../ $ssuming %ene left no dets, as counsel for his heirs, what steps would you suggest to
settle %ene#s estate ! the least e,pensive manner(
2./ $ssuming %ene left only one heir and no dets, as counsel for his lone heir, what steps
would you suggest(
3./ $ssuming that the value of %ene#s estate does not e,ceed P .?,???.??, what remedy is
availale to otain a speedy settlement of his estate(

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SUGGESTED ANSWER
1) &o settle %ene#s estate in the least e,pensive manner, an e,tra*udicial settlement of the
estate y agreement of the parties should e made through a pulic instrument to e filed
with the %egister of Deeds, together with a ond in an amount equivalent to the value of
the personal property involved as certified under oath y the parties concerned and
conditioned upon payment of any *ust claim that may e filed within two -2/ years y an
heir or other person unduly deprived of participation in the estate. &he fact of
e,tra*udicial settlement or administration shall e pulished in a newspaper of general
circulation once a wee4 for three -3/ consecutive wee4s. * Sec.1, Rule '4.)
2./ !f %ene left only one heir, then the heir ma ad*udicate to himself the entire estate y
means of an affidavit of self=ad*udication to e filed also with the register of deeds,
together with the other requirements aovementioned. -id./
3./ Since the value of %ene#s estate e,ceed P.?,???.??, the remedy is to proceed to underta4e
a summary settlement of estates of mall value y filing a petition in court and upon
hearing, which shall eheld not less than one -./ month nor more that three -3/ months
from the date of the last pulication of a notice which shall e pulished once a wee4 for
three -3/ consecutive wee4s in a newspaper of general circulation in the province and after
such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct. &he court may proceed
summarily without the appointment of an e,ecutor or administrator, and without delay,
grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any, to estate, and to apportion and divide among
them after payment of such dets of the estate as the court shall then find to e due. &he
order of partition if it involves real estate, shall e recorded y the proper register#s
office. - Sec.!, rule '4).
AMENDMENT S! SUBSTITUTION OF INFORMATION
)ithin the conte,t of the rule on Criminal Procedure, distinguish an amendment from a
sustitution of an information.
SUGGESTED ANSWER
$n amendment may e made in sustance and form, without leave of court, at any time
efore an accused pleads, and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, y leave
and at the discretion of the court, when the same can e done without pre*udice to the rights of
the accused. Sustitution may e made if it appears at any time efore *udgment that a mista4e
has een made in charging the proper offense, in which case, the court shall dismiss the complaint
or information upon filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with %ule ..7,
Sec. .., provided that the accused would not e placed therey in doule *eopardy and may also
require the witnesses to give ail for their appearance at the trial. - Sec. 14, Rule 11,$
Tee-an.ee, /r. vs. )ada%ag, !,' SCRA 14 /.
STOP AND FRISK SEARCH
)hat is a &erry search - or so called Istop and fris4J /( !s it *ustified under e,isting law and
*urisprudence( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER
$ &erry search is a stop=and=search without a warrant. !t is *ustified when conducted y
police officers on the ases of prior confidential information which were reasonaly corroorated
y other attendant matters. - $niag, @r. vs. Comelec, 23; SC%$ >2> /.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY

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Aeorge was charged with falsification. 'n the date of initial trial, the fiscal moved for the
postponement on the ground that the case had een assigned to a special prosecutor of the D'@
who was out of town to attend to an urgent case, and who had wires him to request for
postponement. &he fiscal manifested that he was not ready for trial ecause he was unfamiliar
with the case. &he *udge then as4ed the accused as well as his counsel whether they were
amenale to a postponement. 0oth Aeorge and his counsel insisted on a trial. &he *udge ordered
the case dismissed.
Upon learning thereof, the special prosecutor filed a petition for certiorari under %ule 89 of
the %ules of Court alleging that the dismissal was capricious and deprived the government of due
process. Aeorge opposed the petition invo4ing doule *eopardy.
a./ !s doule *eopardy a ar to the petition( D,plain.
./ Suppose that trial on the merits had in fact proceeded and the trial *udge, finding the
evidence to e insufficient, dismissed the case, would your answer e the same( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER
a.) NO, ecause this is not an appeal y the prosecution asserting a dismissal to e erroneous.
!t is a petition for certiorari which assails the order of dismissal as invalid and a nullity
ecause it was capricious and deprived the Aovernment of due process. Considering that
this was the first motion for postponement of the trial filed y the fiscal and the ground
was meritorious, the *udge gravely aused his discretion in ordering the case dismissed. I8
09*3* %. &+ )"(%1 1%./%.."( +3 0*3/%&"0%+& +8 09* :".*, 09*3* %. &+ $".%. 8+3 %&)+#%&'
1+2$(* ;*+,"31<! - (eople vs. 0o1e2, !, SCRA !9 )
".) NO, ecause in such case, the order of dismissal would e valid, even if erroneous, and
would e tantamount to an acquittal.
DISMISSAL ON NOLLE PROSEQUI
)hen a criminal case is dismissed on nolle prosequi can it later e refilled(
SUGGESTED ANSWER
$s a general rule, when a criminal case is dismissed on nolle prosequi efore the accused is
placed on trial and efore he is called on to plead, this is not equivalent to an acquittal and does
not ar a susequent prosecution for the same offense. * 0alve2 vs. CA, !' SCRA 6&# 319944 ).
FORMAL OFFER OF EIDENCE
During the pre=trial of a civil case, the partied presented their respective documentary
evidence. $mong the documents mar4ed y the plaintiff was the Deed of $solute Sale of the
property in litigation - mar4ed as D,h. ICJ /.
!n the course of the trial on the merita, D,h. C was identified y the plaintiff, who was
cross=e,amined thereon y the defendant#s counsel" furthermore, the contents of D,h.C were read
into the records y the plaintiff.
Fowever, D,h. C was not among those formally offered in evidence y the plaintiff.
:ay the trial court consider D,h. C in the determination of the action( )hy(
SUGGESTED ANSWER
YES, ecause not only was the Deed of $solute Sale mar4ed y the plaintiff as D,h. C
during the pre=trial, it was identified y the plaintiff in the course of the trial and the plaintiff was
cross=e,amined thereon y the defendant#s counsel. Curthermore, the contents of D,h.C were
read into the records y the plaintiff. Fence, the trial court could properly consider D,h.C in the
determination of the action even though it was not formally offered in evidence. &his is an
e,ception to the rule that the court shall consider no evidence which has not een formally
offered. * Sec. # of Rule 1!)

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PAST RECOLLECTION REIED
G states on direct e,amination that he once 4now the facts eing as4ed ut he cannot
recall them now. )hen handed a written record of the facts, he testifies that the facts are
correctly stated, ut that he has never seen the writing efore.
!s the writing admissile as past recollection recorded( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER
B', ecause for the written record to e admissile as past recollection recorded, it must have
een written or recorded y G or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or
immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he 4new
that the same was correctly written or recorded. - Sec. .8 of %ule .32/ 0ut in this case G has never
seen the writing efore.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
a./ Aive three instances when a Philippine court can ta4e *udicial notice of a foreign law.
./ Fow do you prove a written foreign law(
c./ Suppose a foreign law was pleaded as part of the defense of defendant ut no evidence
was presented to prove the e,istence of said law, what is the presumption to e ta4en
y the court as to the wordings of said law(
SUGGESTED ANSWER
a./ &he three instances when a Philippine court can ta4e *udicial notice of a foreign law
are:
../ )hen the Philippine courts are evidently familiar with the foreign law
2./ )hen the foreign law refers to the law of nations - Sec. . of %ule .27/
3./ )hen it refers to a pulished treatise, periodical or pamphlet on the su*ect of
law if the court ta4es *udicial notice of the fact that the writer thereof is
recogni+ed in his profession or calling on the su*ect. - Sec. >8, %ule .3?/
./ $ written law may e evidenced y an official pulication thereof of y a copy attested
y the officer having the legal custody of the record, or y his deputy, and
accompanied if the record is not 4ept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. !f the office in which the record ids 4ept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may e made y the secretary of the emassy or legation,
consul=general, consul, vice=consul, or consular agent or y any officer in the foreign
country in which the record is 4ept, and authenticated y the seal of his office. - Sec.
2> of %ule .32/
c./ &he presumption is that the wordings of the foreign law are the same as the local law.
&his is referred to as the doctrine of processual presumption.
HEARSAY RULE
Aerry is eing tried for rape. &he prosecution#s evidence sought to estalish that at aout
7:??pm of @anuary 2?, .77>, Aerry went to complainant @une#s house to invite her to watch the
festivities going on at the town pla+a. @une accepted the invitation. Upon reaching the pulic
mar4et, which was *ust a stone#s throw away from @une#s house, Aerry forcily dragged @une
towards the anana grove ehind the mar4et where he was ale to have carnal 4nowledge with
@une for aout an hour. @une did not immediately do home thereafter, and it was only in the early

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morning of the following day that she narrated her ordeal to her daughter Li+a. Li+a testified in
court as to what @une revealed to her.
a./ !s the testimony of Li+a hearsay(
./ !s it admissile in evidence against the o*ection of the defense(
SUGGESTED ANSWER
a./ HDS, Li+a#s testimony is hearsay. $ witness can testify to those facts which he
4nows of his personal 4nowledge, that is, which are derived from his own
perception e,cept as otherwise provided in the rules - Sec. 38 of %ule .3?/.
./ B', it is not admissile in evidence against the o*ection of the defense, ecause it
is not one of the e,ceptions to the hearsay rule. !t cannot e considered part of the
res gestae ecause only statements made y a person while a startling occurrence
is ta4ing place or immediately prior or susequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may e given in evidence as part of the res gestae. - Sec.
>2 of %ule .3?/ She narrated her ordeal to her daughter only in the morning of the
following day, as she did not immediately go home after the incident which
occurred at 7:?? pm. She could have made up the story. She should e placed on
the witness stand, not Li+a whose 4nowledge of the event is hearsay.
$lternative answer:
Li+a#s testimony is admissile in evidence as to the tenor ut not as to the truth of what
@une revealed to her.

DEAD MAN-S STATUTE
:a,imo filed an action against Pedro, the administrator of the estate of deceased @uan, for
the recovery if a car which is part of the latter#s estate. During trialm, :a,imo presented witness
:ariano who testified that he was present when :a,imo and @uan agreed that the latter would
pay a rental of P2?,??? for the use of :a,imo#s car for one month after which @uan should
immediately return the car to :a,imo. Pedro o*ected to the admission of :ariano#s testimony.
!f you were the *udge, would you sustain Pedro#s o*ection( )hy(
SUGGESTED ANSWER
NO, the testimony is admissile in evidence ecause witness :ariano who testified as to
what :a,imo and @uan, the deceased person, agreed upon, is not disqualified to testify on the
agreement. &hose disqualified are parties to a case, or persons in whose ehalf a case is
prosecuted against the administrator of @uan#s estate, upon a claim or demand against his estate as
to any matter of fact occurring efore @uan#s death. * Sec. ! of Rule 1,).

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SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES OF SELECTED CASES
CIIL PROCEDURE
LASON ENTERPRISES CORPORATION ).! COURT OF APPEALS
=G!R! N+.! 121662-6>! J2(< 6, 1???!@
!t is well=settled that an amended pleading supersedes the original one, which is thus
deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record, it does not follow ipso facto that
the service of a new summons for amended petitions or complaints is required. 5-ere t-e
defendants -ave alread% appeared "efore t-e trial court "% virtue of a su11ons on t-e
original co1plaint, t-e a1ended co1plaint 1a% "e served upon t-e1 6it-out need of anot-er
su11ons, even if ne6 causes of action are alleged. After it is ac7uired, a court8s 9urisdiction
continues until t-e case is finall% ter1inated. Conversel%, 6-en defendants -ave not %et
appeared in court and no su11ons -as "een validl% served, ne6 su11ons for t-e a1ended
co1plaint 1ust "e served on t-e1. !t is not the change of cause of action that gives rise to the
need to serve another summons for the amended complaint, ut rather the acquisition of
*urisdiction over the persons of the defendants. !f the trial court has not yet acquired *urisdiction
over them, a new service of summons for the amended complaint is required.
UNITED HOUSING CORPORATION ).! DAYRIT, ET AL!
=G!R! N+! 46>22! J"&2"3< 22, 1??A!@
A 9udg1ent upon co1pro1ise 6-ic- is a 9udg1ent e1"od%ing a co1pro1ise agree1ent
entered into "% t-e parties in 6-ic- t-e% 1a.e reciprocal concessions in order to ter1inate a
litigation alread% instituted is not appeala"le, is i11ediatel% e:ecutor% and -as t-e effect of
res 9udicata. $ *udgment rendered upon a compromise agreement, not contrary to law or pulic
policy or pulic order has all the force and effect of any other *udgment, it eing a *udgment on
the merits, hence, conclusive upon the parties and their privies. $s such, it can e enforced y writ
of e,ecution.
BA FINANCE CORPORATION ).! RUFINO CO, ET AL!
=G!R! N+! 1AB4B1! J2&* 5A, 1??5!@
&he rule is that a compulsory counterclaim cannot Kremain pending for independent
ad*udication y the court.K &his is ecause a compulsory counterclaim is au,iliary to the proceeding
in the original suit and merely derives its *urisdictional support therefrom. T-us, it necessaril%
follo6s t-at if t-e trial court no longer possesses 9urisdiction to entertain t-e 1ain action of
t-e case, as 6-en it dis1isses t-e sa1e, t-en t-e co1pulsor% counterclai1 "eing ancillar% to
t-e principal controvers%, 1ust li.e6ise "e si1ilarl% dis1issed since no 9urisdiction re1ains
for t-e grant of an% relief under t-e counterclai1.
Cor the guidance of 0ench and 0ar, if any of the grounds to dismiss under Sec. 3, %ule .;, of
the %ules of Court arises, the proper recourse for a defendant who desires to pursue his compulsory
counterclaim in the same proceeding is not to move for the dismissal of the complaint" instead, he
should only move to have plaintiff declared non=suited on the complaint so that the latter can no
longer present his evidence thereon, and simultaneously move that he e declared as in default on
the compulsory counterclaim, and reserve the right to present evidence e, parte on his
counterclaim. &his will enale defendant who was un*ustly haled to court to prove his compulsory
counterclaim, which is intertwined with the complaint, ecause the trial court retains *urisdiction
over the complaint and of the whole case. &he non=dismissal of the complaint, the non=suit
notwithstanding, provides the asis for the compulsory counterclaim to remain active and
susisting.

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HEIRS OF FLORENTINA NUGUID DA! DE HABERER ).! CA
=G!R! N+.! L->26?? 0+ L->24A?! M"< 26, 1?C1!@
)here a party dies in an action that survives, and no order is issued y the court for the
appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs of the deceased in sustitution of the
deceased, and as a matter of fact no such sustitution has ever een effected, the trial held y the
court without such legal representatives or heirs and the *udgment rendered after such trial are
null and void ecause the court acquired no *urisdiction over the persons of the legal
representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the *udgment would e inding.
TAN ).! DUMARPA
=G!R! N+! 15C444! S*,0*/$*3 22, 2AA>!@
&he remedies availale to a defendant declared in default are as follows: -a/ a motion to
set aside the order of default under Section 3-/, %ule 7 of the %ules of Court, if the default was
discovered efore *udgment could e rendered" -2/ a motion for new trial under Section .-a/ of
%ule 3;, if the default was discovered after *udgment ut while appeal is still availale" -3/ a
petition for relief under %ule 3<, if *udgment has ecome final and e,ecutory" and ->/ an appeal
from the *udgment under Section ., %ule >., even if no petition to set aside the order of default
has een resorted to.K
GOLDEN FLAME SAWMILL ).! COURT OF APPEALS
=G!R! N+! 11B6>>! A,3%( B, 1??B!@
Prior to pre=trial therefore, in particular, efore a party is considered non=suited or
declared as in default, it must e shown that such party and his counsel were each duly served with
a separate notice of pre=trial. T-e a"sence, t-erefore, of t-e 1andator% notices of pre;trial
nullifies t-e order of default 6-ic- suffers fro1 a serious procedural vice. <nder suc-
circu1stances, t-e grant of relief to t-e part% declared in default "eco1es a 1atter of rig-t$
and t-e proceedings "eginning fro1 t-e order of default do6n to t-e default 9udg1ent itself
s-ould "e considered null and void and of no effect. &hus, upon a showing that a separate notice
of pre=trial was not served either upon a party or his counsel of record or upon oth, the Court has
consistently nullified and set aside the order of default. !n addition, the Court remands the case for
pre=trial and trial efore the trial court, ordering the latter thereafter to render *udgment
accordingly.
QUEBRAL ).! CA "&1 UNION REFINERY CORP!
=G!R! N+! 1A1?>1! J"&2"3< 2B, 1??6!@
$ demurrer to evidence areviates proceedings, it eing an aid or instrument for the
e,peditious termination of all action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or triunal
may either grant or deny. Fowever, whoever avails of it gamles his right to adduce evidence.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provisions of %ule 39, if the defendantLs motion for *udgment on
demurrer to evidence is granted and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, *udgment is
rendered in favor of the adverse party ecause the movant loses his right to present evidence.
MAYUGA, ET AL! ).! CA, ET AL!
=G!R! N+! 125C??! A2'2.0 5A, 1??6!@
=:ecution proceedings are not auto1aticall% sta%ed "% t-e filing of a petition for
relief fro1 9udg1ent. &he filing of their petition for relief and the susequent appeal from the
order denying relief stayed the e,ecution proceedings efore the trial court. Beither are e,ecution
proceedings stayed y the perfection of the appeal from the order denying relief from *udgment. !n

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ordinary appeals, perfection of an appeal under section 7 of %ule >. divests the trial court of
*urisdiction over its *udgment and e,ecution proceedings ecause the *udgment has not yet
attained finality. $n appeal from an order denying relief from *udgment under %ule 3< is different.
Fere, the @udgment is already final and e,ecutory and as aforestated, the only way y which
e,ecution could e suspended is y the issuance of a writ of preliminary in*unction. Bo in*unction
was secured y petitioners.
RODRIGUED ).! PROJECT 6 MARKET SERICE COOPERATIE, INC!
=G!R! N+! 4??6C! A2'2.0 25, 1??B!@
!n this *urisdiction, the general rule is when a court *udgment or order ecomes final and
e,ecutory, it is the minsterial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of e,ecution to enforce this
*udgment. $ writ of e,ecution may however e refused on equitale grounds as when there is a
change in the situation of the parties that would ma4e e,ecution inequitale or when certain
circumstances which transpired after *udgment ecame final render e,ecution of *udgment un*ust.
PHILIPPINE NAILS AND WIRES CORPORATIO ).! MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC!
=G!R! N+! 1>5?55! F*$32"3< 1>, 2AA5!@
Under the old %ules, specifically Section 2 of %ule 37 of the pre=.77; %ules of Court, the
trial court is granted, upon good reasons, the discretion to order an e,ecution even efore the
e,piration of the time to appeal. T-e present Rules also grant t-e trial court t-e discretion to
order t-e e:ecution of a 9udg1ent or a final order even "efore t-e e:piration of t-e period to
appeal, also upon good reasons stated in a special order after due -earing. Such discretion,
however, is allowed only while the trial court still has K*urisdiction over the case and is in
possession of either the original record, or the record on appeal, as the case may e, at the time of
the filing of such motion.K &he mere filing of a ond y the successful party is not a good reason for
ordering e,ecution pending appeal, as La comination of circumstances is the dominant
consideration which impels the grant of immediate e,ecution5"6 the requirement of a ond is
imposed merely as an additional factor, no dout for the protection of the defendantLs creditor.LK
REXLON REALTY GROUP, INC! ).! CA
=G!R! N+! 12C>12! M"3:9 1B, 2AA2!@
Cirstly, it must e rememered that, in the amended petition of %e,lon for annulment of
*udgment, respondent Paramount was impleaded for the reason that the prayer therein sought the
nullification of the new titles issued in the name of respondent Paramount. >nas1uc- as a petition
for annul1ent of 9udg1ent is classified as an original action t-at can "e filed "efore t-e
Court of Appeals, t-e said court can ad1it, "% 6a% of an a1end1ent to t-e petition, ne6
causes of action inti1atel% related to t-e resolution of t-e original petition. Fence,
respondent Paramount ecame a necessary party in the petitionerLs original cause of action see4ing
a declaration of the e,istence and validity of the ownerLs duplicate copy of the su*ect certificate
of title in the possession of the latter, and an indispensale party in the action for the declaration
of nullity of the titles in the name of respondent Paramount. !ndeed, there can e no complete
relief that can e accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim su*ect of the action, if we do not touch upon the necessary consequence
of the nullity of the new duplicate copy of the su*ect certificate of title. &he %ules of Court
compels the inclusion of necessary parties when *urisdiction over the person of the said necessary
party can e otained. Bon=inclusion of a necessary party when there is an opportunity to include
him would mean waiver of the claim against such party.
ANDAYA ).!, ABADIA, ET AL!
=G!R! N+! 1A>A55! D*:*/$*3 24, 1??5!@
@urisdiction over su*ect matter is essential in the sense that erroneous assumption thereof
may put at naught whatever proceedings the court might have had. Fence, even on appeal, and

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even if the parties do not raise the issue of *urisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from
ruling that it has no *urisdiction over the case. !t is elementary that *urisdiction is vested y law
and cannot e conferred or waived y the parties or even y the *udge. !t is also irrefutale that a
court may at any stage of the proceedings dismiss the case for want of *urisdiction. Cor this matter,
the ground of lac4 of *urisdiction in dismissing a case is not waivale. Fence, the last sentence of
Sec. 2, %ule 7, %ules of Court, e,pressly states: K)henever it appears that the court has no
*urisdiction over the su*ect matter, it shall dismiss the action.K
OFELIA HERRERA-FELIX ).! CA
=G!R! N+! 1>5456! A2'2.0 11, 2AA>!@
$ voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. $n appearance in
whatever form, without e,plicitly o*ecting to the *urisdiction of the court over the person, is a
sumission to the *urisdiction of the court over the person. )hile the formal method of entering an
appearance in a cause pending in the courts is to deliver to the cler4 a written direction ordering
him to enter the appearance of the person who suscries it, an appearance may e made y
simply filing a formal motion, or plea or answer. &his formal method of appearance is not
necessary. Fe may appear without such formal appearance and thus sumit himself to the
*urisdiction of the court. Fe may appear y presenting a motion, for e,ample, and unless y such
appearance he specifically o*ects to the *urisdiction of the court, he therey gives his assent to
the *urisdiction of the court over his person. 5-en t-e appearance is "% 1otion o"9ecting to t-e
9urisdiction of t-e court over -is person, it 1ust "e for t-e sole and separate purpose of
o"9ecting to t-e 9urisdiction of t-e court. >f -is 1otion is for an% ot-er purpose t-an to o"9ect
to t-e 9urisdiction of t-e court over -is person, -e t-ere"% su"1its -i1self to t-e 9urisdiction
of t-e court.
REYNALDO HALIMAO ).! ATTYS! DANIEL ILLANUEA "&1 INOCENCIO PEFIANCO FERRER, JR!
=A1/! C".* N+! 5C2B! F*$32"3< 1, 1??6!@
'n the other hand, when a motion to dismiss is ased on payment, waiver, aandonment,
release, compromise, or other form of e,tinguishment, the motion to dismiss does not
hypothetically, ut actually, admits the facts alleged in e,istence of the oligation or det, only
that plaintiff claims that the oligation has een satisfied. So that when a motion to dismiss on
these grounds is denied, what is left to e proven in the trial is no longer the e,istence of the det
ut the fact vel non of payment y the defendant.
GARCIA ).! CA "&1 SPOUSES UY
=G!R! N+! C5?2?! J2&* 11, 1??2!@
$s for private respondentsL -defendantsL/ loss of standing in court, y reason of having een
declared in default, again we rule that a party in default loses the right to present his defense and
e,amine or cross=e,amine witnesses. !t does not mean that eing declared in default, and therey
losing oneLs standing, constitutes a waiver of all rights" what is waived only is the right to e heard
and to present evidence during the trial while default prevails. $ party in default is still entitled to
notice of final *udgments and orders and proceedings ta4en susequent thereto.
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIDATION ).! CA
=G!R! N+! 1A?545! M"3:9 2A, 1??B!@
Dlucidating the crucial distinction etween an ordinary action and a special proceeding,
Chief @ustice :oran states: $ction is the act y which one sues another in a court of *ustice for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special
proceeding is the act y which one see4s to estalish the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact. Fence, action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is a formal demand
of a right y one against another, while the latter is ut a petition for a declaration of a status,
right or fact. )here a party litigant see4s to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an
action. )here his purpose is to see4 the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a

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special proceeding to estalish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of
guardianship.
GARCIA ).! LLAMAS
=G!R! N+! 1B>124! D*:*/$*3 C, 2AA5!@
$ summary *udgment is a procedural device designed for the prompt disposition of actions
in which the pleadings raise only a legal, not a genuine, issue regarding any material fact.
Consequently, facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is yet no admission,
disavowal or qualification" or specific denials or affirmative defenses are set forth in the answer,
ut the issues are fictitious as shown y the pleadings, depositions or admissions. $ summary
*udgment may e applied for y either a claimant or a defending party.
'n the other hand, under Section . of %ule 3> of the %ules of Court, a *udgment on the
pleadings is proper when an answer fails to render an issue or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse partyLs pleading. &he essential question is whether there are issues
generated y the pleadings. 3< $ *udgment on the pleadings may e sought only y a claimant, who
is the party see4ing to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross=claim" or to otain a declaratory
relief.
HEIRS OF RICARDO OLIAS ).! HON! FLORENTINO A! FLOR "&1 JOSE A! MATAWARAN
=G!R! N+! L-4C5>5! M"< 21, 1?CC!@
!n the guise of a position paper, private respondent filed a :otion to Dismiss. )hile this is,
indeed, a prohiited pleading -Sec. .95a6, %ule on Summary Procedure/ it should e noted that the
:otion was filed after an $nswer had already een sumitted within the reglementary period. !n
essence, therefore, it is not the pleading prohiited y the %ule on Summary Procedure. )hat the
%ule proscries is a :otion to Dismiss, which would stop the running of the period to file an $nswer
and cause undue delay.
DACOYCOY ).! IAC
=G!R! N+! 4>CB>! A,3%( 2, 1??1!@
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate
course of action at this stage of the proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as
in the courts of first instance -now %&C/, may e waived e,pressly or impliedly. )here defendant
fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided y Section > of %ule > of the
%ules of Court, and allows the trial to e held and a decision to e rendered, he cannot on appeal
or in a special action e permitted to challenge elatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed
waived.
NORTHERN CEMENT CORPORATION ).! IAC "&1 SHIPSIDE INC!
=G!R! N+! L-6C656! F*$32"3< 2?, 1?CC!@
&here have een instances where the Court has held that even without the necessary
amendment, the amount proved at the trial may e validly awarded, as in &ua+on v. 0olanos, where
we said that if the facts shown entitled plaintiff to relief other than that as4ed for, no amendment
to the complaint was necessary, especially where defendant had himself raised the point on which
recovery was ased. &he appellate court could treat the pleading as amended to conform to the
evidence although the pleadings were not actually amended. $mendment is also unnecessary when
only clerical errors or non=sustantial matters are involved, as we held in 0an4 of the Philippine
!slands v. Laguna. !n Co &iamco v. Dia+, we stressed that the rule on amendment need not e
applied rigidly, particularly where no surprise or pre*udice is caused the o*ecting party. $nd in the
recent case of Bational Power Corporation v. Court of $ppeals, we held that where there is a

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variance in the defendantLs pleadings and the evidence adduced y it at the trial, the Court may
treat the pleading as amended to conform with the evidence.
S,+2.*. GO ).! TONG
=G!R! N+! 1B1?>2! N+)*/$*3 24, 2AA5!@
%ule >9 of the %ules of Court specifically states that in all cases, the C$Ls decisions, final
orders or resolutions M regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved M may e
appealed to this Court through a petition for review, which is *ust a continuation of the appellate
process involving the original case. .9 'n the other hand, a special civil action under %ule 89 is an
independent suit ased on the specific grounds provided therein. $s a general rule, certiorari
cannot e availed of as a sustitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under
%ule >9.
DELGADO ).! CA
=G!R! N+! 154CC1! D*:*/$*3 21, 2AA>!@
&he principle of res *udicata does not apply when the dismissal of the earlier complaint,
involving the same plaintiffs, same su*ect matter, same theory and the same defendants, was
made without pre*udice to its refiling at a future date, or in a different venue, as in this case. &he
dismissal of the case without pre*udice indicates the asence of a decision on the merits and leaves
the parties free to litigate the matter in a susequent action as though the dismissal action had not
een commenced. >n ot-er 6ords, t-e discontinuance of a case not on t-e 1erits does not "ar
anot-er action on t-e sa1e su"9ect 1atter.
YAO KA SIN TRADING ).! CA, ET AL!
=G!R! N+! B5C2A! J2&* 1B, 1??2!@
Under Section ., %ule 3 of the %ules of Court, only natural or *uridical persons or entities
authori+ed y law may e parties in a civil action. !n @uasing Fardware vs. :endo+a, this Court held
that a single proprietorship is neither a natural person nor a *uridical person under $rticle >> of the
Civil Code" it is not an entity authori+ed y law to ring suit in court.
SPOUSES ELANIO C! ONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
=G!R! N+! 1>>BC1! J2(< B, 2AA2@
!t ears stressing that the :&CC cannot admit the elated certification on the ground that
plaintiffs -respondents/ were not anyway guilty of actual forum shopping. &he distinction etween
the prohiition against forum shopping and the certification requirement should y now e too
elementary to e misunderstood. To reiterate, co1pliance 6it- t-e certification against foru1
s-opping is separate fro1 and independent of t-e avoidance of t-e act of foru1 s-opping
itself. T-ere is a difference in t-e treat1ent "et6een failure to co1pl% 6it- t-e certification
re7uire1ent and violation of t-e pro-i"ition against foru1 s-opping not onl% in ter1s of
i1posa"le sanctions "ut also in t-e 1anner of enforcing t-e1. T-e for1er constitutes
sufficient cause for t-e dis1issal 6it-out pre9udice of t-e co1plaint or initiator% pleading
upon 1otion and after -earing, 6-ile t-e latter is a ground for su11ar% dis1issal t-ereof
and for direct conte1pt. &he rule e,pressly requires that a certification against forum shopping
should e attached to or filed simultaneously with the complaint or other initiatory pleading
regardless of whether forum shopping had in fact een committed. $ccordingly, in the instant
case, the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer must follow as a matter of course.
=/=CT)=?T CAS=@ Aailure of t-e defendants to allege lac. of cetification of non;foru1
s-opping is not a 6aiver of t-eir rig-t to assert t-e defect
)hile not raised in the parties# pleadings, it is necessary to mention that the failure of
petitioners# answer filed in the e*ectment case to allege the lac4 of certification of non=forum
shopping did not result in the waiver of their right to assert the defect. 'ur decision in Nho v.
Court of $ppeals where this Court ruled that y virtue of Sec. ., %ule 7, #$$% Rule& of Civil
'rocedure, o*ections of this 4ind are forfeited when not raised in the answerOcomment earlier

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tended to a petition for special civil action of certiorari, is not controlling. T-e instant case is
governed "% t-e 1991 Revised Rules on Su11ar% (rocedure 6-ere a 1otion to dis1iss is
generall% proscri"ed e:cept for lac. of 9urisdiction over t-e su"9ect 1atter or failure to
co1pl% 6it- conciliation proceedings and 6-ere t-e onl% 1atters dee1ed 6aived for failure
to assert in t-e ans6er are negative and affir1ative defenses.
Clearly, petitioners were e,cused from filing a motion to question the asence of the
certification and, concomitantly, their failure to include the o*ection in their answer did not result
in the waiver thereof since the o*ection is neither a negative nor an affirmative defense. &o
clarify, non=compliance with the requirement of certification does not give rise to an affirmative
defense, i.e., the allegation of new matter y way of confession and avoidance, much less a
negative defense since the underta4ing has nothing to do with the operative facts required to e
alleged in an initiatory pleading, such as allegations on the cause of action, ut with a special pre=
requisite for admission of the complaint for filing in court.
GUMABON S! LARIN
EGR N+! 1>2B25 NO! 24,2AA17
&hus, the .77; %ules of Civil Procedure now provide that the court may (otu proprio dismiss
the claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on the record that:
.. the court has no *urisdiction over the su*ect matter"
2. there is another cause of action pending etween the same parties for the same cause"
or
3. where the action is arred y a prior *udgment or y statute of limitations.
Crom the foregoing, it is clear that a court may not (otu proprio dismiss a case for improper
venue, this ground not eing among those mentioned where the court is authori+ed to do so.
!n fact, the applicale rule would e Section ., %ule 7 of the .77; %ules of Civil Procedure
providing that Idefenses and o*ections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived.J Curthermore, Section 8, %ule .8 of the .77; %ules now provides that if no
motion to dismiss has een filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided in this %ule P which
includes the ground that venue is improperly laid -Section .5c6/ P may e pleaded as an affirmative
defense in the answer, and in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may e had thereon
as if a motion to dismiss has een filed. %espondent not having raised improper venue in a motion
to dismiss or in his answer, he is deemed to have waived the same. )ell=4nown is the asic legal
principle that venue is waivale. Cailure of any party to o*ect to the impropriety of venue is
deemed a waiver of his right to do so.
BENITO C! SALADAR vs. HON! TOMAS R! ROMAQUIN
=G!R! N+! 1B1A6C! M"< 21, 2AA>@
&he pleadings of the accused and copies of the orders or resolutions of the trial court are
served on the People of the Philippines through the Provincial Prosecutor. Fowever, in appeals
efore the Court of $ppeals and the Supreme Court either -a/ y writ of error" -/ via petition for
review" -c/ on automatic appeal" or, -d/ in special civil actions where the People of the Philippines
is a party, the general rule is that the 'ffice of the Solicitor Aeneral is the sole representative of
the People of the Philippines.
A cop% of t-e petition in suc- action 1ust "e served on t-e (eople of t-e (-ilippines as
1andated "% Section , Rule 46 of t-e Rules of Court, t-roug- t-e Bffice of t-e Solicitor
0eneral. T-e service of a cop% of t-e petition on t-e (eople of t-e (-ilippines, t-roug- t-e
(rovincial (rosecutor 6ould "e inefficacious. T-e petitionerCs failure to -ave a cop% of -is
petition served on t-e respondent, t-roug- t-e Bffice of t-e Solicitor 0eneral, s-all "e
sufficient ground for t-e dis1issal of t-e petition as provided in t-e last paragrap- of Section
, Rule 46 of t-e Rules of Court. <nless and until copies of t-e petition are dul% served on t-e
respondent, t-e appellate court -as no ot-er recourse "ut to dis1iss t-e petition.
EMERITO REMULLA vs. JOSELITO DP! MANLONGAT
=G!R! N+! 1>C1C?! N+)*/$*3 11, 2AA>@

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!n a numer of cases, the Supreme Court has in fact rela,ed the period for perfecting an
appeal, especially on grounds of sustantial *ustice, or when there are other special and
meritorious circumstances and issues. Eerily, this Court has the power to rela, or suspend the rules
or to e,empt a case from their rigid operation when warranted y compelling reasons and the
requirements of *ustice.
!n the present case, the late filing == y only one day == of the prosecution#s Botice of $ppeal
was e,cusale, considering respondent#s diligent efforts.
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEELOPMENT CORP! S! CA
EGR N+! 16A2>2, M"< 14,2AAB7
&he purpose of Section .., %ule 8 of the %ules of Court is to permit a defendant to assert
an independent claim against a third=party which he, otherwise, would assert in another action,
thus preventing multiplicity of suits. $ll the rights of the parties concerned would then e
ad*udicated in one proceeding. &his is a rule of procedure and does not create a sustantial right.
Beither does it aridge, enlarge, or nullify the sustantial rights of any litigant.
5.96
&his right to file
a third=party complaint against a third=party rests in the discretion of the trial court. &he third=
party complaint is actually independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiff#s complaint,
such that were it not for the rule, it would have to e filed separately from the original complaint.
T-e t-ird;part% co1plaint does not -ave to s-o6 6it- certaint% t-at t-ere 6ill "e
recover% against t-e t-ird;part% defendant, and it is sufficient t-at pleadings s-o6
possi"ilit% of recover%. >n deter1ining t-e sufficienc% of t-e t-ird;part% co1plaint, t-e
allegations in t-e original co1plaint and t-e t-ird;part% co1plaint 1ust "e e:a1ined.
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t-ird;part% co1plaint 1ust allege facts 6-ic- pri1a facie s-o6 t-at t-e defendant is entitled
to contri"ution, inde1nit%, su"rogation or ot-er relief fro1 t-e t-ird;part% defendant.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. HON! RALPH C! LANTION
=G!R! N+! 15?>6B! J"&2"3< 1C, 2AAA@
!n a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section
3, %ule ..2 of the %ules of Court guarantees the respondent#s asic due process rights, granting him
the right to e furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents,
and the right to sumit counter=affidavits and other supporting documents within ten days from
receipt thereof. :oreover, the respondent shall have the right to e,amine all other evidence
sumitted y the complainant.
&hese twin rights may, however, e considered dispensale in certain instances, such as:
../ !n proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, li4e the summary
aatement of a nuisance per &e -$rticle ;?>, Civil Code/, the preventive suspension of a
pulic servant facing administrative charges -Section 83, Local Aovernment Code, 0. P. 0lg.
33;/, the padloc4ing of filthy restaurants or theaters showing oscene movies or li4e
estalishments which are immediate threats to pulic health and decency, and the
cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution"
2./ )here there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not
precluded from en*oying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without pre*udice
to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a
delinquent ta,payer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee" and
3./ )here the twin rights have previously een offered ut the right to e,ercise them had not
een claimed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ).! MODESTO TEE "!#!"! ESTOY TEE
=G!R! N+.! 1>AB>6->4! J"&2"3< 2A, 2AA5!@
&hus, it has een held that term Knarcotics paraphernaliaK is not so wanting in particularity
as to create a general warrant. Bor is the description Kany and all narcoticsK and Kall implements,

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paraphernalia, articles, papers and records pertaining toK the use, possession, or sale of narcotics
or dangerous drugs so road as to e unconstitutional. $ search warrant commanding peace officers
to sei+e Ka quantity of loose heroinK has een held sufficiently particular.
&ested against the foregoing precedents, the description Kan undetermined amount of
mari*uanaK must e held to satisfy the requirement for particularity in a search warrant.
Boteworthy, what is to e sei+ed in the instant case is property of a specified character, i.e.,
mari*uana, an illicit drug. 0y reason of its character and the circumstances under which it would e
found, said article is illegal. $ further description would e unnecessary and ordinarily impossile,
e,cept as to such character, the place, and the circumstances. &hus, this Court has held that the
description Killegally in possession of undetermined quantityOamount of dried mari*uana leaves and
:ethamphetamine Fydrochloride -Shau/ and sets of paraphernaliaK particulari+es the things to e
sei+ed.
&he search warrant in the present case, given its nearly similar wording, Kundetermined
amount of mari*uana or !ndian hemp,K in our view, has satisfied the ConstitutionLs requirements on
particularity of description. &he description therein is: -./ as specific as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow" -2/ e,presses a conclusion of fact M not of law M y which the peace officers may
e guided in ma4ing the search and sei+ure" and -3/ limits the things to e sei+ed to those which
ear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is eing issued. Said warrant imposes a
meaningful restriction upon the o*ects to e sei+ed y the officers serving the warrant. &hus, it
prevents e,ploratory searches, which might e violative of the 0ill of %ights.
PEOPLE S! CABILES
= 2C> SCRA 1?? @
Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement,
not elicited through questioning y the authorities, ut given in an ordianry manner wherey the
accused orally admitted having committed the crime.
ESQUIEL ).! THE SANDIGANBAYAN
=G!R! N+! 154254, S*,0*/$*3 14, 2AA2@
!n Rodrigo, )r* v&* Sandigan+ayan, ,inay v&* Sandigan+ayan, and !ayu& v&* Sandigan+ayan,
we already held that municipal mayors fall under the original and e,clusive *urisdiction of the
Sandiganayan. Bor can ,arangay Captain :ar4 $nthony Dsquivel claim that since he is not a
municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganayan#s *urisdiction. R.A. '9'#, as a1ended "% R.A.
?o. &!49, provides t-at it is onl% in cases 6-ere Dnone of t-e accused are occup%ing positions
corresponding to salar% grade E!'C or -ig-erD t-at De:clusive original 9urisdiction s-all "e
vested in t-e proper regional trial court, 1etropolitan trial court, 1unicipal trial court, and
1unicipal circuit court, as t-e case 1a% "e, pursuant to t-eir respective 9urisdictions as
provided in Fatas (a1"ansa Flg. 1!9, as a1ended.D Bote that under the .77. Local Aovernment
Code, :ayor Dsquivel has a salary grade of 2;. Since ,arangay Captain Dsquivel is the co=accused in
Criminal Case Bo. 2>;;; of :ayor Dsquivel, whose position falls under salary grade 2;, the
Sandiganayan committed no grave ause of discretion in assuming *urisdiction over said criminal
case, as well as over Criminal Case Bo. 2>;;<, involving oth of them.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ).! RUBEN ENOC,*0!"(
=G!R! N+.! 1>B?B4-6C, J"&2"3< 2B, 2AA2@
Section .9 of %$ 8;;? gives the 'mudsman primary *urisdiction over cases cogni+ale y
the Sandiganayan. &he law defines such primary *urisdiction as authori+ing the 'mudsman Kto
ta4e over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such
cases.K T-e grant of t-is aut-orit% does not necessaril% i1pl% t-e e:clusion fro1 its
9urisdiction of cases involving pu"lic officers and e1plo%ees cogni2a"le "% ot-er courts. &he
e,ercise y the 'mudsman of his primary *urisdiction over cases cogni+ale y the Sandiganayan
is not incompatile with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses
committed y pulic officers and employees. !ndeed, it must e stressed that the powers granted
y the legislature to the 'mudsman are very road and encompass all 4inds of malfeasance,

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misfeasance and non=feasance committed y pulic officers and employees during their tenure of
office.
SALADAR S! PEOPLE
= GR N+! 1B1?51, S*,0*/$*3 25, 2AA5 @
!f demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted y the court, the accused has the right
to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case , unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liaility may arise did not e,ist. >f t-e trial court issues an order or
renders 9udg1ent not onl% granting t-e de1urrer to evidence of t-e accused and ac7uitting
-i1 "ut also on t-e civil lia"ilit% of t-e accused to t-e private offended part%, said 9udg1ent
on t-e civil aspect of t-e case 6ould "e a nullit% for t-e reason t-at t-e constitutional rig-t
of t-e accused to due process is t-ere"% violated. &his is so ecause when the accused files a
demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence oth on the criminal and civil
aspects of the case. &he only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. )hat the trial
court should do is to issue an order or partial *udgment granting the demurrer to evidence and
acquitting the accused" and set the case for continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private complainant to adduce evidence y
way of reuttal after which the parties may adduce their sur=reuttal evidence as provided for in
Section .., %ule ..7 of the %evised %ules of Criminal Procedure.
CASUPANAN S!LAROYA
= GR N+! 1>B5?1, A2'2.0 26, 2AA2 @
Under Section . of the present %ule ..., the independent civil action in $rticles 32, 33, 3>
and 2.;8 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action ut may e filed
separately y the offended party even without reservation. &he commencement of the criminal
action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the
Civil Code. T-e suspension in Section ! of t-e present Rule 111 refers onl% to t-e civil action
arising fro1 t-e cri1e, if suc- civil action is reserved or filed "efore t-e co11ence1ent of
t-e cri1inal action.
GABIONDA S! CA
=GR N+! 1>A511, M"3:9 5A, 2AA1@
$n amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already
contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction
for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can e made at any time. @urisprudence
allows amendments to information so long as: -a/ it does not deprive the accused of the right to
invo4e prescription" -/ it does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged" -c/
it does not involve a change in the asic theory of the prosecution so as to require the accused to
undergo any material change or modification in his defense" -d/ it does not e,pose the accused to
a charge which would call for a higher penalty" and, -9/ it does not cause surprise nor deprive the
accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment.
!n the case at ar, it is clear that the questioned amendment is one of form and not of
sustance. T-e allegation of ti1e 6-en an offense is co11itted is a 1atter of for1, unless
ti1e is a 1aterial ingredient of t-e offense. >t is not even necessar% to state in t-e
>nfor1ation t-e precise ti1e t-e offense 6as co11itted unless ti1e is a 1aterial factor. !t is
sufficient that the act is alleged to have een committed at any time as near to the actual date at
which the offense was committed as the Complaint or !nformation will permit.
LALICAN S! ERGARA
=GR N+! 1AC61?, J2(< 51, 1??4@
&his Court has consistently defined the proper procedure in case of denial of a motion to
quash. &he accused has to enter a plea, go to trial without pre*udice on his part to present the
special defenses he had invo4ed in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision
is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authori+ed y law. Certiorari is not t-e proper

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re1ed% 6-ere a 1otion to 7uas- an infor1ation is denied. T-at t-e appropriate recourse is
to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal suc- conviction, as 6ell as t-e denial
of t-e 1otion to 7uas-, is i1pelled "% t-e fact t-at a denial of a 1otion to 7uas- is an
interlocutor% procedural aspect 6-ic- cannot "e appealed nor can it "e t-e su"9ect of a
petition for certiorari. T-e re1edies of appeal and certiorari are 1utuall% e:clusive and not
alternative or successive.
BAYAS S! SANDIGANBAYAN
=GR N+.! 1>56C?-?1, N+)*/$*3 12,2AA2@
&here is nothing irregular or unlawful in stipulating facts in criminal cases. &he policy
encouraging it is consistent with the doctrine of waiver, which recogni+es that K. . . everyone has a
right to waive and agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the enefit and
protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can e dispensed with and relinquished
without infringing on any pulic right and without detriment to the community at large.K
!n the present case, the @oint Stipulation made y the prosecution and petitioners was a
waiver of the right to present evidence on the facts and the documents freely admitted y them.
&here could have een no impairment of petitionersL right to e presumed innocent, right to due
process or right against self=incrimination ecause the waiver was voluntary, made with the
assistance of counsel and is sanctioned y the %ules on Criminal Procedure. 'nce the stipulations
are reduced into writing and signed y the parties and their counsels, they ecome inding on the
parties who made them. &hey ecome *udicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Dven if
placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not e allowed to rescind them unilaterally" it
must assume the consequences of the disadvantage. !f the accused are allowed to plead guilty
under appropriate circumstances, y parity of reasoning, they should li4ewise e allowed to enter
into a fair and true pretrial agreement under appropriate circumstances.
YAP S! CA
=GR N+! 1>1B2?, J2&* 6, 2AA1@
!t militates emphasis that petitioner is see4ing ail on appeal. Section #, Rule 114 of t-e
Revised Rules of Cri1inal (rocedure is clear t-at alt-oug- t-e grant of "ail on appeal in non;
capital offenses is discretionar%, 6-en t-e penalt% i1posed on t-e convicted accused e:ceeds
si: %ears and circu1stances e:ist t-at point to t-e pro"a"ilit% of flig-t if released on "ail,
t-en t-e accused 1ust "e denied "ail, or -is "ail previousl% granted s-ould "e cancelled. !n
the same vein, the Court has held that the discretion to e,tend ail during the course of the appeal
should e e,ercised with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused had
een in fact convicted y the trial court .
SALES S! SANDIGANBAYAN
=GR N+! 1>5CA2, N+)*/$*3 16, 2AA1@
&he determination of proale cause is a function of the *udge" it is not for the provincial
fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. 'nly the *udge and the *udge alone ma4es this determination" 2.6
&he preliminary inquiry made y a prosecutor does not ind the *udge. !t merely assists him in
ma4ing the determination of proale cause. !t is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of
stenographic notes, if any, and all other supporting documents ehind the prosecutorLs certification
which are material in assisting the *udge in his determination of proale cause" and 3.6 @udges and
prosecutors ali4e should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines proale cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should e held for trial or e released. Dven if the two inquiries e made in
one and the same proceeding, there should e no confusion aout their o*ectives. T-e
deter1ination of pro"a"le cause for purposes of issuing t-e 6arrant of arrest is 1ade "% t-e
9udge. T-e preli1inar% investigation proper G 6-et-er or not t-ere is reasona"le ground to
"elieve t-at t-e accused is guilt% of t-e offense c-arged and, t-erefore, 6-et-er or not -e

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s-ould "e su"9ected to t-e e:pense, rigors and e1"arrass1ent of trial G is t-e function of t-e
prosecutor.
ROXAS S, ASQUED
=5BC SCRA 656@
!n criminal prosecutions, a reinvestigation, li4e an appeal, renders the entire case open for review.
US S! PURGANAN
= GR N+! 1>CB41, S*,0*/$*3 2>,2AA2@
&he filing of a petition for e,tradition does not per se *ustify the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against an e,traditee. &he petition, in some instances, may not contain sufficient allegations
and proof on the issue of whether the possile e,traditee will escape from the *urisdiction of the
e,traditing court.
)hen the petition for e,tradition does not provide sufficient asis for the arrest of the
possile e,traditee or the grant of ail as in the case at ar, it is discretionary for the e,tradition
court to call for a hearing to determine the issue.
$n e,traditee has the right to apply for ail. &he right is rooted in the due process clause of
the Constitution. !t cannot e denied simply ecause of the silence of our e,tradition treaty and
law on the matter. &he availaility of the right to ail is uttressed y our other treaties
recogni+ing civil and political rights and y international norms, customs and practices.
&he e,traditee may apply for ail ut its grant depends on the discretion of the e,traditing
court. &he court must satisfy itself that the ail will not frustrate the ends of *ustice.
!n deciding whether to grant ail or not to a possile e,traditee, the e,traditing court
must follow a higher and stricter standard. &he e,traditee must prove y clear and convincing
evidence that he will not flee from the *urisdiction of the e,traditing court and will respect all its
processes. !n fine, that he will not frustrate the ends of *ustice.
TULIAO S! RAMOS
= 2C> SCRA 54C @
$ *udge should demand the presentation of the originals of the required documents efore
approving a ail ond.
PEOPLE S!NARCA
=GR N+! 1AC>CC, J2(< 21, 1??4@
&here is nothing in the %ules which renders invalid a preliminary investigation held without
defendantLs counsel. Bot eing a part of the due process clause ut a right merely created y law,
preliminary investigation if held within the statutory limitations cannot e voided. $ppellantLs
argument, if sustained, would ma4e a moc4ery of criminal procedure, since all that a party has to
do to thwart the validity of the preliminary investigation is for their counsel not to attend the
investigation. !t must e emphasi+ed that the preliminary investigation is not the venue for the full
e,ercise of the rights of the parties. T-is is 6-% preli1inar% investigation is not considered as a
part of trial "ut 1erel% preparator% t-ereto and t-at t-e records t-erein s-all not for1 part
of t-e records of t-e case in court. (arties 1a% su"1it affidavits "ut -ave no rig-t to
e:a1ine 6itnesses t-oug- t-e% can propound 7uestions t-roug- t-e investigating officer. >n
fact, a preli1inar% investigation 1a% even "e conducted e:;parte in certain cases.
YUSOP S! SANDIGANBAYAN
=GR N+! 15CCB?-6A, F*$32"3< 22, 2AA1@
&he defenseLs failure to cross=e,amine Dli+aeth %eglos was occasioned y her supervening
death. Lac4 of cross=e,amination due to the death of the witness does not necessarily render the
deceasedLs previous testimony e,pungile. 0esides, mere opportunity and not actual cross=
e,amination is the essence of the right to cross=e,amine.
We also find unmeritorious appellants' argument that Elizabeth's testimony, having been taken during the bail hearings

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d under Section 8, Rule 11, as amended by !ircular 1"#$, %evidence
SOLID TRIANGLE SALES CORP! S! THE SHERIFF OF RTC, QC! E0!"(
=GR N+! 1>>5A?, N+)*/$*3 25, 2AA1@
&he effect of the quashal of the warrant on the ground that no offense has een committed
is to render the evidence otained y virtue of the warrant Kinadmissile for any purpose in any
proceeding,K including the preliminary investigation.
DE LOS SANTOS-REYES S! MONTESA
=AM-RTJ ?5-?C5, A2'2.0 4, 1??B@
>n satisf%ing -i1self of t-e e:istence of pro"a"le cause for t-e issuance of a 6arrant
of arrest, t-e 9udge, follo6ing t-e esta"lis-ed doctrine and procedure, s-all eit-er *a)
personall% evaluate t-e report and t-e supporting docu1ents su"1itted "% t-e prosecutor
regarding t-e e:istence of pro"a"le cause and, on t-e "asis t-ereof, issue a 6arrant of
arrest, or *") if on t-e face of t-e infor1ation -e finds no pro"a"le cause, -e 1a% disregard
t-e prosecutor8s certification and re7uire t-e su"1ission of t-e supporting affidavits of
6itnesses to aid -i1 in arriving at a conclusion as to t-e e:istence of pro"a"le cause.
-Supreme Court Circular Bo. .2, dated 3? @une .7<;" Soliven vs. :a4asiar, .8; SC%$ 373 5.7<<6"
Cru+ vs. People, 233 SC%$ >37 5.77>6./ &his procedure is dictated y sound pulic policy" otherwise
*udges would e unduly laden with the preliminary e,amination and investigation of criminal
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed efore their courts. At t-is
stage of a cri1inal proceeding, t-e 9udge is not tas.ed to revie6 in detail t-e evidence
su"1itted during t-e preli1inar% investigation$ it is sufficient t-at -e personall% evaluates
t-e report and supporting docu1ents su"1itted "% t-e prosecution in deter1ining pro"a"le
cause. T-is 9udicial function does not carr% 6it- it a 1otu proprio revie6 of t-e
reco11endation of t-e prosecutor in a capital offense t-at no "ail s-all "e granted. Suc- a
reco11endation is t-e e:clusive prerogative of t-e prosecutor in t-e e:ercise of -is 7uasi;
9udicial function during t-e preli1inar% investigation, 6-ic- is e:ecutive in nature. !n such
cases, once the court determines that proale cause e,ists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
the warrant of arrest shall forthwith e issued and it is only after the accused is ta4en into the
custody of the law and deprived of his lierty that, upon proper application for ail, the court on
the asis of the evidence adduced y the prosecution at the hearing called for the purpose may,
upon determination that such evidence is not strong, admit the accused to ail.
PEOPLE S! NADERA
=GR N+.! 1515C>-C4, F*$32"3< 2, 2AAA@
Convictions "ased on an i1provident plea of guilt are set aside onl% if suc- plea is t-e
sole "asis of t-e 9udg1ent. !f the trial court relied on sufficient and credile evidence to convict
the accused, the conviction must e sustained, ecause then it is predicated not merely on the
guilty plea of the accused ut on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.
PHIL! RABBIT BUS LINES S! PEOPLE
= GR N+! 1>44A5, A,3%( >, 2AA> @
$n appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional
safeguard against doule *eopardy and throws the whole case open to a review y the appellate
court. &he latter is then called upon to render *udgment as law and *ustice dictate, whether
favorale or unfavorale to the appellant. &his is the ris4 involved when the accused decides to
appeal a sentence of conviction. !ndeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse, affirm or
modify the *udgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.
ALONTE S! SAELLANO
2C4 SCRA 2>B

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$fter the case has een filed in court, any pardon made y the private complainant,
whether y sworn statement or on the witness stand, cannot e,tinguish criminal lialilty.
PEOPLE S! ESCANO
5>? SCRA 64>
&he acquittal on appel of certain accused ased on reasonale dout enefits a co=accused
who did not appel or who withdrew his appeal.
PEOPLE S! MADERAS
5BA SCRA BA>
)here the accused escapes from actual custody or flees from constructive custody, the
Court may motu proprio or on appellee#s motion dismiss the appeal for aandonment.
EIDENCE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs! EANGELINE GANENAS % URBANO
=G!R! N+! 1>1>AA! S*,0*/$*3 6, 2AA1@
&he alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses refer to minor or
trivial incidents that do not detract from the fact that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto as
a result of the uy=ust operation. &he identities of the leader and the memers of the police team
are nonessential matters that have no direct earing upon the actual commission of the offense.
5itnesses testif%ing on t-e sa1e event do not -ave to "e consistent in ever% detail, as
differences in recollections, vie6points or i1pressions are inevita"le. So long as t-e% concur
on t-e 1aterial points of t-eir respective testi1onies, slig-t differences in t-ese 1atters do
not destro% t-e veracit% of t-eir state1ents
're&u(ption of Regularity in the 'erfor(ance of -fficial Duty
&he testimonies of the police officers with respect to appellant#s participation in the drug=
related transaction, which was the su*ect of the operation, carried with it the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functionsCourts accord credence and full faith to the
testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to e performing their duties regularly,
asent any convincing proof to the contrary!n this case, no sufficient reason or valid e,planation
was presented to deviate from this presumption of regularity on their part.
!n almost every case involving a uy=ust operation, the accused put up the defense of
frame=up. &he Supreme Court views such claim with disfavor, ecause Iit can easily e feigned and
faricated.
EANGELINE CABRERA ).! PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES "&1 LUIS GO,
=G!R! N+! 1BA61C! J2(< 2>, 2AA5!@
!n this case, the prosecution failed to adduce in evidence any notice of dishonor of the
three postdated chec4s or any letter of demand sent to and received y the petitioner. &he are
testimony of Luis Ao that he sent letters of demand to the petitioner notifying her of the dishonor
of her chec4s is utterly insufficient.
Aor failure of t-e prosecution to s-o6 t-at notices of dis-onor of t-e t-ree postdated
c-ec.s 6ere served on t-e petitioner, or at t-e ver% least, t-at s-e 6as sent a de1and letter
notif%ing -er of t-e said dis-onor, t-e pri1a facie presu1ption under Section ! of F.(. Flg. !!
t-at s-e .ne6 of t-e insufficienc% of funds cannot arise. T-us, t-ere can "e no "asis for
esta"lis-ing t-e presence of Dactual .no6ledge of insufficienc% of funds.K
!n light of such failure, we find and so declare that the prosecution failed to prove eyond
reasonale dout all the elements of violation of 0.P. 0lg. 22. Fence, the need to reverse and set
aside the decisions of oth the Court of $ppeals and the trial court convicting the petitioner of the
crime of violation of 0.P. 0lg. 22.
Fowever, we uphold the decision of the C$ affirming the trial courtLs decision ordering the
petitioner to pay to the private respondent the total face value of the chec4s in the amount of
P2?7,.;9.>9. )e stress that a chec4 is an evidence of det against the drawer, and although may

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not e intended to e presented, has the same effect as an ordinary chec4, and if passed upon to a
third person, will e valid in his hands li4e any other chec4. Fence, the petitioner is oliged to pay
to the private respondent Luis Ao the said amount of P2?7,.;9.>9 with .21 legal interest per
annum, from the filing of the information until the finality of this decision, the sum of which,
inclusive of interest, shall e su*ect thereafter to .21 per annum interest until the amount due is
fully paid, conformaly to our ruling that when an oligation is reached, and it consists in the
payment of a sum of money, i.e. a loan or forearance of money, the interest due should e that
which may have een stipulated in writing. !n the asence of such stipulation, the rate shall e .21
per annum computed from default, i.e. *udicial or e,tra*udicial demand. 29 !n this case, the rate of
interest was not stipulated in writing y the petitioner, the private respondent and 0oni Co. &hus,
the applicale interest rate is .21 per annum.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOERNMENT EPCGG7 ).!
=G!R! N+! 15212A! F*$32"3< 1A, 2AA5!@
!n the face of the $ffidavit and the Supplemental $ffidavit, it is indeed strange how the
omudsman could have ruled that there was no testimonial evidence on the said matters. &hat he
ruled thus clearly shows that he whimsically opted to disregard those pieces of evidence and
therey demonstrated his capricious and aritrary e,ercise of *udgment.
&he complainant is required to file affidavits Kas well as other supporting documents to
estalish proale cause,K as stated in the %ules of Court:
K-a/ &he complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall e accompanied
y the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to
estalish proale cause.K
&his requirement was fulfilled y the PCAA. &he Supplemental Complaint was accompanied
y the $ffidavits of witnesses as well as y a host of other supporting documents, all of which M
ta4en together M estalished proale cause.
>t s-ould "e noted t-at t-e Rules on =vidence recogni2es different for1s of evidence G
o"9ect, docu1entar% or testi1onial G 6it-out preference for an% of t-e1 in particular. 5-at
s-ould reall% 1atter are t-e 6eig-t and t-e sufficienc% of t-e evidence presented.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ).! CARLITO MARAHAY < MORACA
=G!R! N+.! 12A62B-2?! J"&2"3< 2C, 2AA5@
)hile the father=daughter relationship of accused=appellant and the victims, :ylene and
0elinda, remains undisputed, the minority of the victims, though alleged, was not satisfactorily
estalished. !t is the urden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was
elow .< years of age when the rape was committed in order to *ustify the imposition of the death
penalty.
!n the recent case of People vs. :anuel Pruna y %amire+ or Drman Pruna y %amire+, this
Court laid down the following guidelines in appreciating age, eit-er as an ele1ent of t-e cri1e
or as a 7ualif%ing circu1stance@
K.. &he est evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live irth of such party.
K2. !n the asence of a certificate of live irth, similar authentic documents such as aptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of irth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
K3. !f the certificate of live irth or authentic document is shown to have een lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailale, the testimony, if clear and credile, of the victimLs mother or a
memer of the family either y affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the e,act age or date of irth of the offended party pursuant to Section
>?, %ule .3? of the %ules on Dvidence shall e sufficient under the following circumstances:

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a. !f the victim is alleged to e elow 3 years of age and what is sought to e proved
is that she is less than ; years old"
. !f the victim is alleged to e elow ; years of age and what is sought to e proved
is that she is less than .2 years old"
c. !f the victim is alleged to e elow .2 years of age and what is sought to e proved
is that she is less than .< years old.
K>. !n the asence of a certificate of live irth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victimLs mother or relatives concerning the victimLs age, the complainantLs testimony will suffice
provided that it is e,pressly and clearly admitted y the accused.
K9. !t is the prosecution that has the urden of proving the age of the offended party. &he
failure of the accused to o*ect to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not e ta4en
against him.
K8. &he trial court should always ma4e a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.K
&hus, although the defense does not contest the age of the victim, it is still essential that
the prosecution present independent proof thereof, pursuant to Bo. 9 of said guidelines. $s a
matter of fact, the minority of the victim must e proved with equal certainty and clearness as the
crime itself. Under Section >>, %ule .3? of the %ules on Dvidence, a irth certificate is the est
evidence of a personLs date of irth. !n the instant case, the prosecution did not present the
certificates of live irth of oth :ylene and 0elinda or other similar authentic documents to prove
their ages. Bot even the victimsL mother or the victims themselves, or any other relative qualified
to testify on matters respecting pedigree, were presented y the prosecution to estalish the
victimsL ages at the time the crimes were committed. Such failure of the prosecution to discharge
its urden constrains this Court to hold that the qualifying circumstance of minority cannot e
appreciated in these cases.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ).! MARLON MORALDE
=G!R! N+! 151C6A! J"&2"3< 16, 2AA5!@
Faving een positively and unmista4aly identified y the complainant as her rapist, the
appellantLs defense of alii cannot prosper. Categorical and consistent positive identification,
a"sent an% s-o6ing of ill;1otive on t-e part of t-e e%e6itness testif%ing t-ereon, prevails
over t-e defenses of denial and ali"i 6-ic-, if not su"stantiated "% clear and convincing
proof, constitute self;serving evidence undeserving of 6eig-t in la6. $lii, li4e denial, is
inherently wea4 and easily faricated. Cor this defense to *ustify an acquittal, the following must
e estalished: the presence of the appellant in another place at the time of the commission of the
offense and the physical impossiility for him to e at the scene of the crime. &hese requisites
have not een met.
HEIRS OF LOURDES SAED SABANPAN ).! ALBERTO C! COMORPOSA
=G!R! N+! 1B2CA4! A2'2.0 12, 2AA5!@
Pleadings filed via fa, machines are not considered originals and are at est e,act copies.
$s such, they are not admissile in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are
genuine or authentic.
&he Certification, on the other hand, is eing contested for earing a facsimile of the
signature of CDB% 'fficer @ose C. &agorda. &he facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is
alluded to in Aarvida. &he one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a
signature produced y mechanical means ut recogni+ed as valid in an4ing, financial, and usiness
transactions.
Bote that the CDB% officer has not disclaimed the Certification. !n fact, the DDB% regional
director has ac4nowledged and used it as reference in his 'rder dated $pril 2, .77<:
K. . . . CDB% 'fficer @ose C. &agorda, in a LCD%&!C!C$&!'BL dated 22 @uly .77;, certified
among others, that: . . . per records availale in his 'ffice, . . . the controverted lot . . . was not
allocated to any person . . . .K
!f the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not
have used it as reference in his 'rder. !nstead, he would have either verified it or directed the

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CDB% officer to ta4e the appropriate action, as the latter was under the formerLs direct control and
supervision.
PetitionersL claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect.
$s early as the pretrial conference at the :unicipal &rial Court -:&C/, the CDB% Certification had
already een mar4ed as evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre=trial 'rder. &he Certification
was not formally offered, however, ecause respondents had not een ale to file their position
paper.
N*%09*3 09* 32(*. +8 ,3+:*123* &+3 ;23%.,321*&:* F+2(1 ."&:0%+& 09* "1/%..%+& +8
*)%1*&:* 09"0 9". &+0 $**& 8+3/"((< +88*3*1 123%&' 09* 03%"(! B20 09%. *)%1*&0%"3< 32(* %.
",,(%:"$(* +&(< 0+ +31%&"3< 03%"(., &+0 0+ :".*. :+)*3*1 $< 09* 32(* +& .2//"3< ,3+:*123* G
:".*. %& F9%:9 &+ 82((-$(+F& 03%"( %. 9*(1
Proative value of the $ffidavit of Petitioner#s witnesses
Petitioners assert that the C$ erred in disregarding the $ffidavits of their witnesses,
insisting that the %ule on Summary Procedure authori+es the use of affidavits. &hey also claim that
the failure of respondents to file their position paper and counter=affidavits efore the :&C
amounts to an admission y silence.
T-e ad1issi"ilit% of evidence s-ould not "e confused 6it- its pro"ative value.
Ad1issi"ilit% refers to t-e 7uestion of 6-et-er certain pieces of evidence are to "e
considered at all, 6-ile pro"ative value refers to t-e 7uestion of 6-et-er t-e ad1itted
evidence proves an issue. T-us, a particular ite1 of evidence 1a% "e ad1issi"le, "ut its
evidentiar% 6eig-t depends on 9udicial evaluation 6it-in t-e guidelines provided "% t-e rules
of evidence.
)hile in summary proceedings affidavits are admissile as the witnessesL respective
testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth
therein, duly proven. Petitioners still ear the urden of proving their cause of action, ecause
they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ).! SATURNINO TUPPAL
=G!R! N+.! 154?C2-CB! J"&2"3< 15, 2AA5!@
&he 'ffice of the Solicitor Aeneral counters that findings of the trial court during the ail
hearing were ut a preliminary appraisal of the strength of the prosecutionLs evidence for the
limited purpose of determining whether appellant is entitled to e released on ail during the
pendency of the trial. Fence, we agree with the 'SA that said findings should not e construed as
an immutale evaluation of the prosecutionLs evidence. !t is settled that the assessment of the
prosecution evidence presented during ail hearings in capital offenses is preliminary and intended
only for the purpose of granting or denying applications for the provisional release of the accused.
TEODORO K! KATIGBAK ).! THE SANDIGANBAYAN
=G!R! N+! 1>A1C5! J2(< 1A, 2AA5!@
$ careful scrutiny of the documentary evidence adduced y the prosecution does not
support the charge of violation of Section 3, paragraph -e/ of %$ 3?.7, as amended, in the instant
information against the petitioners. Significantly, the said pieces of documentary evidence were
offered only for the purpose of estalishing the participation and liaility of their co=accused,
%oert 0alao, as noted in the written Cormal 'ffer of D,hiits 39 of the prosecution dated
Septemer 22, .77;. &he same was prepared and signed y $tty. Bicanor E. Eillarosa, counsel of the
private complainant, with the written approval of Prosecutor :anuel :. Corpu+ of the 'ffice of the
Special Prosecutor. !n this connection, the rule is e,plicit that courts should consider the evidence
only for the purpose for which it is offered.
&he prosecution relies heavily on BF$ 0oard %esolution Bo. 2>93 dated :arch .2, .772 to
estalish the alleged conspiracy etween the petitioners and their co=accused. Fowever, the Court
is othered y the une,plained failure of the prosecution to include in its formal offer of e,hiits
such a very vital piece of evidence in proving the e,istence of the alleged conspiracy among the
petitioners.

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5e e1p-asi2e t-at an% evidence a part% desires to su"1it for t-e consideration of t-e
court 1ust for1all% "e offered "% -i1. Suc- a for1al offer is necessar% "ecause it is t-e dut%
of t-e 9udge to rest -is findings of fact and -is 9udg1ent strictl% on t-e evidence offered "%
t-e parties at t-e trial$ and no finding of fact can "e sustained if not supported "% suc-
evidence. Docu1ents not regularl% received in evidence during t-e trial 6ill not "e considered
in disposing of t-e issues in an action.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ).! HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN "&1 FERDINAND E! MARCOS
=G!R! N+! 1B21B>! J2(< 1B, 2AA5!@
Cerdinand @r.Ls pronouncements, ta4en in conte,t and in their entirety, were a confirmation
of respondents# recognition of their ownership of the Swiss an4 deposits. $dmissions of a party in
his testimony are receivale against him. !f a party, as a witness, delierately concedes a fact, such
concession has the force of a *udicial admission. !t is apparent from Cerdinand @r.Ls testimony that
the :arcos family agreed to negotiate with the Philippine government in the hope of finally putting
an end to the prolems esetting the :arcos family regarding the Swiss accounts. &his was
doutlessly an ac4nowledgment of ownership on their part. &he rule is that the testimony on the
witness stand parta4es of the nature of a formal *udicial admission when a party testifies clearly
and unequivocally to a fact which is peculiarly within his own 4nowledge.
)e have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission made in the pleadings
cannot e controverted y the party ma4ing such admission and ecomes conclusive on him, and
that all proofs sumitted y him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should e ignored,
whether an o*ection is interposed y the adverse party or not. &his doctrine is emodied in
Section >, %ule .27 of the %ules of Court.
!n the asence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondentsL *udicial admission of
ownership of the Swiss deposits is definitely inding on them. &he individual and separate
admissions of each respondent ind all of them pursuant to Sections 27 and 3., %ule .3? of the
%ules of Court.
T9* 1*:("3"0%+&. +8 " ,*3.+& "3* "1/%..%$(* "'"%&.0 " ,"30< F9*&*)*3 " H,3%)%0< +8
*.0"0*H *I%.0. $*0F**& 09* 1*:("3"&0 "&1 09* ,"30<, 09* 0*3/ H,3%)%0< +8 *.0"0*H '*&*3"((<
1*&+0%&' " .2::*..%+& %& 3%'90.! C+&.*J2*&0(<, "& "1/%..%+& +8 +&* %& ,3%)%0< F%09 " ,"30< 0+
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F9*3* .*)*3"( :+-,"30%*. 0+ 09* 3*:+31 "3* ;+%&0(< %&0*3*.0*1 %& 09* .2$;*:0 /"00*3 +8 09*
:+&03+)*3.<, 09* "1/%..%+& +8 +&* %. :+/,*0*&0 "'"%&.0 "((!
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ).! RAQUIM PINUELA
=G!R! N+.! 1>A424-2C! F*$32"3< 5, 2AA5!@
$ccused=appellant further argues that the prosecution did not present Fenry Fualde
ecause his testimony would e adverse to the case. )e are not persuaded. !t is the prosecution
that determines who among its witnesses are to testify in court, and it is neither for the accused
nor the court to override that prerogative. Corollarily, the failure of the prosecution to present a
particular witness does not give rise to the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would
e adverse if produced, where that evidence is at the disposal of oth parties or where the only
o*ect of presenting the witness would e to provide corroorative or cumulative evidence.
Cinally, accused=appellant contends that the trial *udgeLs intervention during cross=
e,amination of the prosecution witnesses was pre*udicial to him. Fowever, a scrutiny of the
questions propounded y the trial *udge, fails to disclose any ias on his part which would
pre*udice accused=appellant. &he questions were merely clarificatory. &he trial court *udge is not
an idle ariter during a trial. Fe can propound clarificatory questions to witnesses in order to ferret
out the truth. &he impartiality of a *udge cannot e assailed on the ground that he as4ed
clarificatory questions during the trial.
GRACE J! GARCIA vs! REDERICK A! RECIO
=G!R! N+! 15C522! O:0+$*3 2, 2AA1@
$ divorce otained aroad y an alien may e recogni+ed in our *urisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Fowever, the divorce decree and the

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governing personal law of the alien spouse who otained the divorce must e proven. 'ur courts
do not ta4e *udicial notice of foreign laws and *udgments" hence, li4e any other facts, oth the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must e alleged and proven according to our law
on evidence.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
BASED ON REMEDIAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE
CIIL PROCEDURE
Q! Fow is *urisdiction over the person of the defendant acquired y the trial court(
E%09*3 $< 9%. )+(2&0"3< ",,*"3"&:* %& :+230 "&1 9%. .2$/%..%+& 0+ %0. "209+3%0<
+3 $< .*3)%:* +8 .2//+&.! &he service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is
to inform him that a case has een filed against him and, thus, enale him to defend
himself. Fe is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner.
)ithout such service in the asence of a valid waiver renders the *udgment of the court
null and void. @urisdiction cannot e acquired y the court on the person of the defendant
even if he 4nows of the case against him unless he is validly served with summons.
Summons and complaint may e served on the defendant either y handing a copy thereof
to him in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, y tendering it to her.
Fowever, if there is impossiility of prompt service of the summons personally on the
defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of the summons may e effected y
sustituted service as provided in Section ;, %ule .> of the said %ules:
SDC. ;. Sustituted service. M !f, for *ustifiale causes, the defendant cannot e
served within a reasonale time as provided in the preceding section, service may e
effected -a/ y leaving copies of the summons at the defendantLs residence with some
person of suitale age and discretion then residing therein, or -/ y leaving the copies of
defendantLs office or regular place of usiness with some competent person in charge
thereof. * Anc-eta vs. Anc-eta, 0R? 14#',, )arc- 4, !,,4 )
Q! )hen can the court resort to sustituted service(
!n :iranda v. Court of $ppeals, we held that the modes of service should e strictly
followed in order that the court may acquire *urisdiction over the person of the
defendant. &hus, it is only when a defendant cannot e served personally within a
reasonale time that sustituted service may e made y stating the efforts made to find
him and personally serve on him the summons and complaint and the fact that such effort

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failed. &his statement should e made in the proof of service to e accomplished and filed
in court y the sheriff. &his is necessary ecause sustituted service is a derogation of the
usual method of service. !t has een held that sustituted service of summons is a method
e,traordinary in character" hence, may e used only as prescried and in the
circumstances categori+ed y statutes. * Anc-eta vs. Anc-eta, 0R? 14#',, )arc- 4,
!,,4 )
Q! $re indispensale parties required to e *oined(
YES! Section ;, %ule 3 of the %ules of Court, as amended, requires indispensale parties to
e *oined as plaintiffs or defendants. &-e 9oinder of indispensa"le parties is 1andator%.
5it-out t-e presence of indispensa"le parties to t-e suit, t-e 9udg1ent of t-e court
cannot attain real finalit%. Strangers to a case are not ound y the *udgment rendered
y the court. &he asence of an indispensale party renders all susequent actions of the
court null and void. Lac4 of authority to act not only of the asent party ut also as to
those present. &he responsiility of impleading all the indispensale parties rests on the
petitionerOplaintiff. - Do1ingo vs! Sc-eer.
Q! )ill the non=*oinder of an indispensale party e a ground for the dismissal of the
petition(
NO! &he non=*oinder of indispensale parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action. Parties may e added y order of the court on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action andOor such times as are *ust. !f the petitionerOplaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensale party despite the order of the court, the latter may
dismiss the complaintOpetition for the petitionerOplaintiffs failure to comply therefor.
/Do1ingo vs. Sc-eer)
Q! $ case for collection of sum of money was filed y respondent against herein petitioner. &he
sheriff failed to serve the summons intended for the petitioner ecause the former could not locate
the petitionerLs address as indicated in the complaint. &hereafter, petitioner filed a :otion to
Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lac4 of *urisdiction over his person. &he court denied said
motion and ordered the issuance of alias summons on the petitioner. !s the denial and issuance of
alias summon proper (
YES! &he trial court was merely e,ercising its discretion under %ule .8, Section 3
of the .77; %ules of Civil Procedure when it denied the petitionerLs motion to
dismiss. Under said rule, after hearing the motion, a *udge may dismiss the action,
deny the motion to dismiss or order the amendment of the pleading. &he trial court
denied the motion to dismiss ased on its finding that the issues alleged y the
respondent in its complaint could not e resolved fully in the asence of the
petitioner. !n its desire to resolve completely the issues rought efore it, the trial
court deemed it fitting to properly acquire *urisdiction over the person of the
petitioner y ordering the issuance of alias summons on the petitioner. Dvidently,
the trial court acted well within its discretion. * Te- vs. CA, 0R? 14',&, April
!4, !,, )
Q! )hen will the rule on forum shopping apply(
T9* 32(* +& 8+32/ .9+,,%&' ",,(%*. F9*3* 09* *(*/*&0. +8 (%0%. ,*&1*&0%" "3*
,3*.*&0 +3 F9*3* " 8%&"( ;21'/*&0 %& +&* :".* F%(( "/+2&0 0+ 3*. ;21%:"0" %& 09* +09*3!
%es *udicata applies only where *udgment on the merits is finally rendered on the first.
*David vs. Spouses ?avarro)
Q! )ill susequent compliance with the requirement to file a certificate of non=forum shopping
cure the defect to file the same in the first instance(

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NO! &his Court held in :elo vs. Court of $ppeals, et al., that the
requirement under $dministrative Circular Bo. ?>=7> for a certificate of non=forum
shopping is mandatory. &he susequent compliance with said requirement does not
e,cuse a partyLs failure to comply therewith in the first instance. !n those cases
where this Court e,cused the non=compliance with the requirement of the
sumission of a certificate of non=forum shopping, it found special circumstances or
compelling reasons which made the strict application of said Circular clearly
un*ustified or inequitale. !n this case, however, the petitioner offered no valid
*ustification for her failure to comply with the Circular. * Fato% vs. RTC, 0R?
1!6&, Ae"ruar% 1', !,, )
Q. !s there a valid motion for reconsideration when there is a failure to incorporate any notice of
hearing(
NO. Section 2, %ule 3; of the %ules of Court provides that a motion for
reconsideration or a motion for a new trial shall e made in writing stating the ground or
grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall e served y the movant on the adverse
party. Such written notice is that prescried in Sections > and 9, %ule .9 of the %ules of
Court. Under Section >, paragraph 2 of said rule, a notice of hearing on a motion shall e
served y the movant to all the parties concerned at least three days efore the date of
hearing. Section 9 of the same rule requires that the notice of hearing shall e directed to
the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the hearing of the motion. &he
requirements, far from eing merely technical and procedural as claimed y the
petitioners, are vital elements of procedural due process.&he requirements entomed in
Sections > and 9 of %ule .9 of the %ules of Court are mandatory and non=compliance
therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma. /Repu"lic vs. (eralta 0RH1#,!',
/une 1&,!,,)
Q! Can the appellate court resolve issues that are not raised on appeal(
YES. &he Court has ruled in a numer of cases that the appellate court is accorded a
road discretionary power to waive the lac4 of proper assignment of errors and to consider
errors not assigned. !t is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are
not assigned as errors in the appeal. !nasmuch as the Court of $ppeals may consider
grounds other than those touched upon in the decision of the trial court and uphold the
same on the asis of such other grounds, the Court of $ppeals may, with no less authority,
reverse the decision of the trial court on the asis of grounds other than those raised as
errors on appeal. )e have applied this rule, as a matter of e,ception, in the following
instances:
-./ Arounds not assigned as errors ut affecting *urisdiction over the su*ect
matter"
-2/ :atters not assigned as errors on appeal ut are evidently plain or clerical
errors within contemplation of law"
-3/ :atters not assigned as errors on appeal ut consideration of which is
necessary in arriving at a *ust decision and complete resolution of the case
or to serve the interests of *ustice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal *ustice"
->/ :atters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal ut raised in the trial
court and are matters of record having some earing on the issue sumitted
which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored"
-9/ :atters not assigned as errors on appeal ut closely related to an error
assigned" and
-8/ :atters not assigned as errors on appeal ut upon which the determination
of a question properly assigned, is dependent. / Iiron Transpo. Is. CA,
0RH11',!,,April 4, !,,)

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Q! !s it a ministerial duty for the sheriff to e,ecute the *udgment of the court(
Y*.! T9%. C+230 9". :+&.%.0*&0(< 9*(1 09"0 H09* .9*3%88K. 120< 0+ *I*:20* "
;21'/*&0 %. /%&%.0*3%"(!H $ purely ministerial act is one Kwhich an officer or triunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescried manner, in oedience to the mandate of
the legal authority, without regard to the e,ercise of his own *udgment upon the propriety
of the act done.K /E+ero v&* 0a1ati City Sheriff&.

Q! )hat are the grounds to annul the *udgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the
%&C(
$n original action in the Court of $ppeals under %ule >; of the %ules of Court, as
amended, to annul a *udgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the %&C may
e ased on two grounds: -a/ e,trinsic fraud" or -/ lac4 of *urisdiction. !f ased on
e,trinsic fraud, the remedy is su*ect to a condition precedent, namely, the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer availale through no fault of the petitioner. &he petitioner must allege in the
petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
*udgment, under %ule 3< of the %ules of Court are no longer availale through no fault of
hers" otherwise, the petition will e dismissed. !f the petitioner fails to avail of the
remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from *udgment through her own fault or negligence
efore filing her petition with the Court of $ppeals, she cannot resort to the remedy under
%ule >; of the %ules" otherwise, she would enefit from her inaction or negligence.
!t is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer
availale through no fault of her own. &he petitioner must also e,plain and *ustify her
failure to avail of such remedies. &he safeguard was incorporated in the rule precisely to
avoid ause of the remedy. $ccess to the courts is guaranteed. 0ut there must e limits
thereto. 'nce a litigantLs rights have een ad*udicated in a valid final *udgment of a
competent court, he should not e granted an unridled license to sue anew. &he
prevailing party should not e ve,ed y susequent suits.

Q( !n a petition for annulment of *udgment under %ule >;, is it always necessary to allege that the
ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration is no longer availale(
!t depends on what ground the petition is ased. $n original action in the Court of
$ppeals under %ule >; of the %ules of Court, as amended, to annul a *udgment or final
order or resolution in civil actions of the %&C may e ased on two grounds: -"7 *I03%&.%:
83"21; +3 E$7 (":# +8 ;23%.1%:0%+&. !f ased on e,trinsic fraud, the remedy is su*ect to a
condition precedent, namely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer availale through no fault of the petitioner.
&he petitioner must allege in the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief from *udgment, under %ule 3< of the %ules of Court are no longer
availale through no fault of hers" otherwise, the petition will e dismissed. !f the
petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from *udgment
through her own fault or negligence efore filing her petition with the Court of $ppeals,
she cannot resort to the remedy under %ule >; of the %ules" otherwise, she would enefit
from her inaction or negligence.
>n a case 6-ere a petition for t-e annul1ent of a 9udg1ent or final order of t-e RTC
filed under Rule 4' of t-e Rules of Court is grounded on lac. of 9urisdiction over t-e
person of t-e defendantJrespondent or over t-e nature or su"9ect of t-e action, t-e
petitioner need not allege in t-e petition t-at t-e ordinar% re1ed% of ne6 trial or
reconsideration of t-e final order or 9udg1ent or appeal t-erefro1 are no longer
availa"le t-roug- no fault of -er o6n. &his is so ecause a *udgment rendered or final
order issued y the %&C without *urisdiction is null and void and may e assailed any time
either collaterally or in a direct action or y resisting such *udgment or final order in any

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action or proceeding whenever it is invo4ed, unless arred y laches. * Anc-eta vs.
Anc-eta, 0R? 14#',, )arc- 4, !,,4 )
Q! )hat is the nature of a *udgment on the question of ownership in e*ectment cases(
Prefatorily, in e*ectment cases, the issue is the physical or material possession
-possession de facto/ and any pronouncement made y the trial court on the question of
ownership is provisional in nature. $ *udgment rendered in e*ectment cases shall not ar
an action etween the same parties respecting title to the land and shall not e conclusive
as to the facts found therein in a case etween the same parties upon a different cause of
action involving possession of the same property. * Alorencio vs. de leon, 0R? 149#',,
)arc- 1!, !,,4 )
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Q! :ay an interlocutory order e su*ect of a petition for certiorari under %ule 89 of the
%ules of Court(
NO! S2:9 +31*3 %. /*3*(< "& %&0*3(+:20+3< +&* "&1 09*3*8+3* &+0 ",,*"("$(*!
N*%09*3 :"& %0 $* 09* .2$;*:0 +8 " ,*0%0%+& 8+3 :*30%+3"3%! Such order may only e
reviewed in the ordinary course of law y an appeal from the *udgment after trial.
$lthough the special civil action for certiorari may e availed of in case there is grave
ause of discretion or lac4 of *urisdiction on the part of the lower court, or ody, it would
e a reach of orderly procedure to allow a party to come efore the appellate court every
time an order is issued with which a party does not agree. Fence, as a general rule, there
must first e a *udgment on the merits of the case efore it may e questioned via a
special civil action for certiorari.
&he remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer to the complaint and to
interpose as defenses the o*ections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and
in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case y appeal in due course.
Fowever, the rule is not ironclad. Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or
mandamus is considered appropriate, that is, -a/ when the trial court issued the order
without or in e,cess of *urisdiction" -/ where there is patent grave ause of discretion y
the trial court" or, -c/ appeal would not prove to e a speedy and adequate remedy as
when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the in*urious effects of the
patently mista4en order maintaining the plaintiffs# aseless action and compelling the
defendant needlessly to go through protracted trial and clogging the court doc4ets y
another futile case. /Ca+alle& v&* 'ere23Si&on.

Q. )hat do you mean y lac4 of *urisdiction, e,cess of *urisdiction and grave ause of discretion(
)hen will the special civil action for certiorari lie(
T9* 03%$2&"( ":0. F%09+20 ;23%.1%:0%+& %8 %0 1+*. &+0 9")* 09* (*'"( ,23,+.* 0+
1*0*3/%&* 09* :".*; 09*3* %. *I:*.. +8 ;23%.1%:0%+& F9*3* 09* 03%$2&"(, $*%&' :(+09*1
F%09 09* ,+F*3 0+ 1*0*3/%&* 09* :".*, +)*3.0*,. %0. "209+3%0< ". 1*0*3/%&*1 $< ("F,
T9*3* %. '3")* "$2.* +8 1%.:3*0%+& F9*3* 09* 03%$2&"( ":0. %& " :",3%:%+2., F9%/.%:"(,
"3$%03"3< +3 1*.,+0%: /"&&*3 %& 09* *I*3:%.* +8 %0. ;21'/*&0 "&1 %. *J2%)"(*&0 0+ (":# +8
;23%.1%:0%+&! !t was incument upon the private respondent to adduce a sufficiently strong
demonstration that the %&C acted whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to,
and even decide of, the controversy efore certiorari will lie. A .,*:%"( :%)%( ":0%+& 8+3
:*30%+3"3% %. " 3*/*1< 1*.%'&*1 8+3 09* :+33*:0%+& +8 *33+3. +8 ;23%.1%:0%+& "&1 &+0
*33+3. +8 ;21'/*&0! )hen a court e,ercises its *urisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprive it of its *urisdiction eing e,ercised when the error is committed.
*C-ing vs. Court of Appeals)

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Q! )hat should the sheriff include in his enforcement of the writ of attachment( )hat are the
remedies in case the sheriff fails to attach the right properties( )hat is the procedure followed y
the court(
S9*3%88 /"< "00":9 +&(< 09+.* ,3+,*30%*. +8 09* 1*8*&1"&0 "'"%&.0 F9+/ " F3%0 +8
"00":9/*&0 9". $**& %..2*1 $< 09* :+230! )hen the sheriff erroneously levies on
attachment and sei+es the property of a third person in which the said defendant holds no
right or interest, the superior authority of the court which has authori+ed the e,ecution
may e invo4ed y the aggrieved third person in the same case. Upon application of the
third person, the court shall order a summary hearing for the purpose of determining
whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the
e,ecution of the writ of attachment, more specifically if he has indeed levied on
attachment and ta4en hold of property not elonging to the plaintiff. !f so, the court may
then order the sheriff to release the property from the erroneous levy and to return the
same to the third person. !n resolving the motion of the third party, the court does not and
cannot pass upon the question of the title to the property with any character of finality. !t
can treat the matter only insofar as may e necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted
correctly or not. !f the claimantLs proof does not persuade the court of the validity of the
title, or right of possession thereto, the claim will e denied y the court. &he aggrieved
third party may also avail himself of the remedy of KterceriaK y e,ecuting an affidavit of
his title or right of possession over the property levied on attachment and serving the same
to the office ma4ing the levy and the adverse party. Such party may also file an action to
nullify the levy with damages resulting from the unlawful levy and sei+ure, which should e
a totally separate and distinct action from the former case. &he aovementioned remedies
are cumulative and any one of them may e resorted to y one third=party claimant
without availing of the other remedies. *Bng vs. Tating$ C-ing vs. CA)

Q! )hat will e the effect if no supersedeas ond has een filed on appeal to stay the e,ecution(
C+230 %. /"&1"0*1 0+ %..2* " F3%0 +8 *I*:20%+&, conformaly to Section .7, %ule ;?
of the %ules of Court, as amended. *David vs. Spouses ?avarro)

Q. )hether or not the petitioner in a petition for review on certiorari can raise questions of facts(

!t ears stressing, however, that in a petition for review on certiorari, only questions of
law may e raised in said petition. &he *urisdiction of this Court in cases rought to it from
the Court of $ppeals is confined to reviewing and reversing the errors of law ascried to it,
findings of facts eing conclusive on this Court. &he Court is not tas4ed to calirate and
assess the proative weight of evidence adduced y the parties during trial all over again.
2. !n those instances where the findings of facts of the trial court and its conclusions
anchored on said findings are inconsistent with those of the Court of $ppeals, this Court
does not automatically delve into the record to determine which of the discordant findings
and conclusions should prevail and to resolve the disputed facts for itself. &his Court is
tas4ed to merely determine which of the findings of the two triunals are conformale to
the facts at hand. 22 So long as the findings of facts of the Court of $ppeals are consistent
with or are not palpaly contrary to the evidence on record, this Court shall decline to
emar4 on a review on the proative weight of the evidence of the parties.*Superlines
Transpo vs. >CC)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Q! Can unmar4ed sworn statements e used to convict an appellant(

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NO. Private complainantLs Sworn Statements, which formed part of the records of
the preliminary investigation, cannot e used to convict appellant, ecause they do not
form part of the records of the case in the %&C. &hey were not mar4ed, much less formally
offered efore it. Dvidence not formally offered cannot e ta4en into consideration in
disposing of the issues of the case. -(eople of t-e (-ils. vs. Ra1ire2, 0R? 1#,,'9;&,,
/une 1,,!,,4 7
Q! Should cases where an improvident plea of guilt is entered e remanded always to the trial
court(
NO. !mprovident plea of guilty on the part of the accused when capital crimes are
involved should e avoided since he might e admitting his guilt efore the court and thus
forfeit his life and lierty without having fully comprehended the meaning and import and
consequences of his plea. &he trial court convicted the appellants of roery with homicide
on the asis of their plea of guilty during their rearraignment. O31%&"3%(<, 09* :".* .9+2(1
$* 3*/"&1*1 0+ 09* 03%"( :+230 8+3 09* ,3+.*:20%+& "&1 09* ",,*(("&0. 0+ "112:* 09*%3
3*.,*:0%)* *)%1*&:*.! H+F*)*3, 09* 3*:+31. .9+F 09"0 1*.,%0* 09* ,(*" +8 '2%(0< +8 09*
",,*(("&0., 09* ,3+.*:20%+& "112:*1 %0. *)%1*&:*. &he appellants li4ewise adduced their
evidence to prove their defenses. T9* C+230 F%(( 3*.+()* 09* :".* +& %0. /*3%0.
%&1*,*&1*&0 +8 09* ,(*" +8 '2%(0< +8 09* ",,*(("&0. 3"09*3 09"& 3*/"&1 09* :".* 0+ 09*
03%"( :+230! E (eople vs. Daniela, 0.R. ?o. 19!,. April !4, !,,)
Q! !s an accused deprived of his right to cross=e,amine a witness when the cross e,amination of
such witness was not conducted due to his counsel#s own doing(
NO. %ight to cross=e,amine is a constitutional right anchored on due process. !t is a
statutory right found in Section .-f/, %ule ..9 of the %evised %ules of Criminal Procedure
which provides that the accused has the right to confront and cross=e,amine the witnesses
against him at the trial. Fowever, the right has always een understood as requiring not
necessarily an actual cross=e,amination ut merely an opportunity to e,ercise the right to
cross=e,amine if desired. )hat is proscried y statutory norm and *urisprudential precept
is the asence of the opportunity to cross=e,amine. &he right is a personal one and may e
waived e,pressly or impliedly. &here is an implied waiver when the party was given the
opportunity to confront and cross=e,amine an opposing witness ut failed to ta4e
advantage of it for reasons attriutale to himself alone. !f y his actuations, the accused
lost his opportunity to cross=e,amine wholly or in part the witnesses against him, his right
to cross=e,amine is impliedly waived. * (eople vs. =scote, 0.R. ?o. 14,'#6. April 4,
!,, )
Q! $ police inspector with a salary grade of 23 was charged with :urder. $fter preliminary hearing,
the %&C ordered the transmittal of the case to the Sandiganayan on the ground that the crime was
committed y the accused Iin relation to his office.J Does the Sandiganayan have *urisdiction
over the case(
NO! Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to
his office ut occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade elow K2;,K the proper
%egional &rial Court or :unicipal &rial Court, as the case may e, shall have e,clusive
*urisdiction over the case conformaly to Sections 2? and 32 of 0atas Pamansa 0lg. .27, as
amended y Section 2 of %.$. Bo. ;87..
!n cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade K2;K or higher, as prescried in the said %epulic $ct Bo. 8;9<, or PBP officers
occupying the ran4 of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, e,clusive *urisdiction
thereof shall e vested in the proper %egional &rial Court, :etropolitan &rial Court,
:unicipal &rial Court, and :unicipal Circuit &rial Court, as the case may e, pursuant to
their respective *urisdiction as provided in 0atas Pamansa 0lg. .27.

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Fowever, for the Sandiganayan to have e,clusive *urisdiction under the said law over
crimes committed y pulic officers in relation to their office, it is that the crime charged
Q! !s it necessary that accused e identified through 4nowledge of his name(
NO. &he identification of a person is not solely through 4nowledge of his name. !n
fact, familiarity with physical features, particularly those of the face, is the est way to
identify a person. 'ne may e familiar with the face ut not necessarily the name. &hus,
it does not follow that to e ale to identify a person, one must necessarily 4now his
name. KD,perience shows that precisely ecause of the unusual acts of estiality
committed efore their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can
rememer with a high degree of reliaility the identity of criminals. )e have ruled that
the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of
their assailants and oserve the manner the crime was committed. :ost often, the face
and ody movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot easily e erased
from their memory.K %elatives of the victim have a natural 4nac4 for rememering the face
of the assailant for they, more than anyody else, would e concerned with see4ing *ustice
for the victim and ringing the malefactor to face the law. -(eople of t-e (-ils. vs. De La
Cru2, 0R? 11,#, Ae"ruar% !&, !,,)
Q! Fow is the crime charged in the information determined(
!n determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory
facts recited therein descriing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are
controlling. )here the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime
charged such specific intent must e alleged in the information and proved y the
prosecution.
!f the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to 4ill the victim, the incidental
deprivation of the victimLs lierty does not constitute the felony of 4idnapping ut is
merely a preparatory act to the 4illing, and hence, is merged into, or asored y, the
4illing of the victim. &he crime committed would either e homicide or murder.
)hat is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the
information or criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is
charged with M that of murder or 4idnapping. Specific intent is used to descrie a state of
mind which e,ists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain
criminal consequences or o*ectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to
act. -(eople of t-e (-ils. vs. Deli1 et. al., 0R? 14!'', /anuar% !&, !,,7
Q. !s failure of the witnesses of the prosecution to appear at the pre=trial a ground for dismissal of
the case under %$ <>73(
NO. Under %.$. <>73, the asence during pre=trial of any witness for the
prosecution listed in the !nformation, whether or not said witness is the offended party or
the complaining witness, is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal case. $lthough
under the law, pre=trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence of the private
complainant or the complaining witness is however not required. Dven the presence of the
accused is not required unless directed y the trial court. !t is enough that the accused is
represented y his counsel. * (eople vs. Tac;An, 0R? 14&,,,, Ae"ruar% !',!,, )
Q! )ill the reinstatement of a case which was dismissed y the lower court without *urisdiction or
with grave ause of discretion amounting to lac4 or e,cess of *urisdiction constitute doule
*eopardy(
NO. &he Court of $ppeals also erred in ruling that the reinstatement of the case
does not place the private respondent in doule *eopardy. &his Court ruled in Saldana vs.
Court of $ppeals, et al. .3 that:

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)hen the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its
right to due process is therey violated
to raise the defense of doule *eopardy, three requisites must e present: -./ a first
*eopardy must have attached prior to the second" -2/ the first *eopardy must have een
validly terminated" and -3/ the second *eopardy must e for the same offense as that in
the first.
Legal *eopardy attaches only -a/ upon a valid indictment, -/ efore a competent court,
-c/ after arraignment, -d/ a valid plea having een entered" and -e/ the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the e,press consent of the accused -People vs. Hlagan, 9<
Phil. <9./. &he lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its *urisdiction when it
violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
!n effect, the first *eopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case
for further hearing andOor trial efore the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation
of the first *eopardy, and does not e,pose the accused to a second *eopardy.
Q! )hether or not an information for Plunder which contains riery -$rticle 2.? of the %evised
Penal Code/, malversation of pulic funds or property -$rticle 2.;, %evised Penal Code/ and
violations of Sec. 3-e/ of %epulic $ct -%$ Bo. 3?.7/ and Section ;-d/ of %$ 8;.3, charges more
than one offense, hence, in violation of the %ules of Court.
NO. &he acts alleged in the information are not charged as separate offenses ut
as predicate acts of the crime of plunder. !t should e stressed that the $nti=Plunder law
specifically Section .-d/ thereof does not ma4e any e,press reference to any specific
provision of laws, other than %.$. Bo. ;?<?, as amended, which coincidentally may
penali+e as a separate crime any of the overt or criminal acts enumerated therein. &he
said acts which form part of the comination or series of act are descried in their
generic sense. &hus, aside from LmalversationL of pulic funds, the law also uses the
generic terms LmisappropriationL, LconversionL or LmisuseL of said fund. &he fact that the
acts involved may li4ewise e penali+ed under other laws is incidental. &he said acts are
mentioned only as predicate acts of the crime of plunder and the allegations relative
thereto are not to e ta4en or to e understood as allegations charging separate criminal
offenses punished under the %evised Penal Code, the $nti=Araft and Corrupt Practices $ct
and Code of Conduct and Dthical Standards for Pulic 'fficials and Dmployees.K-Serapio
vs. Sandigan"a%an, )
Q! )hat is the remedy of the party whose motion to quash has een denied(
Case law has it that a resolution of the Sandiganayan denying a motion to quash
the information is an interlocutory order and hence, not appealale. Bor can it e the
su*ect of certiorari. &he remedy availale to petitioners after their motion to quash was
denied y the Sandiganayan was to proceed with the trial of the case, without pre*udice
to their right to raise the question on appeal if final *udgment is rendered against them.
-Torrres vs. 0arc-itorena, 0R? 1#666, Dece1"er !', !,,! )
Q! $ccused are pulic officials who are charged with violation of the $nti Araft and Corruption Law
for having allegedly caused the reclamation of a piece of land registered in the name of the
respondent. &hereafter, the Solicitor Aeneral instituted a civil case for the reversion of the su*ect
land to the State. &he accused now prays that the criminal case against them e suspended on the
ground of a pre*udicial question ! &hey contend that it ehooved the Sandiganayan to have
suspended the criminal proceedings pending final *udgment in the Civil Case ecause a *udgment in
that case that the property su*ect of the charge is foreshore land will elie the respondent#s claim
that its proprietary right over the su*ect property had een violated y the accused when they
had the su*ect property reclaimed. !s the contention of the accused tenale(

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?B. A pre9udicial 7uestion is understood in la6 as t-at 6-ic- 1ust precede
t-e cri1inal action and 6-ic- re7uires a decision "efore a final 9udg1ent can "e
rendered in t-e cri1inal action 6it- 6-ic- said 7uestion is closel% connected. T-e
civil action 1ust "e instituted prior to t-e institution of t-e cri1inal action. !n this
case, the !nformation was filed with the Sandiganayan ahead of the complaint in Civil
Case Bo. ;.8? filed y the State with the %&C in Civil Case Bo. ;.8?. &hus, no pre*udicial
question e,ists.
0esides, a final *udgment of the %&C in Civil Case Bo. ;.8? declaring the property
as foreshore land and hence, inalienale, is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the petitioners in the criminal case. !t ears stressing that unless and until declared null
and void y a court of competent *urisdiction in an appropriate action therefor, the titles
of S%! over the su*ect property are valid. S%! is entitled to the possession of the
properties covered y said titles. !t cannot e illegally deprived of its possession of the
property y petitioners in the guise of a reclamation until final *udgment is rendered
declaring the property covered y said titles as foreshore land. - >"id.)
Q! )hat is the effect of SC Circular Bo. .7 with respect to the issuance of a search warrant(
)e also held that Circular Bo. .7 was never intended to confer e,clusive
*urisdiction on the D,ecutive @udge mentioned therein" it is not a mandate for the e,clusion
of all other courts and that a court whose territory does not emrace the place to e
searched may issue a search warrant where the application is necessitated and *ustified y
compelling consideration of urgency, su*ect, time and place, thus:
Dvidently, that particular provision of Circular Bo. .7 was never intended to confer
e,clusive *urisdiction on said e,ecutive *udges. !n view of the fact, however, that they were
themselves directed to personally act on the applications, instead of farming out the same
among the other *udges as was the previous practice, it was ut necessary and practical to
require them to so act only on applications involving search of places located within their
respective territorial *urisdictions. &he phrase aove quoted was, therefore, in the nature
of an allocation in the assignment of applications among them, in recognition of human
capailities and limitations, and not a mandate for the e,clusion of all other courts . . .
KUrgentK means pressing" calling for immediate attention. &he court must ta4e into account
and consider not only the Ksu*ectK ut the time and place of the enforcement of the
search warrant as well. &he determination of the e,istence of compelling considerations of
urgency, and the su*ect, time and place necessitating and *ustifying the filing of an
application for a search warrant with a court other than the court having territorial
*urisdiction over the place to e searched and things to e sei+ed or where the materials
are found is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court where the application is
filed, su*ect to review y the appellate court in case of grave ause of discretion
amounting to e,cess or lac4 of *urisdiction. E (eople vs. ro""er C-iu, et al. 0.R. ?os.
14!91#;16. Ae"ruar% !', !,,4.4)
Q! $n !nformation was filed charging appellant :ontane+ of :urder. During trial, appellant
presented Daniel Sumaylo as surreuttal witness. Sumaylo testified that he did not 4ill the victim
ut also stated that he did not 4now the 4iller. Fowever, the following day, Sumaylo e,ecuted an
$ffidavit admitting to have 4illed the victim. $n $mended !nfromation was then filed considering
him as an additional accused. Sumaylo pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of Fomicide. $fter trial,
the court rendered *udgment convicting the appellant of murder as principal and convicting
Sumaylo of homicide. &he appellant filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision. &he
court issued an order partially granting the motion and convicting the appellant of murder, ut only
as an accomplice. &he appellant appealed the decision, asserting that there was no proof of
conspiracy etween him and Sumaylo. &he Court of $ppeals rendered *udgment reinstating the
trial courtLs decision convicting the appellant of murder as principal y direct participation.
$ppellant argues that it was illogical for the trial court to convict him of murder as an
accomplice, although Sumaylo, who was the principal y direct participation for the 4illing of the
victim, was convicted of homicide. &here is no evidence on record that he conspired with Sumaylo

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in 4illing the victim. Fis mere presence at the scene of the 4illing did not render him criminally
liale as an accomplice. %ule on the contention of the appellant.
T9* ",,*(("&0K. .2$/%..%+& 9". &+ /*3%0. Sumaylo#s testimony is given scant attention y
this Court M K&he Court has held in a numer of cases that a recantation of a testimony is
e,ceedingly unreliale, for there is always the proaility that such recantation may later
on e itself repudiated. Courts loo4 with disfavor upon retractions, ecause they can easily
e otained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration.
T-e "arefaced fact t-at Daniel Su1a%lo pleaded guilt% to t-e felon% of
-o1icide is not a "ar to t-e appellant "eing found guilt% of 1urder as a principal. >t
"ears stressing t-at Su1a%lo plea;"argained on -is re;arraign1ent. =ven if t-e pu"lic
prosecutor and t-e fat-er of t-e victi1 agreed to Su1a%lo8s plea, t-e State is not
"arred fro1 prosecuting t-e appellant for 1urder on t-e "asis of its evidence,
independentl% of Su1a%lo8s plea of guilt.
Beither is the appellant entitled to acquittal merely ecause Sumaylo confessed,
after the appellant had rested his case, to eing the sole assailant. &he trial court
diselieved SumayloLs testimony that he alone 4illed the victim and that the appellant was
not at all involved in the 4illing. &he Court of $ppeals affirmed the *udgment of the trial
court. !t ears stressing that when Sumaylo testified for the appellant on surreuttal, he
declared that he did not 4now who 4illed the victim. Fe even declared that the appellant
did not 4ill the victim. Fowever, he made a complete volte=face when he e,ecuted an
affidavit and testified that he alone 4illed the victim and that the appellant was not at all
involved in the 4illing. )e are convinced that SumayloLs somersault was an afterthought, a
last=ditch attempt to e,tricate the appellant from an inevitale conviction.
/ (eople vs. Cesar )ontane2 and Daniel Su1a%lo, 0R? 14&!#', )arc- 14,!,,4)
Q! :ay the trial court give retroactive application to the provisions of the %evised %ules of Criminal
Procedure(
YES! Alt-oug- t-e cri1e 6as co11itted "efore t-e Revised Rules of Cri1inal
(rocedure too. effect, t-e sa1e s-ould "e applied retroactivel% "ecause it is
favora"le to t-e appellant. Fence, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime should
not e appreciated against him.
&he !nformation failed to allege the aggravating circumstance of nighttime as required y
Section <, %ule ..? of the %evised %ules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SDC. <. Designation of the offense. M &he complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given y the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. !f there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall e made to the section or susection of the
statute punishing it. * (eople vs. Torres, 0R? 14'66, /anuar% 16,!,,4 )
Q! Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano, two !nformations for %ape and two
!nformations for acts of lascivousness were filed against her uncle, herein appellant. - Criminal
cases, 7;=3<9, ;;=3<8,;;=3<; and 7;=3<< / &he appellant, assisted y counsel, pleaded not guilty
during the arraignment. @oint trial of all the cases ensued.
$fter the prosecution had rested its case, the trial court reset the hearing for the
appellant to adduce his evidence. )hen the case was called for trial as scheduled, his counsel
manifested to the court that the appellant was changing his plea in Criminal Cases Bos. 7;=3<9 and
7;=3<; from Knot guiltyK to Kguilty.K Fe also manifested that he would no longer adduce any
evidence in his defense in Criminal Cases Bos. 7;=3<8 and 7;=3<< ecause the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt eyond reasonale dout for the crimes charged therein. )hen told y the court
that he could e sentenced to death for the rape charges, the appellant stood pat on his decision
to plead guilty in Criminal Cases Bos. 7;=3<9 and 7;=3<;, and to no longer present any evidence in
his defense in the other two cases. &he appellant was re=arraigned in Criminal Cases Bos. 7;=3<9
and 7;=3<; with the assistance of the same counsel and entered his plea of guilty to the charges.
&he trial court rendered *udgment convicting the appellant of all the crimes charged.

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'n appeal, the appellant does not contest his conviction for rape in Criminal Cases Bos. 7;=
3<9 and 7;=3<8, and the validity of the proceedings in the said cases in the trial court. Fe pleads,
however, that he e spared the death penalty.
../ !n reviewing criminal cases, is the appellate court limited to the assigned errors(
NO! $ppeal in a criminal case is a review de novo and the court is not limited to the
assigned errors. 2. $n appeal thus opens the whole case for review, and the appellate
triunal may consider and correct errors though unassigned and even reverse the decision of
the trial court on the grounds other than those the parties raised as errors. 22
2./ Did the trial court err in appreciating the appellant#s plea of guilt(
YES. $ppellantLs Plea of Auilty in Criminal Case Bo. 7;=3<9 was !mprudently :ade.
!n Criminal Case Bo. 7;=3<9, the appellant was charged with qualified rape, i.e., the rape
of his niece, who was a minor, punishale y death under $rticle 339 of the %evised Penal
Code, as amended y %epulic $ct Bo. ;897. U&1+2$0*1(<, 09* ",,*(("&0 F". :9"3'*1
F%09 " :",%0"( +88*&.*! W9*& 09* ",,*(("&0 %&8+3/*1 09* 03%"( :+230 +8 9%. 1*:%.%+& 0+
:9"&'* 9%. ,(*" +8 H&+0 '2%(0<H 0+ H'2%(0<,H %0 $*9++)*1 09* 03%"( :+230 0+ :+&12:0 "
.*"3:9%&' %&J2%3< %&0+ 09* )+(2&0"3%&*.. "&1 82(( :+/,3*9*&.%+& +8 09* :+&.*J2*&:*. +8
9%. ,(*" ". /"&1"0*1 $< S*:0%+& 6, R2(* 116 +8 09* R*)%.*1 R2(*. +8 C3%/%&"(
P3+:*123*. >n (eople vs. Ca1a%, t-is Court enu1erated t-e follo6ing duties of t-e
trial court under t-e rule@
1! T-e court 1ust conduct a searc-ing in7uir% into t-e voluntariness and full
co1pre-ension 3"% t-e accused4 of t-e conse7uences of -is plea$
!. T-e court 1ust re7uire t-e prosecution to present evidence to prove t-e guilt
of t-e accused and precise degree of -is culpa"ilit%$ and
. T-e court 1ust re7uire t-e prosecution to present evidence in -is "e-alf and
allo6 -i1 to do so if -e desires.
&he raison dLetre for the rule is that the courts must proceed with e,treme care
where the imposale penalty is death, considering that the e,ecution of such sentence is
irrevocale.
&here is no hard and fast rule as to how the trial *udge may conduct a searching inquiry. !t
has een held, however, that the focus of the inquiry must e on the voluntariness of the
plea and the full or complete comprehension y the accused of his plea of guilty so that it
can truly e said that it is ased on a free and informed *udgment.
3./ Fow should a searching inquiry e conducted(
!n People vs. $ran+ado, 28 we formulated the following guidelines as to how the trial court
may conduct its searching inquiry:
-./ $scertain from the accused himself -a/ how he was rought into the custody of the
law" -/ whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial
and preliminary investigations" and -c/ under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. &hese the court shall do in order to rule out
the possiility that the accused has een coerced or placed under a state of duress
either y actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging
quarters.
-2/ $s4 the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with,
and completely e,plained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea
of guilty.
-3/ Dlicit information aout the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
socio=economic status, and educational ac4ground, which may serve as a
trustworthy inde, of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
->/ !nform the accused the e,act length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty
under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Bot infrequently
indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon ad
advice or ecause of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty

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should he admit guilt or e,press remorse. !t is the duty of the *udge to see to it
that the accused does not laor under these mista4en impressions.
-9/ %equire the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against
him or ma4e him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause
him to supply missing details or significance. !n People vs. 'stia, we held that the
trial court is also required to proe thoroughly into the reasons or motivations, as
well as the facts and circumstances for a change of plea of the accused and his
comprehension of his plea" e,plain to him the elements of the crime for which he is
charged as well as the nature and effect of any modifying circumstances attendant
to the commission of the offense, inclusive of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, as well as the qualifying and special qualifying circumstances, and
inform him of the imposale penalty and his civil liailities for the crime for which
he would plead guilty to.
I& 09%. :".*, 09* 03%"( :+230 8"%(*1 0+ /"#* " .*"3:9%&' %&J2%3< %&0+ 09* ",,*(("&0K.
)+(2&0"3%&*.. "&1 82(( :+/,3*9*&.%+& +8 9%. ,(*" +8 '2%(0<!
>./ )ill an improvident plea of guilt automatically asolve the accused from criminal liaility(
NO! $s a rule, this Court has set aside convictions ased on pleas of guilty in capital
offenses ecause of the improvidence thereof, and when such plea is the sole asis of the
condemnatory *udgment. H+F*)*3, F9*3* 09* 03%"( :+230 3*:*%)*., %&1*,*&1*&0(< +8 9%.
,(*" +8 '2%(0<, *)%1*&:* 0+ 1*0*3/%&* F9*09*3 09* "::2.*1 :+//%00*1 09* :3%/*.
:9"3'*1 "&1 09* ,3*:%.* 1*'3** +8 9%. :3%/%&"( :2(,"$%(%0< 09*3*8+3, 9* /"< .0%(( $*
:+&)%:0*1 %8 09*3* %. "/,(* ,3++8 +& 3*:+31, &+0 :+&0%&'*&0 +& 09* ,(*" +8 '2%(0<, +&
F9%:9 0+ ,3*1%:"0* :+&)%:0%+&!
!n this case, the prosecution had already rested its case when the appellant
decided to change his plea. !n fact, the trial court granted the prosecutionLs motion that
the evidence it had presented e considered proof of the degree of culpaility of the
appellant. !t is, thus, incument upon this Court to determine whether the evidence
adduced y the prosecution in Criminal Case Bo. 7;=3<9 is sufficient to estalish eyond
reasonale dout the appellantLs guilt for qualified rape.
B!7 Should the appellant e convicted of %ape in criminal case 7;=3<9(
YES! &he Prosecution $dduced Proof of the $ppellantLs Auilt 0eyond %easonale
Dout of the Crime of %ape in Criminal Case Bo. 7;=3<9. )e have reviewed the evidence on
record and we are convinced that the prosecution adduced proof eyond reasonale dout
that the appellate raped the victim in Bovemer .778. &he victim declared in her sworn
statement, on direct e,amination and her testimony on clarificatory questions made y the
trial court, that indeed, the appellant raped her in Bovemer .778.
W* 1+ &+0 "'3** F%09 09* 32(%&' +8 09* 03%"( :+230 09"0 09* :+&0*&0. +8 09* .F+3&
.0"0*/*&0 +8 L2:*((* "3* 9*"3."<, .%/,(< $*:"2.* .9* 1%1 &+0 0*.0%8< 09*3*+& "&1 /*3*(<
%1*&0%8%*1 9*3 .%'&"023*. 09*3*%&! 0y hearsay evidence is meant that 4ind of evidence
which does not derive its value solely from the credence to e attriuted to the witness
herself ut rests solely in part on the veracity and competence of some persons from whom
the witness has received the information. !t signifies all evidence which is not founded
upon the personal 4nowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited, and which,
consequently, is not su*ect to cross=e,amination. &he asis for the e,clusion appears to
lie in the fact that such testimony is not su*ect to the test which can ordinarily e applied
for the ascertainment of truth of testimony, since the declarant is not present and availale
for cross=e,amination. !n criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would e a
violation of the constitutional provision while the accused shall en*oy the right to confront
and cross=e,amine the witness testifying against him. G*&*3"((<, 09* "88%1")%0. +8 ,*3.+&.
F9+ "3* &+0 ,3*.*&0*1 0+ 0*.0%8< +& 09* 03209 +8 09* :+&0*&0. 09*3*+8 "3* 9*"3."<
*)%1*&:*! S2:9 "88%1")%0 /2.0 $* 8+3/"((< +88*3*1 %& *)%1*&:* "&1 "::*,0*1 $< 09*

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:+230; +09*3F%.*, %0 .9"(( &+0 $* :+&.%1*3*1 $< 09* :+230 8+3 09* .%/,(* 3*".+& 09"0 09*
:+230 .9"(( :+&.%1*3 .2:9 *)%1*&:* 8+3/"((< +88*3*1 "&1 "::*,0*1!
!n this case, Lucelle testified on and affirmed the truth of the contents of her
sworn statement which she herself had given. $s gleaned from the said statement, she
narrated how and when the appellant raped and su*ected her to lascivious acts. She was
cross=e,amined y the appellantLs counsel and answered the trial courtLs clarificatory
questions. &he prosecution offered her sworn statement as part of her testimony and the
court admitted the same for the said purpose without o*ection on the part of the
appellant.
8./ Should the appellant e convicted for qualified rape in criminal case 7;=3<8(
YES! &he Prosecution Proved 0eyond %easonale Dout that the $ppellant %aped
the Eictim in Ceruary .77;. &he appellant admitted to the arangay chairman on :arch 9,
.77;, that he raped Lucelle in Ceruary .77;. A(09+2'9 09* ",,*(("&0 F". &+0 "..%.0*1 $<
:+2&.*( "0 09* 0%/* 9* '")* 9%. .0"0*/*&0 0+ 09* $"3"&'"< :9"%3/"& "&1 F9*& 9*
.%'&*1 09* ."/*, %0 %. .0%(( "1/%..%$(* %& *)%1*&:* "'"%&.0 9%/ $*:"2.* 9* F". &+0 2&1*3
"33*.0 &+3 2&1*3 :2.0+1%"( %&)*.0%'"0%+& F9*& 9* '")* 9%. .0"0*/*&0.
&he e,clusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where
the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. $s
intended y the .7;. Constitutional Convention, this covers Kinvestigation conducted y
police authorities which will include investigations conducted y the municipal police, the
PC and the B0! and such other police agencies in our government.K &he arangay chairman
is not deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section .2-./ and -3/ of
$rticle !!! of the Constitution. Under these circumstances, it cannot e successfully claimed
that the appellantLs statement efore the arangay chairman is inadmissile.
;./ )hat circumstances, if any, should the court consider in imposing the proper penalty upon the
accused in a crime for rape( )ere they duly estalished in this case(
NO. $rticle 339 of the %evised Penal Code, as amended y Section .. of %epulic $ct Bo.
;897, which was the law in effect at the time of the commission of the su*ect rapes,
provides in part:
I$%&. 339. )hen and how rape is committed. M %ape is committed y having carnal
4nowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
.. 0y using force or intimidation"
2. )hen the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious" and
3. )hen the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
&he crime of rape shall e punished y reclusion perpetua.
)henever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or y two or
more persons, the penalty shall e reclusion perpetua to death.
,,, ,,, ,,,
&he death penalty shall also e imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
.. )hen the victim is under eighteen -.</ years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step=parent, guardian, relative y consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common=law spouse of the parent of the victim.
,,, ,,, ,,,J
T9* J2"(%8<%&' :%3:2/.0"&:*. +8 /%&+3%0< "&1 3*("0%+&.9%, /2.0 :+&:23! M+3*
%/,+30"&0(<, 09*< /2.0 $* $+09 "((*'*1 "&1 ,3+)*1, %& +31*3 0+ J2"(%8< 09* :3%/* +8
3",* "&1 F"33"&0 09* %/,+.%0%+& +8 09* 1*"09 ,*&"(0<! !n addition to the requirement
that the qualifying and aggravating circumstance must e specifically alleged in the
information, it must e estalished with certainty that the victim was elow eighteen -.</
years of age or that she was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime. !t must
e stressed that the severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversile and final
nature once carried out, ma4es the decision=ma4ing process in capital offenses aptly
su*ect to the most e,acting rules of procedure and evidence.

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T9* 3*("0%+&.9%, $*0F**& 09* ",,*(("&0 "&1 09* )%:0%/ 9". $**& "1*J2"0*(<
*.0"$(%.9*1! T9* "((*'"0%+&. %& $+09 I&8+3/"0%+&. 09"0 09* ",,*(("&0 %. 09* )%:0%/K.
H2&:(*,H H" 3*("0%)* $< :+&."&'2%&%0< F%09%& 09* 09%31 :%)%( 1*'3**H %. .,*:%8%: *&+2'9 0+
."0%.8< 09* .,*:%"( J2"(%8<%&' :%3:2/.0"&:* +8 3*("0%+&.9%,!
T9* ."/* :"&&+0, 9+F*)*3, $* ."%1 F%09 3*.,*:0 0+ 09* "'* +8 09* )%:0%/! !n 'eople v*
'runa, the Court, after noting the divergent rulings on proof of age of the victim in rape
cases, set out certain guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or
as qualifying circumstance
I& 09* ,3*.*&0 :".*, &+ $%309 :*30%8%:"0* +3 "&< .%/%("3 "209*&0%: 1+:2/*&0 F".
,3*.*&0*1 "&1 +88*3*1 %& *)%1*&:* 0+ ,3+)* L2:*((*K. "'*! )hile the victim testified
that she was orn on Ceruary .7, .7<8, therefore .. years old when the appellant twice
raped her, the same will not suffice as the appellant did not e,pressly and clearly admit
the same as required y Pruna. &he corrooration of LucelleLs mother as to her age is not
sufficient either, as there is no evidence that the said certificate of irth was lost or
destroyed or was unavailale without the fault of the prosecution. &he fact that there was
no o*ection from the defense regarding the victimLs age cannot e ta4en against the
appellant since it is the prosecution that has the urden of proving the same. :oreover,
the trial court did not ma4e a categorical finding of the victimLs minority, another
requirement mandated y Pruna.
<./ &he appellantLs conviction for two counts of rape having een duly proven y the prosecution,
we now come to the question of the penalty to e meted upon him. Should the accused e
sentenced to death penalty(
!n the determination of whether the death penalty should e imposed on the
appellant, the presence of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime is
crucial. !n the cases at ar, although the relationship of uncle and niece etween the
appellant and the victim has een duly proven, the alternative circumstance of
relationship under $rticle .9 of the %evised Penal Code cannot e appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance against the appellant. )hile it is true that the alternative
circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in crimes against chastity, regardless of
whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower degree of the offended party, it is
only ta4en into consideration under $rticle .9 of the %evised Penal Code Kwhen the
offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted
rother or sister, or relative y affinity in the same degree of the offender!H &he
relationship of uncle and niece is not covered y any of the relationships mentioned.
H*&:*, 8+3 09* ,3+.*:20%+&K. 8"%(23* 0+ ,3+)* 09* "'* +8 09* )%:0%/ $< "&< /*"&. .*0
8+309 %& P32&", "&1 :+&.%1*3%&' 09"0 09* 3*("0%+&.9%, +8 2&:(* "&1 &%*:* %. &+0 :+)*3*1
$< "&< +8 09* 3*("0%+&.9%,. /*&0%+&*1 %& A30%:(* 1B +8 09* R*)%.*1 P*&"( C+1*, ".
"/*&1*1, 09* ",,*(("&0 :"& +&(< $* :+&)%:0*1 +8 3",* %& %0. "''3")"0*1 8+3/, 09*
%/,+."$(* ,*&"(0< 8+3 F9%:9 %. 3*:(2.%+& ,*3,*02" 0+ 1*"09!
T9*3* $*%&' &+ /+1%8<%&' :%3:2/.0"&:*. "00*&1"&0 0+ 09* :+//%..%+& +8 09* :3%/*.,
09* ",,*(("&0 .9+2(1 $* .*&0*&:*1 0+ .288*3 3*:(2.%+& ,*3,*02" 8+3 *":9 :+2&0 +8 3",*,
:+&8+3/"$(< 0+ A30%:(* 6? +8 09* R*)%.*1 P*&"( C+1*! / (eople vs. <lit, 0R? 11'99;
&,1, Ae"ruar% !, !,,4 )
Q. Can a trial *udge e,amine a witness(
YES. &his Court emphasi+ed that a presiding *udge en*oys a great deal of latitude in
e,amining witnesses within the course of evidentiary rules. &he presiding *udge should see
to it that a testimony should not e incomplete or oscure. $fter all, the *udge is the
ariter and he must e in a position to satisfy himself as to the respective claims of the
parties in the criminal proceedings. &he trial *udge must e accorded a reasonale leeway

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in putting such questions to witnesses as may e essential to elicit relevant facts to ma4e
the record spea4 the truth. &rial *udges in this *urisdiction are *udges of oth L$) and the
C$C&S, and they would e negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a
miscarriage of *ustice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness
which might develop some material earing upon the outcome. !n the e,ercise of sound
discretion he may put such question to the witness as will enale him to formulate a sound
opinion as to the aility or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. $ *udge may
e,amine or cross=e,amine a witness. Fe may propound clarificatory questions to test the
crediility of the witness and to e,tract the truth. !t cannot e ta4en against him if the
clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy
the theory of one party.
Parenthetically, under Sections .7 to 2. of the %ule on D,amination of a Child
)itness which too4 effect on Decemer .9, 2???, child witnesses may testify in a
narrative form and leading questions may e allowed y the trial court in all stages of the
e,amination if the same will further the interest of *ustice. 'ligations to question should
e couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse, frighten and intimidate the child:
Sec. .7. :'DD of Questioning= &he court shall e,ercise control over the questioning of
children so as to ./ facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, 2/ ensure that questions are
stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, 3/ protect children
from harassment or undue harassment, and >/ avoid waste of time. -(eople vs. Ka.ingcio
Canete, 0.R. ?o.14!9,,)arc- !&, !,,)
Q! Does the failure to state the precise date the offense was committed ipso factor render an
!nformation for %ape defective on its face(
NO. Cailure to specify the e,act dates or time when the rapes occurred does not
ipso facto ma4e the information defective on its face. &he reason is ovious. &he precise
date or time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. &he gravamen of
the crime is the fact of carnal 4nowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated
under $rticle 339 of the %evised Penal Code. $s long as it is alleged that the offense was
committed at any time as near to the actual date when the offense was committed an
information is sufficient. !t is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the
precise date the offense was committed e,cept when it is material ingredient of the
offense. &he offense may e alleged to have een committed on a date as near as possile
to the actual date of its commission. -(eople vs. )auro, )arc- 14,!,,.7
Q! !n a criminal case, what should e the contents of a valid *udgment(
%ule .2?, Section 2 of the .7<9 %ules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
KSDC. 2. Corm and contents of *udgment. M &he *udgment must e written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared y the *udge and signed y him and shall
contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted y the accused
and the law upon which the *udgment is ased.
!f it is of conviction, the *udgment shall state -a/ the legal qualification of the
offense constituted y the acts committed y the accused, and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are any" -/ the
participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact" -c/ the penalty imposed upon the accused" and -d/
the civil liaility or damages caused y the wrongful act to e recovered from the accused
y the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liaility y a
separate action has een reserved or waived.K E(eople of t-e (-ils. vs. Li2ada, 0R?
1446&;'1, /anuar% !4, !,,7
Q! Fow is a criminal case revived( !s there a need for a new preliminary investigation(

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&he case may e revived y the State within the time=ar provided in Section of
%ule ..;either y the refiling of the !nformation or y the filing of a new !nformation for
the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. &here would e no need of a
new preliminary investigation. Lo6ever, in a case 6-erein after t-e provisional
dis1issal of a cri1inal case, t-e original 6itnesses of t-e prosecution or so1e of
t-e1 1a% -ave recanted t-eir testi1onies or 1a% -ave died or 1a% no longer "e
availa"le and ne6 6itnesses for t-e State -ave e1erged, a ne6 preli1inar%
investigation 1ust "e conducted "efore an >nfor1ation is refiled or a ne6
>nfor1ation is filed. $ new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the
original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same
offense or necessarily included therein" or if under a new criminal complaint, the original
charge has een upgraded" or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liaility of
the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. E (eople vs.
Lacson, 0.R. ?o. 1494#. April 1, !,,.)
Q! Should the time=ar rule under the Section < of %ule ..; e applied retroactively(
&he time=ar of two years under the new rule should not e applied retroactively
against the State. !n fi,ing the time=ar, the Court alanced the societal interests and
those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with
minimum pre*udice to the State and the accused. !t too4 into account the sustantial
rights of oth the State and of the accused to due process. &he Court elieved that the
time limit is a reasonale period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with
the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. &he time=ar fi,ed y the
Court must e respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or
insufficient that the rule ecomes a denial of *ustice. * i"id.)
Q! )hat do you mean y e,press consent to a provisional dismissal( !s the inaction or silence of the
accused equivalent to e,press consent(
D,press consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. !t is
a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its
meaning. )here the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional
dismissal of the case Bo '*ection or )ith :y Conformity, the writing amounts to
e,press consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. &he mere inaction or
silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to
o*ect to a provisional dismissal does not amount to e,press consent. * >"id.)
Q! )hat is the effect of a plea for forgiveness made y the accused to the victim andOor her
family(
$ plea for forgiveness may e considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. !n
criminal cases, e,cept those involving quasi=offense -criminal negligence/ or those allowed
y law to e compromised, an offer of compromise y the accused may e received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Bo one would as4 for forgiveness unless he had
committed some wrong, for to forgive means to asolve, to pardon, to cease to feel
resentment against on account of wrong committed" give up claim to requital from or
retriution upon -an offender/. E(eople vs. Ale: )analo, 0R? 14',4, )arc- !&, !,,)
Q! !n resolving a motion for ail, what does a trial court mandated to do(

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&he trial court is mandated, in resolving a motion or petition for ail, to do the
following:
>./ !n all cases, whether ail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for ail or require him to sumit
his recommendation -Section .<, %ule ..> of the %ules of Court, as amended/"
9./ )here ail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for
ail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enaling the
court to e,ercise its sound discretion" -Sections ; and <, supra/
8./ Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong ased on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution"
;./ !f the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the ail ond -Section .7, supra/. 'therwise, the petition should e
denied. * >"id. )
Q! )hat rights are involved in an application for ail(
$ ail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary lierty, ut
li4ewise the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from
dangerous elements. &hese two rights must e alanced y a magistrate in the scale of
*ustice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his e,ercise of *urisdiction. * >"id. )
Q! Distinguish a permanent dismissal from a provisional dismissal of the case.
$ permanent dismissal of a criminal case may refer to the termination of the case on the
merits, resulting in either the conviction or acquittal of the accused" to the dismissal of the
case due to the prosecutionLs failure to prosecute" or to the dismissal thereof on the ground
of unreasonale delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accusedLs right to speedy
disposition or trial of the case against him. !n contrast, a provisional dismissal of a criminal
case is a dismissal without pre*udice to the reinstatement thereof efore the order of
dismissal ecomes final or to the susequent filing of a new information for the offense
within the periods allowed under the %evised Penal Code or the %evised %ules of Court.
* Condrada vs. (eople, 0R? 141646, Ae"ruar% !&, !,, )
Q! )hat are the e,ceptions to the rule that doule *eopardy will not attach if the first case was
dismissed with the consent of the accused(
&here are two e,ceptions to the foregoing rule, and doule *eopardy may attach even if the
dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency
of evidence to support the charge against him" and second, where there has een an
unreasonale delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accusedLs right to speedy trial.
* >"id.)
EIDENCE
Q! !s the testimony of a single prosecution witness sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused(
YES. &he testimony of an eyewitness, coupled with the fact of the victimLs death
are sufficient proof of the guilt of the appellants eyond cavil of dout for murder. T-e
Court -as consistentl% ruled t-at t-e testi1on% of a single prosecution 6itness, as
long as it is positive, clear and credi"le is sufficient on 6-ic- to anc-or a 9udg1ent of
conviction. Corro"orative or cu1ulative evidence is not a prere7uisite to t-e
conviction of t-e accused. &ruth is estalished not y the numer of witnesses ut y the
quality of their testimonies. &he are denial y the appellants of the criminal charge is a
self=serving negative evidence which cannot prevail over the clear, positive and categorical

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testimony of the eyewitness pinpointing the appellants as the culprits. - 'eople v&* Si+onga
GR4$5$6#, )une #7, 8669.
Q! !s an alii sufficient to prove the innocence of the accused(
NO! $lii is one of the wea4est if not the wea4est of defenses in criminal
prosecution as it is easy to faricate and hard to disprove. Cor alii to e elieved, the
following requisites must concur: -a/ the presence of accused at another place at the time
of the perpetration of the offense" and -/ the physical impossiility for him to e at the
scene of the crime. :ore importantly, alii cannot e given credence in light of the
unwavering and positive identification y the private complainant of accused=appellant as
her defiler and the father of her child. !n cases in where the offender is positively
identified y the victim herself who harored no ill motive against him, the defense of alii
is invarialy re*ected. -(eople vs. (agsan9an 0RH19694, Dece1"er !',!,,!)
Q! !n the Law on Dvidence, is self=defense considered as a strong argument(
NO! L%#* "(%$%, .*(8-1*8*&.* %. " F*"# 1*8*&.* $*:"2.* %0 %. *".< 0+ 8"$3%:"0*!
W9*& 09* "::2.*1 %&0*3,+.*. .*(8-1*8*&.*, 9* 09*3*$< "1/%0. 9")%&' #%((*1 09* )%:0%/!
&he urden of proof is shifted on him to prove with clear and convincing evidence the
confluence of the essential requisites of a complete self=defense, namely: -a/ unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim" -/ reasonale necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it" and -c/ lac4 of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. E Rugas vs. (eople, 0R? 14''&9, /anuar% 14,!,,4 7

Q! )ill the testimony of young rape victims e given full credence y our courts of *ustice(
YES! W* 9")* :+&.%.0*&0(< 32(*1 09"0 F9*3*, 09* 3",* )%:0%/. "3* <+2&' "&1 +8
0*&1*3 "'*, 09*%3 0*.0%/+&%*. 1*.*3)* 82(( :3*1*&:* "&1 .9+2(1 &+0 $* .+ *".%(<
1%./%..*1 ". " /*3* 8"$3%:"0%+&, *.,*:%"((< F9*3* 09*< 9")* "$.+(20*(< &+ %((-/+0%)* 0+
0*.0%8< "'"%&.0 09* "::2.*1! !t is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial
court which are supported y evidence, especially on the crediility of the rape victim, are
accorded great weight and respect and will not e distured on appeal. *(eople vs. Li1os.

Q! Do inconsistencies in the testimony impair the crediility of the witness(
NO.&he victim died ecause of multiple wounds and the appellant is charged with
murder for the 4illing of the victim, in conspiracy with the other accused. !n this case,the
identity of the person who hit the victim with a hollow loc4 is of de minimis importance
and the perceived inconsistency in the account of events is a minor and collateral detail
that does not affect the sustance of her testimony. &he witness has een consistent in her
testimony that the appellant was one of the men who staed the victim and
such corroorated y the autopsy report.-(eople vs. (ilola 0RH1!1&!&, /une !', !,,)

Q! Aive the rationale why the trial courts are in the est position to weigh the testimony of
a witness.

T9* F*%'9%&' +8 09* 0*.0%/+&%*. +8 F%0&*..*. %. $*.0 (*80 0+ 09* 03%"( :+230 .%&:*
%0 %. %& 09* $*.0 ,+.%0%+& 0+ 1%.:9"3'* 09"0 82&:0%+&! &he trial *udge has the advantage of
personally oserving the conduct and demeanor of witnesses, an opportunity not availale
to an appellate court! $sent compelling reasons, we will not distur on appeal the trial
court#s findings on the crediility of a witness. /(eople vs. ?uguid.

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Q! )hat is the quantum of proof in administrative proceedings(
!n administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt
is .2$.0"&0%"( *)%1*&:* or such relevant evidence as a reasonale mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Curther, the complainants have the urden of proving, y
sustantial evidence, the allegations in their complaints. /="ero vs. )a.ati Cit% S-eriffs)

Q! !s it proper for the appellate court to distur the finding of the court as to the
crediility of witnesses(
NO. )hen the issue is one of crediility of witnesses, an appellate court will
normally not distur the factual findings of the trial unless the lower court has reached
conclusions that are clearly unsupported y evidence, or unless it has overloo4ed some
facts or circumstances of weight and influence which, if considered, would affect the result
of the case. &he rationale for this rule is that trial courts have superior advantages in
ascertaining the truth and in detecting falsehood as they have the opportunity to oserve
at close range the manner and demeanor of witnesses while testifying. - (eople vs. Dalag,
0.R. ?o. 1!9&9#. April ,, !,,/
Q! $ccused herein was convicted of %ape with Fomicide and $ttempted :urder. Fe now asserts
that his conviction should not e sustained in the asence of direct evidence to prove his guilt
eyond reasonale dout. !s his contention tenale(
NO! )e agree with the appellant that the prosecution failed to adduce direct
evidence to prove that he raped and 4illed :arilyn on the occasion or y reason of the said
crime. Fowever, direct evidence is not indispensale to prove the guilt of the accused for
the crime charged" it may e proved y circumstantial evidence. !n People v. Delim, we
held, thus:
. . . Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the e,istence of the main fact may e inferred according to reason and common
e,perience. )hat was once a rule of ancient practicaility is now entomed in Section >,
%ule .33 of the %evised %ules of Dvidence which states that circumstantial evidence,
sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a
*udgment of conviction if the following requisites concur:
K. . . if -a/ there is more than one circumstance" -/ the facts from which the inferences are
derived have een estalished" and -c/ the comination of all the circumstances is such as
to warrant a finding of guilt eyond reasonale dout.K
&he prosecution is urdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass
of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each eing confirmed y the proof of the
other, and all without e,ception leading y mutual support to ut one conclusion: the guilt
of the accused for the offense charged.
)e are convinced that, ased on the evidence on record and as declared y the trial court
in its decision, the prosecution adduced circumstantial evidence to prove eyond cavil that
it was the appellant who raped and 4illed :arilyn on the occasion or y reason of the rape.
Fence, he is guilty eyond reasonale dout of rape with homicide, a special comple,
crime. - (eople vs. Darila%, 0R? 19'#1;#!, /anuar% !6, !,,4 /
Q. !s medical evidence a condition sine qua non in all se,ual crimes to prove that the victim is a
mental retardate(
NO. Clinical evidence is necessary in orderline cases when it is difficult to
ascertain whether the victim is of a normal mind or is suffering from a mild mental
retardation. :edical evidence is not a condition sine qua non in all cases of rape or se,ual

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crimes for that matter to prove that the victim is a mental retardate or is suffering from
mental deficiency or some form of mental disorder. Fowever, the conviction of an accused
of rape ased on the mental retardation of private complainant must e anchored on proof
eyond reasonale dout of her mental retardation. -(eople of t-e (-ils. vs.Dalandas,
0R? 14,!,9, Dece1"er !', !,,!/
Q! !s it necessary that a witness# sworn statement or affidavit e consistent with his testimony
in open court(
NO. Case law has it that: $ Sinumpaang Salaysay or a sworn statement is merely a
short narrative suscried to y the complainant in question and answer form. &hus, it is
only to e e,pected that it is not as e,haustive as oneLs testimony in open court. &he
contradictions, if any, may e e,plained y the fact that an affidavit can not possily
disclose the details in their entirety, and may inaccurately descrie, without deponent
detecting it, some of the occurrences narrated. 0eing ta4en e, parte, an affidavit is almost
always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and
sometimes from the want of suggestions and inquiries. !t has thus een held that affidavits
are generally suordinated in importance to open court declarations ecause the former
are often e,ecuted when an affiantLs mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford a
fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Curther, affidavits are
not complete reproductions of what the declarant has in mind ecause they are generally
prepared y the administering officer and the affiant simply signs them after the same have
een read to her. E(eople of t-e (-ils. vs.0arcia, 0R? 14##,#, )arc- 14, !,,7
Q! Can the accused rely on the wea4ness of the evidence of the prosecution(
&he accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the wea4ness
of the evidence of the prosecution" ecause even if the prosecutionLs evidence is wea4,
the same can no longer e diselieved. E (eople vs. Ca9urao, 0.R. ?o. 1!!'6'. /anuar%
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Q! )ho has the urden of proving the guilt of the accused eyond reasonale dout(
!n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall e presumed to e innocent until the
charge is proved. &he prosecution is urdened to prove the guilt of the accused eyond
reasonale dout. &he prosecution must rely on its strength and not on the asence or
wea4ness of the evidence of the accused. E (eople vs. )alate, et al., 0.R. ?o. 1!&!1.
)arc- 11, !,,4 7
M. )hat is meant y reasonale dout(
0y reasonale dout is not meant that which of possiility may arise ut it is that
dout engendered y an investigation of the whole proof and an inaility, after such
investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. * i"id.)
M. !n criminal cases, if an evidence is susceptile to two interpretations how should the court
appreciate the same(
!f the evidence is susceptile of two interpretations, one consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the accused must e

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acquitted. &he overriding consideration is not whether the court douts the innocence of
the accused ut whether it entertains a reasonale dout as to his guilt. *>"id)

Q! Can a testimomny prevail over physical evidence(
$ testimony cannot prevail over physical evidence. $fter all, physical evidence is
evidence of the highest order. !t spea4s more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.
*>"id.)

Q! )hat is the e,tent of the discretion of the pulic prosecutor in presenting the witnesses(
&he pulic prosecutor has the discretion as to the witnesses he will present as well
as the course of presenting the case for the prosecution. &he prosecution is not urdened
to present all eyewitnesses of the crime on the witness stand during the trial. &he
testimony of only one eyewitness may suffice so long as it is credile and trustworthy.
E (eople vs. Fada9os, 0.R. ?o. 1969!. /anuar% 1#, !,,4)
Q! $ccused :anny Domingcil was found AU!L&H under Sec. > of $rt. !!, %$ Bo. 8>29, as amended,
otherwise 4nown as the Dangerous Drugs $ct of .7;2 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. 'n
appeal, he contends that contrary to the collective testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, he
was instigated to uy mari*uana and the trial court erred in not giving credence and proative
weight to his testimony and in considering the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution. !s
the appeal of the accused meritorious(
NO! )hat is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the sale actually too4 place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti as evidence. !n this case, the prosecution adduced proof eyond reasonale
dout that the appellant sold one -./ 4ilo of mari*uana to poseur=uyer SP'. 'rlando
Dalusong in the entrapment operation. &he testimonies of the principal prosecution
witnesses complement each other, giving a complete picture of how the appellantLs illegal
sale of the prohiited drug transpired, and how the sale led to his apprehension in
flagrante delicto. &heir testimonies estalish eyond dout that dangerous drugs were in
the possession of the appellant who had no authority to possess or sell the same. :ore
importantly, all the persons who otained and received the confiscated stuff did so in the
performance of their official duties. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the
memers of the uy=ust team were inspired y any improper motive or were not properly
performing their duty, their testimonies on the uy=ust operation deserve full faith and
credit.
Did the trial court err in not appreciating the defen&e of denial of the accu&ed and that he :a&
(erely in&tigated to co((it the cri(e;
NO. &he appellantLs are denial of the crime charged and his arefaced claim that he was
merely instigated y 'liver into procuring the mari*uana cannot prevail over the
straightforward and positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
!t is a,iomatic that for testimonial evidence to e elieved, it must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credile witness ut must also e credile in itself such that common
e,perience and oservation of man4ind lead to the inference of its proaility under the
circumstances. !n criminal prosecution, the court is always guided y evidence that is
tangile, verifiale and in harmony with the usual course of human e,perience and not y
mere con*ecture or speculation. &estimonies that do not adhere to this standard are
necessarily accorded little weight or credence. 0esides, instigation, or the appellantLs
claim of a frame=up, is a defense that has een invarialy viewed y this Court with
disfavor ecause the same can easily e concocted and is a common standard defense ploy
in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs $ct.

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I& the pre&entation +y the pro&ecution to pre&ent the police infor(ant a& :itne&& indi&pen&a+le(
NO.&he failure of the prosecution to present 'liver, the police informant, does not
enfeele the case for the prosecution. !nformants are almost always never presented in
court ecause of the need to preserve their invaluale service to the police. &heir
testimony or identity may e dispensed with inasmuch as his or her narration would e
merely corroorative, especially so in this case, when the poseur=uyer himself testified on
the sale of the illegal drug. - (eople vs. Do1ingcil, 0R? 14,6'9, /anuar% 14,!,,4/
Q! Fow should the court treat inconsistencies in a witness# testimony(
!t is hornoo4 doctrine that a witnessL testimony must e considered in its entirety
and not y truncated portions or isolated passages thereof. !n People v. 'rtega, we held
that it is sound policy that self=contradictions in testimonies should e reconciled, if
possile" contradictory statements should e considered in light of e,planations and
attending circumstances and whether inconsistencies result from misconceptions of an
innocent witness or are a result of mere willful and corrupt misrepresentation. &his Court
has held that even the most candid of witnesses commit mista4es and may even ma4e
confused and inconsistent statements.- (eople vs. +ong Aung +uen 0R? 14#,14;1#,
Ae"ruar% 1&,!,,4 7
Q! !s the testimony of the victim#s mother in a %ape case as to the age of her daughter sufficient to
estalish the aggravating circumstance of minority so as to impose the penalty of death upon the
accused(
NO! !n the present case, no irth certificate or any similar authentic document was
presented and offered in evidence to prove %achelLs age. &he only evidence of the victimLs
age is her testimony and that of her motherLs -Sally de Au+manLs/ Sinumpaang Salaysay,
which was adopted as part of the latterLs direct testimony, attesting to the fact that her
five=year=old daughter was raped. SallyLs testimony regarding %achelLs age was insufficient,
since %achel was alleged to e already five years old at the time of the rape, and what is
sought to e proved is that she was then less than seven years old. Fer testimony will
suffice only if it is e,pressly and clearly admitted y the accused. &here is no such e,press
and clear declaration and admission of the appellant that %achel was less than seven years
old when he raped her. :oreover, the trial court made no finding as to the victimLs age.
Fowever, SallyLs testimony that her daughter was five years old at the time of the
commission of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding the appellant liale for
statutory rape, or the rape of a girl elow twelve years of age. Under the second paragraph
of $rticle 288=0, in relation to $rticle 288=$-./-d/ of the %PC, carnal 4nowledge of a woman
under twelve years of age is punishale y reclusion perpetua. &hus, the appellant should
e sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, and not the death penalty. - (eople vs.
Antivola, 0R? 19!6, Ae"ruar% , !,,4 /
Q! !n an ordinary civil case, to whom does the urden of proof elong(
'viously, the urden of proof is, in the first instance, with the plaintiff who
initiated the action. 0ut in the final analysis, the party upon whom the ultimate urden lies
is to e determined y the pleadings, not y who is the plaintiff or the defendant. &he test
for determining where the urden of proof lies is to as4 which party to an action or suit will
fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the asis for the relief
he see4s to otain, and ased on the result of an inquiry, which party would e successful
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!n ordinary civil cases, the plaintiff has the urden of proving the material allegations of
the complaint which are denied y the defendant, and the defendant has the urden of
proving the material allegations in his case where he sets up a new matter. $ll facts in issue
and relevant facts must, as a general rule, e proven y evidence e,cept the following:
../ $llegations contained in the complaint or answer immaterial to the issues.
2./ Cacts which are admitted or which are not denied in the answer, provided they
have een sufficiently alleged.
3./ &hose which are the su*ect of an agreed statement of facts etween the
parties" as well as those admitted y the party in the course of the proceedings
in the same case.
>./ Cacts which are the su*ect of *udicial notice.
9./ Cacts which are legally presumed.
8./ Cacts peculiarly within the 4nowledge of the opposite party.
E Repu"lic vs. ?eri, 0R? 19#&&, )arc- 4,!,,4 7
Q! )hat is the effect of a presumption upon the urden of proof(
&he effect of a presumption upon the urden of proof is to create the need of
presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created therey which if no proof
to the contrary is offered will prevail" it does not shift the urden of proof. * i"id )
Q. !s direct evidence indispensale to prove the guilt of an accused(
NO. Direct evidence is not always indispensale to prove the guilt of an accused.
&he prosecution may prove the guilt of the accused for the crimes charged either y direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence. Cor circumstantial evidence to warrant the
conviction of an accused under %ule .33, Sec. > of the %evised %ules of Dvidence, the
prosecution is urdened to prove the confluence of the following: a/ &here is more than
one circumstance" / &he facts from which the inferences are derived are proven" and c/
&he comination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction eyond a
reasonale dout. Cacts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
innocence, constitute evidence which in weight and proative force, may surpass even
direct evidence in its effect upon the court. Unless required y law, the testimony of a
single witness, if found credile and positive, is sufficient on which to anchor a *udgment
of conviction. $fter all, the truth is estalished not y the numer of witnesses ut y the
quality of their testimonies. &he witness may not have actually seen the very act of the
commission of the crime charged, ut he may nevertheless identify the accused as the
assailant as the latter was the last person seen with the victims immediately efore and
right after the commission of the crime. -(eople vs. Rafael Calo2a /r.,0.R. ?o. 1&4,4,
/anuar% !&,!,,)
Q! Fow can a witness e impeached y evidence of inconsistent statement(
!t is done y Ilaying a predicateJ. 0efore a witness can e impeached y evidence
that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the
statements must e related to him with the circumstances of the times and places and the
persons present, and he must e as4ed whether he made such statements, and if so,
allowed to e,plain them. !f the statement is in writing they must e shown to the witness
efore any question is put to him concerning them. &he cross=e,aminer must lay the
predicate or the foundation for impeachment and therey prevent an in*ustice to the
witness eing cross=e,amined. &he witness must e given a chance to recollect and to
e,plain the apparent inconsistency etween his two statements and state the
circumstances under which they were made.
&his Court outlined the procedure in United States vs. 0aluyot, for instance, if the
attorney for the accused had information that a certain witness say Pedro Aon+ales had

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made and signed a sworn statement efore the fiscal materially different from that given in
his testimony efore the court, it was incument upon the attorney when cross=e,amining
said witness to direct his attention to the discrepancy and to as4 him if he did not ma4e
such and such statement efore the fiscal or if he did not there ma4e a statement different
from that delivered in court. !f the witness admits the ma4ing of such contradictory
statement, the accused has the enefit of the admission, while the witness has the
opportunity to e,plain the discrepancy if he can. 'n the other hand, if the witness denies
the ma4ing any such contradictory statement, the accused has the right to prove that the
witness did ma4e such statement" and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to
produce the document, secondary evidence of the contents thereof would e admissile.
&his process of cross=e,amining a witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements
is called in the practice of the $merican courts Ilaying a predicateJ for the introduction of
contradictory statements. !t is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is thus laid
upon cross=e,amination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissile to
impeach a witness, though undoutedly the matter is to a large e,tent in the discretion of
the court. -(eople vs. Castillano et. al, .0.R. ?o. 1941!, April !, !,,)
Q! )hat is the nature of a sweetheart defense( )hen will it e given credence y the court(
0eing an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair must e supported y
convincing proof. $ sweetheart defense cannot e given credence in the asence of
corroorative proof li4e love notes, mementos, pictures or to4ens that such romantic
relationship really e,isted. - (eople vs. Ale: )analo, 0R? 14',4, )arc- !&, !,, )
Q! )ould a love affair etween the rape victim and the accused preclude the prosecution of rape(
&his fact would not preclude rape as it does not necessarily mean there was
consent. $ love affair would not have *ustified carnal desires against her will. Definitely, a
man cannot demand se,ual gratification from a fiancee and, worse, employ violence upon
her on the prete,t of love. Love is not a license for lust. * >"id)
Q! !s the moral character of a rape victim material in the prosecution of rape(
Dven assuming arguendo that the offended party was a girl of loose morals, it is settled that
moral character is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction for rape for even
prostitutes can e rape victims. - >"id /
Q. :ay a child witness testify in a narrative form(
Parenthetically, under Sections .7 to 2. of the %ule on D,amination of a Child
)itness which too4 effect on Decemer .9, 2???, child witnesses may testify in a narrative
form and leading questions may e allowed y the trial court in all stages of the
e,amination if the same will further the interest of *ustice. '*ections to questions should
e couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse, frighten and intimidate the child:
Sec. .7. :ode of questioning. M &he court shall e,ercise control over the
questioning of children so as to -./ facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, -2/ ensure that
questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, -3/
protect children from harassment or undue emarrassment, and ->/ avoid waste of time.
* (eople vs. Canete, 0R? 14!9,, )arc- !&, !,, )

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BAR TYPE QUESTIONS
QUESTION 1L
Shirley was charged of violation of 0P 22. $fter Shirley pleaded I Bot AuiltyJ to the charge,
the Prosecutor filed a motion with the Court praying for leave to amend the !nformation to change
the amount of the chec4 from P 2?,??? to P 2??,???. Shirley opposed the motion on the ground
that the amendment of the !nformation is sustantial and will pre*udice her. &he Court granted the
motion of the Prosecution and allowed the amendment.
../ !s the order of the Court correct( D,plain.
2./ )ould your answer e the same if, instead of praying for leave to amend the
!nformation, the Prosecutor prayed for leave to withdraw the !nformation and to
sustitute the same with another !nformation containing the amount of P2??,??? and
the court granted the motion of the Prosecution( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERSL

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1.) YES! Sec. .> of %ule ..? pertinently provides that after the plea and during trial, a
formal amendment may only e made with leave of court and when it can e done
without causing pre*udice to the rights of the accused. &he change of the amount of
the chec4 in this case is only a matter of form and not of sustance. $ sustantial
amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the *urisdiction of the court. $ll other matter are merely of form. $n
amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already
contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for
conviction of the crime charged is a formal amendment as in the instant case.
2.) NO. Sustitution is not proper in this case ecause the new information would refer to
the same offense charged in the original information - i.e. Eiolation of 0.P. 22/ and that
would result to doule *eopardy.
QUESTION 2L
@uana issued and delivered on Ceruary .9, .779 in !a, Ramales, to Perla, her townmate,
two -2/ chec4s, one of which was for P8?,???, postdated :ay ., .779, and the other for P.??,???
postdated @une ., .779 against her account with :etroan4 in Limay, 0ataan in payment of
*ewelries @uana purchased from Perla. Perla deposited the chec4s, on due date, in her account
with the $sia 0an4, in :anila. )hen the chec4s were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, Perla
signed and filed, without prior conciliation proceedings efore the 0arangay officials, one -./
verified criminal complaint for violation of 0P 22 with the :anila :&C against @uana. &he court
issued an order dismissing the case, motu propio, the criminal complaint.
../ !s the order of dismissal correct( D,plain.
2./ !f the court issued an order quashing the criminal complaint would such order e
correct( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERSL
../ NO. Eiolation of P0 22 is now covered y the %ules on Summary Procedure. $s such, the
court is mandated to issue an order declaring whether or not the case shall e governed
y the %ules on Summary Procedure. Fe cannot outrightly dismiss the case without
ma4ing such determination.
2./ !t depends on what ground the motion to quash is ased. $ motion to quash is a
prohiited pleading under the rule of summary procedure. Fowever, under Sec. .7 -a/ of
the rule the said prohiition does not apply when the motion is ased on lac4 of
*urisdiction over the case or failure of the complainant to refer the case to arangay
conciliation.
QUESTION 5L
Pedro and @uan were charged of Dstafa under $rticle 3.9 of the %evised Penal Code, under
an !nformation, ased on the complaint of @essica. $fter the prosecution rested its case, @uan,
without prior leave of court, filed a I Demurrer to Dvidence.J Despite the opposition of the
Prosecutor, the Court issued an order granting the demurrer on the ground that there was
insufficient evidence of estafa committed y Pedro and @uan and dismissed the case against oth of
them ut ordered @essica to file a separate civil complaint for the civil liaility of oth accused.
../ !s the order of the court dismissing the case against oth Pedro and @uan correct(
D,plain.
2./ !s the order of the court ordering @essica to file a separate civil complaint against them
in their civil liaility correct( D,plain.
3./ Does the order of the court amount to an acquittal of oth Pedro and @uan( D,plain.

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#*. YES. $fter the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence upon demurrer to evidence filed y the accused
with or without leave of court. Fowever, when the demurrer to evidence is filed
without leave of court, the accused waives his right to present evidence and sumits
the case for *udgment on the asis of the evidence for the prosecution. - Sec. !, Rule
119 )
8*. YES! )ell settled is the rule in criminal procedure that e,tinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the e,tinction of the civil action, unless the e,tinction proceed
from a declaration in a final *udgment that the fact from which the civil liaility might
arise did not e,ist. Fence, the court may order for the filing of a separate civil
complaint for the civil liaility of oth accused.
9*. YES! !f the demurrer to evidence is sustained, such dismissal eing on the merits is
equivalent to an acquittal. - (eople vs. Cit% Court of Sila%, et. al. L;4'9,, Dec. 9,
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QUESTION >L
@uan, Pedro and Eictor were charged of %ape with the %&C on complaint of @essica. $ll of
the $ccused filed a petition for 0ail. &he Prosecutor did not oppose the petition. Bevertheless, the
court set the hearing of said petition during which the Prosecutor presented three -3/ witnesses,
including @essica and rested its case on said Petition. @uan, Pedro and Eictor testified in support of
their Petition. &he court issued an order denying the Petition, in this language:
I'rder
Cor lac4 of merit, the Petition for 0ail is herey denied.J
&he prosecutor then filed a motion with the court for the discharge of Pedro as a state
witness. @uan and Eictor opposed the motion on the grounds that -a/ the prosecution has already
rested its case" -/ the denial y the court of the Petition for 0ail of the accused precluded the
prosecution from praying for the discharge of one of the accused as a state witness.
../ )as it proper for the Court to set the Petition for 0ail for hearing and receive evidence
even if the prosecutor did not oppose the petition( D,plain.
2./ !s the order of the court denying ail to the accused proper( D,plain.
3./ !s the petition of the prosecution to discharge Pedro as a state witness proper and
meritorious( D,plain.
>./ !f the court denied the petition of the prosecution for the discharge of Pedro, may
Pedro testify for the prosecution( D,plain.
9./ !s it proper for the court to consider only the evidence presented during the Petition for
0ail in resolving the petition for the discharge of Pedro as a state witness( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERSL
../ YES. Since %ape is a capital offense eing punishale y death, ail is not a matter of
right. &he court will still have to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong for
purposes of granting the petition for 0ail. !n view thereof, a hearing is necessary even
if the prosecution did not oppose the petition.
2./ NO. &he 'rder of the court denying or granting a petition for ail should spell out at
least a resume of the evidence on which its order is ased. !n once case it was held
that an order of the court merely stating the numer of witnesses and the court#s
conclusion that the evidence of guilt was not Isufficiently strongJ such order is
defective in for m and sustance and consequently voidale. - Carpio, et.al. vs.
)aglalang, etc. 0.R. ?o. '&16!, April 19, 1991 ).
3./ NO. Under %ule ..7, Sec. .;, when two or more persons are *ointly charged with the
commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution, efore resting its case, the
court may direct one or more of the accused to e discharged with their consent so

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that they may e witnesses for the State. &hus, where the motion is made after the
prosecution rests its case, such motion is not proper and meritorious.
>./ NO. &o order Pedro to testify for the prosecution despite denial of the prosecution#s
motion for his discharge as state witness would violate his right against self=
incrimination.
9./ NO. !n a petition for ail, the court receives evidence to determine whether the
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. 'n the other hand, in a petition for the
discharge of an accused to e a state witness, the prosecution presents evidence to
prove that: -a/ &here is asolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is required" -/ &here is no other direct evidence availale for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed e,cept the testimony of said accused" -c/ &he
testimony of said accused can e sustantially corroorated in its material points" -d/
Said accused does not appear to e the most guilty" and -e/ Said accused has not at
any time een convicted of any offense involving moral turpiture.
QUESTION BL
Peter was charged with the %&C of the crime of murder. $t arraignment, he pleaded I Bot
AuiltyJ to the charge. $fter the prosecution rested its case, Peter filed, without prior leave of
court, a I Demurrer to Dvidence.J &he prosecution opposed the motion. &he court then
promulgated a decision declaring that Peter committed only IFomicideJ convicting him of said
crime.
../ $ssuming that the Prosecution proved only Fomicide, was it proper for the Court to
render a Decision on the asis of said demurrer convicting Peter for said crime(
D,plain.
2./ )ould it e proper for the Prosecutor to file a motion for the reconsideration of the
Decision of the Court without placing Peter in doule *eopardy( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERSL
1.) YES. )hen the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused
waives his right to present evidence and sumits the case for *udgment on the asis of
the evidence for the prosecution. Fence, where the evidence presented y the
prosecution proves Fomicide, the court may render a decision convicting the accused
of Fomicide.
2.) NO! Section . of %ule .2. does not provide for a motion for new trial or
reconsideration y the prosecution as the reopening of the case and introduction of
additional evidence y the prosecution, without the consent of the accused, would
result in doule *eopardy.
QUESTION 6L
%ene drove his car with gross negligence resulting in his car colliding with the car of 0ert.
0ecause of the impact, the car of 0ert umped the car owned y Lando. $s a result of said
accident, the cars of 0ert and Lando wee damaged at the cost of P .??,??? each. 0ert died while
%osa, his wife who was also in the car, sustained serious physical in*uries. $fter Preliminary
investigation, the prosecutor filed two -2/ separate !nformation, namely an !nformation for I
%ec4less !mprudence resulting in Fomicide, Damage to Property - referring to the car of 0ert / and
Serious Physical !n*uriesJ and another !nformation for I%ec4less !mprudence resulting in Damage to
Property for the damage to the car of Lando.
../ )as it proper for the prosecutor to file two -2/ separate informations( D,plain.
2./ )ould it e proper for the prosecutor to file only one -./ information ased on said
accident( D,plain.
3./ !f two -2/ separate !nformation were filed y the prosecutor, may the trial of the 2
cases e consolidated in one court( D,plain.

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../ YES. Sec. .3 of %ule ..? states that a complaint or information must charge only one
offense, e,cept when the law prescries a single punishment for various offenses. !n
this case, the two felonies allegedly committed y the accused must e contained in
two separate informations ecause they have different o*ects.
2./ NO. &he felonies involved do not constitute as an e,ception to the rule proscriing
duplicity of offense. &he two offenses do not fall under the comple, crime under the
%PC where a single penalty is imposed and the special comple, crimes or composite
crimes penali+ed therein.
3./ YES, this is authori+ed y Sec. 22 of %ule ..7 which provides that charges for offenses
founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character
may e tried *ointly at the discretion of the court.
QUESTION 4
$fter :ario pleaded I Bot AuiltyJ to the charge of %ape, :ario proceeded to the house of
Perla and threatened to 4ill her unless she agreed to marry him. $fraid, Perla married :ario.
!mmediately thereafter, Perla filed a complaint with the %&C for the declaration of the nullity of
her marriage to :ario. During pre=trial in the criminal case, :ario filed a motion to quash the
!nformation on the grounds of e,tinction of the crime of %ape and of his criminal liaility for said
crime. :ario attached to his motion a certified true copy of his marriage contract with Perla. &he
prosecutor opposed the :otion of :ario claiming that such a motion cannot e filed after
arraignment. &he prosecutor moved that the criminal case e suspended until after the termination
of the civil case for nullity of the marriage. :ario opposed the motion of the prosecutor and moved
that the civil case should e suspended instead.
%esolve the respective claimsOmotions of the Prosecutor and :ario.
SUGGESTED ANSWERL
$s a general rule, a motion to quash must e filed efore the arraignment, otherwise, they
are deemed waived. &his rule however admits of several e,ceptions. 'ne of which is when the
ground invo4ed is that the criminal action or liaility has een e,tinguished. !n case of %ape,
marriage of the offended woman and the accused e,tinguishes criminal liaility. Fence, the motion
to quash filed y :ario can still e entertained y the court even after his arraignment.
&he motion of the Prosecutor to suspend the criminal case is proper. &he decision in the
civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is pre*udicial to the outcome of the criminal case.
$lthough one of the elements of a pre*udicial question is that is must have een previously
instituted than the criminal case, the same should not e strictly applied in the case at ar. &he
resolution in the case for declaration of the nullity of marriage etween the herein accused and the
offended party is determinative of whether the case for rape will prosper. !f the marriage is
declared void, the criminal liaility of :ario would not e distinguished and will result to the
denial of his motion to quash.
QUESTION CL
Pedro was charged of the comple, crime of I:urderJ and ICrustrated :urderJ under $rt.
2>< in relation with $rticles 8 and >< of the %PC, punishale with death penalty. !t was alleged in
the !nformation that Pedro shot @uan and %odolfo with his licensed gun 4illing @uan and inflicting
serious physical in*uries on %odolfo who managed to survive despite his wounds. Upon arraignment,
Pedro offered to plead guilty to the Ilesser offense of I:urder.J
../ :ay the court grant Pedro#s offer if the Pulic Prosecutor and the heirs of @uan agree
ut %odolfo does not( D,plain.
2./ !f %odolfo, the heirs of @uan, the Pulic Prosecutor and the Court agree to the offer of
Pedro, is the Court mandated to conduct searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of Pedro#s plea( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERSL
1.) NO. Cor a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, the consent of the prosecutor, as well as of
the offended party, and the approval of the court must e otained. )here these

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requirements were not oserved, the accused cannot claim doule *eopardy if he
should e charged anew with the graver offense su*ect of the original information or
complaint. - Sec. 2, %ule ..8 /
2.) YES. &he rules provide that when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the
court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpaility . - Sec. 3, %ule ..8 /
QUESTION ?L
$ppended to the !nformation for %ape against )illiam were the $ffidavits of Perla, the
private complainant, the :edico=Legal %eport on Perla, and the Police %eport on the Police
investigation of Perla#s comlaint.
:ay the trial court rely solely on the allegations of the information and the appendages
thereof for the purpose of ascertaining proale cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against )illiam( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERL
NO. &he case involved in the present case requires a preliminary investigation. $s such,
the *udge conducting the preliminary investigation cannot outrightly issue a warrant of arrest solely
on the asis of the information and supporting affidavits of the prosecution. &he respondent shall
have the right to e,amine the evidence sumitted y the complainant which he may not have een
furnished and to copy them at his e,pense. Fe shall thereafter sumit his counter=affidavit and
that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. &he warrant of
arrest may only issue if the trial *udge is satisfied that a proale cause e,ists and that in his sound
*udgment there is necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of *ustice.
QUESTION 1AL
$lthough $le, committed the special comple, crime of I%oerry with FomicideJ under $rt.
27> par. . of the %PC, the Pulic Prosecutor filed two - 2 /separate !nformations against $le, for
I%oeryJ and IFomicide.J &he court ordered a *oint trial of the 2 cases.
:ay $le, file, efore arraignment, a I:otion to QuashJ the !nformation for IFomicideJ on
the ground of doule *eopardy( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERL
NO. $s a general rule the %ules prohiit a duplicitous information and declares the same to
e quashale including a situation where a comple, crime which should properly e charged in a
single information is made the su*ect of several informations y charging each component crime
thereof separately.
Fowever, in People vs. :ilflores - L=32.>>=>9, @uly 3?, .<<2 /, where the accused was
charged with multiple murder in one information and murder in another, although said offenses
constituted a single comple, crime caused y a single e,plosive, it was held that since said cases
were 9ointl% tried, the technical error was deemed cured and the accused could not claim doule
*eopardy.
QUESTION 11L
&he court rendered *udgment convicting @o*o of ILess Serious Phyical !n*uriesJ and imposed
on him the penalty of four - > / months of arresto mayor. Fowever, the court did not, despite the
evidence on record, order @o*o to pay actual damages and moral damages. $ day after the
promulgation of the Decision, @o*o filed a IPetition for ProationJ with the court. &wo -2/
Days after @o*o had filed his petition, the private prosecutor, without the conformity of the Pulic
Prosecutor, filed a I :otion for %econsiderationJ of the Decision only on the civil liaility of @o*o.

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../ Did the decision of the court ecome final and e,ecutory when @o*o filed his Petition
for Proation( D,plain.
2./ Did the court retain *urisdiction over the case to ta4e cogni+ance of and resolve the
motion of the Private Prosecutor( D,plain.
3./ !f the court granted the motion of the Private Prosecutor, may the court amend its
Decision to include civil liaility of @o*o without violating @o*o#s right against doule
*eopardy( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERSL
1.) YES. Section ; of %ule .2? provides that a *udgment in criminal case ecome final -a/
when no appeal is seasonaly filed" -/ when the accused commenced to serve
sentence: -c/ when the right to appeal is e,pressly waived in writing, e,cept where the
death penalty was imposed y trial court, and -d/ when the accused applies for
proation as he therey waives the right to appeal.
2.) YES. &he trial court can validly amend the civil portion of its decision within .9 days
from promulgation thereof even though the appeal had in the meantime een
perfected y the accused from the *udgment of conviction. - People vs. Ursua, 8? Phil
292 /. !t can, within the said period, order the accused to indemnify the offended
party, although the *udgment had ecome final. - People vs. %odrigue+, 7; Phil 3>7 /.
&he reason for this is that the court continues to retain *urisdiction insofar as the civil
aspect is concerned. $fter the lapse if the .9=day period, there can no longer e any
amendment of the decision.
3.) YES. &his is an e,ception to the rule that a *udgment of conviction cannot e modified
after it has ecome final, otherwise such modification would amount to doule
*eopardy. $s previously stated, the trial court can validly amend the civil portion of its
decision within .9 days from promulgation thereof.
QUESTION 12L
&he trial court found $llan guilty of violation of PD .<88 - possession of unlicensed firearm /
and meted on him the penalty of from fifteen -.9/ years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to .<
years of reclusion temporal, as ma,imum. $llan appealed the Decision to the Court of $ppeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, %$ <27> too4 effect. &he Court of $ppeals affirmed the
Decision of the trial court ut reduced the penalty to one -./ year of prision correctional as
minimum, to 9 years of prision correccional, as ma,imum. &he decision of the Court of $ppeals
ecame final and e,ecutory after which the records of the case were remanded to the trial court.
!s $llan entitled to proation under the Proation Law( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERL
NO. Section > of PD 78< - Proation Law/ provides that no application for proation shall
e entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the *udgment of
conviction. &hus, when $llan has perfected his appeal, his right to apply for proation was lost.
QUESTION 15L
Pedro was charged in the %&C of the crime of theft under $rt. 3?< of the %PC. Fowever,
the !nformation did not allege the value of the property stolen.
!f you are the counsel of Pedro, would you file a I:otion for a 0ill of ParticularsJ or a
I:otion to QuashJ the !nformation( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERL
! would file a :otion for a 0ill of Particulars praying that the prosecution specify the value
of the property stolen to enale my client, Pedro, to properly plead and prepare for trial. !f the
value of the property is consideraly small, my client could raise the defense that one of the
elements in the crime of theft is lac4ing, i.e., intent to gain.
QUESTION 1>L

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$fter the requisite preliminary investigation, the 'mudsman approved a resolution finding
proale cause against Aovernor Pedro for violation of the $nti=Araft and Corrupt Practices $ct.
Aovernor Pedro filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Sandiganayan, under the provisions of %$
;7;9, questioning the factual asis for the resolution. Fowever, the Sandiganayan dismissed the
Petition contending that the Petition should e filed with the Supreme Court pursuant to Sec. 2; of
the %$ 8;;?.
!s the Sandiganayan correct( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERL
NO. !n <a+ian v&* Di&ierto / GRN #8$%=8, Sept* #7, #$$>. , Sec. 2; of %$ 8;;?, which
authori+es an appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of the 'ffice of the 'mudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription in Sec. 3?, $rt. E!, of
the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate *urisdiction of the Supreme Court
without its advice and consent. !n addition, the Court noted that %ule >9 of the .77; %ules of Civil
Procedure precludes appeals from quasi=*udicial agencies, li4e the 'ffice of the 'mudsman, to the
Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of the 'ffice of the 'mudsman in
administrative cases should e ta4en to the Court of $ppeals under %ule >3, as reiterated in the
susequent case of Na(uhe v* -(+ud&(an.
!n oth <a+ian and Na(uhe, the petitions were referred to the Court of $ppeals for final
disposition and considered as petitions for review under %ule >3 of the .77; %ules of Civil
Procedure. * Iillavert vs. Disierto, 0R? 1'1#, Ae"ruar% !,!,,, )
QUESTION 1BL
Upon the filing of the !nformation of Fomicide against Pedro, who was then at large, he
filed a I:otion to QuashJ the !nformation on the ground of lac4 of territorial *urisdiction of the
Court and a I:otion to Suspend the !ssuance of a )arrant of $rrestJ pending resolution of his
I:otion to Quash.J
../ :ay Pedro file the :otion to Quash efore he is arrested or efore he surrenders(
D,plain.
2./ :ay the court hold in aeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Pedro
pending resolution of his I:otion to QuashJ( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERSL
../ YES. &he %ules provide that Iat any time efore entering his plea, the accused may
move to quash the complaint or information.J - Sec. ., %ule ..; /
2./ NO.
QUESTION 16L
@uan was charged of ICrustrated :urderJ with the %&C. During the pendency of the trial,
the victim of the crime died ut the !nformation was not amended to I :urderJ although the
prosecution informed the court of the death of the victim.
!f the court finds @uan criminally liale for the 4illing of the victim, would it e proper for
the court to convict @uan of I:urderJ ( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERL
NO. !n the asence of an amendment, with leave of court, to the original complaint of
Crustrated :urder, the accused cannot e convicted of :urder ecause that it would e in violation
of his right to e informed of the nature of the accusation against him. Fowever, such conviction
shall not e a ar to the filing of a case for :urder. Sec. ; of rule ..; provides that the conviction
of an accused shall not e a ar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes
the offense charged in the former complaint when the graver offense developed due to
supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge.

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QUESTION 14L
@uan was charged of :urder with the %&C. During the trial, the prosecution, over the
o*ection of @uan, presented evidence that the victim of the murder was the illegitimate son of
@uan. $fter the prosecution rested its case, @uan escaped from detention. &he court, thereupon,
rendered its Decision convicting @uan of parricide with one generic aggravating circumstance and
sentenced @uan to death. &he court declared in its Decision that the !nformation was deemed
amended to Parricide to conform to evidence.
../ )as it proper for the court to render *udgment after the escape of @uan form
detention( D,plain.
2./ !s the Decision of the court convicting @uan of parricide on the premise that the
information was deemed amended to conform to evidence correct( D,plain.
3./ )ould it e proper for the court to promulgate its Decision despite the asence of
@uan( D,plain.
>./ )ill the decision of the court ecome final and e,ecutory after the lapse of .9 days
form promulgation if @uan is not arrested or does not surrender within said period(
D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERSL
../ NO. &he escape of @uan from detention does not warrant an immediate rendition of
*udgment as the trial can proceed in a+&entia.
2./ NO, ecause after arraignment during trial , the prosecution cannot alter, add or
modify the accusations stated in the information over the o*ection of the accused.
3./ YES, provided that notice was properly served in accordance with Sec. 8 of %ule .2? of
the %evised %ules in Criminal Procedure. &he said rule provides that if the accused was
tried in asentia ecause he *umped ail or escaped from prison, the notice to him
shall e served at his last 4nown address.
>./ YES, if @uan does not surrender within .9 days from promulgation of *udgment, he shall
lose the remedies availale in the %ules.
QUESTION 1CL
)hat court has e,clusive original *urisdiction over the following offenses(
../ Liel punishale with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine
from P 2 ?? to P 8,???, or oth"
2./ Eiolation of 0P 22 covering a chec4 in the amount of P3??,???
SUGGESTED ANSWERSL
../ &he :etropolitan &rial Courts, :unicipal &rial Courts and :unicipal Circuit &rial Courts
have *urisdiction since the imposale penalty does not e,ceed four years and two
months and a fine of not more than four thousand pesos. - Sec. 3. 526 of 0P .27 /
2./ &he *urisdiction for violation of 0P 22 elongs to the aforesaid courts ecause it is now
governed y the %ules on Summary Procedure.
QUESTION 1?L
Under what circumstances may the :&C issue a warrant of arrest under the %ules on
Summary Procedure( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERL
Section .8 of the %evised %ules on Summary Procedure provides that I the court shall not
order the arrest of the accused unless for failure to appear whenever required. G,,,,,J
QUESTION 2AL
:ay the $ccused file a IDemurrer to DvidenceJ under the %ules on Summary Procedure(
D,plain.

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YES. $ petition for Demurrer to Dvidence is not among the prohiited pleadings under the
%ules on Summary Procedure.
QUESTION 21L
Pedro was charged of the crime of squatting penali+ed y PD ;;2. Pedro, in turn, filed a
civil complaint against @uan, the Private Complainant in the criminal case, claiming ownership over
the said property. &hereafter, Pedro filed, in the criminal case, a motion to suspend the
proceedings on the ground of a pre*udicial question. &he court issued an 'rder granting the said
motion. )hile Pedro was adducing evidence in the civil case, PD ;;2 was asolutely repealed.
!s the order of the court suspending the criminal case for squatting, on the ground of a
pre*udicial question correct( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERL
NO! !t has een held that a pre*udicial question that which must precede the criminal case
and the resolution of which is detrminative of the innocence or guilt of the accused. !n this case,
the civil case was filed after the institution of the criminal case, thus, it is not a pre*udicial
question.
QUESTION 22L
:ay the filiation of illegitimate children e proved y hearsay evidence( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERL
YES, under Section 3? of %ule .3?, pedigree may e proved y acts or declarations of
relatives - whether legitimate or illegitimate since the law does not distinguish/ provided that: -a/
the actor or declarant is dead or unale to testify" -/ the act or declaration is made y a person
related to the su*ect y irth or marriage" -c/ the relationship etween the declarant or the actor
and the su*ect is shown y evidence other than such act or declaration" and -d/ the act or
declaratioin was made ante litem mortam, or prior to the controversy.

QUESTION 25L
!f an $ccused e,ecuted a valid e,tra*udicial confession, may he e convicted of the crime
charges if the Prosecution adduced, in addition to the confession, only circumstancial evidence to
prove corpus delicti( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERL
YES. Section 3 of %ule .33 states that a mere voluntary e,tra*udicial confession
uncorroorated y independent proof of the corpus delicti is not sufficient to sustain a *udgment of
conviction. &here must e independent proof of the corpus delicti. &he evidence may e
circumstantial ut *ust the same, there should e some evidence sustantiating the confession. - US
vs. De la Cru,, 2 Phil. .>< /
QUESTION 2>L
)ould you answer to the immediately preceding question e the same if the Prosecution
adduced, an addition to the confession, only sustantial evidence to prove corpus delicti( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERL
YES. )hat is required is that some evidence apart from the confession would tend to show
that the crime was in fact committed. &his may e supplied y sustantial evidence, or that

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amount of relevant evidence which a reasonale mind might accept as adequate to *ustify a
conclusion.
QUESTION 2BL
Lucio was charged of Parricide. Upon arraignment, Lucio pleaded not guilty. During pre=
trial, Lucio, with the assistance of counsel, admitted that the deceased was his wife and that he
4illed her. &he court issued a Pre=&rial 'rder emodying the admissions of Lucio during the pre=
trial. 0oth Lucio and his counsel signed the Pre=&rial 'rder.
../ $re the admissions of Lucio during the pre=trial *udicial admission against penal
interest( D,plain.
2./ )ould your answer e the same if the admissions of Lucio, during the pre=trial, were
not emodied in a IPre=&rial 'rderJ of the Court( D,plain.
3./ !f the Court rendered a Decision convicting Lucio of Parricide on the asis of his
$dmissions during the pre=trial emodied in the Pre=&rial 'rder of the Court, is not
Lucio therey deprived of his right to adduce evidence in his ehalf( D,plain.
SUGGESTED ANSWERSL
1.) YES. &he testimony of the accused in a parricide case to the effect that he was
married to the victim is an admission against his penal interest and can sustain his
conviction even in the asence if independent evidence to prove such marriage.
- People vs. $ling, L=3<<33, :arch .2, .7<? /. &he same can e applied to the admission
made y the accused during the pre=trial.
2.) NO. )here the admission is not emodied in the Pre=trial 'rder, the same cannot e
used against the accused.
3.) NO! &he admission of the accused in emodied in the Pre=trial order, eing a *udicial
admission, does not require further proof. &he admitter can no longer contradict such
admission unless to show that it was made through palpale mista4e or that no such
admission was made.
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BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS ).! ALS MANAGEMENT M DEELOPMENT CORP!
=G!R! N+! 1B1C21! A,3%( 1>, 2AA>!@
PANGANIBAN, J ,L
FACTSL
'n @uly 27, .7<9, petitioner 0P! !nvestment Corporation filed a complaint for a Sum of
:oney against $LS :anagement and Development Corporation alleging that the respondent failed to
pay the necessary e,penses for the registration of the Condominium Certificate as stipulated in the
contract.
!n its $nswer with Compulsory Counterclaim, respondent averred among others that it has
*ust and valid reasons for refusing to pay petitionerLs legal claims ecause it is in clear and direct
contravention of Section 29 of Presidential Decree Bo. 79; which provides that LBo fee e,cept those
required for the registration of the deed of sale in the %egistry of Deeds shall e collected for the
issuance of such titleL, the 5petitioner6 has *ac4ed=up or increased the amount of its alleged
advances for the issuance and registration of the Condominium Certificate of &itle in the name of
the 5respondent6, y including therein charges which should not e collected from uyers of
condominium units. %espondent further alleged that the petitioner has reached conditions of their
contract.
&he appellate court sustained the trial courtLs finding that Kwhile petitioner succeeded in
proving its claim against the respondent for e,penses incurred in the registration of 5the latterLs6
title to the condominium unit purchased, . . . for its part respondent in turn succeeded in
estalishing an even igger claim under its counterclaim.K
Fence, this Petition.
ISSUEL
)hether or not the Fonorale Court of $ppeals erred in not holding that the trial court had
no *urisdiction over the respondentLs counterclaims.
HELDL
NO! Pursuant to Sec. . of PD .>> -Dmpowering the Bational Fousing $uthority to !ssue
)rits of D,ecution in the Dnforcement of !ts Decisions Under Presidential Decree Bo. 79;/ the
respondentLs counterclaim M eing one for specific performance -correction of defectsOdeficiencies
in the condominium unit/ and damages M falls under the *urisdiction of the FLU%0 and not the %&C.
Fowever, the issue of *urisdiction can no longer e raised in the instant case.
&he general rule is that any decision rendered without *urisdiction is a total nullity and may
e struc4 down at any time, even on appeal efore this Court. !ndeed, the question of *urisdiction
may e raised at any time, provided that such action would not result in the moc4ery of the tenets
of fair play. $s an e,ception to the rule, the issue may not e raised if the party is arred y
estoppel.
!n the present case, petitioner proceeded with the trial, and only after a *udgment
unfavorale to it did it raise the issue of *urisdiction. &hus, it may no longer deny the trial courtLs
*urisdiction, for estoppel ars it from doing so. &his Court cannot countenance the inconsistent
postures petitioner has adopted y attac4ing the *urisdiction of the regular court to which it has
voluntarily sumitted.
&he Court frowns upon the undesirale practice of sumitting oneLs case for decision, and
then accepting the *udgment only if favorale, ut attac4ing it for lac4 of *urisdiction if it is not.
)e also find petitioner guilty of estoppel y laches for failing to raise the question of *urisdiction
earlier. Crom the time that respondent filed its counterclaim on Bovemer <, .7<9, the former
could have raised such issue, ut failed or neglected to do so. !t was only upon filing its appellantLs
rief 28 with the C$ on :ay 2;, .77., that petitioner raised the issue of *urisdiction for the first
time.
!n &i*am v. Sionghanoy, we declared that the failure to raise the question of *urisdiction at
an earlier stage arred the party from questioning it later.
&hus, we struc4 down the defense of lac4 of *urisdiction, since the appellant therein failed
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)e further declared that if we were to sanction the said appellantLs conduct, Kwe would in effect
e declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was
commenced . . . and compel the *udgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. &he inequity
and unfairness of this is not only patent ut revolting.
JOSE LAM ).! ADRIANA CHUA
=G!R! N+! 1512C6! M"3:9 1C, 2AA>@
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FACTSL
'n :arch .., .77> $driana Chua filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage y
$driana Chua against @ose Lam in the %egional &rial Court of Pasay City. $driana prayed that the
marriage etween her and @ose e declared null and void ut she failed to claim and pray for the
support of their child, @ohn Paul. &he trial court declared the marriage etween Lam and Chua null
and void and @ose Lam was ordered to give a monthly support to his son @ohn Paul Chua Lam in
the amount of P2?,???.??.
'n Bovemer 3, .77>, @ose filed a :otion for %econsideration thereof ut only insofar as
the decision awarded monthly support to his son in the amount of P2?,???.??. Fe argued that there
was already a provision for support of the child as emodied in the decision dated Ceruary 2<,
.77> of the :a4ati %&C wherein he and $driana agreed to contriute P29?,???.?? each to a
common fund for the enefit of the child.
'n $ugust 22, .779, the Pasay %&C issued an 'rder denying @ose Lam#s motion for
reconsideration ruling that the compromise agreement entered into y the parties and approved y
the :a4ati %&C efore the marriage was declared null and void a+ initio y the Pasay %&C, is of no
moment and cannot limit andOor affect the support ordered y the latter court.
@ose then appealed the Pasay %&C#s decision to the Court of $ppeals which affirmed the
Pasay %&C#s decision in all respects. @ose filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision ut in a
%esolution dated 'ctoer 2;, .77;, the Court of $ppeals denied the same.
Fence, @ose filed the present petition for review on certiorari under %ule >9 of the %ules of
Court.
ISSUESL
.. )hether the %&C=Pasay is arred from awarding support in favor of @ohn Paul Law in view
of the previous compromise agreement entered into y the parties.
2. )hether the decision rendered y the %&C=Pasay is tainted with irregularities.
HELDL
.. B'. &he Pasay %&C and the Court of $ppeals are oth correct insofar as they ruled that
the amount of support is y no means permanent. !n Advincula v&* Advincula, we held that another
action for support could e filed again y the same plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that the
previous case for support filed against the same defendant was dismissed. )e further held in said
case that:
. . . @udgment for support does not ecome final. &he right to support is of such nature that its
allowance is essentially provisional" for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to
support, his or her alimony may e modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or
decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. !t cannot e regarded as su*ect to final
determination.
&hus, there is no merit to the claim of @ose that the compromise agreement etween him
and $driana, as approved y the :a4ati %&C and emodied in its decision dated Ceruary 2<, .77>
in the case for voluntary dissolution of con*ugal partnership of gains, is a ar to any further award
of support in favor of their child @ohn Paul. &he provision for a common fund for the enefit of
their child @ohn Paul, as emodied in the compromise agreement etween herein parties which had
een approved y the :a4ati %&C, cannot e considered final and re& ?udicata since any *udgment
for support is always su*ect to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the
capailities of the parents to give support.
2! YES! &he Court notes four circumstances that taint the regularity of the proceedings and
the decision rendered y the trial court.
F%3.0, the only ground alleged in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed y $driana
with the Pasay %&C is the psychological incapacity of @ose without any prayer for the support of her

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child. 0ut on a motion to re=open filed susequently y her, the trial court set the case for
reception of evidence and susequently allowed $driana to present evidence on two previous
marriages contracted y @ose with other women to prove that the marriage etween $driana and
@ose was null and void for eing igamous. !t is only later on that respondent $driana first claimed
support for @ohn Paul when she testified in open court. &he petition of $driana was, in effect,
sustantially changed y the admission of the additional evidence. &he ground relied on for nullity
of the marriage was changed from the psychological incapacity of @ose to that of e,istence of
previous marriages of @ose with two different women with an additional claim for support of the
child. Such sustantial changes were not reflected in the petition filed with the trial court, as no
formal amendment was ever made y $driana e,cept the insertion of the handwritten phrase IAnd
for re&pondent to &upport the child of petitioner in an a(ount thi& @onora+le Court (ay dee(
?u&t and rea&ona+leJ found at the ultimate paragraph of the petition, as allowed y the Pasay %&C.
&here is nothing on record to show that petitioner @ose was notified of the sustantial changes in
the petition of $driana.
S*:+&1, the Pasay %&C did not give @ose an opportunity to e present on @uly 8, .77> for
the presentation of evidence y $driana and to refute the same. T9%31, the records do not show
that petitioner was sent a copy of the 'rder dated @uly 8, .77> wherein the trial court granted the
Urgent :otion to %e='pen of respondent $driana and forthwith allowed her to present her evidence
to prove that petitioner herein contracted previous marriages with different women.
F+2309, the evidence presented y respondent regarding her claim for support for @ohn
Paul is glaringly insufficient and cannot e made a valid asis upon which the Pasay %&C could have
determined the monthly amount of P2?,???.?? for the support to e given to @ohn Paul y
petitioner @ose. $ party who has een declared in default is entitled to service of sustantially
amended or supplemental pleadings.Considering that in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage
or annulment of marriage, there can e no default pursuant to Section 8, %ule .< of the %evised
%ules of Court in relation to $rticle >< of the Camily Code, it is with more reason that petitioner
should li4ewise e entitled to notice of all proceedings.
Curthermore, it is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set itself in motion,
nor has it power to decide questions e,cept as presented y the parties in their pleadings. $nything
that is decided eyond them is coram non=*udice and void. T9*3*8+3* F9*3* " :+230 *&0*3. "
;21'/*&0 +3 "F"31. 3*(%*8 $*<+&1 09* ,3"<*3 +8 09* :+/,("%&0 +3 09* .:+,* +8 %0. "((*'"0%+&.
09* *I:*..%)* 3*(%*8 %. &+0 /*3*(< %33*'2("3 $20 %. )+%1 8+3 F"&0 +8 ;23%.1%:0%+&, "&1 %. +,*& 0+
:+(("0*3"( "00":#!
&he appellate court also ruled that a *udgment of a court upon a su*ect within its general
*urisdiction, ut which is not rought efore it y any statement or claim of the parties, and is
foreign to the issues sumitted for its determination, is a nullity. -Dmphasis supplied/
Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it is a serious error for the trial court to have rendered
*udgment on issues not presented in the pleadings as it was eyond its *urisdiction to do so. &he
amendment of the petition to reflect the new issues and claims against @ose was, therefore,
indispensale so as to authori+e the court to act on the issue of whether the marriage of @ose and
$driana was igamous and the determination of the amount that should have een awarded for the
support of @ohn Paul. )hen the trial court rendered *udgment eyond the allegations contained in
the copy of the petition served upon @ose, the Pasay %&C had acted in e,cess of its *urisdiction and
deprived petitioner Lam of due process.
!nsofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage etween $driana and @ose for eing
igamous is concerned, the decision rendered y the Pasay %&C could e declared as invalid for
having een issued eyond its *urisdiction. Bonetheless, considering that @ose, did not assail the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with $driana in his motion for reconsideration which he filed
with the Pasay %&C. !n the petitions he filed in the Court of $ppeals and with us, he li4ewise did not
raise the issue of *urisdiction of the Pasay %&C to receive evidence and render *udgment on his
previous marriages with other woman which were not alleged in the petition filed y $driana.
Petitioner @ose is estopped from questioning the declaration of nullity of his marriage with $driana
and therefore, the Court will not undo the *udgment of the Pasay %&C declaring the marriage of
$driana and @ose null and void for eing igamous. !t is an a,iomatic rule that while a *urisdictional
question may e raised at any time, this, however, admits of an e,ception where estoppel has
supervened.

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&$LLH 'C &FD :'S& C%DQUDB&LH $SNDD QUDS&!'BS
SUBJECTS INCLUSIE YEARS FREQUENCY TOTAL
CIIL PROCEDURE
$ctionale document .7<8
.7<;
.77?
.77.
.778
.
.
.
.
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$mended vs. Supplemental pleadings .7<9 .
1
$mendment of Complaint 2??3 . 1
$mendment of Pleadings .7<8
.773
.77>
2???
.
.
.
. >
$mendment to Conform to Dvidence .772
2??>
.
2 5
0ar y Prior @udgment .777 . 1
0ar y prior *udgment vs. conclusiveness
of *udgment
.77; .
1
0ill of Particulars 2??3 . 1
Capacity to sue .7<< . 1
Cause of $ction .7<;
.7<<
.778
.77;
.77<
.777
.
.
.
.
.
2 4
Cause of action vs. action .77;
.777
.
. 2
Certiorari
-%ule >9 vs. %ule 89/
.7<8
.77.
.777
2???
.
.
.
. >
Certiorari as mode of $ppeal -%ule >9/ .7<8
.7<<
.777
.
2
. >
Classification of $ctions
i.e. real actions, quasi in rem, in rem
etc.
.77> 9 B
Class suit .77.
.77>
.
. 2
Compromise @udgment .7<;
.778
.777
2
.
. >
Construction of %ules of Court .77< . 1
Counterclaim
compulsory

.7<9
.77>
.777
2??>
.778
.
2
2
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permissive .77< 3
Counterclaim vs. Cross=claim .777 . 1
Cross=claim .77; . 1
Death, effect on the Case .777
.779
9
. 6
Declaratory %elief .77< . 1
Decision 2??3
2??>
. 2
Default
effect
remedies
motion to set aside order of
default

when may a party e declared in
default
.779
.777
2???
.77<
2??2
.777
.
.
.
.
.
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Defenses in an $nswer .7<9 . 1
Demurrer to Dvidence
granted ut reversed on appeal
.77.
.77>
2??.
2??>
2??2
2??3
.
.
.
.
.
2
4
Denial of Complaint .773 . 1
Depositions pending action .77; . 1
Dismissal of $ctions
-%ule .;/
.7<7
.778
.
. 2
Dismissal of $ction on the Around of
Prescription
.7<; .
1
Doc4et fees .77. . 1
Drror of @udgment vs. error of
*urisdiction
.7<7 .
1
D,ecution of @udgment .7<9
.7<;
.772
.773
.77;
.
.
.
.
. B
D,ecution pending appeal .77?
.77.
.779
.
.
.
2
Camily Courts
confidentiality 2??2 . 1
Corum=shopping .778
2???
.
. 2
Fierarchy of Courts .773
.778
.
. 2
!mproper Eenue .77< . 1
!ndispensale party .7<8
.778
.
. 2
!n*unction 2??3 . 1
!nterpleader .77< . 1

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!ntervention .77.
2???
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@oinder of causes of action
permissive *oinder of actions
.7<9
.778
.777
.7<7
.
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@oinder of parties
Bon=*oinder of necessary parties
.7<8
.77<
3
. >
@oinder of causes of action vs.
*oinder of parties
.778 .
1
@udgment -asis/ 2??3 . 1
@udgment on the Pleadings .777 3 5
@udgment on the pleadings vs.
summary *udgment
.7<9 .
1
@urisdiction and venue in liel cases .779 . 1
@urisdiction of courts .7<9
.7<8
.7<<
.7<7
.772
.773
.77;
.77<
2???
2??>
2
2
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2
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16
@urisdiction over the Person .7<;
.77>
.
. 2
@urisdiction vs. Cause of $ction .7<< .
1
Natarungang Pamarangay Law -PD .9?</
e,ecution of settlementOagreement
.7<9
.7<<
.779
.777
2??2
.
.
.
.
2 6
Natarungang Pamarangay Law
-Conciliation Proceedings/ vs. Pre=&rial
Conference
.777
2???
2??.
.
.
.
5
Ninds of Pleadings .778 . 1
:anner of :a4ing $llegations in the
Pleading
2??> . 1
:andamus .777 . 1
:is*oinderOnon=*oinder of parties .7<8 .
1
:ode of $ppeal .7<8
.77?
.77.
.772
.77>
.77<
.
3
.
2
.
. ?
:otion for D,tension of &ime .7<< .
1
:otion for %econsideration .7<7
2???
2??3
.
.
. 5
:otion to Dismiss .7<9 .

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.772
.778
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'rder of Default .777
2???
2??.
2
.
. >
'rdinary action vs. special proceedings .778
.77<
.
. 2
Perfection of $ppeal .7<7
.77.
.
. 2
Pre=&rial .7<7
.772
.773
2??.
2??2
.
.
.
.
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%eal Party=in=interest .7<7 . 1
%ecords of child and family cases 2??. . 1
%emedies to set aside final S e,ecutory
*udgment
.779
.77;
.
. 2
%eply .778
2???
.
. 2
%es @udicata .7<8
.7<7
2???
.
.
. 5
%ule >9 vs. %ule 89 .77. . 1
Splitting causes of action .7<9
.778
.77<
.777
.
.
.
. >
Supoena Duces tecum .77; . 1
Supersedeas 0ond .7<<
.7<7
.77?
.
.
. 5
Summary @udgment .7<9
.7<;
.7<7
.778
.
.
.
. >
Summary procedure .7<8
.7<8
.7<<
.77?
.779
.778
2??>
.
2
.
2
.
2 1A
Summons
effect on corporations
D,traterritorial Service
.7<7
.77?
.777
2??>
.777
.777
.773
.
.
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. 4
&hird=party Complaint .773 .

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.77;
.
. 5
&otality %ule in @urisdiction .7<7 . 1
Eenue .7<8
.7<<
.778
.
3
. B
Eerification of Pleadings .778 2 2
)rit of D,ecution .7<<
.779
.
. 2
$lias )rit of D,ecution .7<9
.7<;
.
. 2
SPECIAL CIIL ACTIONS
$ttachment .7<8
.7<<
.
. 2
Contempt .779
.77<
.
. 2
Certiorari as an original action -%ule 89/ .778
.77<
.777
2??>
2
2
3 C
Declaratory relief .7<9
.7<8
.
. 2
D*ectment .7<9
.77?
.77.
.772
.778
.77;
.77<
2
.
.
.
.
2
. ?
Coreclosure of %eal Dstate :ortgage .7<8
2??3
.
. 2
!nterpleader .7<9
.7<<
.778
.
.
. 5
Partition .7<8
2???
.
. 2
Preliminary $ttachment
)hen :ay e $ttached, Damages
.778
.777
2??.
.
2
. >
Preliminary !n*unction .778
2??.
.
2
5
%eceivership 2??.
2??2
.
. 2
%eplevin .7<7
.778
.777
.
.
.
5
%ules on Summary Procedure 2??> . 1
Support Pendente Lite .7<8
.777
2??.
2??2
.
.
.
.
>
&emporary %estraining 'rder -&%'/
effect of violation
.7<<
.7<7
.773
.
.
. >

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issuance of &%' e, parte 2??2 .
Unlawful Detainer .7<< . 1
)rit of preliminary $ttachment
e, parte
Discharge of $ttachment
Dffect of Eiolation
.7<9
.77?
2??2
2???
.77.
.773
2
.
.
.
.
.
4
)rit of Preliminary !n*unction
e, parte
.7<7
2??2
.
. 2
Quo )arranto vs. :andamus
filed y Solicitor Aeneral, venue
2??.
2??.
2??2
2??2
.
.
.
. >
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
$ctions against D,ecutors and
$dministrators
e,ceptions
.7<9
2??2
2
.
5
$doption .7<9 2 2
$ppointment of $dministrator .7<<
.77<
.
. 2
$llowance or Disallowance of )ill
Lost or Destroyed )ill .777 . 1
Change of Bame .772 . 1
Claim $gainst Dstate .7<; . 1
Civil $ctions vs. Special Proceedings .77< . 1
Correction of Dntries .773 . 1
Dscheat, venue of .77; . 1
D,tra=*udicial Settlement .77>
.77<
2??.
.
2
.
>
Auardianship .7<9 . 1
Faeas Corpus .7<9
.773
.779
.77<
2??3
.
.
2
.
. 6
Faeas Corpus vs. Preliminary Citation .779 .
1
Fow to Prove :oney Claim against the
Dstate of the Deceased
.7<; . 1
Preliminary Citation .779 . 1
Proate of )ill .772 . 1
Proate Court, @urisdiction .77?
2??.
2??2
2??3
.
.
.
. >
Unlawful Detainer .7<< 2 2
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
$mendment of information .7<9
.7<;
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downgrades the nature of the
offense
.77;
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2??2
.
.
. 6
$mendment vs. Sustitution of
!nformation
.77> . 1
0ail
forms of ail, when a matter of right
and when a matter of discretion
.7<7
.77.
.773
.77>
.779
.778
.77<
.777
.
.
.
.
.
.
2
>
12
Change of $ttorneys .7<8 . 1
Civil liaility -%ule .../ .779
.778
2
. 5
Complaint vs. !nformation .777 . 1
Conditional e,amination of witnesses for
the prosecution
.7<9 .
1
Continuous &rial system .7<8 . 1
Custodial !nvestigation .77. . 1
Demurrer to Dvidence .7<7
.778
.77<
2??.
2??2
2??3
2??>
.
.
3
.
.
.
.
?
Discharge of State )itness .7<< . 1
Dismissal on nolle pro&eAui 2??3 . 1
Doule @eopardy .7<9
.7<;
.7<<
.773
.77>
2
.
.
2
. 4
Duplicity of 'ffense .773 . 1
Dffect of Death of accused on criminal
liaility
.779 .
1
Dn*oinment of the Prosecution .7<7 .
1
Dquipoise %ule .779 . 1
D,tent of Prosecutor#s duty in the
prosecution of the case
.77?
2???
.
. 2
D,tradition &reaty and Law 2??> 1
Cinality of @udgment .7<9 . 1
!nformation
alleging aggravating circumstance
.77>
.779
.778
2??2
.
.
.
. >
@urisdiction
continuing offense
court martial
.7<7
.77?
.77>
.
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Dangerous Drugs $ct
liel
.779 . >
:odification of @udgment .7<7 . 1
:otion to Quash .7<8
.7<;
.7<7
.77>
.779
.77<
2??3
.
.
2
2
.
.
2 1A
Bewly Discovered Dvidence, grounds .77< 2 2
Plea 0argaining .779 . 1
Plea of Auilt, Dffect of .772
.773
.779
.778
2
.
2
. 6
Pre*udicial Question .779 . 1
Preliminary !nvestigation .7<9
.7<8
.77.
.77<
2??>
2
.
.
.
.
6
Preponderance of Dvidence v. Sustantial
Dvidence 2??3 . 1
Prescription of 'ffense .77?
.773
.
. 2
Pre=&rial .7<8
.7<7
2??>
.
. 5
Promulgation of @udgment .7<7 . 1
Prosecution of Civil $ction .778 . 1
Prosecution of 0.P. 22
civil action
2??.
2??2
.
. 2
Prosecution of Criminal $ctions
-)ho may Prosecute/
2??? . 1
%eservation of !ndependent Civil $ction .779
2???
.
. 2
%ights of $ccused
against self=incrimination O right
to a counsel
.772
.778
.77<
2??>
.
2
.
2 6
%ights in Custodial !nvestigation .77? . 1
Search and Sei+ure
stop and fris4O terry search
.77>
.779
2??3
.
.
. 5
State )itness .7<<
.77?
.77>
.
.
. 5
Sufficiency of !nformation .77>
2??.
.
.
2
Summary Procedure .7<7 . 1

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Suspension upon filing of !nformation 2??. . 1
Ealidity of a *udgment of conviction 2??> 1
)arrantless $rrest .7<<
2???
2??>
.
.
.
5
)rit of replevin, when it may e issueD
2??3 . 1
EIDENCE
$dmissiilty of Dvidence .77.
.77>
.77<
2??3
.
.
3
. 6
$dmissiility of Dlectronic Dvidence 2??3 . 1
$dmissiility of !llegally Sei+ed $rticles .77< . 1
$ncient Document .77? . 1
0est Dvidence %ule .7<<
.772
.77>
2???
2??2
.
2
2
.
.
4
0road Side '*ection vs. Specific
'*ection
.77> .
1
Circumstantial evidence .7<8 . 1
Common %eputation .7<8 . 1
Corpus Delicti .77? . 1
Dead :an#s Statute .7<<
2??.
2??2
.
.
.
5
Dying Declaration .7<;
.77.
.773
.77<
.777
.
.
.
.
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Dying Declaration vs. %es Aestae .77.
.772
.779
.
.
. 5
Fearsay %ule
D,ceptions to Fearsay %ule
.7<;
.77>
.777
.77>
.777
2???
2
.
2
.
.
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D,tra*udicial Confession .7<< . 1
Cormal offer of evidence .77; . 1
Cormal offer of Dvidence vs. 'ffer of
Proof
.77. .
1
Ninds of Dvidence .77> . 1
Laying the predicate .778 . 1
:arital Disqualification %ule .7<7
.779
2???
.
.
. 5
:arital Privilege .77<
2??>
2 2
:odes of Discovery 2??? . 1
'ffer of Compromise as implied .7<8 .

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admission of guilt .7<7 . 2
'ffer of Dvidence .7<; . 1
'ffer of &estimony vs. 'ffer of
Documentary Dvidence
.77> .
1
Parental and Cilial Privilege .7<8
.77<
.
. 2
Parol Dvidence %ule vs. 0est Dvidence
%ule
.7<9 .
1
Parol Dvidence %ule
e,ception
.7<<
2??.
2??2
.
.
.
5
Presentation of Dvidence .773
.779
.
. 2
Presentation of )itnesses .77; 2 2
Past %ecollection %ecorded .778 . 1
Present %ecollection %evived vs. Present
%ecollection %ecorded
.7<9 .
1
Presumptions
Conclusive
Disputale
.779
.7<9
.
2 5
Privileged communication .7<8
.77<
.
. 2
Qualification of )itnesses .7<8
.77>
3
3 6
%ecall of )itnesses .77; . 1
%es Aestae .7<9
.7<<
.
. 2
%es !nter $lios $cta .77. . 1
%ight and 'ligations of )itnesses .7<8
.77>
.
. 2
)eight of &estimony .77> . 1

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