Is Cassirers Philosophy of

Symbolic Forms Able to

Overcome the Intellectual Crisis
Analyzed in His Article
Geist und Leben?
JEAN SEIDENGART
rnst Cassirers article Geist und Leben in der Philosophie der
Gegenwart was published in 1930 in Die neue Rundschau. De-
spite expectations, this article did not concern that critical work that
Cassirer had announced at the end of the preface to the third volume
of his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms:
Consequently the critical work with which I originally intended to con-
clude this volume will be reserved for a future publication which I hope
soon to bring out under the title Life and The Human Spirit toward a
Critique of Present-Day Philosophy. (Cassirer, Philosophy 3: xvi)
1
Rather than offering an account of present-day philosophy, Geist
und Leben dealt exclusively with Max Schelers anthropology as out-
lined in his final book, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, which
appeared just before his death in 1928.
2
Certainly, it is true that Cas-
sirers article of 1930 bore nearly the same title as the one announced
in The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. But after the philosophers
death, a manuscript titled Geist und Leben was discovered in a folder
labeled Zur Metaphysik der symbolischen Formen. These papers were
intended to comprise part of a fourth volume of The Philosophy of
Symbolic Forms, because the third volume was already too bulky to
include several hundred additional pages.
WHAT IS AT STAKE IN CASSIRERS ARTICLE?
Thanks to an anonymous account of the discussions between Cas-
sirer and Heidegger during the International University Course at
Davos in 1929, we know that Cassirer gave an important presentation
on Geist und Leben in Max Schelers Philosophie at the end of his first
THE GERMANIC REVIEW
293
E
lecture (Cassirer and Heidegger 27). Indeed, Cassirer drew directly on
the contents of this lecture when writing the article for Die neue Rund-
schau in 1930. Cassirer's Geist und Leben aims to provide a crit-
ical account of the type of anthropology outlined in Schelers final
work as part of a broader philosophical movement that he refers to as
Lebensphilosophie. To be sure, this development offers little in the
way of innovation, but rather compiles the ideas of thinkers such as
Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Bergson, Dilthey, Simmel,
and, more recently, Martin Heidegger.
Nevertheless, Cassirer clearly expresses his esteem for Scheler as
an original philosopher, and he asserts that the metaphysical prob-
lems encountered in Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos could be
resolved through certain perspectival and conceptual shifts. In short,
Cassirer is convinced that adopting the functionalist view of The Phi-
losophy of Symbolic Forms could overcome the difficulties posed by
Schelers Lebensphilosophie. Cassirer sets out to improve Schelers
metaphysics in the terms of his own philosophy. Among Schelers fun-
damental concepts in need of reconsideration are those of nature, life,
spirit, and knowledge.
It is important to note at the outset that Scheler kept his distance
from German idealism (except at the beginning of his studies at the
University of Munich, where he absorbed Kantianism), and in his writ-
ings he remains quite critical of any manner of abstract formalism
that might lead to German idealism. His prevailing interest in the val-
ues, feelings, and nature of persons and their interrelations likewise
dissuaded him from idealism. In his youth, moreover, the Leben-
sphilosophie of Nietzsche, Dilthey, and Bergson had a great impact
on his thought.
For his part, Cassirer was one of the most brilliant luminaries of
critical idealism, and he remained faithful to Hermann Cohens neo-
Kantianism as well as to the universalist rationalism of the Aufk-
lrung. Thus, it is hardly surprising that Cassirer would refer to
Kleists celebrated work, ber das Marionettentheater (Cassirer, Geist
und Leben 33),
3
in order to expose the dualist elements in Schelers
anthropologyand in particular, the opposition between reflection
(or knowledge) and spontaneous Life (which is unaware of itself).
Cassirer quotes Kleists famous statement on this point:
Wir sehen, da in dem Mae, als in der organischen Welt die Reflexion
dunkler und schwacher wird, die Grazie darin immer strahlender und
herrschender hervortritt. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 32)
294 SEIDENGART
While the passage seems lucid and free of illusion, it nonetheless re-
mains open to philosophical criticism. One could undermine its funda-
mental premise by assuming a Hegelian perspective, according to
which the trajectory of ones lived experience emerges only through a
retrospective conscience. On this view, an event does not actually
begin at the moment it occurs, but only when it has been understood
and reappropriated at the level of knowledge. Hegels Phnomenologie
des Geistes (1807) asserted that it is a distinctive feature of phenome-
nal conscience to experience a time-lag with respect to what is given
in pure experience. In Hegelian terms, then, my certitude is not the
truth in itself. According to Kleist, in contrast, this time-lag is consid-
ered a tragic deception with no redeeming outcome.
Adopting a different approach, Cassirer deploys the rationalism of
the Aufklrung in order to emphasize the Romantic aspects of Schel-
ers philosophical anthropology:
Allbekannte Namen und Werke der philosophischen Literatur der Gegen-
wart drngen sich hier alsbald zum Vergleich auf. Auch in diesem Zuge
zeigt sich wieder, wie stark gerade unsere modernen und modernsten
philosophischen Gedanken in der Romantik wurzeln und wie sie, bewut
oder unbewut, von romantischen Vorbildern abhngig sind. Von neuem
steht heute die groe Antithese von Natur und Geist, die Polaritt von
Leben und Erkenntnis im Mittelpunkt der philosophischen Betrach-
tung. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 33)
Alluding implicitly to Hegels philosophy in this passage, Cassirer un-
derlines the serious crisis facing contemporary Lebensphilosophie. The
philosophers of the Romantic period, however, arrived at metaphysical
solutions in order to overcome the chasm between Life and Spirit:
Denn die romantische Philosophie hlt fr diesen Gegensatz, so scharf sie
ihn herausstellt, auch immer eine bestimmte metaphysische Lsung und
Vershnung bereit. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 34)
This concept of Vershnung comes directly from Hegel and concerns
Absolute Knowledge. In Hegels philosophy, true Life refers to the life
of Spirit. Life denotes the development of the Weltgeist. This true Life
is by no means fixed; rather, it is characterized by differentiation, op-
position, contradiction, and reconciliation (Vershnung; Hegel,
Phnomenologie 1315). Out of reconciliation, moreover, emerges
the final triumph of Geist in Hegels absolute idealism.
It is precisely this conception that left Scheler totally opposed to
German idealism. Schelers aim in the Stellung is to determine the po-
CASSIRERS PHILOSOPHY 295
sition of man in a world governed, at a microphysical level, by the
statistical laws of chance (Scheler 85). Yet, if the cosmos is subject-
ed to blind forces, how is it possible for man to introduce a scale of
values in the world? How does one guard against resentment, a feel-
ing that neutralizes all preference and undermines all perception of ax-
iological difference?
Although Cassirer underlines the deep chasm between Life and
Spirit (die Kluft zwischen den beiden Welten; Geist und Leben 34) in
contemporary metaphysics (Klages and Scheler), he also claims to be
able to bridge these two worlds with the help of his own philosophy.
THE PROBLEM OF SCHELERS ANTHROPOLOGY
ACCORDING TO CASSIRER
In Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, Scheler attempts to inte-
grate all his philosophical works. In keeping with this aim, the work
portrays the ways in which the affective intuition of values, the unity
of concrete human personality, and intersubjective relationships are
all confronted by a purposeless universe governed by blind forces. Ac-
cordingly, Schelers Stellung seeks to define the place for man in a
universe where he feels abandoned. This brief tract begins by outlin-
ing a hierarchy of the principal kinds of living things, which Scheler
refers to as psychophysiological beings: plants, animals, superior an-
imals, and finallywith the appearance of Spirithuman beings. Of
course, it is on this last level that a harrowing opposition unfolds be-
tween Geist and the rest of nature, the latter of which Scheler calls the
forces of the vital sphereor, more simply, Life. On one hand,
there are certain statistical laws governing the chaotic forces that
shape the inorganic world, in addition to other natural laws that gov-
ern the organic world of Life. The hierarchical scale of beings is there-
fore arranged in ascending order according to a creatures structural
complexity and level of psychic capacity. On the other hand, all vital
forces and all exertion (Drang) in nature remain blind to all ideas and
spiritual values (gegenber allen geistigen Ideen und Werten blind;
Scheler, qtd. in Cassirer, Geist und Leben 40).
As noted above, Cassirer situates this problematic dimension of
Schelers anthropology in relation to a general trend that stems from
the work of Romantic philosophers such as Kleist and Schelling and is
developed more fully by Ludwig Klages and Scheler himself.
4
Howev-
er, Cassirer also draws attention to the ways in which Scheler departs
296 SEIDENGART
from this tradition. Cassirer captures Schelers innovation with partic-
ular clarity in the following passage:
[D]as was den Menschen zum Menschen macht, ist ein allem Leben ber-
haupt entgegengesetztes Prinzip, das man als solches berhaupt nicht auf
die natrliche Lebensevolution zurckfhren kann. (Scheler, qtd. in
Cassirer, Geist und Leben 3536; emphasis added)
In other words, if man wants to be fully human, he must disengage from
both nature and his own impulses, and he must rise above Life by main-
taining his distance from it through the workings of his own Spirit. Even
if Cassirer does not concur with Schelers dualism between Geist and
Leben, the two philosophers are nonetheless in agreement concerning
the principal characteristics of Spirit: (a) it is open to the world; (b) it is
able to constitute objects as such; (c) it can construct an objective
world; (d) it applies forms not only to the actual, but also to the possi-
ble; and (e) it is not bound to the actuality of its immediate environ-
ment, but is capable of abstraction and contemplation of the possible
(by separating spatiotemporal forms from their contents).
Whereas Scheler considers these faculties of Spirit as purely nega-
tive (insofar as they assume an ascetic stance toward Life), Cassirer
holds that they refer merely to one pole of spiritual activity. Even so,
Cassirer is struck by Schelers paradoxical idea, which stipulates that
even if Spirit represents the highest position in the hierarchy of values,
it remains completely powerless in the face of vital forces. In a phrase,
Der Geist, wie Scheler ihn fat, ist demnach ursprnglich schlechthin
machtlos (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 39). Life and Spirit are in this
sense two incommensurable realities. Cassirer emphasizes that for
Hegel, in contrast, the Idea possesses a substantial power (sub-
stanzielle Macht; Cassirer, Geist und Leben 39). But according to
Scheler (and pace Hegel), one may attribute to the Spirit and to the
will of man only the capacity to give direction (Leitung) and guidance
(Lenkung) to vital impulses. Cassirer concludes his account with a
lengthy quotation that perfectly summarizes the argument of Schel-
ers Stellung on this point:
[D]ie gegenseitige Durchdringung des ursprnglich ohnmchtigen
Geistes und des ursprnglichdmonischen, d. h. gegenber allen geisti-
gen Ideen und Werten blinden Dranges [. . .] und die gleichzeitige Er-
mchtigung, d. h. Verlebendigung des Geistes ist das Ziel und Ende alles
endlichen Seins und Geschehens, das der Theismus flschlicherweise an
seinen Ausgangspunkt stellt. (Scheler, qtd. in Cassirer, Geist und Leben
3940; emphasis in original)
CASSIRERS PHILOSOPHY 297
THE INCONSISTENCY OF SCHELERS DUALISM BETWEEN
GEIST AND LEBEN
Cassirer limits himself to showing how Schelers problem cannot be
solved in its original formulation: If there is absolute heterogeneity be-
tween Spirit and Life, how can they oppose one another? All conflicts,
all oppositions must presuppose the existence of some common
ground. This particular problem of dualism, moreover, has haunted
the Western metaphysical tradition since antiquity.
In Aristotle, the question arises in the relations between God (pure
Spirit, nosentirely detached from all matter) and the physical
world. Aristotles solution corresponds to his teleological worldview:
God moves the world as the beloved object moves the lover (qtd. in
Cassirer, Geist und Leben 42).
In Cartesian dualism, it appears with the problem of the union
[Vereinigung] of body and soul (Krper und Seele; Cassirer, Geist
und Leben 43). Since Descartes established the physical law of con-
servation (Erhaltungsgesetz) and the law of constancy of momen-
tum in the universe (das Gesetz von der Konstanz der Bewegungs-
gre im Weltall; Cassirer, Geist und Leben 43), the only possibility
of the soul in the material world is to change the direction (Rich-
tung) of movement. Leibniz objected to Cartesian physics on the
grounds that even a simple shift in direction requires a certain ex-
penditure of energy. Leibniz was one of the founders of dynamics,
and, according to this view, the law of conservation relates not to the
conservation of motion, but to the quantity (for example, speed and
direction) of living forces.
In short, Cassirer establishes a parallel between Leibnizs critique of
Descartes and Freuds understanding of the process of inhibition to show
that the latter would be impossible if Spirit were completely powerless.
It is absolutely essential, therefore, to correct Schelers perspective if
one is to resolve the internal dilemma of his anthropology.
CASSIRER RESORTS TO THE MEDIATION OF
FORMATIVE ENERGY
Cassirer moves surreptitiously from Cartesian dualism to Leibnizian
dynamicsand, in particular, to a kind of energeticist perspective in
which different forces can produce different interactions. This ap-
proach requires Cassirer to delve deeply into conceptions of power
298 SEIDENGART
(Macht), energy (Energie), and force (Kraft) in order to escape the im-
passe reached in Schelers anthropology.
Cassirer begins by making a distinction (which had escaped Schel-
er) between efficient energy (Energie des Wirkens) and formative en-
ergy (Energie des Bildens; Cassirer, Geist und Leben 45): Efficient en-
ergy is directed immediately at mans environment, whether to
control it or to change its course. Formative energy is directed at it-
self and moves strictly within the dimension of pure image (des
Bildes) and not within the dimension of effective reality (Wirk-
lichkeit). This distinction allows Cassirer subtly to introduce the per-
spective of his own philosophy of symbolic forms:
Der menschliche Geist kehrt sich hier nicht direkt gegen die Dinge, son-
dern er spinnt sich in eine eigene Welt, in eine Welt der Zeichen, der Sym-
bole, der Bedeutungen ein. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 45)
Thus, unlike the lower animals, Spirit is deprived of all immediate
contact with the world. At the same time, a world of symbols medi-
ates between Spirit and the material world. The influence of Spirit on
the material world and on Life is henceforth comprehensible in terms
of its own energy.
To be sure, Cassirer wholly agrees with Scheler that Spirit does not
emerge out of an intensification of Lifeor, in other words, out of a
higher level of complexity in the psychophysiological hierarchy.
Rather, Spirit marks a change of direction, an abrupt shift (Wandel,
Rckkehr, Umkehr) in the course of Life (Cassirer, Geist und Leben
46). What Cassirer categorically rejects in Schelers anthropology is
the characterization of Spirit as a powerless (kraftlos), inert, and pas-
sive entity (Stillsteller)that is, as an ascetic of Life (Asket des
Lebens; Cassirer, Geist und Leben 46). If Spirit is capable of bringing
Life to a standstill (Stillstand), it must already possess in itself the
power (Kraft) necessary to oppose Life. Moreover, Spirit requires a
certain detachment from Life in order to understand the meaning of
what occurs around it.
5
Even if Spirit and Life stand in opposition to
each other, they nonetheless share a common attribute: a pure activ-
ity (reine Ttigkeit; actus purus) corresponding to their respective
purposes. Accordingly, this pure activity is divided into two separate
forms: mediated formative energy (mittelbare Ttigkeit des Bildens)
and efficient energy (unmittelbaren des Wirkens).
As evidence for this dynamic conception of Spirit, Cassirer cites Spin-
ozas claim in the Ethics that Ideas are not like silent paintings.
6
Like-
CASSIRERS PHILOSOPHY 299
wise, Cassirer does not restrict mediated formative energy to the pure
realm of knowledge. Rather, he stresses that it applies to all creations
(Schpfungen) associated with diverse symbolic forms (language, art,
myth, and religion) to argue for the possibility of a new mode of intu-
ition (neue Anschauung) pertaining to objective reality. The quotation
marks here are meant to imply that objectivity cannot be reduced to the
domain of scientific objectivity (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 46).
Cassirer explains that this formative energy or symbolic formation
(Formung, Gestaltung) comprises a double determination (Dop-
pelbestimmung; Cassirer, Geist und Leben 47)namely, a retreat
from and a return to objective reality. Such a movement is character-
istic of Cassirers critical idealism, in which Spirit must follow a cir-
cuitous route of theorization in order to grasp an object (whatever it
might be). This manner of theorization, moreover, requires that Spirit
suspend the reception of all sense data and introduce between them
and the conscious subject a world of symbolsthat is, representations
and concepts created by its own activity to actively appropriate the
meaning of what is given:
Erst am Ende dieses langen und schwierigen Weges des inneren Gestal-
tens tritt die Wirklichkeit wieder in den Blickpunkt des Menschen ein.
[. . .] Mehr und mehr lernt der Mensch, sich die Welt zu beseitigen, um die
Welt an sich zu ziehen. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 47)
Cassirer lays great stress on this art of the detour, which even su-
perior animals learn only with great difficulty. Moreover, he seeks to
affirmin a manner reminiscent of Kants description of the Coperni-
can revolutionthat Spirit is always active in its quest to arrive at re-
ality. Cassirer expresses the Kantian view in a novel manner:
So ist auch der Aufbau der objektiven Erfahrungswelt angewiesen auf
die ursprnglichen bildenden Krfte des Geistes und auf die Grundgeset-
ze, nach denen diese Krfte ttig sind. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 4849)
This quotation makes direct allusion to a famous term from Kants Cri-
tique of Judgment: formative powers (die bildenden Krfte; empha-
sis added). More specifically, Kant held that
Ein organisiertes Wesen ist also nicht blo Maschine: denn die hat lediglich
bewegende Kraft; sondern es besitzt in sich bildende Kraft und zwar eine
solche, die es den Materien mitteilt, welche sie nicht haben (sie organ-
isiert): also eine sich fortpflanzende bildende Kraft, welche durch das Be-
wegungsvermgen allein (den Mechanism) nicht erklrt werden kann.
(Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft sec. 65, AK 5: 374)
300 SEIDENGART
However, Cassirers use of this term departs from his predecessors in
significant ways. For Kant, it was intended to characterize Life (for ex-
ample, the vital powers). For Cassirer, in contrast, bildende Kraft
refers to the activity of Spirit. Thus, Cassirers appropriation of Kants
terminology implies a shift in meaning: mediation no longer stems
from Life, but from the concepts of force (Kraft) and form. Not inci-
dentally, it was these two concepts that had allowed Leibniz to unify
his conception of the universe and to reconcile Matter and Spirit, in-
sofar as force is the substantial element in every being. Leibniz un-
derstood force as a means of passing between the physical and psy-
chic realms (Leibniz, sec. 3, GP 4: 479).
7
THE MEDIUM OF SYMBOLIC FORMS AS A SOLUTION TO
THE IMPASSE IN SCHELERS ANTHROPOLOGY
Cassirer criticizes Schelers anthropology for a deviation in per-
spective, characterized by a shift from a descriptive phenomenologi-
cal style to a metaphysical style tinged with realism. This change
gives rise to an insurmountable ontological opposition between Spirit
(which is hostile to Life) and Life (which is blind to Ideas).
This move toward metaphysical realism can be discerned in Schel-
ers religious vocabulary: for instance, he mentions the power of as-
ceticism (die Kraft der Askese) specific to Spirit (qtd. in Cassirer,
Geist und Leben 50) as opposed to the vital sphere. It is necessary to
rid this metaphysical opposition of its strong absolutist character in
order to avoid the snare of dualism. Therefore, Cassirer reiterates that
the power of asceticism is not an entity in itself, but merely a basic
phenomenon (Grundphnomen) of Spirit:
Sie ist nicht Abkehr vom Leben schlechthin, sondern sie ist eine innere
Wandlung und Umkehr, die das Leben in sich selbst erfhrt. [. . .] Es sind
vielmehr Energien verschiedener Ordnung und gewissermaen ver-
schiedener Dimension. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 51)
Cassirer accepts Schelers idea that the objectification (Objek-
tivierung) of things as such in the world originates in Spirit. But for
Cassirer, this objectification denotes an activity in which Spirit impos-
es the medium (zwischenreich) of symbolic forms between itself and
the world:
Die Gesamtheit seiner Bedingungen lt sich, wie mir scheint, wenn man
in das Zwischenreich der symbolischen Formen eingeht, wenn man die
CASSIRERS PHILOSOPHY 301
verschiedenartigen Bild-Welten betrachtet, die der Mensch zwischen sich
und die Wirklichkeit stellt. [. . .] Die Sprache und die Kunst, der Mythos
und die theoretische Erkenntnis. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 51; empha-
sis in original)
Returning to a central theme developed in The Philosophy of Sym-
bolic Forms (3: 15155) and in the Davoser Disputation with Heideg-
ger (Cassirer and Heidegger 2526), Cassirer explains that through the
intervention of symbol, Spirit passes from the pragmatic space of
grasping and acting (von dem Greif- und Wirkraum) to the space of
intuition and thought (zum Anschauungs- und Denkraum). Cassirer
thus attempts to substitute a functional correlation between Spirit and
Life for Schelers strong metaphysical opposition. The common ground
of this correlation is the formative power that reveals itself both on the
organic level in nature and on the intellectual level in the cultural realm:
Der Geist braucht nicht mehr als ein allem Leben fremdes oder feindlich-
es Prinzip betrachtet, sonder er kann als eine Wendung und Umkehr des
Lebens selbst verstanden werden eine Wandlung, die es in sich selbst
erfhrt, in dem Mae, als es aus dem Kreise des blo organischen Bildens
und Gestaltens in den Kreis der Form der ideellen Gestaltung, eintritt.
(Cassirer, Geist und Leben 5253; emphasis in original)
With this argument, Cassirer claims to have at once solved the diffi-
culties in Schelers anthropology and to have cleared Hegel of the
accusations made against him by the proponents of Lebensphiloso-
phienamely, that he had sacrificed the concept of Life to a panlogist
approach to philosophy. According to Cassirer, Hegel advanced a new
understanding of Life that was no longer characterized by its es-
trangement (Entfremdung) from Spirit. As evidence of Hegels posi-
tion, Cassirer cites the following passage from the Phenomenology of
the Spirit: Die Kraft des Geistes ist nur so gro als ihre uerung,
seine Tiefe nur so tief, als er in seiner Auslegung sich auszubreiten und
sich zu verlieren getraut (Hegel, Phnomenologie 9; qtd. in Cassirer,
Geist und Leben 53). This quotation provides Cassirer an opportunity
to shift Schelers problematic argument to the realm of Spirit. Since
the vital sphere is withdrawn into itself and unable to express itself di-
rectly, Spirit alone is capable of saying no to Life:
Das eigentliche Drama spielt sich nicht zwischen Leben und Geist, sondern
es spielt sich mitten im Gebiete des Geistes selber, ja in seinem eigentlichen
Brennpunkt ab. Denn alles Anklagen ist eine Form des Aussagens; alles
Verurteilen ist eine Form des Urteils: Aussagen und Urteilen aber sind die
Grund- und Urfunktionen des Logos selbst. (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 54)
302 SEIDENGART
Although both Cassirer and Scheler agree on this point in general,
Cassirer goes further in introducing a dialectical point of view: in say-
ing no to Life, Spirit also negates itself. It would seem, then, that Spir-
it possesses a paradoxical nature, insofar as it is capable of both self-
assertion and self-negation. The latter faculty corresponds to the
reflexive form of negation, which Hegel referred to as negativity, that
is particular to the Life of Spirit. Moreover, this dialectical opposition
does not destroy Spirit, but makes it truly what it is. On these
grounds, Cassirer rejects Schelers dilemma as a specious problem
that derives from the projection of an internal drama (which is the re-
sult of the dialectical nature of Spirit) onto the external world.
At the same time, Cassirers brilliant innovation consists in having
expressed this immanent dialectic of Spirit in terms that evoke Kants
juridical vocabulary: accusation (Anklage), conflict (Widerstreit),
court (Gericht), prosecutor (Anklger), advocate (Sachwalter), wit-
ness (Zeuge). Indeed, this paragraph concludes without any reference
to Hegelian terms such as division (Zwiespltigkeit) or contradiction
(Widerspruch). Cassirer employs instead the Kantian concept of con-
flict (Widerstreit), which requires arbitration before the tribunal of cri-
tique. As for the internal conflict of Spirit with itself, Kant had already
clearly stated in his first Critique that
[d]en Gegner aber mssen wir hier jederzeit in uns selbst suchen. Denn
spekulative Vernunft in ihrem transzendentalen Gebrauche ist an sich di-
alektisch. Die Einwrfe, die zu frchten sein mchten, liegen in uns selbst.
(Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft AK 3: 507; S. 707)
This shift from Hegel to Kant is not without foundation, since Hegel
himself had commended Kant for having asserted the nonarbitrary
nature of the dialectic (Hegel, Wissenschaft 23).
8
Nevertheless, in re-
verting to Kants dialectic, Cassirer reinforces an idealist stance that
would be unacceptable for a partisan of Lebensphilosophie.
THE DYNAMIC MEDIATION OF LANGUAGE BETWEEN LIFE
AND SPIRIT
Moving beyond the field of philosophical controversy, Cassirer ends
his article with a discussion of language as a solution to the dualism
between Geist and Leben. To be sure, language is one symbolic form
among others. Yet, it also constitutes the only means for human beings
to extract themselves from the natural order and gain access to the
realm of culture, which in turn provides the conduit from Life to Spirit.
CASSIRERS PHILOSOPHY 303
When Scheler attempts in the Stellung to define the essential dif-
ference between humans and animals, he focuses not on language
but on what the Greeks called Reason and what he refers to as Spir-
it (Geist). In contrast, Cassirer argues that language is not a fixed sub-
stantial entity, but rather lebendige dynamische Funktion (Cassirer,
Geist und Leben 56). In so doing, he claims to have truly overcome
the opposition between Geist and Leben, since language is a living,
existing thing, the use (Gebrauch) and handling (Handhabung) of
which are the work of Spirit.
For Cassirer, the shift from a substantial to a functional concep-
tion of language offers a way out of the impasse encountered in
Schelers anthropology. On this point, Cassirer claims to draw inspi-
ration from Wilhelm von Humboldt, for whom language was consid-
ered not as an ergon (the result of a work), but as an energeia
that is, as a living activity (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 57). Thus,
language no longer appears as a system of rigid rules or prohibitions
that would be opposed to Life. On the contrary, it functions as a
form-creating power: Vielmehr ist es die ursprngliche Schpfer-
kraft der Sprache, die auch dieser Welt [. . .] immer neue Bewe-
gungsimpulse zufhrt (Cassirer, Geist und Leben 57). In this pas-
sage, Cassirer draws on his previous explanation of the concept of
active power. The common root of Life and Spirit is the activity of
formative force. Human beings apply this force through language,
which is the matrix of all the other symbolic forms. Ultimately, lan-
guage facilitates an active mediation between Life and Spirit. More
generally, it establishes a link (Zusammenhang) between the par-
ticular and the universal: everything is particular in relation to
Life, whereas Spirit alone is capable of ascending to the level of the
universal. In the last resort, then, Cassirer remains close to the uni-
versalist ideal of the Aufklrer.
Indeed, in demonstrating that the symbolic function of language ac-
tively overcomes the metaphysical dualism between Life and Spirit,
Cassirer remains faithful to the critical position he adopted previously
in Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff. However, he also profits from
the fruitful gains he made in The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, where
he argued that
[j]ede echte geistige Grundfunktion hat mit der Erkenntnis den einen
entscheidenden Zug gemeinsam, da ihr eine ursprnglichbildende, nicht
blo eine nachbildende Kraft innewohnt. (Cassirer, Philosophie 1: 9)
304 SEIDENGART
Such evidence points to the conclusion that Cassirer has resolved
the problem posed by Schelers Stellung, but on his own terms. Even
so, it is important to note that Cassirers fundamental philosophical
options diverged from those of Scheler, whose aim was to describe the
modalities of emotional intuition in a realm that was accessible to Life,
but not to pure reason.
Universit de Paris XNanterre
NOTES
1. The original text follows: So soll der kritische Teil, der anfangs diesen
Band abschlieen sollte, einer eigenen knftigen Verffentlichung vorbehalten
werden, die ich unter dem Titel: Leben und Geist zur Kritik der Philoso-
phie der Gegenwart demnchst vorlegen zu knnen hoffe (Cassirer, Philoso-
phie 3: ix).
2. Max Scheler lived from 18741928.
3. Heinrich von Kleist (17771811), ber das Marionettentheater (1810).
Cassirer also referred to this work in the introduction to book 3 of The Philos-
ophy of Symbolic Forms.
4. Nevertheless, Scheler seems to be very critical of Klages (cf. Stellung).
5. This is a common theme of the Marburger Schule (Marburg School)
since Hermann Cohen. First, there is the temporal flow of phenomena. To un-
derstand this flow, the Spirit must establish some fixed points, some invari-
ants, and combine them with phenomenal variations. This is the case not only
in the use of language, with its symbolic function, but also in the perception
that distinguishes between thing and properties, and finally in the sciences,
employing functional equations that combine the relations between invariants
and variables.
6. Cf. Spinoza, Ethica 2: prop. 43, scholium.
7. Leibniz: Je trouvai donc que leur nature consiste dans la force et que de
cela sensuit quelque chose danalogique au sentiment et lapptit; et quain-
si il fallait les concevoir limitation de la notion que nous avons des mes.
8. Hegel: Kant hat die Dialektik hher gestellt und diese Seite gehrt
unter die grten seiner Verdienste , indem er ihr den Schein von Willkhr
nahm, den sie nach der gewhnlichen Vorstellung hatte und sie als ein
notwendiges Tun der Vernunft darstellte (Wissenschaft 23).
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