BY

Pivot to Persia
Washington may not want to admit it, but Iran is the most stable country in the Middle
East right now.
TRI TA PARSI
O
n New Year's Eve 1977, President Jimmy Carter famously toasted the Shah at
the Saadabad Palace in Tehran and declared, "Iran ... is an island of stability
in one of the more troubled areas of the world." Less than two years later, Iran was
in chaos as the revolution swept the country and brought down the 2,500-year-old
monarchy.
Carter has been mocked for his lack of foresight, but he wasn't wrong. He was just
a few decades ahead of his time.
Iraq is disintegrating. Syria is in flames. Pakistan is on the verge of becoming a
failed state. The Taliban is making a comeback in Afghanistan. Libya is falling
apart. The House of Saud is nervous about a potentially existential succession
crisis. In this region, Iran looks like an island of stability.
Meanwhile, the geopolitical enmity that has characterized relations between the
United States and Iran for more than three decades has now been overtaken by
events in Iraq and elsewhere. The United States seeks to reduce its footprint in the
Middle East, choosing instead to focus its geopolitical energy on East Asia. And
Washington's traditional allies in the Persian Gulf are funding Sunni jihadists and
are anti-Shiite. In this context, the U.S.-Iran rivalry cannot be left on autopilot.
News emerged on Monday that Washington and Tehran may cooperate militarily
to stop the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) from advancing deeper into Iraq
-- Iran's neighbor, where the United States has spent years, trillions of dollars, and
thousands of lives. Iraq's Shiite government has been seen by some as a proxy of
Iran that has often sided with Tehran against Washington. But the common
interest between Iran and the United States is not merely tactical or temporary:
With the region roiling as it is, the reality that Iran and the United States might end
up on the same side is simply the new normal.
While Washington may be struggling with the idea of a Persian pivot, Tehran can't
seem to break from the idea that it can boost its regional position by adopting an
antagonistic role against United States. Iranian officials have told me that even if
the nuclear issue is resolved, U.S.-Iran relations will remain a rivalry -- not a
partnership. But when radical Sunni ISIS fighters streamed across the Syrian
border into Iraq and, in a matter of days, took over several major cities, the new
reality became stunningly clear: Iran and the United States need each other more
than ever before. Neither can salvage stability in Iraq or Afghanistan without the
other.
For decades, Iran has tried to challenge U.S. hegemony in the Middle East by
investing in Arab political opposition groups and backing Islamist movements like
Hezbollah and Hamas with funding and support. But in the Sunni Arab world, this
has yielded next to nothing for Tehran. Iran's policy toward the Arab world since
the 1979 revolution has been based on an accurate prediction that the reigns of the
pro-American autocrats would not be durable and that Tehran's long-term
security was best assured by investing in Islamist movements that likely would
take over. Iran's brand of political Islam and anti-Israeli rhetoric, reasoned Tehran,
could be a unifying force, bridging the deep animus that characterized the Arab-
Persian and the Sunni-Shiite divides. Or so it thought.
Instead, the Islamists who gained influence following the Arab Spring -- in Syria,
Egypt, and Libya -- have largely shown allegiance to their financial benefactors in
Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms rather than to their supposed
ideological allies in Tehran. Meanwhile, Iran's support for the Assad regime in
Syria has dissipated the extensive soft power Tehran used to enjoy in the Arab
world.
These days, Iranian officials privately acknowledge
that their government is more popular in Latin
America than it is in the Middle East.
These days,
Iranian officials
privately
acknowledge that
their government
is more popular in
Latin America
than it is in the
Middle East.
The government in Tehran may find a better partner
in the current administration in Washington than it
might expect. Whatever America's distaste for Iran's
brand of repressive Shiite nationalism, President
Barack Obama knows clearly that the real threat to
the United States is not the brand of Islam
emanating from its nominal enemy Iran, but the one
sponsored, funded, and embraced by its formal ally
Saudi Arabia -- particularly if the United States and Iran manage to resolve the
nuclear issue in the next few weeks or months.
Obama was asked about the dangers of Sunni extremism and Shiite extremism by
Bloomberg's Jeffrey Goldberg earlier this year. The Iranians, Obama said, "are
strategic, and they're not impulsive. They have a worldview, and they see their
interests, and they respond to costs and benefits.... They are a large, powerful
country that sees itself as an important player on the world stage, and I do not
think has a suicide wish, and can respond to incentives." And on Sunni
extremism? Obama's silence speaks volumes. The surge of activity from radical
jihadi groups likely only underlines their danger -- and the difference between
them and the government of Iran.
Iran is understandably hesitant about reaching out to the United States. Iran's
leadership has been burned by past efforts to explore areas of strategic and tactical
collaboration with the United States. Tehran provided extensive military,
intelligence, and political support to the U.S. military in 2001 during the campaign
to oust the Taliban. Iran's help, according to President George W. Bush's special
envoy to Afghanistan Amb. Jim Dobbins, was decisive. But once Iran's help was
deemed no longer necessary, Bush included Tehran in the infamous Axis of Evil
speech. Washington wasn't interested in a new relationship with the Iranians.
Washington has paid for that mistake ever since. Both the chaos in Afghanistan
and in Iraq could have been evaded had Washington recognized the stabilizing
role Iran can play if it isn't treated as an outcast. In 2003, Iran offered to help
stabilize Iraq and ensure that the government there would be nonsectarian. The
Bush administration chose not to respond to that offer.
But Iran, too, will pay a price if it clings to an outdated understanding of the
regional and global strategic landscape. Contradictory messages have come out of
Tehran, with officials telling Reuters that they are open to collaboration with the
United States against ISIS, and then having their Foreign Ministry spokesperson
strongly oppose U.S. military intervention. Similarly, the U.S. position seems to be
shifting, from first denying any plans for talking to Iran about Iraq to signaling a
desire to sit down with Tehran.
Iran's key objective is to be recognized as a stabilizing force. But that is a role it
ultimately cannot play if it simultaneously wishes to challenge the United States.
Unlike in Afghanistan, any cooperation in Iraq will likely be more public. If Iran
plays a constructive role, the world will notice. But changing old patterns require
courage, strength, and political will. It remains to be seen if the leadership in
Tehran can deliver those -- or if Washington will be receptive.
Whatever the two sides do, they should not let outdated rivalries stand in the way.
If anything, the onslaught of ISIS shows that a U.S.-Iran conversation about
regional matters is long overdue.
ATTA KENARE/AFP/Getty Images
BY
Rule the Sea, Build Alliances,
and Sweat the Small Stuff
Why Tokyo and Beijing are still fighting a war that began in 1894.
J I M HOLMES
W
ith all eyes locked on Iraq and Ukraine, China and Japan keep ratcheting up
tensions over islands and waters in the East China Sea. On June 11, two
Japanese planes flew dangerously close to a Chinese plane -- with both sides
blaming the other for the encounter. This follows an incident in late May, when
armed Chinese fighter planes buzzed Japanese maritime patrol aircraft, passing
within 100 feet in one case -- a hand's breadth for high-speed aircraft. In mid-June,
China Defense Ministry spokesman Col. Geng Yansheng blustered that Japanese
airmen have "engaged in close-up tailing" of Chinese aircraft, revealing Tokyo's
"malign intentions" and exposing its "hypocrisy and two-facedness in relations
with China."