Void Marriages

FC ARTICLE 4: Te absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35.
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites of shall not afect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
FC ARTICLE 35: Te following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
1. Tose contracted by any party below eighteen years of age, even with the consent of parents or guardians;
2. Tose solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing ofcer had the legal
authority to do so;
3. Tose solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding chapter;
4. Tose bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
5. Tose contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other;
6. Tose subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
In ordinary contracts (1) the child will not be emancipated from parental authority. In marriage,
the child will be emancipated.
If it is a mistake of fact, the marriage is valid. If it is a mistake of law, the marriage is void.
Paragraph 5 refers to physical mistake in identity. Other fraudulent misrepresentation would not
apply.
FC ARTICLE 36: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization.
Psychological incapacity to comply is dierent from inability to understand because the latter is a vice of
consent, without which, an essential requisite of marriage is lacking.
Reasons for adopting psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity:
Substitute for divorce
Solution of church-annulled marriages
To give remedy
Psychological incapacity vs. Vice of consent
a person may fully agree but may not understand the obligations of marriage.
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent but there is a lack of legal capacity, an essential
requisite of marriage.
Psychological Incapacity vs. Insanity
Insanity has varying degree;
Insanity is curable
Tere are lucid intervals in insanity
Insanity is a ground for annulment in other countries
Note: Psychological incapacity was not defned using examples to avoid ejusdem generis (exclusive
enumeration) which might limit the applicability of the provision. It is therefore judged according to the
facts of the case.
Psychological incapacity should exist at the time of the marriage.
Psychological incapacity is restricted to disorders demonstrative of the utter sensitivity or inability
to give meaning and signifcance to the marriage.
Examples of psychological incapacity:
1. Homosexuality;
2. Satryiasis or Nymphomania;
3. Epilepsy with permanently recurring maladaptive manifestationsl
4. Extremely low intelligencel
5. Habitual Alcoholism;
6. Criminality
Manifestations of psychological incapacity:
Refusal of wife to dwell with the husband after marriage;
Aiction which makes common life unbearable;
Sociopathic anomalies on husbands part
SANTOS VS. BEDIA-SANTOS
Facts: Louel Santos who was married to Julia Bedia-Santos wishes to annul his marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. Respondent has, for the last seven years since fling for the annulment, resided in
the United States and has contacted the petitioner only twice.
Held: Psychological incapacity refers to the mental, not physical incapacity. It must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability for it to be considered a psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent. A person may have given his or her consent freely without
understanding the obligations of the contract. Without consent, a marriage is void ab initio. Without the
ability to understand the nature of the contract, the marriage is merely voidable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MOLINA
Facts: Respondent alleged that her husband Reynaldo Molina was psychologically incapacitated because he
showed signs of immaturity, irresponsibility and dependence. She also averred that her husband was never
honest. Te Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court upheld that the marriage was indeed, void.
Held: Psychological incapacity should refer to a mental and not physical incapacity. It is confned to the
most serious personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and signifcance to the marriage. It is not enough that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities. It is
essential that they must be shown as incapable of doing so.
Molina Guidelines In Applying Article 36
1. Te burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintif. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
2. Te root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identifed, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) suciently proven by the experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Te person
alleged to be incapacitated must be psychologically ill to the extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming or knowing them could not have given a valid assumption thereof.
3. Te incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Te evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged vows.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or relative only in regard to the other spouse. Such incapacity must also be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Te illness must be shown as downright inability or incapacity.
6. Te essential marital obligations are:
a. Te husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fdelity, and
render mutual help and support (FC Article 68).
b. Te husband and wife shall fx the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide. Te court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family (FC
Article 69).
c. Te spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. Te expenses for such support
and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and in the absence
thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufciency or absence
of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfed from their separate properties (FC
Article 70).
d. Te management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. Te expenses for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 (FC Article 71).
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
APIAG VS. CANTERO
Facts: Maria Apiag fled an administrative case against her husband, respondent judge, Esmeraldo G.
Cantero. Te Court of Appeals decided that the respondent acted in grave misconduct. Te plaintif and
respondent were married and petitioner bore 2 children by that marriage. After the second child was born,
respondent judge left for no reason. Plaintis, through their counsel asked respondent for support and for
the children to be declared legal heirs. Complainants subsequently learned that respondent has contracted
another marriage with whom he had 5 children. Respondent misrepresented himself in his declaration of
assets and liabilities by putting the name of the second wife on the said statement. He contended that the
frst marriage was void ab initio because he and his frst wife never cohabited and he was forced into the
marriage. He added that he and the petitioners have settled amicably and he has agreed to give the children
of his retirement benefts.
Held: While he did not act in grave misconduct, he acted in impropriety when he failed and refused to
attend to the needs of his children. Although it is undisputed that the judge did not obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his frst marriage, pursuant to the jurisprudence prevailing at the time of the second
marriage, it has been established that no such declaration was necessary.
CHOA VS. CHOA
Facts: Respondent Alfonso Choa fled a complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner Leni
Choa on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Petitioner fled a demurrer of evidence (an objection or
exception by one of the parties in an action at law to the efect that the evidence which the adversary
produced is insucient in point of law to make out a case and sustain the issue). Te demurrer of evidence
was dismissed by the appellate court which upheld that the claims of Alfonso Choathat her wife had fled
several lawsuits against him indicating psychological incapacity and that his wife was immature, carefree
and had no intentions of procreative sexualityas sufcient evidence.
Held: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Te
testimony of the expert doctor and the respondent only showed that the two cannot get along with each
other.
TSOI VS. CA
Facts: Respondent Gina Lao Tsoi fled for annulment of her marriage to petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that since their marriage in May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989, the couple has not consummated their marriage. Defendant contended that it was the
wifes fault that their marriage was not consummated. A physician examined both plainti and defendant
and attested that neither of them had any physical problem. Defendant alleged that the wife was afraid to
consummate the marriage and afraid that she would have to return the jewelry given to her.
Held: Whether or not it was the husband who refused to consummate the marriage is immaterial. Te fact
still stands that it has not been consummated. Tere may be physical and not psychological reasons as to
why the marriage should not be annulled but the evidence to that efect was not presented. Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than stubborn refusal. Te natural order
between spouses is sexual intimacy.
ANTONIO VS. REYES
Facts: Petitioner fled a petition for the declaration of his marriage to respondent as null and void on the
grounds of psychological incapacity as manifested by several instances of lying and concealment of an
illegitimate child by Respondent Ivonne Reyes. Petitioner alleged that respondent fabricated stories which
bordered on the ridiculous.
Held: Marriage was void by virtue of the Molina guidelines, fulflled by the Petitioner.
FC ARTICLE 37: Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
the relationship between the parties is legitimate or illegitimate.
1. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree and
2. Between brothers and sisters, whether of full or half blood.
FC ARTICLE 38: Te following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
1. Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
2. Between step-parents and step-children;
3. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
4. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
5. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
6. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
7. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
8. Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
9. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other persons spouse or his
or her own spouse.
FC ARTICLE 39: Te action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe. However, in the case of marriages celebrated before the efectivity of this code and falling under
Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this code shall have taken efect.
FC ARTICLE 40: Te absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a fnal judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Final judgment is needed to avoid confusion because one of the parties may contract another marriage
which would be bigamous and therefore void during the pendency of the trial for the other marriage.
FC ARTICLE 41: A marriage contracted by any person duringthe subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four* consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufcient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the eect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
FC Article 44: If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law.
RA 8533
CC ARTICLE 390: After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. Te absentee shall not be
presumed dead for the purposes of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared
after the age of seventy-fve years, an absence of fve years shall be sucient in order that his succession may
be open.
CC ARTICLE 391: Te following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs;
1. A person on board a vessel lost during sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not been heard
of for four years since the loss of the vessel or airplane;
2. A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
3. A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four years.
PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA
Facts: Appellant was married to Jovita de Asis on August 5, 1936. On May 14, 1941, appellant married Olga
Lema. On February 2, 1943, the frst wife of appellant died. On August 19, 1949, appellant married one
Carmencita Panlilio. Appellant was then charged with bigamy but he contended that his marriage to Olga
Lema was void ab initio and therefore non-existent. In that light, he claimed, that his marriage to
Carmencita was not bigamous.
Held: Te marriage law in eect at the time the appellant contracted with his second wife, Olga Lema,
states that his marriage to Lema was void ab initio. No judicial decree was necessary to establish its
invalidity.
TOLENTINO VS. PARAS
Facts: Serafa Tolentino was the wife of the deceased, Amado Tolentino. Petitioner requested the correction
of an entry on the death certifcate of the deceased which states that the name of his surviving spouse was
Maria Clemente. Amado Tolentino married his second wife, Maria Clemente while his frst marriage was
still in efect. When the deceased was charged with bigamy, he pleaded guilty and served the corresponding
sentene. Te petition was dismissed by Hon. Edgardo Paras on grounds that the issue was a marital
relationship, and that the court has no jurisdiction.
Held: Te petition was meritorious. Te court had jurisdiction because the wife was, initially, seeking a
judicial declaration that she was the lawful spouse of the deceased. Te plea of guilt of the deceased
efectively established that the second marriage was in fact, void ab initio and that the petitioner was the
lawful spouse.
WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DIY
Lilia Wiegel appealed for the reversal of the decision of respondent judge, Sempio-Diy because, in the
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage fled by Karl Heinz Wiegel against petitioner, respondent
judge ruled against the presentation of evidence. When petitioner was married to the plainti, she had a
previous existing marriage. Petitioner claimed that the frst marriage was void ab initio because she was
forced into marrying her frst husband.
Held: Tere was no need to present evidence because if there had been, in fact, intimidation during the frst
marriage, the said marriage would have been rendered voidable and not void. Had the marriage been void,
a judicial declaration would still be necessary.
TERRE VS. TERRE
Facts: Petitioner charged Atty Jordan Terre with gross immoral conduct for contracting a second marriage
while he has a subsisting marriage. Te petitioner alleged that while she was still in her previous marriage
with her frst cousin, she was courted by defendant and was advised that she was free to contract a second
marriage because her frst marriage was void. Petitioner took the advise and married herein respondent but,
after a few years, the respondent took of. Later the petitioner found out that respondent had contracted
another marriage.
Held: A judicial declaration is necessary to determine whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage. Without such declaration, the subsequently existing marriage is sustained.
ATIENZA VS. BRILLANTES
Facts: Complainant charged respondent Judge Fransisco Brillantes with gross immoral conduct after having
found said respondent sleeping in his own bed, apparently cohabiting with his wife. Complainant left his
wife and kids. Complainant alleged that the said judge was, at that time, married to one Zenaida Ongkiko
with whom he had 5 children. Respondent denied the allegation saying that his marriage with Ongkiko was
void ab initio because it was solemnized without a marriage license. Respondent likewise argued that
Article 40 of the family code was not in eect when his frst marriage took place.
Held: Judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is needed for purposes of remarriage. Te Family
Code can be applied retroactively so long as vested rights will not be impaired by its application.
BORJA-MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ
Facts: Complainant avers that she is the lawful wife of the late David Manzano. Her husband contracted
another marriage while the frst one was still in eect, solemnized by herein respondent judge. Respondent
contends that he did not know that the two were only legally separated and that all he knew was the two
had been cohabiting for seven years. He cited Article 34 which states that no license shall be necessary for
the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years.
Held: Te requisite of Article 34 is that there is no legal impediment between the parties. Te said article is
merely a ground for exemption for marriage license. Te judge knew of the subsisting marriage as it was
stated in the marriage certifcate and in the adavit signed by the parties.
DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Delia Soledad Domingo sought the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property against petitioner Roberto Domingo on the grounds that the petitioner had a valid and existing
marriage with one Emerlinda dela Paz. Te frst wife sued petitioner for bigamy. Respondent claimed that
the petitioner has been dependent on her and since she left to work in Saudi, she has amassed some
P350,000 worth of properties which were under the possession and administration of herein petitioner until
respondent found out about the frst marriage. Petitioner alleged that there was no cause for action because
the marriage was void ab initio and judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is only sought for purposes of
remarrying and no such intention has been expressed.
Held: Although it is stated in the Family Code that judicial declaration is needed for purposes of
remarrying, it does not expressly state that it is exclusive for that purpose alone. Te Family Code provides
that among the eects of the judicial declaration is the immediate separation of property.
EFFECTS OF NULLITY
FC ARTICLE 50: Te efects provided for by paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Article 43 and Article 44 shall
also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by fnal judgment
under Article 40 and 45.
Te fnal judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of the
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be
notifed for the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the log on which it
is situated shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
FC ARTICLE 51: In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of fnal judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such
matters.
Te children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
Te delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents but the value of
the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitimes.
FC ARTICLE 52: Te judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall
be recoded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not afect the
third persons.
FC ARTICLE 53: Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements
of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
FC ARTICLE 54: Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become fnal and executory shall be consicered legitimate. Children
conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
NINAL VS. BAYADOG
Facts: Petitioners request the annulment of the marriage of their father to Norma Bayadog. On September
26, 1974, Pepito married Teodulfa. Teodulfa died on April 24, 2985 and, on December 11, 1986, Pepito
married Norma Bayadog. Te marriage was contracted without a license. Instead, the couple signed an
afdavit stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for 5 years. Te code in efect during the
time of the marriage was the Civil Code. According to Article 76 of the said code, marriage between a man
and a woman who have been living together for more than 5 years no longer requires a marriage license.
Pepito died in February of 1997.
Held: Marriage of Pepito Ninal Sr. and Norma Bayadog is null and void. It is evident that only 20 months
elapsed between the time of the death of the frst wife and the marriage with the second wife. Had the two
been cohabiting for fve years, such cohabitation, and the marriage, was not within the capacity of the
deceased. Te children do not have standing to cause action but, because the marriage was null and void, it
is likewise non-existent.
For marriages of exceptional character, there should be no legal impediment on the part of either party.
Te one contracting a marriage should have legal capacity to do so.
Void Marriages
FC ARTICLE 4: Te absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35.
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites of shall not afect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
FC ARTICLE 35: Te following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
1. Tose contracted by any party below eighteen years of age, even with the consent of parents or guardians;
2. Tose solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing ofcer had the legal
authority to do so;
3. Tose solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding chapter;
4. Tose bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
5. Tose contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other;
6. Tose subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
In ordinary contracts (1) the child will not be emancipated from parental authority. In marriage,
the child will be emancipated.
If it is a mistake of fact, the marriage is valid. If it is a mistake of law, the marriage is void.
Paragraph 5 refers to physical mistake in identity. Other fraudulent misrepresentation would not
apply.
FC ARTICLE 36: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization.
Psychological incapacity to comply is dierent from inability to understand because the latter is a vice of
consent, without which, an essential requisite of marriage is lacking.
Reasons for adopting psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity:
Substitute for divorce
Solution of church-annulled marriages
To give remedy
Psychological incapacity vs. Vice of consent
a person may fully agree but may not understand the obligations of marriage.
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent but there is a lack of legal capacity, an essential
requisite of marriage.
Psychological Incapacity vs. Insanity
Insanity has varying degree;
Insanity is curable
Tere are lucid intervals in insanity
Insanity is a ground for annulment in other countries
Note: Psychological incapacity was not defned using examples to avoid ejusdem generis (exclusive
enumeration) which might limit the applicability of the provision. It is therefore judged according to the
facts of the case.
Psychological incapacity should exist at the time of the marriage.
Psychological incapacity is restricted to disorders demonstrative of the utter sensitivity or inability
to give meaning and signifcance to the marriage.
Examples of psychological incapacity:
1. Homosexuality;
2. Satryiasis or Nymphomania;
3. Epilepsy with permanently recurring maladaptive manifestationsl
4. Extremely low intelligencel
5. Habitual Alcoholism;
6. Criminality
Manifestations of psychological incapacity:
Refusal of wife to dwell with the husband after marriage;
Aiction which makes common life unbearable;
Sociopathic anomalies on husbands part
SANTOS VS. BEDIA-SANTOS
Facts: Louel Santos who was married to Julia Bedia-Santos wishes to annul his marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. Respondent has, for the last seven years since fling for the annulment, resided in
the United States and has contacted the petitioner only twice.
Held: Psychological incapacity refers to the mental, not physical incapacity. It must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability for it to be considered a psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent. A person may have given his or her consent freely without
understanding the obligations of the contract. Without consent, a marriage is void ab initio. Without the
ability to understand the nature of the contract, the marriage is merely voidable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MOLINA
Facts: Respondent alleged that her husband Reynaldo Molina was psychologically incapacitated because he
showed signs of immaturity, irresponsibility and dependence. She also averred that her husband was never
honest. Te Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court upheld that the marriage was indeed, void.
Held: Psychological incapacity should refer to a mental and not physical incapacity. It is confned to the
most serious personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and signifcance to the marriage. It is not enough that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities. It is
essential that they must be shown as incapable of doing so.
Molina Guidelines In Applying Article 36
1. Te burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintif. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
2. Te root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identifed, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) suciently proven by the experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Te person
alleged to be incapacitated must be psychologically ill to the extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming or knowing them could not have given a valid assumption thereof.
3. Te incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Te evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged vows.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or relative only in regard to the other spouse. Such incapacity must also be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Te illness must be shown as downright inability or incapacity.
6. Te essential marital obligations are:
a. Te husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fdelity, and
render mutual help and support (FC Article 68).
b. Te husband and wife shall fx the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide. Te court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family (FC
Article 69).
c. Te spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. Te expenses for such support
and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and in the absence
thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufciency or absence
of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfed from their separate properties (FC
Article 70).
d. Te management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. Te expenses for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 (FC Article 71).
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
APIAG VS. CANTERO
Facts: Maria Apiag fled an administrative case against her husband, respondent judge, Esmeraldo G.
Cantero. Te Court of Appeals decided that the respondent acted in grave misconduct. Te plaintif and
respondent were married and petitioner bore 2 children by that marriage. After the second child was born,
respondent judge left for no reason. Plaintis, through their counsel asked respondent for support and for
the children to be declared legal heirs. Complainants subsequently learned that respondent has contracted
another marriage with whom he had 5 children. Respondent misrepresented himself in his declaration of
assets and liabilities by putting the name of the second wife on the said statement. He contended that the
frst marriage was void ab initio because he and his frst wife never cohabited and he was forced into the
marriage. He added that he and the petitioners have settled amicably and he has agreed to give the children
of his retirement benefts.
Held: While he did not act in grave misconduct, he acted in impropriety when he failed and refused to
attend to the needs of his children. Although it is undisputed that the judge did not obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his frst marriage, pursuant to the jurisprudence prevailing at the time of the second
marriage, it has been established that no such declaration was necessary.
CHOA VS. CHOA
Facts: Respondent Alfonso Choa fled a complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner Leni
Choa on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Petitioner fled a demurrer of evidence (an objection or
exception by one of the parties in an action at law to the efect that the evidence which the adversary
produced is insucient in point of law to make out a case and sustain the issue). Te demurrer of evidence
was dismissed by the appellate court which upheld that the claims of Alfonso Choathat her wife had fled
several lawsuits against him indicating psychological incapacity and that his wife was immature, carefree
and had no intentions of procreative sexualityas sufcient evidence.
Held: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Te
testimony of the expert doctor and the respondent only showed that the two cannot get along with each
other.
TSOI VS. CA
Facts: Respondent Gina Lao Tsoi fled for annulment of her marriage to petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that since their marriage in May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989, the couple has not consummated their marriage. Defendant contended that it was the
wifes fault that their marriage was not consummated. A physician examined both plainti and defendant
and attested that neither of them had any physical problem. Defendant alleged that the wife was afraid to
consummate the marriage and afraid that she would have to return the jewelry given to her.
Held: Whether or not it was the husband who refused to consummate the marriage is immaterial. Te fact
still stands that it has not been consummated. Tere may be physical and not psychological reasons as to
why the marriage should not be annulled but the evidence to that efect was not presented. Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than stubborn refusal. Te natural order
between spouses is sexual intimacy.
ANTONIO VS. REYES
Facts: Petitioner fled a petition for the declaration of his marriage to respondent as null and void on the
grounds of psychological incapacity as manifested by several instances of lying and concealment of an
illegitimate child by Respondent Ivonne Reyes. Petitioner alleged that respondent fabricated stories which
bordered on the ridiculous.
Held: Marriage was void by virtue of the Molina guidelines, fulflled by the Petitioner.
FC ARTICLE 37: Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
the relationship between the parties is legitimate or illegitimate.
1. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree and
2. Between brothers and sisters, whether of full or half blood.
FC ARTICLE 38: Te following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
1. Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
2. Between step-parents and step-children;
3. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
4. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
5. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
6. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
7. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
8. Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
9. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other persons spouse or his
or her own spouse.
FC ARTICLE 39: Te action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe. However, in the case of marriages celebrated before the efectivity of this code and falling under
Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this code shall have taken efect.
FC ARTICLE 40: Te absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a fnal judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Final judgment is needed to avoid confusion because one of the parties may contract another marriage
which would be bigamous and therefore void during the pendency of the trial for the other marriage.
FC ARTICLE 41: A marriage contracted by any person duringthe subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four* consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufcient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the eect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
FC Article 44: If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law.
RA 8533
CC ARTICLE 390: After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. Te absentee shall not be
presumed dead for the purposes of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared
after the age of seventy-fve years, an absence of fve years shall be sucient in order that his succession may
be open.
CC ARTICLE 391: Te following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs;
1. A person on board a vessel lost during sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not been heard
of for four years since the loss of the vessel or airplane;
2. A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
3. A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four years.
PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA
Facts: Appellant was married to Jovita de Asis on August 5, 1936. On May 14, 1941, appellant married Olga
Lema. On February 2, 1943, the frst wife of appellant died. On August 19, 1949, appellant married one
Carmencita Panlilio. Appellant was then charged with bigamy but he contended that his marriage to Olga
Lema was void ab initio and therefore non-existent. In that light, he claimed, that his marriage to
Carmencita was not bigamous.
Held: Te marriage law in eect at the time the appellant contracted with his second wife, Olga Lema,
states that his marriage to Lema was void ab initio. No judicial decree was necessary to establish its
invalidity.
TOLENTINO VS. PARAS
Facts: Serafa Tolentino was the wife of the deceased, Amado Tolentino. Petitioner requested the correction
of an entry on the death certifcate of the deceased which states that the name of his surviving spouse was
Maria Clemente. Amado Tolentino married his second wife, Maria Clemente while his frst marriage was
still in efect. When the deceased was charged with bigamy, he pleaded guilty and served the corresponding
sentene. Te petition was dismissed by Hon. Edgardo Paras on grounds that the issue was a marital
relationship, and that the court has no jurisdiction.
Held: Te petition was meritorious. Te court had jurisdiction because the wife was, initially, seeking a
judicial declaration that she was the lawful spouse of the deceased. Te plea of guilt of the deceased
efectively established that the second marriage was in fact, void ab initio and that the petitioner was the
lawful spouse.
WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DIY
Lilia Wiegel appealed for the reversal of the decision of respondent judge, Sempio-Diy because, in the
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage fled by Karl Heinz Wiegel against petitioner, respondent
judge ruled against the presentation of evidence. When petitioner was married to the plainti, she had a
previous existing marriage. Petitioner claimed that the frst marriage was void ab initio because she was
forced into marrying her frst husband.
Held: Tere was no need to present evidence because if there had been, in fact, intimidation during the frst
marriage, the said marriage would have been rendered voidable and not void. Had the marriage been void,
a judicial declaration would still be necessary.
TERRE VS. TERRE
Facts: Petitioner charged Atty Jordan Terre with gross immoral conduct for contracting a second marriage
while he has a subsisting marriage. Te petitioner alleged that while she was still in her previous marriage
with her frst cousin, she was courted by defendant and was advised that she was free to contract a second
marriage because her frst marriage was void. Petitioner took the advise and married herein respondent but,
after a few years, the respondent took of. Later the petitioner found out that respondent had contracted
another marriage.
Held: A judicial declaration is necessary to determine whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage. Without such declaration, the subsequently existing marriage is sustained.
ATIENZA VS. BRILLANTES
Facts: Complainant charged respondent Judge Fransisco Brillantes with gross immoral conduct after having
found said respondent sleeping in his own bed, apparently cohabiting with his wife. Complainant left his
wife and kids. Complainant alleged that the said judge was, at that time, married to one Zenaida Ongkiko
with whom he had 5 children. Respondent denied the allegation saying that his marriage with Ongkiko was
void ab initio because it was solemnized without a marriage license. Respondent likewise argued that
Article 40 of the family code was not in eect when his frst marriage took place.
Held: Judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is needed for purposes of remarriage. Te Family
Code can be applied retroactively so long as vested rights will not be impaired by its application.
BORJA-MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ
Facts: Complainant avers that she is the lawful wife of the late David Manzano. Her husband contracted
another marriage while the frst one was still in eect, solemnized by herein respondent judge. Respondent
contends that he did not know that the two were only legally separated and that all he knew was the two
had been cohabiting for seven years. He cited Article 34 which states that no license shall be necessary for
the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years.
Held: Te requisite of Article 34 is that there is no legal impediment between the parties. Te said article is
merely a ground for exemption for marriage license. Te judge knew of the subsisting marriage as it was
stated in the marriage certifcate and in the adavit signed by the parties.
DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Delia Soledad Domingo sought the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property against petitioner Roberto Domingo on the grounds that the petitioner had a valid and existing
marriage with one Emerlinda dela Paz. Te frst wife sued petitioner for bigamy. Respondent claimed that
the petitioner has been dependent on her and since she left to work in Saudi, she has amassed some
P350,000 worth of properties which were under the possession and administration of herein petitioner until
respondent found out about the frst marriage. Petitioner alleged that there was no cause for action because
the marriage was void ab initio and judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is only sought for purposes of
remarrying and no such intention has been expressed.
Held: Although it is stated in the Family Code that judicial declaration is needed for purposes of
remarrying, it does not expressly state that it is exclusive for that purpose alone. Te Family Code provides
that among the eects of the judicial declaration is the immediate separation of property.
EFFECTS OF NULLITY
FC ARTICLE 50: Te efects provided for by paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Article 43 and Article 44 shall
also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by fnal judgment
under Article 40 and 45.
Te fnal judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of the
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be
notifed for the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the log on which it
is situated shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
FC ARTICLE 51: In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of fnal judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such
matters.
Te children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
Te delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents but the value of
the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitimes.
FC ARTICLE 52: Te judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall
be recoded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not afect the
third persons.
FC ARTICLE 53: Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements
of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
FC ARTICLE 54: Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become fnal and executory shall be consicered legitimate. Children
conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
NINAL VS. BAYADOG
Facts: Petitioners request the annulment of the marriage of their father to Norma Bayadog. On September
26, 1974, Pepito married Teodulfa. Teodulfa died on April 24, 2985 and, on December 11, 1986, Pepito
married Norma Bayadog. Te marriage was contracted without a license. Instead, the couple signed an
afdavit stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for 5 years. Te code in efect during the
time of the marriage was the Civil Code. According to Article 76 of the said code, marriage between a man
and a woman who have been living together for more than 5 years no longer requires a marriage license.
Pepito died in February of 1997.
Held: Marriage of Pepito Ninal Sr. and Norma Bayadog is null and void. It is evident that only 20 months
elapsed between the time of the death of the frst wife and the marriage with the second wife. Had the two
been cohabiting for fve years, such cohabitation, and the marriage, was not within the capacity of the
deceased. Te children do not have standing to cause action but, because the marriage was null and void, it
is likewise non-existent.
For marriages of exceptional character, there should be no legal impediment on the part of either party.
Te one contracting a marriage should have legal capacity to do so.
Void Marriages
FC ARTICLE 4: Te absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35.
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites of shall not afect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
FC ARTICLE 35: Te following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
1. Tose contracted by any party below eighteen years of age, even with the consent of parents or guardians;
2. Tose solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing ofcer had the legal
authority to do so;
3. Tose solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding chapter;
4. Tose bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
5. Tose contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other;
6. Tose subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
In ordinary contracts (1) the child will not be emancipated from parental authority. In marriage,
the child will be emancipated.
If it is a mistake of fact, the marriage is valid. If it is a mistake of law, the marriage is void.
Paragraph 5 refers to physical mistake in identity. Other fraudulent misrepresentation would not
apply.
FC ARTICLE 36: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization.
Psychological incapacity to comply is dierent from inability to understand because the latter is a vice of
consent, without which, an essential requisite of marriage is lacking.
Reasons for adopting psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity:
Substitute for divorce
Solution of church-annulled marriages
To give remedy
Psychological incapacity vs. Vice of consent
a person may fully agree but may not understand the obligations of marriage.
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent but there is a lack of legal capacity, an essential
requisite of marriage.
Psychological Incapacity vs. Insanity
Insanity has varying degree;
Insanity is curable
Tere are lucid intervals in insanity
Insanity is a ground for annulment in other countries
Note: Psychological incapacity was not defned using examples to avoid ejusdem generis (exclusive
enumeration) which might limit the applicability of the provision. It is therefore judged according to the
facts of the case.
Psychological incapacity should exist at the time of the marriage.
Psychological incapacity is restricted to disorders demonstrative of the utter sensitivity or inability
to give meaning and signifcance to the marriage.
Examples of psychological incapacity:
1. Homosexuality;
2. Satryiasis or Nymphomania;
3. Epilepsy with permanently recurring maladaptive manifestationsl
4. Extremely low intelligencel
5. Habitual Alcoholism;
6. Criminality
Manifestations of psychological incapacity:
Refusal of wife to dwell with the husband after marriage;
Aiction which makes common life unbearable;
Sociopathic anomalies on husbands part
SANTOS VS. BEDIA-SANTOS
Facts: Louel Santos who was married to Julia Bedia-Santos wishes to annul his marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. Respondent has, for the last seven years since fling for the annulment, resided in
the United States and has contacted the petitioner only twice.
Held: Psychological incapacity refers to the mental, not physical incapacity. It must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability for it to be considered a psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent. A person may have given his or her consent freely without
understanding the obligations of the contract. Without consent, a marriage is void ab initio. Without the
ability to understand the nature of the contract, the marriage is merely voidable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MOLINA
Facts: Respondent alleged that her husband Reynaldo Molina was psychologically incapacitated because he
showed signs of immaturity, irresponsibility and dependence. She also averred that her husband was never
honest. Te Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court upheld that the marriage was indeed, void.
Held: Psychological incapacity should refer to a mental and not physical incapacity. It is confned to the
most serious personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and signifcance to the marriage. It is not enough that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities. It is
essential that they must be shown as incapable of doing so.
Molina Guidelines In Applying Article 36
1. Te burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintif. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
2. Te root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identifed, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) suciently proven by the experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Te person
alleged to be incapacitated must be psychologically ill to the extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming or knowing them could not have given a valid assumption thereof.
3. Te incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Te evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged vows.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or relative only in regard to the other spouse. Such incapacity must also be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Te illness must be shown as downright inability or incapacity.
6. Te essential marital obligations are:
a. Te husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fdelity, and
render mutual help and support (FC Article 68).
b. Te husband and wife shall fx the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide. Te court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family (FC
Article 69).
c. Te spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. Te expenses for such support
and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and in the absence
thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufciency or absence
of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfed from their separate properties (FC
Article 70).
d. Te management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. Te expenses for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 (FC Article 71).
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
APIAG VS. CANTERO
Facts: Maria Apiag fled an administrative case against her husband, respondent judge, Esmeraldo G.
Cantero. Te Court of Appeals decided that the respondent acted in grave misconduct. Te plaintif and
respondent were married and petitioner bore 2 children by that marriage. After the second child was born,
respondent judge left for no reason. Plaintis, through their counsel asked respondent for support and for
the children to be declared legal heirs. Complainants subsequently learned that respondent has contracted
another marriage with whom he had 5 children. Respondent misrepresented himself in his declaration of
assets and liabilities by putting the name of the second wife on the said statement. He contended that the
frst marriage was void ab initio because he and his frst wife never cohabited and he was forced into the
marriage. He added that he and the petitioners have settled amicably and he has agreed to give the children
of his retirement benefts.
Held: While he did not act in grave misconduct, he acted in impropriety when he failed and refused to
attend to the needs of his children. Although it is undisputed that the judge did not obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his frst marriage, pursuant to the jurisprudence prevailing at the time of the second
marriage, it has been established that no such declaration was necessary.
CHOA VS. CHOA
Facts: Respondent Alfonso Choa fled a complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner Leni
Choa on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Petitioner fled a demurrer of evidence (an objection or
exception by one of the parties in an action at law to the efect that the evidence which the adversary
produced is insucient in point of law to make out a case and sustain the issue). Te demurrer of evidence
was dismissed by the appellate court which upheld that the claims of Alfonso Choathat her wife had fled
several lawsuits against him indicating psychological incapacity and that his wife was immature, carefree
and had no intentions of procreative sexualityas sufcient evidence.
Held: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Te
testimony of the expert doctor and the respondent only showed that the two cannot get along with each
other.
TSOI VS. CA
Facts: Respondent Gina Lao Tsoi fled for annulment of her marriage to petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that since their marriage in May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989, the couple has not consummated their marriage. Defendant contended that it was the
wifes fault that their marriage was not consummated. A physician examined both plainti and defendant
and attested that neither of them had any physical problem. Defendant alleged that the wife was afraid to
consummate the marriage and afraid that she would have to return the jewelry given to her.
Held: Whether or not it was the husband who refused to consummate the marriage is immaterial. Te fact
still stands that it has not been consummated. Tere may be physical and not psychological reasons as to
why the marriage should not be annulled but the evidence to that efect was not presented. Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than stubborn refusal. Te natural order
between spouses is sexual intimacy.
ANTONIO VS. REYES
Facts: Petitioner fled a petition for the declaration of his marriage to respondent as null and void on the
grounds of psychological incapacity as manifested by several instances of lying and concealment of an
illegitimate child by Respondent Ivonne Reyes. Petitioner alleged that respondent fabricated stories which
bordered on the ridiculous.
Held: Marriage was void by virtue of the Molina guidelines, fulflled by the Petitioner.
FC ARTICLE 37: Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
the relationship between the parties is legitimate or illegitimate.
1. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree and
2. Between brothers and sisters, whether of full or half blood.
FC ARTICLE 38: Te following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
1. Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
2. Between step-parents and step-children;
3. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
4. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
5. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
6. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
7. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
8. Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
9. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other persons spouse or his
or her own spouse.
FC ARTICLE 39: Te action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe. However, in the case of marriages celebrated before the efectivity of this code and falling under
Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this code shall have taken efect.
FC ARTICLE 40: Te absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a fnal judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Final judgment is needed to avoid confusion because one of the parties may contract another marriage
which would be bigamous and therefore void during the pendency of the trial for the other marriage.
FC ARTICLE 41: A marriage contracted by any person duringthe subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four* consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufcient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the eect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
FC Article 44: If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law.
RA 8533
CC ARTICLE 390: After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. Te absentee shall not be
presumed dead for the purposes of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared
after the age of seventy-fve years, an absence of fve years shall be sucient in order that his succession may
be open.
CC ARTICLE 391: Te following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs;
1. A person on board a vessel lost during sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not been heard
of for four years since the loss of the vessel or airplane;
2. A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
3. A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four years.
PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA
Facts: Appellant was married to Jovita de Asis on August 5, 1936. On May 14, 1941, appellant married Olga
Lema. On February 2, 1943, the frst wife of appellant died. On August 19, 1949, appellant married one
Carmencita Panlilio. Appellant was then charged with bigamy but he contended that his marriage to Olga
Lema was void ab initio and therefore non-existent. In that light, he claimed, that his marriage to
Carmencita was not bigamous.
Held: Te marriage law in eect at the time the appellant contracted with his second wife, Olga Lema,
states that his marriage to Lema was void ab initio. No judicial decree was necessary to establish its
invalidity.
TOLENTINO VS. PARAS
Facts: Serafa Tolentino was the wife of the deceased, Amado Tolentino. Petitioner requested the correction
of an entry on the death certifcate of the deceased which states that the name of his surviving spouse was
Maria Clemente. Amado Tolentino married his second wife, Maria Clemente while his frst marriage was
still in efect. When the deceased was charged with bigamy, he pleaded guilty and served the corresponding
sentene. Te petition was dismissed by Hon. Edgardo Paras on grounds that the issue was a marital
relationship, and that the court has no jurisdiction.
Held: Te petition was meritorious. Te court had jurisdiction because the wife was, initially, seeking a
judicial declaration that she was the lawful spouse of the deceased. Te plea of guilt of the deceased
efectively established that the second marriage was in fact, void ab initio and that the petitioner was the
lawful spouse.
WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DIY
Lilia Wiegel appealed for the reversal of the decision of respondent judge, Sempio-Diy because, in the
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage fled by Karl Heinz Wiegel against petitioner, respondent
judge ruled against the presentation of evidence. When petitioner was married to the plainti, she had a
previous existing marriage. Petitioner claimed that the frst marriage was void ab initio because she was
forced into marrying her frst husband.
Held: Tere was no need to present evidence because if there had been, in fact, intimidation during the frst
marriage, the said marriage would have been rendered voidable and not void. Had the marriage been void,
a judicial declaration would still be necessary.
TERRE VS. TERRE
Facts: Petitioner charged Atty Jordan Terre with gross immoral conduct for contracting a second marriage
while he has a subsisting marriage. Te petitioner alleged that while she was still in her previous marriage
with her frst cousin, she was courted by defendant and was advised that she was free to contract a second
marriage because her frst marriage was void. Petitioner took the advise and married herein respondent but,
after a few years, the respondent took of. Later the petitioner found out that respondent had contracted
another marriage.
Held: A judicial declaration is necessary to determine whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage. Without such declaration, the subsequently existing marriage is sustained.
ATIENZA VS. BRILLANTES
Facts: Complainant charged respondent Judge Fransisco Brillantes with gross immoral conduct after having
found said respondent sleeping in his own bed, apparently cohabiting with his wife. Complainant left his
wife and kids. Complainant alleged that the said judge was, at that time, married to one Zenaida Ongkiko
with whom he had 5 children. Respondent denied the allegation saying that his marriage with Ongkiko was
void ab initio because it was solemnized without a marriage license. Respondent likewise argued that
Article 40 of the family code was not in eect when his frst marriage took place.
Held: Judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is needed for purposes of remarriage. Te Family
Code can be applied retroactively so long as vested rights will not be impaired by its application.
BORJA-MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ
Facts: Complainant avers that she is the lawful wife of the late David Manzano. Her husband contracted
another marriage while the frst one was still in eect, solemnized by herein respondent judge. Respondent
contends that he did not know that the two were only legally separated and that all he knew was the two
had been cohabiting for seven years. He cited Article 34 which states that no license shall be necessary for
the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years.
Held: Te requisite of Article 34 is that there is no legal impediment between the parties. Te said article is
merely a ground for exemption for marriage license. Te judge knew of the subsisting marriage as it was
stated in the marriage certifcate and in the adavit signed by the parties.
DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Delia Soledad Domingo sought the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property against petitioner Roberto Domingo on the grounds that the petitioner had a valid and existing
marriage with one Emerlinda dela Paz. Te frst wife sued petitioner for bigamy. Respondent claimed that
the petitioner has been dependent on her and since she left to work in Saudi, she has amassed some
P350,000 worth of properties which were under the possession and administration of herein petitioner until
respondent found out about the frst marriage. Petitioner alleged that there was no cause for action because
the marriage was void ab initio and judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is only sought for purposes of
remarrying and no such intention has been expressed.
Held: Although it is stated in the Family Code that judicial declaration is needed for purposes of
remarrying, it does not expressly state that it is exclusive for that purpose alone. Te Family Code provides
that among the eects of the judicial declaration is the immediate separation of property.
EFFECTS OF NULLITY
FC ARTICLE 50: Te efects provided for by paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Article 43 and Article 44 shall
also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by fnal judgment
under Article 40 and 45.
Te fnal judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of the
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be
notifed for the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the log on which it
is situated shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
FC ARTICLE 51: In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of fnal judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such
matters.
Te children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
Te delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents but the value of
the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitimes.
FC ARTICLE 52: Te judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall
be recoded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not afect the
third persons.
FC ARTICLE 53: Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements
of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
FC ARTICLE 54: Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become fnal and executory shall be consicered legitimate. Children
conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
NINAL VS. BAYADOG
Facts: Petitioners request the annulment of the marriage of their father to Norma Bayadog. On September
26, 1974, Pepito married Teodulfa. Teodulfa died on April 24, 2985 and, on December 11, 1986, Pepito
married Norma Bayadog. Te marriage was contracted without a license. Instead, the couple signed an
afdavit stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for 5 years. Te code in efect during the
time of the marriage was the Civil Code. According to Article 76 of the said code, marriage between a man
and a woman who have been living together for more than 5 years no longer requires a marriage license.
Pepito died in February of 1997.
Held: Marriage of Pepito Ninal Sr. and Norma Bayadog is null and void. It is evident that only 20 months
elapsed between the time of the death of the frst wife and the marriage with the second wife. Had the two
been cohabiting for fve years, such cohabitation, and the marriage, was not within the capacity of the
deceased. Te children do not have standing to cause action but, because the marriage was null and void, it
is likewise non-existent.
For marriages of exceptional character, there should be no legal impediment on the part of either party.
Te one contracting a marriage should have legal capacity to do so.
Void Marriages
FC ARTICLE 4: Te absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35.
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites of shall not afect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
FC ARTICLE 35: Te following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
1. Tose contracted by any party below eighteen years of age, even with the consent of parents or guardians;
2. Tose solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing ofcer had the legal
authority to do so;
3. Tose solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding chapter;
4. Tose bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
5. Tose contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other;
6. Tose subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
In ordinary contracts (1) the child will not be emancipated from parental authority. In marriage,
the child will be emancipated.
If it is a mistake of fact, the marriage is valid. If it is a mistake of law, the marriage is void.
Paragraph 5 refers to physical mistake in identity. Other fraudulent misrepresentation would not
apply.
FC ARTICLE 36: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization.
Psychological incapacity to comply is dierent from inability to understand because the latter is a vice of
consent, without which, an essential requisite of marriage is lacking.
Reasons for adopting psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity:
Substitute for divorce
Solution of church-annulled marriages
To give remedy
Psychological incapacity vs. Vice of consent
a person may fully agree but may not understand the obligations of marriage.
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent but there is a lack of legal capacity, an essential
requisite of marriage.
Psychological Incapacity vs. Insanity
Insanity has varying degree;
Insanity is curable
Tere are lucid intervals in insanity
Insanity is a ground for annulment in other countries
Note: Psychological incapacity was not defned using examples to avoid ejusdem generis (exclusive
enumeration) which might limit the applicability of the provision. It is therefore judged according to the
facts of the case.
Psychological incapacity should exist at the time of the marriage.
Psychological incapacity is restricted to disorders demonstrative of the utter sensitivity or inability
to give meaning and signifcance to the marriage.
Examples of psychological incapacity:
1. Homosexuality;
2. Satryiasis or Nymphomania;
3. Epilepsy with permanently recurring maladaptive manifestationsl
4. Extremely low intelligencel
5. Habitual Alcoholism;
6. Criminality
Manifestations of psychological incapacity:
Refusal of wife to dwell with the husband after marriage;
Aiction which makes common life unbearable;
Sociopathic anomalies on husbands part
SANTOS VS. BEDIA-SANTOS
Facts: Louel Santos who was married to Julia Bedia-Santos wishes to annul his marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. Respondent has, for the last seven years since fling for the annulment, resided in
the United States and has contacted the petitioner only twice.
Held: Psychological incapacity refers to the mental, not physical incapacity. It must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability for it to be considered a psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent. A person may have given his or her consent freely without
understanding the obligations of the contract. Without consent, a marriage is void ab initio. Without the
ability to understand the nature of the contract, the marriage is merely voidable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MOLINA
Facts: Respondent alleged that her husband Reynaldo Molina was psychologically incapacitated because he
showed signs of immaturity, irresponsibility and dependence. She also averred that her husband was never
honest. Te Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court upheld that the marriage was indeed, void.
Held: Psychological incapacity should refer to a mental and not physical incapacity. It is confned to the
most serious personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and signifcance to the marriage. It is not enough that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities. It is
essential that they must be shown as incapable of doing so.
Molina Guidelines In Applying Article 36
1. Te burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintif. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
2. Te root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identifed, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) suciently proven by the experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Te person
alleged to be incapacitated must be psychologically ill to the extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming or knowing them could not have given a valid assumption thereof.
3. Te incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Te evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged vows.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or relative only in regard to the other spouse. Such incapacity must also be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Te illness must be shown as downright inability or incapacity.
6. Te essential marital obligations are:
a. Te husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fdelity, and
render mutual help and support (FC Article 68).
b. Te husband and wife shall fx the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide. Te court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family (FC
Article 69).
c. Te spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. Te expenses for such support
and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and in the absence
thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufciency or absence
of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfed from their separate properties (FC
Article 70).
d. Te management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. Te expenses for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 (FC Article 71).
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
APIAG VS. CANTERO
Facts: Maria Apiag fled an administrative case against her husband, respondent judge, Esmeraldo G.
Cantero. Te Court of Appeals decided that the respondent acted in grave misconduct. Te plaintif and
respondent were married and petitioner bore 2 children by that marriage. After the second child was born,
respondent judge left for no reason. Plaintis, through their counsel asked respondent for support and for
the children to be declared legal heirs. Complainants subsequently learned that respondent has contracted
another marriage with whom he had 5 children. Respondent misrepresented himself in his declaration of
assets and liabilities by putting the name of the second wife on the said statement. He contended that the
frst marriage was void ab initio because he and his frst wife never cohabited and he was forced into the
marriage. He added that he and the petitioners have settled amicably and he has agreed to give the children
of his retirement benefts.
Held: While he did not act in grave misconduct, he acted in impropriety when he failed and refused to
attend to the needs of his children. Although it is undisputed that the judge did not obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his frst marriage, pursuant to the jurisprudence prevailing at the time of the second
marriage, it has been established that no such declaration was necessary.
CHOA VS. CHOA
Facts: Respondent Alfonso Choa fled a complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner Leni
Choa on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Petitioner fled a demurrer of evidence (an objection or
exception by one of the parties in an action at law to the efect that the evidence which the adversary
produced is insucient in point of law to make out a case and sustain the issue). Te demurrer of evidence
was dismissed by the appellate court which upheld that the claims of Alfonso Choathat her wife had fled
several lawsuits against him indicating psychological incapacity and that his wife was immature, carefree
and had no intentions of procreative sexualityas sufcient evidence.
Held: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Te
testimony of the expert doctor and the respondent only showed that the two cannot get along with each
other.
TSOI VS. CA
Facts: Respondent Gina Lao Tsoi fled for annulment of her marriage to petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that since their marriage in May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989, the couple has not consummated their marriage. Defendant contended that it was the
wifes fault that their marriage was not consummated. A physician examined both plainti and defendant
and attested that neither of them had any physical problem. Defendant alleged that the wife was afraid to
consummate the marriage and afraid that she would have to return the jewelry given to her.
Held: Whether or not it was the husband who refused to consummate the marriage is immaterial. Te fact
still stands that it has not been consummated. Tere may be physical and not psychological reasons as to
why the marriage should not be annulled but the evidence to that efect was not presented. Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than stubborn refusal. Te natural order
between spouses is sexual intimacy.
ANTONIO VS. REYES
Facts: Petitioner fled a petition for the declaration of his marriage to respondent as null and void on the
grounds of psychological incapacity as manifested by several instances of lying and concealment of an
illegitimate child by Respondent Ivonne Reyes. Petitioner alleged that respondent fabricated stories which
bordered on the ridiculous.
Held: Marriage was void by virtue of the Molina guidelines, fulflled by the Petitioner.
FC ARTICLE 37: Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
the relationship between the parties is legitimate or illegitimate.
1. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree and
2. Between brothers and sisters, whether of full or half blood.
FC ARTICLE 38: Te following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
1. Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
2. Between step-parents and step-children;
3. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
4. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
5. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
6. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
7. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
8. Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
9. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other persons spouse or his
or her own spouse.
FC ARTICLE 39: Te action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe. However, in the case of marriages celebrated before the efectivity of this code and falling under
Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this code shall have taken efect.
FC ARTICLE 40: Te absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a fnal judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Final judgment is needed to avoid confusion because one of the parties may contract another marriage
which would be bigamous and therefore void during the pendency of the trial for the other marriage.
FC ARTICLE 41: A marriage contracted by any person duringthe subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four* consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufcient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the eect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
FC Article 44: If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law.
RA 8533
CC ARTICLE 390: After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. Te absentee shall not be
presumed dead for the purposes of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared
after the age of seventy-fve years, an absence of fve years shall be sucient in order that his succession may
be open.
CC ARTICLE 391: Te following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs;
1. A person on board a vessel lost during sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not been heard
of for four years since the loss of the vessel or airplane;
2. A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
3. A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four years.
PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA
Facts: Appellant was married to Jovita de Asis on August 5, 1936. On May 14, 1941, appellant married Olga
Lema. On February 2, 1943, the frst wife of appellant died. On August 19, 1949, appellant married one
Carmencita Panlilio. Appellant was then charged with bigamy but he contended that his marriage to Olga
Lema was void ab initio and therefore non-existent. In that light, he claimed, that his marriage to
Carmencita was not bigamous.
Held: Te marriage law in eect at the time the appellant contracted with his second wife, Olga Lema,
states that his marriage to Lema was void ab initio. No judicial decree was necessary to establish its
invalidity.
TOLENTINO VS. PARAS
Facts: Serafa Tolentino was the wife of the deceased, Amado Tolentino. Petitioner requested the correction
of an entry on the death certifcate of the deceased which states that the name of his surviving spouse was
Maria Clemente. Amado Tolentino married his second wife, Maria Clemente while his frst marriage was
still in efect. When the deceased was charged with bigamy, he pleaded guilty and served the corresponding
sentene. Te petition was dismissed by Hon. Edgardo Paras on grounds that the issue was a marital
relationship, and that the court has no jurisdiction.
Held: Te petition was meritorious. Te court had jurisdiction because the wife was, initially, seeking a
judicial declaration that she was the lawful spouse of the deceased. Te plea of guilt of the deceased
efectively established that the second marriage was in fact, void ab initio and that the petitioner was the
lawful spouse.
WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DIY
Lilia Wiegel appealed for the reversal of the decision of respondent judge, Sempio-Diy because, in the
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage fled by Karl Heinz Wiegel against petitioner, respondent
judge ruled against the presentation of evidence. When petitioner was married to the plainti, she had a
previous existing marriage. Petitioner claimed that the frst marriage was void ab initio because she was
forced into marrying her frst husband.
Held: Tere was no need to present evidence because if there had been, in fact, intimidation during the frst
marriage, the said marriage would have been rendered voidable and not void. Had the marriage been void,
a judicial declaration would still be necessary.
TERRE VS. TERRE
Facts: Petitioner charged Atty Jordan Terre with gross immoral conduct for contracting a second marriage
while he has a subsisting marriage. Te petitioner alleged that while she was still in her previous marriage
with her frst cousin, she was courted by defendant and was advised that she was free to contract a second
marriage because her frst marriage was void. Petitioner took the advise and married herein respondent but,
after a few years, the respondent took of. Later the petitioner found out that respondent had contracted
another marriage.
Held: A judicial declaration is necessary to determine whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage. Without such declaration, the subsequently existing marriage is sustained.
ATIENZA VS. BRILLANTES
Facts: Complainant charged respondent Judge Fransisco Brillantes with gross immoral conduct after having
found said respondent sleeping in his own bed, apparently cohabiting with his wife. Complainant left his
wife and kids. Complainant alleged that the said judge was, at that time, married to one Zenaida Ongkiko
with whom he had 5 children. Respondent denied the allegation saying that his marriage with Ongkiko was
void ab initio because it was solemnized without a marriage license. Respondent likewise argued that
Article 40 of the family code was not in eect when his frst marriage took place.
Held: Judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is needed for purposes of remarriage. Te Family
Code can be applied retroactively so long as vested rights will not be impaired by its application.
BORJA-MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ
Facts: Complainant avers that she is the lawful wife of the late David Manzano. Her husband contracted
another marriage while the frst one was still in eect, solemnized by herein respondent judge. Respondent
contends that he did not know that the two were only legally separated and that all he knew was the two
had been cohabiting for seven years. He cited Article 34 which states that no license shall be necessary for
the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years.
Held: Te requisite of Article 34 is that there is no legal impediment between the parties. Te said article is
merely a ground for exemption for marriage license. Te judge knew of the subsisting marriage as it was
stated in the marriage certifcate and in the adavit signed by the parties.
DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Delia Soledad Domingo sought the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property against petitioner Roberto Domingo on the grounds that the petitioner had a valid and existing
marriage with one Emerlinda dela Paz. Te frst wife sued petitioner for bigamy. Respondent claimed that
the petitioner has been dependent on her and since she left to work in Saudi, she has amassed some
P350,000 worth of properties which were under the possession and administration of herein petitioner until
respondent found out about the frst marriage. Petitioner alleged that there was no cause for action because
the marriage was void ab initio and judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is only sought for purposes of
remarrying and no such intention has been expressed.
Held: Although it is stated in the Family Code that judicial declaration is needed for purposes of
remarrying, it does not expressly state that it is exclusive for that purpose alone. Te Family Code provides
that among the eects of the judicial declaration is the immediate separation of property.
EFFECTS OF NULLITY
FC ARTICLE 50: Te efects provided for by paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Article 43 and Article 44 shall
also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by fnal judgment
under Article 40 and 45.
Te fnal judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of the
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be
notifed for the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the log on which it
is situated shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
FC ARTICLE 51: In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of fnal judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such
matters.
Te children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
Te delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents but the value of
the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitimes.
FC ARTICLE 52: Te judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall
be recoded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not afect the
third persons.
FC ARTICLE 53: Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements
of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
FC ARTICLE 54: Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become fnal and executory shall be consicered legitimate. Children
conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
NINAL VS. BAYADOG
Facts: Petitioners request the annulment of the marriage of their father to Norma Bayadog. On September
26, 1974, Pepito married Teodulfa. Teodulfa died on April 24, 2985 and, on December 11, 1986, Pepito
married Norma Bayadog. Te marriage was contracted without a license. Instead, the couple signed an
afdavit stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for 5 years. Te code in efect during the
time of the marriage was the Civil Code. According to Article 76 of the said code, marriage between a man
and a woman who have been living together for more than 5 years no longer requires a marriage license.
Pepito died in February of 1997.
Held: Marriage of Pepito Ninal Sr. and Norma Bayadog is null and void. It is evident that only 20 months
elapsed between the time of the death of the frst wife and the marriage with the second wife. Had the two
been cohabiting for fve years, such cohabitation, and the marriage, was not within the capacity of the
deceased. Te children do not have standing to cause action but, because the marriage was null and void, it
is likewise non-existent.
For marriages of exceptional character, there should be no legal impediment on the part of either party.
Te one contracting a marriage should have legal capacity to do so.
Void Marriages
FC ARTICLE 4: Te absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35.
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites of shall not afect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
FC ARTICLE 35: Te following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
1. Tose contracted by any party below eighteen years of age, even with the consent of parents or guardians;
2. Tose solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing ofcer had the legal
authority to do so;
3. Tose solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding chapter;
4. Tose bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
5. Tose contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other;
6. Tose subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
In ordinary contracts (1) the child will not be emancipated from parental authority. In marriage,
the child will be emancipated.
If it is a mistake of fact, the marriage is valid. If it is a mistake of law, the marriage is void.
Paragraph 5 refers to physical mistake in identity. Other fraudulent misrepresentation would not
apply.
FC ARTICLE 36: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization.
Psychological incapacity to comply is dierent from inability to understand because the latter is a vice of
consent, without which, an essential requisite of marriage is lacking.
Reasons for adopting psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity:
Substitute for divorce
Solution of church-annulled marriages
To give remedy
Psychological incapacity vs. Vice of consent
a person may fully agree but may not understand the obligations of marriage.
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent but there is a lack of legal capacity, an essential
requisite of marriage.
Psychological Incapacity vs. Insanity
Insanity has varying degree;
Insanity is curable
Tere are lucid intervals in insanity
Insanity is a ground for annulment in other countries
Note: Psychological incapacity was not defned using examples to avoid ejusdem generis (exclusive
enumeration) which might limit the applicability of the provision. It is therefore judged according to the
facts of the case.
Psychological incapacity should exist at the time of the marriage.
Psychological incapacity is restricted to disorders demonstrative of the utter sensitivity or inability
to give meaning and signifcance to the marriage.
Examples of psychological incapacity:
1. Homosexuality;
2. Satryiasis or Nymphomania;
3. Epilepsy with permanently recurring maladaptive manifestationsl
4. Extremely low intelligencel
5. Habitual Alcoholism;
6. Criminality
Manifestations of psychological incapacity:
Refusal of wife to dwell with the husband after marriage;
Aiction which makes common life unbearable;
Sociopathic anomalies on husbands part
SANTOS VS. BEDIA-SANTOS
Facts: Louel Santos who was married to Julia Bedia-Santos wishes to annul his marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. Respondent has, for the last seven years since fling for the annulment, resided in
the United States and has contacted the petitioner only twice.
Held: Psychological incapacity refers to the mental, not physical incapacity. It must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability for it to be considered a psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent. A person may have given his or her consent freely without
understanding the obligations of the contract. Without consent, a marriage is void ab initio. Without the
ability to understand the nature of the contract, the marriage is merely voidable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MOLINA
Facts: Respondent alleged that her husband Reynaldo Molina was psychologically incapacitated because he
showed signs of immaturity, irresponsibility and dependence. She also averred that her husband was never
honest. Te Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court upheld that the marriage was indeed, void.
Held: Psychological incapacity should refer to a mental and not physical incapacity. It is confned to the
most serious personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and signifcance to the marriage. It is not enough that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities. It is
essential that they must be shown as incapable of doing so.
Molina Guidelines In Applying Article 36
1. Te burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintif. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
2. Te root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identifed, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) suciently proven by the experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Te person
alleged to be incapacitated must be psychologically ill to the extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming or knowing them could not have given a valid assumption thereof.
3. Te incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Te evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged vows.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or relative only in regard to the other spouse. Such incapacity must also be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Te illness must be shown as downright inability or incapacity.
6. Te essential marital obligations are:
a. Te husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fdelity, and
render mutual help and support (FC Article 68).
b. Te husband and wife shall fx the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide. Te court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family (FC
Article 69).
c. Te spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. Te expenses for such support
and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and in the absence
thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufciency or absence
of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfed from their separate properties (FC
Article 70).
d. Te management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. Te expenses for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 (FC Article 71).
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
APIAG VS. CANTERO
Facts: Maria Apiag fled an administrative case against her husband, respondent judge, Esmeraldo G.
Cantero. Te Court of Appeals decided that the respondent acted in grave misconduct. Te plaintif and
respondent were married and petitioner bore 2 children by that marriage. After the second child was born,
respondent judge left for no reason. Plaintis, through their counsel asked respondent for support and for
the children to be declared legal heirs. Complainants subsequently learned that respondent has contracted
another marriage with whom he had 5 children. Respondent misrepresented himself in his declaration of
assets and liabilities by putting the name of the second wife on the said statement. He contended that the
frst marriage was void ab initio because he and his frst wife never cohabited and he was forced into the
marriage. He added that he and the petitioners have settled amicably and he has agreed to give the children
of his retirement benefts.
Held: While he did not act in grave misconduct, he acted in impropriety when he failed and refused to
attend to the needs of his children. Although it is undisputed that the judge did not obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his frst marriage, pursuant to the jurisprudence prevailing at the time of the second
marriage, it has been established that no such declaration was necessary.
CHOA VS. CHOA
Facts: Respondent Alfonso Choa fled a complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner Leni
Choa on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Petitioner fled a demurrer of evidence (an objection or
exception by one of the parties in an action at law to the efect that the evidence which the adversary
produced is insucient in point of law to make out a case and sustain the issue). Te demurrer of evidence
was dismissed by the appellate court which upheld that the claims of Alfonso Choathat her wife had fled
several lawsuits against him indicating psychological incapacity and that his wife was immature, carefree
and had no intentions of procreative sexualityas sufcient evidence.
Held: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Te
testimony of the expert doctor and the respondent only showed that the two cannot get along with each
other.
TSOI VS. CA
Facts: Respondent Gina Lao Tsoi fled for annulment of her marriage to petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that since their marriage in May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989, the couple has not consummated their marriage. Defendant contended that it was the
wifes fault that their marriage was not consummated. A physician examined both plainti and defendant
and attested that neither of them had any physical problem. Defendant alleged that the wife was afraid to
consummate the marriage and afraid that she would have to return the jewelry given to her.
Held: Whether or not it was the husband who refused to consummate the marriage is immaterial. Te fact
still stands that it has not been consummated. Tere may be physical and not psychological reasons as to
why the marriage should not be annulled but the evidence to that efect was not presented. Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than stubborn refusal. Te natural order
between spouses is sexual intimacy.
ANTONIO VS. REYES
Facts: Petitioner fled a petition for the declaration of his marriage to respondent as null and void on the
grounds of psychological incapacity as manifested by several instances of lying and concealment of an
illegitimate child by Respondent Ivonne Reyes. Petitioner alleged that respondent fabricated stories which
bordered on the ridiculous.
Held: Marriage was void by virtue of the Molina guidelines, fulflled by the Petitioner.
FC ARTICLE 37: Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
the relationship between the parties is legitimate or illegitimate.
1. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree and
2. Between brothers and sisters, whether of full or half blood.
FC ARTICLE 38: Te following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
1. Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
2. Between step-parents and step-children;
3. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
4. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
5. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
6. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
7. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
8. Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
9. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other persons spouse or his
or her own spouse.
FC ARTICLE 39: Te action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe. However, in the case of marriages celebrated before the efectivity of this code and falling under
Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this code shall have taken efect.
FC ARTICLE 40: Te absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a fnal judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Final judgment is needed to avoid confusion because one of the parties may contract another marriage
which would be bigamous and therefore void during the pendency of the trial for the other marriage.
FC ARTICLE 41: A marriage contracted by any person duringthe subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four* consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufcient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the eect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
FC Article 44: If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law.
RA 8533
CC ARTICLE 390: After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. Te absentee shall not be
presumed dead for the purposes of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared
after the age of seventy-fve years, an absence of fve years shall be sucient in order that his succession may
be open.
CC ARTICLE 391: Te following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs;
1. A person on board a vessel lost during sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not been heard
of for four years since the loss of the vessel or airplane;
2. A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
3. A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four years.
PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA
Facts: Appellant was married to Jovita de Asis on August 5, 1936. On May 14, 1941, appellant married Olga
Lema. On February 2, 1943, the frst wife of appellant died. On August 19, 1949, appellant married one
Carmencita Panlilio. Appellant was then charged with bigamy but he contended that his marriage to Olga
Lema was void ab initio and therefore non-existent. In that light, he claimed, that his marriage to
Carmencita was not bigamous.
Held: Te marriage law in eect at the time the appellant contracted with his second wife, Olga Lema,
states that his marriage to Lema was void ab initio. No judicial decree was necessary to establish its
invalidity.
TOLENTINO VS. PARAS
Facts: Serafa Tolentino was the wife of the deceased, Amado Tolentino. Petitioner requested the correction
of an entry on the death certifcate of the deceased which states that the name of his surviving spouse was
Maria Clemente. Amado Tolentino married his second wife, Maria Clemente while his frst marriage was
still in efect. When the deceased was charged with bigamy, he pleaded guilty and served the corresponding
sentene. Te petition was dismissed by Hon. Edgardo Paras on grounds that the issue was a marital
relationship, and that the court has no jurisdiction.
Held: Te petition was meritorious. Te court had jurisdiction because the wife was, initially, seeking a
judicial declaration that she was the lawful spouse of the deceased. Te plea of guilt of the deceased
efectively established that the second marriage was in fact, void ab initio and that the petitioner was the
lawful spouse.
WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DIY
Lilia Wiegel appealed for the reversal of the decision of respondent judge, Sempio-Diy because, in the
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage fled by Karl Heinz Wiegel against petitioner, respondent
judge ruled against the presentation of evidence. When petitioner was married to the plainti, she had a
previous existing marriage. Petitioner claimed that the frst marriage was void ab initio because she was
forced into marrying her frst husband.
Held: Tere was no need to present evidence because if there had been, in fact, intimidation during the frst
marriage, the said marriage would have been rendered voidable and not void. Had the marriage been void,
a judicial declaration would still be necessary.
TERRE VS. TERRE
Facts: Petitioner charged Atty Jordan Terre with gross immoral conduct for contracting a second marriage
while he has a subsisting marriage. Te petitioner alleged that while she was still in her previous marriage
with her frst cousin, she was courted by defendant and was advised that she was free to contract a second
marriage because her frst marriage was void. Petitioner took the advise and married herein respondent but,
after a few years, the respondent took of. Later the petitioner found out that respondent had contracted
another marriage.
Held: A judicial declaration is necessary to determine whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage. Without such declaration, the subsequently existing marriage is sustained.
ATIENZA VS. BRILLANTES
Facts: Complainant charged respondent Judge Fransisco Brillantes with gross immoral conduct after having
found said respondent sleeping in his own bed, apparently cohabiting with his wife. Complainant left his
wife and kids. Complainant alleged that the said judge was, at that time, married to one Zenaida Ongkiko
with whom he had 5 children. Respondent denied the allegation saying that his marriage with Ongkiko was
void ab initio because it was solemnized without a marriage license. Respondent likewise argued that
Article 40 of the family code was not in eect when his frst marriage took place.
Held: Judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is needed for purposes of remarriage. Te Family
Code can be applied retroactively so long as vested rights will not be impaired by its application.
BORJA-MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ
Facts: Complainant avers that she is the lawful wife of the late David Manzano. Her husband contracted
another marriage while the frst one was still in eect, solemnized by herein respondent judge. Respondent
contends that he did not know that the two were only legally separated and that all he knew was the two
had been cohabiting for seven years. He cited Article 34 which states that no license shall be necessary for
the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years.
Held: Te requisite of Article 34 is that there is no legal impediment between the parties. Te said article is
merely a ground for exemption for marriage license. Te judge knew of the subsisting marriage as it was
stated in the marriage certifcate and in the adavit signed by the parties.
DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Delia Soledad Domingo sought the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property against petitioner Roberto Domingo on the grounds that the petitioner had a valid and existing
marriage with one Emerlinda dela Paz. Te frst wife sued petitioner for bigamy. Respondent claimed that
the petitioner has been dependent on her and since she left to work in Saudi, she has amassed some
P350,000 worth of properties which were under the possession and administration of herein petitioner until
respondent found out about the frst marriage. Petitioner alleged that there was no cause for action because
the marriage was void ab initio and judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is only sought for purposes of
remarrying and no such intention has been expressed.
Held: Although it is stated in the Family Code that judicial declaration is needed for purposes of
remarrying, it does not expressly state that it is exclusive for that purpose alone. Te Family Code provides
that among the eects of the judicial declaration is the immediate separation of property.
EFFECTS OF NULLITY
FC ARTICLE 50: Te efects provided for by paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Article 43 and Article 44 shall
also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by fnal judgment
under Article 40 and 45.
Te fnal judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of the
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be
notifed for the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the log on which it
is situated shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
FC ARTICLE 51: In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of fnal judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such
matters.
Te children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
Te delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents but the value of
the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitimes.
FC ARTICLE 52: Te judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall
be recoded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not afect the
third persons.
FC ARTICLE 53: Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements
of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
FC ARTICLE 54: Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become fnal and executory shall be consicered legitimate. Children
conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
NINAL VS. BAYADOG
Facts: Petitioners request the annulment of the marriage of their father to Norma Bayadog. On September
26, 1974, Pepito married Teodulfa. Teodulfa died on April 24, 2985 and, on December 11, 1986, Pepito
married Norma Bayadog. Te marriage was contracted without a license. Instead, the couple signed an
afdavit stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for 5 years. Te code in efect during the
time of the marriage was the Civil Code. According to Article 76 of the said code, marriage between a man
and a woman who have been living together for more than 5 years no longer requires a marriage license.
Pepito died in February of 1997.
Held: Marriage of Pepito Ninal Sr. and Norma Bayadog is null and void. It is evident that only 20 months
elapsed between the time of the death of the frst wife and the marriage with the second wife. Had the two
been cohabiting for fve years, such cohabitation, and the marriage, was not within the capacity of the
deceased. Te children do not have standing to cause action but, because the marriage was null and void, it
is likewise non-existent.
For marriages of exceptional character, there should be no legal impediment on the part of either party.
Te one contracting a marriage should have legal capacity to do so.
Void Marriages
FC ARTICLE 4: Te absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35.
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites of shall not afect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
FC ARTICLE 35: Te following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
1. Tose contracted by any party below eighteen years of age, even with the consent of parents or guardians;
2. Tose solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing ofcer had the legal
authority to do so;
3. Tose solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding chapter;
4. Tose bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
5. Tose contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other;
6. Tose subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
In ordinary contracts (1) the child will not be emancipated from parental authority. In marriage,
the child will be emancipated.
If it is a mistake of fact, the marriage is valid. If it is a mistake of law, the marriage is void.
Paragraph 5 refers to physical mistake in identity. Other fraudulent misrepresentation would not
apply.
FC ARTICLE 36: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization.
Psychological incapacity to comply is dierent from inability to understand because the latter is a vice of
consent, without which, an essential requisite of marriage is lacking.
Reasons for adopting psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity:
Substitute for divorce
Solution of church-annulled marriages
To give remedy
Psychological incapacity vs. Vice of consent
a person may fully agree but may not understand the obligations of marriage.
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent but there is a lack of legal capacity, an essential
requisite of marriage.
Psychological Incapacity vs. Insanity
Insanity has varying degree;
Insanity is curable
Tere are lucid intervals in insanity
Insanity is a ground for annulment in other countries
Note: Psychological incapacity was not defned using examples to avoid ejusdem generis (exclusive
enumeration) which might limit the applicability of the provision. It is therefore judged according to the
facts of the case.
Psychological incapacity should exist at the time of the marriage.
Psychological incapacity is restricted to disorders demonstrative of the utter sensitivity or inability
to give meaning and signifcance to the marriage.
Examples of psychological incapacity:
1. Homosexuality;
2. Satryiasis or Nymphomania;
3. Epilepsy with permanently recurring maladaptive manifestationsl
4. Extremely low intelligencel
5. Habitual Alcoholism;
6. Criminality
Manifestations of psychological incapacity:
Refusal of wife to dwell with the husband after marriage;
Aiction which makes common life unbearable;
Sociopathic anomalies on husbands part
SANTOS VS. BEDIA-SANTOS
Facts: Louel Santos who was married to Julia Bedia-Santos wishes to annul his marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. Respondent has, for the last seven years since fling for the annulment, resided in
the United States and has contacted the petitioner only twice.
Held: Psychological incapacity refers to the mental, not physical incapacity. It must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability for it to be considered a psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent. A person may have given his or her consent freely without
understanding the obligations of the contract. Without consent, a marriage is void ab initio. Without the
ability to understand the nature of the contract, the marriage is merely voidable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MOLINA
Facts: Respondent alleged that her husband Reynaldo Molina was psychologically incapacitated because he
showed signs of immaturity, irresponsibility and dependence. She also averred that her husband was never
honest. Te Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court upheld that the marriage was indeed, void.
Held: Psychological incapacity should refer to a mental and not physical incapacity. It is confned to the
most serious personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and signifcance to the marriage. It is not enough that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities. It is
essential that they must be shown as incapable of doing so.
Molina Guidelines In Applying Article 36
1. Te burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintif. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
2. Te root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identifed, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) suciently proven by the experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Te person
alleged to be incapacitated must be psychologically ill to the extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming or knowing them could not have given a valid assumption thereof.
3. Te incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Te evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged vows.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or relative only in regard to the other spouse. Such incapacity must also be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Te illness must be shown as downright inability or incapacity.
6. Te essential marital obligations are:
a. Te husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fdelity, and
render mutual help and support (FC Article 68).
b. Te husband and wife shall fx the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide. Te court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family (FC
Article 69).
c. Te spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. Te expenses for such support
and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and in the absence
thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufciency or absence
of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfed from their separate properties (FC
Article 70).
d. Te management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. Te expenses for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 (FC Article 71).
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
APIAG VS. CANTERO
Facts: Maria Apiag fled an administrative case against her husband, respondent judge, Esmeraldo G.
Cantero. Te Court of Appeals decided that the respondent acted in grave misconduct. Te plaintif and
respondent were married and petitioner bore 2 children by that marriage. After the second child was born,
respondent judge left for no reason. Plaintis, through their counsel asked respondent for support and for
the children to be declared legal heirs. Complainants subsequently learned that respondent has contracted
another marriage with whom he had 5 children. Respondent misrepresented himself in his declaration of
assets and liabilities by putting the name of the second wife on the said statement. He contended that the
frst marriage was void ab initio because he and his frst wife never cohabited and he was forced into the
marriage. He added that he and the petitioners have settled amicably and he has agreed to give the children
of his retirement benefts.
Held: While he did not act in grave misconduct, he acted in impropriety when he failed and refused to
attend to the needs of his children. Although it is undisputed that the judge did not obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his frst marriage, pursuant to the jurisprudence prevailing at the time of the second
marriage, it has been established that no such declaration was necessary.
CHOA VS. CHOA
Facts: Respondent Alfonso Choa fled a complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner Leni
Choa on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Petitioner fled a demurrer of evidence (an objection or
exception by one of the parties in an action at law to the efect that the evidence which the adversary
produced is insucient in point of law to make out a case and sustain the issue). Te demurrer of evidence
was dismissed by the appellate court which upheld that the claims of Alfonso Choathat her wife had fled
several lawsuits against him indicating psychological incapacity and that his wife was immature, carefree
and had no intentions of procreative sexualityas sufcient evidence.
Held: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Te
testimony of the expert doctor and the respondent only showed that the two cannot get along with each
other.
TSOI VS. CA
Facts: Respondent Gina Lao Tsoi fled for annulment of her marriage to petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that since their marriage in May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989, the couple has not consummated their marriage. Defendant contended that it was the
wifes fault that their marriage was not consummated. A physician examined both plainti and defendant
and attested that neither of them had any physical problem. Defendant alleged that the wife was afraid to
consummate the marriage and afraid that she would have to return the jewelry given to her.
Held: Whether or not it was the husband who refused to consummate the marriage is immaterial. Te fact
still stands that it has not been consummated. Tere may be physical and not psychological reasons as to
why the marriage should not be annulled but the evidence to that efect was not presented. Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than stubborn refusal. Te natural order
between spouses is sexual intimacy.
ANTONIO VS. REYES
Facts: Petitioner fled a petition for the declaration of his marriage to respondent as null and void on the
grounds of psychological incapacity as manifested by several instances of lying and concealment of an
illegitimate child by Respondent Ivonne Reyes. Petitioner alleged that respondent fabricated stories which
bordered on the ridiculous.
Held: Marriage was void by virtue of the Molina guidelines, fulflled by the Petitioner.
FC ARTICLE 37: Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
the relationship between the parties is legitimate or illegitimate.
1. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree and
2. Between brothers and sisters, whether of full or half blood.
FC ARTICLE 38: Te following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
1. Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
2. Between step-parents and step-children;
3. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
4. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
5. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
6. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
7. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
8. Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
9. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other persons spouse or his
or her own spouse.
FC ARTICLE 39: Te action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe. However, in the case of marriages celebrated before the efectivity of this code and falling under
Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this code shall have taken efect.
FC ARTICLE 40: Te absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a fnal judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Final judgment is needed to avoid confusion because one of the parties may contract another marriage
which would be bigamous and therefore void during the pendency of the trial for the other marriage.
FC ARTICLE 41: A marriage contracted by any person duringthe subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four* consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufcient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the eect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
FC Article 44: If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law.
RA 8533
CC ARTICLE 390: After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. Te absentee shall not be
presumed dead for the purposes of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared
after the age of seventy-fve years, an absence of fve years shall be sucient in order that his succession may
be open.
CC ARTICLE 391: Te following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs;
1. A person on board a vessel lost during sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not been heard
of for four years since the loss of the vessel or airplane;
2. A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
3. A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four years.
PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA
Facts: Appellant was married to Jovita de Asis on August 5, 1936. On May 14, 1941, appellant married Olga
Lema. On February 2, 1943, the frst wife of appellant died. On August 19, 1949, appellant married one
Carmencita Panlilio. Appellant was then charged with bigamy but he contended that his marriage to Olga
Lema was void ab initio and therefore non-existent. In that light, he claimed, that his marriage to
Carmencita was not bigamous.
Held: Te marriage law in eect at the time the appellant contracted with his second wife, Olga Lema,
states that his marriage to Lema was void ab initio. No judicial decree was necessary to establish its
invalidity.
TOLENTINO VS. PARAS
Facts: Serafa Tolentino was the wife of the deceased, Amado Tolentino. Petitioner requested the correction
of an entry on the death certifcate of the deceased which states that the name of his surviving spouse was
Maria Clemente. Amado Tolentino married his second wife, Maria Clemente while his frst marriage was
still in efect. When the deceased was charged with bigamy, he pleaded guilty and served the corresponding
sentene. Te petition was dismissed by Hon. Edgardo Paras on grounds that the issue was a marital
relationship, and that the court has no jurisdiction.
Held: Te petition was meritorious. Te court had jurisdiction because the wife was, initially, seeking a
judicial declaration that she was the lawful spouse of the deceased. Te plea of guilt of the deceased
efectively established that the second marriage was in fact, void ab initio and that the petitioner was the
lawful spouse.
WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DIY
Lilia Wiegel appealed for the reversal of the decision of respondent judge, Sempio-Diy because, in the
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage fled by Karl Heinz Wiegel against petitioner, respondent
judge ruled against the presentation of evidence. When petitioner was married to the plainti, she had a
previous existing marriage. Petitioner claimed that the frst marriage was void ab initio because she was
forced into marrying her frst husband.
Held: Tere was no need to present evidence because if there had been, in fact, intimidation during the frst
marriage, the said marriage would have been rendered voidable and not void. Had the marriage been void,
a judicial declaration would still be necessary.
TERRE VS. TERRE
Facts: Petitioner charged Atty Jordan Terre with gross immoral conduct for contracting a second marriage
while he has a subsisting marriage. Te petitioner alleged that while she was still in her previous marriage
with her frst cousin, she was courted by defendant and was advised that she was free to contract a second
marriage because her frst marriage was void. Petitioner took the advise and married herein respondent but,
after a few years, the respondent took of. Later the petitioner found out that respondent had contracted
another marriage.
Held: A judicial declaration is necessary to determine whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage. Without such declaration, the subsequently existing marriage is sustained.
ATIENZA VS. BRILLANTES
Facts: Complainant charged respondent Judge Fransisco Brillantes with gross immoral conduct after having
found said respondent sleeping in his own bed, apparently cohabiting with his wife. Complainant left his
wife and kids. Complainant alleged that the said judge was, at that time, married to one Zenaida Ongkiko
with whom he had 5 children. Respondent denied the allegation saying that his marriage with Ongkiko was
void ab initio because it was solemnized without a marriage license. Respondent likewise argued that
Article 40 of the family code was not in eect when his frst marriage took place.
Held: Judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is needed for purposes of remarriage. Te Family
Code can be applied retroactively so long as vested rights will not be impaired by its application.
BORJA-MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ
Facts: Complainant avers that she is the lawful wife of the late David Manzano. Her husband contracted
another marriage while the frst one was still in eect, solemnized by herein respondent judge. Respondent
contends that he did not know that the two were only legally separated and that all he knew was the two
had been cohabiting for seven years. He cited Article 34 which states that no license shall be necessary for
the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years.
Held: Te requisite of Article 34 is that there is no legal impediment between the parties. Te said article is
merely a ground for exemption for marriage license. Te judge knew of the subsisting marriage as it was
stated in the marriage certifcate and in the adavit signed by the parties.
DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Delia Soledad Domingo sought the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property against petitioner Roberto Domingo on the grounds that the petitioner had a valid and existing
marriage with one Emerlinda dela Paz. Te frst wife sued petitioner for bigamy. Respondent claimed that
the petitioner has been dependent on her and since she left to work in Saudi, she has amassed some
P350,000 worth of properties which were under the possession and administration of herein petitioner until
respondent found out about the frst marriage. Petitioner alleged that there was no cause for action because
the marriage was void ab initio and judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is only sought for purposes of
remarrying and no such intention has been expressed.
Held: Although it is stated in the Family Code that judicial declaration is needed for purposes of
remarrying, it does not expressly state that it is exclusive for that purpose alone. Te Family Code provides
that among the eects of the judicial declaration is the immediate separation of property.
EFFECTS OF NULLITY
FC ARTICLE 50: Te efects provided for by paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Article 43 and Article 44 shall
also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by fnal judgment
under Article 40 and 45.
Te fnal judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of the
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be
notifed for the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the log on which it
is situated shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
FC ARTICLE 51: In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of fnal judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such
matters.
Te children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
Te delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents but the value of
the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitimes.
FC ARTICLE 52: Te judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall
be recoded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not afect the
third persons.
FC ARTICLE 53: Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements
of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
FC ARTICLE 54: Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become fnal and executory shall be consicered legitimate. Children
conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
NINAL VS. BAYADOG
Facts: Petitioners request the annulment of the marriage of their father to Norma Bayadog. On September
26, 1974, Pepito married Teodulfa. Teodulfa died on April 24, 2985 and, on December 11, 1986, Pepito
married Norma Bayadog. Te marriage was contracted without a license. Instead, the couple signed an
afdavit stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for 5 years. Te code in efect during the
time of the marriage was the Civil Code. According to Article 76 of the said code, marriage between a man
and a woman who have been living together for more than 5 years no longer requires a marriage license.
Pepito died in February of 1997.
Held: Marriage of Pepito Ninal Sr. and Norma Bayadog is null and void. It is evident that only 20 months
elapsed between the time of the death of the frst wife and the marriage with the second wife. Had the two
been cohabiting for fve years, such cohabitation, and the marriage, was not within the capacity of the
deceased. Te children do not have standing to cause action but, because the marriage was null and void, it
is likewise non-existent.
For marriages of exceptional character, there should be no legal impediment on the part of either party.
Te one contracting a marriage should have legal capacity to do so.
Void Marriages
FC ARTICLE 4: Te absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35.
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites of shall not afect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
FC ARTICLE 35: Te following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
1. Tose contracted by any party below eighteen years of age, even with the consent of parents or guardians;
2. Tose solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing ofcer had the legal
authority to do so;
3. Tose solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding chapter;
4. Tose bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
5. Tose contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other;
6. Tose subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
In ordinary contracts (1) the child will not be emancipated from parental authority. In marriage,
the child will be emancipated.
If it is a mistake of fact, the marriage is valid. If it is a mistake of law, the marriage is void.
Paragraph 5 refers to physical mistake in identity. Other fraudulent misrepresentation would not
apply.
FC ARTICLE 36: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization.
Psychological incapacity to comply is dierent from inability to understand because the latter is a vice of
consent, without which, an essential requisite of marriage is lacking.
Reasons for adopting psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity:
Substitute for divorce
Solution of church-annulled marriages
To give remedy
Psychological incapacity vs. Vice of consent
a person may fully agree but may not understand the obligations of marriage.
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent but there is a lack of legal capacity, an essential
requisite of marriage.
Psychological Incapacity vs. Insanity
Insanity has varying degree;
Insanity is curable
Tere are lucid intervals in insanity
Insanity is a ground for annulment in other countries
Note: Psychological incapacity was not defned using examples to avoid ejusdem generis (exclusive
enumeration) which might limit the applicability of the provision. It is therefore judged according to the
facts of the case.
Psychological incapacity should exist at the time of the marriage.
Psychological incapacity is restricted to disorders demonstrative of the utter sensitivity or inability
to give meaning and signifcance to the marriage.
Examples of psychological incapacity:
1. Homosexuality;
2. Satryiasis or Nymphomania;
3. Epilepsy with permanently recurring maladaptive manifestationsl
4. Extremely low intelligencel
5. Habitual Alcoholism;
6. Criminality
Manifestations of psychological incapacity:
Refusal of wife to dwell with the husband after marriage;
Aiction which makes common life unbearable;
Sociopathic anomalies on husbands part
SANTOS VS. BEDIA-SANTOS
Facts: Louel Santos who was married to Julia Bedia-Santos wishes to annul his marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. Respondent has, for the last seven years since fling for the annulment, resided in
the United States and has contacted the petitioner only twice.
Held: Psychological incapacity refers to the mental, not physical incapacity. It must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability for it to be considered a psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent. A person may have given his or her consent freely without
understanding the obligations of the contract. Without consent, a marriage is void ab initio. Without the
ability to understand the nature of the contract, the marriage is merely voidable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MOLINA
Facts: Respondent alleged that her husband Reynaldo Molina was psychologically incapacitated because he
showed signs of immaturity, irresponsibility and dependence. She also averred that her husband was never
honest. Te Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court upheld that the marriage was indeed, void.
Held: Psychological incapacity should refer to a mental and not physical incapacity. It is confned to the
most serious personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and signifcance to the marriage. It is not enough that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities. It is
essential that they must be shown as incapable of doing so.
Molina Guidelines In Applying Article 36
1. Te burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintif. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
2. Te root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identifed, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) suciently proven by the experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Te person
alleged to be incapacitated must be psychologically ill to the extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming or knowing them could not have given a valid assumption thereof.
3. Te incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Te evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged vows.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or relative only in regard to the other spouse. Such incapacity must also be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Te illness must be shown as downright inability or incapacity.
6. Te essential marital obligations are:
a. Te husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fdelity, and
render mutual help and support (FC Article 68).
b. Te husband and wife shall fx the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide. Te court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family (FC
Article 69).
c. Te spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. Te expenses for such support
and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and in the absence
thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufciency or absence
of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfed from their separate properties (FC
Article 70).
d. Te management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. Te expenses for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 (FC Article 71).
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
APIAG VS. CANTERO
Facts: Maria Apiag fled an administrative case against her husband, respondent judge, Esmeraldo G.
Cantero. Te Court of Appeals decided that the respondent acted in grave misconduct. Te plaintif and
respondent were married and petitioner bore 2 children by that marriage. After the second child was born,
respondent judge left for no reason. Plaintis, through their counsel asked respondent for support and for
the children to be declared legal heirs. Complainants subsequently learned that respondent has contracted
another marriage with whom he had 5 children. Respondent misrepresented himself in his declaration of
assets and liabilities by putting the name of the second wife on the said statement. He contended that the
frst marriage was void ab initio because he and his frst wife never cohabited and he was forced into the
marriage. He added that he and the petitioners have settled amicably and he has agreed to give the children
of his retirement benefts.
Held: While he did not act in grave misconduct, he acted in impropriety when he failed and refused to
attend to the needs of his children. Although it is undisputed that the judge did not obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his frst marriage, pursuant to the jurisprudence prevailing at the time of the second
marriage, it has been established that no such declaration was necessary.
CHOA VS. CHOA
Facts: Respondent Alfonso Choa fled a complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner Leni
Choa on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Petitioner fled a demurrer of evidence (an objection or
exception by one of the parties in an action at law to the efect that the evidence which the adversary
produced is insucient in point of law to make out a case and sustain the issue). Te demurrer of evidence
was dismissed by the appellate court which upheld that the claims of Alfonso Choathat her wife had fled
several lawsuits against him indicating psychological incapacity and that his wife was immature, carefree
and had no intentions of procreative sexualityas sufcient evidence.
Held: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Te
testimony of the expert doctor and the respondent only showed that the two cannot get along with each
other.
TSOI VS. CA
Facts: Respondent Gina Lao Tsoi fled for annulment of her marriage to petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that since their marriage in May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989, the couple has not consummated their marriage. Defendant contended that it was the
wifes fault that their marriage was not consummated. A physician examined both plainti and defendant
and attested that neither of them had any physical problem. Defendant alleged that the wife was afraid to
consummate the marriage and afraid that she would have to return the jewelry given to her.
Held: Whether or not it was the husband who refused to consummate the marriage is immaterial. Te fact
still stands that it has not been consummated. Tere may be physical and not psychological reasons as to
why the marriage should not be annulled but the evidence to that efect was not presented. Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than stubborn refusal. Te natural order
between spouses is sexual intimacy.
ANTONIO VS. REYES
Facts: Petitioner fled a petition for the declaration of his marriage to respondent as null and void on the
grounds of psychological incapacity as manifested by several instances of lying and concealment of an
illegitimate child by Respondent Ivonne Reyes. Petitioner alleged that respondent fabricated stories which
bordered on the ridiculous.
Held: Marriage was void by virtue of the Molina guidelines, fulflled by the Petitioner.
FC ARTICLE 37: Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
the relationship between the parties is legitimate or illegitimate.
1. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree and
2. Between brothers and sisters, whether of full or half blood.
FC ARTICLE 38: Te following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
1. Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
2. Between step-parents and step-children;
3. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
4. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
5. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
6. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
7. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
8. Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
9. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other persons spouse or his
or her own spouse.
FC ARTICLE 39: Te action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe. However, in the case of marriages celebrated before the efectivity of this code and falling under
Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this code shall have taken efect.
FC ARTICLE 40: Te absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a fnal judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Final judgment is needed to avoid confusion because one of the parties may contract another marriage
which would be bigamous and therefore void during the pendency of the trial for the other marriage.
FC ARTICLE 41: A marriage contracted by any person duringthe subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four* consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufcient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the eect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
FC Article 44: If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law.
RA 8533
CC ARTICLE 390: After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. Te absentee shall not be
presumed dead for the purposes of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared
after the age of seventy-fve years, an absence of fve years shall be sucient in order that his succession may
be open.
CC ARTICLE 391: Te following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs;
1. A person on board a vessel lost during sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not been heard
of for four years since the loss of the vessel or airplane;
2. A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
3. A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four years.
PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA
Facts: Appellant was married to Jovita de Asis on August 5, 1936. On May 14, 1941, appellant married Olga
Lema. On February 2, 1943, the frst wife of appellant died. On August 19, 1949, appellant married one
Carmencita Panlilio. Appellant was then charged with bigamy but he contended that his marriage to Olga
Lema was void ab initio and therefore non-existent. In that light, he claimed, that his marriage to
Carmencita was not bigamous.
Held: Te marriage law in eect at the time the appellant contracted with his second wife, Olga Lema,
states that his marriage to Lema was void ab initio. No judicial decree was necessary to establish its
invalidity.
TOLENTINO VS. PARAS
Facts: Serafa Tolentino was the wife of the deceased, Amado Tolentino. Petitioner requested the correction
of an entry on the death certifcate of the deceased which states that the name of his surviving spouse was
Maria Clemente. Amado Tolentino married his second wife, Maria Clemente while his frst marriage was
still in efect. When the deceased was charged with bigamy, he pleaded guilty and served the corresponding
sentene. Te petition was dismissed by Hon. Edgardo Paras on grounds that the issue was a marital
relationship, and that the court has no jurisdiction.
Held: Te petition was meritorious. Te court had jurisdiction because the wife was, initially, seeking a
judicial declaration that she was the lawful spouse of the deceased. Te plea of guilt of the deceased
efectively established that the second marriage was in fact, void ab initio and that the petitioner was the
lawful spouse.
WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DIY
Lilia Wiegel appealed for the reversal of the decision of respondent judge, Sempio-Diy because, in the
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage fled by Karl Heinz Wiegel against petitioner, respondent
judge ruled against the presentation of evidence. When petitioner was married to the plainti, she had a
previous existing marriage. Petitioner claimed that the frst marriage was void ab initio because she was
forced into marrying her frst husband.
Held: Tere was no need to present evidence because if there had been, in fact, intimidation during the frst
marriage, the said marriage would have been rendered voidable and not void. Had the marriage been void,
a judicial declaration would still be necessary.
TERRE VS. TERRE
Facts: Petitioner charged Atty Jordan Terre with gross immoral conduct for contracting a second marriage
while he has a subsisting marriage. Te petitioner alleged that while she was still in her previous marriage
with her frst cousin, she was courted by defendant and was advised that she was free to contract a second
marriage because her frst marriage was void. Petitioner took the advise and married herein respondent but,
after a few years, the respondent took of. Later the petitioner found out that respondent had contracted
another marriage.
Held: A judicial declaration is necessary to determine whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage. Without such declaration, the subsequently existing marriage is sustained.
ATIENZA VS. BRILLANTES
Facts: Complainant charged respondent Judge Fransisco Brillantes with gross immoral conduct after having
found said respondent sleeping in his own bed, apparently cohabiting with his wife. Complainant left his
wife and kids. Complainant alleged that the said judge was, at that time, married to one Zenaida Ongkiko
with whom he had 5 children. Respondent denied the allegation saying that his marriage with Ongkiko was
void ab initio because it was solemnized without a marriage license. Respondent likewise argued that
Article 40 of the family code was not in eect when his frst marriage took place.
Held: Judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is needed for purposes of remarriage. Te Family
Code can be applied retroactively so long as vested rights will not be impaired by its application.
BORJA-MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ
Facts: Complainant avers that she is the lawful wife of the late David Manzano. Her husband contracted
another marriage while the frst one was still in eect, solemnized by herein respondent judge. Respondent
contends that he did not know that the two were only legally separated and that all he knew was the two
had been cohabiting for seven years. He cited Article 34 which states that no license shall be necessary for
the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years.
Held: Te requisite of Article 34 is that there is no legal impediment between the parties. Te said article is
merely a ground for exemption for marriage license. Te judge knew of the subsisting marriage as it was
stated in the marriage certifcate and in the adavit signed by the parties.
DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Delia Soledad Domingo sought the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property against petitioner Roberto Domingo on the grounds that the petitioner had a valid and existing
marriage with one Emerlinda dela Paz. Te frst wife sued petitioner for bigamy. Respondent claimed that
the petitioner has been dependent on her and since she left to work in Saudi, she has amassed some
P350,000 worth of properties which were under the possession and administration of herein petitioner until
respondent found out about the frst marriage. Petitioner alleged that there was no cause for action because
the marriage was void ab initio and judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is only sought for purposes of
remarrying and no such intention has been expressed.
Held: Although it is stated in the Family Code that judicial declaration is needed for purposes of
remarrying, it does not expressly state that it is exclusive for that purpose alone. Te Family Code provides
that among the eects of the judicial declaration is the immediate separation of property.
EFFECTS OF NULLITY
FC ARTICLE 50: Te efects provided for by paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Article 43 and Article 44 shall
also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by fnal judgment
under Article 40 and 45.
Te fnal judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of the
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be
notifed for the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the log on which it
is situated shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
FC ARTICLE 51: In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of fnal judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such
matters.
Te children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
Te delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents but the value of
the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitimes.
FC ARTICLE 52: Te judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall
be recoded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not afect the
third persons.
FC ARTICLE 53: Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements
of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
FC ARTICLE 54: Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become fnal and executory shall be consicered legitimate. Children
conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
NINAL VS. BAYADOG
Facts: Petitioners request the annulment of the marriage of their father to Norma Bayadog. On September
26, 1974, Pepito married Teodulfa. Teodulfa died on April 24, 2985 and, on December 11, 1986, Pepito
married Norma Bayadog. Te marriage was contracted without a license. Instead, the couple signed an
afdavit stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for 5 years. Te code in efect during the
time of the marriage was the Civil Code. According to Article 76 of the said code, marriage between a man
and a woman who have been living together for more than 5 years no longer requires a marriage license.
Pepito died in February of 1997.
Held: Marriage of Pepito Ninal Sr. and Norma Bayadog is null and void. It is evident that only 20 months
elapsed between the time of the death of the frst wife and the marriage with the second wife. Had the two
been cohabiting for fve years, such cohabitation, and the marriage, was not within the capacity of the
deceased. Te children do not have standing to cause action but, because the marriage was null and void, it
is likewise non-existent.
For marriages of exceptional character, there should be no legal impediment on the part of either party.
Te one contracting a marriage should have legal capacity to do so.
Void Marriages
FC ARTICLE 4: Te absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35.
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites of shall not afect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
FC ARTICLE 35: Te following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
1. Tose contracted by any party below eighteen years of age, even with the consent of parents or guardians;
2. Tose solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing ofcer had the legal
authority to do so;
3. Tose solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding chapter;
4. Tose bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
5. Tose contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other;
6. Tose subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
In ordinary contracts (1) the child will not be emancipated from parental authority. In marriage,
the child will be emancipated.
If it is a mistake of fact, the marriage is valid. If it is a mistake of law, the marriage is void.
Paragraph 5 refers to physical mistake in identity. Other fraudulent misrepresentation would not
apply.
FC ARTICLE 36: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization.
Psychological incapacity to comply is dierent from inability to understand because the latter is a vice of
consent, without which, an essential requisite of marriage is lacking.
Reasons for adopting psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity:
Substitute for divorce
Solution of church-annulled marriages
To give remedy
Psychological incapacity vs. Vice of consent
a person may fully agree but may not understand the obligations of marriage.
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent but there is a lack of legal capacity, an essential
requisite of marriage.
Psychological Incapacity vs. Insanity
Insanity has varying degree;
Insanity is curable
Tere are lucid intervals in insanity
Insanity is a ground for annulment in other countries
Note: Psychological incapacity was not defned using examples to avoid ejusdem generis (exclusive
enumeration) which might limit the applicability of the provision. It is therefore judged according to the
facts of the case.
Psychological incapacity should exist at the time of the marriage.
Psychological incapacity is restricted to disorders demonstrative of the utter sensitivity or inability
to give meaning and signifcance to the marriage.
Examples of psychological incapacity:
1. Homosexuality;
2. Satryiasis or Nymphomania;
3. Epilepsy with permanently recurring maladaptive manifestationsl
4. Extremely low intelligencel
5. Habitual Alcoholism;
6. Criminality
Manifestations of psychological incapacity:
Refusal of wife to dwell with the husband after marriage;
Aiction which makes common life unbearable;
Sociopathic anomalies on husbands part
SANTOS VS. BEDIA-SANTOS
Facts: Louel Santos who was married to Julia Bedia-Santos wishes to annul his marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. Respondent has, for the last seven years since fling for the annulment, resided in
the United States and has contacted the petitioner only twice.
Held: Psychological incapacity refers to the mental, not physical incapacity. It must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability for it to be considered a psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent. A person may have given his or her consent freely without
understanding the obligations of the contract. Without consent, a marriage is void ab initio. Without the
ability to understand the nature of the contract, the marriage is merely voidable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MOLINA
Facts: Respondent alleged that her husband Reynaldo Molina was psychologically incapacitated because he
showed signs of immaturity, irresponsibility and dependence. She also averred that her husband was never
honest. Te Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court upheld that the marriage was indeed, void.
Held: Psychological incapacity should refer to a mental and not physical incapacity. It is confned to the
most serious personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and signifcance to the marriage. It is not enough that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities. It is
essential that they must be shown as incapable of doing so.
Molina Guidelines In Applying Article 36
1. Te burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintif. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
2. Te root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identifed, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) suciently proven by the experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Te person
alleged to be incapacitated must be psychologically ill to the extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming or knowing them could not have given a valid assumption thereof.
3. Te incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Te evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged vows.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or relative only in regard to the other spouse. Such incapacity must also be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Te illness must be shown as downright inability or incapacity.
6. Te essential marital obligations are:
a. Te husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fdelity, and
render mutual help and support (FC Article 68).
b. Te husband and wife shall fx the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide. Te court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family (FC
Article 69).
c. Te spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. Te expenses for such support
and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and in the absence
thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufciency or absence
of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfed from their separate properties (FC
Article 70).
d. Te management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. Te expenses for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 (FC Article 71).
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
APIAG VS. CANTERO
Facts: Maria Apiag fled an administrative case against her husband, respondent judge, Esmeraldo G.
Cantero. Te Court of Appeals decided that the respondent acted in grave misconduct. Te plaintif and
respondent were married and petitioner bore 2 children by that marriage. After the second child was born,
respondent judge left for no reason. Plaintis, through their counsel asked respondent for support and for
the children to be declared legal heirs. Complainants subsequently learned that respondent has contracted
another marriage with whom he had 5 children. Respondent misrepresented himself in his declaration of
assets and liabilities by putting the name of the second wife on the said statement. He contended that the
frst marriage was void ab initio because he and his frst wife never cohabited and he was forced into the
marriage. He added that he and the petitioners have settled amicably and he has agreed to give the children
of his retirement benefts.
Held: While he did not act in grave misconduct, he acted in impropriety when he failed and refused to
attend to the needs of his children. Although it is undisputed that the judge did not obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his frst marriage, pursuant to the jurisprudence prevailing at the time of the second
marriage, it has been established that no such declaration was necessary.
CHOA VS. CHOA
Facts: Respondent Alfonso Choa fled a complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner Leni
Choa on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Petitioner fled a demurrer of evidence (an objection or
exception by one of the parties in an action at law to the efect that the evidence which the adversary
produced is insucient in point of law to make out a case and sustain the issue). Te demurrer of evidence
was dismissed by the appellate court which upheld that the claims of Alfonso Choathat her wife had fled
several lawsuits against him indicating psychological incapacity and that his wife was immature, carefree
and had no intentions of procreative sexualityas sufcient evidence.
Held: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Te
testimony of the expert doctor and the respondent only showed that the two cannot get along with each
other.
TSOI VS. CA
Facts: Respondent Gina Lao Tsoi fled for annulment of her marriage to petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that since their marriage in May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989, the couple has not consummated their marriage. Defendant contended that it was the
wifes fault that their marriage was not consummated. A physician examined both plainti and defendant
and attested that neither of them had any physical problem. Defendant alleged that the wife was afraid to
consummate the marriage and afraid that she would have to return the jewelry given to her.
Held: Whether or not it was the husband who refused to consummate the marriage is immaterial. Te fact
still stands that it has not been consummated. Tere may be physical and not psychological reasons as to
why the marriage should not be annulled but the evidence to that efect was not presented. Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than stubborn refusal. Te natural order
between spouses is sexual intimacy.
ANTONIO VS. REYES
Facts: Petitioner fled a petition for the declaration of his marriage to respondent as null and void on the
grounds of psychological incapacity as manifested by several instances of lying and concealment of an
illegitimate child by Respondent Ivonne Reyes. Petitioner alleged that respondent fabricated stories which
bordered on the ridiculous.
Held: Marriage was void by virtue of the Molina guidelines, fulflled by the Petitioner.
FC ARTICLE 37: Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
the relationship between the parties is legitimate or illegitimate.
1. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree and
2. Between brothers and sisters, whether of full or half blood.
FC ARTICLE 38: Te following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
1. Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
2. Between step-parents and step-children;
3. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
4. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
5. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
6. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
7. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
8. Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
9. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other persons spouse or his
or her own spouse.
FC ARTICLE 39: Te action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe. However, in the case of marriages celebrated before the efectivity of this code and falling under
Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this code shall have taken efect.
FC ARTICLE 40: Te absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a fnal judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Final judgment is needed to avoid confusion because one of the parties may contract another marriage
which would be bigamous and therefore void during the pendency of the trial for the other marriage.
FC ARTICLE 41: A marriage contracted by any person duringthe subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four* consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufcient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the eect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
FC Article 44: If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law.
RA 8533
CC ARTICLE 390: After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. Te absentee shall not be
presumed dead for the purposes of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared
after the age of seventy-fve years, an absence of fve years shall be sucient in order that his succession may
be open.
CC ARTICLE 391: Te following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs;
1. A person on board a vessel lost during sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not been heard
of for four years since the loss of the vessel or airplane;
2. A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
3. A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four years.
PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA
Facts: Appellant was married to Jovita de Asis on August 5, 1936. On May 14, 1941, appellant married Olga
Lema. On February 2, 1943, the frst wife of appellant died. On August 19, 1949, appellant married one
Carmencita Panlilio. Appellant was then charged with bigamy but he contended that his marriage to Olga
Lema was void ab initio and therefore non-existent. In that light, he claimed, that his marriage to
Carmencita was not bigamous.
Held: Te marriage law in eect at the time the appellant contracted with his second wife, Olga Lema,
states that his marriage to Lema was void ab initio. No judicial decree was necessary to establish its
invalidity.
TOLENTINO VS. PARAS
Facts: Serafa Tolentino was the wife of the deceased, Amado Tolentino. Petitioner requested the correction
of an entry on the death certifcate of the deceased which states that the name of his surviving spouse was
Maria Clemente. Amado Tolentino married his second wife, Maria Clemente while his frst marriage was
still in efect. When the deceased was charged with bigamy, he pleaded guilty and served the corresponding
sentene. Te petition was dismissed by Hon. Edgardo Paras on grounds that the issue was a marital
relationship, and that the court has no jurisdiction.
Held: Te petition was meritorious. Te court had jurisdiction because the wife was, initially, seeking a
judicial declaration that she was the lawful spouse of the deceased. Te plea of guilt of the deceased
efectively established that the second marriage was in fact, void ab initio and that the petitioner was the
lawful spouse.
WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DIY
Lilia Wiegel appealed for the reversal of the decision of respondent judge, Sempio-Diy because, in the
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage fled by Karl Heinz Wiegel against petitioner, respondent
judge ruled against the presentation of evidence. When petitioner was married to the plainti, she had a
previous existing marriage. Petitioner claimed that the frst marriage was void ab initio because she was
forced into marrying her frst husband.
Held: Tere was no need to present evidence because if there had been, in fact, intimidation during the frst
marriage, the said marriage would have been rendered voidable and not void. Had the marriage been void,
a judicial declaration would still be necessary.
TERRE VS. TERRE
Facts: Petitioner charged Atty Jordan Terre with gross immoral conduct for contracting a second marriage
while he has a subsisting marriage. Te petitioner alleged that while she was still in her previous marriage
with her frst cousin, she was courted by defendant and was advised that she was free to contract a second
marriage because her frst marriage was void. Petitioner took the advise and married herein respondent but,
after a few years, the respondent took of. Later the petitioner found out that respondent had contracted
another marriage.
Held: A judicial declaration is necessary to determine whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage. Without such declaration, the subsequently existing marriage is sustained.
ATIENZA VS. BRILLANTES
Facts: Complainant charged respondent Judge Fransisco Brillantes with gross immoral conduct after having
found said respondent sleeping in his own bed, apparently cohabiting with his wife. Complainant left his
wife and kids. Complainant alleged that the said judge was, at that time, married to one Zenaida Ongkiko
with whom he had 5 children. Respondent denied the allegation saying that his marriage with Ongkiko was
void ab initio because it was solemnized without a marriage license. Respondent likewise argued that
Article 40 of the family code was not in eect when his frst marriage took place.
Held: Judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is needed for purposes of remarriage. Te Family
Code can be applied retroactively so long as vested rights will not be impaired by its application.
BORJA-MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ
Facts: Complainant avers that she is the lawful wife of the late David Manzano. Her husband contracted
another marriage while the frst one was still in eect, solemnized by herein respondent judge. Respondent
contends that he did not know that the two were only legally separated and that all he knew was the two
had been cohabiting for seven years. He cited Article 34 which states that no license shall be necessary for
the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years.
Held: Te requisite of Article 34 is that there is no legal impediment between the parties. Te said article is
merely a ground for exemption for marriage license. Te judge knew of the subsisting marriage as it was
stated in the marriage certifcate and in the adavit signed by the parties.
DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Delia Soledad Domingo sought the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property against petitioner Roberto Domingo on the grounds that the petitioner had a valid and existing
marriage with one Emerlinda dela Paz. Te frst wife sued petitioner for bigamy. Respondent claimed that
the petitioner has been dependent on her and since she left to work in Saudi, she has amassed some
P350,000 worth of properties which were under the possession and administration of herein petitioner until
respondent found out about the frst marriage. Petitioner alleged that there was no cause for action because
the marriage was void ab initio and judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is only sought for purposes of
remarrying and no such intention has been expressed.
Held: Although it is stated in the Family Code that judicial declaration is needed for purposes of
remarrying, it does not expressly state that it is exclusive for that purpose alone. Te Family Code provides
that among the eects of the judicial declaration is the immediate separation of property.
EFFECTS OF NULLITY
FC ARTICLE 50: Te efects provided for by paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Article 43 and Article 44 shall
also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by fnal judgment
under Article 40 and 45.
Te fnal judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of the
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be
notifed for the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the log on which it
is situated shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
FC ARTICLE 51: In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of fnal judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such
matters.
Te children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
Te delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents but the value of
the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitimes.
FC ARTICLE 52: Te judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall
be recoded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not afect the
third persons.
FC ARTICLE 53: Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements
of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
FC ARTICLE 54: Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become fnal and executory shall be consicered legitimate. Children
conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
NINAL VS. BAYADOG
Facts: Petitioners request the annulment of the marriage of their father to Norma Bayadog. On September
26, 1974, Pepito married Teodulfa. Teodulfa died on April 24, 2985 and, on December 11, 1986, Pepito
married Norma Bayadog. Te marriage was contracted without a license. Instead, the couple signed an
afdavit stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for 5 years. Te code in efect during the
time of the marriage was the Civil Code. According to Article 76 of the said code, marriage between a man
and a woman who have been living together for more than 5 years no longer requires a marriage license.
Pepito died in February of 1997.
Held: Marriage of Pepito Ninal Sr. and Norma Bayadog is null and void. It is evident that only 20 months
elapsed between the time of the death of the frst wife and the marriage with the second wife. Had the two
been cohabiting for fve years, such cohabitation, and the marriage, was not within the capacity of the
deceased. Te children do not have standing to cause action but, because the marriage was null and void, it
is likewise non-existent.
For marriages of exceptional character, there should be no legal impediment on the part of either party.
Te one contracting a marriage should have legal capacity to do so.