EN BANC

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ G.R. No. 141524

FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO,
LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB
OBANIA AND DOMINGO Present :
CABACUNGAN,
Petitioners, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO and
GARCIA, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS
OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO,
namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,
SALVADOR and CARMEN, all
surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON.
ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding
Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial
Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
Respondents. Promulgated :
September 14, 2005
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J .:

Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito
Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for
annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest
Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs
of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and
Carmen.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and
respondents) filed various motions with the trial court. Among these were:
(1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the
Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2)
the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of
the Philippines, respectively.

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public
respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as
follows: (1) the petitioners motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands
and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their failure to
file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo
because the substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the
Land Banks motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied
because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be
determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent
heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there
were factual matters that could be determined only after trial.
[1]


The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very
well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the
complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.

In an order
[2]
dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed
petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.
Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3,
1998 and, on the 15
th
day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion
for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order
dismissing the motion for reconsideration
[3]
which petitioners received on
July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal
[4]
and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal,
holding that it was filed eight days late.
[5]
This was received by petitioners
on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too
was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.
[6]


Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of
appeal before the Court of Appeals.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably
filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the
day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for
reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the
reglementary period for appeal.
[7]


On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the
petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been
reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12,
1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the
order was the final order appealable under the Rules. It held further:

Perforce the petitioners tardy appeal was correctly
dismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal within the
reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirement is
fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory.
[8]



Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned
decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.

In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules,
petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate
court:




I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE
HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE
PETITIONERS APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL
MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE
APPEAL DOCKET FEES.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN
RULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE
RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT
PETITIONERS APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN
PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF
THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF
APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET
FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE WORDS FINAL ORDER IN SECTION 3,
RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL
REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE
HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998
INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1,
1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS
THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC.
V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE
THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE
SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE
ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
[9]



The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within
which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a
part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one
who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements
of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to
appeal.
[10]
The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural
rules. BP 129,
[11]
as amended, provides:

Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of
the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed
from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period
for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of
judgment appealed from. x x x


Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment
or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final
order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely
motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of
time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed. (emphasis supplied)


Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15
days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final
judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits
which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be
an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
[12]


As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998
denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the final
order, not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint.
Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for
reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998.

What therefore should be deemed as the final order, receipt of
which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order
dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,
[13]
the trial
court declared petitionerQuelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his
complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus
motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the
15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another
order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of
appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been filed out of time.

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15
days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that
was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared
that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of
dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what
ended the issues raised there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan
v. Haldeman et al.
[14]
where we again considered the order denying
petitioner Apuyans motion for reconsideration as the final order which
finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners view
that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.

We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the
15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice
of appeal on time?

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the
15
th
day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not
file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration.
According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-
day appeal period.
[15]
It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the
last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day
left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their
MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to
a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the final order or the order
dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there that they
only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of
appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar cases,
[16]
premised on
the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional.
[17]
The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of
public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the
judgments and awards of courts must become final at some definite time
fixed by law.
[18]


Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by
serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court
within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a
notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The
time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or
for new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such
motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.

But where such motion has been filed during office hours of
the last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be
perfected within the day following that in which the party
appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.
[19]

(emphasis supplied)


According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously
consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15
days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial
Reorganization
[20]
that drafted BP 129, the raison d etre behind the
amendment was to shorten the period of appeal
[21]
and enhance the
efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict
observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we
condoned late filing of notices of appeal,
[22]
and only in very exceptional
instances to better serve the ends of justice.

In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v.
Municipality of Libmanan,
[23]
however, we declared that appeal is an
essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not
be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised the lower courts to
be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every
party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,
[24]
we stated that, as a rule, periods
which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under
exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be
excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay
incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and
justice.

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to
tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the
extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those
situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not
meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But
we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not
stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the
commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have
always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement
of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full
opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.
[25]


The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all
courts.
[26]
It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish
new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy
disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of
Appeals, particularly Rules 42,
[27]
43
[28]
and 45,
[29]
the Court allows
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties
to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical
to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
[30]


Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the
Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies
[31]
to the
Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
[32]
The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion
for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal
within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of
receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules
which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies.
[33]
Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the
notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or
within 15 days from notice of the final order, which we already determined
to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of
BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to
hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case
March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still
applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a
party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this
manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given
another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or
rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch
and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we
likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to
when the 15-day appeal period should be counted from receipt of notice
of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of final order
appealed from (July 22, 1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal
within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it
within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-
day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the
decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal
period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five
days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on
July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal
period of 15 days, as already discussed.
[34]


We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso
(Philippines), Inc. v. IAC
[35]
since the Court of Appeals never even referred
to it in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
decision of the Court of AppealsREVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 145420 September 19, 2006
A. RAFAEL C. DINGLASAN, JR. petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
Before this Court is a Petition for New Trial and, in the alternative, for the
Reopening of the Case
1
on the ground of newly discovered evidence filed
by A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr. (Dinglasan) who was found guilty
2
of
violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing
Checks Law, by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 62, in
Criminal Case No. 21238.
On 17 August 1985, Elmyra Trading Corporation (Elmyra), represented by
its President, Dinglasan, and Antrom, Inc. (Antrom), also represented by its
President, Antonio Garcia Jr., entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
whereby the parties agreed that Antrom will extend credit accommodation
in favor of Elmyra to finance its prawn business. The latter, in turn, will
issue checks to guarantee the payment of its obligations.
A few months after a number of financing transactions were made,
Elmyra's indebtedness to Antrom reached the amount of P1,476,000.58.
As initial payment, Dinglasan issued a Commercial Bank (drawee bank)
Check No. HO270451 with Antrom as payee, but postdated on 3 October
1985 in the amount of P515,000.00. Upon presentment for payment with
the drawee bank, however, the said check was dishonored for insufficiency
of funds.
Consequently, on 16 December 1985, an Information
3
charging Dinglasan
with Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed before the RTC of
Makati, Branch 62, docketed as Criminal Case No. 21238, People of the
Philippines v. A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr. The Information reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of October, 1985, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, well knowing that he has no
sufficient funds in or credit with the bank, did there and then willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make out and issue Commercial Bank of Manila
Check No. H0207451 dated October 3, 1985 in the amount of P515,000.00
in payment of his obligation to Antrom Inc., represented by Rosanna E.
Velasco, but when said check was presented to the bank for payment, the
same was dishonored and/or refused payment for reason "Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds" and accused, despite repeated demands and lapse of
five (5) banking days from notice thereof, failed and refused to make good
the said check and/or to deposit with the drawee bank the necessary
amount to cover the aforesaid check, to the damage and prejudice of the
herein complainant in the aforementioned amount of P515,000.00
On 16 December 1991, the trial court convicted Dinglasan for having
committed the crime charged. In a Decision
4
promulgated on the same date,
the court a quo found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. The dispositive portion reads this wise:
WHEREFORE, finding accused A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
an imprisonment of one year and to pay a fine of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.00); and, to indemnify ANTROM, INC., the sum of Five
Hundred Fifteen (sic) (P515,000.00) Pesos, at [the] legal rate of interest
from October 3, 1985, until the full amount of P515,000.0 is fully paid.
Dinglasan, thereafter, filed a Motion for Reconsideration
5
which was denied
by the same court for lack of merit in an Order
6
issued on 4 September
1992.
On 25 September 1992, Dinglasan appealed to the Court of Appeals the
adverse RTC Decision dated 16 December 1991, finding him guilty of
violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and the RTC Order dated 4 September
1992, denying his Motion for Reconsideration.
7

On 26 October 1998, the appellate court in CA-G.R. CR No. 14138, People
of the Philippines v. A. Rafael. C. Dinglasan, handed down a
Decision,
8
dismissing the appeal, thereby, affirming in toto the Decision of
the RTC finding Dinglasan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Decision now on
appeal is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accused-appellant.
Aggrieved, the accused filed before this Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari
9
questioning the 26 October 1998 Decision of the Court of
Appeals. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 137800, A. Rafael C.
Dinglasan v. Court of Appeals, and was raffled to the Third Division of this
Court. In a Resolution
10
dated 28 June 1999, this Court resolved to deny
the petition for failure to show that a reversible error had been committed
by the appellate court.
A Motion for Reconsideration
11
was then filed by Dinglasan on 26 August
1999, but the same was again denied by this Court in a Resolution dated
13 September 1999 for failure to raise substantial arguments that would
warrant reconsideration of the Resolution dated 28 June 1999 with an ad
cautelam that such denial is final.
12

Undaunted, Dinglasan filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration but the
same was merely noted without action by this Court in view of the En Banc
Resolution dated 7 April 1987 that no motion for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration of a judgment or a final resolution by the same
party shall be entertained. In a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, this
Court directed that no further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.
The Resolution of this Court dated 28 June 1999 denying Dinglasan's
Petition for Review became final and executory on 14 October 1999 as
evidenced by the Entry of Judgment.
13

By virtue of the final and executory judgment rendered by this Court in G.R.
No. 137800, the prosecution, on 19 September 2000, filed a motion
14
with
the RTC for the issuance of the warrant of arrest and writ of execution in
order to satisfy the judgment. The prosecution likewise prayed that a hold-
departure order be issued in order to prevent Dinglasan from leaving the
country until he has fully served his sentence.
In an Order
15
issued on 21 September 2000, the trial court, acting on the
said motion, issued a warrant for the arrest of Dinglasan and a writ of
execution for the enforcement of his civil liability and, at the same time,
enjoining him from leaving the country.
Alarmed, Dinglasan on 30 October 2000, filed the instant Petition for New
Trial and, in the alternative, for the Reopening of the Case
16
based on
newly discovered evidence, which was docketed as G.R. No. 145420,
entitled, "A. Rafael C. Dinglasan Jr. v. Court of Appeals." He urges this
Court to uphold substantial justice, emphasizing that the newly discovered
evidence he seeks to introduce in this case is so material and of such
weight that, if, admitted would probably change the judgment, hence,
suspension of procedural rules is warranted.
The alleged newly discovered evidence claimed by Dinglasan are the
affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan, in her capacity as Executive Vice-
President and Treasurer of Elmyra, and Ma. Encarnacion Vda. De
Dinglasan, the wife of Mariano Dinglasan, who, during his lifetime, was the
Cashier and Liaison Officer of the same company. These affidavits,
together with the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 attached to
Solidbank Manager's Check No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 sent by Ma.
Elena Dinglasan to Antrom, tends to prove that Dinglasan made good of
the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor. He could not,
therefore, be validly convicted of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for one
of the essential elements of the offense, that is, the drawer failed and
refused to make good the said check within five banking days from the
notice of dishonor, is absent.
In her affidavit,
17
Ma. Elena Dinglasan attested that she was the Executive
Vice-President and Treasurer of Elmyra for the period of 1985-1986. As
such, she was in-charge of disbursing and sourcing of corporation funds
including the preparation of checks and approval of vouchers supporting
the disbursements. In the course of its business, the affiant caused the
issuance of Commercial Bank Check No. 270451 on 27 September 1985 in
the amount of P515,000.00, but postdated on 3 October 1985, which was
dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds and which eventually
caused Dinglasan's conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Upon receiving the notice of dishonor, she caused the preparation of
Solidbank Manager's Check No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 in the
amount of P150,000.00 intended to cover a part of the amount of the
bounced check. The Solidbank check, together with its transmittal letter
dated 8 October 1985, stating the purpose of the said check, was sent to
Antrom and was received by its representative as evidenced by the
signature appearing on the receiving copy thereof.
Explaining why the said transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 was
belatedly offered as evidence on this case, Ma. Elena Dinglasan reasoned
that that she was not aware that the said letter has any significance on
Dinglasan's liability. She explained further that in 1993 she was diagnosed
of breast cancer and had to undergo surgical operation and chemotherapy.
To corroborate the statements of Ma. Elena Dinglasan, Encarnacion Vda.
De Dinglasan on her part, narrated under oath that her late husband used
to bring some of Elmyra's documents home to work on at night and after
her husband's death in 1994, such documents were kept inside a box and
left somewhere in one corner of their house. It was only when a minor
renovation was made therein several years after her husband passed away
that she was able to chance upon the said documents again. The said
documents were turned over to Dinglasan on 21 October 2000. It was later
discovered that the said documents include the transmittal letter dated 8
October 1985 sent by Ma. Elena Dinglasan to Antrom.
18

In contrast, private respondent Antrom contends that the Petition for New
Trial and/or Reopening of the Case based on newly discovered evidence
should be dismissed on the ground that the same is procedurally and
substantially defective.
19

Elaborating, Antrom claims that under the Revised Rules of Court, the
Motion for New Trial should be filed at any time after the appeal from the
lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of the appellate
court convicting the accused becomes final. The judgment of this Court in
G.R. No. 137800 dated 28 June 1999 became final and executory on 14
October 1999 as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment. The present petition,
on the other hand, was filed only on 30 October 2000 or a year after the
finality of the decision in G.R. No. 137800. The filing of the instant action,
therefore, has already prescribed.
20

Moreover, Antrom continues, considering for the sake of argument that the
instant action was filed within the reglementary period, still, the petition
must fail for the requisites for newly discovered evidence as ground for new
trial were not satisfactorily complied with. Let it be noted that the transmittal
letter dated 8 October 1995 was previously attached as evidence in a
Petition for Review filed by Dinglasan before the Ministry of Justice (now
the Department of Justice) on 15 December 1986, assailing the Resolution
of the Fiscal dated 11 December 1986 recommending the filing of
Information against him. The same letter was also introduced as evidence
before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14138 when Dinglasan
assailed the RTC decision dated 16 December 1991. Hence, the claim that
the alleged evidence was not available during the trial in the courts below,
and is thus, newly discovered is erroneous, if not misleading.
21

Finally, Antrom stresses that, granting for the sake of argument, that the
petition at bar was filed on time and the alleged evidence is newly
discovered within the purview of the law, such evidence introduced and
admitted, nevertheless, would not exculpate Dinglasan from liability. The
gravamen of the offense is the act of the drawer in making or issuing a
check with the full knowledge that he does not have sufficient funds to
cover the amount. Such awareness was admitted by Dinglasan when he
expressly requested Antrom not to deposit the check without his explicit
conformity in anticipation that such check will be dishonored if presented
for payment. The mere act of issuing a worthless check and not the
nonpayment of the obligation is punished by law because of its deleterious
effect on public interest.
The Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, on their
part, submitted that the instant petition should be dismissed because it was
filed out of time and Dinglasan's evidence sought to be admitted is neither
material nor newly discovered so as to warrant new trial or reopening of the
case. The alleged evidence if introduced and admitted, would not in any
way alter the judgment. Upon perusal of the transmittal letter dated 8
October 1985, it was nowhere stated therein that Solidbank Manager's
Check No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 was intended as partial payment
of Commercial Bank Check No. 270451 dated 3 October 1985 that
bounced. The said letter was a mere proposal wherein a payment in kind or
dacion en pago was offered by Elmyra. The Solicitor General likewise
noted that the letter dated 8 October 1986 was already introduced as
evidence in the Petition for Review with the Ministry of Justice filed by
Dinglasan.
22

For the resolution of this Court are the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT PETITION WAS FILED ON
TIME.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT A NEW TRIAL OR REOPENING OF THE
CASE BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE SHOULD BE
ALLOWED.
The pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Rule 124 Procedure in the Court of Appeals.
Section 14. Motion for New Trial. At any time after the appeal from
the lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of the
Court of Appeals convicting the accused becomes final, the latter
may move for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence
material to his defense. The motion shall conform to the provisions of
section 4 Rule 121. (Emphasis supplied.)
Explicit from the above stated rule that a Motion for New Trial should be
filed before the judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused
becomes final.
While Dinglasan agrees with the above stated rules that the instant petition
should be filed before the finality of the judgment convicting the appellant,
he, however argues that judgment attains finality only upon the receipt of
the order or resolution denying his second motion for reconsideration.
Dinglasan's argument is without merit.
Let it be recalled that Dinglasan's Motion for Leave to File Second Motion
for Reconsideration was denied by this Court as the subject matter thereof
is a prohibited pleading and that the Motion for Reconsideration was merely
noted without action. This order is issued pursuant to En Banc Resolution
dated 7 April 1999 which prohibits any motion for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration and was further emphasized by the provision of
the Revised Rules of Court which provides that:
Rule 52. Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. No second motion
for reconsideration of a judgment or a final resolution by the same
party shall be entertained.
This prohibition is justified by public policy which demands that at the
risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must become final at
some definitive date fixed by law.
23

To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the
resolution or order denying the second motion for reconsideration would
result to an absurd situation whereby courts will be obliged to issue orders
or resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in the first place, in order
that the period for the finality of judgments shall run, thereby, prolonging
the disposition of cases. Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to
forestall the running of the period of finality of judgments by virtue of filing a
prohibited pleading; such a situation is not only illogical but also unjust to
the winning party.
It bears stressing further that on 14 October 1999, the Resolution of this
Court in G.R. No. 137800 dated 28 June 1999 became final and executory
as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment according to the pertinent provision
of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads:
Rule 51. - Judgment.
"Sec. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or
motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided
in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be
entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date
when the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be
deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the
dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed
by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution
has become final and executory.
After the judgment or final resolution is entered in the entries of
judgment, the case shall be laid to rest. A decision that acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable and it may no longer be
modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by
the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
24

Very clearly, the filing of the instant Petition for New Trial and/or Reopening
of the Case on 30 October 2000 was made way beyond the prescriptive
period for doing so. The claim of Dinglasan that he honestly believed that
this Court will appreciate his defense of payment as reiterated in his
Second Motion for Reconsideration which was why he deemed it pre-
mature to file the instant petition before receiving the Court's ruling on the
said motion, could not be given credence.
The finality of decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made to
depend on the convenience of the party. To rule otherwise would
completely negate the purpose of the rule on completeness of service,
which is to place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgment and processes
beyond the power of the party being served to determine at his pleasure.
25

Dinglasan further asseverates that this petition was belatedly made
because the evidence sought to be admitted were not available at the time
the instant petition should have been filed. Accordingly, he claims that this
evidence falls within the purview of newly discovered evidence as
contemplated by law.
The pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Rule 121 New Trial or Reconsideration.
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on
any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the accused have been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the
accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment.
The requisites for newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule
121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: (a) the evidence
was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably
change the judgment.
26

These standards, also known as the "Berry Rule," trace their origin to the
1851 case of Berry v. State of Georgia
27
where the Supreme Court of
Georgia held:
Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence, are not
favored by the Courts. x x x Upon the following points there seems to be a
pretty general concurrence of authority, viz; that it is incumbent on a party
who asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence, to
satisfy the Court, 1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge since
the trial. 2d. That it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not
come sooner. 3d. That it is so material that it would produce a different
verdict, if the new trial were granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative only - viz;
speaking to facts, in relation to which there was evidence on the trial. 5th.
That the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced, or its absence
accounted for. And 6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the only object of
the testimony is to impeach the character or credit of a witness.
These guidelines have since been followed by our courts in determining the
propriety of motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of
showing that the new evidence he seeks to present has complied with the
requisites to justify the holding of a new trial.
28

The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a "newly
discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due
diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two
aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a
predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered.
29

Applying the foregoing test, Dinglasan insists, and the affidavits of Ma.
Elena Dinglasan and Encarnacion Vda. De Dinglasan attest, that the
transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 was discovered recently or just
before the time the affidavits were executed on 23 October 2000. The
records, however, show otherwise.
In CA-G.R. CR No. 14138, it appears that the appellate court already
considered that transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 in rendering its
Decision dated 26 October 1998. The pertinent portion of the Decision
reads:
It appears, however, that in accused-appellant's letter dated October 10,
1986, (Exhibit "B") no mention was made of the two (2) manager's checks,
considering that at least one of the two (2), both dated October 8, 1988 (pp.
2-3, Records) was allegedly given to private complainant on the said date
(pp. 69-70, Ibid.). Instead a proposal wherein payment in kind or dacion en
pago was offered by accused-appellant. Also, the trial court correctly noted
that, "x x x accused is a lawyer and a businessman. He will not part of more
than one million pesos, in the form of manager's checks, as replacement of
a check that bounced, without any supporting document." (p. 8, Decision,
Criminal Case No. 21238).
We are in accord with the findings of the lower court that there is no
evidence establishing that accused-appellant asked for the return of the
Combank Check in the same way that the PTB Check had been returned,
other than stating in his letter of October 8, 1985 that said check had been
considered cancelled (p. 69, Records), and after the Combank Check had
already bounced. (p. 10, Brief for Accused-Appellant). Its quite absurd that
accused-appellant would replace the Combank Check with an amount
more than the P515,000.00, if the whole indebtedness was still subject to
final liquidation. As evidenced by the voucher (Exhibit "5") accused-
appellant issued Combank Check in exchange for PTB Check. Hence, it is
quite quizzical why accused-appellant did not ask for the return of the
Combank check after having issued two (2) manager's check.
30
(Emphasis
supplied.)
Verily, the claim of Dinglasan that the alleged evidence sought to be
presented in this case was recently discovered is a falsity. It is a desperate
attempt to mislead this Court to give due course to a cause that has long
been lost. Dinglasan appeals for the compassion of this Court but never did
so in good faith. It is contrary to human experience to have overlooked an
evidence which was decisively claimed to have such significance that might
probably change the judgment.
The records are very clear. The transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 was
already offered as evidence in CA-G.R. CR No. 14138 and was even
annexed to the Petition for Review filed before the Court of Appeals as
Annex "B." Irrefragably, the letter dated 8 October 1985 is not newly
discovered. It is an attempt to raise again a defense which was already
weighed by the appellate court. A contrary ruling may open the floodgates
to an endless review of decisions, where losing litigants, in delaying the
disposition of cases, invoke evidence already presented, whether through a
motion for reconsideration or for a new trial, in guise of newly discovered
evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DISMISSED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION


BERNARDO DE LEON,
Petitioner,

-versus-

PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
substituted by the CITY OF
PARAAQUE, RAMON ARELLANO,
JR., RICARDO PENA and REYMUNDO
ORPILLA,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY (now
PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION
AUTHORITY), substituted by the CITY
OF PARAAQUE,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 181970











G.R. No. 182678

Present:
-versus-

HON. SELMA PALACIO ALARAS,in
her capacity as the Acting Presiding
Judge of Branch 135, Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, and BERNARDO
DE LEON.
Respondents.

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
*

PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.


Promulgated:

August 3, 2010
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J .:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions.
G.R. No. 181970 is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court filed by Bernardo de Leon seeking the reversal and
setting aside of the Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
November 21, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 90328 which dismissed his petition
for certiorari. De Leon also assails the CA Resolution
[2]
dated March 4,
2008 denying his Motion for Reconsideration.

On the other hand, G.R. No. 182678 is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by the Public Estates Authority
(PEA)
[3]
seeking the nullification of the Orders dated December 28, 2007
and March 4, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch
135 in Civil Case No. 93-143.

The pertinent factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as
summarized by the CA, are as follows:

On [January 15, 1993], petitioner Bernardo De Leon (De
Leon) filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction before the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Makati City,
raffled to Branch 135, against respondent Public Estates Authority
(PEA), a government-owned corporation, as well as its officers,
herein private respondents Ramon Arellano, Jr., Ricardo Pena
and Reymundo Orpilla. The suit for damages hinged on the
alleged unlawful destruction of De Leons fence and houses
constructed on Lot 5155 containing an area of 11,997 square
meters, situated in San Dionisio, Paraaque, which De Leon
claimed has been in the possession of his family for more than 50
years. Essentially, De Leon prayed that one, lawful possession
of the land in question be awarded to him; two, PEA be ordered to
pay damages for demolishing the improvements constructed on
Lot 5155; and, three, an injunctive relief be issued to enjoin PEA
from committing acts which would violate his lawful and peaceful
possession of the subject premises.

The court a quo found merit in De Leons application for
writ of preliminary injunction and thus issued the Order dated 8
February 1993, pertinent portions of which read:
After a careful consideration of the evidence
presented and without going into the actual merits
of the case, this Court finds that plaintiff (De Leon)
has duly established by preponderance of evidence
that he has a legal right over the subject matter of the
instant case and is entitled to the injunctive relief
demanded for and may suffer irreparable damage or
injury if such right is not protected by Law [Rules (sic)
58, Section 3 of the Revised (Rules of Court)].

Premises considered upon plaintiffs (De
Leons) filing of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00,
let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against
the defendants, their agents, representatives and
other persons (PEA and its officers) acting for and in
their behalf are hereby enjoined from disturbing the
peaceful possession of plaintiff (De Leon) and his
co-owners over Lot 5155 and further, from destroying
and/or removing whatever other improvements
thereon constructed, until further orders of this Court.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

PEA sought recourse before the Supreme Court through
a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for a Restraining Order,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion against the court a quo for
issuing injunctive relief. The Petition was later referred to this
Court for proper determination and disposition, and was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 30630.

On 30 September 1993, the Ninth Division of this Court
rendered a Decision discerning that the court a quo did not act in
a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power in issuing
the writ of preliminary injunction against PEA. The Ninth Division
ruled that the court a quo was precisely careful to state in
its Order that it was without going into the actual merits of the
case and that the words plaintiff (De Leon) and his co-owners
were used by the court a quo rather loosely and did not intend it
to be an adjudication of ownership.

Unfazed, PEA appealed to the Supreme Court via
a Petition for Certiorari insisting that Lot 5155 was a salvage zone
until it was reclaimed through government efforts in 1982. The
land was previously under water on the coastline which reached
nine to twenty meters deep. In 1989, PEA started constructing R-
1 Toll Expressway Road for the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,
which project directly traversed Lot 5155. PEA argued that the
documentary evidence presented by De Leon to bolster his
fallacious claim of possession and ownership were procured only
in 1992, thus negating his very own allegation that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in occupation since time
immemorial.

Ruling squarely on the issue adduced before it, the
Supreme Court declared that Lot 5155 was a public land so that
De Leons occupation thereof, no matter how long ago, could not
confer ownership or possessory rights. Prescinding therefrom, no
writ of injunction may lie to protect DeLeons nebulous right of
possession. Accordingly, in its Decision dated 20 November 2000,
the Supreme Court disposed of the controversy in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
30630, andDISMISSES the complaint in Civil Case
No. 93-143 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

The aforesaid Decision became final and executory as no
motion for reconsideration was filed. In due course, PEA moved
for the issuance of a writ of execution praying that De Leon and
persons claiming rights under him be ordered to vacate and
peaceably surrender possession of Lot5155.

Acting on PEAs motion, the court a quo issued the first
assailed Order dated 15 September 2004, viz:

Acting on the Motion For Issuance Of Writ of
Execution filed by defendant Public Estate[s]
Authority, and finding the same to be impressed with
merit, the same is GRANTED.

Let a Writ of Execution issue directing plaintiff,
his agents, principals, successors-in-interest and all
persons claiming rights under him to vacate and
peaceably turn over possession of Lot 5155 to
defendant Public Estate[s] Authority.

SO ORDERED.

As could well be expected, De Leon moved for
reconsideration thereof and quashal of the writ of execution. He
adamantly insisted that the court a quos Order for the issuance of
the writ of execution completely deviated from the dispositive
portion of the Supreme Courts Decisiondated 20 November 2000
as it did not categorically direct him to surrender possession
of Lot 5155 in favor of PEA.

However, both motions met the same fate as these were
denied by the court a quo in the second disputed Order dated 29
April 2005.
[4]




Dissatisfied, De Leon filed another Motion for Reconsideration dated
July 1, 2005, but the same was denied by the RTC in an Order dated July
27, 2005.

De Leon then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
assailing the September 15, 2004 and April 29, 2005 Orders of the RTC of
Makati City. This was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90328. In the same
proceeding, De Leon filed an Urgent-Emergency Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction but
the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated April 24, 2006.

Subsequently, De Leon filed a second special civil action
for certiorari with the CA seeking to annul and set aside the same RTC
Orders dated September 15, 2004 and April 29, 2005, as well as the RTC
Order of July 27, 2005. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90984.

On July 26, 2006, PEA filed a Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ
of Demolition
[5]
praying that the RTC issue a Special Order directing De
Leon and persons claiming under him to remove all improvements erected
inside the premises of the subject property and, in case of failure to remove
the said structures, that a Special Order and Writ of Demolition be issued
directing the sheriff to remove and demolish the said improvements.

On October 11, 2006, the RTC issued an Order
[6]
holding in
abeyance the Resolution of PEAs Motion. PEA filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,
[7]
but it was denied by the RTC in an Order
[8]
dated
January 12, 2007.

On February 27, 2007, PEA filed an Omnibus Motion
[9]
to dismiss or,
in the alternative, resolve the petitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 90328 and CA-
G.R. SP No. 90984.

In its Decision
[10]
dated March 21, 2007, the CA dismissed De Leons
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90984 on the ground of forum shopping.

Subsequently, on November 21, 2007, the CA also dismissed De
Leons petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90328 holding that an earlier decision
promulgated by the Supreme Court, finding the subject property to be
public and that De Leon has no title and no clear legal right over the
disputed lot, has already attained finality.
[11]
De Leon filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the CA denied it via its Resolution
[12]
dated March 4,
2008.

Thereafter, PEA filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve (Re: Very Urgent
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Demolition).
[13]


On December 28, 2007, the RTC issued an Order
[14]
holding in
abeyance the resolution of PEAs Motion pending receipt by the trial court
of the entry of judgment pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 90328. PEA filed a
Motion for Reconsideration.
[15]


In its Order dated March 4, 2008, the RTC issued an Order denying
PEAs Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 23, 2008, De Leon filed the present petition for review
on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 181970, assailing the November 21,
2007 Decision of the CA.

Subsequently, on May 15, 2008, PEA, on the other hand, filed the
instant special civil action for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 182678,
questioning the Orders of the RTC of Makati City, dated December 28,
2007 and March 4, 2008.

In G.R. No. 181970, De Leon questions the Decision of the CA on the
following grounds: (a) he can only be removed from the subject land
through ejectment proceedings; (b) the Decision of this Court in G.R. No.
112172 merely ordered the dismissal of De Leons complaint for damages
in Civil Case No. 93-143; and (c) even though petitioner is not the owner
and has no title to the subject land, mere prior possession is only required
for the establishment of his right.

In G.R. No. 182678, the sole issue raised is whether respondent
judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders
which held in abeyance the resolution of PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a
Writ of Demolition.

On February 25, 2009, PEA and the City of Paraaque filed a Joint
Motion for Substitution stating that PEA had transferred its ownership and
ceded its interests over the subject property to the City of Paraaque as full
payment for all of the formers real property tax liabilities. As a
consequence, the movants prayed that PEA be substituted by the City
of Paraaque as petitioner in G.R. No. 182678 and respondent in G.R. No.
181970.
[16]


In a Resolution
[17]
dated on October 14, 2009, this Court granted the
Motion for Substitution filed by PEA and the City ofParaaque.

The issues raised in the present petitions boil down to the question of
whether PEA is really entitled to possess the subject property and, if
answered in the affirmative, whether the RTC should proceed to hear
PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition.

The Court rules for PEA.
The question of ownership and rightful possession of the subject
property had already been settled and laid to rest in this Courts Decision
dated November 20, 2000 in G.R. No. 112172 entitled, Public Estates
Authority v. Court of Appeals (PEA v. CA).
[18]
In the said case, the Court
ruled thus:

The issue raised is whether respondent and his brothers
and sisters were lawful owners and possessors of Lot 5155 by
mere claim of ownership by possession for a period of at least fifty
(50) years.

The Court of Appeals ruled that respondent Bernardo de
Leon and his brothers and sisters were lawful owners and
possessors of Lot 5155 entitled to protection by injunction against
anyone disturbing their peaceful possession of said Lot.

The ruling is erroneous. An applicant seeking to establish
ownership of land must conclusively show that he is the owner in
fee simple, for the standing presumption is that all lands belong to
the public domain of the State, unless acquired from the
Government either by purchase or by grant, except lands
possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain, or that it
had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.

In this case, the land in question is admittedly public.
The respondent Bernardo de Leon has no title thereto at all.
His claim of ownership is based on mere possession by
himself and his predecessors-in-interests, who claim to have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land in question, under a bona fide claim
of ownership for a period of at least fifty (50) years.However,
the survey plan for the land was approved only in 1992, and
respondent paid the realty taxes thereon on October 30, 1992,
shortly before the filing of the suit below for damages with
injunction. Hence, respondent must be deemed to begin asserting
his adverse claim to Lot 5155 only in 1992. More, Lot 5155 was
certified as alienable and disposable on March 27, 1972, per
certificate of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. It is obvious that respondents possession has
not ripened into ownership.

x x x x

Consequently, respondent De Leon has no clear legal
right to the lot in question, and a writ of injunction will not lie to
protect such nebulous right of possession. x x x
[19]


The Court does not subscribe to De Leons argument that the issues
of ownership and possession of the subject lot should not have been taken
up by the court on the ground that his complaint is only for damages.
De Leon must be aware that his action for damages is anchored on his
claim that he owns and possesses the subject property.
[20]
On this basis, it
would be inevitable for the court to discuss the issues of whether he, in
fact, owns the disputed property and, as such, has the right to possess the
same. Moreover, it is clear from this Courts Decision in PEA v. CA that the
main issue resolved therein was whether respondent [De Leon] and his
brothers and sisters were the lawful owners and possessors of Lot 5155 by
mere claim of ownership by possession for a period of at least fifty (50)
years.

De Leon insists that what this Court did in PEA v. CA was to simply
dismiss his complaint for damages and nothing more, and that the RTC
erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of execution
placing PEA in possession of the disputed property. He insists that he can
only be removed from the disputed property through an ejectment
proceeding.

The Court is not persuaded.

As a general rule, a writ of execution
should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an
execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or
award.
[21]
The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must
conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment
promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to
enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be
executed.
[22]


However, it is equally settled that possession is an essential attribute
of ownership.
[23]
Where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in
the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be
considered included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated partys
claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of
ownership.
[24]
Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the
delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to
possess the land independently of his claim of ownership which was
rejected.
[25]
This is precisely what happened in the present case. This Court
had already declared the disputed property as owned by the State and that
De Leon does not have any right to possess the land independent of his
claim of ownership.

In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is
essentially an order to place the prevailing party in possession of the
property.
[26]
If the defendant refuses to surrender possession of the
property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer should
oust him.
[27]
No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the
decision; nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision that in such
event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove
the improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a
reasonable period of time.
[28]
The removal of the improvements on the land
under these circumstances is deemed read into the decision, subject only
to the issuance of a special order by the court for the removal of the
improvements.
[29]


It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears
upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
[30]
In the present case, it would be redundant for PEA to
go back to court and file an ejectment case simply to establish its right to
possess the subject property. Contrary to De Leons claims, the issuance of
the writ ofexecution by the trial court did not constitute an unwarranted
modification of this Courts decision in PEA v. CA, but rather, was a
necessary complement thereto. Such writ was but an essential
consequence of this Courts ruling affirming the nature of the subject parcel
of land as public and at the same time dismissing De Leons claims of
ownership and possession. To further require PEA to file an ejectment suit
to oust de Leon and his siblings from the disputed property would, in effect,
amount to encouraging multiplicity of suits.

De Leon also contends that there was never any government
infrastructure project in the subject land, much less a Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road traversing it, at any time ever since, until now and that allegations of
a government project in the subject land and of such Road traversing the
subject land have been downright falsities and lies and mere concoctions of
respondent PEA.
[31]
However, this Court has already ruled in PEA v.
CA that it is not disputed that there is a government infrastructure project
in progress traversing Lot 5155, which has been enjoined by the writ of
injunction issued by the trial court.

In any case, De Leons argument that there was no government
infrastructure project in the subject property begs the issue of ownership
and rightful possession. The subject lot was properly identified. There is no
dispute as to its exact location. Hence, whether or not there is a
government project existing within the premises or that which traverses it is
not relevant to the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of the disputed
lot and, therefore, has legal possession thereof.
As to whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding in abeyance the resolution of PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a
Writ of Demolition, Section 7,
[32]
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides the
general rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari
commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or court of
origin does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. It is true that there are
instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for
a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of
judicial courtesy.
[33]
The principle of judicial courtesy, however, remains to
be the exception rather than the rule. As held by this Court in Go v.
Abrogar,
[34]
the precept of judicial courtesy should not be applied
indiscriminately and haphazardly if we are to maintain the relevance of
Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Indeed, in the amendments introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, a
new paragraph is now added to Section 7, Rule 65, which provides as
follows:

The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within
ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or
tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction,
or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the
principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.

While the above quoted amendment may not be applied in the instant
case, as A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was made effective only on December 27,
2007, the provisions of the amendatory rule clearly underscores the
urgency of proceeding with the principal case in the absence of a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction.

This urgency is even more pronounced in the present case,
considering that this Courts judgment in PEA v. CA, finding that De Leon
does not own the subject property and is not entitled to its possession, had
long become final and executory. As a consequence, the writ of execution,
as well as the writ of demolition, should be issued as a matter of course, in
the absence of any order restraining their issuance. In fact, the writ of
demolition is merely an ancillary process to carry out the Order previously
made by the RTC for the execution of this Courts decision in PEA v. CA. It
is a logical consequence of the writ of execution earlier issued.

Neither can De Leon argue that he stands to sustain irreparable
damage. The Court had already determined with finality that he is not the
owner of the disputed property and that he has no right to possess the
same independent of his claim of ownership.

Furthermore, the Order of the RTC holding in abeyance the resolution
of PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition also appears to be
a circumvention of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, which limit the period of effectivity of restraining orders issued by the
courts. In fact, the assailed Orders of the RTC have even become more
potent than a TRO issued by the CA because, under the Rules of Court, a
TRO issued by the CA is effective only for sixty days. In the present case,
even in the absence of a TRO issued by a higher court, the RTC, in effect,
directed the maintenance of the status quo by issuing its assailed Orders.
Worse, the effectivity of the said Orders was made to last for an indefinite
period because the resolution of PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Demolition was made to depend upon the finality of the judgment in G.R.
No. 181970. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders dated
December 28, 2007 and March 4, 2008.

Finally, the Court reminds the De Leon that it does not allow the
piecemeal interpretation of its Decisions as a means to advance his case.
To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof
should be isolated and read in this context, but the same must be
considered in its entirety.
[35]
Read in this manner, PEAs right to possession
of the subject property, as well as the removal of the improvements or
structures existing thereon, fully follows after considering the entirety of the
Courts decision in PEA v. CA. This is consistent with the provisions of
Section 10, paragraphs (c) and (d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
provide for the procedure for execution of judgments for specific acts, to
wit:

SECTION 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. -

x x x x

(c) Delivery or restitution of real property. - The officer shall
demand of the person against whom the judgment for the delivery
or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claiming
rights under him to peaceably vacate the property within the three
(3) working days, and restore possession thereof to the judgment
obligee; otherwise, the officer shall oust all such persons
therefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peace
officers, and employing such means as may be reasonably
necessary to retake possession, and place the judgment obligee
in possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents or
profits awarded by the judgment shall be satisfied in the same
manner as a judgment for money.

(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of
execution. - When the property subject of execution contains
improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or
his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said
improvements, except upon special order of the court, issued
upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after
the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time
fixed by the court.

As a final note, it bears to point out that this case has been dragging
for more than 15 years and the execution of this Courts judgment in PEA v.
CA has been delayed for almost ten years now simply because
De Leon filed a frivolous appeal against the RTCs order of execution
based on arguments that cannot hold water. As a consequence, PEA is
prevented from enjoying the fruits of the final judgment in its favor. The
Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its contention
that every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final,
executory and unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the
execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the life of the
law.
[36]
To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is
to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts.
[37]
It is in the
interest of justice that this Court should write finis to this litigation.

WHEREFORE, the Court disposes and orders the following:

The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 181970 is DENIED.
The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 90328 dated November 21, 2007 and March 4, 2008,
respectively, are AFFIRMED.

The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 182678 is GRANTED. The
assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135,
dated December 28, 2007 and March 4, 2008, are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati is hereby DIRECTED to hear and
resolve PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition with utmost
dispatch. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. The Clerk of
Court is DIRECTED to remand the records of the case to the court of
origin.

SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 178495 July 26, 2010
SPOUSES RODOLFO A. NOCEDA and ERNA T. NOCEDA, Petitioners,
vs.
AURORA ARBIZO-DIRECTO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J .:
Assailed in the instant petition is the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals
(CA), dismissing the appeal on the ground of res judicata.
On September 16, 1986, respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo filed a
complaint against her nephew, herein petitioner Rodolfo Noceda, for
"Recovery of Possession and Ownership and Rescission/Annulment of
Donation" with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71,
docketed as Civil Case No. RTC-354-I. Respondent alleged that she and
her co-heirs have extra-judicially settled the property they inherited from
their late father on August 19, 1981, consisting of a parcel of land,
described as Lot No. 1121, situated in Bitoong, San Isidro, Cabangan,
Zambales. She donated a portion of her hereditary share to her nephew,
but the latter occupied a bigger area, claiming ownership thereof since
September 1985.
Judgment was rendered in favor of respondent on November 6, 1991,
where the RTC (a) declared the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition dated
August 19, 1981 valid; (b) declared the Deed of Donation dated June 1,
1981 revoked; (c) ordered defendant to vacate and reconvey that donated
portion of Lot 2, Lot 1121 subject of the Deed of Donation dated June 1,
1981 to the plaintiff or her heirs or assigns; (d) ordered the defendant to
remove the house built inside the donated portion at the defendants
expense or pay a monthly rental of P300.00 Philippine Currency; and (e)
ordered the defendant to pay attorneys fees in the amount
of P5,000.00.
2
The decision was appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 38126.
On January 5, 1995, spouses Rodolfo Dahipon and Cecilia Obispo-
Dahipon filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession, and
annulment of sale and damages against spouses Antonio and Dominga
Arbizo, spouses Rodolfo and Erna Noceda, and Aurora Arbizo-Directo with
the RTC, Iba, Zambales, Branch 70. This was docketed as Civil Case No.
RTC-1106-I. In the complaint, spouses Dahipon alleged that they were the
registered owners of a parcel of land, consisting of 127,298 square meters,
situated in Barangay San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, designated as Lot
1121-A. The Original Certificate of Title No. P-9036 over the land was
issued in the name of Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon, pursuant to Free Patent No.
548781. Spouses Dahipon claimed that the defendants therein purchased
portions of the land from them without paying the full amount. Except for
Aurora, a compromise agreement was entered into by the parties, as a
result of which, a deed of absolute sale was executed, and TCT No. T-
50730 was issued in the name of spouses Noceda for their portion of the
land. For her part, Aurora questioned Dahipons alleged ownership over the
same parcel of land by filing an adverse claim.
In the meantime, a decision was rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 38126 on
March 31, 1995 with the following fallo:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ORDERING defendant
Rodolfo Noceda to VACATE the portion known as Lot "C" of Lot 1121 per
Exhibit E, which was allotted to plaintiff Aurora Arbizo-Directo. Except for
this modification, the Decision dated November 6, 1991 of the RTC, Iba,
Zambales, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I, is hereby AFFIRMED
in all other respects. Costs against defendant Rodolfo Noceda.
3

Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review with this Court, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 119730. The Court found no reversible error, much
less grave abuse of discretion, with the factual findings of the two courts
below, and thus denied the petition on September 2, 1999.
4
The decision
became final and executory, and a writ of execution was duly issued by the
RTC on March 6, 2001 in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I.
On December 4, 2003, petitioners instituted an action for quieting of title
against respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 2108-I. In the complaint,
petitioners admitted that Civil Case No. RTC-354-I was decided in favor of
respondent and a writ of execution had been issued, ordering them to
vacate the property. However, petitioners claimed that the land, which was
the subject matter of Civil Case No. RTC-354-I, was the same parcel of
land owned by spouses Dahipon from whom they purchased a portion; and
that a title (TCT No. T-37468) was, in fact, issued in their name. Petitioners
prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
implementation of the Writ of Execution dated March 6, 2001 in Civil Case
No. RTC-354-I, and that "a declaration be made that the property bought,
occupied and now titled in the name of [petitioners] was formerly part and
subdivision of Lot No. 1121 Pls-468-D, covered by OCT No. P-9036 in the
name of Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon."
5

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
Respondent averred that petitioners, aware of their defeat in Civil Case No.
RTC-354-I, surreptitiously negotiated with Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon for the
sale of the land and filed the present suit in order to subvert the execution
thereof.
The trial court denied the motion, holding that there was no identity of
causes of action.
Trial thereafter ensued. On January 25, 2006, after petitioners presented
their evidence, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence, stating that the
claim of ownership and possession of petitioners on the basis of the title
emanating from that of Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon was already raised in the
previous case (Civil Case No. RTC-354-I).
On February 22, 2006, the trial court issued a resolution granting the
demurrer to evidence.
The CA affirmed. Hence, petitioners now come to this Court, raising the
following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA OR
DOCTRINE OF CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT IS APPLICABLE
UNDER THE FACTS OBTAINING IN THE PRESENT CASE[;]
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT HAS A BETTER TITLE THAN
THE PETITIONERS[; and]
WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING ON PURCHASERS IN BAD FAITH IS
APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE[.]
6

Petitioners assert that res judicata
7
does not apply, considering that the
essential requisites as to the identity of parties, subject matter, and causes
of action are not present.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, as follows:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or
final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
x x x x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in
a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have
been so adjudged, or which actually and necessarily included therein
or necessary thereto.
The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules, namely: (1) the
judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
concludes the litigation between the parties and their privies and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action
either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or
decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the
two suits are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between
the principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may
operate as evidence.
8]
The first general rule above stated, and which
corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, is referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while the
second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same
section and rule, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."
9

The Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City
10
explained the
second concept which we reiterate herein, to wit:
The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or
question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed
upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and
persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in
any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or
any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different
cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper
authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can
be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same
parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will
be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in
issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193
SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but merely
identity of issue.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of
Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez v. Reyes (76 SCRA
179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction between bar by former judgment
which bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim,
demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which bars
the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the
same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions
which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied
to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation.
Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final judgment,
although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto and
although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were
not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of the
former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without
deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that
matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment
necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the
judgment itself.
11

The foregoing disquisition finds application in the case at bar. Undeniably,
the present case is closely related to the previous case (Civil Case No.
RTC-354-I), where petitioners raised the issue of ownership and
possession of Lot No. 1121 and the annulment of the donation of said lot to
them. The RTC found for respondent, declaring the deed of donation she
executed in favor of petitioners revoked; and ordered petitioners to vacate
and reconvey the donated portion to respondent. The decision of the RTC
was affirmed by the CA, and became final with the denial of the petition for
review by this Court in G.R. No. 119730. In that case, the Court noted the
established fact "that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion
donated to him by respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo, but he also fenced
the whole area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus,
petitioners act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent
Directo without the latters knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation
which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an
act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor."
12
Clearly, therefore,
petitioners have no right of ownership or possession over the land in
question.1avvph!1
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, such material fact
becomes binding and conclusive on the parties. When a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or
when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the
court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them.
13
Thus, petitioners can no longer
question respondents ownership over Lot No. 1121 in the instant suit for
quieting of title. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation
of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties
on a different claim or cause of action.
14

Furthermore, we agree that petitioners instituted the instant action with
unclean hands. Aware of their defeat in the previous case, they attempted
to thwart execution and assert their alleged ownership over the land
through their purported purchase of a lot from Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon. This
later transaction appears to be suspect. A perusal of G.R. No. 119730
reveals that the Court was not unaware of Dahipons alleged claim over the
same parcel of land. It noted that Dahipon did not even bother to appear in
court to present her free patent upon respondents request, or to intervene
in the case, if she really had any legitimate interest over the land in
question.
15
In any event, petitioners assertion of alleged good title over the
land cannot stand considering that they purchased the piece of land from
Dahipon knowing fully well that the same was in the adverse possession of
another.
Thus, we find no reversible error in the appellate courts ruling that
petitioners are in fact buyers in bad faith. We quote:
With appellants actual knowledge of facts that would impel a reasonable
man to inquire further on [a] possible defect in the title of Obispo,
considering that she was found not to have been in actual occupation of the
land in CA-G.R. CV No. 38126, they cannot simply invoke protection of the
law as purchasers in good faith and for value. In a suit to quiet title,
defendant may set up equitable as well as legal defenses, including
acquisition of title by adverse possession and a prior adjudication on the
question under the rule on res judicata. Appellants status as holders in bad
faith of a certificate of title, taken together with the preclusive effect of the
right of possession and ownership over the disputed portion, which was
adjudged in favor of appellee in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I, thus provide
ample justification for the court a quo to grant the demurrer to evidence and
dismiss their suit for quieting of title filed against the said appellee.
16

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
87026 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila


THIRD DIVISION


ADELAIDA INFANTE, G.R. NO. 156596
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, J J .

ARAN BUILDERS, INC., Promulgated:
Respondent.
*
August 24, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N


AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:


This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision
[1]
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) promulgated on August 12, 2002, which upheld the Order
dated September 4, 2001, issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Muntinlupa City (RTC).

The undisputed facts and issues raised in the lower courts are
accurately summarized by the CA as follows:
Before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City (or
Muntinlupa RTC; Branch 276), presided over by Hon. Norma
C. Perello (or respondent judge), was an action for revival of
judgment filed on June 6, 2001 by Aran Builders, Inc. (or private
respondent) against AdelaidaInfante (or petitioner), docketed as
Civil Case No. 01-164.

The judgment sought to be revived was rendered by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (or Makati RTC; Branch
60) in an action for specific performance and damages, docketed
as Civil Case No. 15563.

The Makati RTC judgment, which became final
and executory on November 16, 1994, decreed as follows:

26. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:

26.1 The defendant ADELAIDA B. INFANTE is ordered to do the
following within thirty (30) days from finality hereof:

26.1.1. To deliver to the plaintiff ARAN BUILDERS, INC. the
following: (a) the complete plans (lot plan, location map and
vicinity map); (b) Irrevocable Power of Attorney; (c ) Real Estate
Tax clearance; (d) tax receipts; (e) proof of up to date payment of
Subdivision Association dues referred to in the CONTRACT TO
SELL dated November 10, 1986 (Exh. A or Exh. 1);

26.1.2. To execute the deed of sale of Lot No. 11, Block 9, Phase
3-A1, Ayala Alabang Subdivision covered by TCT No. 114015
forP500,000.00 in favor of the plaintiff;

26.1.3. To pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamp taxes
and other taxes which the Bureau of Internal Revenue may assess
in connection with the sale mentioned in the preceding paragraph
and to submit to the plaintiff proof of such payment;

26.1.4. To secure the written conformity of AYALA
CORPORATION to the said sale and to give such written
conformity to the plaintiff;

26.1.5. To register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds
and deliver to AYALA CORPORATION the certificate of title
issued in the name of plaintiff pursuant to such registration;

26.2 Upon the compliance of the defendant with the preceding
directives, the plaintiff must immediately pay to the defendant the
sum of P321,918.25;

26.3 The defendant is ordered to pay
plaintiff P10,000.00 as attorneys fees;

26.4 The Complaint for moral and exemplary damages is
DISMISSED;

26.5 The COUNTERCLAIM is DISMISSED; and

26.6 Cost is taxed against the defendant.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the action (for revival of
judgment) on the grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that venue was
improperly laid. Private respondent opposed the motion.

On September 4, 2001, the Muntinlupa RTC issued an
order which reads:

The MOTION TO DISMISS is denied.

Admittedly, the Decision was rendered by
the Makati Regional Trial Court, but it must be emphasized that at
that time there was still no Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City,
then under the territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts, so that
cases from this City were tried and heard at Makati City. With the
creation of the Regional Trial Courts of Muntinlupa City, matters
involving properties located in this City, and cases
involving Muntinlupa City residents were all ordered to be litigated
before these Courts.

The case at bar is a revival of a judgment which declared
the plaintiff as the owner of a parcel of land located
in MuntinlupaCity. It is this judgment which is sought to be
enforced thru this action which necessarily involves the interest,
possession, title, and ownership of the parcel of land located
in Muntinlupa city and adjudged to Plaintiff. It goes without saying
that the complaint should be filed in the latter City where the
property is located, as there are now Regional Trial Courts hereat.

Defendant may answer the complaint within the remaining
period, but no less than five (5) days, otherwise a default
judgment might be taken against her.

It is SO ORDERED.

Her motion for reconsideration having been denied per
order dated September 28, 2001, petitioner came to this Court
[CA] via the instant special civil action for certiorari. She ascribes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of respondent judge for erroneously
holding that Civil Case No. 01-164 is a revival of judgment which
declared private respondent as the owner of a parcel of land
located in Muntinlupa City and (that) the judgment rendered by
the (Makati RTC) in Civil Case No. 15563 sought to be enforced
necessarily involves the interest, possession, title and ownership
of the parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City.

Petitioner asserts that the complaint for specific
performance and damages before the Makati RTC is a personal
action and, therefore, the suit to revive the judgment therein is
also personal in nature; and that, consequently, the venue of the
action for revival of judgment is either MakatiCity
or Paraaque City where private respondent and petitioner
respectively reside, at the election of private respondent.

On the other hand, private respondent maintains that the
subject action for revival judgment is quasi in rem because it
involves and affects vested or adjudged right on a real property;
and that, consequently, venue lies in Muntinlupa City where the
property is situated.
[2]


On August 12, 2002, the CA promulgated its Decision ruling in favor
of herein private respondent. The CA held that since the judgment sought
to be revived was rendered in an action involving title to or possession of
real property, or interest therein, the action for revival of judgment is then
an action in rem which should be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
place where the real property is located. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the CA Decision but the motion was denied per
Resolution datedJanuary 7, 2003.

Hence, herein petition. Petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding
that the complaint for revival of judgment is an action inrem which was
correctly filed with the RTC of the place where the disputed real property is
located.

The petition is unmeritorious.

Petitioner insists that the action for revival of judgment is an
action in personam; therefore, the complaint should be filed with the RTC of
the place where either petitioner or private respondent resides. Petitioner
then concludes that the filing of the action for revival of judgment with the
RTC of Muntinlupa City, the place where the disputed property is located,
should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.

Private respondent is of the opinion that the judgment it is seeking to
revive involves interest over real property. As such, the present action for
revival is a real action, and venue was properly laid with the court of the
place where the realty is located.

Thus, the question that must be answered is: where is the proper
venue of the present action for revival of judgment?

Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
after the lapse of five (5) years from entry of judgment and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a final and executory judgment or order
may be enforced by action. The Rule does not specify in which court the
action for revival of judgment should be filed.

In Aldeguer v. Gemelo,
[3]
the Court held that:

x x x an action upon a judgment must be brought either in
the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place
where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place
designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of
actions in general. (Emphasis supplied)
[4]


but emphasized that other provisions in the rules of procedure which fix
the venue of actions in general must be considered.
[5]


Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 provide:

Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to
or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated.

x x x x

Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions
may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the
present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal
action. Applying the afore-quoted rules on venue, if the action for revival
of judgment affects title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place
where the real property is located. If such action does not fall under the
category of real actions, it is then a personal action that may be filed with
the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.

In support of her contention that the action for revival of judgment is a
personal action and should be filed in the court of the place where either
the plaintiff or defendant resides, petitioner cites the statements made by
the Court in Aldeguer v. Gemelo
[6]
andDonnelly v. Court of First Instance of
Manila
[7]
. Petitioner, however, seriously misunderstood the Court's rulings
in said cases.

In Aldeguer, what the Court stated was that [t]he action for the
execution of a judgment for damages is a personal one, and under
section 377 [of the Code of Civil Procedure], it should be brought in any
province where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the
plaintiff
[8]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied). Petitioner apparently
took such statement to mean that any action for revival of judgment should
be considered as a personal one. This thinking is incorrect. The Court
specified that the judgment sought to be revived in said case was a
judgment for damages. The judgment subject of the action for revival did
not involve or affect any title to or possession of real property or any
interest therein. The complaint filed in the revival case did not fall under
the category of real actions and, thus, the action necessarily fell under the
category of personal actions.

In Donnelly, the portion of the Decision being relied upon by petitioner
stated thus:

Petitioner raises before this Court two (2) issues, namely:
(a) whether an action for revival of judgment is one quasi
in rem and, therefore, service of summons may be effected thru
publication; and (b) whether the second action for revival of
judgment (Civil Case No. 76166) has already prescribed. To our
mind, the first is not a proper and justiciable issue in the
present proceedings x x x. Nevertheless, let it be said that an
action to revive a judgment is a personal one. (Emphasis
supplied)
[9]


The Court clearly pointed out that in said case, the issue on whether an
action for revival of judgment is quasi in rem was not yet proper
and justiciable. Therefore, the foregoing statement cannot be used as a
precedent, as it was merely an obiter dictum. Moreover, as in Aldeguer,
the judgment sought to be revived in Donnelly involved judgment for a
certain sum of money. Again, no title or interest in real property was
involved. It is then understandable that the action for revival in said case
was categorized as a personal one.

Clearly, the Court's classification in Aldeguer and Donnelly of the
actions for revival of judgment as being personal in character does not
apply to the present case.

The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment determine
whether it is a real action or a personal action.

The complaint for revival of judgment alleges that a final
and executory judgment has ordered herein petitioner to execute a deed of
sale over a parcel of land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of herein
private respondent; pay all pertinent taxes in connection with said sale;
register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds and deliver to Ayala
Corporation the certificate of title issued in the name of private
respondent. The same judgment ordered private respondent to pay
petitioner the sum of P321,918.25upon petitioner's compliance with the
aforementioned order. It is further alleged that petitioner refused to comply
with her judgment obligations despite private respondent's repeated
requests and demands, and that the latter was compelled to file the action
for revival of judgment. Private respondent then prayed that the judgment
be revived and a writ of execution be issued to enforce said judgment.

The previous judgment has conclusively declared private
respondent's right to have the title over the disputed property conveyed to
it. It is, therefore, undeniable that private respondent has an established
interest over the lot in question; and to protect such right or interest, private
respondent brought suit to revive the previous judgment. The sole reason
for the present action to revive is the enforcement of private respondent's
adjudged rights over a piece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the
category of a real action, for it affects private respondent's interest over real
property.

The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the
complaint should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place
where the realty is located.

Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:

Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each
branch. - The Supreme Court shall define the territory over
which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its
authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be
the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or
actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as determining the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may exercise
appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be
exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to
the people of the different parts of the region and making the
attendance of litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as
possible. (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing, it is quite clear that a branch of the Regional Trial
Court shall exercise its authority only over a particular territory
defined by the Supreme Court. Originally, Muntinlupa City was under the
territorial jurisdiction of the MakatiCourts. However, Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 7154, entitled An Act to Amend Section Fourteen
of Batas Pambansa Bilang129, Otherwise Known As The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1981, took effect on September 4, 1991. Said law
provided for the creation of a branch of the Regional Trial Court
in Muntinlupa. Thus, it is now the Regional Trial Court
in Muntinlupa City which has territorial jurisdiction or authority to validly
issue orders and processes concerning real property
within Muntinlupa City.

Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by
the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 when it denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss; and the CA did not commit any error in
affirming the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August
12, 2002 and Resolution dated January 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED


G.R. No. 80892 September 29, 1989
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS of JESUS
AMADO ARANETA, respondents.
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for petitioner.
Antonio P. Barredo for respondents.

CORTES, J .:
Petitioner impugns the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November
10 and December 2 and 3, 1987 which, in effect, gave due course to
private respondents' petition for annulment of judgment.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
On February 15,1984 Freddie and Marconi Da Silva, as mortgagors, and
Islamic Da'Wah Council of the Philippines (Council for brevity), as
mortgagee, executed a real estate mortgage over a 4,754 sq. m. parcel of
land located in Cubao, Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 30461 as security for the payment of a one million peso
promissory note in favor of the mortgagee. The mortgagors were unable to
pay their obligation, hence, the Council instituted foreclosure proceedings
with the Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-43746. On
February 5, 1985 the parties submitted a compromise agreement wherein it
was stipulated that because of the Da Silvas' inability to pay their debt to
the Council, and for the additional consideration of P 500,000.00, they
jointly agree to cede, transfer and convey to the Council the land they
mortgaged to the latter. On February 12, 1985, the Regional Trial Court
approved the compromise agreement. Thereafter, TCT No. 328021 was
issued in the name of the Council by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
Subsequent thereto, on August 8,1985, Jesus Amado Araneta filed with the
Register of Deeds a notice of lis pendens in connection with Civil Case No.
Q-47989 entitled "Islamic Da'Wah Council of the Philippines v. Jesus
Amado Araneta" for ejectment. The complaint was converted into an action
for collection of rentals with damages but was later on withdrawn by the
Council. On August 13, 1985 Araneta also filed with the same Register of
Deeds an affidavit of adverse claim in connection with Civil Case No. Q-
43469 entitled "Marconi Da Silva, et al. v. Jesus Amado Araneta, et al." for
recovery of possession. The notice of lis pendens and adverse claim were
annotated at the back of TCT No. 328021 by the Register of Deeds.
On October 9, 1985 the Council filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City a complaint for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and
Damages with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Araneta
praying, inter alia, for the cancellation of all the annotations at the back of
TCT No. 328021. The case is docketed as Civil Case No. Q-46196.
While this case was pending, on July 6, 1987, the heirs of Jesus Amado
Araneta, private respondents herein, filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition to annul the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-43746 for foreclosure. In
support of their petition the heirs of Araneta narrated the following events:
(1) on December 20,1953 Jesus Amado Araneta purchased the
4,754 sq.m. parcel of land located in Cubao from the Spouses
Garcia and since then he and his family have always been in
possession thereof;
(2) for some reason known only to Araneta and Fred Da
Silva,an employee of the former, title to the property was placed
in the latter's name as evidenced by TCT No. 30461 although
from the time of its issuance the owner's duplicate copy of said
TCT has always been in the possession of Araneta,
(3) on January 31, 1963, the parties decided to terminate the
trust that had been created over the property, thus, Da Silva
executed a deed of sale over the same parcel of land in favor of
Araneta but no consideration was given by the latter to the
former for said sale and any recital of consideration appearing
in the deed is purely fictitious;
(4) the Register of Deeds, however, refused to register the
deed of sale because the title is in the name of "Fred Da Silva
married to Leocadia Da Silva" and is thus presumed conjugal
and the conjugal partnership should first be liquidated as the
wife had already died;
(5) alleging that their copy was lost and/or destroyed, on
February 1, 1984 Freddie and Marconi Da Silva, two of the
three surviving children of Fred Da Silva who died in 1963, filed
a petition, docketed as LRC record Case No. Q-2772, for the
issuance of a new copy of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT
No. 30461. The petition was granted by Judge Vera on March
24,1984:
(6) Araneta learned about this and immediately filed a motion to
re-open the proceedings stating that he has in his possession
the ,- owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 30461 and explaining
the reasons for such possession;
(7) the motion was granted and on December 7,1984 the land
registration court ordered the Da Silvas to (a) return to the
Register of the second owner's duplicate copy of the title and
(b) neither enter into any transaction concerning said second
owner's duplicate copy nor utilize the title for any purpose other
than to return the same to the Register of Deeds;
(8) on November 11, 1985, the Da Silvas manifested before the
land registration court that the title to the property was
transferred to the Council based on a compromise agreement
in Civil Case No. Q43746 for foreclosure; and
(9) on motion of the heirs of Araneta, who substituted him upon
his death in 1985, Judge Vera consolidated Civil Cases Nos. Q-
2772 and Q-43469, both of which were raffled to his sala, with
Civil Case No. Q-46196 but the judge hearing the latter case
would not heed the order of consolidation.
(10) and then set out their case for annulment of judgment
alleging that the Da Silvas, with the connivance of the Council,
executed a purported promissory note secured by a real estate
mortgage the terms and conditions of which were made very
onerous as to pave the way for the foreclosure of the property
by virtue of a confession of judgment; and, the Council had
always known of the Araneta's claim of ownership over the land
because the former's executive officer and secretary general is
the lawyer of the Da Silvas in the cases they filed against the
Araneta's. The heirs of Araneta in their petition prayed, inter
alia, that (1) the judgment in Civil Case No. Q- 43746 be
annulled and set aside and (2) a restraining order be issued to
enjoin the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-46196 [Petition,
Annex "A"].
In a resolution dated November 10, 1987 the Court of Appeals issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the trial judge from hearing Civil Case
No. Q-46196 until further orders from the court. In the same resolution the
parties were ordered to appear for a pre- trial conference. The Council filed
a motion for reconsideration of this resolution. Later on the Council filed a
Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss
questioning the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction to hear the petition for
annulment of a judgment that had already been fully executed. The Council
also invoked the additional grounds of lack of cause of action because the
Aranetas are not valid claimants of the property; lack of legal capacity to
sue because the Aranetas were not parties to the foreclosure case; litis
pendentia because of the pendency of the quieting of title case between
the same parties; and, abandonment, waiver and unenforceability under
the Statute of Frauds [Petition, Annex "H"]. On December 2, 1987 the Court
of Appeals denied the Council's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
In the hearing conducted on December 3, 1987 the Council reiterated the
grounds it raised in its Supplemental Motion and Motion to Dismiss but the
same were summarily denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition
forcertiorari.
Petitioner contends the following: first, that the Court of Appeals should not
continue to hear the petition for annulment of judgment since it is already
fully executed and the purpose for which the case for annulment was filed
will no longer be served, the parties having already complied with the
decision; second, private respondents have no right to question the validity
or legality of the decision rendered foreclosing the mortgage since they are
foreign to the transaction of mortgage between petitioner and Freddie and
Marconi Da Silva; lastly, petitioner claims that private respondents have
another remedy in law and that is in Civil Case No. Q-46196 for Quieting of
Title where the question of ownership may be passed upon.
At the outset it must be clarified that the instant petition is one
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the inquiry this
Court should address itself is limited to error of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion committed by the Court, of Appeals, in particular, whether or
not respondent court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment.
This clarification is rendered necessary because the parties themselves, in
their pleadings, have gone beyond this issue and have discussed the
merits of the annulment of judgment case now pending decision with the
Court of Appeals.
In its Petition, the Council contends that a Regional Trial Court has the
authority and jurisdiction to annul a judgment of another Regional Trial
Court, a coordinate or co-equal court Specifically, petitioner alleges that the
filing of a separate action for annulment of judgment is unnecessary
because the Regional Trial Court hearing Civil Case No. Q-43469 for
Quieting of Title can annul the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-43746 for
Foreclosure rendered by another Regional Trial Court [Rollo, pp. 15-16). In
its Memorandum, however, the Council admitted that the Court of Appeals
has the exclusive jurisdiction to annul the decision of the Regional Trial
Court [Rollo, pp. 152-1531.
Annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where
the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The judgment may be
annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud [Canlas v. Hon- Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 77691, August 8,19881. Jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of Regional Trial Court judgment has been clarified by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 (otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980). Prior to the enactment of this law, different views had been
entertained regarding the issue of whether or not a branch of a Regional
Trial Court may annul a judgment of another branch of the same
court. * However, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 introduced a new provision conferring on the Court of Appeals exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts. Sec. 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 expressly provides that:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. -The Court of Appeals shall exercise: ...
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; Thus, it is beyond dispute
that it is only the Court of Appeals that can take cognizance of
the annulment of judgment in Civil Case No. Q-43746 rendered
by the Regional Trial Court.
The next issue raised in this petition deals with the question of who may
properly institute a petition for annulment of judgment. It is petitioner's
contention that the remedy is available only to one who is a party to the
case where the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. Private
respondents, on the other hand, allege that "there are sufficient facts and
circumstances sufficient to show prima facie that [they] have a substantial
interest in the ownership of the property which had been foreclosed without
their knowledge and consent" [Rollo, p. 90]. In fine, the question deals with
whether or not the heirs of Araneta have a cause of action against the
Council.
In Militante v. Edrosolano [G.R. No. L-27940, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA
4731, an action for annulment of judgment in Civil Case No. 6216 between
Edrosolano and Belosillo was filed by Militante. The petition stemmed from
a complaint instituted by Militante on September 6, 1965 against
Edrosolano for damages arising from a breach of contract of carriage. On
January 18,1966 Militante obtained an order of preliminary attachment on
the property of Edrosolano. Alleging that he purchased all of Edrosolano's
TPU equipment on February 28, 1966, Belosillo filed a third-party claim. It
appears that on February 25, 1963 Belosillo obtained a judgment by default
against Edrosolano in Civil Case No. 6216 for collection of amount of
P45,000.00, the value of the promissory note executed by the latter on
February 1, 1960. After a recital of these antecedent facts, Militante, in his
petition for annulment of judgment contended, inter alia, that (1) Civil Case
No. 6216 "was based on a fictitious cause of action because [the]
promissory note was without lawful consideration whatsoever" [at 476]; (2)
Edrosolano did not file any answer to Belosillo's complaint and allowed the
latter to obtain a judgment by default which judgment attained finality
without the former appealing therefrom; and, (3) while judgment in Civil
Case No. 6216 was promulgated iii 1963 it was "only on January 19, 1966
when . . . Belosillo caused the execution thereof after [Militante] had
already instituted his civil case for damages against ... Edrosolano and an
order for issuance of preliminary attachment issued" [at 477]. The trial court
however dismissed Militante's action for annulment on finding that it did not
state a cause of action. Thereafter, Militante filed an appeal to this Tribunal
and in setting aside the trial court's order of dismissal', the Court, speaking
through then Mr. Associate Justice Enrique Fernando, stated that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. More specifically, the view entertained by the lower court in
its order of dismissal that an action for annulment of judgment
can be availed of only by those principally or secondarily bound
is contrary to what had been so clearly declared by this Court in
the leading case of Anuran v. Aquino t38 Phil. 291, decided in
1918. It was emphatically announced therein: "There can be no
question as to the right of any persons adversely affected by a
judgement to maintain an action to enjoin its enforcement and
to have it declared a nullity on the ground of fraud and collusion
practiced in the very matter of obtaining the judgment when
such fraud is extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in the
issues raised at the trial which resulted in such judgment. x x x."
[at 3233.] Such a principle was further fortified by an
observation made by this Court through Justice Ozaeta in
Garchitorena v. Sotelo [74 Phil. 25 (,1942)j'. These are his
words: "The collusive conduct of the parties in the foreclosure
suit constituted an extrinsic or collateral fraud by reason of
which the judgment rendered therein may be annulled in this
separate action [citing also the case of Anuran]. Aside from the
Anuran-Aquino case, innumerable authorities from other
jurisdictions may be cited 'in support of the annulment. But were
there not any precedent to guide us, reason and justice would
compel us to lay down such doctrine for the first time." [at 481-
482-, Italics supplied.]
It is therefore clear from the foregoing that a person need not be a party to
the judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is that he can prove
his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and
collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.
In this present case it is true that the heirs of Araneta are not parties to the
foreclosure case. Neither are they principally nor secondarily bound by the
judgment rendered therein. However. their petition filed with the Court of
Appeals they alleged fraud and connivance perpetuated by and between
the Da Silvas and the Council as would adversely affect them. This
allegation, if fully substantiated by preponderance of evidence, could be the
basis for the annulment of Civil Case No. Q-43476.
Finally, the Council asserts that the remedy of annulment of judgment
applies only to final and executory judgment and not to that which had
already been fully executed or implemented.It is the Council's contention
that as the judgment in the foreclosure case had already been executed
evidenced by the fact that title to the property in question had been
transferred in its name the judgment can no longer be annulled. The
Council's contention is devoid of merit. In Garchitorena u. Sotelo, supra,
the Court affirmed the trial court's annulment of the judgment on
foreclosure notwithstanding the fact that ownership of the house and lot
subject of the mortgage had passed from the mortgagee who foreclosed
the mortgage and purchased the property at public auction to a person who
bought the same and finally to another individual in whose name the
Torrens certificate of title stood by the time the case reached this Tribunal.
In view of the foregoing the Court finds that the Court of Appeals neither
acted without jurisdiction nor committed grave abuse of discretion in giving
due course to the petition for annulment of judgment as would warrant the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the orders of the
Court of Appeals dated November 10 and December 2 and 3,1987 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez,Jr., Feliciano and Bidlin,JJ., concur.