3C

SUCCESSION
CASE DIGESTS
Arts. 774 777
1. Bonilla v. Barcena
In this case, the action to quiet title instituted
by the late Barcena while she was still alive was
dismissed by the lower court saying that the heirs had
no legal capacity to sue. The SC held that the
deceased can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing
the case at bar. The records of this case show that the
complaint was filed while Barcena while still alive
and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over
her person. rt. !!! provides that "the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death
of the testator.# $hen Barcena died, her claim or
right to the parcels of land in litigation was not
e%tinguished by her death but was transmitted to heir
heirs upon her death.
2. i!"oco v. Intestate o# $ra%ante
In this case, &ragante applied for a
certificate of public convenience. fter his death, the
certificate was issued to his intestate estate, to which
petitioner opposed contending that substitution of the
legal representative of the estate should not have
been allowed. The SC held that such certificate
would be certainly be property, and the right to
acquire such a certificate, by complying with the
requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his
lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial
administrator after his death.
3. $&le v. $&le
The heirs &ule in this case opposes the
appointment of an administrator upon the ground that
the deceased left no debts and that his property had
already been partitioned among his children during
his lifetime. The SC held that in the absence of debts
e%isting against the estate, the heirs may enter upon
the administration of the property immediately. If
they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If
they desire to partition it among themselves and can
do this by mutual agreement, they also have that
privilege. The rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death' in other
words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the
property of the deceased ancestor. The administrator
has no right to intervene in any way whatsoever in
the division of the estate among the heirs when they
are adults and when there are no debts against the
estate.
4. 'eirs o# t(e ate Do!in%o N. Nicolas v.
)etro*an+
Surviving spouse (osefa mortagaged their
conjugal property to )etroban* which was later
foreclosed. The SC held that petitioners, as children
and therefore compulsory heirs of deceased
+omingo, acquired ownership of portions of the lots
as their legitime upon the death of their father or
prior to the foreclosure of mortgage and the filing by
the respondent ban* of its petition for the issuance of
a writ of possession. They should not be deprived of
their legitime by the enforcement of the writ of
possession thus such should not include parts of the
two lots pertaining to petitioners. ,ote that in this
case, as shown by the records, the estate of +omingo
has not been judicially or e%tra-judicially settled.
Arts. 77, - 7,2
.. A&stria v. /e0es
.etitioners in this case pray for the
annulment of the will of the deceased alleging its
intrinsic validity. They are contending that had the
deceased *nown that the adoption of .erfecto was
spurious and was thus not a compulsory heir, she
would not have instituted him. The SC held that the
will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute
on this point or at best is vague and uncertain. The
Civil Code provides that the words of the will are to
receive an interpretation which will give to every
e%pression some effect, rather than once which will
render any of the e%pressions inperative. Testacy is
favoured and doubts are resolved on its side,
especially where the will evinces an intention on the
part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole
estate, as was done in this case.
1. D2C 'ol3in%s v. CA
The question in this case is whether or not
the Contract of /ease with 0ption to Buy entered into
by the late Bartolome with petitioner was terminated
upon her death or w1n it binds her sole heir even after
her demise. The SC held that as a general rule, heirs
are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-terest e%cept when the rights and
obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by
23 their nature, 43 stipulation or 53 provisions of law.
In the case at bar, there is neither contractual
stipulation nor legal provision ma*ing the rights and
obligations under the contract intransmissible. There
is no personal act required from the deceased
Bartolome apart from the obligation to deliver
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possession of the subject property to petitioner upon
the e%ercise by the latter of its option to lease the
same which may very well be performed by her heir.
Articles 7,,-74.
7. Dionisio vs. Dionisio
The will was in Tagalog and was translated
in Spanish by the oppositor as well as by the official
court interpreter. If the oppositor6s translation was
correct then the attestation clause would not have
been made in accordance with the law. The members
of the court held that the interpretation of the court
interpreter is correct and in conformity with the
idiomatic usage of the Tagalog language.
!77 8 in case of doubt, interpretation that
will ma*e the disposition operative shall be preferred.
!92 8 4 modes of interpreting, the one that
will prevent intestacy will be preferred.
,. In re 5ill o# /iosa
The will was e%ecuted prior to the
enactment of an act which required additional
formalities. The question is which law will govern:
SC ruled that the law at the time the will was
e%ecuted will govern. ;ence the additional
formalities need not be complied with.
!9< 8 validity of a will as to its form
depends on the law in force at the time of e%ecution
4. Enri6&e78 et al. vs. A*a3ia8 et al.
;olographic will was e%ecuted before the
enactment of the ,ew Civil Code. .rior to the said
code, holographic wills were not allowed. SC ruled
using !9<.
=ationale for !9< 8 although the will
operates after the death, the wishes of the testator was
nevertheless given solemn e%pression at the time the
will was e%ecuted >provided of course it complied
with the formalities then required3
lso, SC added that if a will was void under
the law during its e%ecution and a subsequent law is
passed which does away with certain formalities, the
will does not become valid.
Articles 741-,93
19. Ba%tas vs. :a%&io
Testator6s body was paraly?ed on the left
side, his hearing was impaired, he had lost his power
of speech, his head fell to one side, and saliva ran
from his mouth. ;owever, he retained the use of his
right hand and was able to write fairly well. The
question is whether or not the testator was of sound
mind. SC ruled that the presumption of a sound mind
was not rebutted.
$itnesses testified that the testator wrote the
disposition in pieces of paper' he was as*ed whether
they were indeed dispositions to which he nodded his
head in affirmation' and the will was read to him out
loud.
11. ;a< T&a v. ;a< Ca 2&an
It was shown that from the bed in which
Tomasa was lying, it was possible for her to see the
table on which the witnesses signed the will. $hile
the rule is absolute that one who ma*es a will must
sign the same in the presence of the witnesses and
that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each
other, as well as in the presence of the one ma*ing
the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the
signatures made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the
signatures are made where it is possible for each of
the necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see
the signatures placed upon the will.
12. Sanc(o vs. A*ella
0pponent alleged that the testator6s mental
faculties were not functioning normally anymore'
that she had poor eyesight1hearing' that she urinated
without *nowing' that she had very poor memory. SC
ruled that senile debility, blindness, deafness, or poor
memory is not by itself sufficient to incapacitate a
person from ma*ing his1her will. In this case, the
records showed that the testator6s mental faculties
were functioning well.
lso, the fact that the testator included in
her dispositions property that she had already donated
does not indicate mental insanity. t most, it is
merely forgetfulness.
13. Gon7ales vs. Gon7ales 3e Car&n%con%
Two alleged wills were presented for
probate to which the petitioner opposed presenting an
instrument revo*ing the said wills allegedly e%ecuted
by the testator. The family physician who attended to
the testator during her last illness and saw her on the
day the said instrument was allegedly e%ecuted,
testified that during that time the testator was in a
comatose and unconscious state. SC upheld this
testimony as against the testimony of attesting
witnesses tending to imply that the testator was of
sound mind.
Arts. ,9. - ,91
14. :a0a3 v. Tolentino
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+eceased placed her thumb mar* on every
page of the will. ;er lawyer wrote her name under it.
,othing was noted on the attestation clause that the
deceased directed the lawyer to write her name.
;eld@ Aalid. not necessary that the
attestation clause in question should state that the
testatri% requested the lawyer to sign her name
inasmuch as the testatri% signed the will by her thumb
mar*.
1.. Ta*aoa3a v. /osal =14,2>
0n the first page >which contained the entire
testamentary dispositions3, the testatri% signed at the
bottom, while the witnesses signed at the left-hand
margin. 0n the second page which contained the
attestation clause, the testatri% signed at the left hand
margin, and the witnesses signed below the
attestation clause. The attestation clause also did not
state the number of pages.
;eld@ Aalid. The signatures of the
instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first
page of the will attested not only to the genuineness
of the signature of the testatri% but also the due
e%ecution of the will as embodied in the attestation
clause.
The objects of attestation and of subscription
were fully met and satisfied when the witnesses
signed at the left margin of the sole page which
contained all the testamentary dispositions.
The failure to state the number of pages
would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact
that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will
that it is really composed of only 4 pages duly signed
by the testatri% and her instrumental witnesses.
11. A7&ela v. CA =2991>
$ill was two pages long. The number of
pages were also not stated in the attestation, only a
blan* was there.
The will was not properly ac*nowledged.
>",ilagdaan *o at ninotario *o ngayong 2B ;unyo,
dito sa )anila.#3
The witnesses also did not sign under the
attestation clause but on the left hand margin of the
page.
;eld@ Invalid will.
Issue of number of pages@ no substantial
compliance in this case because no statement in the
attestation clause or anywhere else in the will itself as
to the number of pages which comprise the will.
Issue of witnesses not signing under the
attestation clause@ the signatures to the attestation
clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the
statements contained in the attestation clause itself.
the attestation clause is separate and apart from the
disposition of the will. They should sign below it.
Issue of not properly ac*nowledged@
contrary to rt 7BC. c*nowledgement is the act of
one who has e%ecuted a deed in going before some
competent officer and declaring it to be his act or
deed. )oreover, will must be ac*nowledged and not
merely subscribed and sworn to. notarial will that
is not ac*nowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if
it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.
17. G&errero v. Bi(is =2997>
The will was ac*nowledged by the testatri%
and the witnesses at the testatri%6s witnesses in DC
before a notary public who was commissioned for
and in Caloocan City.
;eld@ Invalid. ,otary public was acting
outside the place of his commission, and this did not
satisfy rt 7BC. ,o notary shall possess authority to
do any notarial act beyond the limits of his
jurisdiction.
1,. De Gala v. Gon7ales
Testatri% signed using a thumb mar*. In the
attestation clause, it is not mentioned that the testatri%
signed by thumb mar*. But, in the last paragraph of
the will, she mentioned that she signed it using her
thumb mar*.
;eld@ Aalid. It appeared in the attestation
clause that the signature was affi%ed in the presence
of the witnesses, and the form of the signature is
sufficiently described and e%plained in the last clause
of the body of the will. It may be conceded that the
attestation clause does not, standing alone, quite meet
the requirements of the statute, but ta*en in
connection with the last clause of the body of the
will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the
legislative intent.
14. C&evas v. Ac(acoso
The attestation clause in this case was
signed by the testator, but signed below his name by
the witnesses. The clause was made by the testator
himself more than by the instrumental witnesses.
;eld@ Aalid. It substantially complies with
the statue. The apparent anomaly is not serious to
invalidate the will, it appearing that right under the
signature of the testator, there appear the signatures
of the 5 witnesses.
Arts. ,97 - ,94
29. Testate o# t(e ate A*a3a vs. A*a"a
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lthough the attestation clause does not
indicate the number of witnesses a close inspection of
the will shows that three witnesses signed it. The
question of the number of the witnesses is answered
by an e%amination of the will itself and without the
need for presentation of evidence aliunde.
Arts. ,19 - ,14
21. A"ero vs. CA
=equirements under rt 725 and 72E on the
authentication of changes and signing and dating of
dispositions refer only to the validity of the
dispositions, but not its probate. If the testator fails to
sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is
that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such
failure, however, does not render the whole testament
void.
Arts. ,29 - ,27
22. Unson vs. A*ella
will can be admitted to probate,
notwithstanding that one or more witnesses do not
remember having attested it, provided the court is
satisfied upon the evidence adduced that the will has
been e%ecuted and signed in the manner prescribed
by law. s a general rule, the attesting witnesses must
be produced when there is opposition to the probate.
But there are e%ceptions to this rule, for instance,
when the witness is dead, cannot be served with
process of the court, or his reputation for the truth has
been questioned, or he appears hostile to the
proponent.
Arts. ,2, ,37
23. )olo vs. )olo
subsequent will, containing a clause
revo*ing a previous will, having been disallowed, for
the reason that it was not e%ecuted in conformity with
the formal requirements as to the ma*ing of wills,
cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous
will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation.
It is the intention of the testator that the revocation of
previous will is dependent upon the validity of a
subsequent will. The failure of the new testamentary
disposition, upon whose validity the revocation
depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a
suspensive condition, and hence prevents the
revocation of the original will. The operation of the
doctrine depends upon the intention of the testator at
the time of the revocation of the first will.
24. Ga%o vs. )a!&0ac
The law does not require any evidence of the
revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved.
$here a will which can not be found is shown to be
in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the
presumption is, in the absence of other competent
evidence, that it was cancelled or destroyed. The
same presumption arises where it is shown that the
testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be
found after his death.
2.. 'eirs o# /osen3o asa! vs. U!en%an
The purported last will and testament of
testator could not properly be relied upon to establish
petitioner6s right to posess the subject lot because,
without having been probated, the said last will and
testament could not be the source of any right. Before
any will can have force or validity it must be
probated. rt 757 is e%plicit when it says "no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the =ules of
Court.#
Arts. ,34 - ,34
21. /e0es v. CA
The natural children of the deceased in this
case are questioning the intrinsic validity of the will
on the ground that his compulsory heir cannot be one,
as theirs was an illicit relationship. SC held that as a
general rule, courts in probate proceedings are
limited to pass only upon the e%trinsic validity of the
will sought to be probated. There are, however,
notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity
was first determined as when the defect of the will is
apparent on its face and the probate of the will may
become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically
invalid. The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed
upon because "practical considerations# demanded it
as when there is preterition of heirs or the
testamentary provisions are doubtful legality. In this
case however, There was never an open admission of
any illicit relationship. Thus, there was no need to go
beyond the face of the will.
27. Balana0 v. )artine7
The basic issue in this case was whether the
probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or
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formal validity, and in declaring it void. The SC held
that in view of the unusual provisions of the will,
which are of dubious legality, the trial court acted
correctly in passing upon the willFs intrinsic validity
even before its formal validity had been established.
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony
if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
But the probate court erred in declaring, that
the will was void and in converting the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding
notwithstanding the fact that it previously gave effect
to the surviving husbandFs conformity to the will and
to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which
presumably included his one-half share of the
conjugal estate. The rule is that Gthe invalidity of one
of several dispositions contained in a will does not
result in the invalidity of the other dispositions,
unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not
have made such other dispositions if the first invalid
disposition had not been madeG.
2,. )aca! v. Gat!aitan
/eonarda and (uana reciprocally assigned their
respective property to one another conditioned upon
who might die first, the time of death determining the
event upon which the acquisition of such right by the
one or the other depended. This contract, as any other
contract, is binding upon the parties thereto.
Inasmuch as /eonarda had died before (uana the
latter thereupon acquired the ownership of the house,
in the same manner as /eonarda would have acquired
the ownership of the automobile and of the furniture
if (uana had died first. (In this case, the court
essentially sustained the validity of survivorship
agreements.)
24. /o3ri%&e7 v. /o3ri%&e7
$hen +omingo =odrigue? died intestate, he
was survived by his widow, Concepcion &eli%, his
children grandchildren. The widow, children and
grandchildren of the deceased entered into an e%tra-
judicial settlement of his estate, consisting of one-
half of the properties allegedly belonging to the
conjugal partnership. The widow later on questioned
the validity of this e%trajudicial partition, saying that
she entered such contract under duress, violence and
intimidation.
The SC agreed with the trial Court that the
evidence was not convincing that the contracts of
transfer from the widow to her daughter, and from the
latter to her mother and stepfather were e%ecuted
through violence or intimidation >this was done to
allegedly convert paraphernal property into
conjugal3.
$hat is more decisive is that duress being
merely a vice or defect of consent, an action based
upon it must be brought within four years after it has
ceased' and the present action was instituted only
after 47 years after the intimidation is claimed to
have occurred, and no less than 9 years after the
supposed culprit died. 0n top of it, appellant entered
into a series of subsequent transactions with appellees
that confirmed the contracts that she now tries to set
aside. Therefore, this cause of action is clearly
barred.
Arts. ,49 - ,.3
39. :ecson v. Coronel
0ppositors essentially question that validity
of the will on the ground that it would have been too
impossible that they, as relatives, would be left with
nothing as this was not normal in .hilippine customs.
The SC held that there is nothing strange in the
preterition made by +olores Coronel of her blood
relatives, nor in the designation of /oren?o .ecson as
her sole beneficiary. &urthermore, although the
institution of the beneficiary here would not seem the
most usual and customary, still this would not be
null per se.
In the absence of any statutory restriction
every person possesses absolute dominion over his
property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he
pleases without regard to natural or legal claim upon
his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite
capacity to ma*e a will, and the disposition of his
property is not affected by fraud of undue influence,
the will is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is
unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust.
Arts. ,.4 - ,.1
31. Non v. CA
.etitioners in this case are asserting co-
ownership of the property while respondents claim
that they are the absolute owners by virtue of a deed
of donation e%ecuted in their favor. The SC ruled for
respondents. $hen Airginia .. Aiado died intestate in
2974, her part of the conjugal property was
transmitted to her heirs H her husband (ulian and
their children.. The inheritance, which vested from
the moment of death of the decedent, remained under
a co-ownership regime among the heirs until
partition. Ivery act intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees
would be a partition although it would purport to be a
sale, an e%change, a compromise, a donation or an
e%trajudicial settlement. The Court found the
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instruments e%ecuted showing donation were validly
e%ecuted.
Articles ,.7-,79
32. ?3a. De Aranas vs. Aranas
.etitioners were assailing the stipulation in
the will which provided that the testator6s nephew
shall have usufructuary rights and be the first
administrator of certain properties' and that upon his
death or refusal to continue to act as
usufructuary1administrator, the administration shall
pass to the anyone of the sons of his brother.
.etitioners contended that this violated rt. 7!B, CC.
SC ruled that there was a limitation to the
right of the nephew, namely his death or his refusal.
The disposition must be respected J given effect.
Kpon the death or refusal of the nephew, the property
can be disposed of subject to the limitations provided
in rt. 7C5 concerning fideicommissary substitution.
Articles ,71-,,.
33. /a!ire7 v. ?3a. De /a!ire7
The deceased was survived by his spouse, 4
grandnephews, and his companion. The administrator
submitted a partition to the court which divided the
estate into 4@ one-half would go to the widow in
satisfaction of her legitime' the other half, which is
the free portion, would go to the grandnephews'
however, 215 of the free portion is charged with the
widow6s usufruct and the remaining 415 with a
usufruct in favor of the companion.
The grandnephews opposed the substitution
on the ground that the 2
st
heirs are not related to the
substitutes within the 2
st
degree.
SC ruled that the fideicommissary
substitution is void. The substitutes >grandnephews3
are not related to the companion within one degree.
In effect, the SC ruled that "one degree#
means "one generation# and not "one designation.#
So, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be
either a child or a parent of the 2
st
heir.
34. )iciano vs. Bri!o
Testator is a Tur*ish national who stated in
his will that the institution of legatees therein is
conditional insofar as the said legatees must respect
the testator6s will to distribute his property in
accordance with the laws of the .hilippines. SC ruled
that this condition is void because it is contrary to
law. Knder the old civil code, the national law of the
testator should govern his testamentary dispositions.
Articles ,,1-493 =e@ce<t ,41>
3.. /osales vs. /osales
.etitioner was the widow of the son of the
deceased. In other words, the deceased is the mother-
in-law of the petitioner. Issue here was w1n a widow
is an heir of her parent-in-law: SC ruled that the
widow is neither an intestate nor a compulsory heir.
There is no law which entitles the widow to inherit
from her mother-in-law by her own right or by the
right of representation.
lso, rt. 77! refers to the estate of the
deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse
is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of
a parent-in-law where the surviving spouse is
considered a 5
rd
person.
31. Barit&a vs. CA
The deceased died while driving a tricycle
which collided with a bus. The widow e%ecuted a
release of claim and an affidavit of desistance
discharging the owner of the bus from all
actions1claims arising from the accident for a certain
sum of money. The parents of the deceased thereafter
filed a claim for damages against the bus owner. SC
ruled that the widow and her son are the successors-
in-interest authori?ed to receive payment. The parents
shall only succeed when the decedent leaves no
legitimate descendants. $hile the surviving spouse is
a concurring compulsory heir.
37. De A<aricio vs. :ara%&0a
.etitioner was the love child of a priest and
her mother. The mother was married to another
person to avoid ridicule. In the will of the deceased
father >hehe3, he ac*nowledged petitioner as his
natural daughter and also designated her as his only
heir. .etitioner filed an action against respondent
claiming parcels of land which she allegedly
inherited from the deceased. =espondent contends
that the petitioner is the legitimate child of the mother
and the person to whom she was married.
SC ruled that the issue of paternity is immaterial
considering that the deceased died without any
compulsory heir and that he instituted the petitioner
as his lawful heir in his will.
0ne who has no compulsory heirs may
dispose by will all of his estate or any part of it in
favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
Art. ,41
3,. De :a<a v. Ca!ac(o
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.ropositus died. The uncles and aunts want

the property for them. The niece wants the property
for herself. $here does the property go:
;eld@ To the niece. The uncles and aunts are
e%cluded from the succession by the niece, although
they are related to him within the same degree as the
latter. $hy: Because the reversion of the reservable
property is governed by the rules on intestate
succession, wherein the nieces1nephews succeed
ahead of the spouse, and only in the absence of the
spouse will the uncles and aunts succeed.
34. $rias C(&a v. C$I
The propositus inherited property from his
father. In the intestate proceeding where he got the
property, the Court ordered upon the propositus and
his mother an obligation to pay a 5
rd
party arising
from an obligation. Is the first transfer still
gratuitous:
;eld@ Les. The transmission is gratuitous
when the recipient does not give anything in return. It
matters not whether the property transmitted is
subject to any prior charges. $hat is essential is that
the transmission by made gratuitously, without
imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient.
It is evident that the transmission of the property was
by means of a hereditary succession and therefore
gratuitous. The obligation was imposed by the Court,
and not by the propositus6 father.
s long as the transmission was free from
any condition imposed by the deceased himself and
the property is given out of pure generosity, it is
gratuitous.
49. De los /e0es vs. :aterno
The right of a reservatario is a reservable
right and may be noted in the certificate of
registration as a valid lien against the property.
;owever, this right may be lost by his failure to
present any opposition to a petition for registration of
a parcel of land under the Torrens system and his
subsequent failure to oppose such registration within
the period prescribed by law.
41. S&!a0a v. IAC
The reservista registers the property with the
=+, but the titles do not show the that the property
was reserved for anyone. ;owever, the affidavit of
the reservista stating that the property was reserved
under reserva troncal was registered with the =+.
She sold the property to 5
rd
persons. $hen
she dies, the reservatorios wanted the property bac*.
;eld@ ccroding to .+ 2<49, the registration
of the affidavit of the reservista was constructive
notice to the world, so the 5
rd
persons could not rely
solely on the clean title. It also appeared that the 5
rd
persons *new of the reservable property. )oreover,
the Court also stated that it was the duty of the
reservista to both reserve the property and annotate it
accordingly as well.
42. /iosa v. /oc(a
The reservista refused to register the
property and annotate it accordingly. The
reservatorios want the reservation be noted in the =+.
;eld@ =egister it. The reservista is bound to
register the reservation within 9B days from the date
of the adjudication of the property to the heirs by the
court. fter this period, the reservatorios have the
right to enforce compliance with the obligation.
$here a reservable property is sold by the
reservista, without having registered its reservable
character, the obligation to registere the same is
transferred to the purchaser, when, in ma*ing the
purchase, the latter *new the facts which give the
property the reservable character.
43. ?3a. De T&<as v. /TC
mong the assets listed in the will of the
deceased were several lots, admittedly his private
capital. ;owever, at the time of his death, these lots
were no longer owned by him, he having donated
them the year before to the Tupas &oundation, Inc.
TupasF widow brought suit against Tupas &oundation,
Inc. to have the donation declared inofficious insofar
as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible.
;eld@ The fact that the donated property no
longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor
at the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent
its being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an obvious
proposition that collation contemplates and
particularly applies to gifts inter vivos.
Since it is clear that the questioned donation
is collationable and that, having been made to a
stranger >to the donor3 it is, by law chargeable to the
freely disposable portion of the donorFs estate, to be
reduced insofar as inofficious.
If the value of the donation at the time it was
made does not e%ceed that difference, then it must be
allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is
inofficious as to the e%cess and must be reduced by
the amount of said e%cess. In this case, if any e%cess
be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the
petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the
deceased.
3C Succession Case Digests (Midterms)
Diaz, Garcia, Ingles, Machuca
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