MOLO VS.

MOLO
90 Phil 37
FACTS: Mariano Molo died on January 24, 1941 without leaving any forced heir either in the descending
or ascending line. His wife Juana Molo (petitioner) survived him, and by his nieces and nephew Luz,
Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo (oppositors-appellants).
Oppositors appellants were the legitimate children of a deceased brother of the testator.
Mariano left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918 and another executed on June 20, 1939, in
both the 1918 and 1939 wills Juana was instituted as his universal heir. The latter will contains a clause,
which expressly revokes the will executed in 1918. Juana Molo filed in the CFI a petition seeking the
probate of the will executed in 1939. The court rendered a decision denying the probate of said will on
the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed in accordance with law.
In view of the disallowance of the will, the widow filed another petition for the probate of the will
executed by the deceased on August 18, 1918. The oppositors filed an opposition to the petition
contending that, notwithstanding the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocatory clause is valid and
still has the effect of nullifying the prior will of 1918. Likewise, regardless of the revocatory clause, said
will of 1918 cannot still be given effect because of the presumption that the testator himself deliberately
revoked it. The will of 1918 was admitted to probate. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Was the admittance into probate proper?

What is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation?

HELD: A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the
reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law as to the making of wills, cannot
produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.

The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is usually applied where the testator cancels or destroys a
will or executed an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if made,
fails to effect for same reason.

The failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon whose validity the revocation depends, is
equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the
original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in place of that destroyed will not render the
destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a
new will.

Even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be presumed from
the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating
the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939
has been validly executed and would be given due effect.

The theory on which the principle of dependent relative revocation is predicated in that the testator
did not intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on
different occasions and instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to
his intention of dying testate.

Nuguid vs Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449
Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.
Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the
former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate
and that letter of administration be issued to her.
Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as
universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line
were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.
Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir.
Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.
Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited the
compulsory heirs.
Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs
in the direct ascending line her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but
simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of
ineffective disinheritance.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents
of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner,
by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.
Guevara v. Guevara Dec. 29, 1943
Facts: Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife,
stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario.
Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.
In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any settlement
proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to
himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as
well as the devise given to her.
Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a large
parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption that the
decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of
Ernesto should be disregarded. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.
Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with
RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent the
last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory
and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.
Suppression of the wil is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.
Dela Cerna v. Potot Dec. 23 1943
Facts: The spouses Bernabe Dela Serna and Gerasisa Rebabca executed a joint will where they gave two
(2) parcels of land to manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child. When Bernabe died,
the said will was probated in 1939.
Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed in 1952 but
due to the failure of the petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was dismissed in 1954.
The CFI held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to law. While the Court
of Appeals reversed and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate
jurisdiction and conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and held that Once a decree of probate becomes
final in accordance with the rules of procedure, it is res judicata. THe final decree of probate entered in
1939 in the CFI of Cebu is conclusive as to the last will of Bernabe despite the fact that even then the
Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills. (There was an error on the court but the decree
has now become final.)
The probate court committed an error of law which should have been corrected on appeals but which
did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision. A
decision which is binding upon the whole world.
Nevertheless, the probate in 1939 only affected the share of Bernabe and could not include the
disposition of the share of his wife which was still alive then, her properties were still not within the
jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the validity of the will with respect to her, must be on her death, be re-
examined and adjudicated de novo -- since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.
Gallanosa v. Arcangel June 21, 1978
Facts: Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80 years old. He owned 61 parcels of
and at that time. He died in 1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon. In his will, he bequethed his
1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his second wife Tecla and if she predecease him (as what occurred),
the said share shall be assigned to the spouses Gallanosa (Pedro & Corazon). Pedro is Tecla's son by her
1st marriage. He also gave 3 parcels of land to Adolfo, his protege.
The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, thjhe legal heirs filed an
action for the recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on the ground of res
judicata. Then, 28 years after probate, another acton agaisnt Gallanosa for annulment of the will,
recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result, the lower court set aide the 1939
decree of probate.
Issue: Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled
RULING: No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Due execution
means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution and that he was
not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. Finally, that it was executed in accordance
with the formalities provided by law.
The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already expired, hence the judgment may only be set
aside on the grounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, and 2) the judgment was
obtained by means of extrinsic collateral fraud (which must be filed within 4 years from the discovery).
Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills and testament.
NERI v AKUTIN 74 PHIL 185
FACTS : Testator Neri indicated in his will that he was leaving all of his properties by universal title to his
children by his secondmarriage with preterition of his children by his first marriage. Eleuterio, Agripino,
Agapita, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina are all Neris children by his first marriage.
The trial court annulled the institution of the heirs and declared total intestacy. The children by the
second marriage filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that:1) there is no preterition as to
the children of the first marriage have received their shares in the property left by
thetestator 2)assuming that there has been a preterition, the effect would not be the annulment of the
institution of heirs but simplythe reduction of the bequest made to them.-
The children by the second marriage anchor their argument on the concept of heir whose A814
definition is deemed repealed by that of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is maintained that the word
"heredero" under the Civil Code, is notsynonymous with the term "heir" under the Code of Civil
Procedure, and that the "heir" under the latter Code is nolonger personally liable for the debts of the
deceased as was the "heredero" under the Civil Code
ISSUES: WON there is preterition
WON there should be annulment of the institution of the heirs and open the estate to total intestacy
HELD
1. YES, there is preterition- According to the courts findings, none of the children by the first marriage
received their respective shares from the testators property - Even if clause 8 of the will is invoked (said
clause states that the children by his first marriage had already received their shares in his property
excluding what he had given them as aid during their financial troubles and the money they had
borrowed from him) the Court can rely only on the findings of the trial court that the inventory indicates
that the property of Neri has remained intact and that no portion has been given to the children of the
first marriage.- Neri left his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage and did not
expressly disinherit his children by his first marriage but did not leave anything to them. This fits the
case of preterition according to A814, CC which provides that the institution of heirs shall be annulled
and intestate succession should be declared open.
2. YES- The word "heir" as used in A814 of the Civil Code may not have the meaning that it has under the
Code of CivilProcedure, but this does prevent a bequest from being made by universal title as is in
substance the subject-matter of A814 of the Civil Code.- It may also be true that heirs under the Code
of Civil Procedure may receive the bequest only after payment of debts left by the deceased and
not before as under the Civil Code, but this may have a bearing only upon the question as to when
succession becomes effective and can in no way destroy the fact that succession may still be by
universal or special title.- Since a bequest may still be made by universal title and with preterition of
forced heirs, its nullity as provided in article814 still applies there being nothing inconsistent with it in
the Code of Civil Procedure. The basis for its nullity is the nature and effect of the bequest and not its
possible name under the Code of Civil Procedure.
- In addition, Secs. 755 and 756 of the Code of Civil Procedure affected A814 and A851 of the Civil
Code. But these sections have been expressly repealed by Act No. 2141, thus restoring force to A814
and A851.