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This article discusses the development of social and technological forecasting over the last 20 years. It outlines three main lines of development:
1) In the 1950s, many books made broad predictions about problems like population growth but had little scientific basis.
2) In the 1960s, national committees and international organizations began using economic and technological analysis to make recommendations and forecasts.
3) In the 1960s, new research institutes were founded that took a more multidisciplinary approach and published more specialized studies on forecasting the future.
While forecasting has become more data-driven and accurate in quantifiable areas, it remains difficult to predict the social impacts of new ideas and technologies. Overall expectations for forecast
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Futures Volume 3 Issue 3 1971 [Doi 10.1016%2F0016-3287%2871%2990023-1] I.F. Clarke -- The Pattern of Prediction- Forecasting- Facts and Fallibilities
This article discusses the development of social and technological forecasting over the last 20 years. It outlines three main lines of development:
1) In the 1950s, many books made broad predictions about problems like population growth but had little scientific basis.
2) In the 1960s, national committees and international organizations began using economic and technological analysis to make recommendations and forecasts.
3) In the 1960s, new research institutes were founded that took a more multidisciplinary approach and published more specialized studies on forecasting the future.
While forecasting has become more data-driven and accurate in quantifiable areas, it remains difficult to predict the social impacts of new ideas and technologies. Overall expectations for forecast
This article discusses the development of social and technological forecasting over the last 20 years. It outlines three main lines of development:
1) In the 1950s, many books made broad predictions about problems like population growth but had little scientific basis.
2) In the 1960s, national committees and international organizations began using economic and technological analysis to make recommendations and forecasts.
3) In the 1960s, new research institutes were founded that took a more multidisciplinary approach and published more specialized studies on forecasting the future.
While forecasting has become more data-driven and accurate in quantifiable areas, it remains difficult to predict the social impacts of new ideas and technologies. Overall expectations for forecast
FORECASTING: FACTS AND FALLIBILITIES I. F. Clarke This article concludes a series that has traced the pattern of prediction from the primitive forecasts of the eighteenth century to the more modern scientific approaches. The main lines of development in socia! and technological fore- casting during the last twenty years are assessed: f:xpectations are high, but the achievements are still to come. THE extraordinary growth in the practice of social and technological forecasting during the past 20 years is one of the more important indications of the profound changes that have begun to affect the environment, the populations, and the economic systems of our planet. The forecaster is for the moment the favourite medicine man of 20th century industrial society; he is the pathfinder who discovers-we hope-the answer to the problems of declining industries and growing popu- lations. The future, it seems, is already with us, waiting to be discovered in the new jungle jargon of total system analysis, matrix techniques, search profiles, morphological analysis, and envelope curve extrapolation. The range of the investigations goes from rela- tively small-scale r and d projects (in the Swedish engineering industry, for instance) to the far-reaching conse- quences that the Commissariat General au Plan has had for France. Prediction has followed the pattern already established in the sciences. As the research teams and the elaborate laboratories have taken over from the Rutherfords with their string-and-seal- ing wax, the Wellsian world-watchers Professor I. F. Clarke is Head of the English Studies Department, clnivrrsity of Strathclyde, UK. have given ~JkiCe to groups and associa- tions of forecasters. The journals and the conferences proliferate; the insti- tutes continue to multiply. And all this has come about in less than 10 years ; for the post-war chronology starts with books and articles in the 195Os, followed by the first international conferences and the new foundations in the 60s. There have been three main lines of development. First, starting in the 5Os, there was a flood of books that were little more than a continuation of the one-man forecasts of the 1920s. These stated problems and described the most probable contours of the future. Many of them began with the now familiar questions of population and the food supply: Harrison Brown, The challenge of mans future (New York, 1954) ; Fritz Baade, Brot fiir gang Europa (Hamburg, 1955) ; Vassiliev and Gouschev, Life in the twenty-jirst century (Moscow, 1959). Far more important than these, how- ever, were the reports and the recom- mendations that began to emerge from the national and the international committees established to advise on matters as different as the restoration of the German economy, industrial applications of atomic energy, and the needs of the developing nations. These committees employed the basic tech- niques of economic analysis and techno- logical appraisal that led directly to the FUTURES Sept ember 1971 Figure 1. The Flying City: one of the earliest fantasies that sprang from the first balloon ascents was the notion of vast balloons that would transport thousands through the skies Figure 2. The coal-burning car: another source of amused prophecy was the development of the early steam engines. It seemed a short step in 1831-from the steam engine to the steam-car. Figure 3. As the inventions overtook the prophecies, forecasts in the 1920s looked ahead to ocean liners and vast airships on the trans-Atlantic routes. FUTURES September WH The Pattern of Prediction 305 emergence of technological forecasting in the 1960s. For example, the US Presidents Materials Policy Commis- sion produced in 1952 a five-volume survey, Resources for Freedom, which examined the prospects of vital com- modities, energy sources and major technologies. The analysts and the pattern-recognisers of the world had begun to unite. In 1955 the British Government received from the Lord President of the Council the Pro- gramme of nuclear power; and in that same year the United Nations organised an international conference in Geneva on The peaceful uses of atomic energy. At all times the achievements and the opportunities of modern technology have decided the pace of development; and on many occasions the social con- sequences of human inventiveness have thrown up problems that must find right answers in the future. In the un- paralleled outpouring of programmes and propositions there were certain clearly discernible factors at work. After 1945 governments throughout the world had to decide on the most effective means of restoring national econo- mies. And here political considerations often affected decisions, since the end- ing of vast colonial empires, when added to the Communist victory in China, changed strategic balances throughout the world. But in all places the most pervasive and powerful in- fluence has been the increasing power of governments to control national and international economies; and that power derives directly from the growth in communications and transportation. During the 50s the main influence remained with the governmental com- mittees, especially those working on long-term economic and military plans. By the early 6Os, however, it had become apparent that the nations do not live by the plan alone; and one of the first signs of a widening in the range of enquiry was the conference organised by CIBA in 1963 on Man and his Future. The institutes and the founda- tions followed: in Austria Robert Jungk established the Institute fur Zukunftsfragen; in Paris Bertrand de Jouvenel started the Futuribles research association; in the United Kingdom the Social Research Council set up the Committee on the next Thirty Years; and the American Academy of Arts and Science has created the Commis- sion on the Year 2000 in the USA. Out of the new institutes and the world conferences has come a second wave of publications, more specialist and often more practical than the predictions of the immediate post-war period. From the Hudson Institute has come a classic in the new field-Kahn and Wiener, The Tear 2000; from the Institut fur Zukunftsfragen has come a series of forecasts under the general title of Modelle fiir eine neue Welt; and presum- ably the proceedings of the Science Policy Foundation symposium (London, April 197 1) will soon appear in print. At present technological forecasting looks rather like a political party in its first year of office : expectations are high, but the achievements are still to come. Will they ever come ? In the areas where quantitative techniques can operate successfully, the forecasts will un- doubtedly become more and more accurate. But how do the computers begin to assess the impact of ideas on a society? In the last 100 years the physi- cal sciences and the technologies have reached their predicted goals: sub- marines, flying machines, atomic energy, space rockets all belong to the ancient history of forecasting. And yet the great social objectives are still with us. World peace, universal prosperity, the reign of law, the brotherhood of man-these aspirations make up the unfinished business of the human race. And these aspirations are central to many of the issues that emerge from the forecasting of alternative futures. To plan is to choose; and in order to make the best choice, it is essential that we should know what we want. But are we certain that the human race knows what it wants? FUTURES Sept ember 1971
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