711

ESSAY
The end of history as a self-denying
prophecy
Bart van Steenbergen
The End of History by Fukuyama is of particular interest for futurists, because it
can be seen as a futuristic experiment with a no-future world as the ultimate
outcome.1 There are many ways to look at The End of History; as an expression
of modern (as distinct from post-modern) political philosophy, as an interesting
mixture of Hegelianism and liberalism, as a description of the good society, but
with unhappy human beings, as a new form of holistic thinking, as an attempt to
legitimize the USAs role as the economic, political and moral world leader. All
these items are discussed here, but the emphasis is on Fukuyamas vision on the
future of man and society. In that context we come up with our own futuristic
experiment by exploring the possibility of the end of history as a self-fulfilling
and a self-denying prophecy.
Pour disputer il faut @tre daccord. This
French expression refers to the fact that
for a fruitful discussion and critique, ie
for a dialogue in the Socratic sense (by
which both parties will come one step
nearer to the truth), there has to be
agreement or at least acceptance on a
number of the basic premises. This is
very true for The End of History, for it is
based on a number of assumptions,
which are highly debatable and refuted
by a number of modern political philo-
sophers.
The notion of a universal history of
mankind especially has been heavily
attacked. For the time being, however,
we follow Fukuyama here in order not to
break off the dialogue at too early a
stage, but the opposition to this idea
should be discussed here briefly.
The first opponent that Fukuyama
Bart van Steenbergen is at the Faculty of Social
Sciences, University of Utrecht, PO Box
80.140, 3508 TC Utrecht, the Netherlands (fax:
31-30-534733).
will find on his way is Karl Popper, a
consistent adversary of any kind of his-
toricism and of Hegelianism in particu-
lar, describing it as scientific nonsense
and morally dangerous, for it will lead to
totalitarianism and the closing of the
open society. History has no meaning,
says Popper, but we must give it a
meaning.* In a recent interview the
90-year-old philosopher, as militant as
ever, called Fukuyamas end of history
stupid phrases, since there is neither a
law of progress, nor a logical end-point.
What does exist is our responsibility.3
In a similar way, but for different
reasons, the post-modernists will refute
the notion of a universal history as a
totalizing social theory, as master nar-
ratives, to use Lyotards phrase, which
are somehow reductionistic, simplistic
and even terroristic.4 We disagree with
both Lyotard and Popper that totalizing
thought can be equated with totalitarian-
ism, but there is something to the view
that the notion of a universal history
gives a reductionistic view of complex
reality. However this is not necessarily a
problem if we look at reductionism as
FUTURES September 1992
712 Essay
the reduction of a complex phenom-
enon to its essence. This is what scholars
and intellectuals do and should do; look
for the essential basic patterns underly-
ing the confusing world of phenomena.
By emphasizing that there is only plural-
ity and pluriformity, that there is no
unity and that the most contradictory
phenomena can coexist, the post-
modernists have given up on the basic
assignment of intellectuals. In that sense
Fukuyamas universal history is a wel-
come critique of post-modernism.
The end of internal contradictions
In his standard work, Prognostics, the
Dutch futurist Fred Polak has developed
a great number of what he calls histor-
ical models for the future, like the
cyclical, the evolutionary, the equili-
brium model and modern sacral models
(eg Teilhard de Chardin). We mention
this because if one accepts the notion of
a universal history one does not neces-
sarily have to accept the dialectical
variant.
Typical for Fukuyamas dialectical
model is first the notion of progress, ie
liberal democracy as the end-station and
as the best of all possible societies
without internal contradictions, and
second, the idea of a universal develop-
ment with vanguards and laggards.
So far we have accepted (but not
without hesitation) the idea of a uni-
versal history, but now some critical
remarks have to be made.
To start with, it is doubtful whether a
liberal democracy is without internal
contradictions. Modern history has
come full circle since it started with
liberal democracy at the end of the 18th
century in France and America, and it
ended with it at the end of the 20th
century at least in a great part of the
world. In the meantime several alternat-
ives, in particular fascism and commun-
ism, have risen and declined. This, ac-
cording to Fukuyama, shows the
strength of the liberal democratic system
as the only one which has conquered
and superseded all internal contradic-
tions.
Although it is undoubtedly true that
this system has been much more flexible
and adaptable than Marx had thought, it
is doubtful whether it can survive the
most recent challenge, the environ-
mental problematique; the UN confer-
ence in Rio has confirmed that doubt. In
dialectical terms, we envisage a growing
contradiction between a capitalist eco-
nomy which is inherently based on in-
dustrial growth and expansion, on the
one hand, and the need for sustainability
on the other. The Rio conference has
shown that not only the rich countries
push economic expansion, but that also,
and sometimes even more so, the poor
countries are striving for high economic
growth to the detriment of the environ-
ment, in order to narrow the gap and
obtain a greater share of global wealth.
Let there be no misunderstanding: such
claims of the South are fully legitimate
from the point of view of a more just and
equal distribution of wealth, but it is also
true that they will sharpen the contradic-
tions within the global capitalist system.
From a dialectical perspective this would
mean that another historical stage is still
to be expected as the outcome of the
present conflicts and contradictions.
It is remarkable how little attention
Fukuyama devotes to these ecological
problems, but it is also understandable,
for it might undermine his end of his-
tory argument.
The best of all societies?
Second, we ask to what extent a liberal
democracy is the best of all possible
societies. Fukuyama has his hesitations
here, particularly with regard to the
fulfilment of the human need of recogni-
tion, but there is no doubt that from a
societal perspective it is seen as the
highest stage of development.
However, one can ask for whom is a
liberal democracy a good society? Even if
we assume for a moment that it is the
best for the West, it is doubtful whether
it is also the best for the rest of the
world; or, to put it differently, are we
dealing here with a zero-sum game
(which means that the development of
the rich Western countries takes place to
the detriment of the developing coun-
tries), or is it a non-zero-sum game,
which is based on the notion that in a
world of liberal democracies and capital-
ist economies all parties are winners.
FUTURES September 1992
Essay 713
Fukuyama takes the latter position,
but his arguments are not convincing.
He is right to reject the so-called Depen-
dencia theory as a universal theory, for
there are indeed a number of societies,
especially in East Asia, which have
refuted the universality of this theory
by breaking through their status of
backward and peripheral countries. In
particular the little tigers or NlCs have
shown their capacity to participate in,
and gain from the global capitalist
system.
On the other hand, this theory is still
valid for certain regions, and especially
for Latin America. In that context it is
illuminating to make a comparison be-
tween that region and Southern Europe.
In both regions a number of countries
have gone through a process of demo-
cratization in the past few decades-
Spain, Portugal and Greece in the 1970s;
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Paraguay in
the 1980s. Typical for the Latin American
transition process is a cyckal model of
development. Attempts to establish
democracy there have promoted a pro-
cess of recurrent economic crises, which
often lead to a form of coup detat and
a return to authoritarian rule, until
another attempt is then made to estab-
lish a (fragile) democracy, and the pro-
cess starts all over again. Such a cyclical
model is basically unstable and the re-
cent developments in Peru indicate that
this model is still valid for this region.
The Southern European countries
have a long history of authoritarian rule,
but the transition which took place in
the 1970s looks irreversible, at least in
Spain and Portugal, with solid and stable
democratic regimes and economic
prosperity. Our point is that these differ-
ences are strongly if not decisively in-
fluenced by external forces, and in this
case by the role of the Northern neigh-
bour.
In the case of Europe, the Northern
European countries (the EC) have opted
for a policy of integration and inter-
dependence in development coopera-
tion and for strengthening the demo-
cratic forces in Southern Europe. For the
USA, Latin America has long been a
semi-colony, which implies a policy of
dependence, and moreover Washington
has hardly ever endorsed democratic
movements in that region-quite the
contrary. Here the zero-sum game
model is still valid.
Even if we limit ourselves to Western
countries. it is still doubtful whether a
liberal democracy is the best of all
possible existing societies. We want to
elucidate this point by referring to T. H.
Marshalls famous article on Citizenship
and social class.6 Marshall develops an
evolutionary theory of citizenship as a
cumulative process and as a historical
and political struggle for the extension
of citizens rights in three steps over the
past three centuries. In the 18th century
civil rights and liberties emerged; in the
19th century political rights; and in the
second half of the 20th century the social
rights of citizens developed in the wel-
fare states of Western Europe.
It should be emphasized, however,
that there is a fundamental difference
between the principles of a liberal and
democratic state, based on civil and
political rights on the one hand and the
social rights of a welfare state on the
other, as the German sociologist Claus
Offe has emphasized. Liberal principles
are formulated in a negative way (mostly
in terms of freedom from state interven-
tion), whereas social rights are formul-
ated in a positive way; they imply an
active and interventionistic state, which
also creates its problems, but that is
another matter.
These social rights are meant to give
the formal status of equality of citizens a
material foundation. The state guaran-
tees a certain level of material well-
being, which enables the citizen to exer-
cise his or her rights to full participation
in the community (Marshalls definition
of complete citizenship). Fukuyamas
liberal democracy limits itself to the
civil and political rights of citizens; the
notion of social rights is completely left
out. This is the crucial difference be-
tween a more or less pure liberal demo-
cracy like the USA and a social demo-
cracy like the European welfare states.
We agree with Marshall that a social
democracy is a higher level of develop-
ment than a liberal democracy. The
recent riots in Los Angeles, have clearly
shown the inherent weakness of a liberal
democracy, in particular with regard to
the social rights of citizens.
FUTURES September 1992
714 Essay
A WliVC?FSil theory?
The third point deals with the question
of how universal is Fukuyamas thesis of
universal historical development. Isnt it
basically an expression of Eurocentrism?
It is certainly true, as Fukuyama empha-
sizes, that a great number of countries
have turned democratic over the past
decades, but we can also observe strong
tendencies in the opposite direction
towards some form of theocracy, espe-
cially in the Islamic world. As the recent
tendencies in Algeria, Afghanistan and a
number of the former Soviet republics
Like Tadzjikistan indicate, the call for an
Islamic state is spreading. Moreover this
seems to have a broad popular base and
is not just an expression of authoritarian
regimes. In particular, the Algerian case
shows the dilemma of the helplessness
of a democracy against undemocratic
forces.
It may be true that this form of
Islamic theocracy has little appeal out-
side the Moslem world, but it potentially
affects more than 1 billion people, which
is not to be neglected.
Even more important is the question
to what extent the cotintries of East and
South Asia can be called liberal demo-
cracies, or whether they are at Least
moving in that direction.
On Fukuyamas list of liberal demo-
cracies we find Asian countries like
Lapan, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Thailand
and the Pbil~~~ines. It may be true that
these countries have some form of iot-
ma/ democratic institutions, but they
lack a civic culture, a democratic and
liberal spirit, which forms the cultural
foundation for a political democracy.
In this context it would be interest-
ing to investigate more tb~r~ughiy the
roie of Confucianism in a number of
Asian countries, since this religion, or,
better, social philosophy, seems to piay
a role comparable to the one played by
Calvinism a few centuries ago in Europe.
We are referring here to the promotion
of the economic modernization process
and to values like industrjo~sness and a
sober lifestyle. On the other hand, as
distinct from Calvinism with its congre-
gational church structure, Confucianism
has little affinity with democracy, let
alone with liberal values; on the con-
trary, it is based on the notion of a
hierarchical society.
The past has shown that economic
modernization can take place in authori-
tarian systems and there is no reason to
believe that this wiil be fundamentally
different in the future.
To sum up this part of the essay, we
are prepared to follow Fukuyama with
his thesis that a historical dialectical
process is taking place in the direction of
a liberal democracy. We have great
doubts, however, whether this is an
end-station without new contradictions.
Moreover, we disagree that such a lib-
erai democracy means progress for the
world and that it is the expression of the
best of all possibie societies. Liberal
democracies in the North hamper the
development of certain (but not all)
regions in the South, and in our opinion
a social democracy is a more humane
and just society than a liberal demo-
cracy, although both are harmful for the
environment. The assumed global trend
towards democracy can also be disputed
if we look at the revival of non-demo-
cratic belief systems.
L~j~irnati~n of woxtd leadership
The end of history thesis is an interest-
ing example of creative speculation
about the future of our society of a kind
which is basically different from a
weather forecast, since in essence our
history is a human-made product, which
can be influenced by our ideas, hopes,
fears, thoughts etc. We mention this
because it is interesting to speculate on
the influence that this notion of the end
of history might have. It is quite poss-
ibte and even probable that after a few
years these ideas wiit be forgotten, but
iet us assume for the moment that this is
not the case and that we are dealing here
with one of the influential ideas of our
era, which has created, to some extent,
the mood of the time and, even more,
the mood of the time to come.
The reception given the book seems
to point in this direction, for it is cer-
tainly not its scientific quaiity which has
caused the extensive interest, but rather
its appeal value, or, to put it differently,
the way that people may recognize their
historical epoch in it.
It is this potential and possible in-
FUTURES September 1992
Essay 715
fluence of the book that we want to
explore here by using the notions of the
self-fulfilling and the self-denying pro-
phecy. By this we mean that a certain
forecast in itself may influence the cause
of history either in the predicted or in
the opposite direction. Fukuyamas
book gives room for speculation in both
directions.
Let us start with the notion of the
self-fulfilling prophecy. Between the
publication of the original essay in sum-
mer 1989 and of the book in spring 1992,
two important events took place-the
collapse of communism in Central and
Eastern Europe and the Gulf War. The
implication of the first event was that the
USA remained as the only world power;
the bipolar model had ceased to exist.
This requires a new orientation of the
USA concerning its role as a world
leader.
Roughly, two scenarios can be dis-
tinguished as follows. The first assumes
a form of neo-isolationism. This is not
new in American history, on the con-
trary. In the past the USA had to be
pushed several times by others to play its
role on the global stage. Now that the
evil empire has been beaten, the USA
can turn inwards more and stop playing
the role of global policeman. This point
of view is supported by both conserv-
atives and radicals, be it for different
reasons.
The second scenario, which is sup-
ported by the present US government,
and possibly by a majority of the Ameri-
can people, emphasizes that the USA
should continue to play a crucial role in
the world, be it a different one from that
during the Cold War. What is needed, in
this view, is a new orientation and a new
definition of that role.
In many ways the Gulf War came as
manna from heaven for the supporters
of this scenario, for it gave the USA a
motive for showing all its might, and the
military intervention in Kuwait and Iraq
could be presented to the world as
morally right, since it was directed
against an aggressor and brutal dictator
for whom there should be no place in
the new world order as envisaged by
President Bush.
Fukuyamas book can function as a
manifesto for this new world order. In a
way it has formulated the basic ideology
of such a world order, and for that
matter it could strengthen the second
scenario and promote its realization.
The end of history could give the
Americans a new confidence in the
superiority of their social and economic
system and in the belief that they are the
vanguard of the world, the first ones
who have reached the stage of the good
society. It reminds us of Rostows
Stages of economic growth,8 an idea
which is also based on the concept that
there is a universal path towards eco-
nomic development and prosperity and
that the USA is the undisputed leader in
that process.
Moreover, Fukuyama promotes the
idea that the new US leadership role is
a benevolent one, that it is not based on
military intervention and suppression
(although in some cases like Iraq, it may
be necessary to intervene in a classical
military way), but on free competition in
the global market and on the belief that
in such a global capitalist system all
parties will gain if they stick to the rules
of the game (the non-zero-sum game
principle).
Hidden desires
The idea of the end of history as a
self-denying prophecy becomes a pos-
sibility when we compare this book with
somewhat similar publications (which
appeared 30 years ago) such as Political
Man by Seymour M. Lipset,g in which
existing US democracy was equated with
the good society, and The End of Ideo-
logy by Daniel Bell,O who predicted a
convergence of socialist and liberal ideo-
logies.
Whereas Lipset was very positive
and uncritical about this development,
Bell expressed some concern. An ide-
ology has a motivating and mobilizing
function; it gives people, and especially
young people, a goal in life, something
to strive for. When the existing ideolo-
gies come to an end, because they are
exhausted and meet each other in the
middle where they form a bleak com-
promise, any room for passion and dedi-
cation has disappeared. An ideology is
by its nature an all-or-nothing affair and,
as Bell has phrased it, the new middle
way is for the middle-aged, but not for
the young for whom the things they
FUTURES September 1992
716 &say
want are devitalized. The emotional
energy and the needs still exist, but
there is no room to mobilize this energy
and to give it meaning and direction.
For many young (American) intellec-
tuals this analysis and mild criticism of
Bell marks the transition from the dull
1950s to the roaring 196Os, with the
re-emergence of ideological and polit-
ical battles.
A few years after The End of Ideo-
logy, Herbert Marcuse published his
One-Dimensional Man, which dealt in
a similar, but much more critical way
with the closing of the political universe
and the emergence of a one-dimen-
sional society, as he calls it. Marcuse has
become the ideological hero of the
rebellious generation of the second part
of the 1960s. The book was for many
students and intellectuals an eye-
opener; this type of society was seen as
a dystopia, which had to be opposed and
resisted. The outcome was that the one-
dimensional society became an almost
classic example of a self-denying pro-
phecy. The role of Bell has been much
more limited in this respect, but
nevertheless he may have contributed to
this change of the Zeifgeist.
Back to Fukuyama. He can be com-
pared with Bell, since he is also worried
about the influence such an end-of-
history epoch and ideology might have
on the new generation. In his essay he
writes that: the end of history will be a
very sad time; the worldwide ideological
struggle that called forth courage and
idealism will be replaced by economic
calculation, the endless solving of tech-
nical problems, environmental concerns
and the satisfying of consumer
demands.
In his book he devotes much space
to the discussion of basic human needs
and desires, and especially to the strug-
gle for recognition. Fukuyama distin-
guishes several types of thymos (the
desire for recognition), but he has great
doubts whether all these desires can be
fulfilled in a liberal democracy. It may be
that he touches on deep and hidden
needs and desires in (post-) modern man
which cannot be fulfilled in a (post-)
modern society (liberal democracy) and
that new and eruptive expressions of
those desires may break through the
somewhat lethargic mentality of our fin
de sikle epoch and create new forms of
political commitments.
Such a (speculative) development
might mean the end of the end of
history.
Notes and references
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
IO.
11.
This essay is based on: Francis Fukuyama,
The end of history, The National
Inferest, 16, Summer 1989, pages 3-18;
and Francis Fukuyama, The End of History
and the LastMan (London, Hamish Hamil-
ton, 1992).
K. R. Popper, The Open Society and its
Enemies (London, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1962).
See the interview by Olaf lhlau with Karl
R. Popper in HP/de Tijd, 17 April 1992,
pages 54-60.
D. Kellner, Postmodernism as social
theory: some challenges and problems,
Theory, Culture and Society, 5 (2-3), June
1988, pages 239-270.
L. Polak, Prognostics, A Science in the
Making Surveys the Future (New York,
Elsevier, 1971).
In T. H. Marshall, C/ass, Citizenship and
Social Development (Westport, CT,
Greenwood Press, 1973), pages 65-122.
The original essay was prepared as a
public lecture in 1949.
C. Offe, A non-productivist design for
social policies, paper presented at the
conference Quality of Citizenship, Uni-
versity of Utrecht, 20-22 March 1991.
W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic
Growth (Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1960).
S. M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City,
NY, Doubleday, 1960).
D. Bell, The End of ideology (New York,
Basic Books, 1960).
H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Bos-
ton, MA, Beacon Press, 1964).
FUTURES September 1992