PNB, petitioner, vs. FLORENCE O. CABANSAG, respondent.
FACTS: In late 1998, [herein Respondent Florence Cabansag] arrived in Singapore as a tourist. She applied for employment, with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank. At the time, the Singapore PNB Branch was under the helm of Ruben C. Tobias, a lawyer, as General Manager, with the rank of Vice-President of the Bank. She applied for employment as Branch Credit Officer, at a total monthly package of $SG4,500.00, effective upon assumption of duties after approval. Ruben C. Tobias found her eminently qualified and wrote on October 26, 1998, a letter to the President of the Bank in Manila, recommending the appointment of Florence O. Cabansag, for the position.
On December 7, 1998, Ruben C. Tobias wrote a letter to Florence O. Cabansag offering her a temporary appointment, as Credit Officer, at a basic salary of Singapore Dollars 4,500.00, a month and, upon her successful completion of her probation to be determined solely, by the Bank, she may be extended at the discretion of the Bank, a permanent appointment and that her temporary appointment was subject to certain terms and conditions.
Cabansag accepted the position and assumed office. In the meantime, the Philippine Embassy in Singapore processed the employment contract of Florence O. Cabansag and, on March 8, 1999, she was issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, an Overseas Employment Certificate, certifying that she was a bona fide contract worker for Singapore.
Barely three (3) months in office, Tobias told Cabansag that her resignation was imperative as a cost-cutting measure of the Bank. Tobias, likewise, told Cabansag that the PNB Singapore Branch will be sold or transformed into a remittance office and that, in either way, she had to resign from her employment. She then asked Ruben C. Tobias that she be furnished with a Formal Advice from the PNB Head Office in Manila. However, Ruben C. Tobias flatly refused. Florence O. Cabansag did not submit any letter of resignation.
On April 16, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O. Cabansag to his office and demanded that she submit her letter of resignation, with the pretext that he needed a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer to penetrate the local market, with the information that a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer had already been hired and will be reporting for work soon. She was warned that, unless she submitted her letter of resignation, her employment record will be blemished with the notation DISMISSED spread thereon. Without giving any definitive answer, Florence O. Cabansag asked Ruben C. Tobias that she be given sufficient time to look for another job. Ruben C. Tobias told her that she should be out of her employment by May 15, 1999.
However, on April 19, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O. Cabansag and adamantly ordered her to submit her letter of resignation. She refused. On April 20, 1999, she received a letter from Ruben C. Tobias terminating her employment with the Bank.
On January 18, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of the Complainant and against the Respondents. PNB appealed the labor arbiters Decision to the NLRC. In a Resolution dated June 29, 2001, the Commission affirmed that Decision. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision in favor of Florence Cabansag.
ISSUE Whether or not the arbitration branch of the NLRC in the National Capital Region has jurisdiction over the instant controversy.
HELD The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC is specified in Article 217 of the Labor Code and more specifically, Section 10 of RA 8042 reads in part:
SECTION 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
Based on the foregoing provisions, labor arbiters clearly have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, including termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers (OFW). We are not unmindful of the fact that respondent was directly hired, while on a tourist status in Singapore, by the PNB branch in that city state. Prior to employing respondent, petitioner had to obtain an employment pass for her from the Singapore Ministry of Manpower. Securing the pass was a regulatory requirement pursuant to the immigration regulations of that country.
Noteworthy is the fact that respondent likewise applied for and secured an Overseas Employment Certificate from the POEA through the Philippine Embassy in Singapore. The Certificate, issued on March 8, 1999, declared her a bona fide contract worker for Singapore. Under Philippine law, this document authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled her to all benefits and processes under our statutes. Thus, even assuming arguendo that she was considered at the start of her employment as a direct hire governed by and subject to the laws, common practices and customs prevailing in Singapore she subsequently became a contract worker or an OFW who was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon certification by the POEA. At the time her employment was illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA employment Certificate. Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding.
For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment or travel. In the case of field employees, as well as ambulant or itinerant workers, their workplace is where they are regularly assigned, or where they are supposed to regularly receive their salaries/wages or work instructions from, and report the results of their assignment to their employers.
Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (RA 8042), a migrant worker refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker.*21+ Undeniably, respondent was employed by petitioner in its branch office in Singapore. Admittedly, she is a Filipino and not a legal resident of that state. She thus falls within the category of migrant worker or overseas Filipino worker.
2
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 120095, August 5, 1996; 260 SCRA 319 (Labor Standards Artist Record Book as a requirement for overseas employment contract)
Facts: The deployment of female entertainers to Japan was controlled by the government through Department Order No. 3, wherein said entertainers were required an Artist Record Book as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment. Petitioners contends that overseas employment is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution and avers that the alleged deprivation thereof through the onerous requirement of an ARB violates due process and constitutes an invalid exercise of police power.
Issue: WON an Artist Record Book is a valid requirement for overseas employment.
Held: Yes. The ARB requirement and the questioned Department order related to its issuance were issued pursuant to a valid exercise of police power which considers the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY V. CA 429 SCRA 81 (2004)
FACTS: The Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCOPhil) filed on July 17, 1995 a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 0f the Rules of Court with the RTC of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional portions of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the government from enforcing the said portions of the law. The questioned portions of the said RA deal with illegal recruitment, penalties for illegal recruitment, anon the venue of criminal action for illegal recruitment.
On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order on the implementation or effectivity of the questioned provisions based on the allegations of the private respondents that they will suffer grave or irreparable damage or injury if the law is implemented.
ARCO-Phil was joined in the petition by eleven other corporations which were allegedly members of the organization when it filed an amended petition. The amended petition also questioned other sections of the law which dealt with the overseas deployment only of skilled Filipino workers alleging discrimination against unskilled workers.
Respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. According to the respondent, Section6(g) and (i) discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and, as such, violated the equal protection clause, as well as Article II, Section 12 and Article XV, Sections 1 and 3(3) of the Constitution.
As the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted rights. The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have the right to seek employment abroad. According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers, while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.
The respondent justified its plea for injunctive relief on the allegation in its amended petition that its members are exposed to the immediate and irreparable anger of being deprived of their right to a livelihood and other constitutional rights without due process, on its claim that a great number of duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their operations for fear that (a)their officers and employees would be prosecuted under the unjust and unconstitutional penal provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 and meted equally unjust and excessive penalties.
Petitioners filed a petition with the court of Appeals assailing the order and the writ with the court of Appeals on the grounds that it has not shown any convincing proof that in fact damage or injury would result in the implementation of the questioned statute. The Court however dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: WONthe appellate court erred in affirming the trial courts order and the writ it Issued
HELD: The SC also held that the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction is mooted by case law. The SC cited various cases it had earlier decided on apply RA8042. By these rulings, the SC, in effect, affirmed the validity of the assailed provisions. Hence the enforcement of the provisions cannot be enjoined unless the SC, by final judgment declares the provisions to be unconstitutional.
In Peoplev.Diaz: We held that Rep. Act No. 8042 is but an amendment of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is not an ex-post facto law because it is not applied retroactively
In JMMPromotionandManagement,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals: The issue of the extent of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling vis--vis the equal protection clause and the non-impairment clause of the Constitution were raised and we held, thus:
A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meanin g of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong. Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals.
According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in whichever one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others. In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider.
To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violate the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of 3
various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. Seamen are required to take tests determining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has begun to require previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses
It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists
People v Panis 142 SCRA 664 (1986)
Facts: Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee-charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code.
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee."
The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition of recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code.
Held: Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, states that, "(b) 'Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, 'enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appelleevs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA,accused-appellant G.R.No.121777(350SCRA163)January 24, 2001KAPUNAN,J.
FACTS: On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria Lourdes Modesto and Nancy Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is there to recruit job applicants for Singapore. Carol dela Piedra was already briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down.
They listened to the recruiter who was then talking about thebr eakdown of the fees involved: P30, 000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5, 000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2, 000, while P30, 000 will be by salary deduction. The recruiter said that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore. Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. After the interview, Lourdes gave the initial payment of P2, 000 to Jasmine, who assured her that she was authorized to receive the money. Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recru itment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa.
Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately a friend, a certain Mayet Bellotindos so they could both go the place where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken.
Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the sala. Ramos even heard a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talks about the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand. Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report. After which, a raid was executed. Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment.
Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime.
First, accused submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, 4
thus, violates the due process clause. The provision in question reads: ART. 13. Definitions. (a) x x x. (b) Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing,enli sting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not:
Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause. (2) Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and therefore should be exculpated
HELD: For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.
Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court criticized the definition of recruitment and placement. The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso.
The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13(b), therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness. Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that constitute recruitment and placement suffer from over breadth since by merely referring a person for employment; a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral(referring an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad.
Evidently, Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of over breadth.
A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion.
A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute.
(2)Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes the equal protection clause in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and even received Lourdes Modestos payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free.
From this, she concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins.
Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City. The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit. The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination.In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in charging her, there was a clear and intentional discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officials.
Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation.
As said earlier, accused has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged with thecommission of a crime, while a Zamboanguea, the guilty part y inappellants eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.
People vs. Ortiz-Miyake September 16, 1997 GR No. 115338-39 Regalado, J.:
Facts: Appellant Ortiz-Miyake promised Elenita Marasigan, complainant, a job as a factory worker in Taiwan for a fee lower than that recruitment agency she first went to. But later, she was required to make additional payment. She was not issued receipts despite her persistence. Marasigan never departed for Taiwan.
Upon verification with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), it was revealed that appellant was not authorized to recruit workers. They went to court but Marasigan was the only one who testified during the trial. The prosecution wanted to prove that two other complainants were also victimized by appellant. In lieu of their testimonies, they presented their relatives. Both testified that Generillo and Del Rosario were victimized by the appellant but was never there when negotiations and payments were made with the appellant.
Accused Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale in the Regional Trial Court of Makati on the complaint made by Elenita Marasigan and other defendants. 5
Issue: WON accused is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.
Ruling: Appellant is only guilty of simple illegal recruitment.
In illegal recruitment, the number of persons victimized is determinative. Where illegal recruitment is committed against a lone victim, the accused may be convicted of simple illegal recruitment which is punishable with a lower penalty. Where the offense is committed against three or more persons, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in large scale which provides a higher penalty.
In illegal recruitment in large scale, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. The testimonies of the relatives of the other two complainants lack personal knowledge of the actual circumstances surrounding the charges made by Generilo and Del Rosario.
For insufficiency of evidence and in absence of the third element of illegal recruitment in large scale, the Court cannot affirm the conviction made by the RTC.
BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC. vs. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA, WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and JAIME ORTIZ GR No. 182978-79 SPOUSES SIMPLICIO AND MILA CUARESMA vs. WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER, INC. GR No. 184298-99 April 7, 2009
FACTS: On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. (Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), for a contract duration of three years, with a corresponding salary of US$247.00 per month. Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning. Jessie Fajardo, a co-worker of Jasmin, narrated that on June 21, 1998, Jasmin was found dead by a female cleaner lying on the floor inside her dormitory room with her mouth foaming and smelling of poison. Based on the police report and the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital, who conducted an autopsy of Jasmins body, the likely cause of her death was poisoning. Jasmins body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following day, the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting medical report indicated that Jasmin died under violent circumstances, and not poisoning as originally found by the KSA examining physician. The toxicology report of the NBI, however, tested negative for non- volatile, metallic poison and insecticides.
Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmins parents and her surviving heirs, received from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) the following amounts: P50,000.00 for death benefits; P50,000.00 for loss of life; P20,000.00 for funeral expenses; and P10,000.00 for medical reimbursement.
On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and its principal in the KSA, Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab), claiming death and insurance benefits, as well as moral and exemplary damages for Jasmins death, Jasmins death was work-related, having occurred at the employers premises; that under Jasmins contract with Becmen, she is entitled to iqama insurance coverage; that Jasmin is entitled to compensatory damages in the amount of US$103,740.00, which is the sum total of her monthly salary of US$247.00 per month under her employment contract, multiplied by 35 years (or the remaining years of her productive life had death not supervened at age 25, assuming that she lived and would have retired at age 60).
In their position paper, Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed suicide, citing a prior unsuccessful suicide attempt sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital. They likewise deny liability because the Cuaresmas already recovered death and other benefits totaling P130,000.00 from the OWWA. They insist that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to iqama insurance because this refers to the issuance not insurance of iqama, or residency/work permit required in the KSA. On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, they claim that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to the same because they have not acted with fraud, nor have they been in bad faith in handling Jasmins case.
While the case was pending, Becmen filed a manifestation and motion for substitution alleging that Rajab terminated their agency relationship and had appointed White Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) as its new recruitment agent in the Philippines. Thus, White Falcon was impleaded as respondent as well, and it adopted and reiterated Becmens arguments in the position paper it subsequently filed.
ISSUES: (1.) whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims, by way of benefits and damages, for the death of their daughter Jasmin. 2) whether or not Jasmins death be considered as work- connected and thus compensable even while she was not on duty;
HELD: Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Article 21 of the Code states that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. And, lastly, Article 24 requires that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcons acts and omissions are against public policy because they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs abroad, who are entitled to full protection under the law. They set an awful example of how foreign employers and recruitment agencies should treat and act with respect to their distressed employees and workers abroad. Their shabby and callous treatment of Jasmins case; their uncaring attitude; their unjustified failure and refusal to assist in the determination of the true circumstances surrounding her mysterious death, and instead finding satisfaction in the unreasonable insistence that she committed suicide just so they can conveniently avoid pecuniary liability; placing their own corporate interests above of the welfare of their employees all these are contrary to morals, good customs and public policy, and constitute taking advantage of the poor employee and her familys ignorance, helplessness, indigence and lack of power and 6
resources to seek the truth and obtain justice for the death of a loved one.
Giving in handily to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide, and adamantly insisting on it just to protect Rajab and Becmens material interest despite evidence to the contrary is against the moral law and runs contrary to the good custom of not denouncing ones fellowmen for alleged grave wrongdoings that undermine their good name and honor.
Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code which states that laws which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with public interest,and neither shall act oppressively against the other, or impair the interest or convenience of the public. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
The grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of misconduct on the part of the employer is sanctioned by Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of such damages in actions referred to in Article 21.
Thus, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Cuaresmas are entitled to moral damages, which Becmen and White Falcon are jointly and solidarily liable to pay, together with exemplary damages for wanton and oppressive behavior, and by way of example for the public good.
On the second issue:
While the employers premises may be defined very broadly not only to include premises owned by it, but also premises it leases, hires, supplies or uses, we are not prepared to rule that the dormitory wherein Jasmin stayed should constitute employers premises as would allow a finding that death or injury therein is considered to have been incurred or sustained in the course of or arose out of her employment. There are certainly exceptions, but they do not appear to apply here. Moreover, a complete determination would have to depend on the unique circumstances obtaining and the overall factual environment of the case, which are here lacking. WHEREFORE, Rajab & Silsilah Company, White Falcon Services, Inc., Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc., and their corporate directors and officers are found jointly and solidarily liable and ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of Jasmin Cuaresma, spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma, the following amounts: (1) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as moral damages; (2) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as exemplary damages; (3)Attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.