Filozofia

I. *GENURI I STILURI N FILOZOFIE

Immanuel Kant-Criticismul
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel Filozofia speculativ
Auguste Compte-Filozofia
pozitiv
Friedrich ietzsche-Filozofia
voin!ei de putere
"dmund Husserl-
Fenomenologia
Filozofie #i analiz logic a
lim$a%ului&
a' (udolf Carnap
$' )ud*ig Wittgenstein
II. FILOZOFIE I VIA
+laton
,aruch -pinoza
)ucian ,laga
,ertrand (ussell
Karl .aspers
/
Genuri i !iluri "n filozofie
#on$e%&ia 'e%re filozofie a lui I((anuel )an!
*#ri!i$i(ul*
/' Concep!ia sa despre filozofie este redat printr-un
fragment din principala sa lucrare0 Critica raiunii
pure'
1' teme&
a' conte2tul&emprism 3ra!ionalism4 revolu!ia
copernican
$' domenii&
i' gnoseologie
ii' filozofie practic
c' idealism transcendental
d' concepte& lucri in sine0 fenomen0 0 ra!iune0
intelect0 snesi$ilitate0 intui!ie0 categorie0 idee0
analitic0 transcendental0 voin!0 datorie0
imperativ 5categoric0 ipotetic60 ma2im
7' Filozofia sa mai este cunoscut #i su$ numele de
criticism'Aceasta deoarece Kant a considerat c
principala sarcin a filozofiei const 8n realizarea unei
critici a cunoa#terii umane'+rin critic tre$uie s
1
8n!elegem discriminare analitc 5de la grecescul krisis
discriminare ra!ional6'
9' Immanuel Kant a considerat c filozofia tre$uie s
devin asemenea unei tiine0 s fie riguroas 8n
determinarea afirma!iilor sale despre lumea
8ncon%urtoare0 iar acest lucru se poate face doar
printr-o determinare a capacit!ii noastre de
cunoa#tere 5 redat prin cele trei faclut!i ale
cunoa#terii din Critica raiunii pure& sensibilitatea,
intelectul i raiunea6'
:' Kant a 8ncercat astfel o reconstrucie a ideii de
filozofie0 care ar fi tre$uit s ai$ urmtoarele sarcini&
a' respingerea vechiului stil de filozofare
speculativ 5metafizica6;
$' reconstruirea metafizicii su$ forma riguroas
a unei #tiin!e;
c' analiza 5critica6 celor trei facult!i de
cunoa#tere #i precizarea limitelor fiecreia din
ele;
d' sta$ilirea raportului dintre experiena
simurilor #i aportul formelor mentale 8n
constituirea cunoa#terii;
e' verificarea validit!ii cuno#tin!elor prin
raportarea la date ei2stente 8n e2perien!'
+rincipalele concepte #i idei0 8n ordinea importan!ei mesa%ului
te2tului0 sunt& criticism, analiz, critic a cunoaterii,limite
ale cunoaterii, faculti ale cunoaterii, sensibilitate,
intelect, raiune,experien,respingere a metafizicii,
cunoatere speculativ.
Immanuel Kant
7
/' Immanuel Kant is one of the most influential
philosophers in the histor< of Western
philosoph<'
1' His contri$utions to
metaphysics
epistemology(C.R.Pur)
ethics( C.R.Pr0 Baz. Metaf. morav)
aesthetics 5C.R ac. !e "u!'6
have had a profound impact on almost ever<
philosophical movement that follo*ed him'
CRITICA RAIUNII PURE
/' A large part of Kant=s *or> addresses the
?uestion "What can we know?"
1' @he ans*er0 if it can $e stated simpl<0 is that
our >no*ledge is constrained to mathematics
and the science of the natural0 empirical *orld'
7' It is impossi$le0 Kant argues0 to e2tend
>no*ledge to the supersensi$le realm of
speculative metaph<sics'
9' @he reason that >no*ledge has these constraints0
Kant argues0 is that the mind pla<s an active role
in constituting the features of e2perience and
limiting the mind=s access to the empirical realm
of space and time'
Historical Background to Kant
9
/' @here are two major historical movements in the
earl< modern period of philosoph< that had a
significant impact on Kant&
a' mpiricism and
$' !ationalism'
1' Kant argues that $oth the method and the content
of these philosophers= arguments contain serious
fla*s'
7' A central epistemological pro$lem for
philosophers in $oth movements *as determining
how we can escape "rom within the con"ines o"
the human mind and the immediatel< >no*a$le
content of our o*n thoughts to ac?uire
>no*ledge of the *orld outside of us'
9' @he "mpiricists sought to accomplish this
through the senses and a posteriori reasoning'
:' @he (ationalists attempted to use a priori
reasoning to $uild the necessar< $ridge'
A' # posteriori reasoning depends upon
e2perience or contingent events in the *orld to
provide us *ith information' @hat B,ill Clinton is
president of the Cnited -tates in /DDD0B for
e2ample0 is something that I can >no* onl<
through e2perience;
a' I cannot determine this to $e true through
an anal<sis of the concepts of BpresidentB
or B,ill Clinton'B
E' # priori reasoning0 in contrast0 does not depend
upon e2perience to inform it'
:
a' @he concept B$achelorB logicall< entails
the ideas of an unmarried0 adult0 human
male *ithout m< needing to conduct a
surve< of $achelors and men *ho are
unmarried'
F' Kant $elieved that this t*ofold distinction in
>inds of >no*ledge *as inade?uate to the tas> of
understanding metaph<sics for reasons *e *ill
discuss in a moment'
Kant$s #nswers to his %redecessors
/' Kant=s ans*er to the pro$lems generated $< the
t*o traditions mentioned a$ove changed the "ace
o" philosophy.
1' First0 Kant argued that that old division $et*een
a priori truths and a posteriori truths emplo<ed
$< $oth camps *as insufficient to descri$e the
sort of metaph<sical claims that *ere under
dispute'
7' An anal<sis of >no*ledge also re?uires a
distinction $et*een synthetic and analytic truths'
9' In an anal<tic claim& the predicate is contained
within the su'ject'
a' In the claim0 B"ver< $od< occupies
space0B the propert< of occup<ing space is
A
revealed in an anal<sis of *hat it means to
$e a $od<'
:' @he su$%ect of a s<nthetic claim0 ho*ever0 does
not contain the predicate'
a' In0 B@his tree is /1G feet tall0B the
concepts are s<nthesized or $rought
together to form a ne* claim that is not
contained in an< of the individual
concepts'
A' @he "mpiricists had not $een a$le to prove
synthetic a priori claims li>e B"ver< event must
have a cause0B $ecause the< had conflated
Bs<ntheticB and Ba posterioriB as *ell as
Banal<ticB and Ba priori'B
a' @hen the< had assumed that the t*o
resulting categories *ere e2haustive'
$' A s<nthetic a priori claim0 Kant argues0 is
one that must 'e true without appealing
to e(perience0 <et the predicate is not
logicall< contained *ithin the su$%ect0 so
it is no surprise that the "mpiricists failed
to produce the sought after %ustification'
c' @he (ationalists had similarl< conflated
the four terms and mista>enl< proceeded
as if claims li>e0 B@he self is a simple
su$stance0B could $e proven anal<ticall<
and a priori'
E' -<nthetic a priori claims0 Kant argues0 demand
an entirely di""erent kind o" proo" than those
E
re?uired for anal<tic0 a priori claims or s<nthetic0
a posteriori claims'
F' Indications for ho* to proceed0 Kant sa<s0 can $e
found in the e2amples of s<nthetic a priori claims
in natural science and mathematics0
specificall< geometr<'
D' Claims li>e e*ton=s0 Bthe ?uantit< of matter is
al*a<s preserved0B and the geometer=s claim0 Bthe
angles of a triangle al*a<s add up to /FG
degreesB are >no*n a priori0 $ut the< cannot $e
>no*n merel< from an anal<sis of the concepts of
matter or triangle'
a' We must Bgo outside and $e<ond the
concept' ' ' %oining to it a priori in thought
something *hich I have not thought in it'B
5, /F6
$' A s<nthetic a priori claim constructs upon
and adds to *hat is contained anal<ticall<
in a concept without appealing to
e(perience.
/G' -o if *e are to solve the pro$lems generated $<
"mpiricism and (ationalism0 the central ?uestion
of metaph<sics in the Criti#ue of Pure Reason
reduces to BHow are synthetic a priori
judgments possi'le?"
a' If *e can ans*er that ?uestion0 then *e
can determine the&
i' +ossi$ilit<
ii' legitimac<0 and
iii' range of all metaph<sical claims'
F
Kant$s )opernican !e*olution+
,ind ,aking -ature
/' Kant=s ans*er to the ?uestion is complicated0 $ut
his conclusion is that a num$er of s<nthetic a
priori claims0 li>e those from geometr< and the
natural sciences0 are true 'ecause o" the
structure o" the mind that knows them'
1' B"ver< event must have a causeB cannot $e
proven $< e2perience0 $ut e2perience is
impossi$le *ithout it $ecause it descri$es the *a<
the mind must necessaril< order its
representations'
7' We can understand Kant=s argument again $<
considering his predecessors' According to the
(ationalist and "mpiricist traditions0 the mind is
passi*e either $ecause&
a' it finds itself possessing innate& well.
"ormed ideas read< for anal<sis0
$' or $ecause it receives ideas of o$%ects into
a >ind of empt< theater0 or 'lank slate'
9' Kant=s crucial insight here is to argue that
e2perience of a *orld as *e have it is onl<
possi$le i" the mind pro*ides a systematic
structuring o" its representations'
D
:' @his structuring is $elo* the level of0 or logicall<
prior to0 the mental representations that the
"mpiricists and (ationalists anal<zed'
A' @heir epistemological and metaph<sical theories
could not ade?uatel< e2plain the sort of
%udgments or e2perience *e have $ecause
a' they only considered the results o" the
mind$s interaction with the world&
$' not the nature o" the mind$s
contri'ution'
E' Kant=s methodological innovation *as to emplo<
*hat he calls a transcendental argument to
prove s<nthetic a priori claims'
F' @<picall<0 a transcendental argument attempts to
prove a conclusion a$out the necessary
structure o" knowledge on the $asis of an
incontroverti$le mental act'
D' Kant argues in the !e"utation o" ,aterial
Idealism that B@here are o$%ects that e2ist in
space and time outside of me0B 5, 1E96
a' *hich cannot $e proven $< a priori or a
posteriori methods0 is a necessar<
condition of the possi$ilit< of $eing a*are
of one=s o*n e2istence' It *ould not $e
possi$le to $e a*are of m<self as e2isting0
he sa<s0 *ithout presupposing the e2isting
of something permanent outside of me to
distinguish m<self from' I am a*are of
m<self as e2isting' @herefore0 there is
something permanent outside of me'
/G
@his argument is one of man< transcendental arguments
that Kant gives that focuses on the contri$ution that the
mind itself ma>es to its e2perience' @hese arguments
lead Kant to conclude that the "mpiricists= assertion that
e2perience is the source of all our ideas' It must $e the
mind=s structuring0 Kant argues0 that ma>es e2perience
possi$le' If there are features of e2perience that the mind
$rings to o$%ects rather than given to the mind $< o$%ects0
that *ould e2plain *h< the< are indispensa$le to
e2perience $ut unsu$stantiated in it' And that *ould
e2plain *h< *e can give a transcendental argument for
the necessit< of these features' Kant thought that
,er>ele< and Hume identified at least part of the mind=s
a priori contri$ution to e2perience *ith the list of claims
that the< said *ere unsu$stantiated on empirical grounds&
B"ver< event must have a cause0B B@here are mind-
independent o$%ects that persist over time0B and
BIdentical su$%ects persist over time'B @he empiricist
pro%ect must $e incomplete since these claims are
necessaril< presupposed in our %udgments0 a point
,er>ele< and Hume failed to see' -o0 Kant argues that a
philosophical investigation into the nature of the e2ternal
*orld must $e as much an in?uir< into the features and
activit< of the mind that >no*s it'
@he idea that the mind pla<s an active role in structuring
realit< is so familiar to us no* that it is difficult for us to
see *hat a pivotal insight this *as for Kant' He *as *ell
a*are of the idea=s po*er to overturn the philosophical
*orldvie*s of his contemporaries and predecessors0
//
ho*ever' He even some*hat immodestl< li>ens his
situation to that of Copernicus in revolutionizing our
*orldvie*' Hn the )oc>ean vie*0 mental content is
given to the mind $< the o$%ects in the *orld' @heir
properties migrate into the mind0 revealing the true
nature of o$%ects' Kant sa<s0 B@hus far it has $een
assumed that all our cognition must conform to o$%ectsB
5, 2vi6' ,ut that approach cannot e2plain *h< some
claims li>e0 Bever< event must have a cause0B are a priori
true' -imilarl<0 Copernicus recognized that the
movement of the stars cannot $e e2plained $< ma>ing
them revolve around the o$server; it is the o$server that
must $e revolving' Analogousl<0 Kant argued that *e
must reformulate the *a< *e thin> a$out our relationship
to o$%ects' It is the mind itself *hich gives o$%ects at
least some of their characteristics $ecause the< must
conform to its structure and conceptual capacities' @hus0
the mind=s active role in helping to create a *orld that is
e2perienca$le must put it at the center of our
philosophical investigations' @he appropriate starting
place for an< philosophical in?uir< into >no*ledge0 Kant
decides0 is *ith the mind that can have that >no*ledge'
Kant=s critical turn to*ard the mind of the >no*er is
am$itious and challenging' Kant has re%ected the
dogmatic metaph<sics of the (ationalists that promises
supersensi$le >no*ledge' And he has argued that
"mpiricism faces serious limitations' His transcendental
method *ill allo* him to anal<ze the metaph<sical
re?uirements of the empirical method *ithout venturing
/1
into speculative and ungrounded metaph<sics' In this
conte2t0 determining the BtranscendentalB components of
>no*ledge means determining0 Ball >no*ledge *hich is
occupied not so much *ith o$%ects as *ith the mode of
our >no*ledge of o$%ects in so far as this mode of
>no*ledge is to $e possi$le a priori'B 5A /1I, 1:6
@he pro%ect of the Criti#ue of Pure Reason is also
challenging $ecause in the anal<sis of the mind=s
transcendental contri$utions to e2perience *e must
emplo< the mind0 the onl< tool *e have0 to investigate
the mind' We must use the faculties of >no*ledge to
determine the limits of >no*ledge0 so Kant=s Criti#ue of
Pure Reason is $oth a criti?ue that ta>es pure reason as
its su$%ect matter0 and a criti?ue that is conducted $<
pure reason'
Kant=s argument that the mind ma>es an a priori
contri$ution to e2periences should not $e mista>en for an
argument li>e the (ationalists= that the mind possesses
innate ideas li>e0 BGod is a perfect $eing'B Kant re%ects
the claim that there are complete propositions li>e this
one etched on the fa$ric of the mind' He argues that the
mind provides a formal structuring that allo*s for the
con%oining of concepts into %udgments0 $ut that
structuring itself has no content' @he mind is devoid of
content until interaction *ith the *orld actuates these
formal constraints' @he mind possesses a priori templates
for %udgments0 not a priori %udgments'
/7
Kant$s /ranscendental Idealism
With Kant=s claim that the mind of the >no*er ma>es an
active contri$ution to e2perience of o$%ects $efore us0 *e
are in a $etter position to understand transcendental
idealism' Kant=s arguments are designed to sho* the
limitations of our >no*ledge' @he (ationalists $elieved
that *e could possess metaph<sical >no*ledge a$out
God0 souls0 su$stance0 and so; the< $elieved such
>no*ledge *as transcendentall< real' Kant argues0
ho*ever0 that *e cannot have >no*ledge of the realm
$e<ond the empirical' @hat is0 transcendental >no*ledge
is ideal0 not real0 for minds li>e ours' Kant identifies t*o
a priori sources of these constraints' @he mind has a
receptive capacit<0 or the sensi'ility0 and the mind
possesses a conceptual capacit<0 or the understanding.
In the /ranscendental #esthetic section of the Criti#ue0
Kant argues that sensi$ilit< is the understanding=s means
of accessing o$%ects' @he reason s<nthetic a priori
%udgments are possi$le in geometr<0 Kant argues0 is that
space is an a priori form of sensi$ilit<' @hat is0 *e can
>no* the claims of geometr< *ith a priori certaint<
5*hich *e do6 onl< if e2periencing o$%ects in space is
the necessar< mode of our e2perience' Kant also argues
that *e cannot e2perience o$%ects *ithout $eing a$le to
represent them spatiall<' It is impossi$le to grasp an
/9
o$%ect as an o$%ect unless *e delineate the region of
space it occupies' Without a spatial representation0 our
sensations are undifferentiated and *e cannot ascri$e
properties to particular o$%ects' @ime0 Kant argues0 is
also necessar< as a form or condition of our intuitions of
o$%ects' @he idea of time itself cannot $e gathered from
e2perience $ecause succession and simultaneit< of
o$%ects0 the phenomena that *ould indicate the passage
of time0 *ould $e impossi$le to represent if *e did not
alread< possess the capacit< to represent o$%ects in time'
Another *a< to understand Kant=s point here is that it is
impossi$le for us to have an< e2perience of o$%ects that
are not in time and space' Furthermore0 space and time
themselves cannot $e perceived directl<0 so the< must $e
the form $< *hich e2perience of o$%ects is had' A
consciousness that apprehends o$%ects directl<0 as the<
are in themselves and not $< means of space and time0 is
possi$le--God0 Kant sa<s0 has a purel< intuitive
consciousness--$ut our apprehension of o$%ects is al*a<s
mediated $< the conditions of sensi$ilit<' An< discursive
or concept using consciousness 5A 17GI, 1F76 li>e ours
must apprehend o$%ects as occup<ing a region of space
and persisting for some duration of time'
-u$%ecting sensations to the a priori conditions of space
and time is not sufficient to ma>e %udging o$%ects
possi$le' Kant argues that the understanding must
provide the concepts0 *hich are rules for identif<ing
*hat is common or universal in different representations'
/:
5A /GA6 He sa<s0 B*ithout sensi$ilit< no o$%ect *ould $e
given to us; and *ithout understanding no o$%ect *ould
$e thought' @houghts *ithout content are empt<;
intuitions *ithout concepts are $lind'B 5, E:6 )oc>e=s
mista>e *as $elieving that our sensi$le apprehensions of
o$%ects are thin>a$le and reveal the properties of the
o$%ects themselves' In the #nalytic o" )oncepts section
of the Criti#ue0 Kant argues that in order to thin> a$out
the input from sensi$ilit<0 sensations must conform to the
conceptual structure that the mind has availa$le to it' ,<
appl<ing concepts0 the understanding ta>es the
particulars that are given in sensation and identifies *hat
is common and general a$out them' A concept of
BshelterB for instance0 allo*s me to identif< *hat is
common in particular representations of a house0 a tent0
and a cave'
@he empiricist might o$%ect at this point $< insisting that
such concepts do arise from e2perience0 raising ?uestions
a$out Kant=s claim that the mind $rings an a priori
conceptual structure to the *orld' Indeed0 concepts li>e
BshelterB do arise partl< from e2perience' ,ut Kant raises
a more fundamental issue' An empirical derivation is not
sufficient to e2plain all of our concepts' As *e have
seen0 Hume argued0 and Kant accepts0 that *e cannot
empiricall< derive our concepts of causation0 su$stance0
self0 identit<0 and so forth' What Hume had failed to see0
Kant argues0 is that even the possi$ilit< of ma>ing
%udgments a$out o$%ects0 to *hich Hume *ould assent0
presupposes the possession of these fundamental
/A
concepts' Hume had argued for a sort of associationism
to e2plain ho* *e arrive at causal $eliefs' J< idea of a
moving cue $all0 $ecomes associated *ith m< idea of the
eight $all that is struc> and falls into the poc>et' Cnder
the right circumstances0 repeated impressions of the
second follo*ing the first produces a $elief in me that
the first causes the second'
@he pro$lem that Kant points out is that a Humean
association of ideas alread< presupposes that *e can
conceive of identical0 persistent o$%ects that have regular0
predicta$le0 causal $ehavior' And $eing a$le to conceive
of o$%ects in this rich sense presupposes that the mind
ma>es several a priori contri$utions' I must $e a$le to
separate the o$%ects from each other in m< sensations0
and from m< sensations of m<self' I must $e a$le to
attri$ute properties to the o$%ects' I must $e a$le to
conceive of an e2ternal *orld *ith its o*n course of
events that is separate from the stream of perceptions in
m< consciousness' @hese components of e2perience
cannot $e found in e2perience $ecause the< constitute it'
@he mind=s a priori conceptual contri$ution to e2perience
can $e enumerated $< a special set of concepts that ma>e
all other empirical concepts and %udgments possi$le'
@hese concepts cannot $e e2perienced directl<; the< are
onl< manifest as the form *hich particular %udgments of
o$%ects ta>e' Kant $elieves that formal logic has alread<
revealed *hat the fundamental categories of thought are'
@he special set of concepts is Kant=s /a'le o"
/E
)ategories0 *hich are ta>en mostl< from Aristotle *ith a
fe* revisions&
0" 1uantity
Cnit<
+luralit<
@otalit<
0" 1uality 0" !elation
(ealit< Inherence and -u$sistence
egation Causalit< and Kependence
)imitation Communit<
0" ,odality
+ossi$ilit<-Impossi$ilit<
"2istence-one2istence
ecessit<-Contingenc<
While Kant does not give a formal derivation of it0 he
$elieves that this is the complete and necessar< list of the
a priori contri$utions that the understanding $rings to its
%udgments of the *orld' "ver< %udgment that the
/F
understanding can ma>e must fall under the ta$le of
categories' And su$suming spatiotemporal sensations
under the formal structure of the categories ma>es
%udgments0 and ultimatel< >no*ledge0 of empirical
o$%ects possi$le'
-ince o$%ects can onl< $e e2perienced spatiotemporall<0
the onl< application of concepts that <ields >no*ledge is
to the empirical0 spatiotemporal *orld' ,e<ond that
realm0 there can $e no sensations of o$%ects for the
understanding to %udge0 rightl< or *rongl<' -ince
intuitions of the ph<sical *orld are lac>ing *hen *e
speculate a$out *hat lies $e<ond0 metaph<sical
>no*ledge0 or >no*ledge of the *orld outside the
ph<sical0 is impossi$le' Claiming to have >no*ledge
from the application of concepts $e<ond the $ounds of
sensation results in the empt< and illusor< transcendent
metaphysics of (ationalism that Kant reacts against'
It should $e pointed out0 ho*ever0 that Kant is not
endorsing an idealism a$out o$%ects li>e ,er>ele<=s' @hat
is0 Kant does not $elieve that material o$%ects are
un>no*a$le or impossi$le' While Kant is a
transcendental idealist--he $elieves the nature of o$%ects
as the< are in themselves is un>no*a$le to us--
>no*ledge of appearances is nevertheless possi$le' As
noted a$ove0 in @he (efutation of Jaterial Idealism0
Kant argues that the ordinar< self-consciousness that
,er>ele< and Kescartes *ould grant implies Bthe
e2istence of o$%ects in space outside me'B 5, 1E:6
/D
Consciousness of m<self *ould not $e possi$le if I *ere
not a$le to ma>e determinant %udgments a$out o$%ects
that e2ist outside of me and have states that are
independent of the of m< inner e2perience' Another *a<
to put the point is to sa< that the fact that the mind of the
>no*er ma>es the a priori contri$ution does not mean
that space and time or the categories are mere figments
of the imagination' Kant is an empirical realist a$out
the *orld *e e2perience; *e can >no* o$%ects as the<
appear to us' He gives a ro$ust defense of science and
the stud< of the natural *orld from his argument a$out
the mind=s role in ma>ing nature' All discursive0 rational
$eings must conceive of the ph<sical *orld as spatiall<
and temporall< unified0 he argues' And the ta$le of
categories is derived from the most $asic0 universal
forms of logical inference0 Kant $elieves' @herefore0 it
must $e shared $< all rational $eings' -o those $eings
also share %udgments of an intersu$%ective0 unified0
pu$lic realm of empirical o$%ects' Hence0 o$%ective
>no*ledge of the scientific or natural *orld is possi$le'
Indeed0 Kant $elieves that the e2amples of e*ton and
Galileo sho* it is actual' -o ,er>ele<=s claims that *e do
not >no* o$%ects outside of us and that such >no*ledge
is impossi$le are $oth mista>en'
In con%unction *ith his anal<sis of the possi$ilit< of
>no*ing empirical o$%ects0 Kant gives an anal<sis of the
>no*ing su$%ect that has sometimes $een called his
transcendental psychology' Juch of Kant=s argument
can $e seen as su$%ective0 not $ecause of variations from
1G
mind to mind0 $ut $ecause the source of necessit< and
universalit< is in the mind of the >no*ing su$%ect0 not in
o$%ects themselves' Kant dra*s several conclusions
a$out *hat is necessaril< true of an< consciousness that
emplo<s the faculties of sensi$ilit< and understanding to
produce empirical %udgments' As *e have seen0 a mind
that emplo<s concepts must have a receptive facult< that
provides the content of %udgments' -pace and time are
the necessar< forms of apprehension for the receptive
facult<' @he mind that has e2perience must also have a
facult< of com$ination or synthesis0 the imagination for
Kant0 that apprehends the data of sense0 reproduces it for
the understanding0 and recognizes their features
according to the conceptual frame*or> provided $< the
categories' @he mind must also have a facult< of
understanding that provides empirical concepts and the
categories for %udgment' @he various faculties that ma>e
%udgment possi$le must $e unified into one mind' And it
must $e identical over time if it is going to appl< its
concepts to o$%ects over time' Kant here addresses
Hume=s famous assertion that introspection reveals
nothing more than a $undle of sensations that *e group
together and call the self' .udgments *ould not $e
possi$le0 Kant maintains0 if the mind that senses is not
the same as the mind that possesses the forms of
sensi$ilit<' And that mind must $e the same as the mind
that emplo<s the ta$le of categories0 that contri$utes
empirical concepts to %udgment0 and that s<nthesizes the
*hole into >no*ledge of a unified0 empirical *orld' -o
the fact that *e can empiricall< %udge proves0 contra
1/
Hume0 that the mind cannot $e a mere $undle of
disparate introspected sensations' In his *or>s on ethics
Kant *ill also argue that this mind is the source of
spontaneous0 free0 and moral action' Kant $elieves that
all the threads of his transcendental philosoph< come
together in this Bhighest pointB *hich he calls the
transcendental unity o" apperception.
Kant$s #nalytic o" %rinciples
We have seen the progressive stages of Kant=s anal<sis of
the faculties of the mind *hich reveals the transcendental
structuring of e2perience performed $< these faculties'
First0 in his anal<sis of sensi'ility0 he argues for the
necessaril< spatiotemporal character of sensation' @hen
Kant anal<zes the understanding0 the facult< that
applies concepts to sensor< e2perience' He concludes
that the categories provide a necessar<0 foundational
template for our concepts to map onto our e2perience' In
addition to providing these transcendental concepts0 the
understanding also is the source of ordinar< empirical
concepts that ma>e %udgments a$out o$%ects possi$le'
@he understanding provides concepts as the rules for
identif<ing the properties in our representations'
Kant=s ne2t concern is *ith the facult< of %udgment0 BIf
understanding as such is e2plicated as our po*er of
rules0 then the po*er of %udgment is the a$ilit< to
su$sume under rules0 i'e'0 to distinguish *hether
11
something does or does not fall under a given rule'B 5A
/71I, /E16' @he ne2t stage in Kant=s pro%ect *ill $e to
anal<ze the formal or transcendental features of
e2perience that ena$le %udgment0 if there are an< such
features $esides *hat the previous stages have identified'
@he cognitive po*er of %udgment does have a
transcendental structure' Kant argues that there are a
num$er of principles that must necessaril< $e true of
e2perience in order for %udgment to $e possi$le' Kant=s
anal<sis of %udgment and the arguments for these
principles are contained in his #nalytic o" %rinciples'
Within the Anal<tic0 Kant first addresses the challenge of
su$suming particular sensations under general categories
in the 2chematism section' $ranscen!ental sc%emata0
Kant argues0 allo* us to identif< the homogeneous
features pic>ed out $< concepts from the heterogeneous
content of our sensations' .udgment is onl< possi$le if
the mind can recognize the components in the diverse
and disorganized data of sense that ma>e those
sensations an instance of a concept or concepts' A
schema ma>es it possi$le0 for instance0 to su$sume the
concrete and particular sensations of an Airedale0 a
Chihuahua0 and a )a$rador all under the more a$stract
concept Bdog'B
@he full e2tent of Kant=s Copernican revolution $ecomes
even more clear in the rest of the Anal<tic of +rinciples'
@hat is0 the role of the mind in ma>ing nature is not
limited to space0 time0 and the categories' In the Anal<tic
17
of +rinciples0 Kant argues that even the necessar<
conformit< of o$%ects to natural la* arises from the
mind' @hus far0 Kant=s transcendental method has
permitted him to reveal the a priori components of
sensations0 the a priori concepts' In the sections titled the
A2ioms0 Anticipations0 Analogies0 and +ostulates0 he
argues that there are a priori %udgments that must
necessaril< govern all appearances of o$%ects' @hese
%udgments are a function of the ta$le of categories= role
in determining all possi$le %udgments0 so the four
sections map onto the four headings of that ta$le' I
include all of the a priori %udgments0 or principles0 here
to illustrate the earlier claims a$out Kant=s empirical
realism0 and to sho* the intimate relationship Kant sa*
$et*een his pro%ect and that of the natural sciences&

#(ioms o" Intuition
All intuitions are e2tensive
magnitudes'

#nticipations o" %erception

In all appearances the real that is
an o$%ect of sensation has
intensive magnitude0 i'e'0 a

19
degree'



%ostulates o" mpirical
/hought
What agrees 5in terms of intuition
and concepts6 *ith the formal
conditions of e2perience is
possi$le'
What coheres *ith the material
conditions of e2perience 5*ith
sensation6 is actual'
@hat *hose coherence *ith the
actual is determined according to
universal conditions of
e2perience is necessar< 5e2ists
necessaril<6
1:
Kant$s 3ialectic
@he discussion of Kant=s metaph<sics and epistemolog<
so far 5including the Anal<tic of +rinciples6has $een
confined primaril< to the section of the Criti#ue of Pure
Reason that Kant calls the /ranscendental #nalytic'
@he purpose of the Anal<tic0 *e are told0 is Bthe rarel<
attempted dissection of the po*er of the understanding
itself'B 5A A:I, DG6' Kant=s pro%ect has $een to develop
the full argument for his theor< a$out the mind=s
contri$ution to >no*ledge of the *orld' Hnce that theor<
is in place0 *e are in a position to see the errors that are
caused $< transgressions of the $oundaries to >no*ledge
esta$lished $< Kant=s transcendental idealism and
empirical realism' Kant calls %udgments that pretend to
have >no*ledge $e<ond these $oundaries and that even
re?uire us to tear do*n the limits that he has placed on
>no*ledge0 transcendent judgments. @he
/ranscendental 3ialectic section of the $oo> is devoted
to uncovering the illusion of >no*ledge created $<
transcendent %udgments and e2plaining *h< the
temptation to $elieve them persists' Kant argues that the
proper functioning of the faculties of sensi$ilit< and the
understanding com$ine to dra* reason0 or the cognitive
po*er of inference0 ine2ora$l< into mista>es' @he facult<
of reason naturall< see>s the highest ground of
unconditional unit<' It see>s to unif< and su$sume all
particular e2periences under higher and higher principles
of >no*ledge' ,ut sensi$ilit< cannot $< its nature
1A
provide the intuitions that *ould ma>e >no*ledge of the
highest principles and of things as the< are in themselves
possi$le' evertheless0 reason0 in its function as the
facult< of inference0 inevita$l< dra*s conclusions a$out
*hat lies $e<ond the $oundaries of sensi$ilit<' @he
unfolding of this conflict $et*een the faculties reveals
more a$out the mind=s relationship to the *orld it see>s
to >no* and the possi$ilit< of a science of metaph<sics'
Kant $elieves that Aristotle=s logic of the syllogism
captures the logic emplo<ed $< reason' @he resulting
mista>es from the inevita$le conflict $et*een sensi$ilit<
and reason reflect the logic of Aristotle=s syllogism.
Corresponding to the three $asic >inds of s<llogism are
three dialectic mista>es or illusions of transcendent
>no*ledge that cannot $e real' Kant=s discussion of these
three classes of mista>es are contained in the
%aralogisms& the #ntinomies& and the Ideals o" !eason'
@he Kialectic e2plains the illusions of reason in these
sections' ,ut since the illusions arise from the structure
of our faculties0 the< *ill not cease to have their
influence on our minds an< more than *e can prevent the
moon from seeming larger *hen it is on the horizon than
*hen it is overhead' 5A 1DEI, 7:96'
In the %aralogisms0 Kant argues that a failure to
recognize the difference $et*een appearances and things
in themselves0 particularl< in the case of the introspected
self0 lead us into transcendent error' Kant argues against
several conclusions encouraged $< Kescartes and the
1E
rational ps<chologists0 *ho $elieved the< could $uild
human >no*ledge from the BI thin>B of the cogito
argument' From the BI thin>B of self-a*areness *e can
infer0 the< maintain0 that the self or soul is /6 simple0 16
immaterial0 76 an identical su$stance and 96 that *e
perceive it directl<0 in contrast to e2ternal o$%ects *hose
e2istence is merel< possi$le' @hat is0 the rational
ps<chologists claimed to have >no*ledge of the self as
transcendentall< real' Kant $elieves that it is impossi$le
to demonstrate an< of these four claims0 and that the
mista>en claims to >no*ledge stem from a failure to see
the real nature of our apprehension of the BI'B (eason
cannot fail to appl< the categories to its %udgments of the
self0 and that application gives rise to these four
conclusions a$out the self that correspond roughl< to the
four headings in the ta$le of categories' ,ut to ta>e the
self as an o$%ect of >no*ledge here is to pretend to have
>no*ledge of the self as it is in itself0 not as it appears to
us' Hur representation of the BIB itself is empt<' It is
su$%ect to the condition of inner sense0 time0 $ut not the
condition of outer sense0 space0 so it cannot $e a proper
o$%ect of >no*ledge' It can $e t%oug%t through concepts0
$ut *ithout the commensurate spatial and temporal
intuitions0 it cannot $e >no*n' "ach of the four
paralogisms e2plains the categorical structure of reason
that led the rational ps<chologists to mista>e the self as it
appears to us for the self as it is in itself'
We have alread< mentioned the #ntinomies0 in *hich
Kant anal<zes the methodological pro$lems of the
1F
(ationalist pro%ect' Kant sees the Antinomies as the
unresolved dialogue $et*een s>epticism and dogmatism
a$out >no*ledge of the *orld' @here are four
antinomies0 again corresponding to the four headings of
the ta$le of categories0 that are generated $< reason=s
attempts to achieve complete >no*ledge of the realm
$e<ond the empirical' "ach antinom< has a thesis and an
antithesis0 $oth of *hich can $e validl< proven0 and since
each ma>es a claim that is $e<ond the grasp of
spatiotemporal sensation0 neither can $e confirmed or
denied $< e2perience' @he First Antinom< argues $oth
that the *orld has a $eginning in time and space0 and no
$eginning in time and space' @he -econd Antinom<=s
arguments are that ever< composite su$stance is made of
simple parts and that nothing is composed of simple
parts' @he @hird Antinom<=s thesis is that agents li>e
ourselves have freedom and its antithesis is that the< do
not' @he Fourth Antinom< contains arguments $oth for
and against the e2istence of a necessar< $eing in the
*orld' @he seemingl< irreconcila$le claims of the
Antinomies can onl< $e resolved $< seeing them as the
product of the conflict of the faculties and $< recognizing
the proper sphere of our >no*ledge in each case' In each
of them0 the idea of Ba$solute totalit<0 *hich holds onl<
as a condition of things in themselves0 has $een applied
to appearancesB 5A :GAI,:796'
@he result of Kant= anal<sis of the Antinomies is that *e
can re%ect $oth claims of the first t*o and accept $oth
claims of the last t*o0 if *e understand their proper
1D
domains' In the first Antinom<0 the *orld as it appears to
us is neither finite since *e can al*a<s in?uire a$out its
$eginning or end0 nor is it infinite $ecause finite $eings
li>e ourselves cannot cognize an infinite *hole' As an
empirical o$%ect0 Kant argues0 it is indefinitel<
constructi$le for our minds' As it is in itself0 independent
of the conditions of our thought0 should not $e identified
as finite or infinite since $oth are categorial conditions of
our thought' Kant=s resolution of the third Antinom< 5A
99:I, 9E76 clarifies his position on freedom' He
considers the t*o competing h<potheses of speculative
metaph<sics that there are different t<pes of causalit< in
the *orld& /6 there are natural causes *hich are
themselves governed $< the la*s of nature as *ell as
uncaused causes li>e ourselves that can act freel<0 or 16
the causal la*s of nature entirel< govern the *orld
including our actions' @he conflict $et*een these
contrar< claims can $e resolved0 Kant argues0 $< ta>ing
his critical turn and recognizing that it is impossi$le for
an< cause to $e thought of as uncaused itself in the realm
of space and time' ,ut reason0 in tr<ing to understand the
ground of all things0 strives to unif< its >no*ledge
$e<ond the empirical realm' @he empirical *orld0
considered $< itself0 cannot provide us *ith ultimate
reasons' -o if *e do not assume a first or free cause *e
cannot completel< e2plain causal series in the *orld' -o
for the @hird Antinom<0 as for all of the Antinomies0 the
domain of the @hesis is the intellectual0 rational0
noumenal *orld' @he domain of the Antithesis is the
spatiotemporal *orld'
7G
/he Ideas o" !eason
@he facult< of reason has t*o emplo<ments' For the
most part0 *e have engaged in an anal<sis of theoretical
reason *hich has determined the limits and re?uirements
of the emplo<ment of the facult< of reason to o$tain
>no*ledge' @heoretical reason0 Kant sa<s0 ma>es it
possi$le to cognize *hat is' ,ut reason has its practical
emplo<ment in determining *hat ought to $e as *ell' 5A
A77I, AA/6 @his distinction roughl< corresponds to the
t*o philosophical enterprises of metaph<sics and ethics'
(eason=s practical use is manifest in the regulative
function of certain concepts that *e must thin> *ith
regard to the *orld0 even though *e can have no
>no*ledge of them'
Kant $elieves that0 BHuman reason is $< its nature
architectonic'B 5A 9E9I, :G16' @hat is0 reason thin>s of
all cognitions as $elonging to a unified and organized
s<stem' (eason is our facult< of ma>ing inferences and
of identif<ing the grounds $ehind ever< truth' It allo*s
us to move from the particular and contingent to the
glo$al and universal' I infer that BCaius is mortalB from
the fact that BCaius is a manB and the universal claim0
BAll men are mortal'B In this fashion0 reason see>s higher
and higher levels of generalit< in order to e2plain the
*a< things are' In a different >ind of e2ample0 the
7/
$iologist=s classification of ever< living thing into a
>ingdom0 ph<lum0 class0 order0 famil<0 genus0 and
species0 illustrates reason=s am$ition to su$sume the
*orld into an ordered0 unified s<stem' @he entire
empirical *orld0 Kant argues0 must $e conceived of $<
reason as causall< necessitated 5as *e sa* in the
Analogies6' We must connect0 Bone state *ith a previous
state upon *hich the state follo*s according to a rule'B
"ach cause0 and each cause=s cause0 and each additional
ascending cause must itself have a cause' (eason
generates this hierarch< that com$ines to provide the
mind *ith a conception of a *hole s<stem of nature'
Kant $elieves that it is part of the function of reason to
strive for a complete0 determinate understanding of the
natural *orld' ,ut our anal<sis of theoretical reason has
made it clear that *e can never have >no*ledge of the
totalit< of things $ecause *e cannot have the re?uisite
sensations of the totalit<0 hence one of the necessar<
conditions of >no*ledge is not met' evertheless0 reason
see>s a state of rest from the regression of conditioned0
empirical %udgments in some unconditioned ground that
can complete the series 5A :F9I, A/16' (eason=s
structure pushes us to accept certain i!eas of reason that
allo* completion of its striving for unit<' We must
assume the ideas of 4od& "reedom& and immortality0
Kant sa<s0 not as o$%ects of >no*ledge0 $ut as practical
necessities for the emplo<ment of reason in the realm
*here *e can have >no*ledge' ,< den<ing the
possi$ilit< of >no*ledge of these ideas0 <et arguing for
71
their role in the s<stem of reason0 Kant had to0 Bannul
>no*ledge in order to ma>e room for faith'B 5, 2226'
Kant$s thics
/' It is rare for a philosopher in an< era to ma>e a
significant impact on an< single topic in
philosoph<'
1' For a philosopher to impact as man< different
areas as Kant did is e2traordinar<'
7' His ethical theor< has $een as0 if not more0
influential than his *or> in epistemolog< and
metaph<sics'
9' Jost of Kant=s *or> on ethics is presented in two
works&
a' $%e oun!ations of t%e Metap%&sics of
Morals 5/EF:6 is Kant=s Bsearch for and
esta$lishment of the supreme principle of
moralit<'B
$' In $%e Criti#ue of Practical Reason
5/EFE6 Kant attempts to unif< his account
of practical reason *ith his *or> in the
Criti#ue of Pure Reason'
:' Kant is the primar< proponent in histor< of *hat
is called deontological ethics'
a' Keontolog< is the study o" duty'
77
$' Hn Kant=s vie*0 the sole feature that gives
an action moral *orth is not the outcome
that is achieved $< the action0 $ut the
moti*e that is 'ehind the action'
c' @he categorical imperative is Kant=s
famous statement of this dut<& "#)/
0-56 #))0!3I-4 /0 /H#/ ,#7I, B6
WHI)H 608 )#- #/ /H 2#, /I,
WI55 /H#/ I/ 2H0853 B)0, #
UNIVERSAL LAW."
(eason and Freedom
/' For Kant0 as *e have seen0 the drive for total0
s<stematic >no*ledge in reason can onl< $e
fulfilled *ith assumptions that empirical
o$servation cannot support'
1' @he metaph<sical facts a$out the ultimate nature
of things in themselves must remain a mystery
to us $ecause of the spatiotemporal constraints on
sensi$ilit<'
7' When *e thin> a$out the nature of things in
themselves or the ultimate ground of the
empirical *orld0 Kant has argued that *e are still
constrained to thin> through the categories0 *e
cannot thin> other*ise0 $ut *e can have no
79
>no*ledge $ecause sensation provides our
concepts *ith no content'
9' -o0 reason is put at odds *ith itself $ecause it is
constrained 'y the limits o" its transcendental
structure& $ut it seeks to ha*e complete
knowledge that *ould ta>e it $e<ond those
limits'
:' 9reedom pla<s a central role in Kant=s ethics
$ecause the possi'ility o" moral judgments
presupposes it'
A' Freedom is an idea o" reason that serves an
indispensa$le practical function'
E' Without the assumption of freedom0 reason
cannot act'
a' If *e thin> of ourselves as completel<
causall< determined0 and not as uncaused
causes ourselves0 then an< attempt to
conceive of a rule that prescri$es the
means $< *hich some end can $e
achieved is pointless' I cannot $oth thin>
of m<self as entirel< su$%ect to causal la*
and as $eing a$le to act according to the
conception of a principle that gives
guidance to m< *ill' We cannot help $ut
thin> of our actions as the result of an
uncaused cause if *e are to act at all and
emplo< reason to accomplish ends and
understand the *orld'
7:
-o reason has an unavoida$le interest in thin>ing of itself
as free' @hat is0 theoretical reason cannot demonstrate
freedom0 $ut practical reason must assume for the
purpose of action' Having the a$ilit< to ma>e %udgments
and appl< reason puts us outside that s<stem of causall<
necessitated events' B(eason creates for itself the idea of
a spontaneit< that can0 on its o*n0 start to act--*ithout0
i'e'0 needing to $e preceded $< another cause $< means
of *hich it is determined to action in turn0 according to
the la* of causal connection0B Kant sa<s' 5A :77I, :A/6
In its intellectual domain0 reason must thin> of itself as
free'
It is dissatisf<ing that he cannot demonstrate freedom0
nevertheless0 it comes as no surprise that *e must thin>
of ourselves as free' In a sense0 Kant is agreeing *ith the
common sense vie* that ho* I choose to act ma>es a
difference in ho* I actuall< act' "ven if it *ere possi$le
to give a predictive empirical account of *h< I act as I
do0 sa< on the grounds of a functionalist ps<chological
theor<0 those considerations *ould mean nothing to me
in m< deli$erations' When I ma>e a decision a$out *hat
to do0 a$out *hich car to $u<0 for instance0 the
mechanism at *or> in m< nervous s<stem ma>es no
difference to me' I still have to peruse Consumer
Reports0 consider m< options0 reflect on m< needs0 and
decide on the $asis of the application of general
principles' J< first person perspective is unavoida$le0
hence the deli$erative0 intellectual process of choice is
unavoida$le'
7A
@he Kualit< of the Human -ituation
@he ?uestion of moral action is not an issue for t*o
classes of $eings0 according to Kant' @he animal
consciousness0 the purel< sensuous $eing0 is entirel<
su$%ect to causal determination' It is part of the causal
chains of the empirical *orld0 $ut not an originator of
causes the *a< humans are' Hence0 rightness or
*rongness0 as concepts that appl< to situations one has
control over0 do not appl<' We do not morall< fault the
lion for >illing the gazelle0 or even for >illing its o*n
<oung' @he actions of a purel< rational $eing0 $<
contrast0 are in perfect accord *ith moral principles0
Kant sa<s' @here is nothing in such a $eing=s nature to
ma>e it falter' Its *ill al*a<s conforms *ith the dictates
of reason' Humans are $et*een the t*o *orlds' We are
$oth sensi$le and intellectual0 as *as pointed out in the
discussion of the first Criti#ue' We are neither *holl<
determined to act $< natural impulse0 nor are *e free of
non-rational impulse' Hence *e need rules of conduct'
We need0 and reason is compelled to provide0 a principle
that declares ho* *e ought to act *hen it is in our po*er
to choose
-ince *e find ourselves in the situation of possessing
reason0 $eing a$le to act according to our o*n
conception of rules0 there is a special $urden on us' Hther
7E
creatures are acte! upon $< the *orld' ,ut having the
a$ilit< to choose the principle to guide our actions ma>es
us actors' We must e2ercise our *ill and our reason to
act' Will is the capacit< to act according to the principles
provided $< reason' (eason assumes freedom and
conceives of principles of action in order to function'
@*o pro$lems face us ho*ever' First0 *e are not *holl<
rational $eings0 so *e are lia$le to succum$ to our non-
rational impulses' -econd0 even *hen *e e2ercise our
reason full<0 *e often cannot >no* *hich action is the
$est' @he fact that *e can choose $et*een alternate
courses of actions 5*e are not determined to act $<
instinct or reason6 introduces the possi$ilit< that there
can $e $etter or *orse *a<s of achieving our ends and
$etter or *orse ends0 depending upon the criteria *e
adopt' @he presence of t*o different >inds of o$%ect in
the *orld adds another dimension0 a moral dimension0 to
our deli$erations' (oughl< spea>ing0 *e can divide the
*orld into $eings *ith reason and *ill li>e ourselves and
things that lac> those faculties' We can thin> of these
classes of things as ends-in-themselves and mere means-
to-ends0 respectivel<' "nds-in-themselves are
autonomous $eings *ith their o*n agendas; failing to
recognize their capacit< to determine their o*n actions
*ould $e to th*art their freedom and undermine reason
itself' When *e reflect on alternative courses of action0
means-to-ends0 things li>e $uildings0 roc>s0 and trees0
deserve no special status in our deli$erations a$out *hat
goals *e should have and *hat means *e use to achieve
7F
them' @he class of ends-in-themselves0 reasoning agents
li>e ourselves0 ho*ever0 do have a special status in our
considerations a$out *hat goals *e should have and the
means *e emplo< to accomplish them' Joral actions0 for
Kant0 are actions *here reason leads0 rather than follo*s0
and actions *here *e must ta>e other $eings that act
according to their o*n conception of the la*0 into
account'
'
#on$e%&ia 'e%re filozofie
a lui
Geor+ ,il-el( Frie'ri$- .e+el
*Filozofia %e$ula!i/0*
/' Concep!ia sa despre filozofie este redat printr-un
fragment din lucrarea Prelegeri !e istorie a filozofiei.
1' Filozofia lui Hegel0 dup propriile cuvinte0 este o
filozofie speculativ0 a '!eii ce se desprinde de lumea
sensi$il #i trece dincolo de e2perien!a 8n#eltoare #i
particular a sim!urilor'
7' )umea are o structur ideal0 ea este o e2presie a
transfigurrilor unei entit!i ideale denumite de Hegel0
(piritul )bsolut'Istoria omului nu reprezint altceva
decLt etapele5 determina!iile6 pe care le parcurge
aceast entitate a$solut #i misterioas de la forme
mai simple de gLndire la forme mai de gLndire mai
8nalte #i speculative'
7D
9' Filozofia se confund de fapt cu istoria filozofiei0
care este identic0 la rLndul su0 cu istoria !evenirii
-piritului A$solut ca gLndire' "tapele devenirii
-piritului A$solut sunt momente ale istoriei filozofiei0
care tre$uie gLndite ca fiind legate 8ntre ele 8ntr-un
proces dialectic 8n trei momente& tez * antitez *
sintez'
:' Filozofia reprezint forma de g8ndire integratoare a
tuturor acestor momente ca fiind pr!i ale aceluia#i
proces'Filozofia reprezint g+n!irea care a ,neles
,ntregul0 care are perspectiva 8ntregului0 8nl!Lndu-se
dincolo de momentele particulare'"a este g+n!irea la
scara istoriei0 nu doar a unui singur moment'"ste
gLndirea sintetic0 prin care lucrurile sunt legate
8mpreun'
A' +entru Hegel0 fa! de Kant0 cunoa#terea adevrat este
cunoa#terea speculativ, ca fiind mai mult decLt
privirea dincoace #i dincolo de ceea ce ne apare %ic et
nunc 5acum #i aici6 #i este verifica$il prin
confruntarea cu e2perien!a'
E' +rincipalele concepte #i idei0 8n ordinea importan!ei
mesa%ului te2tului0 sunt& (pirit )bsolut, '!ee,
!ialectica %egelian ,n trei trepte, filozofia ca istoria
filozofiei, istoria filozofiei ca istoria !evenirii
(piritului )bsolut, g+n!ire sintetic , g+n!ire
speculativ.

#on$e%&ia 'e%re filozofie a lui Au+u!e #o(%!e
*Filozofia %ozi!i/0*
9G
/' "ste redat printr-un fragment din cartea sa Curs !e
filozofie pozitiv.
1' Auguste Compte ca #i Imannuel Kant0 de e2emplu0
este unul dintre aceia care au dorit ca filozofia s fie
trnsformat 8n #tiin!' Conceptul de #tiin! #i ideea de
#tiin!0 au suferit de la o epoc la alta diverse
modificri de 8n!eles' Mn timpul lui Compte0 #tiin!a
este 8n!eleas ca tiin pozitiv0 $azat pe e2periment
#i pe analiza e2clusiv a fenomenelor0 ignorLnd
cauzele ascunse 5metafizice60 care le determin pe
acestea din urm'
7' Ni Auguste Compte este un critic al metafizicii0
accep!iune dat filozofiei speculative0 care emite idei
ce trec dincolo de orice cadru e2perimental prin care
ele s poat fi verificate'
9' Kup Compte0 gLndirea umanit!ii se gse#te 8ntr-un
proces progresiv0 care cuprinde urmtoarele etape&
a' etapa teologic, dominat de gLndirea de tip
supersti!ios0 care 8ncearc s vad 8n spatele
fenomenelor o$i#nuite cauze supranaturale;
$' etapa metafizic0 corespunde unei evolu!ii& la
$aza manifestrii fenomenelor sunt gLndite
principii a$stracte precum conceptele de
00principiuO0 00cauz primO0 00esen!O;
c' etapa pozitiv 0 care corespunde gLndiri de tip
#tiin!ific #i pozitiv0 8n care e2plica!iile $azate
pe o$serva!ie0 e2perien! #i teorii #tiin!ifice
identific ca determinante pentru fenomene
anumite legi naturale'
:' +rincipalele concepte #i idei0 8n ordinea importan!ei
mesa%ului te2tului0 sunt& filozofie pozitiv, filozofie
speculativ, tiin, tiin pozitiv, fenomene, cauze,
9/
metafizic, etape ale eoluiei g+n!irii, etapa telogic,
etapa metafizic, etapa pozitiv, legi naturale,
principii abstracte ale g+n!irii, superstiii.
#on$e%&ia 'e%re filozofie a lui Frie'ri$- Nie!z$-e
*Filozofia 11/ie&ii2*
/' "ste redat prin cLteva fragmente din cr!ile -incolo
!e bine i !e ru #i .oina !e putere.
1' Ca #i Kant0 ietzsche se raporteaz critic la filozofia
anterioar lui' 00CriticaO lui ietzsche nu este0 precum
cea >antian0 ra!ionalist0 ci din perspectiva
manifestrilor psihologice a$isale ale omului'Filozofia
de tip ra!ionalist este criticat de ietzsche ca fiind o
piedic #i o falsificare a adevratelor impulsuri ale
omului0 cele provenind din voin!a de putere' Critica sa
se 8ndreapt 8n special 8mpotriva definirii omului ca
fiin! eminamente ra!ional 5defini!ie consacrat de
tradi!ia de gLndire european6 #i0 de asemenea0
8mpotriva considerrii omului0 din aceast cauz0 ca o
fiin! aproape angelic0 fr insincte sau senzualitate'
7' -arcina filozofie0 dup ietzsche0 ar te$ui s constea
8n recuperarea imaginii integrale a omului0 8n care
senzualitatea0 instinctualitatea #i zestrea sa $iologic
s nu mai fie refulate sau evitate din discursul
filozofic'
9' Filozofia tre$uie s fie o e2presie a vie!ii0 a $ucuriei
de a crea'ietzsche dezvolt 8n acest sens o teorie a
supraomului0 vzut ca o persoan dotat cu o voin
!e putere mare, pe care o converte#te 8n crea!ia
artistic de e2cep!ie'
91
:' Filozofia 0 8n concep!ia lui ietzsche se asemean cu
un e2erci!iu de demontare a miturilor impuse de
filozofia ra!ionalist #i de gLndirea teologic cre#tin0
ea tre$uie s anun!e un amurg al i!olilor' Mn acest
sens0 ietzsche dezvolt o concep!ie proprie despre
adevr0 cunoscut su$ numele de
perspectivism'Conform acesteia0 adevrul0 falsul0
$inele #i rul sunt construc!ii valorice ale
omului5metafore60 vestigii ale aspectelor a$isale ale
omului0 #i nicidecum entit!i o$iective0 deta#ate de
su$iectivitatea uman'
A' +rincipalele concepte #i idei0 8n ordinea importan!ei
mesa%ului te2tului0 sunt& voin !e putere, critic a
filozofiei raionaliste, perspectivism, teoria
supraomului, senzualism,intepretare,creaie artistic,
subiectivitate.
#on$e%&ia 'e%re filozofie a lui E'(un' .uerl
* Feno(enolo+ia*
/' Concep!ia sa despre filozofie este redat printr-un
fragment din cartea ilozofia ca tiin riguroas.
1' "dmund Husserl este printele fenomenologiei0 curent
filozofic care pune accent pe studierea lumii luntrice
a omului0 denumit su$iectivitate sau lume a
con#tiin!ei'
7' "2ist o lume a con#tiin!ei la fel cum e2ist o lume
fizic e2terioar nou'(eprezentrile noastre despre
lume nu sunt simple copii sau ogilndiri ale lumii fizice
date 8ntr-o con#tiin! pasiv' Kimpotriv0 consider
Husserl0 con#tiin!a noastr are ini!iativ0 trimite
semnale spre lumea e2terioar0 denumite de el acte
97
intenionale'+rin aceste inten!ionri se 8nvestesc cu
sens #i valoare0 dinspre lumea interioar a omului0
o$iectele din lumea fizic0 care sunt 8n sine neutre0
lipsite de sens sau valoare' "le capt sens pentru noi0
sunt 8m$og!ite 8n statutul lor ontic printr-o
dimensiune valoric'
9' +entru Husserl0 filozofia este fenomenologie0 iar
fenomenologia este analiz a lumii con#tiin!ei
inten!ionale0 este o e2plorare a lumii interioare a
con#tiin!ei'
:' Ca #i al!i filozofi0 Husserl a crezut c filozofia tre$uie
s se transforme 8ntr-o #tiin! riguroas'H #tiin! este
opus supersti!iilor0 convingerilor ne8ntemeiate'
Ntiin!ele pozitive moderne0 dup Husserl0 con!in 8ns
o mare doz de supersti!ii0 anume acelea legate de
faptul c ar putea e2ista cuno#tin!e a$solut o$iective0
provenite sut la sut din fapte $rute'Mn realitate0 8n
#tiin!ele pozitive0 o mare parte din ceea ce se nume#te
cunoa#tere este datorat su$iectivit!ii' Ntin!a
riguroas0 ca ideal al lui Husserl0 ar tre$ui s
porneasc de la o analiz temeinic a structurilor
con#tiin!ei0 care ar face posi$il 8n!elegerea mai $un
a cuno#tin!elor despre lumea e2terioar sau fizic'
A' +rincipalele concepte #i idei0 8n ordinea importan!ei
mesa%ului te2tului0 sunt/ fenomenologie, lume a
contiinei, contiin intenional, analiz a
contiinei, sens, valoare, intenionalitate, acte
intenionale.
Filozofie i analiz0 lo+i$0 a li(3a4ului
#on$e%&ia 'e%re filozofie a lui Ru'olf #arna%
99
/' Concep!ia sa despre filozofie este redat printr-un
fragment din lucrarea -epirea metafizicii prin
analiza logic a limba0ului'
1' (udolf Carnap este unul din reprezentan!ii
pozitivismului logic0 nume dat unei orientri filozofice
care avea dept program urmtoarele&
a' fundamentarea filozofiei pe $aze
e2perimentale ca cele din #tiin!ele pozitive;
$' respingerea oricrei filozofii de tip metafizic
#i speculativ ca fiind eronat;
c' determinarea adevrului propozi!iilor
filozofice prin metoda analizei logice a
lim$a%ului0 care presupunea urmtoarele&
i' diferen!ierea 8ntre propozi!ii&
cu semnifica!ie&
a' tautologiile;
$' propozi!ii de
e2perien!;
propozi!ii fr semnifica!ie
5propozi!iile metafizice care
con!in termeni fr un
corespondent direct 8n
realitate ca& )bsolut,
1econ!iionat, iin etc'6
7' Filozofia0 8n accep!iunea dat de pozitivismul logic0 ar
tre$ui s devin o disciplin de analiz #i verificare a
propozi!iilor cu sens #i de separare a acestora de cele
fr sens'Filozofia nu ar avea 0 prin urmare0 o func!ie
creatoare sau constitutiv de teorii0 ci se reduce la o
simpl metod de verificare0 pus 8n slu%$a #tiin!ei0
singura care poate s fie constructiv'
9:
9' +rincipalele concepte #i idei0 8n ordinea importan!ei
mesa%ului te2tului0 sunt& pozitivism logic, analiz
logic a limba0ului, propoziii cu sens sau
semnificaie, tautologii, propoziii !e experien,
critic a metafizicii, meto! !e verificare, tiin.
#on$e%&ia 'e%re filozofie a lui Lu'5i+ ,i!!+en!ein
/' Concep!ia sa despre filozofie este redat printr-un
fragment din cartea sa $ractatus logico *
p%ilosop%icus'
1' Filozofia0 consider Wittgenstein0 nu are alt rost decLt
acela de a fi o analiz logic a lim$a%ului'(ela!ia
dintre lim$a%ul logic #i lume este una simetric0
propozi!iilor elementare sau atomare le corespund
situa!ii simple din realitate0 iar propozi!iilor compuse
sau moleculare0 stri de fapt cmple2e'
7' Filozofia este considerat de Wittgenstein o activitate
de clarificare a lim$a%ului0 de identificare a
propozi!iilor fr sens ale metafizicii ca fiind lipsite
de semnifica!ie'
9' (olul filozofiei este unul strict explicativ0 crea!ia de
teorii revine #tiin!ei'Filozofia nu este o doctrin0 ci o
activitate'
:' Concep!ia sa filozofic a cunoscut dou etape'Mn
te2tul din manual0 se red prima concep!ie filozofic a
sa0 care este 8n mare parte asemntoare cu cea a lui
Carnap'
A' +rincipalele concepte #i idei0 8n ordinea importan!ei
mesa%ului te2tului0 sunt&
9A
analiz logic a limba0ului, propoziii atomare,
propoziii moleculare, propoziii metafizice, stare !e
fapt, !octrin, activitate.

Filozofia i /ia&0
#on$e%&ia 'e%re filozofiei a lui 6la!on
/' Concep!ia sa despre filozofie este redat printr-un
fragment din dialogul Republica'
1' Filozofia platonician a fost e2pus de autorul ei su$
forma unor dialoguri pe anumite teme0 dez$tute de
anumite persona%e; cel mai cele$ru dintre acestea fiind
persona%ul -ocrate0 care apare aproape constant 8n
dialogurile platonice'+rin -ocrate0 se spune0 este
e2primat indirect punctul de vedere al lui +laton'
7' Kialogul Republica este unul dintre cele mai mari #i
mai comple2e dialoguri platonice'@ema rolului
filozofiei 8n via!a omului #i a caracteristicilor
adevratului filozof este a$ordat 8n cr!ile PI #i PII
ale dialogului amintit'
9E
9' Cea mai spectaculoas parte a acestei dez$ateri despre
filozofie se regse#te 8n a#a numitul Mit al Peterii0
care red esen!a concep!iei platoniciene despre
filozofie0 despre realitate #i despre cunoa#tere'
:' Mitul Peterii cuprinde urmtoarele idei redate
sim$olic&
a' via!a omului de pe pmLnt poate fi asemnat
cu mediul unei pe#teri0 8n care domin
8ntunericul0 care determin orientarea omului
prin cunoa#terea 8n#eltoare a sim!urilor;
$' mitul red trei etape 8n care se gse#te un
ipotetic persona% uman0 care &
i' face parte dintr-un grup de oameni
lega!i de la na#tere #i a#eza!i 8n fa!a
unui perete0 pe care sunt proiectate
ni#te um$re'eavLnd posi$ilitatea s
se mi#te #i s vad #i altceva0 ei iau
drept realitate acest spectacol al
um$relor;
ii' unul dintre ace#tia0 persona%ul
ipotetic0 este dezlegat fcLnd
urmtoarele&
8nva! s se mi#te;
8nva! s priveas #i s
compare o$iectele pe care le
descoper ;
urc dinspre ie#irea din
pe#ter spre domeniul luminii
;
iii' persona%ul iese din pe#ter #i str$ate
urmtoarele etape&
9F
8nva! s-#i o$i#nuiasc
privirea cu lumina zilei;
reu#e#te s priveasc direct 8n
soare0 sim$ol al cunoa#terii
a$solute'
A' +rin Mitul Peterii0 +laton ne transmite mesa%ul c
filozofia ar fi asemenea urcu#ului persona%ului
principal0 care este de fapt filozoful0 ctre adevr #i
realitatea ultim0 prin str$aterea unor trepte ale
cunoa#terii 5 cunoatere prin simuri, cunoatere
analitic , cunoatere intelectual2intuitiv6 #i 0 o dat
cu acestea0 ale realit!ii 5trecerea de la lumea um$relor
#i aparen!elor la lumea entit!ilor a$solute '!eile
platonice6'
E' Filozofia este0 prin urmare&
a' un urcu transformator al celui care se
8ndeletnice#te cu ea;
$' are un rol pai!eutic0;
c' este o0 ,,art a rsucirii3 eseniale a omului
dinspre ceea ce este aparent #i 8n#eltor ctre
ceea ce este real 8n cel mai mare grad '
+rincipalele concepte #i idei0 8n ordinea mesa%ului te2tului0
sunt& simbolul peterii, simbolul urcuului, gra!ele
cunoaterii, gra!ele realitii, ,,arta rsucirii3, e!ucaie
esenial 4pai!eia5, lumea simurilor, aparene, lumea
inteligibl, '!ei platonice, soarele ca simbol al '!eii !e Bine2
'!eea suprem.
Plato
I
INTRODUCTION
9D
Plato (circa 428-c. 347 BC), Greek philosopher, one of the
most creative an infl!ential thinkers in "estern philosoph#$
II
%I&'
Plato (as )orn to an aristocratic famil# in *thens$ +is father,
Ariston, (as )elieve to have escene from the earl#
kin,s of *thens$ Perictione, his mother, (as istantl#
relate to the -th.cent!r# BC la(maker /olon$ "hen Plato
(as a chil, his father ie, an his mother marrie
P#rilampes, (ho (as an associate of the statesman Pericles$
*s a #o!n, man Plato had political ambitions, )!t he
)ecame isill!sione )# the political leaership in *thens$
+e event!all# )ecame a disciple of Socrates, acceptin,
his )asic philosoph# an dialectical style of debate0
the p!rs!it of tr!th thro!,h 1!estions
ans(ers
an aitional 1!estions$
Plato (itnesse the eath of /ocrates at the hans of the
*thenian emocrac# in 233 BC$ Perhaps fearin, for his o(n
safet#, he left *thens temporaril# an travele to Italy,
Sicily, an Eypt.
:G
In 387 Plato fo!nded the Academy in *thens, the
instit!tion often escri)e as the first '!ropean !niversit#$ It
provie a comprehensive c!rric!l!m, incl!in, s!ch
s!)4ects as astronom#, )iolo,#, mathematics, political
theor#, an philosoph#$ *ristotle (as the *caem#5s most
prominent st!ent$
P!rs!in, an opport!nit# to com)ine philosoph# an practical
politics, Plato "ent to Sicily in 3#7 to t!tor the ne( r!ler
of /#rac!se, Dion#si!s the 6o!n,er, in the art of
philosophical r!le$ The e7periment faile$ Plato mae
another trip to /#rac!se in 2-8, )!t a,ain his en,a,ement in
/icilian affairs met (ith little s!ccess$ The concl!in, #ears
of his life (ere spent lect!rin, at the *caem# an (ritin,$
+e ie at a)o!t the a,e of 9: in *thens in 2;9 or 2;< BC$
FORMA I CLASIFICAREA OPERELOR LUI PLATON
Plato5s (ritin,s (ere in dialo!e form= philosophical ieas
(ere avance, isc!sse, an critici>e in the conte7t of a
conversation or debate in$ol$in t"o or more persons$
The earliest collection of Plato5s (ork incl!es 0
2? dialo!es
82 letters.
:/
The a!thenticit# of a fe( of the ialo,!es an most of
the letters has )een isp!te$
The ialo,!es ma# )e ivie into
early
middle
later periods of composition$
I.%&E EA'(IES% represent Plato5s attempt to
comm!nicate the philosoph# an ialectical st#le of
/ocrates$ /everal of these ialo,!es take the same form$
/ocrates, enco!nterin, someone (ho claims to kno( m!ch,
professes to )e i,norant an seeks assistance from the one
(ho kno(s$ *s /ocrates )e,ins to raise )!estions,
ho(ever, it )ecomes clear that the one rep!te to )e (ise
reall# oes not kno( (hat he claims to kno(, an /ocrates
emer,es as the (iser one )eca!se he at least kno(s that he
oes not kno($ /!ch kno(le,e, of co!rse, is the )e,innin,
of (isom$ Incl!e in this ,ro!p of ialo,!es are
Charmides (an attempt to efine temperance), Lysis (a
isc!ssion of frienship), Laches (a p!rs!it of the meanin,
of co!ra,e), Protagoras (a efense of the thesis that virt!e
is kno(le,e an can )e ta!,ht), Euthyphron (a
:1
consieration of the nat!re of piet#), an *oo+ I of the
Republic (a isc!ssion of 4!stice)$
,iddle and (ate -ialo!es
The ialo,!es of the mile an later perios of Plato5s life
reflect his o"n philosophical de$elopment$ The ieas in
these (orks are attri)!te )# most scholars to Plato himself,
altho!,h Socrates contin!es to be the main character
in man# of the ialo,!es$
II.%&E ,I--(E PE'I.- incl!e Gorgias (a
consieration of several ethical 1!estions), Meno (a
isc!ssion of the nat!re of kno(le,e), the Apology
(/ocrates5 efense of himself at his trial a,ainst the char,es
of atheism an corr!ptin, *thenian #o!th), Criton
(/ocrates5 efense of o)eience to the la(s of the state),
Phaidon (the eath scene of /ocrates, in (hich he
isc!sses the theor# of &orms, the nat!re of the so!l, an
the 1!estion of immortalit#), the Symposium sa!
Banchetul (Plato5s o!tstanin, ramatic achievement,
(hich contains several speeches on )ea!t# an love), the
Republic (Plato5s s!preme philosophical achievement,
(hich is a etaile isc!ssion of the nat!re of 4!stice)$
III/%&E 0.'1S .2 %&E (A%E' PE'I.-
incl!e the Theaitetos (a enial that kno(le,e is to )e
:7
ientifie (ith sense perception), Parmenides (a critical
eval!ation of the theor# of &orms), Sophist (f!rther
consieration of the theor# of Ieas, or &orms), Philebos (a
isc!ssion of the relationship )et(een pleas!re an the
,oo), Timaios (Plato5s vie(s on nat!ral science an
cosmolo,#), an the Laws (a more practical anal#sis of
political an social iss!es)$
TEORIA PLATONIC A
IDEILOR (FORMELOR)
*t the heart of Plato5s philosoph# is his theor# of &orms, or
Ieas$ Ultimatel#, his vie( of 0
kno(le,e
his ethical theor#
his ps#cholo,#
his concept of the state
*
Theor# of @no(le,e
Plato5s theor# of &orms an his theor# of kno(le,e are so
interrelated that the# m!st )e isc!sse to,ether$
Infl!ence )# /ocrates, Plato (as convince that
+no"lede is attainable. +e (as also convince of t"o
essential characteristics of +no"lede0
:9
&irst, kno(le,e m!st )e certain an infallible.
/econ, kno(le,e m!st have as its o)4ect that
(hich is ,en!inel# real as contraste (ith that
(hich is an appearance onl#$ Beca!se that "hich
is f!lly real m!st, for Plato0
)e fi7e,
permanent,
an !nchan,in,, he ientifie the real (ith the
ideal realm of bein as oppose to the physical
"orld of becomin$
One conse1!ence of this vie( (as Plato5s re4ection of
empiricism, the claim that kno(le,e is erive from sense
e7perience$ +e tho!,ht that propositions erive from sense
e7perience have, at most, a e,ree of pro)a)ilit#$ The# are
not certain$ &!rthermore, the o)4ects of sense e7perience
are chan,ea)le phenomena of the ph#sical (orl$ +ence,
ob3ects of sense e4perience are not proper ob3ects of
+no"lede$
Plato5s o"n theory of +no"lede is fo!nd in the
Republic, partic!larl# in his isc!ssion of the ima,e of the
ivie line an the m#th of the cave$ In the former, Plato
istin,!ishes )et(een t"o le$els of a"areness0
I. opinion
II$ +no"lede.
::
Claims or assertions a)o!t the ph#sical or visi)le (orl,
incl!in, )oth commonsense o)servations an the
propositions of science, are opinions onl#$ /ome of these
opinions are (ell fo!ne= some are not= )!t none of them
co!nts as ,en!ine kno(le,e$ The hi,her level of a(areness
is kno(le,e, )eca!se there reason, rather than sense
e7perience, is involve$ Reason, properl# !se, res!lts in
intellect!al insihts that are certain, an the o)4ects of
these rational insi,hts are the a)iin, !niversals, the eternal
&orms or s!)stances that constit!te the real (orl$
The m#th of the cave escri)es inivi!als chaine eep
(ithin the recesses of a cave$ Bo!n so that vision is
restricte, the# cannot see one another$ The onl# thin,
visi)le is the (all of the cave !pon (hich appear shao(s
cast )# moels or stat!es of animals an o)4ects that are
passe )efore a )ri,htl# )!rnin, fire$ Breakin, free, one of
the inivi!als escapes from the cave into the li,ht of a#$
"ith the ai of the s!n, that person sees for the first time
the real (orl an ret!rns to the cave (ith the messa,e that
the onl# thin,s the# have seen heretofore are shao(s an
appearances an that the real (orl a(aits them if the# are
(illin, to str!,,le free of their )ons$ %he shado"y
en$ironment of the ca$e symboli5es for Plato the
physical "orld of appearances$ 'scape into the s!n.fille
settin, o!tsie the cave s#m)oli>es the transition to the
:A
real "orld, the (orl of f!ll an perfect )ein,, the (orl of
&orms, (hich is the proper o)4ect of kno(le,e$
B
Nat!re of &orms
The theor# of &orms ma# )est )e !nerstoo in terms of
mathematical entities$ * circle, for instance, is efine as a
plane fi,!re compose of a series of points, all of (hich are
e1!iistant from a ,iven point$ No one has ever act!all#
seen s!ch a fi,!re, ho(ever$
"hat people have act!all# seen are ra(n fi,!res that are
more or less close appro7imations of the ieal circle$ In fact,
(hen mathematicians efine a circle, the points referre to
are not spatial points at all= the# are lo,ical points$ The# o
not occ!p# space$ Nevertheless, altho!,h the &orm of a
circle has never )een seenAinee, co!l never )e seenA
mathematicians an others o in fact kno( (hat a circle is$
That the# can efine a circle is evience that the# kno(
(hat it is$ &or Plato, therefore, the 2orm 6circ!larityB
e7ists, )!t not in the physical "orld of space and time$
It e7ists as a chan,eless o)4ect in the (orl of &orms or
Ieas, (hich can )e kno(n onl# )# reason. 2orms ha$e
reater reality than ob3ects in the physical "orld )oth
)eca!se of their perfection an sta)ilit# an )eca!se the#
are moels, resem)lance to (hich ,ives orinar# ph#sical
o)4ects (hatever realit# the# have$ Circ!larit#, s1!areness,
:E
an trian,!larit# are e7cellent e7amples, then, of (hat Plato
meant )# &orms$ *n o)4ect e7istin, in the ph#sical (orl
ma# )e calle a circle or a s1!are or a trian,le onl# to the
e7tent that it resem)les (Cparticipates inB is Plato5s phrase)
the &orm Ccirc!larit#B or Cs1!arenessB or Ctrian,!larit#$B
Plato e7tene his theor# )e#on the realm of mathematics$
Inee, he (as most intereste in its application in the
field of social ethics. The theor# (as his (a# of e7plainin,
ho( the same !niversal term can refer to so man# partic!lar
thin,s or events$ The (or justice, for e7ample, can )e
applie to h!nres of partic!lar acts )eca!se these acts
have somethin, in common, namel#, their resem)lance to,
or participation in, the &orm C4!stice$B *n inivi!al is
h!man to the e7tent that he or she resem)les or
participates in the &orm Ch!manness$B If Ch!mannessB is
efine in terms of )ein, a rational animal, then an
inivi!al is h!man to the e7tent that he or she is rational$ *
partic!lar act is co!ra,eo!s or co(arl# to the e7tent that it
participates in its &orm$ *n o)4ect is )ea!tif!l to the e7tent
that it participates in the Iea, or &orm, of )ea!t#$
'ver#thin, in the (orl of space an time is (hat it is )#
virt!e of its resem)lance to, or participation in, its !niversal
&orm$ The a)ilit# to efine the !niversal term is evience
that one has ,raspe the &orm to (hich that !niversal
refers$
:F
Plato conceive the 2orms as arraned hierarchically=
the s!preme &orm is the 2orm of the 7ood, (hich, li+e
the s!n in the myth of the ca$e, ill!minates all the other
Ieas$ There is a sense in (hich the &orm of the Goo
represents Plato5s movement in the irection of an !ltimate
principle of e7planation$ Ultimatel#, the theor# of &orms is
intene to e7plain ho( one comes to kno( an also ho(
thin,s have come to )e as the# are$ In philosophical
lan,!a,e, Plato5s theor# of &orms is )oth an
epistemoloical 8theory of +no"lede9 and an
ontoloical 8theory of bein9 thesis.
D
PO%ITIC*% T+'OR6
The Republic, Plato5s ma4or political (ork, is concerne (ith
the 1!estion of 4!stice an therefore (ith the 1!estions
6"hat is a 3!st stateB an C"ho is a 3!st indi$id!al:;
The ieal state, accorin, to Plato, is compose of three
classes$ The economic str!ct!re of the state is maintaine
)# the merchant class$ /ec!rit# nees are met )# the
military class, an political leaership is provie )# the
philosopher-+ins$ * partic!lar person5s class is
etermine )# an e!cational process that )e,ins at )irth
an procees !ntil that person has reache the ma7im!m
level of e!cation compati)le (ith interest an a)ilit#$ Those
(ho complete the entire e!cational process )ecome
:D
philosopher.kin,s$ The# are the ones "hose minds ha$e
been so de$eloped that they are able to rasp the
2orms an, therefore, to make the (isest ecisions$ Inee,
Plato5s ieal e!cational s#stem is primaril# str!ct!re so as
to pro!ce philosopher.kin,s$
Plato associates the traditional 7ree+ $irt!es "ith the
class str!ct!re of the ideal state0
%emperance is the !ni1!e virt!e of the artisan
class=
co!rae is the virt!e pec!liar to the militar# class=
"isdom characteri>es the r!lers$
3!stice, the fo!rth virt!e, characteri>es societ# as a
(hole$ %he 3!st state is one in "hich each class
performs its o"n f!nction "ell "itho!t
infrinin on the acti$ities of the other
classes$
Plato di$ides the h!man so!l into three parts0 the
rational part, the "ill, an the appetites$ The 4!st person
is the one in (hom the rational element, s!pporte )# the
(ill, controls the appetites$ *n o)vio!s analo,# e7ists here
(ith the threefol class str!ct!re of the state, in (hich the
enli,htene philosopher.kin,s, s!pporte )# the soliers,
,overn the rest of societ#$
AG
DI
'T+IC/
Plato5s ethical theor# rests on the ass!mption that $irt!e is
+no"lede an can )e ta!,ht, (hich has to )e !nerstoo
in terms of his theor# of &orms$ *s inicate previo!sl#, the
!ltimate &orm for Plato is the &orm of the Goo, an
kno(le,e of this &orm is the so!rce of !idance in
moral ecision makin,$ Plato also ar,!e that to kno( the
,oo is to o the ,oo$ The corollar# of this is that an#one
(ho )ehaves immorall# oes so o!t of i,norance$ This
concl!sion follo(s from Plato5s conviction that the moral
person is the tr!l# happ# person, an )eca!se inivi!als
al(a#s esire their o(n happiness, the# al(a#s esire to o
that (hich is moral$
DII
IN&%U'NC'
Plato5s infl!ence thro!,ho!t the histor# of philosoph# has
)een mon!mental$ "hen he ie, /pe!sipp!s )ecame hea
of the *caem#$ The school contin!e in e7istence !ntil *D
?E3, (hen it (as close )# the B#>antine emperor F!stinian
I, (ho o)4ecte to its pa,an teachin,s$ Plato5s impact on
Fe(ish tho!,ht is apparent in the (ork of the 8st.cent!r#
*le7anrian philosopher Philo F!ae!s$ Neoplatonism,
fo!ne )# the 2r.cent!r# philosopher Plotin!s, (as an
important later evelopment of Platonism$ The theolo,ians
A/
Clement of *le7anria, Ori,en, an /t$ *!,!stine (ere earl#
Christian e7ponents of a Platonic perspective$ Platonic ieas
have ha a cr!cial role in the evelopment of Christian
theolo,# an also in meieval Islamic tho!,ht (see Islam)$
D!rin, the Renaissance, the primar# foc!s of Platonic
infl!ence (as the &lorentine *caem#, fo!ne in the 8?th
cent!r# near &lorence$ Uner the leaership of Garsilio
&icino, mem)ers of the *caem# st!ie Plato in the ori,inal
Greek$ In 'n,lan, Platonism (as revive in the 8<th
cent!r# )# Ralph C!(orth an others (ho )ecame kno(n
as the Cam)ri,e Platonists$ Plato5s infl!ence has )een
e7tene into the E:th cent!r# )# s!ch thinkers as *lfre
North "hitehea, (ho once pai him tri)!te )# escri)in,
the histor# of philosoph# as simpl# Ca series of footnotes to
Plato$B
#on$e%&ia 'e%re filozofie a lui
7aru$- S%inoza
/' Concep!ia sa despre filozofie este reddat printr-un
fragment din cartea 6tica'
1' Ca #i +laton0 -pinoza prive#te filozofia ca o cale spre
desvLr#irea interioar a celui care o practic'Kin
A1
,nelegerea lumii0 prin parcurgerea mai multor etape0
survine 8n cele din urm ,nelegerea naturii umane'
7' Concep!ia depre lume a lui -pinoza se nume#te
panteism'+entru el atura #i Kumnezeu sunt
una'Hmul este o parte din atur0 care este a$solut
ordonat0 ra!ional #i necesar'Mnaintarea 8n filozofie
8nseamn 8naintarea 8n 8n!elegerea acestui mecanism
perfect'
9' Cunoa#terea nefilozofic este o cunoa#tere iluzorie0 8n
care omul crede c se poate sustrage acestei ordini; 8n
realitate0 el este supus necesit!ii
naturale'e8n!elegerea este datorat0 dup -pinoza0
pasiunilor ira!ionale ale sufletului0 care distorsioneaz
realitatea'Filozofia are rolul de a rectifica modul
omului de a privi 8n lume0 de a adecva cunoa#terea #i
a sincroniza sufletul cu atura'Aceast 008nsnto#ireO
a sufletului are loc printr-o ascez ra!ional0 de analiz
#i discriminare atent a lumii 8ncon%urtoare #i a celei
luntrice0 suflete#ti'
:' Consecin!ele 8ndeletnicirii cu filozofia sunt&
a' schim$area opticii asupra lumii& necesitatea
nu mai este resim!it ca o constrLngere0 ci ca
o form de ordine; astfel 0 necesitatea este
convertit 8n li$ertate;
$' Atingerea unei strii contemplativ-ra!ionale0
care culmineaz cu ceea ce -pinoza nume#te
amor -ei raionalis 5iu$irea intelectual de
Kumnezeu60 forma de cunoa#tere suprem a
omului0 dup -pinoza 0 care 8i aduce acestuia
8mpcarea cu sine0 cu ordinea ra!ional a
aturii sau a lui Kumnezeu'
A7
A' +rincipalele concepte #i idei0 8n ordinea importan!ei
mesa%ului te2tului0 sunt& panteism, ,nelegere,
cunoatere a!ecvat, pasiuni ale sufletului, ascez
raional, sc%imbarea opticii umane, necesitate,
or!ine natural sau !ivin, libertate, convertirea
necesitii ,n libertate, iubirea intelectual !e
-umnezeu, contemplaie.
#on$e%&ia 'e%re filozofie a lui Lu$ian 7la+a
/' Concep!ia sa despre filozofie este redat printr-un
fragment din lucrarea -espre contiina filozofic.
1' Komeniul privilegiat al reflec!iei filozofice $lagiene
este reprezentat de filozofia culturii'Concep!ia sa
despre filozofie este privit dintr-o perspectiv
cultural #i umanist'Mn lucrarea mai sus amintit0
considerat o lucrare de metafilozofie 5domeniu
filozofic care are drept o$iect de reflec!ie filozofia6 0
capitolele ilozofie, tiin, experien #i ilozofie i
art , -espre contiina filozofic 0,laga 8#i e2pune
concep!ia sa despre filozofie 8n urma unei comparri a
filozofiei cu #tiin!a #i cu arta'@oate acestea0 spune el
tre$uie %udecate nu deta#at de cadrul cultural0 ci ca
manifestri culturale cu note specifice'
7' -pecificul filozofiei0 de e2emplu este redat de
urmtoarele caracteristetici&
a' este un domeniu autonom al culturii0
$' este refle2iv;
c' caut 8n!elegerea misterului;
A9
d' domeniul sau o$iectul su de reflec!ie 8l
constitue 8ntregul e2isten!ei;
e' filozofia dezvolt o con#tiin! filozofic celui
care filozofeaz'Aceasta se caracterizeaz
prin faptul c filozoful supune reflec!iei sale0
din dorin!a de a 8n!elege 0chiar activitatea sa 0
filozofia'
9' +rincipalele concepte #i idei0 8n ordinea importan!ei
mesa%ului te2tului0 sunt&
filozofia culturii, cultur, metafilozofie,!omenii ale
culturii,tiin, art, mister, totul existenei, contiin
filozofic, reflecie.

Concep!ia despre filozofie viziunea lui ,ertrand
(ussell
8$ Concep!ia sa despre filozofiei este redat printr-un
fragment din lucarea sa Problemele filozofiei'Carte
aprut 8n /D//0 care cuprinde /: capitole #i 8n care
autorul a$ordeaz teme filozofice precum& ce este
realitatea0 ce este materia0 ce este i!ealismul0 ce
8nseamn cunoaterea #i despre cLte feluri !e
cunoatere se poate vor$i0 ce este filosofia 5mai ales
8n ultimele dou capitole& 7imitele cunoaterii
filosofice #i .aloarea filosofiei 6'
E$ +entru ,ertrand (ussell0 filozofia reprezint un
e2erci!iu intelectual cu urmri practice desoe$ite
A:
pentru via!a celui care se 8ndeletnice#te cu acest tip de
activitate&
a' 8l eli$ereaz de pre%udec!i;
$' 8i dezvolt o atitudine critic 5ne eli$ereaz de
00atitudinea dogmaticO6;
c' 8i lrge#te orizontul gLdirii #i 8l eli$ereaz
de 00tirania o$i#nuin!eiO;
d' prin acceptarea incertitudinii sau a limitelor
cunoa#terii noastre ni se dezvolt atitudinea
de a ne mira 8n fa!a mre!iei lumii;
e' ne dezvotl sim!ul li$ert!ii ca o consecin! a
contemplrii universului;
f' ne face genero#i0 prin lrgirea "ului nostru la
dimensiunile #i mre!ia Cniversului
contemplat0 eli$erLndu-ne astfel de
egocentrism #i egoism'
+rincipalele concepte #i idei0 8n ordinea importan!ei mesa%ului
te2tului0 sunt& valoare a filozofiei, atitu!ine critic, atitu!ine
!ogmatic, pre0u!eci, mirare, lrgire a 6ului, 8nivers,
incertitu!ine, certitu!ine, cunoatere.
2$ (ussell0 ,ertrand Arthur William0 7rd "arl
(ussell 5/FE1-/DEG60 ,ritish philosopher0
mathematician& and -o'el laureate0 *hose
emphasis on logical analysis influenced the course of
1Gth-centur< philosoph<'
;$ ,orn in @rellec>0 Wales0 on Ja< /F0 /FE10 (ussell
*as educated at @rinit< College0 Cniversit< of
Cam$ridge' After graduation in /FD90 he traveled in
France0 German<0 and the Cnited -tates and *as then
AA
made a fello* of @rinit< College' From an earl< age
he developed a strong sense o" social consciousness;
at the same time0 he involved himself in the study o"
logical and mathematical :uestions0 *hich he had
made his special fields and on *hich he *as called to
lecture at man< institutions throughout the *orld' He
achieved prominence *ith his "irst major work0 $%e
Principles of Mat%ematics 5/DG160 in *hich he
attempted to remove mathematics from the realm of
a$stract philosophical notions and to give it a precise
scientific frame*or>'
?$ (ussell then colla$orated for eight <ears *ith the
,ritish philosopher and mathematician #l"red -orth
Whitehead to produce the monumental work
Principia Mathematica 57 volumes0 ;<;=.;<;>6' @his
*or> sho*ed that mathematics can $e stated in terms
of the concepts of general logic0 such as class and
mem$ership in a class' It $ecame a masterpiece of
rational thought' (ussell and Whitehead proved that
num$ers can $e defined as classes of a certain t<pe0
and in the process the< developed logic concepts and
a logic notation that esta$lished s<m$olic logic as an
important specialization *ithin the field of
philosoph<' In his ne(t major work0 $%e Problems of
P%ilosop%& 5/D/160 (ussell $orro*ed from the fields
of sociolog<0 ps<cholog<0 ph<sics0 and mathematics to
re"ute the tenets o" idealism0 the dominant
AE
philosophical school of the period0 *hich held that all
o$%ects and e2periences are the product of the
intellect' (ussell0 a realist0 $elieved that o'jects
percei*ed 'y the senses ha*e an inherent reality
independent o" the mind.
-$ (ussell condemned $oth sides in World War I 5/D/9-
/D/F60 and for his uncompromising stand he *as
fined0 imprisoned& and !eprive! of %is teac%ing post
at Cambri!ge. In prison he *rote 'ntro!uction to
Mat%ematical P%ilosop%& 5/D/D60 com$ining the t*o
areas of >no*ledge he regarded as insepara$le' After
the *ar he visited the (ussian -oviet Federated
-ocialist (epu$lic0 and in his $oo> Practice an!
$%eor& of Bols%evism 5/D1G6 he e2pressed his
disappointment *ith the form of socialism practiced
there' He felt that the methods used to achieve a
Communist s<stem *ere intolera$le and that the
results o$tained *ere not *orth the price paid'
<$ (ussell taught at ,ei%ing Cniversit< in China during
/D1/ and /D11' From /D1F to /D710 after he returned
to "ngland0 he conducted the private0 highl<
progressive Beacon Hill 2chool "or young children'
From /D7F to /D99 he taught at various educational
institutions in the Cnited -tates' He *as $arred0
ho*ever0 from teaching at the College of the Cit< of
e* Qor> 5no* Cit< College of the Cit< Cniversit<
of e* Qor>6 $< the state supreme court $ecause of
AF
his attacks on religion in such *or>s as 9%at '
Believe 5/D1:6 and his advocac< of se2ual freedom0
e2pressed in Manners an! Morals 5/D1D6'
9$ (ussell returned to "ngland in /D99 and *as
reinstated as a fello* of @rinit< College' Although he
a$andoned pacifism to support the Allied cause in
World War II 5/D7D-/D9:60 he $ecame an ardent and
active opponent of nuclear *eapons' In /D9D he *as
a*arded the Hrder of Jerit $< King George PI'
(ussell received the /D:G -o'el %ri?e "or 5iterature
and *as cited as Rthe champion o" humanity and
"reedom o" thought'O He led a movement in the late
/D:Gs advocating unilateral nuclear disarmament $<
,ritain0 and at the age o" @< he was imprisoned after
an antinuclear demonstration' He died on Fe$ruar< 10
/DEG'
D' In addition to his earlier *or>0 (ussell also made
a ma%or contri$ution to the development of
logical positi*ism0 a strong philosophical
movement of the /D7Gs and /D9Gs' @he ma%or
Austrian philosopher )ud*ig Wittgenstein0 at
one time (ussell=s student at Cam$ridge0 *as
strongl< influenced $< his original concept of
logical atomism' In his search for the nature
and limits o" knowledge0 (ussell *as a leader in
the re*i*al o" the philosophy o" empiricism in
the larger field of epistemolog<' In :ur
;no<le!ge of t%e 6xternal 9orl! 5/D1A6 and
AD
'n#uir& into Meaning an! $rut% 5/DA160 he
attempted to e2plain all factual >no*ledge as
constructed out of immediate e2periences'
Among his other $oo>s are $%e )BC of Relativit&
5/D1:60 6!ucation an! t%e (ocial :r!er 5/D7160
A History of Western Philosophy 5/D9:60 $%e
'mpact of (cience upon (ociet& 5/D:160 M&
P%ilosop%ical -evelopment 5/D:D60 9ar Crimes
in .ietnam 5/DAE60 and The Ato!io"raphy of
#ertran$ Rssell 57 volumes0 /DAE
#on$e%&ia 'e%re filozofie a lui )arl 8a%er
/' "ste redat printr-un fragment din lucarea sa :riginile
filozofiei'
1' Mn aceast lucrare0 .aspers 8ncearc s caute originile
filozofrii #i s identifice specificitatea ei'Ke-a lungul
istoriei filozofiei 0 spune el0 filozofia a parcurs
anumite trepte de poziionare ,nelegtoare a
su$iectului fa! de lumea din %urul su #i fa! de sine0
redate de autor astfel&
a' mirarea sau uimirea 5primul act al cutrii
8n!elegeri de tip filozofic0 ca o cunoa#tere de
tip dezinteresat6;
$' ,n!oiala 5ca 8ndoial metodic0 de confruntare
cu limitele cunoa#terii umane6;
c' cutremurarea 5atitudinea de implicare de sine
a su$iectului cunosctor0 luare de atitudine0
EG
refle2ivitatea adLnc legat de situaiile2
limit precum moartea0 suferin!a0 e#ecul etc' 6'
7' Mn ceea ce prive#te specificul #i menirea filozofiei0
.aspers consider c filozofia tre$uie s-i a%ute pe
practican!i s realizeze o comunicare autentic0
dincolo de tendin!a de $analizare #i stereotipizare a
comunicrii'Acest comunicare autentic poate fi
realizat prin implicarea participan!ilor la comunicare
8ntr-un !ialog revelator al propriei fiin!e0 dar #i prin
care s desoperim comunicarea animat de iu$irea
seamnului 5lieben!er ;ampf6'"a tre$uie s fie o
comunicare transfiguratoare prin iu$ire de adevr'
9' Concep!ia lui .aspers despre filozofie poate fi inegrat
existenialismului religios0 8n care autenticitatea
e2isten!ei individuale este atins prin transcenderea
egoismului uman spre forme de comunicare mai
cuprinztoare0 precum sunt cele oferite de diferitele
forme de transcenden! religioas'
:' +rincipalele concepte #i idei0 8n ordinea importan!ei
mesa%ului te2tului0 sunt& origine a filozofiei, specificul
filozofiei, uimire, ,n!oial, cutremurare, !ialog,
comunicare autentic, situaie2limit, comunicare
animat !e iubire, trnscen!en, existenialism.


E/

E1