Provisional Remedies

CASES 2014
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RULE 59: RECEIVERSHIP
Compana General de TabacosvsGauzonKlenzeneCacho
Belgian Catholic missionariesvs Magallanes Press Kristian Lastimosa Caumeran
Po PaucovsSiguenza Cristina Quiron CASE DIGESTED BY ARIEF MAMAO (big thanks rief!!!!!)
Berg vsTeus Don Noval
Vivaresvs Reyes Cedric Tiu Gutierrez II
Chavez vs CA AileeTejano
Descallarvs CA Rebecca L. Jordan
Making Enterprises inc vsMarfori Rhea Yray
Bonaplata vs Amber John Andrew Camello
Commodities Storage and Ice plant vs CA Owen Lerin
Harden vs Director of Prisons Mel Jason Augusto
CalovsRoldan Mario Calvo
Ylardevs Enriquez Dave Parilla
Rocha and co vsCrossfield JobeyBernaldez
Paranete vs Tan Romeo Cisco AmparadoTenedora
TantanovsCaboverde IshaBerezoCorbeta
Citibank NA vs CA Kimberly Marie Esmea
Martinez vsGrano Karen AbegailMonteron
Platonvs Sandoval AireneEdao
Orendainvs BF homes Anne VernadiceArea
Traders Royal bank vs IAC Jecar G. Sual

RULE 60 and Rule 61
REPLEVIN and SUPPORT Pendete Lite cases
BA Finance Corporation vs CA - April Tano Ape Real
Superlines Transportation v. Philippine National Construction - Beatrice Quijano in pdf but screen shot provided
Calderon v. Roxas, Servicewide Specialists, Inc, v. CA - Jurdelyn Jur Rep
Citibank v. CA - Gemma Ramirez
Roxas v. Court of Appeals, Factoran v. CA - LM Digaum Maluxie Digz
Advent Capital v. Young - Eisone Brix
Asian Terminals, Inc v. Ricafort - Rhobie Corbo
Mangonon v. CA, Serg's Products Inc, v. PCI Leasing - Joan Risel Baliar Abangan
Rivera v. Vargas - Brian Desabille
Spouses Bautista v. Sula - Maylene Ukat
Lua vs. Lua, Fernandez v. The International Corporate Bank - Joreyna Mae
Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation v. CA - Wawi Cataquis
Nepomuceno v. Lopez, Francisco v. Zandueta - Ada Bonita Tohay
Yangco vs Rhode - Rannex Guma
Coquia v. Baltazar - Cheska Geli
Villanueva vs Villanueva - Noelle Maico
Bayot vs CA, Magoma vs Macadaeg - Riza Mae Guerrero Omega
Ramos vs CA - Keisha Rojas
Spouses Lim v. Lim - Ron Stephane Maylon
Saavedra v. Ybanez Estrada, Gotardo v. Buling - Arief Mamao and Carol Solatorio

Rule 62 Interpleader
Viuda de Camilo vs Aranio klenzene cacho
Wack Wack folf vs Lee Won april tano
Rizal commercial banking Corp vs etro Container Corporation beattrice quijano
Bank of commerce vs planters development bank Kristian caumeran
Ocampo vs Tirona cristina quiron
Pasricha vs Don Luis Dison Realty don noval
Maglente vs Hon Balatazar Padilla cedric Gutierrez

Rule 63 Declaratory Relief
Imbong vs Ochoa ailee tejano
Malana vs Tapa Rebecca jordan
Office of the Ombudsman vs Ibay rhea yray
De llana vs alba owen lerin
Almeda vs Bathala marketing mel Jason augusto
Edades vs Edades Mario calvo
Tolentino vs Board of Accountancy dave parilla

Rule 64 Review of Judgments from COMELEC and COA
Macabago vs comelec jobey bernaldez
Cagas vs comelec isha corbeta
Reyna vs commission on audit Kimberly esmena
Ibrahim vs COMELEC Karen monteron
Reblora vs AFP airen edano
Sahali vs COMELEC anne vernadice arena
Limkaichong vs COMELEC April 1, 2009 -jecar sual
Limkaichong vs COMELEC July 30, 2009 eison brix
Pates vs COMELEC rhobie corbo
Osmena vs COA joan abangan

Rule 65 CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS
Brian Desabille Araullo vs Aquino
Mylene Ocat Triplex enterprises, Inc vs PNB Republic Bank
Joreyna Mae David vs Rivera
Cheska Geli Esquivel vs Ombudsman
Noelle Maico Militante vs CA
Riza Mae Omega Pamana vs CA
Keisha Rojas Enriquez vs Macadaeg
Ron Maylon Madrigal Transport vs Lapanday Holdings Corp
Arief Mamao Aquino vs CA
Carol Solatorio Topacio vs Ong
Klenzene Cacho Morabe vs Brown
Beattrice Quijano Herrera vs Barretto
April Tano Microsoft Corp vs Best Deal Computer Center Corp
Kristian Caumeran Campus vs Wislizenus
Cristina Suesnsen Abad Santos vs Province of Tarlac
Don Noval Leung Ben vs OBrien
Cedric Gutierrez Napa vs Weissenhagen
Ailee Tejano San Pedro vs Hon Aspala
Rebecca Jordan Camutin vs Spuses Potente
Rhea Yray Sim vs NLRC
Owen Lerin Alcantara et al vs Ermita
Mel Jason augusto The Special audit Team, commission on audit vs CA
Mario Calvo Pefianco vs Moral
Dave Parilla Pimentel et al vs Executive Secretary
Jobey Bernaldez Hipos, Sr vs Judge Bay
Isha corbeta COMELEC vs Judge Quijano-Padilla
Kimberly Esmena Metropolitan Manila Development authority vs Concerned Residents
of Manila Bay
Karen Monteron Manalo vs PAIC
Airen Edano UP Board of Regents vs CA
Anne Vernadice Arena Laguna Metts corporation vs Caalam
Jecar Sual Lapid vs Laurea
Eison Brix Concepcion Jr vs COMELEC
Rhobie Corbo Golangco vs Fung
Joan Abangan Alcaraz vs Gonzalez















RULE 59 RECEIVERSHIP

G.R. No. 6305 September 26, 1911
COMPAIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMANA GAUZON and JUAN D. POMAR, defendants.
JUAN D. POMAR, receiver-appellant.

DOCTRINE:
- The receiver is generally defined to be "an indifferent person between the parties litigant, appointed by the
court and on behalf of all the parties, and not of the plaintiff or defendant only, to receive and hold the thing
or property in litigation, pending the suit, to receive the rents, issues or profits of the land or thing in
question, to receive the rents or other income, to hold possession and control of the property which is the
subject matter of the litigation, and to dispose of the same or deliver it to such person or persons as may be
directed by the court. He is said to be the arm and hand of the court, a part of the machinery of the court, by
which the rights of parties are protected. He is required not only to preserve the property, but to protect the
rights of all of the parties interested.

FACTS:
Defendant, RomanaGauzon executed and delivered to the plaintiff (Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas) a
mortgage upon an hacienda known as "San Jose".

The said defendant (RomanaGauzon) having failed to pay the said mortgage, the plaintiff (Compaia General de
Tabacos de Filipinas) commenced an action for the foreclosure of said mortgage, and asked that a receiver be
appointed to take change of the property in question, pending the said action.

Hon. Vicente Jocson, after hearing the petition filed in said cause, appointed the said defendant, Juan D. Pomar, an
employee of the plaintiff, receiver of the property involved in said foreclosure proceedings. Said foreclosure
proceedings continued to a termination.

After the termination of the receivership, the court required of the receiver (Juan D. Pomar) a report and an
accounting of his operations as receiver. It appears from the record that the lower court had a good deal of trouble in
securing a final report. The receiver apparently acted as though his only responsibility was to the plaintiff (Compaia
General de Tabacos de Filipinas).

After a careful consideration of the various items of the account of the receiver, Judge McCabe ordered the receiver,
Juan Pomar, to pay into court the sum of P7,883.76, a balance which he ought to have had in his possession.

Defendant appealed to this court.

ISSUES:
1. WON the court erred in reducing to P8,565.97 the P22,944.73 spent by the receiver for cutting, hauling, and
manufacture of 8,005.58 piculs of sugar, for packing, transportation and storage thereof, and insurance and
selling commission thereon.
2. WON the court erred in not allowing the item of P147.86 paid out by the receiver as interest on money
borrowed to cover the first expenses of his receivership.
3. WON the court erred in not approving the disbursement made by the receiver of the P3,001.94 delivered to
the aparceros as their share of the crop.
4. WON the court erred in reducing to P1,000 the P4,860.87 which the receiver claimed as compensation for
his services
5. WON the court erred in holding that the order appointing the receiver does not extend his powers beyond
those prescribed in section 175 of Act No. 190.

HELD:
First issue:
- It was the duty of the receiver to harvest the sugar cane at least possible cost to the owners of the
crop. There is much proof in the record to indicate that the receiver did not harvest the crop of sugar cane
as expeditiously as he should have done. There is no proof in the record which shows that the amount
estimated by the said commissioner for the cutting, grinding, etc., of the sugar cane in question, was not a
reasonable amount for that expense.

Second issue:
- A receiver has no authority to borrow money unless the same is expressly given by the court. We
would be inclined, however, to allow this amount (P147.86) had the necessity been fully demonstrated for
borrowing the money. There was absence of express authority and absence of proof of the absolute
necessity for incurring this item of expense

Third issue:
- It appears that the receiver delivered one-half of the sugar to the aparceros without deducting the amount of
money and effects advanced to them. If he, in fact, advanced to the aparceros the said sum (P3,001.94) he
should have deducted it from the amount due said aparceros, and not have attempted to collect the same
from the amount due the owner of the hacienda, prejudicing the owner of the hacienda thereby. Here, the
receiver exceeded his authority. Nevertheless we would be inclined to allow this amount (P3,001.94)
if it were a just charge against the administration of the hacienda. But, as was said above, it is not a
just charge against the owner of the hacienda. This amount should have been collected from
the aparceros.

Fourth issue:
- The lower court, in the appointment of the receiver, did not fix any sum for his compensation; neither is it
customary for courts in appointing receivers to fix their compensation in advance. Their compensation is a
matter which is always left to the sound discretion of the court, to be allowed from time to time.
- Considering the negligent manner in which the receiver administered the hacienda, as well as his
negligence in complying with the various orders of the court with reference to rendering accounts,
we are of the opinion that the sum of P1,000 is, in fact, more than a just compensation for his
services. In view, however, of the fact that the owner of the hacienda did not appeal from the order of
the court allowing said sum (P1,000) we approve the finding of the lower court.

Fifth issue:
The appellant seems to believe that section 175 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions gave him full power to
administer the property placed under his control as receiver as he might deem wise and necessary, without any
intervention on the part of the court or of the interested parties.
- The appellant evidently overlooked the phrase of said article which says: "The receiver shall have, under
the control of the court in which the action is pending, power, etc."
- The receiver is generally defined to be "an indifferent person between the parties litigant, appointed
by the court and on behalf of all the parties, and not of the plaintiff or defendant only, to receive and
hold the thing or property in litigation, pending the suit (Booth vs. Clark, 17 How. (U. S.),322, 331), to
receive the rents, issues or profits of the land or thing in question (Both vs. Clark, supra), to receive
the rents or other income, to hold possession and control of the property which is the subject matter
of the litigation, and to dispose of the same or deliver it to such person or persons as may be
directed by the court. (Wiswall vs. Kunz, 173 Ill., 110.)"
- The receiver is said to be the arm and hand of the courta part of the machinery of the court, by
which the rights of parties are protected. He is required not only to preserve the property, but to
protect the rights of all of the parties interested.

We find no reason for changing or modifying the decision of the lower court, and the same is hereby affirmed, with
costs.







G.R. No. L-25729 November 24, 1926
THE BELGIAN CATHOLIC MISSIONARIES, INC. vs MAGALLANES PRESS, INC., ET AL., defendants. JOSE MARIA
MEMIJE, appellant.
DOCTRINE: In a mortgage loan, the proceeds of the property is deemed under conservatorship and not replevin upon payment
of bond. Replvin is the delivery of ownership to its owner. Pending the dispute of ownership (who should get the insurance
proceed), the proper remedy is conservatorship and not replevin.
FACTS:
Magallanes Press obtained a loan from JP Heilberg with interest rate per annum SECURED by a CHATTEL MORTGAGE on the
printing machineries. Later the successor company Magallanes Press Corporation (take note that the original company and the
successor companyis different) contracted another LOAN from Belgian Catholic Missionaries and SECURED THE SAME CHATTEL
MORTGAGE. (This means that the printing machine was a security to 2 different loans at the same time).
JP Heilberg transferred the credit to Jose Marie Memije. Now there is a subrogation of rights. Memije will collect on behalf of
JP Heilberg. Also Memije is entitled to additional credit because the HEADS of Magallanes Press Co formerly contracted loans to
Memije to pay JP Heilberg.
The printing machines, subject to the chattel mortgage was destroyed by a fire. Gladly, the machines was covered by an
insurance and such insurance proceeds was supposed to be paid to Mimeji. When J. P. Heilbronn & Co., Inc., transferred its
mortgage credit to Jose Ma.Memije it, in turn, endorsed said insurance policies to him. The insurance companies were disposed
to pay the respective insurance policies, which amounted to P7,686.45, but due to the issuance of the above-mentioned writ of
preliminary injunction, payment could not be made.
Due to the filing of the complaint in the present case on May 9, 1923, and the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on
May 10th of the same year, Jose Ma. Memije was unable to collect the amount of the insurance policies, and when he was
summoned under the complaint on May 14, 1923, he made demand on the Magallanes Press Co., Inc., for the payment of his
mortgage credit on the same date the manager of said corporation, E. F. Clemente, permitted the secretary of the said
corporation to place the property covered by the mortgage into the hands of the said Jose Ma. Memije in order that the same
might be sold, but the sale could not be consummated due to the issuance of the said writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: What is the proper remedy of the insurance proceeds? Replevin or Conservatorship?
HELD: It appears that the defendant Jose Ma. Memije having attempted to foreclose the mortgage, by which the mortgage
credit acquired by him from J. P. Heilbronn & Co., Inc., was secured, in order to recover not only the original credit but also the
increase, the Belgian Catholic Missionaries Co., Inc., filed a complaint, with a petition for a writ of preliminary injunction against
the sheriff, in whose hands the foreclosure of the mortgage was placed. The writ of preliminary injunction having been issued,
upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P15,000, and there being no person more interested in the conservation and custody of
the property covered by the mortgage than said plaintiff company, being the largest creditor, it applied and obtained from the
court the possession of the same.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, this case is not one of replevin but simply a proceeding instituted by the plaintiff
for the deposit of the property in litigation, upon the filing of a bond, said plaintiff, acting as a receiver by authority of the court,
being the person most interested in the conservation and care of the same
The lower court, therefore, did not err in authorizing the plaintiff company to take possession of the personal property in
litigation upon the filing of a bond sufficient to secure the conservation or value thereof.










Topic: Distinguised a Receiver from a Sheriff

G.R. No. L-29295 October 22, 1928
J.M. PO PAUCO vs. DOLORES SIGUENZA, et al. WISE & CO.

FACTS

J.M. Po Pauco obtained final judgment in his favor against the spouses Dolores Siguenza and Mariano Aguilar for the
sum of P72,278.01, both parties agreeing to deduct therefrom the sum of P13,007.46 which is the net value of the
sugar cane belonging to said defendants and attached by the plaintiff and manufactured by the Philippine National
Bank, the receiver of the said product. In another civil case, Wise & Co., Ltd., had on October 18, 1926 obtained
judgment against the herein plaintiff J. M. Po Pauco for the sum of P10,572.80 with legal interest thereon, execution
of said judgment having been ordered in those proceedings, which has not yet, even partially, been paid.

On October 23, 1927, Wise & Co., Ltd., intervened in this case praying that the Philippine National Bank, the receiver
of the said sum of P13,007.46, be ordered to satisfy the judgment in favor of the said petitioner Wise & Co., Ltd.,
against J.M. Po Pauco.

Opposition was filed to said petition by the Philippine National Bank alleging that said bank has a preferential right
over the surplus of the sale of the sugar delivered to it as receiver, and also that the Hibila Trading Corporation
obtained judgment against the said J. M. Po Pauco, in civil case No. 3197 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Negros, holding that the rights of the Hibila Trading Corporation over the sugar harvest of 1923-1924 and 1924-1925
of the spouses Dolores Siguenza and Mariano Aguilar in the San Agustin Estate, are preferential over those of J. M.
Po Pauco and, therefor, the latter is not at all entitled to any of the surplus remaining from the sale of said sugar

ISSUE
To determine which has the better right to the net proceeds of the sale of said sugar

RULING

The proceeds of the sale or sum mentioned is in the custody of the receiver & not of a sheriff. Thus, not within the the
reach of judicial processes.

The sheriff is a court officer of a general character who is not appointed for a certain judicial case; the sheriff is an
officer who exercises or can exercise his functions within the limits of his jurisdicition.

A receiver, on the other hand, is a special officer, appointed in relation to and within a certain case or action, and
whose duties are limited to his sphere of action, and do not extend further than the case in which he was appointed.

For this reason, while the funds in the custody of a sheriff may be within the reach of processes coming from other
judicial proceedings, such is not the case with respect to those under the custody of a depositary. From which it
follows that those who, as in the present case, have any claim to property or sum in the possession of a receiver,
must appear in the same proceeding in which said receiver discharges his duties, and there, by motion or petition,
allege and prove their claims.

















Topic: Receivership (Rule 59)
EFFECT OF DISMISSAL OF THE CASE
ERNEST BERG, (plaintiff-appellant)
vs.
VALENTIN TEUS, (defendant-appellee)
G.R. No. L-2987 February 20, 1951

FACTS:
Ernest Berg brought the action against ValentinTeus to foreclose a real estate and chattelmortgage executed in November,
1944, to secure six promissory notes of the aggregate value of P80,000 and payable on demandtwo years after declaration of
armistice between the UnitedStates and Japan.

Mortgagor had undertaken, among other things, to insure and pay the taxes on the mortgagedproperties; not to alienate, sell,
lease, encumber or in any manner dispose thereof; and to keepand maintain the said properties in good order and repair.Teus
had failed to keep taxes fully paid; had made material alterations on the premises, and hadsold and conveyed them to Central
Azucarera del Norte. The mortgage shall be deemed to beautomatically foreclosed and the mortgagee may forthwith proceed
to foreclose this mortgageeitherextrajudicially, even after the death of the mortgagor,in pursuance of the provisions of Act No.
3135, as amended

On basis of this agreement it was prayed that the mortgage be declared automaticallyforeclosed and the plaintiff entitled to
immediate possession of the properties in question.Berg's attorney also asked for the appointment of a receiver.

Defendant having moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds thatplaintiff'scauseof action had not accrued by
reason of the executive ordersand having opposed the motionforreceivership,JudgeZoiloHilario entered an order holding that
as to the collection of the sixnotes the suit had been prematurely brought, setting the cause for trial on the merits because,
thereasons alleged in the motion to dismiss were not "indubitable" with reference to theappointment of a receiver sought by
the plaintiff.The moratorium ought not to interfere withthe plaintiff's motion for appointment of receiver.

Defendant filed a new motion to dismiss; Judge Luis Ortega, replaced Judge Hilario, ignoring thelatter's order entered the order
now on appeal by which the entire action was quashed on thetheory advanced in the motion to dismiss.

The new order was silent on both the application for receivership and the prayer that theplaintiff be adjudged authorized by
the terms of the mortgage to foreclose it extrajudiciallyand seize the properties.Judge Ortega opined that Executive Orders
Nos. 25 and 32 were still in force unaffected byRepublic Act No. 342 as to debts contracted during the Japanese occupation.

Plaintiff contended that those executive orders had passed out of existence by thedisappearance of the emergency
contemplated thereby.The constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and Republic Act No. 342 and alliedissues can
wait. These issues are delicate and would require prolonged study and deliberation.Besides, there is a pending bill in Congress
repealing those executive orders and law.

ISSUE:
Whether on basis of this agreement the mo9rtgage be declared automatically foreclosed and the plaintiff entitled to immediate
possession of the properties in question; and,whether there is a need for appointment of a receiver.

HELD:
The alleged violation of the conditions of the mortgaged contract, if true, make it necessary, if not imperative, for the
protection of the interest of the plaintiff, that the mortgaged properties be placed in the custody of the court, the fact that the
appointment of a receiver, as the defendant emphasizes, is an ancillary remedy is precisely one powerful reason why the case
should not be dismissed, Receivership is an auxiliary remedy and the dismissal of the main action would eliminate the only
basis for the appointment of receiver and thus completely bar the door to any relief from mischiefs.

Judge Hilario evidently saw the grave injustice to the plaintiff and the irreparable injury to which his rights would be exposed if
an indefinite suspension of the entire proceeding were decreed.

In suspending the right of the creditor to enforce his right, the president and congress had no idea of depriving him of all means
of preventing the destruction or alienation of the security for the debt. A destruction which would virtually write-off, in some
cases, the whole credit. If that were the intention, it is doubtful if the orders and the law invoked could stand the test of
constitutionality.

GR No. 155408

Julio A. Vivares and Mila G. Ignaling vEngr Jose J. Reyes

The kernel dispute in this petition under Rule 45 is the legality of the May 22, 2001 Resolution of the Camiguin Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 28 in Civil Case No. 517, which placed the estate of Severino Reyes under receivership. The Court of
Appeals (CA) saw it differently in CA-G.R. SP No. 67492its June 18, 2002 Decision recalled the RTC directive on the
appointment of the receiver, prompting Julio Vivares and Mila Ignaling to file the petition at bar to convince the Court to
reinstate the receivership.
The Facts
Severino Reyes was the father of respondent Jose Reyes and Torcuato Reyes. Upon the death of Severino, respondent and
Torcuato came upon their inheritance consisting of several properties. They had an oral partition of the properties and
separately appropriated to themselves said properties.

Petitioner Vivares was the designated executor of Torcuatos last will and testament, while petitioner Ignaling was declared a
lawful heir of Torcuato.

Petitioners instituted an action for Partition and Recovery of Real Estate before the Camiguin RTC. What was being contested
were the properties that were still in the name of Severino.

On March 15, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion to Place Properties in Litigation under Receivership before the trial court alleging
that to their prejudice respondent had, without prior court approval and without petitioners knowledge, sold to third parties
and transferred in his own name several common properties. The petitioners prayed to place the entire disputed estate of
Severino under receivership. They nominated Lope Salantin to be appointed as receiver.

Respondent opposed the appointment of receivership and asserted that the transfer in his name of the said properties was a
result of oral partition.

On September 19, 2000, respondent filed for cancellation of the receivership and offered to pay a bond in an amount fixed by
court.
Respondent also filed a motion to cancel the notice of lispendens on certain properties owned by Elena Unchuan.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and dismissed the motion to cancel the receivership and lift the notice of lispendens on the
properties allegedly owned by Elena.

CA reversed the ruling, cancelled the receivership and lifted the notice of lispendens on the properties owned by Elena. The
case was then remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE ANNOTATION OF A NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS PRECLUDES THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER WHEN
THERE IS A NEED TO SAFEGUARD THE PROPERTIES IN LITIGATION.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RECEIVERSHIP SHOULD BE CANCELLED WITH THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY BOND BY THE RESPONDENT.

Ruling:

The Court sustained the ruling of the CA with some modifications.
On the first issue: Petitioners failed to adduce clear, convincing, and hard evidence to show the alleged fraud in the transfers
and the antedating of said transfers. The fact that the transfers were dated prior to the demise of Torcuato on May 12, 1992
does not necessarily mean the transfers were attended by fraud. He who alleges fraud has the burden to prove it. There was
no sufficient cause or reason to justify placing the disputed properties under receivership.
On the second issue:petitioner is willing to post a counterbond in the amount to be fixed by the court based on Sec.
3, Rule 59. Anchored on this rule, the trial court should have dispensed with the services of the receiver, more so
considering that the alleged fraud put forward to justify the receivership was not at all established.
It is undisputed that respondent has actual possession over some of the disputed properties which are entitled to
protection. Between the possessor of a subject property and the party asserting contrary rights to the properties, the
former is accorded better rights.

6. Chavez vs. CA, GR. No. 174356, January 20, 2010
ABAD, J.:

But receivership is not an action. It is but an auxiliary remedy, a mere incident of the suit to help achieve its purpose.
Consequently, it cannot be said that the grant of receivership in one case will amount to res judicata on the merits of the other
cases. The grant or denial of this provisional remedy will still depend on the need for it in the particular action.

Facts
Respondent Fidela Y. Vargas owned a five-hectare mixed coconut land and rice fields in Sorsogon. Petitioner Evelina G.
Chavez had been staying in a remote portion of the land with her family, planting coconut seedlings on the land and supervising
the harvest of coconut and palay. Fidela and Evelina agreed to divide the gross sales of all products from the land between
themselves. Since Fidela was busy with her law practice, Evelina undertook to hold in trust for Fidela her half of the profits.
But Fidela claimed that Evelina had failed to remit her share of the profits and, despite demand to turn over the
administration of the property to Fidela, had refused to do so. Consequently, Fidela filed a complaint against Evelina and her
daughter, Aida C. Deles, who was assisting her mother, for recovery of possession, rent, and damages with prayer for the
immediate appointment of a receiver before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulan, Sorsogon.[1] In their answer, Evelina and
Aida claimed that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since it actually involved an agrarian
dispute.

After hearing, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction based on Fidelas admission that Evelina and
Aida were tenants who helped plant coconut seedlings on the land and supervised the harvest of coconut and palay. As
tenants, the defendants also shared in the gross sales of the harvest. The court threw out Fidelas claim that, since Evelina and
her family received the land already planted with fruit-bearing trees, they could not be regarded as tenants. Cultivation, said
the court, included the tending and caring of the trees. The court also regarded as relevant Fidelas pending application for a
five-hectare retention and Evelinas pending protest relative to her three-hectare beneficiary share.

Dissatisfied, Fidela appealed to the CA. She also filed with that court a motion for the appointment of a receiver. On
April 12, 2006 the CA granted the motion and ordained receivership of the land, noting that there appeared to be a need to
preserve the property and its fruits in light of Fidelas allegation that Evelina and Aida failed to account for her share of such
fruits.

Parenthetically, Fidela also filed three estafa cases with the RTC of Olongapo City and a complaint for dispossession
with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) against Evelina and Aida. In all these cases, Fidela asked
for the immediate appointment of a receiver for the property.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent Fidela is guilty of forum shopping considering that she had earlier filed
identical applications for receivership over the subject properties in the criminal cases she filed with the
RTC of Olongapo City against petitioners Evelina and Aida and in the administrative case that she filed
against them before the DARAB; and

2. Whether or not the CA erred in granting respondent Fidelas application for receivership.


RULING:

One. By forum shopping, a party initiates two or more actions in separate tribunals, grounded on the same cause, trusting that
one or the other tribunal would favorably dispose of the matter. The elements of forum shopping are the same as in
litispendentia where the final judgment in one case will amount to res judicatain the other. The elements of forum shopping
are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such
that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.

Here, however, the various suits Fidela initiated against Evelina and Aida involved different causes of action and sought
different reliefs. The present civil actionthat she filed with the RTC sought to recover possession of the property based on
Evelina and Aidas failure to account for its fruits. The estafa cases she filed with the RTC accused the two of misappropriating
and converting her share in the harvests for their own benefit. Her complaint for dispossession under Republic Act 8048 with
the DARAB sought to dispossess the two for allegedly cutting coconut trees without the prior authority of Fidela or of the
Philippine Coconut Authority.

The above cases are similar only in that they involved the same parties and Fidela sought the placing of the properties under
receivership in all of them. But receivership is not an action. It is but an auxiliary remedy, a mere incident of the suit to help
achieve its purpose. Consequently, it cannot be said that the grant of receivership in one case will amount to res judicata on
the merits of the other cases. The grant or denial of this provisional remedy will still depend on the need for it in the particular
action.

Two. In any event, we hold that the CA erred in granting receivership over the property in dispute in this case. For one thing, a
petition for receivership under Section 1(b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the property or fund subject of
the action is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object is
the prevention of imminent danger to the property. If the action does not require such protection or preservation, the remedy
is not receivership.

Here Fidelas main gripe is that Evelina and Aida deprived her of her share of the lands produce. She does not claim that the
land or its productive capacity would disappear or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. Nor does Fidela claim that the land
has been materially injured, necessitating its protection and preservation. Because receivership is a harsh remedy that can be
granted only in extreme situations, Fidela must prove a clear right to its issuance. But she has not. Indeed, in none of the other
cases she filed against Evelina and Aida has that remedy been granted her.

Besides, the RTC dismissed Fidelas action for lack of jurisdiction over the case, holding that the issues it raised properly belong
to the DARAB. The case before the CA is but an offshoot of that RTC case. Given that the RTC has found that it had no
jurisdiction over the case, it would seem more prudent for the CA to first provisionally determine that the RTC had jurisdiction
before granting receivership which is but an incident of the main action.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Resolutions dated April 12, 2006 and July 7, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV 85552, areREVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The receivership is LIFTED and the Court of Appeals is directed to resolve CA-G.R. CV 85552 with utmost dispatch.

ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, petitioner,
v.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO F. BORROMEO, respondents.
G.R. No. 106473 July 12, 1993

TOPIC: Where rights of a party are still to be determined; Propriety
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
The appointment of a receiver is not proper where the rights of the parties (one of whom is in possession of the
property), are still to be determined by the trial court.

"Relief by way of receivership is equitable in nature, and a court of equity will not ordinarily appoint a receiver where
the rights of the parties depend on the determination of adverse claims of legal title to real property and one party is
in possession."

Only when the property is in danger of being materially injured or lost... or if portions thereof are being occupied by
third persons claiming adverse title thereto, may the appointment of a receiver be justified


FACTS:

CamiloBorromeo, a realtor, filed against petitioner AntoniettaDescallar a civil complaint for the recovery of three (3)
parcels of land and the house built thereon in the possession of the petitioner and registered in her name under
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Mandaue

Borromeo alleged that he purchased the property on July 11, 1991 from Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian national and
former lover of the petitioner for many years until he deserted her in 1991 for the favors of another woman

Descallar alleged that the property belongs to her as the registered owner. Wilhelm Jambrich, is an Austrian, hence,
not qualified to acquire or own real property in the Philippines. He has no title, right or interest whatsoever in the
property which he may transfer to Borromeo.

On March 5, 1992, Borromeo asked the trial court to appoint a receiver for the property during the pendency of the
case which Judge Mercedes Golo-Dadole granted the application for receivership and appointed her clerk of court as
receiver with a bond of P250,000.00.

Descallar appealed the decision before the CA but appellate court dismissed the petition.

ISSUE
whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in appointing a receiver for real property registered in the name of
the petitioner in order to transfer its possession from the petitioner to the court-appointed receiver

RULING: Yes

The Court is amazed that the trial court and the Court of Appeals appear to have given no importance to the fact that
the petitioner herein, besides being the actual possessor of the disputed property, is also the registered owner
thereof. Her title and possession cannot be defeated by mere verbal allegations that although she appears in the
deed of sale as vendee of the property, it was her Austrian lover, Jambrich, who paid the price of the sale of the
property. Her Torrens certificates of title are indefeasible or incontrovertible

we find the order of receivership tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The appointment of a receiver is not
proper where the rights of the parties (one of whom is in possession of the property), are still to be
determined by the trial court.

"Relief by way of receivership is equitable in nature, and a court of equity will not ordinarily appoint a receiver where
the rights of the parties depend on the determination of adverse claims of legal title to real property and one party is
in possession." (Calo, et al. vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445).

Only when the property is in danger of being materially injured or lost... or if portions thereof are being occupied by
third persons claiming adverse title thereto, may the appointment of a receiver be justified (Motoomul vs. Arrieta, 8
SCRA 172).

In this case, there is no showing that grave or irremediable damage may result to respondent Borromeo unless a
receiver is appointed. The property in question is real property, hence, it is neither perishable or consummable. Even
though it is mortgaged to a third person, there is no evidence that payment of the mortgage obligation is being
neglected. In any event, the private respondent's rights and interests, may be adequately protected during the
pendency of the case by causing his adverse claim to be annotated on the petitioner's certificates of title.

Another flaw in the order of receivership is that the person whom the trial judge appointed as receiver is her own clerk
of court. This practice has been frowned upon by this Court
That order, in effect, made the clerk of court a sort of a receiver charged with the duty of receiving the
proceeds of sale and the harvest of every year during the pendency of the case with the disadvantage that
the clerk of court has not filed any bond to guarantee the faithful discharge of his duties as depositary; and
considering
that in actionsinvolving title to real property, the appointment of a receiver cannot beentertained bec
ause its effect would be to take the property out of thepossession of the defendant, except in extrem
e cases when there is clearproof of its necessity to save the plaintiff from grave and irremediable los
s ordamage, it is evident that the action of the respondent judge is unwarranted and unfair to the
defendants. (Mendoza vs. Arellano, 36 Phil. 59;

During the pendency of this appeal, Judge Dadole rendered a decision upholding Borromeo's claim to Descallar's
property, This circumstance does not retroactively validate the receivership until the decision (presumably now
pending appeal) shall have attained finality.

WHEREFORE, finding grave abuse of discretion in the order of receivership which the respondent Court of Appeals
affirmed in its decision of July 29, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27977, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and
the decision of the appellate court, as well as the order dated March 17, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN1148, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Costs against the private
respondent.


MAKING ENTERPRISES, INC. AND SPOUSES JOAQUIN TAMANO AND ANGELITA TAMANO, PETITIONERS,
VS.JOSE MARFORI AND EMERENCIANA MARFORI, RESPONDENTS.

[ G.R. No. 152239, August 17, 2011 ]

Where rights of a party are still to be determined; Propriety

FACTS:

On June 4, 1984, Jose F. Marfori acquired a five-storey commercial building, known as the Marsman Building, from
the Development Bank of the Philippines. As the land on which the building stood was owned by the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA), Marfori entered into a contract of lease of the said lot with the PPA. The contract was for a period of twenty-five (25)
years, renewable for a similar period, and was subject to the condition that upon the expiration of lease, the building and all other
improvements found on the leased premises shall become the PPA's sole property. Marfori then incurred huge expenses for the
rehabilitation of the building and leased some portions of the building to the PPA.

On April 10, 1987, Marfori executed a dacion en pago and assignment of rights transferring the ownership of the
Marsman Building to Making Enterprises, Inc. (Making), on the condition that Making would assume all of Marfori's obligations.

Marfori's wife, Emerenciana, alleged that she did not consent to the transfer of the Marsman Building to Making. She
claimed that the building is part of their conjugal property. she filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint against Making, the
spouses Joaquin and AngelitaTamano, the spouses Lester and Cristina Lee, and the PPA for Recovery of Ownership, Annulment
of Contract with Damages, Receivership, Accounting and Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Restraining Order. She sought,
among others, to annul the dacion en pago and assignment of rights and prayed for the appointment of a receiver to preserve the
rentals of the building. She also prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the PPA from paying its
rentals to Making and from approving the transfer of the Marsman Building.

RTC denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and the application for receivership.

Emerenciana filed before the CA a petition for certiorari and receivership with prayer for preliminary injunction.
However, the CA dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form and substance.

Marfori, on the other hand, was the accused in an action for estafa and violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22 with the
Prosecutor's Office of Caloocan City.

On November 27, 1996, Marfori and his wife had filed with this Court a Consolidated Petitiondocketed as G.R. No.
126841 asking among others, for the appointment of a receiver to preserve the rentals collected from the Marsman Building and
the issuance of an injunction to enjoin the implementation of the warrants of arrest issued against him. Respondents argued that
the filing of the criminal cases against Marfori had no factual and legal justification and hence, should be enjoined. SC referred
the petition to CA.

CA granted the petition and appointed a receiver. The CA found that unless a receiver is appointed, there is a
danger of loss or material injury considering that petitioners possess absolute control of the building.


ISSUES:

(1) Whether the CA erred in granting the application for the appointment of a receiver for the Marsman Building; and

(2) Whether the CA erred in permanently enjoining the criminal prosecution of Jose Marfori.


RULING:

Yes

1
st
issue: the application for an appointment of a receiver must be denied.

An application for the appointment of a receiver under Section 1(a), Rule 59 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, requires that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured,
necessitating its protection or preservation. Section 1 provides:


SECTION 1. Appointment of receiver.--Upon a verified application, one or more receivers of the property subject of
the action or proceeding may be appointed by the court where the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or by
the Supreme Court, or a member thereof, in the following cases:

(a) When it appears from the verified application, and such other proof as the court may require, that the party
applying for the appointment of a receiver has an interest in the property or fund which is the subject of the action or
proceeding, and that such property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured unless a receiver
be appointed to administer and preserve it;

Respondents failed to show how the building as well as the income thereof would disappear or be wasted if not
entrusted to a receiver. They were not able to prove that the property has been materially injured, necessitating its protection and
preservation. Because receivership is a harsh remedy that can be granted only in extreme situations, respondents must
prove a clear right to its issuance. This they failed to do.

It must be stressed that the issue of the validity of the dacion en pago and assignment of rights executed by Marfori in
favor of Making still has to be resolved in Civil Case No. 94-70092. Until the contract is rescinded or nullified, the same
remains to be valid and binding. Thus, we agree with the RTC when it held that courts of equity will not ordinarily
appoint a receiver where the rights of the parties depend on the determination of adverse claims of legal title to real
property and one party is in possession.
Case: Commodities Storage & Ice Plant Corporation vs. CA
Doctrine: Appointment, Section 1
Facts:
In 1990, petitioner spouses Victor and Johannah Trinidad obtained a loan of P31,000,000.00 from respondent Far East
Bank & Trust Company to finance the purchase of the Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage. The loan was secured by a mortgage
over the ice plant and the land on which it stands. Petitioners failed to pay their loan. The bank extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage and the ice plant was sold by public bidding on March 22, 1993. Respondent bank was the highest bidder and it
registered the certificate of sale on September 22, 1993. Petitioner spouses filed a case against respondent bank for
reformation of the loan agreement, annulment of the foreclosure sale, and damages. The RTC dismissed the complaint for
failure to pay the docket fees.

On October 28, 1994, another civil case was filed by petitioners for damages, accounting and fixing of redemption
period. An Urgent Petition for Receivership was also filed on November 16, 1994. They prayed for the appointment to save
the ice plant, conduct its affairs and safeguard its records during the pendency of the case. The RTC assigned petitioners
nominee as receiver. On appeal, the order was annulled and set aside.

*Important part of the case* Petitioners claim that the appointment of a receiver is justified under Section 1 (b) of Rule 59. They
argue that the ice plant which is the subject of the action was in danger of being lost, removed and materially injured because of
the following "imminent perils":
6.1 Danger to the lives, health and peace of mind of the inhabitants living near the Sta. Maria Ice Plant;
6.2 Drastic action or sanctions that could be brought against the plaintiff by affected third persons, including
workers who have claims against the plaintiff but could not be paid due to the numbing manner by which the
defendant took the Sta. Maria Ice Plant;
6.3 The rapid reduction of the Ice Plant into a scrap heap because of evident incompetence, neglect and
vandalism.

Issue: WON the assignment of a receiver is justified.

Held: NO.
[Requisite of petition for receivership under section 1 (b)]
A petition for receivership under Section 1 (b) of Rule 59 requires that the property or fund which is the subject of the
action must be in danger of loss, removal or material injury which necessitates protection or preservation. The guiding
principle is the prevention of imminent danger to the property. If an action by its nature, does not require such
protection or reservation, said remedy cannot be applied for and granted.

In the instant case, we do not find the necessity for the appointment of a receiver. Petitioners have not sufficiently
shown that the Sta. Maria Ice Plant is in danger of disappearing or being wasted and reduced to a "scrap heap."
Neither have they proven that the property has been materially injured which necessitates its protection and
preservation. In fact, at the hearing on respondent bank's motion to dismiss, respondent bank, through counsel,
manifested in open court that the leak in the ice plant had already been remedied and that no other leakages had
been reported since.This statement has not been disputed by petitioners.

Augusto, Mel Jason T.
RULE 59-RECEIVERSHIP
Harden vs Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-2349, October 22, 1948
TOPIC: JURISDICTION
DOCTRINE: While a court cannot give its receiver authority to act in another state without the assistance of the courts thereof,
it may act directly upon the parties before it with respect to the property beyond the territorial limits of its jurisdiction and hold
them in contempt if they resist the courts orders with reference to its custody or disposition. Whether the property was
removed before or after the appointment of the receiver is likewise immaterial.

ANTECEDENT FACTS: A receiver was appointed and a preliminary injunction was issued restraining Fred M. Harden and his
codefendant, Jose Salumbides from transferring and alienating, except for a valuable consideration and with the consent of
the court, moneys, share of stock and other properties and assets, real and personal, belonging to the conjugal partnership.
When Mrs. Harden found out that Fred M. Harden transferred to the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the
Chartered Bank of Asia, Australia and China, both in Hongkong, over 1,000 pesos in drafts or cash and to Virginia Recreation
Center, Long Beach, California, P20,196.80, and to an unknown person, P50,000; she(Mrs. Harden) moved the court to order
Fred Harden to return all these amounts and to and to redeposit them with the Manila branch of the Chartered Bank of
India, Australia & China. The court order, through Judge Pena stated that Fred Harden should do so within the period of 15
days from the receipt of a copy of said order. But when she filed a petition of certiorari to the Supreme Court and all other
various motions, said order was modified, stating that Fred Harden should do so within the period of 5 days from the receipt
of a copy of said order with the inclusion of a decree which states, among others:
..Fred M. Harden be ordered to deliver the certificate covering the 368,553 Balatoc Mining Company shares either to the
Clerk of this Court or to the receiver in this case for safekeeping after his compliance with the order of January 17, 1948 and
said defendant is further ordered, after the registration of the said certificate, to deposit the same with the Manila Branch of
the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China.
NOTE:the last part of the order was the culmination of another series of motions with their corresponding hearings. So, it is
important to know the facts of such motions. The facts culled from the pleadings are the following:
the receiver appointed in the main case prayed that the certificates of stock of the conjugal
partnership, 368,553 shares of Balontoc Mining Co., alleged to be in the possession of the
defendant, be ordered turned over to him (receiver) so that he may registered them. The
court authorized Harden to register not later that June 30. Mrs. Harden complained when
her husband failed to comply with said order and prayed he be ordered to show cause why
he should not be declared in contempt. Harden filed a perfunctory compliance. In his
"compliance", Harden stated that he had been granted an extension until December 31,
1947, within which to register the Balatoc Mining Co. shares under Republic Act No. 62.
After some time, the receiver informed the court that despite the expiration of December
31, 1947, Fred Harden had not been registered said certificate. Upon his request, he is
given an extension until March 31, 1948 to comply with said order. Mrs. Harden prayed
that defendant Harden "be ordered to deliver the certificatecovering the 368,553 Balatoc
Mining Co. shares either to the clerk of the court or to the receiver herein for
safekeeping, immediately after registering them pursuant to Republic Act No. 62. It was
in stage of the case that the present petitioner was committed to jail for failing to comply
with the said orders of the court. Fred Hardens imprisonment in New Bilibid, Muntinlupa
Rizal is to be continued until he complies with the said orders of the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court has no jurisdiction of the property in a foreign country, and that it has no power to effect an
action for receivership to the persons of such property.

RULING: The High Tribunal ruled in the negative.

The Supreme Court said that while a court cannot give its receiver authority to act in another state without the assistance of
the courts thereof, it may act directly upon the parties before it with respect to the property beyond the territorial limits of its
jurisdiction and hold them in contempt if they resist the courts orders with reference to its custody or disposition. Whether the
property was removed before or after the appointment of the receiver is likewise immaterial.

Further, the Court citing the case of Sercomb vs. Catlin, where that Supreme Court of Illinois ruled: It is true that the property
attached is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, but the appellant, who caused it to be attached, is in this state,
and within the jurisdiction of its courts. If the superior court had no power to reach the goods in Newton's hands, it had the
power to reach appellant, who sought to prevent its receiver from getting possession of the goods. It makes no difference that
the property was in a foreign jurisdiction.

Anent to the issue of whether or not the penalty complained of is cruel, unjust or excessive, the Supreme Court ruled
otherwise.

The Court said that the penalty is suitable and adapted to its objective; and it accords with section 7, Rule 64, of the Rules of
Court which provides that "when the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to
perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it. If the term of imprisonment in this case is
indefinite and might last through the natural life of the petitioner, yet by the terms of the sentence the way is left open for him
to avoid serving any part of it by complying with the orders of the court, and in this manner put an end to his incarceration. To
order that one be imprisoned for an indefinite period in civil contempt is purely a remedial measure. Its purpose is to coerce
the contender to do an act within his or her power to perform.

But take note of the dissenting opinion of Justice Perfecto (although this is not binding): Section 7, Rule 64 Rules of Court
which states:

SEC. 7. Imprisonment until ordered obeyed. When the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the
power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it.

(Note that this provision pertains to the old Rule, as this case was decided on year 1948.)

Justice Perfecto if of the opinion that the reglementary provision is null and void per se and, therefore, should be denied
compliance. Perhaps, there is no other provision in our statute books more revolting to conscience, more shocking to the most
elemental sense of justice, and most unreasonably Draconian. The provision is characterized by such an extreme of
arbitrariness that is comprehensible only under a dictatorial system of government. (Something interesting to ponder, isnt it?)

CALO VS. ROLDAN
G.R. No.L-252. March 30, 1946

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:Appointment of a receiver is not proper or does not lie in action of Injunction.

FACTS:
Plaintiffs Calo and San Jose, as owners and possessors of certain parcels of rice land in Laguna filed a complaint
against the defendantsRegingRelova and certain TeodulaBartolome alleging that the latter, through the use of
force, stealth, strategy and intimidation, intend or are intending to enter and work or harvest whatever existing
fruits found on the land. Included in the complaint is a prayer for an issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
be issued ex parte to restrain, enjoin and prohibit defendants from entering, interfering with or harvesting the
lands belonging to plaintiffs spouses with an accompanying bond of 200.
Defendants opposed the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that they are the owners of
the lands and have been in actual possession since 1925 and the plaintiffs have never been in possession thereof.
The CFI of Laguna denied the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the defendants were in actual
possession of said lands. Motion for Reconsideration was filed, pending resolution plaintiff filed an urgent petition
ex parte praying that their MR of the order denying petition for preliminary injunction be granted and/or for the
appointment of a RECEIVER of the properties involved, on the ground that the plaintiffs have an interest in the
properties and fruits and that the appointment of a receiver was the most convenient and feasible means of
preserving, administering and disposing of the properties in litigation. Judge Roldan, who was the judge appointed,
replacing Judge Rilloroza granted the petition for appointment of and appointed a receiver in the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of the petition for the appointment of a receiver was proper.

RULING:
No, the plaintiffs action is one of ordinary injunction for which they alleged that they are the owners of the lands
involved and were in actual possession thereof and that the defendants without any legal right, though the use of
force, intimidation, stealth, threat and strategy and prayed that the defendants be restrained, enjoined and
prohibited from entering in, interfering with or harvesting the lands.
The provisional remedies (attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership, delivery of personal property are
remedies to which party litigant may resort for the preservation or protection of their rights or interest, and for no
other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. If an action, by its nature, does not require such
protection or preservation, said remedies cannot applied for and granted. To each kind of action/sa proper remedy
is provided for law,
-Preliminary prohibitory injunction, lies when the relief demanded in the complaint consists in restraining the
commission/continuance of the act complained of, either perpetually or for a limited period, and the other
conditions required by Sec. of Rule 60. The purpose is to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the
action or the relation between parties, in order to protect the rights of plaintiff respecting the subject of the action
during the pendency of the suit.
-Receiver, may be appointed to take charge of personal/real property which is the subject of an ordinary civil
action, when it appears that the party applying for the appointment of a receiver has an interest in the property or
fund which is the subject of the action or litigation, and that such property or fund is in danger of being lost,
removed or materially injured unless a receiver is appointed to guard and preserve it. The property or fund must
be in litigation according to the allegations of the complaint, and the object of appointing a receiver is to secure
and preserve the property or thing in controversy pending the litigation.
According to the complaint of the plaintiff, the action is one of ordinary injunction based on the allegation in the
complaint.Therefore it is evident that the respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in appointing a
receiver. Appointment of a receiver is not proper or does not lie in an action of injunction such as the one filed by
the plaintiff. The petition for appointment of a receiver filed by the plaintiffs is based on the ground that it is the
most convenient and feasible means of preserving, administering and disposing of the properties in litigation; and
according to plaintiffs' theory or allegations in their complaint, neither the lands nor the palay harvested therein,
are in litigation. The litigation or issue raised by plaintiffs in their complaint is not the ownership or possession of
the lands and their fruits. It is whether or not defendants intend or were intending to enter or work or harvest
whatever existing fruits could then be found in the lands described in the complaint, alleged to be the exclusive
property and in the actual possession of the plaintiffs.
It is a matter not only of law but of plain common sense that a plaintiff will not and legally cannot ask for the
appointment of a receiver of a property which he alleges to belong to him and to be actually in his possession. For
the owner and possessor of a property is more interested than other persons in preserving and administering it.

Ylarde vs. Enriquez

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to vacate an appointment of a receiver by order of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija.
Eugenia Ylarde was the legal or common law wife of one Simplicio Rosario, now deceased. Rosario was granted a
free patent to a homestead measuring fifteen hectares. This is the land or it is a part of this land that is involved in this
litigation. After Eugenia Ylarde's legal or common-law husband died, she executed an extrajudicial partition wherein
she falsely declared under oath that she was the sole heiress of the estate in question. Following that so-called
extrajudicial partition a transfer certificate of title was issued in Eugenia's name cancelling the original document.
In September, 1945, Bienvenido, Magdalena and Apolinario all surnamed Sabado, Simplicio Rosario's collateral
relatives, brought the action against Eugenia. During the pendency of the case, Eugenia died and was substituted by
Rodolfo, Flor (through a guardian ad litem) and Julia all surnamed Ylarde.
On December 17, 1946, Eugenia Ylarde died, and she has been substituted as party defendant by Rodolfo Ylarde,
Flor de Vida Ylarde through a guardian ad litem, and Julia Ylarde. The record does not reveal the degree of
relationship between these new defendants and the deceased Eugenia Ylarde.
The Ylardes allege that they are and have been in the possession of the part of the land which corresponded to them
or to Eugenia Ylarde in the partition, while the Sabados entered upon the possession of their share upon the signing
of the settlements. The respondents (the Sabados) denied that the petitioners are in "physical" possession of the
property in dispute.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court abused its discretion in appointing a receiver.
HELD: YES. Appointment of receiver is hereby revoked.
The land which is the subject matter of the suit here is not in any danger of disappearing or being wasted. There is no
pretense that it has any permanent improvements or fixtures which produce income, rents or profits to be collected or
preserved. At the most a bond with sufficient sureties would be adequate to protect the plaintiffs from any possible
injury consequent upon being deprived of the possession of the property.
A receiver, it has been repeatedly held, should not be granted where the injury resulting therefrom would probably be
greater than the injury ensuing from leaving the possession of the property undisturbed. This doctrine fits into the
case at bar. The court would place in the hands of a receiver to administer, crops to plant and raise which, as we
have seen, the defendants have spent considerable money and attention with the plaintiffs contributing nothing
beyond their allegation that they own the ground.
An appointment of a receiver is an interlocutory matter; and an appeal from an order making such appointment can
be interposed only after final judgment is rendered. In this case on appeal would be of no avail to prevent the
enforcement of the order before damage which the petitioners seek to avoid had been done.

G.R. No. L-3430 August 7, 1906
ROCHA & CO., Sociedad en Comandita, plaintiff,
vs.
A. S. CROSSFIELD, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and FRANCISCO T. FIGUERAS,defendants.
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER
FACTS:
On the 25th of January, 1906 Francisco T. Figueras, one of the defendants, commenced in the Court of First Instance
of Manila an action against Rocha & Co. in which he alleged, among other things, that in 1898 a limited partnership
had been formed under the name of "Carman & Co.;" that he and two others were general partners and that there
were various special partners; that in accordance with the terms of the articles of partnership any one of the partners
had the right to withdrawn from the partnership upon six months' notice; that upon giving the said notice his
participation in the profits of the partnership should cease but that his capital should draw interest at the market rate
until it was returned, and that it should be returned in four installments, one part upon giving notice, the second part
six months after the notice, the third part twelve months after the notice, and the fourth part eighteen months after the
notice. He further alleged that on the withdraw from the partnership and waived his right to receive at the time the
fourth part of his capital and consented that the fourth part should be paid at the end of six months. It was further
alleged that on the 15th day of February, 1904, the partnership of Carman & Co., was reorganized under the name of
Rocha & Co., which latter company assumed all the debts and liabilities of Carman & Co., and took possession of all
its assets.
The complaint alleged that the plaintiff's participation in the business consisted (1) of the capital which he had paid in,
P12,000 (2) his proportionate part of a reserve fund, and (3) his proportionate part of a sinking fund, and that he was
entitled to receive from the partnership the sum of P51,484.17; that the partnership alleged that his interest did not
exceed P34,218.22, and on the 2d day of August, 1904, the partnership paid, and the plaintiff received, one-fourth of
the amount which the partnership admitted that the plaintiff was entitled to.
There was no allegation in the complaint that the partnership of Carman & Co., was dissolved by the withdrawal of
Figueras, nor was there any allegation that after that withdrawal he was the owner of an undivided or of any interest
in the physical property which belonged to the partnership and which consisted of lorchas, launches, and cascos, nor
was there any allegation that he had any lien upon any of this property.
It is apparent that the real controversy between the parties is over the right of Figueras to receive his proportionate
part of the reserve fund and of the sinking fund.
Notwithstanding the want of these allegations, Figueras, after the presentation complaint and after the defendants
had demurred thereto, made an application to the court below for the appointment of a receiver of the property of
Rocha & Co. A receiver was appointed who afterwards took possession of the entire property of Rocha & Co., and
thereupon Rocha & Co., commenced this original action of certiorari in this court, asking that the proceedings in
reference to the appointment of a receiver be certified of this court and that after such certification they be examined
and that the order appointing the receiver be declared void because the court making it had no jurisdiction to appoint
such receiver. A preliminary injunction was granted by one of the justices of this court restraining the receiver and the
defendants in this action from taking further proceedings in the matter during the pendency thereof.
The defendants, having been cited, appeared and answered the complaint, admitting practically all of the facts
alleged therein, a hearing was had upon said complaint and answer, and order was made by this court requiring the
court below to send to it all of the proceedings in the case relating to the appointment of the receiver. Those
proceedings have been remitted, a hearing has been had thereon, and the case is now before us for final disposition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A VALID GROUND FOR APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER?
RULING:
Section 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure is as follows:
SEC. 174.When a receiver may be appointed. A receiver may be appointed in the following cases:
(1) When a corporation has been dissolved, or is insolvent, or is in imminent danger of insolvency, or has
forfeited its corporate rights.
(2) Where it is made to appear by the complaint or answer, and by such other proof as the judge may
require, that the party making the application for the appointment of receiver has an interest in the property
or fund which is the subject of the action and it shown that the property or fund is in danger of being lost,
removed, or materially injured unless a receiver shall be appointed to guard and preserve it.
(3) In an action by the mortgagee for the foreclosure of a mortgaged where it appears that the property is in
danger of being wasted or materially injured and that its value is probably insufficient to discharge the
mortgage debt.
(4) Whenever in other cases it shall be made to appear to the court that the appointment of a receiver is the
most convenient and feasible means of preserving and administering the property which is the subject of
litigation during the pendency of the action.
The case at bar does not fall within any of the provisions of this section. There is no allegation in the complaint, as
has been before stated, that the plaintiff is the owner of any of the property of Rocha & Co., nor is there any
allegation that he has any lien thereon, nor are there any facts alleged in the complaint from which it could be inferred
that he was owner of such property or had any lien thereon. On the contrary, from the facts that are alleged in the
complaint it would seem that his separation from the partnership of Carman & Co., left that partnership as a going
concern and did not dissolve it. The effect of the provisions of the articles of partnership which are referred to in the
complaint is that after the withdrawal of any partner the remaining partners became the owners of all the assets of the
partnership and he became a general creditor of the partnership.
After this action had been commenced in this court, and after a preliminary injunction had been issued as aforesaid,
Figueras applied to the court below for leave to amend his complaint in the action therein opening and such leave
was granted. This amendment, having been made after the action was commenced in this court and after a receiver
was appointed, can not be considered.
In one of the orders made by the court below relating to the receiver, its authority for making it was based on
paragraphs 2 and 4 of section 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure above quoted. In a subsequent order this ground
was abandoned and the appointment was based on paragraph 1 of said section, the court holding that a special
partnership was corporation within the meaning of said section 174. This claim can not be sustained and, in fact, it
was not urged in the argument of this case in this court.
The case not being one in which a receiver could be appointed, the order making such appointment was void and
was beyond the jurisdiction of the court, although that court had jurisdiction of the main action has been settled
adversely to the defendants in this suit by the case of Bonaplata vs. Ambler
The order of the court below appointing a receiver in this case was illegal and void, and it all proceedings taken
therein are hereby annulled. Let judgment be entered to that effect in favor of the plaintiff in this action and against
the defendants, and with costs against the defendant, Figueras. At the expiration of ten days let judgment be entered
in accordance herewith. So ordered.

MILA CABOVERDE TANTANO and ROSELLER CABOVERDE, petitioners VsDOMINALDA ESPINA-CABOVERDE,
EVE CABOVERDE-YU, FE CABOVERDE-LABRADOR, and JOSEPHINE E. CABOVERDE, respondents

VELASCO, JR.
The Case
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 are the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered on
June 25, 2012 and September 21, 2012, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 03834, which effectively affirmed the Resolutions
dated February 8, 2010 and July 19, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11, in
Civil Case No. S-760, approving respondent DominaldaEspina-Caboverde's application for receivership and appointing the
receivers over the disputed properties.
The Facts
Petitioners Mila CaboverdeTantano (Mila) and RosellerCaboverde (Roseller) are children of respondent DominaldaEspina-
Caboverde (Dominalda) and siblings of other respondents in this case, namely: Eve Caboverde-Yu (Eve), Fe Caboverde-
Labrador (Fe), and Josephine E. Caboverde (Josephine). Petitioners and their siblings, Ferdinand, Jeanny and Laluna, are the
registered owners and in possession of certain parcels of land, identified as Lots 2, 3 and 4 located at Bantayan, Sindangan and
Poblacion, Sindangan in Zamboangadel Norte, having purchased them from their parents, Maximo and DominaldaCaboverde.
The present controversy started when on March 7, 2005, respondents Eve and Fe filed a complaint before the RTC of Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte where they prayed for the annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly transferring Lots 2, 3 and 4 from
their parents Maximo and Dominalda in favor of petitioners Mila and Roseller and their other siblings, Jeanny, Laluna and
Ferdinand. Docketed as Civil Case No. S-760, the case was raffled to Branch 11 of the court. In their verified Answer, the
defendants therein, including Maximo and Dominalda, posited the validity and due execution of the contested Deed of Sale.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. S-760, Maximo died. On May 30, 2007, Eve and Fe filed an Amended Complaint with
Maximo substituted by his eight (8) children and his wife Dominalda. The Amended Complaint reproduced the allegations in the
original complaint but added eight (8) more real properties of the Caboverde estate in the original list. As encouraged by the
RTC, the parties executed a Partial Settlement Agreement (PSA) where they fixed the sharing of the uncontroverted properties
among themselves, in particular, the adverted additional eight (8) parcels of land including their respective products and
improvements. Under the PSA, Dominalda's daughter, Josephine, shall be appointed as Administrator. The PSA provided that
Dominalda shall be entitled to receive a share of one-half (1/2) of the net income derived from the uncontroverted properties. The
PSA also provided that Josephine shall have special authority, among others, to provide for the medicine of her mother. The
parties submitted the PSA to the court on or about March 10, 2008 for approval.
Before the RTC could act on the PSA, Dominalda, who, despite being impleaded in the case as defendant, filed a Motion to
Intervene separately in the case. Mainly, she claimed that the verified Answer which she filed with her co-defendants contained
several material averments which were not representative of the true events and facts of the case. This document, she added, was
never explained to her or even read to her when it was presented to her for her signature. On May 12, 2008, Dominalda filed a
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer, attaching her Amended Answer where she contradicted the contents of the
aforesaid verified Answer by declaring that there never was a sale of the three (3) contested parcels of land in favor of Ferdinand,
Mila, Laluna, Jeanny and Roseller and that she and her husband never received any consideration from them. She made it clear
that they intended to divide all their properties equally among all their children without favor. In sum, Dominalda prayed that the
reliefs asked for in the Amended Complaint be granted with the modification that her conjugal share and share as intestate heir of
Maximo over the contested properties be recognized.
The RTC would later issue a Resolution granting the Motion to Admit Amended Answer.
On May 13, 2008, the court approved the PSA, leaving three (3) contested properties, Lots 2, 3, and 4, for further proceedings in
the main case. Fearing that the contested properties would be squandered, Dominalda filed with the RTC on July 15, 2008 a
Verified Urgent Petition/Application to place the controverted Lots 2, 3 and 4 under receivership. Mainly, she claimed that while
she had a legal interest in the controverted properties and their produce, she could not enjoy them, since the income derived was
solely appropriated by petitioner Mila in connivance with her selected kin. She alleged that she immediately needs her legal share
in the income.

The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues in their petition:
(1)Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the appointment of a receiver despite clear showing
that the reasons advanced by the applicant are not any of those enumerated by the rules; and
(2) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Resolution of the RTC and ruling that the
receivership bond is not required prior to appointment despite clear dictates of the rules.
The Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
This Court has held that a receiver should not be appointed to deprive a party who is in possession of the property in litigation,
just as a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued to transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to
another where the legal title is in dispute and the party having possession asserts ownership in himself, except in a very clear case
of evident usurpation. Furthermore, this Court has declared that the appointment of a receiver is not proper when the rights of the
parties, one of whom is in possession of the property, depend on the determination of their respective claims to the title of such
property unless such property is in danger of being materially injured or lost, as by the prospective foreclosure of a mortgage on
it or its portions are being occupied by third persons claiming adverse title.
It must be underscored that in this case, Dominalda's claim to the disputed properties and her share in the properties' income and
produce is at best speculative precisely because the ownership of the disputed properties is yet to be determined in Civil Case No.
S-760. Also, except for Dominalda's claim that she has an interest in the disputed properties,Dominalda has no relation to their
produce or income. By placing the disputed properties and their income under receivership, it is as if the applicant has obtained
indirectly what she could not obtain directly, which is to deprive the other parties of the possession of the property until the
controversy between them in the main case is finally settled.
This Court cannot countenance this arrangement. To reiterate, the RTC's approval of the application for receivership and the
deprivation of petitioners of possession over the disputed properties would be justified only if compelling reasons exist.
Unfortunately, no such reasons were alleged, much less proved in this case. In any event, Dominalda's rights may be amply
protected during the pendency of Civil Case No. S-760 by causing her adverse claim to be annotated on the certificates of title
covering the disputed properties.
As regards the issue of whether or not the CA was correct in ruling that a bond was not required prior to the appointment of the
receivers in this case, We rule in the negative. aAcHCT Respondents Eve and Fe claim that there are sufficient grounds for the
appointment of receivers in this case and that in fact, petitioners agreed with them on the existence of these grounds when they
acquiesced to Dominalda's Application for Receivership. Thus, respondents insist that where there is sufficient cause to appoint a
receiver, there is no need for an applicant's bond because under Sec. 2 of Rule 59, the very purpose of the bond is to answer for
all damages that may be sustained by a party by reason of the appointment of a receiver in case the applicant shall have procured
such appointment without sufficient cause. Thus, they further argue that what is needed is the receiver's bond which was already
fixed and approved by the RTC.
Also, the CA found that there was no need for Dominalda to file a bond considering that petitioners filed a Manifestation where
they formally consented to the receivership. Hence, it was as if petitioners agreed that there was sufficient cause to place the
disputed properties under receivership; thus, the CA declared that petitioners were estopped from challenging the sufficiency of
such cause.
The foregoing arguments are misplaced. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the
court shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is presented. The use of the
word "shall" denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of
no moment. Hence, the filing of an applicant's bond is required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a receiver's
bond rests upon the discretion of the court. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 clearly states that the court may, in its discretion, at any time after
the appointment, require an additional bond as further security for such damages.
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing considerations, this petition is GRANTED. The assailed CA June 25, 2012 Decision and
September 21, 2012 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 03834 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolutions dated
February 8, 2010 and July 19, 2010 of the RTC, Branch 11 in Sindangan, Zamboangadel Norte, in Civil Case No. S-760,
approving respondent DominaldaEspina-Caboverde's application for receivership and appointing the receivers over the disputed
properties are likewise
SET ASIDE.

Case: Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank), petitioner, vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Douglas F.
Anama, respondents. G.R. No. 61508 March 17, 1999

Case doctrine:The Court of Appeals found that the requirements of Section 5, Rule 59 on receivership were not complied with
by the petitioner, particularly the filing or posting of a bond and the taking of an oath. It should be noted that under the old
Rules of Court which was in effect at the time this case was still at trial stage, a bond for the appointment of a receiver was not
generally required of the applicant, except when the application was made ex parte.

FACTS:

In considering for a loan obtained from Citibank, N.A., the defendant Douglas Anama executed a promissory note, dated
November 10, 1972, to pay the plaintiff bank the sum of P418,000.00 in sixty (60) equal successive monthly installments of
P8,722.25, starting on the 10th day of December 1972 and on the 10th of every month thereafter.

To secure payment of the loan, private respondent Anama also constituted a Chattel Mortgage of even date in favor of
petitioner, on various machineries and equipment located at No. 1302 Epifaniodelos Santos Avenue, Quezon City.

For failure and refusal of the private respondent to pay the monthly installment due under the said promissory note since
January despite repeated demands, petitioner filed a verified complaint against private respondent Anama for the collection of
his unpaid balance on the said promissory note, for the delivery and possession of the chattels covered by the Chattel Mortgage
preparatory to the foreclosure thereof

Anama submitted his Answer with Counterclaim, denying the material averments of the complaint, and averring, inter alia that
the remedy of replevin was improper and the writ of seizure should be vacated.

The trial court, upon proof of default of the private respondent in the payment of the said loan, issued an Order of Replevin.
Despite the issuance of the said order however, actual delivery of possession did not take place because of negotiations for an
amicable settlement. A pre-trial conference was held and the petitioner then took over private respondents business as
receiver. But when settlement failed, the lower court tried the case on the merits.

Petitioner then presented a Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Seizure, ordering the sheriff to seize and dispose of the
properties involved. Private respondent opposed the motion claiming, among others, (1) that Citibanks P400,000 replevin bond
to answer for damages was grossly inadequate; (2) that he was never in default to justify the seizure; xxx (4) that his supposed
obligations with Citibank were fully secured and his mortgaged properties are more than sufficient to secure payment thereof;
xxx

The trial court issued an Order granting the Motion for Alias Writ of Seizure. Private respondent moved for reconsideration of
the aforesaid order but the same was denied. As a consequence, the sheriff seized subject properties, dismantled and removed
them from the premises where they were installed, delivered them to petitioners possession and advertised them for sale at
public auction.

Private respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Injunction. Finding that the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions, the CA granted the
petition, holding that the provisions of the Rules of Court on Replevin and Receivership have not been complied with, in that (1)
there was no Affidavit of Merit accompanying the Complaint for Replevin; (2) the bond posted by Citibank was insufficient; and
(3) there was non-compliance with the requirement of a receivers bond and oath of office. Hence the present petition for
certiorari with TRO by Citibank.

ISSUE:
1. WON respondent court erred in practically and in effect rendering judgment on the merits against the petitioner by ordering
the return of the machineries and equipment and its accessories to their original and respective places and positions.
2. WON respondent erred in finding that the issuance of replivin was improper
3. WON respondent erred in finding that the bond posted by the petitioner is questionable and/or insufficient.
4. WON the respondent erred in finding that the petitioner did not comply with the provisions of sec. 5, rule 59 by failing to
post a receiver's bond.
5. WON respondent erred in finding that the hon. jorge r. coquia acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in dealing with the situation.


RULING:

No. CA found that the requirements of Section 5, Rule 59 on receivership were not complied with by the petitioner, particularly
the filing or posting of a bond and the taking of an oath. However, the old Rules of Court which was in effect at the time this
case was still at trial stage, a bond for the appointment of a receiver was not generally required of the applicant, except when
the application was made ex parte. CA was right in finding a defect in such assumption of receivership in that the requirement
of taking an oath has not been complied with.

For erroneously issuing the alias writ of seizure without inquiring into the sufficiency of the replevin bond and for allowing
petitioner to assume receivership without the requisite oath, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion in dealing with the situation. Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of
replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. This is because a possessor has every right to be respected in its
possession and may not be deprived of it without due process. Petition DISMISSED.

RULE 59. RECEIVERSHIP

Instruction: Discharge
Case: Martinez vs. Grano (49 Phil. 214)
Doctrine of the Case:
A receiver who asserts ownership over the property in his hands as receiver and refuses to submit any account of the
financial status of said property should be removed by the court having charge of the receivership.
Facts:
Estanislao Reyes was appointed as receiver and entered into possession the property in controversy in January 1921.
During this period, the property did not produce enough income to meet the expenses and pay the sum due to the first mortgage,
El Hogar Filipino. Thus, he recommended to the court that the property be sold.
The court made an order authorizing the receiver to sell the land with the condition that the proceeds of the sale must be
deposited to the clerks office. Meanwhile, receiver reported that there is no purchaser of the property and he himself came
forward making an offer to take the property with an understanding that he would assume all obligations encumbering it.
Defendant, ClemenciaGrano, opposed the sale because it included the three parcels of property belonged to her. Thus, the court
rendered decision excluding the three parcels of land which belongs to Grano.
When the decision was returned to the lower court, Reyes submitted a motion asking the court to declare him as owner
of the property. In response, Judge Paredes instead declared that the approved sale was a nullity on the ground that Reyes
violated the condition imposed upon by the court. Thus, Reyes was treated not as a purchaser but as a receiver of the property.
In view of this, Reyes still pretended to be the owner of the property by virtue of the purchase and still refused to
submit any account of his receivership in the subsequent years. Thus, the judge revoked his appointment as receiver and ordered
him to rendered an account and deliver the property immediately to the parties in interest all the properties on its present
condition.

Issues:
Whether or not appellant should be removed as receiver over the property in controversy.

Held:
Yes.
There cannot be the slightest doubt of the power of the lower court to remove a receiver and terminate a receivership
under Section 180 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and in view of the attitude of the appellant, the impropriety of his longer
remaining in office is apparent.
The court, however, is of opinion that if upon the prompt submission and examination of the receivers accounts, it
should be found that he has actually paid out for the conservation and protection of the property which is the subject of the
receivership more than he has received by way of income, or should have received in the exercise of reasonable diligence, such
balance in his favor should be recognized as lawful claim constituting a lien on the property.

Actions against Receivers; Leave of Court
Rule 59, Section 6 without leave of court which appointed him; as Section 6 provides that no action may be filed by or
against a receiver without leave of the court which appointed him. The rule talks of the current receiver of the company and
not the previous receiver. The reason behind Rule 59, Section 6, which requires leave of court for all suits by or against the
present receiver, is to forestall any undue interference with the receivers performance of duties through improvident suits. One
of the general powers of a receiver under Rule 59, Section 6 of the Rules of Court is the power to bring and defend suits in
such capacity.

Topic: Discharge
CASE: G.R. No. 49031 JOSE PLATON and ROMAN CASTILLO, petitioners, vs. HON. CLAUDIO SANDOVAL, in his capacity as
Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, and INES MAILOM, respondents. August 28, 1944

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
The receiver, being an officer of the court and not the agent or representative of either party to the action, has no legal interest or
standing to question the court's determination that the necessity for the continuation of the receivership has ceased to exist.

FACTS:
Jose Platon was appointed receiver of the property of the late ServandaMailom while the civil case regarding the annulment of
the sale of certain parcels of land made by the spouses Roman Castillo and ServandaMailom (previous to her death) to Antonio
Castillo, brother of Roman, was on going . The said civil case was instituted by Ines Mailom, one of the heirs of
ServandaMailom. Later on, Ines Mailom and the other heirs moved to discharge the receiver on the ground that there was no
more necessity for the continuation of the receivership inasmuch as the defendant Antonio Castillo had renounce his claim to said
property in a stipulation of facts submitted to the court and the heirs of the deceased ServandaMailom, including the
administrator Roman Castillo, had submitted a project of partition in the intestate proceedings. An order to discharge the receiver
was issued by the court. Jose Platon filed a motion to annul the order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a receiver has a legal interest or standing to question the court's determination that the necessity for the
continuation of the receivership has ceased to exist.

HELD:
No, the receiver, being an officer of the court and not the agent or representative of either party to the action, has no legal interest
or standing to question the court's determination that the necessity for the continuation of the receivership has ceased to exist.
The property in litigation and under receivership belongs to the intestate estate of the deceased ServandaMailom, deceased wife
of the petitioner Roman Castillo. The defendant Antonino Castillo, who is not a heir of said deceased, does not claim ownership
of said property and has signed his conformity to the discharge of the receiver. And the heirs of said deceased have agreed upon
the partition of said property with the approval of the probate court. It seems clear, therefore, that the declaration of the
respondent judge that there was no longer any necessity for the continuation of the receivership was well founded. In any event, it
cannot be said that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction or abused his discretion in making such a finding.


ORENDAIN vs BF HOMES

FACTS
BF Homes, Inc. is a domestic corporation operating under Philippine laws and organized primarily to develop and sell
residential lots and houses and other related realty business. Records show that respondent BF Homes had to avail itself of
financial assistance from various sources to enable it to buy properties and convert them into residential subdivisions. This
resulted in its incurring liabilities, On the other hand, during its business operations, it was able to acquire properties and
assets which, if liquidated, were more than enough to pay all its creditors. Despite its solvent status, respondent filed a
Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration in a State of Suspension of Payments before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Respondent highlighted the importance of and prayed for a Rehabilitation Receiver in the petition. Such
receiver, according to respondent, was imperative to oversee the managementand operations of [BF Homes] so that its
business may not be paralyzed and the interest of the creditors may not be prejudiced. It further argued that rehabilitation
[was] feasible and imperative because otherwise, in view of the extent of its involvement in the shelter program of the
government and in the nations home mortgage insurance system, which has a secured coverage , not only [the] creditors,
[buyers, and stockholders] of the petitioner corporation may suffer but the public as well.
A Deed of Absolute Sale
[8]
was executed by and between BF Homesrepresented by petitioner Orendain and
the Local Superior of the Franciscan Sisters of the Immaculate Phils., Inc. (LSFSIPI) over a parcel of land situated at Barangay
Pasong Papaya, BF International, Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila. Consequently, receiver Orendain was relieved of his
duties and responsibilities.

On January 23, 1996, BF Homes filed a Complaint before the Las Pias RTC against LSFSIPI and petitioner Orendain,
alleging, inter alia, that the LSFSIPI transacted with Orendain in his individual capacity and therefore, neither FBO
Management, Inc.norOrendain had title to the property transferred. BF Homes averred that the selling price was grossly
inadequate or insufficient amounting to fraud and conspiracy with the LSFSIP.
On June 14, 1996, Florencio B. Orendain filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that BF Homes, acting through its
Committee of Receivers, had neither the interest nor the personality to prosecute the said action, in the absence of SECs
clear and actual authorization for the institution of the said suit.

On July 15, 1996, BF Homes filed its Opposition
[15]
to petitioners Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the case was within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, not the SEC,considering that the case was an ordinary reconveyance suit. Likewise, BF
Homes alleged that the cause of action was not barred by the perceived finality of the SEC November 7, 1994 Omnibus Order,
and that the general powers of a receiver authorized BF Homes to institute actions to recover the property.

RTC denied Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.Orendain filed Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied due
to lack of merit. Petitioner Orendain was directed to file his answer to the Complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of the
Order.
The CA ruled, the SEC could not acquire jurisdiction over the Franciscan Sisters; while petitioner Orendain was sued in
his individual capacity and not in his official capacity as receiver.
[23]


Moreover, the CA stated that at the time the assailed orders were issued, the subject SEC Order had not yet attained
finality; that there was no identity between the first and the second action with respect to the parties; and that the SEC
November 7, 1994 Omnibus Order relied on by Orendain was not a decision on the merits of BF Homes Petition for
Rehabilitation and for a Declaration in a State of Suspension of Payments under Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1758.

Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the Committee of receivers may institute an action against a former receiver without prior SEC
approval.
RULING:
Petitioner argues that the Committee of Receivers should have sought prior clearance from the SEC before
instituting the action for reconveyance before the RTC, because it does not have the legal capacity to sue. This is incorrect. One
of the general powers of a receiver under Rule 59, Section 6 of the Rules of Court is the power to bring and defend suits in
such capacity.

Petitioner also contends that an action filed by a successor-receiver against him as predecessor-receiver is not
allowed under Rule 59, Section 6 without leave of court which appointed him; as Section 6 provides that no action may be
filed by or against a receiver without leave of the court which appointed him. This is bereft of merit.

The rule talks of the current receiver of the company and not the previous receiver like petitioner Orendain. The
reason behind Rule 59, Section 6, which requires leave of court for all suits by or against the present receiver, is to forestall any
undue interference with the receivers performance of duties through improvident suits. Apparently, such situation cannot
apply to Orendain who is no longer BF Homes receiver.
Moreover, the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic by the passage of RA 8799 or The Securities
Regulation Code which took effect on August 8, 2000.
[37]


Section 5.2 of RA 8799 transferred exclusive and original jurisdiction of the SEC over actions involving intra-
corporate controversies to the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate RTC. In the transition, all intra-corporate cases
pending in the SEC, which were not ripe for adjudication as of August 8, 2000, were turned over to the RTC. Congress thereby
recognized the expertise and competence of the RTC to take cognizance of and resolve cases involving intra-corporate
controversies. Thus, whether or not the issue is intra-corporate, it is now the [RTC] and no longer the SEC that takes
cognizance of [and resolves cases involving intra-corporate controversies].

TRADERS ROYAL BANK, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, and HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE C.
TAYENGCO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 111357. June 17, 1997.]

FACTS:
In G.R. No. 63855, it was ruled that the deceased spouses Jose and SalvacionTayengco, the lawful owners of the
properties under receivership.

In G.R. No. 60076, the validity of the appointment of petitioner Traders Royal Bank (TRB)as receiver pendentelite was
affirmed.

In this case the receivership proceeding was duly terminated.

TRB rendered its final accounting of the funds under receivership wherein itretained the amount of P219, 016.24 as
its receiver's fee, instead of turning over theentire fund to the Tayengcos. The RTC approved the final accounting submitted by
TRB, including thededuction of its fee from the fund under receivership.

The Tayengcos assailed said order before the Court of Appeals, contending thatTRB's compensation should have been
charged against the losing party and notfrom the funds under receivership.

The Court of Appeals ruled that TRB cannot deduct its fee from the funds under its receivershipsince this must be
shouldered by the losing party or equally apportioned among theparties-litigants. Consequently, TRB was ordered to return the
P219,016.24 to theTayengcos, and the losing parties, Cu Bie, et al., were held solely liable for TRB'scompensation.

TRB filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied.

ISSUE/S:
a. WON the Court of Appeals decision barred by res judicata by virtue of the ruling in G.R. No. 60076 recognizing the
propriety of TRB's appointment asreceiver
b. Who is responsible for TRB's receiver's fee?

HELD:
a. No. The elements of res judicata are:
1. The previous judgment has become final;
2. the prior judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the matter andparties;
3. the first judgment was made on the merits; and
4. There wassubstantial identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action, as between theprior and
subsequent actions.

In G.R. No. 60076,thepetition was for the annulment of the trial court's order requiring Tayengcotorender and submit an
accounting of the rental of the buildings and apartments,whileC.A. G.R. CV No. 21423 was an appeal questioning the order of
the trial court authorizing the deduction by TRB of its compensation from the receivership funds.There is clearly no identity of
causes of action here. Clearly, the last element of resjudicata is absent in the case at bar.

b. The compensation of a receiver who has been properly appointed terminates,is to be charged against the defeated
party, or the prevailing litigant may be made to share the expense, as justice requires.

The trial court's order approving TRB's compensation to be chargedsolely against the funds under its receivership is
without legal justification; hence, itwas correctly reversed by the Court of Appeals.

Section 8, Rule 59 ofthe Rules of Court, explicitly provides for the manner in which it shall bepaid for its services, to wit:

"SEC. 8.Termination of receivership; compensation of receiver.
Whenever the court, of its own motion or on that of either party, shalldetermine that the necessity for a receiver no
longer exists, it shall, afterdue notice to all interested parties and hearing, settle the accounts of thereceiver, direct
the delivery of the funds and other property in his hands tothe persons adjudged entitled to receive them, and order
the discharge ofthe receiver from further duty as such. The court shall allow the receiversuch reasonable
compensation as the circumstances of the case warrant,to be taxed as costs against the defeated party, or
apportioned, as justicerequires ."

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

RULE 60 and 61




G.R. No. 185595
CALDERON VS ROXAS

FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, weremarried on
December 4, 1985 and their union produced four hildren. On January 16, 1998,petitioner filed a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.While
the action was pending, the trial court granted Calderons request for support pendentlite (while the
action for nullity is pending).On May 16, 2005, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the
marriage null and void,awarding custody of the children to the mother and ordering Roxas to provide
support to thechildren. Several actions were raised in court, with Roxas asking for a decrease of
themonthly support while Calderon asking for an increase in the amount and Roxas payment onhis
arrears for support.
ISSUE:
This petition is raised by Calderon not to assail the nullity of their marriage but,rather, is premised on
whether or not the matter of support pendent lite is alreadyinterlocutory and final
HELD:
Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory aspect of theassailed orders
pertains only to private respondents motion to reduce supportwhich wasgranted, and to her own
motion to increase support, which was denied. Petitioner points outthat the ruling on support in arrears
which have remainedunpaid, as well as her prayer for reimbursement/payment were in the nature of
final ordersassailable by ordinary appeal. SC disagrees.An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental
matters and leaves something more to bedone to resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment
or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a
particular stage of the same action. Clearly, whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory is
notdependent on compliance or noncompliance by a party to its directive, as what
petitionersuggests.Moreover, private respondents obligation to give monthly support in the amount
fixed by theRTC in the assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what transpired in the
earlystage of the proceedings when the court cited the private respondent in contempt of courtand
ordered him arrested for his refusal/failure to comply with the order granting supportpendente lite. A
few years later, private respondent filed a motion to reduce support whilepetitioner filed her own
motion to increase the same, and in addition sought spousal supportand support in arrears. This fact
underscores the provisional character of the order grantingsupport pendente lite.Petitioners theory
that the assailed orders have ceased to be provisional due to thearrearages incurred by private
respondent is therefore untenable. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal
is an appropriate specialcivil action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered
without or inexcess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in
questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner's appeal was correctlydismissed by
the CA.

Servicewide vs CA
G.R. No. 110048 | November 19, 1999 | J. Purisima

FACTS:

1. Leticia Laus purchased on credit a Colt Galant xxx from Fortune Motors (Phils.) Corporation and
executed a promissory note for the amount of P56,028.00, inclusive of 12% annual interest, payable
within a period of 48 months. In case of default in the payment of any installment, the total principal
sum, together with the interest, shall become immediately due and payable.

2. As a security for the promissory note, a chattel mortgage was constituted over the said motor vehicle,
with a deed of assignment incorporated therein such that the credit and mortgage rights were assigned
by Fortune Motors Corp. in favor of Filinvest Credit Corporation with the consent of the mortgagor-
debtor Laus.

3. Filinvest in turn assigned the credit in favor of Servicewide Specialists, Inc.

4. Laus failed to pay the monthly installment for April 1977 and the succeeding 17 months. Servicewide
demanded payment of the entire outstanding balance with interests but Laus failed to pay despite
formal demands.

5. As a result of Laus failure to settle her obligation, or at least to surrender possession of the motor
vehicle for foreclosure, Servicewide instituted a complaint for replevin, impleading Hilda Tee and John
Dee in whose custody the vehicle was believed to be at the time of the filing of the suit. Plaintiff alleged,
among others, that it had superior lien over the mortgaged vehicle. The court approved the replevin
bond.

6. Alberto Villafranca filed a third party claim contending that he is the absolute owner of the subject
motor vehicle after purchasing it from a certain Remedios Yang free from all lien and emcumbrances;
and that on July 1984, the said automobile was taken from his residence by Deputy Sheriff Bernardo
Bernabe pursuant to the seizure order issued by the court a quo.

7. Upon motion of the plaintiff below, Villafranca was substituted as defendant and summons was
served upon him. Villafranca moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there is
another action pending between the same parties before the Makati RTC. The court granted the the
motion but subsequently set aside the order of dismissal. For failure to file his Answer as required by the
court a quo, Villafranca was declared in default and plaintiffs evidence was received ex parte.

8. The lower court later on dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner appealed to CA on the ground that a suit for replevin
aimed at the foreclosure of a chattel is an action quasi in rem, and does not require the inclusion of the
principal obligor in the Complaint.

9. CA affirmed the RTC decision. It also denied petitioners MR, hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

W/N a case for replevin may be pursued against the defendant, Alberto Villafranca, without impleading
the absconding debtor-mortgagor

HELD:

No. Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that an applicant for replevin must show that he is
the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof.
Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the specified property is so conceded or evident, the
action need only be maintained against him who so possesses the property. In rem action est per quam
rem nostram quae ab alio possidetur petimus, et semper adversus eum est qui rem possidet.

However, in case the right of possession on the part of the plaintiff, or his authority to claim such
possession or that of his principal, is put to great doubt (a contending party may contest the legal bases
for plaintiffs cause of action or an adverse and independent claim of ownership or right of possession
may be raised by that party), it could become essential to have other persons involved and impleaded
for a complete determination and resolution of the controversy.

In a suit for replevin, a clear right of possession must be established. The conditions essential for
foreclosure of chattel mortgage would be to show, firstly, the existence of the chattel mortgage and,
secondly, the default of the mortgagor. Since the mortgagees right of possession is conditioned upon
the actual fact of default which itself may be controverted, the inclusion of other parties, like the debtor
or the mortgagor himself, may be required in order to allow a full and conclusive determination of the
case. Laus, being an indispensable party, should have been impleaded in the complaint for replevin and
damages. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts action in the
litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. Petition DENIED.

ADVENT vs. YOUNG
FACTS:

1. Advent filed for corporate rehabilitation with RTC of Makati, the court issued an order which
states that "theenforcement of all claims whether such enforcement isby court action or otherwise,
against Advent, its guarantors and sureties not solidarily liable with it, is stayed";
2. Young filed a petition for rehabilitation, claiming that several employee benefits allegedly due
him as Advent's former president and chief executive officer;
3. Rehabilitation court approved the rehab plan, included in the inventory of Advent's assets was
the subject car which is in the possession of Young;
4. Young refused to return the car (benz e230), hence the replevin case;
5. Advent posted a 3M replevin bond, throungh Stronghold Insurance Company Inc.,TC issued a
writ of replevin hence Young turned over the car;
6. Young filed an answer, stating that as a former employee of Advent, he had the option to
purchase thesubject car and to offset the value of the car with the proceeds of his retirement pay and
stock option plan;
7. TC ordered the dismissal of the replevin case for Advent's failure to execute and dismissed
Young's counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction;
8. Young filed M for partial recon of the dismissal order with respect of his counterclaim and filed
an omnibus motiom that Advent return the car and pay him 1.2M indamages for improper and irregular
seizure;
9. TC denied both motion;
10. CA ruled in favor of Young, the writ of seizure issued as an incident of the main action (for
replevin) became functus officio and should have been recalled or lifted.

ISSUE:
1. WON, CA committed an error in directing the return of the car to Young.
2. WON, CA erred in ordering the TC to set a hearing for the determination of damages against the
replevin.

HELD:

Partly meritorious

1. No Upon the dismissal of the replevin case for failure to prosecute, the writ of seizure became
functus officio and should have been lifted. there was no adjudicationon the merits, which means that
there were no determination of the issue of who has the better right of possession to the car. In the
replevin case, Young cannot demand that Advent pay him money because such payment, even if valid,
has been "stayed" by order of the rehabilitation court. However in the same case, Young can raise
Advent's car plan, coupled with his retirement pay and stock option plan, as giving him a better right of
possession of the car.

3. Yes Sec 10, Rule 60 of the ROC, provides that in replevin cases, the damages to be awarded
upon the bond "shall be claimed, ascertained and granted" in accordance with Sec.20, Rule
57, which allows the application to be filed at any time before the judgment becomes
executory. It should be filed in the same casethat is the main action and with the court
having jurisdiction over the case at the time of the application. In this case, there was no
application for damages against Stronghold resulting from the issuance of the writ of
seizure before the finality of the dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute. It
appears that Young filed his omnibus motion claiming damages against Stronghold after
the dismissal order issued by TC had attained finality. Thus, Young is barred from claiming
damages against the replevin bond. With this the CA erred in ordering the trial court to set
a hearing for the determination of damages against the replevin bond.


ASIAN TERMINALS INC. vs. RICAFORT

FACTS:
Respondents were duly-licensed importers of vehicles. Sometime in April and May 1998, they imported 72
secondhand right-hand drive buses from Japan. When the shipment arrived at the South Harbor, Port of
Manila, the District Collector of Customs impounded the vehicles and ordered them stored at the warehouse
of the Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI),a customs-bonded warehouse under the custody of the Aviation and Cargo
Regional Division. Conformably with Section 2607 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the District Collector of
Customs issued Warrants of Distraint3 against the shipment and set the sale at public auction on September
10, 1998.

The vehicles were seized by virtue of Section 1, Republic Act (RA) No. 8506, which took effect on February 22,
1998, which provides that "it shall be unlawful for any person to import, cause the importation of, register,
cause the registration of, use or operate any vehicle with its steering wheel right hand side thereof in any
highway, street or road ,whether private or public, or at the national or local.

On November 11, 1998, the importers filed a complaint with the RTC of Paraaque City ,against the Secretary
of Finance, Customs Commissioner, and the Chief Executive of the Societe Generale de Surillee, for replevin
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary and mandatory injunction and damages. They contend
that the importation of right-hand drive vehicles is not prohibited under RA No. 8506 provided that
conversion kits are included in the imported vehicles.

RTC granted writ of replevin. Meanwhile, Petitioner ATI filed a third party claim against respondent
importers for unpaid warehouse dues. As the Bureau of Customs file a Motion/Notice toDismiss/Withdraw
Complaint, the trial court dismissed the complaint along with the Third Party Claim/Motion for Intervention
as the latter is only it being only an accessory to the principal case. ATI moved to reconsider and was denied.

ATI then appealed to the CA which ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
respondents. Under the Customs and Tariff Code, the Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture
proceedings had the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions relating on the seizure and
forfeiture of dutiable goods. Since it was bereft of jurisdiction in the principal case, it also had no jurisdiction
over the third party claim/complaint in intervention as such is only ancillary and supplemental. Instant Case


ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the instant case, and, within the replevin it issued was
valid.


RULING
Petition must fail. The Trial Court has no jurisdiction. Section 602 of the Tariffs and Customs Code provides
that the Bureau of Customs shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over seized and forfeited cars. Under Section
2301 of the TCC, the Collector of Customs is empowered to make a seizure of cargoes and issue a receipt for
the detention thereof.

SEC. 2301. Warrant for Detention of Property-Cash Bond. Upon making any seizure, the Collector shall issue
a warrant for the detention of the property; and if the owner or importer desires to secure the release of the
property for legitimate use, the Collector shall, with the approval of the Commissioner of Customs, surrender
it upon the filing of a cash bond, in an amount to be fixed by him, conditioned upon the payment of the
appraised value of the article and/or any fine, expenses and costs which may be adjudge din the case.

Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for replevin by respondents herein, issue
the writ of replevin and order its enforcement. The Collector of Customs had already seized the vehicles and
set the sale thereof at public auction. The RTC should have dismissed the petition for replevin at the outset.
By granting the plea of respondents (plaintiffs below) for the seizure of the vehicles and the transfer of
custody to the court, the RTC acted without jurisdiction over the action and the vehicles subject matter
thereof.

It bears stressing that the forfeiture of seized goods in the Bureau of Customs is a proceeding against the
goods and not against the owner. It is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, i.e., directed against the res or
imported articles and entails a determination of the legality of their importation. In this proceeding, it is, in
legal contemplation, the property
itself which commits the violation and is treated as the offender, without reference whatsoever to the
character or conduct of the owner. In fine, the initial orders of the RTC granting the issuance of the writ of
replevin and its implementation are void.

While it is true that the District Collector of Customs allowed the release of the vehicles and the transfer
thereof to the custody of the RTC upon the payment by the private respondents of the required taxes,
duties and charges, he did not thereby lose jurisdiction over the vehicles; neither did it vest jurisdiction
on the RTC to take cognizance of and assume jurisdiction over the petition for replevin.

The RTC cannot be faulted for dismissing petitioners complaint-in-intervention.Considering that it had no
jurisdiction over respondents action and over the shipment subject of the complaint, all proceedings before it
would be void. The RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint-in-intervention and act
thereon except to dismiss the same. Moreover, considering that intervention is merely ancillary and
supplemental to the existing litigation and never an independent action, the dismissal of the principal action
necessarily results in the dismissal of the complaint-in-intervention. Likewise, a court which has no
jurisdiction over the principal action has no jurisdiction over a complaint-in-intervention. Intervention
presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of intervention is
governed by jurisdiction of the main action.


SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE:
MA. BELEN B. MANGONON vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 125041. June 30, 2006.

FACTS: On 17 March 1994, Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and
Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite
with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent
Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At
that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the
marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was
annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. On 25 March
1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica
and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon,
raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the
institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America
(USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally
settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by
the Long Island University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said
universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education.
ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT
1. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT
COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FIXING THE AMOUNT OF MONTHLY SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
GRANTED TO PETITIONER'S CHILDREN AT A MEASLEY P5,000.00 PER CHILD
2. RESPONDENT COURT IGNORED EVIDENCE ON RECORD OF THE FINANCIAL INCAPACITY OF RICA AND
RINA'S PARENTS IN DEFAULT OF WHOM THE OBLIGATION TO GIVE SUPPORT DEVOLVES ON THE
GRANDFATHER.
3. IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT THE PERSON OBLIGED TO GIVE SUPPORT GRANDFATHER DON PACO
IS UNDOUBTEDLY CAPABLE OF GIVING THE AMOUNT DEMANDED, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FIXING AN
AMOUNT OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE
EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE RECIPIENTS.
HELD: The petition is meritorious. Under Rule 61, a court may temporarily grant support pendente lite
prior to the rendition of judgment or final order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need
to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court
is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly
resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary
evidence appearing in the record. 32
After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the evidence presented, we find that petitioner
was able to establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin daughters to private respondents
and the twins' entitlement to support pendente lite.
As to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the provision of the law
mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient. 42 Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable for half of
the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by
petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various
business endeavors.
Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their education by the
time of the promulgation of this decision, we deem it proper to award support pendente lite in arrears
43 to be computed from the time they entered college until they had finished their respective studies.
The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil Code on petitioner and her twin daughters raised
by respondent Francisco is best left for the resolution of the trial court. After all, in case it would be
resolved that Rica and Rina are not entitled to support pendente lite, the court shall then order the
return of the amounts already paid with legal interest from the dates of actual payment.
REPLEVIN: Serg's Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., G.R. No. 137705, August 22, 2000
FACTS: On February 13, 1998, respondent PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. filed with the RTC of Quezon City
a complaint for sum of money, with an application for a writ of replevin. On March 6, 1998, respondent
judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to
PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon payment of the necessary expenses. The sheriff proceeded to
petitioner's factory and seized one machinery. On March 25, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for special
protective order invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and
control its processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.
The motion was opposed by PCI on the ground that the properties were personal and therefore still
subject to seizure and writ of replevin. In their reply, petitioners asserted that the properties were
immovable. They further stated that PCI was estopped from treating these machineries as personal
because the contracts were totally sham and farcical. On April 7, 1998, petitioners went to the Court of
Appeals via an original action for certiorari. The Court of Appeals ruled that the subject machines were
personal property as provided by the agreement of the parties. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the said machines are personal, not immovable, property which may be a proper
subject of a writ of replevin.
HELD: The Court found the petition not meritorious. The Court ruled that the contracting parties may
validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they
are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a
contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. In the present
case, the lease agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be considered as
personal properties. Clearly then, petitioners were estopped from denying the characterization of the
subject machines as personal property. The validity and the nature of the contract (lease agreement) are
the lis mota of the civil action pending before the RTC. A resolution of these questions, therefore, is
effectively a resolution of the merits of the case. Hence, they should be threshed out in the trial, not in
the proceedings involving the issuance of the Writ of Seizure. Indeed, in La Tondea Distillers v. CA, the
Court explained that the policy under Rule 60 was that questions involving title to the subject property
questions which petitioners are now raising should be determined in the trial. In that case, the
Court noted that the remedy of defendants under Rule 60 was either to post a counter-bond or to
question the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond. They were not allowed, however, to invoke the title to
the subject property. The Court ruled: "In other words, the law does not allow the defendant to file a
motion to dissolve or discharge the writ of seizure (or delivery) on ground of insufficiency of the
complaint or of the grounds relied upon therefor, as in proceedings on preliminary attachment or
injunction, and thereby put at issue the matter of the title or right of possession over the specific chattel
being replevied, the policy apparently being that said matter should be ventilated and determined only
at the trial on the merits." Under the circumstances, they are proper subject of the writ of seizure.
Accordingly, the petition was denied and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

TERLYNGRACE RIVERA vs. FLORENCIO L. VARGAS,
G.R. No. 165895, June 5, 2009
TOPIC: Duty of Sheriff
FACTS:
On February 24, 2003, respondent Florencio Vargas (Vargas) filed a complaint
3
against
petitioner and several John Does before Branch 02 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, for the recovery of a 150 T/H rock crushing plant located in Sariaya,
Quezon.
Summons
7
dated February 24, 2003 was served upon petitioner through her personal
secretary on April 28, 2003 at her residence in Paraaque City. Interestingly, however, the writ
of replevin
8
was served upon and signed by a certain Joseph Rejumo, the security guard on duty
in petitioners crushing plant in Sariaya, Quezon on April 29, 2003,
9
contrary to the sheriffs
return
10
stating that the writ was served upon Rivera.
On May 12, 2003, the RTC issued an Order
14
disapproving petitioners redelivery bond
application for failure to comply with the requirements under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying her
counterbond on the ground that it was filed out of time. She contends that the mandatory five-
day period did not even begin to run in this case due to the improper service of the writ of
replevin, contrary to Section 4 of Rule 60.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of counterbond filed beyond the 5 day mandatory period is
erroneous considering the writ was improperly served.
RULING:
Before a final judgment, property cannot be seized unless by virtue of some provision of
law.
33
The Rules of Court, under Rule 60, authorizes such seizure in cases of replevin. However,
a person seeking a remedy in an action for replevin must follow the course laid down in the
statute, since the remedy is penal in nature.
34
When no attempt is made to comply with the
provisions of the law relating to seizure in this kind of action, the writ or order allowing the
seizure is erroneous and may be set aside on motion
35
by the adverse party.
The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is
unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the
property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case) together with
the application, the affidavit of merit, and the replevin bond.
37
The reasons are simple, i.e., to
provide proper notice to the adverse party that his property is being seized in accordance with
the courts order upon application by the other party, and ultimately to allow the adverse party
to take the proper remedy consequent thereto.
Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional
guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
In the case at bar since the writ was invalidly served, petitioner is correct in contending
that there is no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-day period shall commence to
run.
The writ must also satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective: i.e. it should
be directed to the officer who is authorized to serve it; and it should be served upon the person
who not only has the possession or custody of the property involved but who is also a party or
agent of a party to the action. Consequently, a trial court is deemed to have acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction with respect to the ancillary action of replevin if it seizes and detains a
personalty on the basis of a writ that was improperly served, such as what happened in this
case.
Petitioners proper remedy should have been to file a motion to quash the writ of
replevin or a motion to vacate the order of seizure. Nevertheless, petitioners filing of an
application for a redelivery bond, while not necessary, did not thereby waive her right to
question the improper service.
The trial, with respect to the main action, shall continue. Respondent may, however, file
a new application for replevin should he choose to do so.
The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, as well as its Resolution,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 78529 is hereby SET ASIDE.

Spouses Bautista v. Sula
A.M. No. P-04-1920
August 17, 2007
PRINCIPLE
Under Section 5, complainants may require the return of the vehicle by (1) posting a counter-bond in double the value
of the vehicle and (2) serving Glor with a copy of the counter-bond. Both requirements must be complied with before
the vehicle is delivered to Glor. Put differently:
If a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff restored to him, he should within
five days from such taking, (1) post a counter-bond in double the value of said property, and (2) serve plaintiff with a
copy thereof, both requirements as well as compliance therewith within the five-day period mentioned being
mandatory. x x x
Conformably, a defendant in a replevin suit may demand the return of possession of the property replevined by filing
a redelivery bond executed to the plaintiff in double the value of the property as stated in the plaintiffs affidavit within
the period specified in Sections 5 and 6.
FACTS:
On 6 December 2003, Ruth B. Bautista (Ruth) borrowed P300,000 from Ceniza C. Glor (Glor). The loan, payable in
three months, bore a monthly interest of five percent. The three-month period commenced on 6 December 2003 and
expired on 6 March 2004. To secure the loan, Ruth executed a chattel mortgage over her Honda CRV in favor of
Glor.
Upon maturity of the loan, Glor repeatedly demanded payment from Ruth. Despite the repeated demands, Ruth
refused to pay her debt, or surrender possession of the vehicle. Thus, on 6 May 2004, Glor filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City (trial court), a civil case for judicial foreclosure of chattel mortgage with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of replevin.
The trial court issued a writ of replevin directing Ernesto L. Sula (Sheriff/ respondent) to take possession of the
vehicle and keep it in his custody. Respondent enforced the writ on 17 May 2004.
On 20 May 2004, spouses Bautista (complainants) filed with the trial court an urgent motion for the return of the
vehicle and submission of counter-bond. On 21 May 2004, complainants filed a motion to withdraw the urgent motion,
attaching thereto an omnibus motion for entry of appearance, urgent setting of hearing, and redelivery of the vehicle
to them. Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 60, complainants required the return of the vehicle to them by filing a counter-
bond and serving Glor a copy of the counter-bond.
The trial court failed to approve complainants counter-bond within the five-day period provided in Section 6 of Rule
60, Glor, in a letter, asked respondent to deliver the vehicle to her.
On the other hand, complainants asked respondent not to deliver the vehicle to Glor because (1) pursuant to Section
5, they had required the return of the vehicle to them and filed the corresponding counter-bond; (2) the vehicles
delivery to Glor was not justified under Section 6; and (3) there was no order from the trial court directing the delivery
to Glor. In a letter dated 26 May 2004, Glor reiterated her demand on respondent to deliver the vehicle to her;
otherwise, she would be constrained to pursue legal actions against him.
On 26 May 2004, complainants alleged that respondent approached them in the Quezon City Hall of Justice building
asking them to wait for him by the benches at the back of the second floor. There, respondent told them that he was
willing to ignore Glors request in exchange for P20,000. With a little hesitation, they offered him P3,000 and
promised to give the balance on the following day. Respondent agreed and immediately received the P3,000. On the
next day, however, complainants did not give the balance. They asked respondent if he could give them more time to
raise the money. On 27 May 2004, respondent filed a sheriffs manifestation asking the trial courts guidance on
whether he should deliver the vehicle to Glor or keep it in custodia legis.
However, without waiting for the trial courts instructions regarding the vehicle, respondent filed his sheriffs return on
28 May 2004 stating that he had already delivered the vehicle to Glor.
On 31 May 2004, complainants alleged that they went to the trial court to check on the vehicle and to look for
respondent. There, respondent admitted to them that he had already delivered the vehicle to Glor he acted on his
own discretion. On June 2 and 7 2004, complainants filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), respectively, a joint affidavit-complaint against respondent. Since the acts complained of
were related to respondents functions as an officer of the court, the Office of the Ombudsman, in its 1st Indorsement
dated 20 July 2004, referred the matter to the OCA.
ISSUE: WON the sheriff has discretion to determine who among the parties is entitled to possession of the subject
property.
RULING:
No. The appropriate course of action should have been for respondent to wait for the instructions of the court as to
whom he will release the property since he had already asked for its guidance through his Manifestation which was
submitted to the court virtually at the close of office hours on 26 May 2004. Yet the following morning, he suddenly
decided to release the car to the plaintiff without waiting for any court order on the matter. Such apparent haste raised
questions on his actions and leaves doubts as to his intent or interest in the case.
Moreover, under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered
immediately to the plaintiff. This is because a possessor has every right to be respected in its possession and may
not be deprived of it without due process.
The purpose of the five (5) day period in Section 6, Rule 60 is to give defendants in a replevin case a chance to
require the return of the property by filing a counter[-]bond. Considering that there was no court order to release the
property to the applicant/plaintiff and the complainants were able to require the return of the property and file their
counter[-]bond within the five (5) day period required by the Rules, respondent should have been more circumspect in
releasing the property to the plaintiff/applicant. By hastily deciding to release the seized property to the
plaintiff/applicant without waiting for the courts order, respondent patently abused his authority.

Thank u Maico;)
Support case:
Lua vs Lua G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 5, 2013
FACTS: On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
with respondent Danilo Y. Lua.
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order dated March 31, 2004 granting support pendente
lite.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering
that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has continued to
support the family for their sustenance and well-being in accordance with familys social and financial standing. He
also found the amount of support unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the
needs of the respondent.
However, respondents motion violated the three day notice period and therefore did not interrupt the running of the
period to appeal. His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals.
The CA rendered its Decision, finding merit in respondents contention that the trial court gravely abused its discretion
in granting P250,000.00 monthly support to petitioner without evidence to prove his actual income.
On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an Order granting petitioners motion for issuance of a writ of execution
as it rejected respondents interpretation of the CA decision. On November 25, 2005, Judge Yrastorza, Sr. issued an
Order denying both motions.
Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears pendente lite, petitioner filed in the CA a
Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages. Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The two cases were consolidated.
By Decision, the CA dismissed the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages filed by petitioner and
granted respondents Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total support
in arrears owing to petitioner and her children.
RULING: In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two children was determined
after due hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial
court was reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was
intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house
helpers, and other household expenses.
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued
support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended
primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioners scoliosis
therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their
maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than
groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding
support pendente lite.
While it is true that the courts previous decision ordered respondent to pay the support in arrears "less than the
amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly support,"
the deductions should be limited to those basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts.
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of financial assistance to his two (2) children
via their credit cards and paying for their school expenses, the same is, however, devoid of any form of spousal
support to the plaintiff, for, at this point in time, while the action for nullity of marriage is still to be heard, it is
incumbent upon the defendant, considering the physical and financial condition of the plaintiff and the overwhelming
capacity of defendant, to extend support unto the latter.
Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court,
which is immediately executor. However, this act was not contumacious considering that he had not been remiss in
actually providing for the needs of his children. It is a matter of record that respondent continued shouldering the full
cost of their education and even beyond their basic necessities in keeping with the familys social status. Moreover,
respondent believed in good faith that the trial and appellate courts, upon equitable grounds, would allow him to offset
the substantial amounts he had spent or paid directly to his children.
Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support should be submitted to the trial court in which the
action for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this Court is not a trier of facts. The amount of support may
be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and
the resources or means of the person obliged to support. As we held in Advincula v. Advincula: Judgment for support
does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during
the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in
accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject
to final determination.
Fernandez vs International Corporate Bank
First imagine this case kanang mopalit bitaw ka og car then magloan ka sa Banko to pay for ur
car (car loan). So the bank maoy mopay for the car while ikaw magpay ka sa bank in installment
basis.
Then in order to secure payment, ang imung gipalit nga car Kay imu rasad e-mortgage (chattel
mortgage) with the bank
Facts:Sps. Fernandez purchased a Nissan sentra sedan through the financing scheme of the
International Corporate Bank (union bank of the Philippines) in 48 monthly installments and also
executed a chattel mortgage to secure payment.
A complaint with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin. The writ was issued by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City.
Petitioner contended that the MTC has no jurisdiction to try case and issue the writ because the
plaintiff's office is in Makati and the defendant's residence is in Quezon City and the amount
involved is P553,344 [karemember mo sa courts' jurisdiction kadtu if molapas P200,000 or
P300,000 Kay sa RTC dba? Mao May contention sa petitioner nga walay jurisdiction daw ang
MTC]
CA: MTC has jurisdiction over civil cases in which the amount of the demand did not exceed
P200,000 exclusive of interest,damages and attys fees. Here the claim is P190,635.90.
Moreover, the writ of replevin can be validly executed anywhere in Metro Manila because
Section 27, chapter III of BP 129 authorized the establishment of MTC of Metro Manila with 82
branches. Therefore any branch could issue writs and process that could validly be served and
executed anywhere within Metro Manila.
Issue:
May the writ of replevin issued by the MTC of Pasay City be enforced outside the city?
Ruling:
Yes.
Under the resolution of the SC en banc ( January 11, 1983) providing for the interim rules to the
implementation of BP 129, a writ of replevin like the one issued may be served anywhere in the
Philippines. Petitioners confused the jurisdiction of a court to hear and decide a case on one hand
with,on the other, its power to issue writs and processes pursuant to and in the exercise of said
jurisdiction.
All writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or
impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit to its area of enforceability.


Coquia v. Baltazar, G.R. No. L-2942, December 29, 1949
Facts:
Respondents Gaspara, Francisca, Dionisio, Alfredo, and Salvador Coquia, assisted by their mother and guardianad
litem Maria Dalori, filed an action in the Court of the First Instance of Leyte against the spouses Silvestra Coquia and
Luis Carandang to recover the possession as owner of four parcels of land. They alleged that they are acknowledged
natural children and the sole heirs of the latter. The petitioners (Silvestra and Luis) in their answer denied that the
respondents are acknowledged natural children of the deceased Alfredo Coquia.
Pending the trial of the case said respondents (plaintiff's below) filed a petition for alimony pendente lite which Judge
Edmundo S. Piccio granted in the sum of P200 a month (subsequently reduced to P100 a month).
The respondent judge, Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, a denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. He held that the
order of Judge Piccio for alimony pendente lite was well founded. On February 26, 1949, ordered the issuance of a
writ of execution against the herein petitioners to collect the sum of P400 corresponding to four months of unpaid
alimony.
Petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari to annul the above mentioned orders.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in granting the petition for alimony pendent lite, writ of execution, and
order of denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Held:
YES. Rule 63 of the Rules of the Court, which authorizes the granting of alimony pendente lite" at the
commencement of the proper action, or at any time afterwards but prior to the final judgment," is not applicable to this
case. The action commenced before the respondent judge was not for support but for the recovery of the ownership
and possession of real property. Manifestly such an action is not "the proper action" contemplated by said rule The
mere fact that the plaintiffs have legal and equitable rights in the property they seek to recover (Q. E. D. ) does not
authorize the court to compel the defendants to support the plaintiffs pending the determination of the suit.
Moreover, the petitioners, who are sister and brother-in law, respectively, of the deceased Alfredo Coquia, are not
bound to support the alleged natural children of the latter. Under the article 143 of the Civil Code only the following
are bound to support each other: (1) husband and wife: (2) legitimate ascendants and descendants: and (3) parents
and acknowledged natural children, and the legitimate descendants of the latter.
PETITION IS GRANTED. ORDERS complained of are SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. L-29959 December 3, 1929

AURELIA DADIVAS DE VILLANUEVA vs. RAFAEL VILLANUEVA

FACTS: The plaintiff, Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva, was married to the defendant, Rafael
Villanueva, on July 16, 1905, in the City of Manila, where the pair have since resided. To
them have been born three children, namely, Antonio, Guillermo, and Sergio. The grounds
on which separate maintenance is sought infidelity and cruelty. The incorrigible nature of
the defendant in his relations with other women, coupled with a lack of consideration and
even brutality towards the plaintiff, caused her to withdraw from the domestic hearth and to
establish a separate abode for herself and two younger children. This final separation
occurred on April 20, 1927, about one month before the present action was begun.

This action was instituted by Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva against her husband, Rafael
Villanueva, for the purpose of obtaining separate maintenance and custody of the two
younger minor children, Guillermo and Sergio Villanueva, as well as a proper allowance for
professional legal services rendered by the plaintiff's attorneys in this action, as well as
costs.

Upon hearing the cause the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint and
abrogated a prior order of the court for maintenance pendente lite, with costs against the
plaintiff. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to support pendente lite.

RULING: Yes. In the case before us repeated acts of conjugal infidelity on the part of the
husband are proved, and he appears to be a recurrent, if not an incurable offender against
the sanctity of the marriage tie. This gives the wife an undeniable right to relief. The law is
not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose
incurable propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable.

In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance
from her husband it is not necessary that the husband should bring a concubine into the
marital domicile. Perverse and illicit relations with women outside of the marital
establishment are enough. As was said by Justice Moreland in Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (35
Phil., 252, 262), a husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty
to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband by wrongful, illegal, and
unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take
advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and
repudiate his duties thereunder.

While this litigation was pending in the lower court the defendant was required to pay the
amount of P500 per month for maintenance of the plaintiff, under an interlocutory. But
these payments ceased when the appealed decision was promulgated on or about the end
of March, 1928. The plaintiff in this case is therefore entitled to judgment at the rate of
P500 per month beginning April 1, 1928, until judgment shall be promulgated in this case,
and from that date the defendant will be required to pay P500 per month for maintenance
as already suggested.

Bayot vs CA (G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008)

Principle: Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, husband could no longer be subject to a husbands
obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to wife. The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to
support the needs of their daughter, Alix. As to the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly
shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure
for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court
can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned
shall have finished her education.

Facts: Vicente and Rebecca were married in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the
Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen born in Agaa, Guam, USA to
Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebeccas marital
relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican
Republic. The Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96, ordering the dissolution of the couples marriage
and leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements, but giving them joint custody and
guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97, settling the couples
property relations pursuant to an Agreement they executed. Said agreement specifically stated that the conjugal
property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and
personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that,
since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente. She filed
petition before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicentes
alleged psychological incapacity. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a
permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition
is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of
her application for support pendente lite. To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on
her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the DOJ, and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of. Vicente
and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and
perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
RTC denied Vicentes motion to dismiss and granting Rebeccas application for support pendente lite;
repsondent (Vicente) is hereby ordered to remit the amount of Php 220,000.00 a month to Petitioner as support for
the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition. RTC further declared that as to the grant of support
pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her
from receiving legal support.
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the above RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a
petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. The CA issued the desired TRO. The appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction. Rebecca moved but was denied reconsideration. Thus, Rebecca petition for
certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635. Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA effectively dismissed
Civil Case No. 01-094 (declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicentes alleged psychological
incapacity with application of support pendente lite), and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the
case. To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicentes motion to dismiss Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.
Hence, Rebeccas Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.

Issue: Whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

Held: SC find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for
argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as
an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American
citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen,
as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees. Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national
laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and
Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No.
362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997.
Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this
jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente
is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are
no longer husband and wife to each other.

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husbands obligation
under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to Rebecca. Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under
the premises, cause of action. One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebeccas underlying petition before the RTC,
Vicentes motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The
petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a
marriage. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief
does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. With the
valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no
more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs
of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that
the support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982,
reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for
declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been
partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual
figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial
court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child
concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No.
155635, that is, Rebeccas right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on
the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of
Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for
support pendente lite.

G.R. No. L-5153, Mangoma v. Macadaeg and Bautista, 90 Phil. 508
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to declare null and void an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated September 28, 1951, ordering petitioner to give support pendente lite to his wife and
daughter in the amount of P750 a month beginning January 17, 1951 up to the termination of the case of separation
of property pending between them.
Respondent Candelaria Bautista filed an action against petitioner seeking the separation of the property of the
spouses and the consequent dissolution and liquidation of their conjugal partnership. Months thereafter, prior to the
trial on the merits, respondent prayed the court that pending the determination of the case, she and her daughter
Leticia be given support pendente lite in the amount of P1,000 a month and that petitioner be ordered to act
accordingly. Her motion is based on the following ground: On August 30, 1945, while their marriage was still
subsisting, petitioner contracted another marriage with one Luceria Bernardo; in January, 1946, petitioner abandoned
respondent and two minor daughters and went to live with his second wife; while the bigamy case against petitioner
was under investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila, petitioner refused to give any support to respondent and her
children for their maintenance; petitioner and respondent, through their joint effort and industry, acquired considerable
property which, added to the earnings of petitioner from his various kinds of business, yields a net income of at least
P5,000 a month; petitioner owes them in arrears by way of support a total of P6,000 from January 17, 1951.
Petitioner objected to the motion pendente lite on the following grounds: Respondent abandoned the conjugal home
to live with an American soldier, a fact admitted by her when she testified in the city fiscals office of Manila in the
investigation of the charge of bigamy filed by her against petitioner; respondent committed adultery with said
American soldier from October to December 1945, and lived with him from January to August 1946; later in 1947,
respondent also lived with one Celestino Fernandez up to October 1949; having committed adultery, respondent,
therefore, is not entitled to support; their child Leticia who is under the custody of respondent should be turned over to
petitioner to free her from the influence of her mother who is living under immoral circumstances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in ordering petitioner to give support pendente lite to his wife and daughter
RULING:
We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to present his evidence for the
purpose of determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the application. Adultery on the part of the wife
is a valid defense against an action for support (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil., 285). Consequently, as to the child, it is
also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of the defendant
and, hence, would not be entitled to support as such. But as this defense should be established, and not merely
alleged, it would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is not of course necessary to go fully into the merits
of the case, it being which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in
view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered." (Sanchez vs. Zulueta, 68 Phil., 112.)
The facts of this case show that petitioner has not also been given an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of
the defense he has set up against the motion for support pendente lite. It appears that the respondent judge
commissioned his deputy clerk to receive evidence the parties may desire to present on said motion, but that after
respondent had presented her evidence and before the deputy clerk and been able to complete the hearing,
respondent judge issued the order subject of these proceedings without giving petitioner an opportunity to present his
evidence. It is true several trials were held before the deputy clerk of court, but there is nothing to show that petitioner
has resorted to dilatory tactics as to justify that action on the motion be taken without receiving his evidence. The
affidavit submitted by counsel for petitioner, which stands uncontradicted, shows that said counsel asked for
postponement of the hearing only one and that he failed to appear on the date set for the continuation of the hearing
due to a misunderstanding. At any rate, the court is not persuaded from a consideration of the pleadings that there
has been a deliberate attempt on the part of the petitioner, or his counsel, to delay the proceedings, and, therefore,
before action is taken on the matter, an opportunity should be given him to be heard, considering the serious nature
of his special defense. In line with the ruling of this Court in the Sanchez case, supra, there is no other alternative
than to remand this case to the lower court in order that immediate steps may be taken relative to the reception of the
evidence of petitioner in support of his opposition.

RAMOS vs CA
G.R. No. L-31897 June 30, 1972

FACTS: Assisted by their mother, Felisa and Lorraine Lagos, both minors, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, a complaint against petitioner Luis T. Ramos, for support and damages, alleging
that she bore said children, born on August 27, 1963 and June 21, 1965, respectively, in consequence of
illicit relations with said Ramos, who had failed and refused to support said minors, notwithstanding
repeated demands, and despite the fact that he has, as a municipal mayor, the means therefor, which
she does not have. Ramos having denied the main allegations of the complaint and set up a
counterclaim for damages.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs, sentencing Ramos to pay each of said minors the sum of P75.00
monthly, in addition to the aggregate sum of "P2,075.00 representing the support in arrears for the elder child,
that is, from July 17, 1964, when defendant stopped giving him the support, up to the filing of the complaint on
September 3, 1965," and "the support in arrears in the amount of P180.00 for the younger child, or from June 21,
1965, when she was born, up to September 3, 1965, when the complaint for support was filed," apart from "the
sum of P500.00 representing attorney's fees and costs of suit suffered by the plaintiffs."
Ramos then appealed to the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs-appellees moved therein for support pendente lite. In a
reasoned and signed resolution dated November 21, 1969, Ramos was ordered by the Court of Appeals to deposit
with its Clerk the sum of P4,727.50 representing one-half of the amount due under the appealed decision to the
aforesaid plaintiffs "within 15 days from notice, otherwise he will be cited for contempt. Once the amount is
deposited, the Clerk of this Court is directed to deliver the same to plaintiff-appellee Felisa Lagos." Subsequent
reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the matter was elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA abused its discretion in issuing the aforementioned resolution "there
having been neither a recognition of paternity by the petitioner nor its establishment by final judgment"

RULING: The Supreme Court opined that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to
present his evidence for the purpose of determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the
application. Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support (Quintana
vs. Lerma, 24 Phil., 285). Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such
adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of the defendant and, hence would not be
entitled to support as such. But as this defense should be established, and not merely alleged, it would
be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is not of course necessary to go fully into merits of the
case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind of amount of evidence which it may deem
sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or take other, in view of the merely
provisional character of take resolution to be entered.

In the case at bar not only had evidence on the alleged relation between the minors and Ramos been
introduced. Judgment had, moreover, been rendered finding that said relation had been duly
established, although an appeal from said judgment was and is still pending in the Court of Appeals.
Indeed, the Rules of Court clearly authorizes the granting of support pendente lite, even prior to the
rendition of judgment by the trial court. Sections 1 and 5 of Rule 61 provide:
SEC. 1. Application. The plaintiff, at the commencement of the proper action, or at any time
afterwards but prior to final judgment, may file an application for support pendente lite, stating
the grounds for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties, and shall be accompanied
by affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in support thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 5. Order. The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render
such order as equity and justice may require, having due regard to the necessities of the
applicant, the means of the adverse party, the probable outcome of the case, and such other
circumstances as may aid in the proper elucidation of the question involved. If the application is
granted, the court shall fix the amount of money to be provisionally paid, and the terms of
payment. ... .
7

It goes without saying that if, before the rendition of judgment, the trial court may "provisionally" grant alimony
pendente lite, with more reason may an appellate court exercise a similar authority, after a full dress trial and a
decision of the trial court on the merits finding that the claim of filiation and support has been adequately proven
in the case at bar, beyond doubt even if such decision were still pending appeal taken by the party adjudged
to be bound to give such support.
Needless to say, the refusal of the trial court to grant, said alimony pendente lite did not and cannot deprive the
appellate court of said authority, or even dent the wisdom of the action taken by the latter, considering that the
former did not give any plausible reason for its aforementioned refusal and that the same may have, in fact, been
due to the appeal taken by the defendant, whose record on appeal had already been approved.
Neither did the failure of the Court of Appeals to hear petitioner herein on oral argument before denying his
motion for reconsideration or to grant him "a 10-day abeyance in the implementation" of said resolution
constitute a grave abuse of discretion, for petitioner is not entitled as a matter of right to said oral argument,
which was discretionary for said appellate court, as was its authority to grant or deny the aforementioned period
of ten (10) days. Furthermore, petitioner has not shown that he could have adduced substantial reasons to
warrant a reversal of the contested resolution had this period been granted or said oral argument taken place.
Again, the grant to the minors who had merely asked "a monthly support of P75.00 for each child," or P150.00 a
month for both, and, through their mother, had offered to file a bond of the aggregate sum of P4,727.50,
without requiring a bond therefor, did not constitute a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, in the light of the circumstances surrounding the case. Paraphrasing Garcia v. Court of Appeals,
11
the
circumstances obtaining in the present case suggest that this is an instance where, in view of the poverty of herein
private respondents, "it would be a travesty of justice" to refuse them support until the decision of the trial judge
"is sustained on appeal."
PETITION DISMISSED.

Sps. Lim vs. Lim [G.R. No. 163209] October 30, 2009
FACTS:
Cheryl Lim married Edward Lim (son of petitioner). They have three children (Lester, Candice and Mariano III).
Cheryl abandoned their house and bringing the children (all minors) with her after a violent confrontation with Edward
whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described a very compromising
situation.
Cheryl sued the petitioners for support. The trial court ordered Edward and petitioners to jointly provide P40,000.00
monthly support to respondents (with Edward to shoulder P6,000.00 and petitioners the balance of P34,000.00
subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability)
Petitioner appealed the decision:
Petitioner argued that while Edwards income is insufficient, the law itself sanction its effects by providing
that legal support should be in keeping with the financial capacity of the family under Art. 194 (Civil Code) as
amended by EO 209 (Family Code)

Court of Appeal affirmed the Trial Courts decision:
Parents and their legitimate children are obliged to mutually support one another and this obligation extends
down to the legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren
Art. 200 paragraph (3) of the Family Code clearly provides that should the person obliged to give support
does not have the sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the other persons enumerated in Art. 199 in its order shall
provide the necessary support. This is because the closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that
binds them. Thus, the obligation to support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their
default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.
HELD:
Affirmative.
1st: Petitioners Liable to Provide Support but only to their Grandchildren.
Petitioners contention
Petitioners theorized that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority during the childrens
minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over
their children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latters offspring ends with them.
The governing provision is on Support and not on Parental Authority. While both areas share a common ground in
that parental authority encompasses the obligation to provide legal support, they differ in their concerns including the
duration of the obligation of the obligation and its occurrence among relatives of differing degrees. Although the
obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child, the same
obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally last during the obligees lifetime.Petitioners partial
concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by
blood of lower degree.As petitioners grandchildren by blood, only the respondents Lester, Candice and Mariano III
(children of Cheryl and Edward) belong to this category. Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family extends
only to her husband, arising from their marital bond. Her share on the monthly support was not determined. Hence,
remanded back to the trial court to limit.
2nd: Petitioners Precluded from Availing of the Alternative Option Under Article 204 of the Civil Code, as
Amended Petitioners contention As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in Art. 204
(Civil Code) allowing to fulfill their obligation by maintaining respondents at petitioners Makati resident.


Art. 204 will also force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is the scene of her husbands infidelity. While not
rising to the level of a legal obstacle, Cheryls charge against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient
evidence, her steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bring the case within the ambit
of the exception clause of Art. 204 precluding its application.

ALEIDA SAAVEDRA vs. CEFERINO YBAEZ ESTRADA
G.R. No. 33795. September 4, 1931

FACTS

The parties in this case are husband and wife, who were married in January, 1904, in Dumaguete,
Oriental Negros. As a result of their marriage nine children have been born, three of whom are dead and
six living. Two of the living children are already of age, namely, Manuel and Gabriela. The other four are
still minors, living with their mother. In the course of their marriage a large amount of land has been
acquired, consisting of over 400 hectares of land - all property of the conjugal partnership.

While the plaintiff was enceinte (pregnant) with her ninth child, the defendant treated her with personal
violence, and she was compelled to remove herself from contact with him by obtaining accommodations
for herself and all her children in the San Jose asylum in Cebu.

In 1920, the plaintiff was forced to present a civil action seeking an order requiring the defendant to
supply maintenance for herself and children but in 1926 the defendant prevailed upon her to dismiss said
action upon his promise to supply her needs. This promise was not kept; and for more than a decade this
woman has struggled alone maintaining her family as best she could by obtaining credit from strangers
and sacrificing paraphernal property of her own.

Aleida Saavedra instituted an action against her husband. The purpose of the complaint is to secure a
judgment for maintenance for the plaintiff and her children from the defendant and to obtain an order
requiring him to pay such maintenance not only in the future but for a period in the past, beginning in
1920, during which the defendant has contributed nothing for the support of his family.

ISSUE

Whether or not the lower court erred in its failure to award judgment for past due maintenance accruing
under a preliminary order in case No. 3335, effective September, 1920, and running until the present
action was instituted.

RULING

An order for maintenance pendente lite was entered by the trial court in that case, and nothing has ever
been paid upon said account. Nevertheless it appears that, on May 21, 1926, Saavedra, also plaintiff in
case No. 3335, caused said action to be dismissed, in reliance upon the defendant's promises.

The dismissal of said case necessarily had the effect of abrogating the order for maintenance pendente
lite, and placed the plaintiff in a position where she is unable to enforce that order. An order pendente lite
is in its very nature contingent, and the dismissal of the action had the effect of abrogating the order.

It being understood, therefore, first, that the amount of maintenance accruing to the plaintiff from the date
of the institution of this action is at the rate of P330 per month, amounting to P7,920, to the date of the
promulgation of this decision, which amount the defendant is directed to pay to the plaintiff; xxx thirdly,
that the plaintiff is entitled to have the encumbrance indicated in this right to maintenance inscribed on the
registry of property; and fourth, this judgment is without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to be
reimbursed for any amount, or amounts, which she may have expended from the proceeds of her
paraphernal property, or for which she may have become indebted upon account of the necessary
maintenance of herself and children prior to the bringing of this action, the judgment from, as thus
modified, is affirmed.

The order hereinafter made for the affirmance of the judgment in this respect will be made without
prejudice to her right hereafter, by independent action, or in the ultimate liquidation of the conjugal estate,
to be reimbursed as to the matters mentioned.

GOTARDO vs BULING
PRINCIPLE: In traditional paternity action, the one claiming for filiation and support must prove a prima
facie case. A prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported by corroborative proofthat she
had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden shifts to the putative father. Since
filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
FACTS:
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint for compulsory
recognition and support pendent lite claiming that petitioner, Charles Gotardo, is the father
of her child Gliffze.
They met at Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank, Southern Leyte branch where she had
been hired as a casual employee while petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.
Sometime in September 1993, petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the
respondent Sexual encounters occurred twice a month and eventually, on August 8, 1994 the
respondent was pregnant.
They both made plans and allegedly applied for a marriage license, until petitioner backed
out of the wedding plans.
Petitioner failed to support Gliffze and was sent a demand letter for recognition and support
for their child but when petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed a
complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendent lite.
RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffzes filiation.
On appeal, CA ordered petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son
Gliffze Buling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA is correct in ordering petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his
minor son.

RULING:
YES. No error in the CAs ruling. Petition denied.
Filiation proceedings are filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated
with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or inheritance. In paternity cases, burden of
proof is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child.
There are four procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima
facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and the child. A prima facie cases exists if a woman declares supported by
corroborative proofthat she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point the burden of
evidence shifts to the putative father. There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative
father: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency
or (2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze
through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of
her conception. The testimony was corroborated by Rodulfo, the witness.
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to
support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. The amount of support is variable, hence, no final
judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of
the person obliged to support.

RULE 62 Interpleader
Viuda de Camilo vs Aranio
L-15653, September 29, 1961

In order for action for interpleader to be proper, there must be an existence of conflicting claims. Furthermore,
the plaintiff should have no interest in the subject property.

Facts

Petitioner Vda de Camilo has open and adverse possession of a parcel of public foreshore land with building
(Tax Dec 5286) erected on it and respondent Ong Peng Kee as lessee on one of the apartments
The Franciscos, on the other hand, is also in open and adverse possession of adjacent piece of land with
building under Tax Dec 4911.
On Sept 1, 1957, the two abovementioned buildings were burned down, Two weeks later, respondents Ong
Peng Kee and Adelia Ong constructed building on their own which allegedly encroached upon petitioners
land.
On Dec 3, 1957, Vda de Camilo filed case of forcible entry upon respondents. On Aug 8, 1958, Estrada and
Francisco also filed a similar case. In answer, the respondents alleged the land was leased to them by the
Municipality of Malangas.
Pending trial, respondents filed a complaint for interpleader. A motion to dismiss interpleader was filed by the
petitioners.
Consequently, the Justice of Peace denied motion to dismiss interpleader, ordered the parties to interplead,
and likewise dismissed the forcible entry cases.

Issue:
Whether or not interpleader is proper

Ruling
The petitioners claimed the possession of the respective portion of the lands belonging to them on which
the respondents had erected their house after the fire which destroyed petitioners' buildings. This being
the case, the contention of petitioners-appellants that the complaint to interplead lacked cause of action,
is correct.
Section 1, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides
Interpleader when proper. Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or
may be made against a person, who claims no interest whatever in the subject-matter, or an
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against
the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves.
The petitioners did not have conflicting claims against the respondents. Their respective claim was
separate and distinct from the other. De Camilo only wanted the respondents to vacate that portion of
her property which was encroached upon by them when they erected their building. The same is true
with Estrada and the Franciscos. They claimed possession of two different parcels of land of different
areas, adjoining each other. Furthermore, it is not true that respondents Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong
did not have any interest in the subject matter. Their interest was the prolongation of their occupancy
or possession of the portions encroached upon by them. It is, therefore, evident that the requirements
for a complaint of Interpleader do not exist.


Wack-Wack Golf v. Lee Won
G.R. No. L-23851, March 26, 1976

The interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Petitioner had already been made independently liable in Civil Case
No. 26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final
judgment in the said civil case.

Facts: Wack Wack Golf & Country Club Inc., operating under Philippine laws, filed a complaint to compel Lee and Tan
(claimants) to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims upon the ownership of its membership fee certificates 201.
The complaint further alleged that Lee claims ownership of the subject matter by virtue of decision rendered in a civil
case 26044 of the CFI Manila and that Tan claims to be a lawful owner of its aforesaid membership fee certificate 201 by
virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 issued to him. Defendants filed their separate motion to
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action and bar by prescription.

I ssue: Whether or not the complaint to interplead will prosper?

Ruling: The interpleader will not prosper. It has been held that an action of interpleader is too late when filed after
judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending parties, especially where he (plaintiff) he had
prior notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the
adverse claimants. Because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the latter.

Moreover, a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled
to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment.
The interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Petitioner had already been made independently liable in Civil Case No.
26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment
in the said civil case.

Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Metro Container Corporation
G.R. No. 127913, September 13, 2001

The reason for the interpleader action ceased when the MeTC rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 6202 whereby the
court directed METROCAN to pay LEYCON whatever rentals due on the subject premises. While RCBC, not being a
party to Civil Case No. 6202, could not be bound by the judgment therein, METROCAN is bound by the MeTC
decision.
Facts: METROCAN is the lessee of the property from LEYCON, lessor, which property is subject to the contract of
mortgage entered into between RCBC and LEYCON.

METROCAN filed the interpleader action (Civil Case No. 4398-V-94) because it was unsure which between LEYCON
and RCBC was entitled to receive the payment of monthly rentals on the subject property. LEYCON was claiming
payment of the rentals as lessor of the property while RCBC was making a demand by virtue of the consolidation of the
title of the property in its name.

Prior to the action of interpleader, LEYCON filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against METROCAN docket as civil
case no. 6202. In said civil case, the court dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer in view of an amicable
settlement they entered and ordered METROCAN to pay LEYCON the rentals.

Comes now METROCAN moving for the dismissal of the interpleader action (civil case no. 4398-V-94) because there is
no need to pursue such cause of action because it is already moot and academic.
RCBC on the other hand wants to prove his claim in the interpleader action filed, thus, compelling METROCAN to
pursue the interpleader case.

I ssue: Whether or not the interpleader case should continue?

Ruling: The interpleader case should no longer continue. the reason for the interpleader action ceased when the MeTC
rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 6202 whereby the court directed METROCAN to pay LEYCON "whatever rentals
due on the subject premises x x x." While RCBC, not being a party to Civil Case No. 6202, could not be bound by the
judgment therein, METROCAN is bound by the MeTC decision. When the decision in Civil Case No. 6202 became final
and executory, METROCAN has no other alternative left but to pay the rentals to LEYCON. Precisely because there was
already a judicial fiat to METROCAN, there was no more reason to continue with Civil Case No. 4398-V-94. Thus,
METROCAN moved for the dismissal of the interpleader action not because it is no longer interested but because there is
no more need for it to pursue such cause of action.

It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but
against double vexation in respect of one liability. It requires, as an indespensable requisite, that "conflicting claims upon
the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. The decision in Civil Case No.
6202 resolved the conflicting claims insofar as payment of rentals was concerned.

Petitioner is correct in saying that it is not bound by the decision in Civil Case No. 6202. It is not a party thereto.
However, it could not compel METROCAN to pursue Civil Case No. 4398-V-94. RCBC has other avenues to prove its
claim. Is not bereft of other legal remedies. In fact, he issue of ownership can very well be threshed out in Civil Case No.
4037-V-93, the case for Nullification of Extrajudicial foreclosure Sale and Damages filed by LEYCON against RCBC.

NOTE: This is a consolidated cases worth 25 pages. The case is more of a civil procedure and
jurisdiction. The discussion on interpleader is only one of the topic.
G.R. Nos. 154470-71 September 24, 2012
BANK OF COMMERCE vs.PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
1 The Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) was the registered owner of seven Central Bank (CB)
bills with a total face value of P 70 million, issued on January 2, 1994 and would mature on January 2,
1995.
2
As evidenced by a "Detached Assignment" dated April 8, 1994,
3

2 The RCBC sold these CB bills to the BOC.
4
As evidenced by another "Detached Assignment"
5
of even date,
the BOC, in turn, sold these CB bills to the PDB.
6

3 The BOC delivered the Detached Assignments to the PDB.
7

4 On April 15, 1994 (April 15 transaction), the PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth P 70 million,
with maturity date of June 29, 1994, as evidenced by a Trading Order
8
and a Confirmation of Sale.
9

However, instead of delivering the Treasury Bills, the PDB delivered the seven CB bills to the BOC, as
evidenced by a PDB Security Delivery Receipt, bearing a "note:
**
substitution in lieu of 06-29-94"
referring to the Treasury Bills.
10

Nevertheless, the PDB retained possession of the Detached Assignments. It is basically the nature of this
April 15 transaction that the PDB and the BOC cannot agree on.
ARGUMENTS OF PDB (Planters Development Bank):
The PDB essentially claims that in both the April 15 transaction (involving the first set of CB bills) and the April
19 transaction (involving the second set of CB bills), there was no intent on its part to transfer title of the CB
bills, as shown by its non-issuance of a detached assignment in favor of the BOC and Bancap, respectively.
The PDB particularly alleges that it merely "warehoused"
31
the first set of CB bills with the BOC, as security
collateral.
NOW, Bank of commerce and All Asia ARE IMPLEADEAD for the value of the treasury bill.
On December 28, 1994, the RTC temporarily enjoined Nuqui and the BSP from paying the face value of
the CB bills on maturity.
32
On January 10, 1995, the PDB filed an Amended Petition, additionally
impleading the BOC and All Asia.
33

THE IMPLEADED RESPONDS
The BOC filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the petition. It argued that the PDB has no cause of
action against it since the PDB is no longer the owner of the CB bills. Contrary to the PDBs "warehousing
theory,"
38
the BOC asserted that the (i) April 15 transaction and the (ii) April 19 transaction covering both sets
of CB bills - were valid contracts of sale, followed by a transfer of title (i) to the BOC (in the April 15 transaction)
upon the PDBs delivery of the 1st set of CB bills in substitution of the Treasury Bills the PDB originally
intended to sell, and (ii) to Bancap (in the April 19 transaction) upon the PDBs delivery of the 2nd set of CB
bills to Bancap, likewise by way of substitution.
The BOC adds that Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 cannot apply to the PDBs case because (i) the PDB
is not in possession of the CB bills and (ii) the BOC acquired these bills from the PDB, as to the 1st set of CB
bills, and from Bancap, as to the 2nd set of CB bills, in good faith and for value. The BOC also asserted a
compulsory counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees.
4. PDB agrees that the various claimants should now interplead and substantiate their respective claims on the
subject CB bills. However, the total face value of the subject CB bills should be deposited in escrow with a
private bank to be disposed of only upon order of the RTC.
42

In May 2001, the PDB filed an Omnibus Motion,
61
questioning the RTCs jurisdiction over the BOCs "additional
counterclaims." The PDB argues that its petitions pray for the BSP (not the RTC) to determine who among the
conflicting claimants to the CB bills stands in the position of the bona fide holder for value. The RTC cannot
entertain the BOCs counterclaim, regardless of its nature, because it is the BSP which has jurisdiction
to determine who is entitled to receive the proceeds of the CB bills.
Lastly, since Nuquis office (Government Securities Department) had already been abolished,
69
it can no longer
adjudicate the dispute under the second situation covered by CB Circular No. 28. The abolition of Nuquis office
is not only consistent with the BSPs Charter but, more importantly, with CB Circular No. 769-80, which
removed the BSPs adjudicative authority over fraudulent assignments.
THE PDBS COMMENT
The PDB claims that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint/petition and not by the
defenses set up in the answer.
70
In filing the petition with the RTC, the PDB merely seeks to compel the BSP to
determine, pursuant to CB Circular No. 28, the party legally entitled to the proceeds of the subject CB bills,
which, as the PDB alleged, have been transferred through fraudulent representations an allegation which
properly recognized the BSPs jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of ownership over the CB bills.
We grant the petitions. DISCUSSION ON THE JURISDICTION:
Broadly speaking, jurisdiction is the legal power or authority to hear and determine a cause.
80
In the exercise of
judicial or quasi-judicial power, it refers to the authority of a court to hear and decide a case.
81
In the context of
these petitions, we hark back to the basic principles governing the question of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
First, jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined only by the Constitution and by law.
82
As a matter of
substantive law, procedural rules alone can confer no jurisdiction to courts or administrative agencies.
83
In fact,
an administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and, as such,
could wield only such powers that are specifically granted to it by the enabling statutes. In contrast, an RTC is a
court of general jurisdiction, i.e., it has jurisdiction over cases whose subject matter does not fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
84

Second, jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined not by the pleas set up by the defendant in his
answer
85
but by the allegations in the complaint,
86
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to favorable
judgment on the basis of his assertions.
87
The reason is that the complaint is supposed to contain a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.
88

Third, jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint.
89

The PDBs claim is not accurate. What the PDB requested the BSP on that date was not the recording of the
assignment of the CB bills in its favor but the annotation of its claim over the CB bills at the time when (i) it was
no longer in possession of the CB bills, having been transferred from one entity to another and (ii) all it has are
the detached assignments, which the PDB has not shown to be compliant with Section 10 (b) 2 above-quoted.
Obviously, the PDB cannot insist that the BSP take cognizance of its plaint when the basis of the BSPs refusal
under existing regulation, which the PDB is bound to observe, is the PDBs own failure to comply therewith.
True, the BSP exercises supervisory powers (and regulatory powers) over banks (and quasi banks). The issue
presented before the Court, however, does not concern the BSPs supervisory power over banks as this power
is understood under the General Banking Law. In fact, there is nothing in the PDBs petition (even including the
letters it sent to the BSP) that would support the BSPs jurisdiction outside of CB Circular No. 28, under its
power of supervision, over conflicting claims to the proceeds of the CB bills.
BSP has quasi-judicial powers over a class of cases which does not include the adjudication of ownership of
the CB bills in question.
ISSUE: SHOULD the Planters Development Bank is hereby REQUIRED to file with the Regional Trial
Court its comment or answer-in-interpleader to Bank of Commerces Amended Consolidated Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim, as previously ordered by the Regional Trial Court?
The remedy of interpleader
Based on the unique factual premise of the present case, the RTC acted correctly in initially assuming
jurisdiction over the PDBs petition for mandamus, prohibition and injunction.
128
While the RTC agreed (albeit
erroneously) with the PDBs view (that the BSP has jurisdiction), it, however, dismissed not only the BOCs/the
BSPs counterclaims but the PDBs petition itself as well, on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction.
This is plain error.
Not only the parties themselves, but more so the courts, are bound by the rule on non-waiver of
jurisdiction.
129
believes that jurisdiction over the BOCs counterclaims and the BSPs counterclaim/crossclaim for
interpleader calls for the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the allowance of the PDBs petition
even becomes imperative because courts may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte.
130

Of the three possible options available to the RTC, the adoption of either of these two would lead the trial
court into serious legal error: first, if it granted the PDBs petition, its decision would have to be set aside on
appeal because the BSP has no jurisdiction as previously discussed; and second when it dismissed the PDBs
petitions and the BOCs counterclaims on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction, the trial court seriously erred
because precisely, the resolution of the conflicting claims over the CB bills falls within its general
jurisdiction.
Without emasculating its jurisdiction, the RTC could have properly dismissed the PDBs petition but on the
ground that mandamus does not lie against the BSP; but even this correct alternative is no longer plausible
since the BSP, as a respondent below, already properly brought before the RTC the remaining conflicting
claims over the subject CB bills by way of a counterclaim/crossclaim for interpleader. Section 1, Rule 62 of the
Rules of Court provides when an interpleader is proper.
The remedy of an action of interpleader
131
is designed to protect a person against double vexation in respect of
a single liability.
7
It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter
are or may be made against the stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter) who claims no interest
whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants.
132

Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single proceeding to determine
conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having to pay more than once on a
single liability.
133

When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, in reality a new action arises,
134
where the
claims of the interpleaders themselves are brought to the fore, the stakeholder as plaintiff is relegated merely to
the role of initiating the suit.
DOCTRINE 1: In short, the remedy of interpleader, when proper, merely provides an avenue for the
conflicting claims on the same subject matter to be threshed out in an action. Section 2 of Rule 62
provides:
DOCTRINE 2: Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-in-interpleader as
part of, although separate and independent from, the answer. Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
137
does not include a complaint-in-interpleader as a claim,
138
a
form of defense,
139
or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to put up in his answer or in a
motion to dismiss.
This does not mean, however, that the BSPs "counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader" runs counter to
general procedures.
DOCTRINE 3: In an interpleader suit, however, a claim is not required to be contained in any of these
pleadings but in the answer-(of the conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is different from
the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-complaint) which is separately allowed under Section 5,
par. 2 of Rule 62.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the consolidated PETITIONS are GRANTED. The Planters
Development Bank is hereby REQUIRED to file with the Regional Trial Court its comment or answer-in-
interpleader to Bank of Commerces Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, as
previously ordered by the Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, is
hereby ORDERED to assess the docket fees due from Planters Development Bank and Bank of Commerce
and order their payment, and to resolve with DELIBERATE DISPATCH the parties conflicting claims of
ownership over the proceeds of the Central Bank bills.
SO ORDERED

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No.147812. April 6, 2005]
LEONARDO R. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. LEONORA TIRONA, respondent.

Doctrine : An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to
whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property


Ocampo alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of landwith an approximate area of 500
square meters, located at Alvarez Street, Pasay City. Ocampo bought the subject land from
Rosauro Breton, heir of the subject lands registered owner Alipio Breton Cruz.
Possession and administration of the subject land are claimed to be already in Ocampos
management even though the TCT is not yet in his name. Tirona, on the other hand, is a lessee
occupying a portion of the subject land.
Tirona stopped paying lease because she thought the land will be rewarded to her by a law
in view of the fact that the subject premises was declared under area for priority development,
[Tirona] is invoking her right of first refusal and in connection thereto [Tirona] will temporarily
stop paying her monthly rentals until and unless the National Housing Authority have processed
the pertinent papers as regards the amount due to [Ocampo] by reason of the implementation of
the above. Because of this, Ocampo ordered Tirona to vacate the premises.
On 11 September 1995, Ocampo filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 754-95 for
unlawful detainer and damages against Tirona before the MTC.
Tirona filed her answer on 27 September 1995. Tirona asserted that Doa Lourdes
Rodriguez Yaneza actually owns the subject.
Ocampo filed a motion to strike out the answer filed and a motion for judgment on 10
October 1995. Ocampo claimed that the answer was not verified; therefore, it was as if no
answer was filed.
On 12 October 1995, Tirona filed a motion with leave to amend defendants answer.
[8]
She
alleged that she filed her answer without the assistance of a lawyer due to fear that she might
be unable to file the required pleading on time. In the spirit of substantial justice, the MTC
granted Tironas motion to amend her answer on 20 October 1995. On 15 November 1995, the
MTC directed Ocampo and Tirona to submit their respective position
The MTCs Ruling
The MTC ruled that Tirona does not have any reason to suspend payment of rents until
after PD No. 1517, in relation to PD Nos. 1893 and 1968, is implemented in her favor. Tironas
non-payment of rents rendered her occupation of the subject land illegal.
Ocampo filed a motion for execution pending appeal on 24 January 1996, while Tirona filed
a notice of appeal on 25 January 1996.
The RTCs Ruling
In an order dated 11 March 1996, the RTC issued a writ of execution pending appeal for the
enforcement of the MTCs decision.
The appellate court stated that the principal issue for its resolution is whether Ocampo, being
the buyer of the subject land which is not yet partitioned among the heirs, can validly evict
Tirona.
[19]

The Appellate Courts Ruling
The appellate court considered partition of the estate of Alipio Breton as a prerequisite to
Ocampos action. The appellate court ruled that [u]ntil the partition of the estate is ordered by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City in the pending partition proceedings and the share of
each co-heir is determined by metes and bounds, [Ocampo] cannot rightfully claim that what he
bought is part of the property occupied by [Tirona].
[20]

Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
DECLARING THAT LEONARDO R. OCAMPO HAS NO RIGHT TO EJECT LEONORA
TIRONA, NOR DEMAND PAYMENT OF RENTALS FROM HER FOR THE USE
AND OCCUPANCY OF THE LOT INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT CASE.
[22]

The Ruling of the Court
The petition has merit.
We agree with Ocampos observation that Tirona changes her theory of the case each time
she appeals.
[23]
For this reason, we shall limit our ruling to the propriety of Ocampos unlawful
detainer case against Tirona.
Moreover, we have assessed the evidence on record and found that the appellate court did
not contradict the findings of facts of the MTC and RTC. Thus, we see no reason to deviate
from their findings of facts.
In Mirasol v. Magsuci, et al.,
[28]
we ruled that the sale of a leased property places the
vendee into the shoes of the original lessor to whom the lessee bound himself to pay
When Tirona filed her answer before the MTC, she raised the issue of ownership and
ascribed ownership of the subject lot to one Doa Lourdes Rodriguez Yaneza. Tirona later
changed her strategy and filed an amended answer that ascribed ownership of the subject lot to
Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. The fact of the lease and the expiration of its term are the only
elements of the action. The defense of ownership does not change the summary nature of the
action.
Interpleader
The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-
Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the
contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by
Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader.
[37]
An action for interpleader is proper
when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on
the property.
[38]

The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or
real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in
both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants,
comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is
afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double
vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among
themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in
such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not
a cross-complaint.
[39]

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition for review.


PASRICHA vs. DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC. G.R. No. 136409 March 14, 2008

Facts of the case: Petitioners entered into contracts of lease with respondent realtor for the rental of units in the
san building in ermita manila. Among the payments due from the petitioners are the agreed monthly rentals,
increments as well as the utility bills of the units subject of the contract. However, the lease of three of the
rooms agreed upon did not materialize, leaving only Six (6) rooms (nos. 22, 24, 32, 33, 34 and 35) as subjects of
the lease contracts. While the contracts were in effect, petitioners dealt with Francis Pacheco (Pacheco), then
General Manager of private respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda Bautista (Ms. Bautista).
Petitioners religiously paid the monthly rentals until May 1992. After that, however, despite repeated demands,
petitioners continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent. Consequently, respondent was constrained to refer
the matter to its lawyer who, in turn, made a final demand on petitioners for the payment of the accrued rentals
amounting to P916,585.58.12. Because petitioners still refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed
by private respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista. Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the
stipulated rent for the leased premises starting July until November 1992, but claimed that such refusal was
justified because of the internal squabble in respondent company as to the person authorized to receive
payment. To show good faith and willingness to pay the rents, petitioners alleged that they prepared the check
vouchers for their monthly rentals from January 1993 to January 1994. On November 24, 1994, the MeTC
rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for ejectment because of Ms. Bautistas alleged lack of authority
to sue on behalf of the corporation. It, however, considered petitioners non-payment of rentals as unjustified.
The court held that mere willingness to pay the rent did not amount to payment of the obligation, petitioners
should have deposited their payment in the name of respondent company. Deciding the case on appeal, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila reversed the decision of the MTC. The court adopted the MeTCs finding on
petitioners unjustified refusal to pay the rent, which is a valid ground for ejectment. It, however, faulted the
MeTC in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of capacity to sue. Instead, it upheld Ms. Bautistas authority
to represent respondent notwithstanding the absence of a board resolution to that effect, since her authority
was implied from her power as a general manager/treasurer of the company. Aggrieved, petitioners elevated
the matter to the Court of Appeals in a petition for review on certiorari.On March 18, 1998, petitioners filed an
Omnibus Motion to cite Ms. Bautista for contempt; to strike down the MeTC and RTC Decisions as legal nullities.
Without resolving the aforesaid motion, on May 26, 1998, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision but deleted the
award of attorneys fees. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but the appellate
court considered said motions as repetitive of their previous arguments, irrelevant and obviously dilatory and
granted respondents motion for execution and directed the RTC to issue a new writ of execution of its decision,
with the exception of the award of attorneys fees which the CA deleted. Thus this case before this Court in this
petition for review on certiorari, faulting the appellate court for not finding that, among other claims, their non-
payment of rentals was justified. Issues: Whether or not: 1. the non-payment of rentals was justified; and, 2.
there was no remedy available to the petitioners to clarify the issue of to whom payment is to be made. Held:
The petition lacks merit. Unlawful detainer cases are summary in nature. In such cases, the elements to be
proved and resolved are the fact of lease and the expiration or violation of its terms. Specifically, the essential
requisites of unlawful detainer are: 1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract, express or implied; 2) the
expiration or termination of the possessors right to hold possession; 3) withholding by the lessee of possession
of the land or building after the expiration or termination of the right to possess; 4) letter of demand upon
lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and 5) the filing of the
action within one year from the date of the last demand received by the defendant. Records show that
respondent repeatedly demanded that petitioners vacate the premises, but the latter refused to heed the
demand; thus, they remained in possession of the premises. The only contentious issue is whether there was
indeed a violation of the terms of the contract: on the part of petitioners, whether they failed to pay the
stipulated rent without justifiable cause; while on the part of respondent, whether it prevented petitioners from
occupying the leased premises except Room 35. To settle this issue once and for all, we deem it proper to assess
the array of factual findings supporting the trial courts conclusion. The evidence of petitioners non-payment of
the stipulated rent is overwhelming. Petitioners, however, claim that such non-payment is justified by the
following: 1) the refusal of respondent to allow petitioners to use the leased properties, except room 35; 2)
respondents refusal to turn over Rooms 36, 37 and 38; and 3) respondents refusal to accept payment tendered
by petitioners. Petitioners justifications are belied by the evidence on record. As correctly held by the CA,
petitioners communications to respondent prior to the filing of the complaint never mentioned their alleged
inability to use the rooms. What they pointed out in their letters is that they did not know to whom payment
should be made, whether to Ms. Bautista or to Pacheco. In their July 26 and October 30, 1993 letters, petitioners
only questioned the method of computing their electric billings without, however, raising a complaint about
their failure to use the rooms. Although petitioners stated in their December 30, 1993 letter that respondent
failed to fulfill its part of the contract, nowhere did they specifically refer to their inability to use the leased
rooms. Besides, at that time, they were already in default on their rentals for more than a year. What was
clearly established by the evidence was petitioners non-payment of rentals because ostensibly they did not
know to whom payment should be made. However, this did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were
the case, they were not without any remedy. They should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines on the consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader. Article 1256 of the Civil
Code provides: Article 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just
cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due.
Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the following cases: x x x x (4) When two or more persons
claim the same right to collect; x x x x. Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal
of a judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the
announcement of the consignation in other cases. In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced
the effect of payment of the rentals. The rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation
becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not imputable to him. Petitioners claim that they
made a written tender of payment and actually prepared vouchers for their monthly rentals. But that was
insufficient to constitute a valid tender of payment. Even assuming that it was valid tender, still, it would not
constitute payment for want of consignation of the amount. Well-settled is the rule that tender of payment
must be accompanied by consignation in order that the effects of payment may be produced. Moreover, Section
1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. When interpleader proper. Whenever conflicting claims
upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action
against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves. Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom
payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect). The
remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in
respect of one liability. Notably, instead of availing of the above remedy, petitioners opted to refrain from
making payments. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the Status Quo Order dated
January 18, 1999 is hereby LIFTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 26, 1998 and its Resolution
dated December 10, 1998 in CA are AFFIRMED.

Maglente vs Hon Balatazar Padilla GR. 148182 March 7, 2007
INTERPLEADER:
petitioners argument that the trial courts writ of execution in the interpleader case carried with it the corollary
right to a writ of possession is without merit. A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when
the right of possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly relating to
either. The interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue.
Facts:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the order of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, dated April 20, 2001, denying petitioners motion for the issuance of a writ
of possession in their favor.
On January 15, 1985, Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC), owner of a 687.80-square meter parcel of land at 400
Solana St., Intramuros, Manila, entered into a contract of lease for three years with one of the petitioners,
Ursula Maglente. Both agreed Maglente will not sub-lease the property without consent of the lessor.
PRC and Maglente agreed the latter will have the right of first refusal if the former will sell the property.
When the lease was about to expire, PRC sent a written offer to sell the leased property to Maglente. Petitioners
replied with their desire to purchase the same property.
PRC filed for an INTERPLEADER in the RTC against both petitioners and respondents so they could litigate among
themselves on who had the right to purchase the property.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitionerss, affirmed by the CA and Supreme Court. The dispositive portion reads:
In the case under consideration, the contract of sale was already perfected PRC offered the subject lot for sale to
[petitioners] Maglente and her group Respondent Maglente and her group accepted such offermanifesting
their intention to purchase the property as provided for under the lease contract. Thus, there was already an offer
and acceptance giving rise to a valid contract. As a matter of fact, [petitioners] have already completed payment of
their downpayment of P100,000. Therefore, as borne by evidence on record, the requisites under Article 1318 of
the Civil Code for a perfected contract have been met.
On motion of petitioners, a writ of execution was later issued by the RTC directing PRC to execute the contract of
sale/contract to sell in favor of petitioners and respondents complied.
The petitioners filed a writ of possession but respondents (who were occupying the property) objected on the
ground that the trial courts decision on the interpleader case merely resolved petitioners right to purchase the
leased property but did not declare them as the owners entitled to possession. The trial court sustained
respondents argument and denied petitioners motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not they are entitled to a writ of possession after being adjudged (in the interpleader case) as the
proper parties to buy the subject property, considering that a deed of sale has already been executed in their
favor.
HELD:
The petitioners are not entitled to relief.
The petitioners were not owners of the property yet. Although the contract to of sale between parties had already
been perfected, we refrained from declaring them the owners since, pending the execution of the deed of sale or
delivery of the property, ownership had yet to transfer to them at that time.
The remedy of certiorari is limited to acts of any tribunal or board exercising judicial functions without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. It must be based on jurisdictional grounds like want of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion; otherwise, any error committed by it will amount to nothing more than an error of
judgment which may be questioned only on ordinary appeal.
A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances:
(1) Land registration proceedings;
(2) Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property;
(3)Judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened,
and
(4) Execution sales. Here, petitioners seek the writ as a consequence of the trial courts decision ordering the
execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor. The writ does not lie in such a case.
Furthermore, the trial courts decision in the interpleader case (affirmed by both the CA and the SC) merely
resolved the question of who, between petitioners and respondents, had the right to purchase PRCs property. The
directive was only for PRC to execute the necessary contract in favor of petitioners as the winning parties, nothing
else.
The rule is that the enforcement of a judgment may not vary or alter the tenor of the judgment but must strictly
conform to it.
Finally, petitioners cannot recover possession of the property via a mere motion. They must file the appropriate
action in court against respondents to recover possession. While this remedy can delay their recovery, this Court
cannot permit an abbreviated method without subverting the rules and processes established for the orderly
administration of justice

Rule 63 Declaratory Relief

[ G.R. No. 204819, April 08, 2014 ]

JAMES M. IMBONG AND LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG AND BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG AND MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., PETITIONERS, VS.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS AND HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RESPONDENTS.

PRINCIPLE
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.

FACTS

16 petitions assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law) based on the following grounds:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision oninvoluntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
7. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family protected by the Constitution.
9. The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority.
10. The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule
11. The RH Law violates Natural Law
12. The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

The respondents pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that
1. there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.;
2. some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and
3. the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

ISSUE

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief: whether or not the petition for declaratory relief may be heard by the Supreme Court
6] One Subject/One Title Rule

SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional as it violates the ff:

1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM

RULING

Re: Declaratory relief (note: this is the full paragraph on declaratory relief)

The respondents assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.[120] Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would
just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-
reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

Re: Substantive Issues

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b)
allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modern methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2] Section 23(a)(1) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3] Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;

4] Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent
only to elective surgical procedures.

5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a
reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bono reproductive health service in
so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8] Section 3.01(a) and Section 3.01 (j) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier primarily in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they areultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013, is hereby
LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

RULE 63 DECLARATORY RELIEF
11.)
b.) CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, EVELYN DANAO, FERMINA DANAO, LETICIA DANAO and
LEONORA DANAO, the last two are represented herein by their Attorney-in-Fact, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, Petitioners,
v.
BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY REYNA, SATURNINO CAMBRI and SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND MARIA LIGUTAN,Respondents.
G.R. No. 181303 September 17, 2009
PRINCIPLE: The mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word "shall" and explicitly
requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property
where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00.

FACTS: Petitioners Carmen Danao Malana, et al. (Danao heirs) alleged to be the owners of a land in Tugegarao which
they inherited from Anastacio Danao. During the lifetime of Danao, he allowed Consuelo Pauig (family member of Tappa) to
build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property.
Danao and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that Danao and his heirs might need it.
Danao heirs claimed that respondents Benigno Tappa, et al. continued to occupy the subject property even after Consuelos
death, building their residences thereon using permanent materials.
Danao heirs also learned that Tappa, et al. were claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring that they already
needed it, Danao heirs demanded that respondents vacate the same. The call was unheeded. Meanwhile, Danao heirs
referred their land dispute to the Lupong Tagapamayapa. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that they
owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership. The heirs opposed
this, saying that the documents were falsified and highly dubious. This notwithstanding, Tappa, et al. created a cloud upon
the heirs title to the property. Thus, the heirs filed a case for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages in the RTC.

ISSUE:
Did the judge commit grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction? No .
Petition is dismissed. RTC should remand the records to the MTC.

RULING:
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought
under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.

Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63. Section 1 states that an action for the reformation of an
instrument, to quiet title, and to consolidate ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase may be brought under the RTC.
These remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the
litigants, often without the need of execution. Whereas the Rules of Court uses may, the amended Judicial
Reorganization Act uses the word shall in determining jurisdiction. JRA explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the
assessed value does not exceed P20,000 (OMM) or P50,000 (MM).

In this case, the assessed value of the subject property is only P410.00; therefore, the jurisdiction is with the MTC, not the
RTC. Further, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments
involved or of rights arising thereunder. The purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed or contract for their guidance in the enforcement
thereof, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof. Where the law or contract has already been
contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In
the present case, the case for quieting of title was filed after Danao heirs already demanded, and Tappa refused to vacate the
subject property. Since the heirs had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them
is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a
suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding
of possession of the realty. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given that
the property is only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over
an action to recover the same.


Rule 63 Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

11. Where to file (1)

c. Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G. R. No. 137538, September 3, 2001

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO B. IBAY, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Makati City, Branch 135, UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, and LOURDES
T. MARQUEZ, in her capacity as Branch Manager of UBP Julia Vargas
Branch, respondents.

PRINCIPLE
The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. It is not among the actions within the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved.

Similarly, the Rules of Court is
explicit that such action shall be brought before the appropriate Regional Trial Court.
Section 1, Rule 63.
The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for
judicial determination.

FACTS

In connection with its investigation of the alleged scam on Public Estates Authority-
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation, the Ombudsman issued an Order
directing private respondent Lourdes Marquez, branch manager of Union Bank of the
Philippines to produce several bank documents for inspection relative to Account Nos.
011-37270-5, 240-020718, 245-30317-3 and 245-303318-1, reportedly maintained in
the said branch. he inspection would be done "in camera" wherein the bank records
would be examined without bringing the documents outside the bank premises. Its
purpose was to identify the specific bank records prior to the issuance of the required
information not in any manner needed in or relevant to the investigation.

Private respondent failed to comply. She explained that the subject accounts pertain to
International Corporate Bank (Interbank) which merged with Union Bank in 1994. She
added that despite diligent efforts, the bank could not identify these accounts since the
checks were issued in cash or bearer forms. She informed petitioner that she had to first
verify from the Interbank records in its archives the whereabouts of said accounts

The Ombudsman issued another order to private respondent to produce the requested
bank documents for "in camera" inspection. In the event of her failure to comply as
directed, private respondent was ordered to show cause why she should not be cited for
contempt and why she should not be charged for obstruction.

Private respondent filed petition for declaratory relief with an application for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 135, presided by respondent Judge Francisco Ibay.

Private respondent averred that under Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. 1405 (Law on Secrecy of
Bank Deposits), she had the legal obligation not to divulge any information relative to
all deposits of whatever nature with banks in the Philippines. But petitioner's Order cited
Section 15 (8) of R.A. 6770 stating that the Ombudsman had the power to examine and
have access to bank accounts and records. Private respondents, therefore, sought a
definite ruling and/or guidelines as regards her rights as well as petitioner's power to
inspect bank deposits under the cited provisions of law. Meanwhile, private respondent
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing petitioner's order
to institute indirect contempt proceedings against her.


Petitioner moved to dismiss the aforesaid petition for declaratory relief on the ground
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. RTC denied the petition.
Ombudsman filed a petition to nullify the RTCs orders on the ground that public
respondent assumed jurisdiction over the case and issued orders with grave abuse of
discretion and clear lack of jurisdiction.


ISSUE
Whether or not public respondent acted without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining the cited petition for declaratory relief.
RULING :
No.
Petitioner contends that the RTC of Makati City lacks jurisdiction over the petition for
declaratory relief. It asserts that respondent judge should have dismissed the petition
outright in view of Section 14 of R.A. 6770.
Section 14 of R.A. 6770 provides:
Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is
a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

Petitioner's invocation of the aforequoted statutory provision is misplaced. The special
civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court.

It is not among the actions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
even if only questions of law are involved.

Similarly, the Rules of Court is explicit that
such action shall be brought before the appropriate Regional Trial Court. Section 1, Rule
63 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
x x x x x x x x x
The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for
judicial determination.

In this case, the controversy concerns the extent of the power of petitioner to examine
bank accounts under Section 15 (8) of R.A. 6770 vis--vis the duty of banks under
Republic Act 1405 not to divulge any information relative to deposits of whatever
nature. The interests of the parties are adverse considering the antagonistic assertion of
a legal right on one hand, that is the power of Ombudsman to examine bank deposits,
and on the other, the denial thereof apparently by private respondent who refused to
allow petitioner to inspect in camera certain bank accounts. The party seeking relief,
private respondent herein, asserts a legal interest in the controversy. The issue invoked
is ripe for judicial determination as litigation is inevitable. Note that petitioner has
threatened private respondent with "indirect contempt" and "obstruction" charges
should the latter not comply with its order.
Circumstances considered, we hold that public respondent has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition for declaratory relief. Nor can it be said that public
respondent gravely abused its discretion in doing so. We are thus constrained to dismiss
the instant petition for lack of merit.

In any event, the relief being sought by private respondent in her action for declaratory
relief before the RTC of Makati City has been squarely addressed by our decision
in Marquez vs. Desierto.

In that case, we ruled that before an in camera inspection of
bank accounts may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of
competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, and the
inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of
competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to
be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account
identified in the pending case. In the present case, since there is no pending litigation
yet before a court of competent authority, but only an investigation by the Ombudsman
on the so-called "scam", any order for the opening of the bank account for inspection is
clearly premature and legally unjustified.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

De la Llana vs. Alba
Facts:
This case is about the constitutionality of B.P. 129 wherein it is assailed that justices and
judges of the CA to MCC, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and CTA, are separated
from the judiciary.

An erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or Prohibition was
considered as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondents from taking any
action implementing the assailed law. It was alleged that such was enacted as an undue
delagation of legislative power to the President. It his Answer, Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza pointed out that the law is a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang
Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary.

Issue: WON B.P. 129 is unconstitutional

Held: NO. (please note that the erroneous pleading was treated as one for prohibition. However,
you must take note that the case is one concerning Constitutional issues. Kindly take note the
case of Martelino vs. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 160208, where
the court dismissed the petition for declaratory relief and prohibition. The court did not treat the
petition as an action for prohibition here. Note the discussion under footnote 34 where this case
was cited as basis. A qualification was made by Justice Regalado.)

WHERE TO FILE? Footnote 4 of the case:
It may be mentioned in passing that petitioners ignored the fact that an action for declaration
relief should be filed in a Court of First Instance and apparently are unaware, that there is no
such proceeding known in constitutional law to declare an act unconstitutional. So it has been
authoritatively ruled even prior to the 1935 Constitution and much more so after its effectivity
and Chat of the present Constitution. That is The concept of judicial review as known in The
Philippines, a principle that goes back to the epochal decision of Chief Justice Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). This Court, then, as do lower court has the duty arid
The power to declare an act unconstitutional but only as in incident to its function of deciding
cases. Cf. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936); People v. Vera 67 Phil. 56
(1937).

Further reading:
The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge
de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's
opinion in People v. Vera. Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." The other petitioners as
members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and
substantial interest" on the matter.

Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a
legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by
respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here
involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the
Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor
separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed
never to have ceased to hold office.

The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule
that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the
principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith."

As with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test
remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more
apparent.

This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts
inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise
thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the
Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court.
It is admitted that section 9 of the same article of the Constitution provides for the security of
tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of the same article of the
Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not
decide actual cases and controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York,
198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. Ed; 937)" justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the argument
that the National Assembly may abuse its power and move deliberately to defeat the
constitutional provision guaranteeing security of tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One
need not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion of Cooley,
Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application of a legal or constitutional
principle is necessarily factual and circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the
dead and the unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the
violation of the constitutional provision regarding security of tenure is palpable and plain, and
that legislative power of reorganization may be sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil
purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily.
But not until then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was
the fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the legislative department and that
Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges
or of any particular judge. Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the
legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater necessity for
reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the new government than at the time Acts
Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the
case of these two Acts there was an express provision providing for the vacation by the judges of
their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its
silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power."

A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice Laurel in
Zandueta, reference was made to Act No. 2347 on the reorganization of the Courts of First
Instance and to Act No. 4007 on the reorganization of all branches of the government, including
the courts of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance were replaced by
new courts with the same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to
the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as to Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also
the system of the courts of first instance was provided for expressly. It was pointed out by Justice
Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and
constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the legislature
may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially
or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions." The challenged statute
creates an intermediate appellate court, regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts of the
national capital region, and other metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts in cities, as well
as in municipalities, and municipal circuit trial courts. There is even less reason then to doubt the
fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment
of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that
pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate
remedy. The choice, however, was for the Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only
with the question of power.

To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides
with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7
of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however,
go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior
courts. Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote
of at least eight members, order their dismissal." Thus it possesses the competence to remove
judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal
is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There
can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case
of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure
does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No
fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this
Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case,
certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has
been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it
properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power, Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior
courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not
readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a
construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives
between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be
preferred.

There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part
of every act to avoid any constitutional taint must be applied Nuez v.
Sandiganbayan, promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other Sections
of the Decree could have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now,
however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting
opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the direct fate of
invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the
powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be committed.
It commends itself for approval." Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential
Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically provides: "The
Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of this Decree through implementing orders, on a
province-to-province basis." It is true there is no such provision in this Act, but the spirit that
informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order contemplated under its Section 44. Thus
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality.

CASE DIGEST

EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA, petitioners vs. BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Respondents (GR NO. 150806)

ANTECEDENTS
There was a contract of lease entered. In the said contract, Ponciano agreed to lease a portion of the
Almeda Compund. It was renewed by respondent Bathala Marketing Industries Inc., as lessee,
represented by its president Ramon H. Gracia with Pociano L. ALmeda as lessor, husband of petitioner
Eufemia and father of petitioner Romel ALmeda. During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died.
Petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess and collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on its
monthly rentals and that the monthly rental should be increased by 73%. However Respondent refused
to pay the rentals.

Respondent then instituted an action for declaratory relief for the purposes of determining the correct
interpretation of the lease contract and to prevent damage and prejudice. Petitioners then filed an
action for ejectment, recission and damages. Petitioner then moved for the dismissal of the declaratory
relief because there was already a breach of the obligation. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC with modifications.

Hence the instant petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the action for declaratory relief is proper

RULING
Is the declaratory relief filed by the respondent proper? Supreme Court said YES. Why?

The High Tribunal ruled in this wise:

After the petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed,
respondent complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the
rentals stipulated therein. Respondent RELIGIOUSLY FULFILLED its obligations to petitioners even during
the pendency of the present suit. There is NO SHOWING that respondent committed an act constituting
a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is NOT BARRED from instituting before the
trial court the petition for declaratory relief. Put simply, respondent have not committed a breach of
the subject contract of lease.
On the claim that the instant petition is not proper because a separate action for recission, ejectment
and damages had been commenced before another court, this claim must FAIL. Supreme Court said, the
trial court HAD NOT YET RESOLVED the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the
declaratory relief petition. Hence, the instant petition should prosper.

Edades v. Edades, 99 Phil. 675

Facts: Plaintiff Juan Edades brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan seeking a declaratory judgment
on his hereditary rights in the property of his alleged father and incidentally the recognition of his status as an illegitimate son
of Emigdio Edades. The Edades siblings and their father (who was still alive) filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The motion to dismiss was sustained by CFI Pangasinan,
which held that an action for declaratory relief just for purpose of clearing away doubt, uncertainty, or insecurity to the one's
status or rights would be improper. Juan Edades appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the present action can be maintained.

Ruling: Yes, but not as an action for declaratory relief. The case does not fall under the authorized causes for an action for
declaratory relief. It does not concern a deed, will, contract or other written instrument. It does not affect a statute or
ordinance whose construction or validity is questioned.

The case is neither predicated on a justiciable controversy, considering that the father is still alive and there are no successional
rights yet to be resolved.

But the action is not merely aimed to determine the hereditary right of Juan. It has also the aim to establish his status as an
illegitimate child. Since this is his right, the action can prosper.

Disposition: Case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Hilarion C. Tolentino vs. THE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY, Robert Orr Ferguson And Hans Hausamann (1951)
FACTS: Petitioner filed an action for declaratory relief for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of section 16-A of
Commonwealth Act No. 3105, otherwise known as the Philippine Accountancy Law, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
342, on the ground that "it is a class legislation since by its terms it excludes persons engaged in other callings or professions
from adopting, acquiring or using a trade name in connection with the practice of such callings or professions." The action is
addressed against the Board of Accountancy, Robert Orr Ferguson, and Hans Hausamann and notice thereof has been served
on the Solicitor General under section 4 of rule 66 of the Rules of Court; but the Board of Accountancy did not answer the
complaint, nor has the Solicitor General intervened. Only Ferguson and Hausamann appeared and answered through counsel.
Attorney Claro M. Recto was allowed to intervene asamicus curiae. The parties are agreed as to the material facts alleged in the
pleadings. They are also agreed that the firm name "Fleming and WIlliamson" is an old trade name of accountants which was
used originally in 1952 by Messrs. D.M. Flemung and J. Williamson. The right to use this firm name was sold to various parties
until the end it was acquired at the defendants Robert Orr Ferguson and Hans Hausamann in 1946. The case was submitted for
judgment on the pleadings. After the parties had submitted their memoranda, the court dismissed the complaint holding that
the disputed law does not offend against the constitution. From that decision the plaintiff appealed to this Court.
ISSUES: (1) whether or not the plaintiff has sufficient cause of action to question the constitutionality of Commonwealth act
No. 342; and (2) whether or not said Act is constitutional.
HELD: Issue #1 - No sufficient cause of action In the present case, plaintiff does not claim having suffered any prejudice or
damage to him or to his rights or prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the disputed name by the defendants. His
complaint is rather addressed against the propriety of the use of said trade name by the defendants because it is misleading
and is liable to defraud the public. Plaintiff, therefore, has no actual justiciable controversy against the herein defendants which
may give him the right to secure relief by asserting the unconstitutionality of the law in question. Conditions / Requisites for
Declaratory Relief: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests
are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved
must be ripe for judicial determination. These requisite facts are wanting and, therefore, the complaint must fail for lack of
sufficient cause of action. Issue # 2 Act is NOT unconstitutional The law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The mere
fact that legislation is based on a classification and is made to apply only to a certain limited group of persons, and not to
others, does not affect its validity, if it is so made that all persons subject to its terms are treated alike under similar
circumstances and conditions. (12 A. Jur., 143.) The legislature may classify professions, occupations, and business, according to
natural and reasonable lines of distinction, and if a statute affects like all persons of the same class it is not invalid as class
legislation. The law does not preclude persons engaged in other professions from using trade names. While said Act does not
mention other professions, occupations or calling, it does not mean that they are precluded from using a trade name as this
privilege is likewise given to them in other similar laws. The law is not discriminatory. The claim that Commonwealth Act No.
342 is discriminatory because it was approved only to protect foreign accountants has no basis in law or in fact, for there is
nothing that bears it out. Said Act applies to all accountants in general without distinction. The law does not contravene the
principles of separation of powers. The Act does not encroach upon the powers of the Executive Department as represented by
the Board of Accountancy simply because it attempts to regulate the profession of accountants. If our legislature can create the
Board of Accountancy, it can certainly amend the law that gave life to it without in any way encrouching on the prerogatives of
the Executive Department of our government. Petition DENIED. Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

RULE 64 REVIEW on JUDGEMENTS BY COMELEC and
COA

RULE 64 SEC. 1
G.R. No. 152163
November 18, 2002
SABDULLAH T. MACABAGO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAMAEL M. SALACOP, respondents. D E
C I S I O N CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS: On May 22, 2001, petitioner Sabdullah T. Macabago was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the
winning candidate for the position of Municipal Mayor of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. Petitioner had a lead of 198 votes over his
adversary, private respondent Jamael M. Salacop. On June 1, 2001, private respondent filed a petition with the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) against petitioner and the proclaimed Vice-Mayor and Municipal Councilors, as well as the
members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, docketed as SPC-01-234, to annul the elections and the proclamation of
candidates in the Municipality of Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur. Private respondent alleged that there was a massive substitution
of voters, rampant and pervasive irregularities in voting procedures in Precincts Nos. 19, 20, 28 and 29, and a failure of the
Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) to comply with Sections 28 and 29 of Comelec Resolution No. 3743 and Section 193 of
the Omnibus Election Code, thus rendering the election process in those precincts a sham and a mockery and the
proclamation of the winning candidates a nullity. Private respondent further averred that if his petition were to be given due
course, he would win by a margin of one hundred ninety-four (194) votes over the votes of petitioner. He thus prayed:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission that the
election results in Precincts 19, 20, 28 and 29 be ordered set aside and considered excluded and the proclamation of the
winning candidates in the said municipality be ANNULLED to reflect the genuine desire of the majority of the people. All
other reliefs, deemed just and equitable under the circumstances are likewise prayed for."1 In support of his petition, private
respondent appended thereto photocopies of random Voters Registration Records (VRRs) evidencing the fraud and deceit
that allegedly permeated the electoral process, as well as affidavits tending to prove that serious irregularities were
committed in the conduct of the elections in the subject precincts.2 In his answer, petitioner denied the truth of the material
allegations in the petition and averred that it raised a pre-proclamation controversy. He further alleged that the grounds
relied upon by private respondent would be proper in an election protest but not in a pre-proclamation controversy.3 The
COMELEC En Banc took cognizance of the petition and on February 11, 2002, issued an order directing the Election Officer
of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur, to bring to and produce before the COMELEC Office in Manila the original VRRs of the
questioned precincts for technical examination: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission hereby RESOLVES
to direct Mr. Ibrahim M. Macadato, the Election Officer of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur to produce the subject original VRR's of
the questioned precincts here in Manila for the appertaining technical examination. SO ORDERED."4 In the same order, the
COMELEC declared that contrary to petitioner's claims, the petition did not allege a pre-proclamation controversy. The
Commission characterized the petition as one for the annulment of the election or declaration of failure of election in the
municipality, a special action covered by Rule 26 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Accordingly, the COMELEC set
aside the docketing of the petition as a Special Case (SPC) and ordered the redocketing thereof as a Special Action (SPA).
After its examination of the evidence submitted by petitioner, the COMELEC concluded that there was convincing proof of
massive fraud in the conduct of the elections in the four (4) precincts that necessitated a technical examination of the
original copies of the VRRs and their comparison with the voters' signatures and fingerprints. The COMELEC further noted
that since the lead of Macabago was only 124 votes vis--vis the 474 voters of the contested precincts, the outcome of the
petition would adversely affect the result of the elections in the Municipality. In issuing said Order, the COMELEC relied on
its broad powers under the 1987 Constitution and the pronouncement of this Court in Pantaleon Pacis vs. Commission on
Elections,5 and Tupay Loong vs. Commission on Elections, et al. ISSUE: WON COMELEC COMMITED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION? RULING: Petitioner avers that he was impelled to file the instant petition without first filing with the
COMELEC a motion for a reconsideration of its order because under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for a
reconsideration of an interlocutory order of the COMELEC En Banc is a prohibited pleading, and that the COMELEC acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order. Private respondent on
the other hand insists that under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a special civil action for certiorari filed with
this Court is proper only for the nullification of a final order or resolution of the COMELEC and not of its interlocutory order or
resolution such as the assailed order in this case. Section 1, Rule 64, as amended, reads: "SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule
shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit."8 Under Section 2 of the same Rule, a judgment or final order or resolution of the COMELEC may be brought by the
aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65, as amended, except as therein provided. We ruled inElpidio M.
Salva, et al. vs. Hon. Roberto L. Makalintal, et al.9 that Rule 64 of the Rules applies only to judgments or final orders of the
COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The rule does not apply to interlocutory orders of the COMELEC in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions or to its administrative orders. In this case, the assailed order of the COMELEC
declaring private respondent's petition to be one for annulment of the elections or for a declaration of a failure of elections in
the municipality and ordering the production of the original copies of the VRRs for the technical examination is administrati ve
in nature.10 Rule 64, a procedural device for the review of final orders, resolutions or decision of the COMELEC, does not
foreclose recourse to this Court under Rule 65 from administrative orders of said Commission issued in the exercise of its
administrative function.11 It bears stressing that under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, judicial power is vested in
the courts. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Judicial power is an antidote
to and a safety net against whimsical, despotic and oppressive exercise of governmental power. The aggrieved party may
seek redress therefrom through the appropriate special civil action provided by the Rules of Court. As to acts of the
COMELEC, the special civil action may be one for certiorari pursuant to Article IX(A), Section 7 of the Constitution. As a
general rule, an administrative order of the COMELEC is not a proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari.12 But
when the COMELEC acts capriciously or whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing such an order, the aggrieved party may seek redress from this Court via a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.13 Private respondent cannot find solace in the pronouncement in Ruperto Ambil, Jr.
vs. Commission on Elections, et al.14 because the subject matter of the petition therein was an interlocutory order of a
Division of the COMELEC. This Court held that the remedy of the aggrieved party was first to file a motion for a
reconsideration of the order with the COMELEC En Banc. The raison d'etre therefor is that under Rule 3, Section 6(c) of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, any motion for a reconsideration of a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division of the
COMELEC has to be referred to and resolved by the Commission sitting En Banc. A motion for reconsideration filed with the
COMELEC En Banc of an order, ruling or resolution of a Division thereof is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy therefrom.

G.R. No. 194139 January 24, 2012
DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA, Respondents.

Facts:
The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of Governor of the
Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. Petitioner was
proclaimed the winner with 163,440 votes while respondent Bautista has 159,527 votes only.
Respondent Bautista filed an electoral protest alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and
violations of election laws, rules and resolutions.
In his answer, the petitioner averred as his special affirmative defenses that Bautista did not make the
requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or
omissions complained of.
On August 13, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed order denying the special affirmative
defenses of the petitioner. It declared that the payment made by Protestant (Bautista) is a substantial
compliance with the requirement of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804. Furthermore, the Protestant has likewise
essentially complied with Section 7(g), Rule 6 of the above-mentioned Resolution.
The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not discuss whether the protest
specified the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the elections, in violation of Section 2, paragraph 2, Rule
19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, requiring all decisions to clearly and distinctly express the facts and the
law on which they were based; and that it also contravened Section 7(g), Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No.
8804 requiring a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. He prayed that the matter be
certified to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Section 1, Section 5, and Section 6, all of Rule 20 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804. The petitioner insisted that COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 had introduced the
requirement for the "detailed specification" to prevent "shotgun fishing expeditions by losing
candidates;" that such requirement contrasted with Rule 6, Section 1 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, under which the protest needed only to contain a "concise statement of the ultimate facts"
constituting the cause or causes of action; that Bautistas protest did not meet the new requirement under
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.
In his opposition, Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be
elevated to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to the ruling in Panlilio v. COMELEC; that the rules of the
COMELEC required the initiatory petition to specify the acts or omissions constituting the electoral frauds,
anomalies and election irregularities, and to contain the ultimate facts upon which the cause of action was
based.
On October 7, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed order, denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration for failing to show that the first order was contrary to law.
Without going into the merits of the protest, the allegations in the protestants petition have substantially
complied with the requirements of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 that will warrant the opening of the ballot
boxes in order to resolve not only the issues raised in the protest but also those set forth in the Protesteesanswer.
When substantial compliance with the rules is satisfied, allowing the protest to proceed is the best way of
removing any doubt or uncertainty as to the true will of the electorate. All other issues laid down in the parties
pleadings, including those in the Protestees special and affirmative defenses and those expressed in the
preliminary conference brief, will best be threshed out in the final resolution of the instant case.
The prayer to elevate the instant Motion for Reconsideration to the Commission En Banc is DENIED considering
that the 13 August 2010 Order is merely interlocutory and it does not dispose of the instant case with finality,
in accordance with Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Hence, petitioner commenced special civil action of Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court.
Petitioners Contention:
1. Section 9, Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 obliged the COMELEC First Division to
summarily dismiss the protest for being insufficient in form and content.
2. The protest be considered as a mere fishing expedition to be outrightly dismissed in light of the
elections being held under an automated system.

Respondent, together with OSG, contention:
1. The COMELEC had the power and prerogative to determine the sufficiency of the allegations of
an election protest; and that certiorari did not lie because the COMELEC First Division acted
within its discretion.
2. In addition, OSG maintains that the assailed orders, being interlocutory, are not the proper subjects
of a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the assailed orders of the COMELEC are not subject of a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 64.

Courts Ruling:
NO.
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not
extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no
power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the
COMELEC.
Therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by
the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the
petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result
should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along
with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.
There may be an exception to the general rule. Under the exception, the Court may take cognizance of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on
the ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically
provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and
consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to
the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the
COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order
can be reviewed.

However, the Kho v. Commission on Elections exception has no application herein, because the COMELEC First
Division had the competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained
of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the
outright dismissal of the protest.

RULE 64.

Rule 64: (Scope) Reyna v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167219, 8 February 2011

Doctrine: It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, are generally
accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of
their expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction.

FACTS:

Petitioners Ruben Reyna (Reyna) and Lloyd Soria (Soria) are Senior Field Operations Specialist and Loans
and Credit Analyst II, respectively, of the Land Banks branch in Ipil, Zamboangadel Sur.Ipil Branch
received loan applications from four farmers cooperatives under the banks cattle financing program.
To process the applications, each cooperative accomplished a Credit Facility Proposal (CFP), which
required that they execute a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with their proposed cattle supplier,
Remad Livestock Corporation (Remad). Consequently, after approval of the loan applications, the Ipil
Branch issued to Remad advance payment for the cattle to be released. But, because of foot-and-mouth
disease that broke out among its herds, Remad failed to make the deliveries when they fell due.

During a post audit, the Land Bank disallowed the advance payment under CSB 95-005 and Notices of
Disallowance. She pointed out that the Ipil Branch paid for the cattle in advance in violation of the Land
Bank Manual on Field Office Group (FOG) Lending Operations and Commission on Audit (COA) rules and
regulations. However, such disallowance was not on account of evidence of dishonest connivance with
the farmers cooperatives and their cattle supplier.

The bank branchs resident auditor held Reyna and Soria, together with four other employees of the Ipil
Branch, personally liable for the disallowed advances. This led to the filing of a criminal complaint
against the bank officers and employees with the Office of the Ombudsman for gross negligence,
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the bank, and
giving unwarranted benefits to persons, causing undue injury

COA Regional Office - affirmed the findings of the auditor.
Ombudsman - dismissed the charges against the Ipil Branch officers and employees for lack of sufficient
evidence to support a finding of probable cause against them regarding the charges.

COA affirmed the findings of the local auditor and held that the Ombudsmans dismissal of the
charges against the Land Bank officers and employees did not affect the validity of the disallowance
which had already become final and executory. Also, it ruled that the criminal case before the
Ombudsman was distinct and separate from the disallowance case which was civil in nature.

ISSUES:

WON COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in declaring the
prepayment stipulation in the contract between the bank and remad proscribed by section 103 of the
state audit code of the philippines.


RULING:

To emphasize, the Auditor noted that nowhere in the documents reviewed disclosed about
prepayment scheme with REMAD. It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such
as the COA, are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by substantial
evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction.

If the prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners should have produced the document to
prove such fact as alleged by them in the present petition. However, as stated before, even this Court is
at a loss as to whether the prepayment scheme was authorized as a review of the document (CATTLE
BREEDING AND BUY BACK MARKETING AGREEMENT ) to which petitioners base their authority to make
advance payments, does not contain such a stipulation or provision. Highlighted also is the fact that
petitioners clearly violated the procedure in releasing loans found in the Manual on Lending Operations
which provides that payments to the dealer shall only be made after presentation of reimbursement
documents acknowledged by the authorized LBP representative that the same has been delivered.

Based on the foregoing, the COA should, therefore, not be faulted for finding that petitioners facilitated
the commission of the irregular transaction. The evidence they presented before the COA was
insufficient to prove their case. So also, even this Court is at a loss as to the truthfulness and veracity of
petitioners' allegations as they did not even present before this Court the documents that would serve
as the basis for their claims.


Mode of Review (Section 2)

G.R. No. 192289 January 8, 2013
KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROLAN G. BUAGAS, Respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner, Kamarudin K. Ibrahim, filed his certificate of candidacy to run as Vice-
Mayor of Datu-Unsay in the May 10, 2010 elections.
On the other hand, respondent, Rolan G. Buagas is the Acting Election Officer in
the said municipality. He forwarded to the COMELECs Law Department the names of
candidates who were not registered voters therein which include petitioners name,
along with those of two candidates for mayor, one for vice-mayor and 16 for councilor.
Pursuant thereto, COMELECs Law Department passed a Memorandum to the
COMELEC en banc the names of 56 candidates running for various posts in
Maguindanao and Davao del Sur who were not registered voters of the municipalities
where they sought to be elected. The Law Department recommended the retention of
the said names in the Certified List of Candidates, but for the COMELEC to motupropio
institute actions against them for disqualification and for violation of election laws.
Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc issuedMinute Resolution No. 09-0946
approving but with modification, the LawDepartments recommendation. It
disqualifypetitionerfrom the 2010 Vice-Mayoralty race for supposedly not being a
registered voter of the said municipality.
Petitioner, together with 50 other candidates filed a Petition/Opposition assailing
the COMELEC Resolution contending that some of those affected by the Resolution
had participated as candidates in the 2004 and 2007 elections, thus, if they were not
registered voters, they should have been disqualified then. Further, it was emphasized
that the candidates who filed the Petition/Opposition were permanent residents and
were domiciled at the place where they sought to be elected.
However, the COMELEC en banc denied its Petition/Opposition declaring that
the Resolution was issued by respondent and Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of
Maguindanao stating that Ibrahim and the other candidates were not registered voters
of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao. The certification was issued in the performance of official
duty, hence, the presumption of regularity attached to it in the absence of contrary
evidence.
During the 2010 elections, without the Resolution attaining finality, Ibrahim won
obtaining 446 votes.However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC), which was
then chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahims proclamation.
Hence, petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order filed
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court assailing the respondent COMELEC resolutions.
Petitioner contends that MBOC is a ministerial body created merely "to take the returns
as made from the different voting precincts, add them up and declare the result." Since
he received the highest number of votes for Vice-Mayor, all possible doubts should be
resolved in favor of his eligibility.
Moreover, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) proposes for Ibrahims
petition be granted on the lack of proper proceedings by the COMELEC on their
issuances because IBRAHIM was disqualified as a candidate. Further, jurisdiction over
petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy pertains to the COMELEC sitting in division
and not to the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc can only take cognizance
of petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy when the required number of votes for a
division to reach a decision, ruling, order or resolution is not obtained, or when motions
for reconsideration are filed to assail the said issuances of a division.
On the part of the COMELEC, it assails that Ibrahims immediate resort to the
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is improper. COMELEC
argued that despite the issuance of the assailed resolutions, Ibrahims name was not
stricken off from the certified list of candidates and the votes cast for him were counted.
Thus, there is no actual prejudice caused upon him becausethe COMELEC did not
direct the MBOC to suspend his proclamation. Also, Ibrahim should have instead filed a
pre-proclamation controversy before the COMELEC anchored on the supposed illegality
of the MBOCs proceedings.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is correct in directly filing the Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions issued by the
COMELEC en banc.

Courts Ruling:
YES.
The Court held that Ibrahim properly resorted to the instant Petition filed under
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to assail the Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and
May 6, 2010 of the COMELEC en banc.
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially provides that
any decision, order or ruling of any of the Constitutional Commissions may be brought
for review to the Supreme Court on certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy
thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions rendered or issued by the COMELEC en banc
must be final and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power. Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that it shall govern the
review of final judgments and orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit.
Moreover, the assailed Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010
were issued with finality by the COMELEC en banc. Under the Constitution and the
Rules of Court, the said resolutions can be reviewed by way of filing before us a petition
for certiorari. Besides, the issues raised do not at all relate to alleged irregularities in the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or to
the composition and proceedings of the board of canvassers. What the instant Petition
challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahims proclamation and of the
COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed resolutions. The crux of the instant Petition
does not qualify as one which can be raised as a pre-proclamation controversy.



Note:
The two assailed Resolutions issued by COMELEC en banc:
(a) Minute Resolution No. 09-0946(December 22, 2009 Resolution), dated
December 22, 2009, disqualifying the petitioner herein, Kamarudin K. Ibrahim
(Ibrahim), from the 2010 Vice-Mayoralty race in Datu Unsay, Maguindanao for
supposedly not being a registered voter of the said municipality; and
(b) Resolution (May 6, 2010 Resolution) issued on May 6, 2010, relative to
SPA Case No. 10-002 (MP) LOCAL, denying Ibrahims opposition to Resolution
No. 09-0946.


Mode of Review (Section 2)

G.R. No. 192289 January 8, 2013
KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROLAN G. BUAGAS, Respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner, Kamarudin K. Ibrahim, filed his certificate of candidacy to run as Vice-
Mayor of Datu-Unsay in the May 10, 2010 elections.
On the other hand, respondent, Rolan G. Buagas is the Acting Election Officer in
the said municipality. He forwarded to the COMELECs Law Department the names of
candidates who were not registered voters therein which include petitioners name,
along with those of two candidates for mayor, one for vice-mayor and 16 for councilor.
Pursuant thereto, COMELECs Law Department passed a Memorandum to the
COMELEC en banc the names of 56 candidates running for various posts in
Maguindanao and Davao del Sur who were not registered voters of the municipalities
where they sought to be elected. The Law Department recommended the retention of
the said names in the Certified List of Candidates, but for the COMELEC to motupropio
institute actions against them for disqualification and for violation of election laws.
Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc issuedMinute Resolution No. 09-0946
approving but with modification, the LawDepartments recommendation. It
disqualifypetitionerfrom the 2010 Vice-Mayoralty race for supposedly not being a
registered voter of the said municipality.
Petitioner, together with 50 other candidates filed a Petition/Opposition assailing
the COMELEC Resolution contending that some of those affected by the Resolution
had participated as candidates in the 2004 and 2007 elections, thus, if they were not
registered voters, they should have been disqualified then. Further, it was emphasized
that the candidates who filed the Petition/Opposition were permanent residents and
were domiciled at the place where they sought to be elected.
However, the COMELEC en banc denied its Petition/Opposition declaring that
the Resolution was issued by respondent and Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of
Maguindanao stating that Ibrahim and the other candidates were not registered voters
of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao. The certification was issued in the performance of official
duty, hence, the presumption of regularity attached to it in the absence of contrary
evidence.
During the 2010 elections, without the Resolution attaining finality, Ibrahim won
obtaining 446 votes.However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC), which was
then chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahims proclamation.
Hence, petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order filed
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court assailing the respondent COMELEC resolutions.
Petitioner contends that MBOC is a ministerial body created merely "to take the returns
as made from the different voting precincts, add them up and declare the result." Since
he received the highest number of votes for Vice-Mayor, all possible doubts should be
resolved in favor of his eligibility.
Moreover, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) proposes for Ibrahims
petition be granted on the lack of proper proceedings by the COMELEC on their
issuances because IBRAHIM was disqualified as a candidate. Further, jurisdiction over
petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy pertains to the COMELEC sitting in division
and not to the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc can only take cognizance
of petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy when the required number of votes for a
division to reach a decision, ruling, order or resolution is not obtained, or when motions
for reconsideration are filed to assail the said issuances of a division.
On the part of the COMELEC, it assails that Ibrahims immediate resort to the
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is improper. COMELEC
argued that despite the issuance of the assailed resolutions, Ibrahims name was not
stricken off from the certified list of candidates and the votes cast for him were counted.
Thus, there is no actual prejudice caused upon him becausethe COMELEC did not
direct the MBOC to suspend his proclamation. Also, Ibrahim should have instead filed a
pre-proclamation controversy before the COMELEC anchored on the supposed illegality
of the MBOCs proceedings.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is correct in directly filing the Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions issued by the
COMELEC en banc.

Courts Ruling:
YES.
The Court held that Ibrahim properly resorted to the instant Petition filed under
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to assail the Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and
May 6, 2010 of the COMELEC en banc.
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially provides that
any decision, order or ruling of any of the Constitutional Commissions may be brought
for review to the Supreme Court on certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy
thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions rendered or issued by the COMELEC en banc
must be final and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power. Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that it shall govern the
review of final judgments and orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit.
Moreover, the assailed Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010
were issued with finality by the COMELEC en banc. Under the Constitution and the
Rules of Court, the said resolutions can be reviewed by way of filing before us a petition
for certiorari. Besides, the issues raised do not at all relate to alleged irregularities in the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or to
the composition and proceedings of the board of canvassers. What the instant Petition
challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahims proclamation and of the
COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed resolutions. The crux of the instant Petition
does not qualify as one which can be raised as a pre-proclamation controversy.



Note:
The two assailed Resolutions issued by COMELEC en banc:
(a) Minute Resolution No. 09-0946(December 22, 2009 Resolution), dated
December 22, 2009, disqualifying the petitioner herein, Kamarudin K. Ibrahim
(Ibrahim), from the 2010 Vice-Mayoralty race in Datu Unsay, Maguindanao for
supposedly not being a registered voter of the said municipality; and
(b) Resolution (May 6, 2010 Resolution) issued on May 6, 2010, relative to
SPA Case No. 10-002 (MP) LOCAL, denying Ibrahims opposition to Resolution
No. 09-0946.

ROBERTO B. REBLORA, Petitioner, vs. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. G.R. No. 195842 June 18, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner prior to rendering active service to AFP worked in DILG for 4 years and 5 months. In
AFP his total service was 30 years. Upon his retirement the AFP did not include the length of
time he rendered in DILG in the computation of his retirement benefits. The petitioner disagreed
with computation of the AFP. He insisted that the computation of his retirement benefit should
include the period of his civilian government service at the DILG immediately before he entered
military service. He argued that the computation of the AFP does not reflect the true length of his
military service of thirty-four (34) years and that it is, in fact, a full four (4) years short.
Petitioner thus claims that he is entitled to P135,991.81 in additional retirement benefit. AFP did
not grant the additional claim thus petitioner went to COA for review of the AFPs decision.
COA did not agree to AFPs computation but offered a different computation . COA included the
services he rendered in DILG but excluded the services he rendered after he reached the 30 years
service requirement to the effect that after that period he was already deemed resigned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COA was correct?
HELD:
In the assailed Decision and Resolution, the COA correctly held that for purposes of computing
his retirement benefits under PD No 1638, as amended, petitioner should have been considered
compulsorily retired as of 22 May 2000 per Section 5(a) of the same law. This is so because it
was on 22 May 2000 that petitioner reached the age of fifty-six (56) after a total of thirty-one
(31) years in active servicefulfilling thereby the conditions for compulsory retirement under
the said section. In coming up with such a conclusion, the COA most certainly reckoned the
beginning of petitioners active service in the military from his stint as civilian worker at the
DILG.
The inclusion of petitioners civilian government service at the DILG in the computation of his
length of active service in the military, on the other hand, is only but proper in light of Section 3
of PD No. 1638, as amended.
It thus becomes clear that the petitioners claim for additional retirement benefits corresponding
to his civilian service at the DILG is actually quite misplaced when made as against the COA.
While the COA denied petitioners claim, it did not actually conform in toto with the earlier
computation made by the AFP. The clear import of the assailed COA Decision and Resolution is
that petitioners civilian service at the DILG should be included in his active military service for
the purpose of computing his retirement benefits under PD No. 1638 only that the services he
rendered after 22 May 2000, for reasons explained above, should also be excluded from the same
computation.
The COA denied petitioners claim for additional retirement benefit because when petitioner was
considered as compulsory retired as of 22 May 2000 pursuant to PD No. 1638, instead of 22 May
2003, it found that petitioner was not underpaid but was actually overpaid his retirement benefits
in the amount of P77,807.16. This is what was being referred to by the COA when it disposed
that, even if so, the payment of petitioners retirement benefits "should be in accordance with PD
No. 1638."We find that the COA made no error of judgment, much less committed any error of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, in disposing so.

G.R. No. 201796 January 15, 2013
GOVERNOR SADIKUL A. SAHALI and VICE-GOVERNOR RUBY M. SAHALl, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), RASHIDIN H. MA TBA and JILKASI J.
USMAN,Respondents.
Facts:
During the May 10, 2010 elections, Sadikul and private respondent Rashidin H. Matba (Matba) were
two of the four candidates who ran for the position of governor in the Province of Tawi-Tawi while
Ruby and private respondent Jilkasi J. Usman (Usman) ran for the position of Vice-Governor.
2

On May 14, 2010, the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed petitioners Sadikul and
Ruby as the duly elected governor and vice-governor, respectively, of the province of Tawi-
Tawi. Alleging that the said elections in the Province of Tawi-Tawi were attended by massive and
wide-scale irregularities, Matba filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam
5
with the COMELEC. Usman
also filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam
6
with the COMELEC, contesting the results in 39 out of
the 282 clustered precincts in the Province of Tawi-Tawi. Usmans election protest was likewise
raffled to the First Division of the COMELEC. On February 20, 2012, the COMELEC First Division
ordered the recount of the contested ballots, directing the creation of five recount committees for the
said purpose.
13

On February 24, 2012, Matba and Usman filed a Manifestation and Ex-Parte Motion (Re: Order
Dated 20 February 2012), requesting that they be allowed to secure photocopies of the contested
ballots. Further, they moved for a technical examination of the EDCVL, the VRR and the Book of
Voters for the contested precincts in the province of Tawi-Tawi by comparing the signature and the
thumbmarks appearing on the EDCVL as against those appearing on the VRRs and the Book of
Voters.
On March 5, 2012, the COMELEC First Division issued an Order
15
which granted the said ex-parte
motion filed by Matba and Usman.On March 9, 2012, Sadikul and Ruby jointly filed with the
COMELEC First Division a Strong Manifestation of Grave Concern and Motion for Reconsideration.
On May 3, 2012, the COMELEC First Division issued the herein assailed Order
20
which denied the
said motion for reconsideration of the March 5, 2012 Order filed by Sadikul and Ruby. The
COMELEC First Division maintained that Sadikul and Ruby were not deprived of due process. It
pointed out that the intention of Matba and Usman to ask for the technical examination of the said
election documents had always been apparent from the filing of their separate election protests,
preliminary conference briefs and their intention to offer as evidence all election documents and
paraphernalia such as the EDCVL, VRRs and Book of Voters on the protested precincts.
Hence, petitioners Sadikul and Ruby filed the instant petition with this Court essentially asserting that
the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
The petitioners resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to assail an interlocutory order issued
by the COMELEC First Division is amiss. "A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the COMELEC in an election protest may not directly assail the order in this Court
through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order
during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course."
Under the Constitution, the power of this Court to review election cases falling within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC only extends to final decisions or resolutions of the
COMELEC en banc, not to interlocutory orders issued by a Division thereof.
The petitioners reliance on Kho is misplaced. In Kho, the issue was whether a Division of the
COMELEC may admit an answer with counter-protest which was filed beyond the reglementary
period. This Court held that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion when it
admitted the answer with counter-protest that was belatedly filed.
On the propriety of a filing a Petition for Certiorari with this Court sans any motion for reconsideration
having been filed with the COMELEC en banc, it was held therein that, as an exception, direct resort
to this Court via certiorari assailing an interlocutory order may be allowed when a Division of the
COMELEC commits grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F.
VILLANDO
[G.R. Nos. 178831-32. April 1, 2009.]
FACTS:
Limkaichong run for the position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. This
was opposed by concerned citizens such as Napoleon Camero and Renald F. Villando who sought
disqualification on the ground that she lacked the citizenship requirement of a Member of the House of
Representatives.

Limkaichong, in her answer, claimed that she is anatural-born Filipino since she was born to a
naturalized Filipino father and anatural-born Filipino mother, who had reacquired her status as such due
to herhusband's naturalization. Thus, at the time of her birthnineteen (19) days had already passed after
her father took his Oath of Allegiancewas issued a Certificate of Naturalization on thesame day. She
contended that the COMELEC should dismiss the petitions outrightfor lack of cause of action, failure to
question the qualification based on Section 78 of Omnibus Election code andit were dismissible on the
ground that they were in the nature of acollateral attack on her and her father's citizenships, in
contravention of the well-established rule that attack on one's citizenship may only be made through a
direct action for its nullity.

The cases were consolidated and remained pending when the elections were conducted. After
the elections, Limkaichong emerged as the winner.

Paras, her opponent, filed with the COMELEC a Very Urgent Motion for Leave to intervene and
to suspend the Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong as Winning Candidate of the First District of
Negros Oriental.

COMELEC Second Division:
Granted the disqualification cases, directed the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC to strike
out her name from the list of eligible candidates, and for the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend
her proclamation. It ruled that naturalization proceeding of petitioners father did not attain finality for
said proceeding was defective. It deprived the Solicitor General the chance to participate in the
proceeding. This was fatal to the naturalization of petitioners father. Her fathers failure to acquire
Philippine Citizenship renders petitioner unable to comply with the citizenship requirement.
Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration.

COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending
the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases.

The PBOC, in compliance with COMELEC Resolution No. 8062, reconvened and proclaimed
Limkaichong as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the First District of Negros
Oriental.

Paras filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Nullify and/or Annul the Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy-
Limkaichong as First District Representative of Negros Oriental stating, among others, that
Limkaichong's proclamation violated the earlier order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending her
proclamation.

COMELEC First Division:
It dismissed the petition ratiocinating that the disqualification cases were not yet final when
Limkaichong was proclaimed. Accordingly, her proclamation which was valid or legal, effectively
divested the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over the cases.

Limkaichong then filed motion to dismiss other petitions contending COMELEC has lost
jurisdiction upon her assumption of office. She argues that HRET now has jurisdiction.

Because of the COMELECs failure to provide clarification, Limkaichong filed Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying for the
annulment of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and the June 29, 2007 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc in the disqualification cases for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. She averred that since she was already proclaimed on May 25, 2007 as
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental, had assumed office on June 30, 2007, and had
started to perform her duties and functions as such, the COMELEC had lost its jurisdiction and it is now
the HRET which has jurisdiction over any issue involving her qualifications for the said office.

On August 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc ruled on Limkaichong's manifestation and motion for
clarification. It ruled allpending incidents relating to the qualifications of Limkaichong should now be
determined by the House of RepresentativesElectoral Tribunal in accordance with the above-quoted
provision of theConstitution.

Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) and Paras on different datespetitioned the court to declare petitioner
disqualified.

The Court consolidatedthe petitions.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Limkaichong's proclamation was valid.
2. Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclamation, the HRET, instead of theCOMELEC, should assume
jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.
3. Whether the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banccorrectly disqualified
Limkaichong on the ground that she is not a naturalbornFilipino citizen.
4. Whether the COMELEC's disqualification of Limkaichong is final andexecutory.
5. Whether the Speaker of the House of Representatives may be compelledto prohibit
Limkaichong from assuming her duties as a Member of theHouse of Representatives

HELD:
1. Yes. Limkaichongs timely motion for reconsideration suspended the decision disqualifying her.
Since the execution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of
petitioner.
2. Yes. The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate hasbeen proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of theHouse of Representatives, the COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contestsrelating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winningcandidate
divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it atthe time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should nowpresent his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionallymandated tribunal to hear and decide a case
involving a Member of the House ofRepresentatives with respect to the latter's election, returns
and qualifications. Theuse of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in
Section250 62 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdictionover
election contests relating to its members.
3. Court cannot resolve the matter of Limkaichong's citizenship as the same should havebeen
challenged in appropriate proceedings.
4. Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifyingLimkaichong and suspending her
proclamation cannot yet be implementedconsidering that she timely filed a motion for
reconsideration. Thus, pursuant toSection 13 (c), Rule 18 and Section 2 Rule 19 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure,the Joint Resolution has not yet attained finality for it to be
implemented.Notably, the seeming impropriety of the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
datedJune 29, 2007 has since been remedied by the promulgation of its Resolution datedAugust
16, 2007, recognizing that it no longer has jurisdiction over thedisqualification cases following
the valid proclamation of Limkaichong and herassumption of office as a Member of the House of
Representatives.
5. No. The unseating of a Member of the House ofRepresentatives should be exercised with great
caution and after the properproceedings for the ouster has been validly completed. For to
arbitrarily unseatsomeone, who obtained the highest number of votes in the elections, and
duringthe pendency of the proceedings determining one's qualification or disqualification,would
amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides
6.
PATES vs COMELEC

FACTS:
Taking into account the following material antecedents:
a. February 1, 2008 The COMELEC First Division issued its Resolution (assailed in the
petition);b. February 4, 2008 The counsel for petitioner Nilo T. Pates (petitioner) received a copy of
the February 1, 2008 Resolution;c. February 8, 2008 The petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration
(MR) of the February 1, 2008 Resolution (4 days from receipt of theFebruary 1,
2008 Resolution)d. September 18, 2008 The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying the
petitioners MR (also assailed in the petition).e. September 22, 2008 The petitioner received the
COMELEC en banc Resolution of September 18, 2008

Under this chronology, the last day for the filing of a petition for certiorari fell on a Saturday (October 18,
2008), as the petitioner only had the remaining period of 26 days to file his petition, after using up 4 days in
preparing and filing his Motion for Reconsideration. Effectively, the last day for filing was October 20, 2008
the following Monday or the first working day after October 18, 2008. The petitioner filed his petition with us
on October 22, 2008 or two days late; hence, our Resolution of dismissal of November 11, 2008.

The petitioner asks us in his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Reiteration for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order to reverse the dismissal of his petition, arguing that the petition was
seasonably filed under the fresh period rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in a number of cases decided
beginning the year 2005. The fresh period refers to the original period provided under the Rules of Court
counted from notice of the ruling on the motion for reconsideration by the tribunal below, without deducting
the period for the preparation and filing of the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON Rule 65 of the Rules of Court should be used for review of judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC.

RULING:
As a Matter of Law

Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless otherwise provided by the
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules
of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and
the Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition
forcertiorari, subject to the exception clause except as hereinafter provided.

Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter rule. They exist
as separate rules for substantive reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the most patent difference
between the two i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to is Section 3 which provides for a
special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The
period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the
intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally-
granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).

Significantly, the petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance or any compelling reason
to warrant the non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his petition. He failed to explain why his filing was
late. Other than his appeal to history, uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain why we should adopt
and apply the fresh period rule to an election case.

To us, the petitioners omissions are fatal, as his motion does not provide us any reason specific to his
case why we should act as he advocates.

OSMENA vs COA

Facts: The City of Cebu was to play host to the 1994 Palarong Pambansa (Palaro). In preparation for the
games, the City engaged the services of WT Construction, Inc. (WTCI) and Dakay Construction and
Development Company (DCDC) to construct and renovate the Cebu City Sports Complex. While the
construction was being undertaken, Osmea issued a total of 20 Change/Extra Work Orders to WTCI.
These Change/Extra Work Orders were not covered by any Supplemental Agreement, nor was there a
prior authorization from the Sanggunian. Nevertheless, the work proceeded on account of the
extreme urgency and need to have a suitable venue for the Palaro.

Thereafter, WTCI and DCDC demanded payment for the extra work they performed in the construction
and renovation of the sports complex. A Sanggunian member sponsored a resolution authorizing
Osmea to execute the supplemental agreements with WTCI and DCDC to cover the extra work
performed, but the other Sanggunian members refused to pass the resolution. Thus, the extra work
completed by WTCI and DCDC was not covered by the necessary appropriation to effect payment,
prompting them to file two separate collection cases before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City
(Civil Case Nos. CEB-17004[5] and CEB-17155[6]). The RTC found the claims meritorious, and ordered
the City to pay for the extra work performed.

During post-audit, the City Auditor issued two notices disallowing the payment of litigation expenses,
damages, and attorneys fees to WTCI and DCDC. These amounts, the City Auditor concluded, were
unnecessary expenses for which the public officers should be held liable in their personal capacities
pursuant to the law.

Osmea and the members of the Sanggunian sought reconsideration of the disallowance with the COA
Regional Office, which modified the City Auditors Decision by absolving the members of the sanggunian
from any liability. It declared that the payment of the amounts awarded as damages and attorneys fees
should solely be Osmeas liability, as it was him who ordered the change or extra work orders without
the supplemental agreement required by law, or the prior authorization from the Sanggunian. The
Sanggunian members cannot be held liable for refusing to enact the necessary ordinance appropriating
funds for the judgment award because they are supposed to exercise their own judgment and discretion
in the performance of their functions; they cannot be mere rubber stamps of the city mayor.

The COA Regional Offices Decision was sustained by the COAs National Director for Legal and
Adjudication (Local Sector) in a Decision dated January 16, 2004. Osmea filed an appeal against this
Decision.

PETITION: Osmea filed his motion for reconsideration, of the COAs May 6, 2008 Decision, 18 days
from his receipt thereof, leaving him with 12 days to file a Rule 64 petition against the COA ruling. He
argues that the remaining period should be counted not from the receipt of the COAs June 8, 2009
Resolution by the Office of the Mayor of Cebu City on June 29, 2009, but from the time he officially
reported back to his office on July 15, 2009, after his trip abroad. Since he is being made liable in his
personal capacity, he reasons that the remaining period should be counted from his actual knowledge of
the denial of his motion for reconsideration. Corollary, he needed time to hire a private counsel who
would review his case and prepare the petition.

Osmea pleads that his petition be given due course for the resolution of the important issues he raised.
The damages and interest charges were awarded on account of the delay in the payment of the extra
work done by WTCI and DCDC, which delay Osmea attributes to the refusal of the Sanggunian to
appropriate the necessary amounts. Although Osmea acknowledges the legal necessity for a
supplemental agreement for any extra work exceeding 25% of the original contract price, he justifies the
immediate execution of the extra work he ordered (notwithstanding the lack of the supplemental
agreement) on the basis of the extreme urgency to have the construction and repairs on the sports
complex completed in time for the holding of the Palaro. He claims that the contractors themselves did
not want to embarrass the City and, thus, proceeded to perform the extra work even without the
supplemental agreement.

Osmea also points out that the City was already adjudged liable for the principal sum due for the extra
work orders and had already benefitted from the extra work orders by accepting and using the sports
complex for the Palaro. For these reasons, he claims that all consequences of the liability imposed,
including the payment of damages and interest charges, should also be shouldered by the City and not
by him.

On May 6, 2008, the COA issued the assailed Decision which affirmed the notices of disallowance.[12]
Osmea received a copy of the Decision on May 23, 2008. Eighteen days after or on June 10, 2008,
Osmea filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 6, 2008 COA Decision.

The COA denied Osmeas motion via a Resolution dated June 8, 2009.[13] The Office of the Mayor of
Cebu City received the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the COA on June 29, 2009. A day before, however,
Osmea left for the United States of America for his check-up after his cancer surgery in April 2009 and
returned to his office only on July 15, 2009. Thus, it was only on July 27, 2009 that Osmea filed the
present petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to assail the COAs Decision of May 6, 2008 and Resolution
of June 8, 2009.

RULING:
Relaxation of procedural rules to give effect to a partys right to appeal

Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of
the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five
(5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.

From time to time, however, we have recognized exceptions to the Rules but only for the most
compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of
justice. Every plea for a liberal construction of the Rules must at least be accompanied by an
explanation of why the party-litigant failed to comply with the Rules and by a justification for the
requested liberal construction. Where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the
petition, this Court may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its legal
jurisdiction.

Osmea cites the mandatory medical check-ups he had to undergo in Houston, Texas after his cancer
surgery in April 2009 as reason for the delay in filing his petition for certiorari. Due to his weakened
state of health, he claims that he could not very well be expected to be bothered by the affairs of his
office and had to focus only on his medical treatment. He could not require his office to attend to the
case as he was being charged in his personal capacity.

We find Osmeas reasons sufficient to justify a relaxation of the Rules. Although the service of the June
8, 2009 Resolution of the COA was validly made on June 29, 2009 through the notice sent to the Office
of the Mayor of Cebu City,[16] we consider July 15, 2009 the date he reported back to office as the
effective date when he was actually notified of the resolution, and the reckoning date of the period to
appeal. If we were to rule otherwise, we would be denying Osmea of his right to appeal the Decision of
the COA, despite the merits of his case.

Moreover, a certiorari petition filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court must be verified, and a
verification requires the petitioner to state under oath before an authorized officer that he has read the
petition and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge. Given that
Osmea was out of the country to attend to his medical needs, he could not comply with the
requirements to perfect his appeal of the Decision of the COA.

While the Court has accepted verifications executed by a petitioners counsel who personally knows the
truth of the facts alleged in the pleading, this was an alternative not available to Osmea, as he had yet
to secure his own counsel. Osmea could not avail of the services of the City Attorney, as the latter is
authorized to represent city officials only in their official capacity.[17] The COA pins liability for the
amount of damages paid to WTCI and DCDC on Osmea in his personal capacity, pursuant to Section
103 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 (PD 1445).[18]

Thus, the reckoning date to count the remaining 12 days to file his Rule 64 petition should be counted
from July 15, 2009, the date Osmea had actual knowledge of the denial of his motion for
reconsideration of the Decision of the COA and given the opportunity to competently file an appeal
thereto before the Court. The present petition, filed on July 27, 2009, was filed within the reglementary
period.

RULE 65
November 27, 1916
TOPI C: Definition and purpose (CERTI ORARI )
Remedial law; Certiorari and prohibition. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Thus, petitions
for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
MA. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO ET AL. v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III ET AL., G.R. NO.
209287, July 1, 2014
FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of
the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary
Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next
years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act
(GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and
other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken
from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for
the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation
Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and
several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity
of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).

ISSUE:
Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular
(NBC) No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.

RULING:
The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies.

The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for
certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists under
Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of
the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.

The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are aptly explained
in Delos Santos v.Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued
out of Chancery, or the Kings Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the
record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ
would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior courts
judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they
would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available.
If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in matters of law.
The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its
jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review
judicial or quasi-judicial acts.

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has
been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of
certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a
superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose, viz:

x x x x

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which
includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this
regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion
must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or
board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation
of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.


Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to
be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of
some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to
the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed
to the court itself. The Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy
Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an
IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed
against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said
proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative
or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court
within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.
Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior
court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior
court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available
in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to
invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly
falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that
respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction
may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining
order.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.

Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was
properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by
necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the
validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the republican
system of checks and balances.

OTHER ISSUES
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
RULING:

I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by
the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government
spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation
made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were
merely being realigned via the DAP.

II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents
power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at
bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even
the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment
of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within their respective offices.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated
because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and
other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing
project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects
are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the
GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA
because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and
is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the
definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in
the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA
does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers.
Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are
already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under
the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect
that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was
secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate
the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the
DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the
validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors,
implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

Triplex Enterprises, Inc v. PNB-Republic Bank,
G.R. No. 151007
July 17, 2006
Settled is the rule that rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on
admissibility of evidence during the course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be
the subject of a separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be assigned as errors and
reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits
of the case.
FACTS:
The case stemmed from an action for annulment of contract, mandamus and damages filed by
petitioner against Leverage & Services Group, Inc. and respondents PNB-Republic Bank and Solid
Builders, Inc. Petitioner sought to annul the sale of two parcels of land situated in Tagaytay City by PNB-
Republic Bank to Solid Builders, Inc. and to compel PNB-Republic Bank to award instead the sale to it as
the highest bidder. Petitioner's claim was rejected by PNB-Republic Bank due to the sale of the properties
to Solid Builders, Inc.

After the rejection of petitioner's bid, Atty. Romeo Roque, the real estate broker whose services were
engaged by petitioner for its negotiations with PNB-Republic Bank concerning the Tagaytay properties,
obtained a legal opinion from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) stating that the
absence of the required Board approval of PNB Republic Bank on the sale of the subject properties to
Solid Builders did not perfect the contract to sell the subject properties. Thus this gives petitioners the
right to purchase it.

During trial, petitioner called Atty. Roque to testify but his testimony was disallowed, upon motion of
respondent, for the violation on the rule of privileged communication. Aggrieved, petitioner filed for
certiorari with Court of Appeals which subsequently dismissed the action

ISSUE: Whether or not the admissibility of evidence is a proper subject of Certiorari.
RULING:
No. Certiorari as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. The writ may be
issued only where it is convincingly proved that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, or
an act too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or that the trial court exercised its power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.
While certiorari may be maintained as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order in
cases where the tribunal has issued an order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, it does not lie to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling.
The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court
or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not
errors in judgment. The rationale of this rule is that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment will be a void judgment.
When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the defendant, any mistake in the
application of the law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court may be corrected only by
appeal. The determination made by the trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence is but an
exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have perpetrated in making such a determination is
an error in judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that rulings of the trial court on
procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of a trial are interlocutory in
nature and may not be the subject of a separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be assigned as
errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the
merits of the case.
In the case at bar, petitioner assails the order of the trial court disallowing the admission in
evidence of the testimony of Roque on the opinion of the OGCC. By that fact alone, no grave abuse of
discretion could be imputed to the trial court. Furthermore, the said order was not an error of jurisdiction.
Even assuming that it was erroneous, the mistake was an error in judgment not correctable by the writ of
certiorari.

DAVID vs. RIVERA
Certiorari does not lie to review an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss, even if it is in the
form of a demurrer to evidence filed after the plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case.
Being interlocutory, an order denying a demurrer to evidence is not appealable. Neither can it be the
subject of a petition for certiorari. After such denial, the petitioners should present their evidence and if
the decision of the trial judge would be adverse to them, they could raise on appeal the same issues raised
in the demurrer. However, it is also settled that the rule admits of an exception, i.e., when the denial of a
demurrer is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Facts:
Respondent Agustin Rivera filed on May 10, 1994 a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession
with Prayer for Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the PARAB of Pampanga against
petitioners because respondent alleged that petitioners had been harassing him for the purpose of making
him vacate the subject land although it had already been given to him sometime in 1957 by the parents of
the petitioners as disturbance compensation, in consideration of his renunciation of his tenurial rights over
the original 18 hectare farmholding.
On the other hand, petitioners Davids filed an ejectment case with the MCTC of Pampanga alleging that
the respondent was occupying the subject land without paying rentals and that they need the subject land
for their personal use but the respondent refused to vacate it despite repeated demands.
However, the respondent asserted that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case in light of the tenancy
relationship between him and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners, as evidenced by the
Certification issued by MARO and reiterating his claim of ownership over the subject land and informed
the court of the complaint he had earlier filed before the PARAB.
PARAB rendered a decision that Rivera (respondent) is a tenant and that his peaceful possession thereof
be maintained which was appealed by petitioners to DARAB.
However, MCTC ordered Rivera to vacate the land because the court found that respondents claim that
the land is agricultural or devoted to agricultural production lacks evidence to support it.
Without appealing the MCTC decision but within the period to appeal, Rivera (respondent) filed before
the RTC of Angeles City a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, seeking the nullification of the MCTC Decision alleging that the MCTC had no
jurisdiction as the issue before it was agrarian in nature. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging that
the extraordinary remedy of prohibition cannot be a substitute for an appeal and that the MCTC had
jurisdiction.
RTC ruled that the denial of the motion to dismiss is proper. MR was also denied. Thus, petitioners filed a
petition for Certiorari in the CA.
CA finds that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying the motion to
dismiss because the order of denial is merely interlocutory and cannot be assailed in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and the issues raised in the petition for prohibition were
genuine and substantial, necessitating the presentation of evidence by both parties.
Issue:
Whether the denial of the motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence was afflicted with grave
abuse of discretion
Ruling:
No.
Certiorari does not lie to review an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss, even if it is in the
form of a demurrer to evidence filed after the plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case.
Being interlocutory, an order denying a demurrer to evidence is not appealable. Neither can it be the
subject of a petition for certiorari.
Jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters is now expressly vested in the DAR, through the DARAB. The
respondent has availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy which is the special civil action of
prohibition. It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters
clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or
where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
obtained. The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction
in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.
To say, as the petitioners argue, that the MCTC Decision has already attained finality because the
respondent opted to file a petition for prohibition instead of an appeal is to sacrifice needlessly
respondents right at the altar of technicalities.
It should be pointed out that the petitioners elevated to the appellate court the Order of the RTC denying
their motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one
party to the adequacy of the evidence of his adversary to make out a case. In this case, the trial court
ruled that respondents evidence in support of his application for a writ of prohibition was sufficient to
require the presentation of petitioners contravening proof. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in so ruling. Thus, the CA is correct in upholding RTCs decision.
ANTONIO PROSPERO ESQUIVEL and MARK ANTHONY ESQUIVEL, petitioners, vs. THE HON.
OMBUDSMAN, THE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
HERMINIGILDO EDUARDO, respondents, [G.R. No. 137237. September 17, 2002]

FACTS:
Eduardo and Catacutan charged petitioners Antonio Prospero Esquivel, municipal mayor of Jaen
and his brother, Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel, barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, NueveEcija
with alleged illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats.
Petitioners disarmed PO2 Eduardo of his Cal. 45 service pistol then forced him to board petitioners
vehicle and brought him to the Jaen Municipal Hall. While on their way, Mayor Esquivel mauled him with
the use of a firearm and threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel then ordered SPO1 Espiritu to kill him,
SPO1 Catacutan arrived to verify what happened to his teammate but Mayor Esquivel likewise
threatened him. PO2 Eduardo fell and lost consciousness. When he regained his consciousness, he was
told that he would be released but was forced to sign a statement in the police blotter that he was in good
physical condition. PO2 Eduardo told PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated and
threatened because the mayor believed he was among the law enforcers who raided a jueteng den in
Jaen that same day. PNP-CIDG forwarded the pertinent records, including a medical certificate showing
the injuries suffered, to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action.
Petitioners and their companions denied the charges against them. Instead, they alleged that PO2
Eduardo is a fugitive from justice with an outstanding warrant of arrest for malversation.
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a resolution recommending that both Mayor Esquivel
and Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel be indicted for the crime of less serious physical
injuries, and Mayor Esquivel alone for grave threats. Separate informations docketed as Criminal Case
No. 24777for less serious physical injuries against Mayor Esquivel and Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel,
and Criminal Case No. 24778or grave threats against petitioner mayor, were filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. As directed
by the Sandiganbayan, they likewise filed a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation with the Office of
the Special Prosecutor (OSP). That motion was, however, denied by the OSP.
ISSUE:
(1) Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of the informations
against petitioners?
(2)Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over Criminal Cases
Nos. 24777 and 24778?
RULING:
1. NO.
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. The Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with
the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling
reasons to indicate otherwise.
Petitioners utterly failed to establish that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the disputed resolution and order. There was no abuse of discretion much less grave abuse in
disregarding PO2 Eduardos admission that he was in good physical condition when he was released
from the police headquarters. Such admission was never brought up during the preliminary investigation.
The records show that no such averment was made in petitioners counter-affidavitnor was there any
document purporting to be the exculpatory statement attached therein as an annex or exhibit. Petitioners
only raised this issue in their motion for reconsideration
.

Consequently, the admission that petitioners brand as incontrovertible is but a matter of evidence best
addressed to the public respondents appreciation. It is evidentiary in nature and its probative value can
be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the
proper remedy.

2. NO
Municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Note that under
the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade of 27.Since Barangay Captain
Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under
salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over
said criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them.
MILITANTE vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Petitioner is the registered owner of three (3) contiguous parcels of land with an aggregate area
of 1,590 square meters in Balintawak, Caloocan City. The three parcels are covered by TCT Nos. 53066-
A, 53067 and 53068, all derived from TCT No. 71357 issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.
Twenty-four (24) squatter families live in these lots.
On September 24, 1981, petitioner wrote the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission seeking a
declaration of non-coverage from the Urban Land Reform Program of the government. On October 2,
1981, HSRC Commissioner Raymundo R. Dizon, Jr. issued a certificate declaring petitioner's lots "outside
the declared Urban Land Reform Zone." With this certificate, petitioner asked the National Housing
Authority to relocate the squatters on his land. Acting on the request, General Gaudencio Tobias, NHA
General Manager, sent a letterto Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr., of Caloocan City, to conduct a census of the
families occupying petitioners lots.
The NHA called the squatters for a dialogue to look into the possibility of amicably settling the eviction
problem and/or to find out why a clearance should be issued or not for the removal/demolition of all the
illegal structures in the said property. In view of their failure of the squatters to attend, Joaquin Castano,
Acting Division Manager, Resettlement Division, NHA, wrote a memorandum to the Department Manager,
Resettlement Department, NHA, recommending the issuance of a demolition clearance.
On January 21, 1982, NHA General Manager Tobias granted clearance to dismantle and remove all illegal
structures on petitioner's property within three (3) months from receipt of the order. Clearance was also
granted for the relocation of the 24 families to the Sapang Palay Resettlement Project.
The demolition did not take place. In a letter, General Tobias inquired from Mayor Asistio whether
Caloocan City had plans of developing petitioner's properties in the Bagong Barrio Project. On December
13, 1982, Mayor Asistio replied that "considering the said properties are private in character, the City has
no plans presently or in the immediate future to develop or underwrite the development of said
properties."
Four (4) years later, in 1986, the NHA, through General Tobias, approved an emergency fund of P2
million for the acquisition of petitioner's lots. NHA started negotiations with petitioner. In 1987, petitioner,
through an authorized representative, made an initial offer of P200.00 per square meter. The NHA made
a counter-offer of P175.00 per square meter. Petitioner increased his price to P1,000.00 and later to
P3,000.00. NHA General Manager Raymundo R. Dizon, Jr. informed petitioner that NHA's maximum offer
was P500.00. This was rejected by petitioner, through his lawyer.
On September 8, 1990, petitioner, through counsel, requested for a revalidation of his demolition
clearance and relocation of the squatters. On January 15, 1991, NHA General Manager Monico Jacob
revalidated the demolition clearance and informed Mayor Asistio that the NHA was making available
enough serviced home lots in Bagong Silang Resettlement Project for the 24 families. Respondent
Annabelle Carangdang, NHA Project Manager in Bagong Barrio, refused to implement the clearance to
eject the squatters on petitioner's land. Carangdang claimed that petitioners land had already been
declared expropriated by P.D. 1315.
Petitioner then filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a "Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with
Declaration as Inexistent and Unconstitutional Presidential Decree No. 1315" against the NHA and
Carangdang. Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and held that petitioner failed to
overcome the presumption of the decree's constitutionality.
ISSUE: a) Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the writ of prohibition.
b) Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandamus.
RULING: The Supreme Court denied the petition.
a) Petitioner is not entitled to the writ of prohibition. Prohibition is a preventive remedy. It seeks for a
judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be
illegal. In the case at bar, petitioner does not pray that respondent Carangdang should be ordered to
desist from relocating the squatters. What petitioner challenges is respondent Carangdang's refusal to
implement the demolition clearance issued by her administrative superiors. The remedy for a refusal to
discharge a legal duty is mandamus, not prohibition.
b) The petitioner is not also entitled to a writ of mandamus. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that
he has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus. He failed to
discharge this burden. The records show that there is no direct order from the NHA General Manager
addressed to respondent Carangdang to evict the squatters and demolish their shanties on the subject
property. The NHA demolition clearance issued by General Tobias on January 21, 1982 was addressed to
Mayor Asistio, the mayor of Caloocan City. The clearance's revalidation by NHA General Manager Monico
Jacob was likewise addressed to Mayor Asistio.
Furthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be availed of only when there is no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for mandamus is premature if
there are administrative remedies available to the petitioner. If superior administrative officers could
grant the relief prayed for, special civil actions are generally not entertained. In the instant case,
petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. He may seek another demolition order from the
NHA General Manager this time directly addressed to respondent Carangdang or the pertinent NHA
representative. In fact, the Government Corporate Counsel asserts that petitioner should have brought
Carangdang's inaction to the attention of her superiors. There is therefore no extreme necessity to invoke
judicial action as the administrative set-up could have easily corrected the alleged failure to act. The
General Manager, as Chief Executive Officer of the NHA, has the power of supervision over the operations
and internal affairs of NHA.

Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil 674)
When Mandamus can be treated as Prohibition
- Mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting that error, for this is not a case where a tribunal
"unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office" or "unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right." It is rather a case
where a judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss an action which
would not be maintained in his court. The remedy in such case is prohibition and that remedy is
available in the present case because the order complained of, being merely of an interlocutory nature,
is not appealable.

- While the petition is for mandamus, the same may well be treated as one for prohibition by waiving
strict adherence to technicalities in the interest of a speedy administration of justice pursuant to section
2, Rule 1, Rules of Court.


FACTS: This case stems from a civil action for the recovery of a piece of real property situated in Negros
Oriental, the complaint alleged that the said property had been bought by plaintiff at an execution sale
but notwithstanding the sale, the judgment debtor, as supposed owner of said property, subsequently
mortgaged the same to the Philippine National Bank and refused to surrender possession thereof to
plaintiff. The plaintiff thus instituted the civil action to have himself declared owner of said property and
placed in possession thereof.

Before filing their answer, the defendants in that case moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground, among others, that, as the action concerned title to and possession of real estate situated in
Negros Oriental, venue was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The motion having
been denied, the defendants filed the present petition for mandamus to compel the respondent judge
to dismiss the action.

Answering the petition, the respondent judge puts up the defense that the act sought to be ordered
involves the exercise of judicial discretion and that petitioner has another adequate remedy, which is by
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy?

HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the respondent judge committed a manifest error in denying
the motion to dismiss since the action sought to be dismissed affects title to and the recovery of
possession of real property situated in Oriental Negros, it is obvious that the action was improperly
brought in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The motion to dismiss was therefore proper and should
have been granted.

However, mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting that error, for this is not a case where a
tribunal "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office" or "unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right."
(Section 3, Rule 67, Rules of Court.) It is rather a case where a judge is proceeding in defiance of the
Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss an action which would not be maintained in his court. The remedy
in such case is prohibition (section 2, Rule 67), and that remedy is available in the present case because
the order complained of, being merely of an interlocutory nature, is not appealable.

While the petition is for mandamus, the same may well be treated as one for prohibition by waiving
strict adherence to technicalities in the interest of a speedy administration of justice pursuant to section
2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. A writ of prohibition was then issued enjoining the respondent judge and his
successors.

TOPIC: Prohibition vis--vis quo warranto

Topic: Certiorari under Rule 65 and Rule 45, distinguished

Doctrine: The special civil action of certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a suit fails to
appeal a judgment to the proper forum despite the availability of the remedy of appeal. Certiorari
is not and cannot be used as a substitute for appeal, where the latter remedy is available. If any,
the petitioner's proper recourse would have been to elevate the assailed CA decision to this
Court via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

MA. SALVACION G. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ST. PAUL's COLLEGE
OF MANILA, INC. and SR. NATIVIDAD DE JESUS FERRAREN, S.P.C., respondents.
G.R. No. 149404. September 15, 2006.

FACTS

Petitioner, a professor in the respondent St. Paul's College of Manila for 22 years, verbally
accepted sometime in February, 1998 a tutorial and a summer teaching load for the summer of
1998. Subsequently, the petitioner decided to leave for the United States in response to an
urgent request from her brother and sister-in-law thereat to help them take care of their children,
thus necessitating a revision of her summer schedule.

Hence, in a letter dated March 31, 1998 and addressed to respondent Sister Natividad De
Jesus Ferraren, president and college dean of the respondent college, the petitioner proposed a
change in her teaching schedule to accommodate her departure for abroad on April 27, 1998.

In a memorandum, the petitioner was required to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of
said memorandum why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action, including dismissal,
for: (1) taking a leave without the explicit approval of the college dean and president; (2)
abandonment of employment; (3) fraud and willful breach of trust; (4) failure to observe
contractual obligations with the school; (5) serious misconduct or willful disobedience in
connection with work; and (6) insubordination, all punishable under the College's Faculty
Manual.

On June 10, 1998, the petitioner surfaced and came forward to personally deliver to Sister
Ferraren her written compliance to the show-cause memorandum. In it, she admitted having
changed her schedule without first seeking Sister Ferraren's approval but with the explanation
that she had been constantly trying as early as March of that year to write for an approval of
adjustment in her teaching schedule but to no avail.

Formal notices were separately sent to the petitioner, department chairperson Ms. Shirley
Agatep and college registrar Ms. Lilia B. Santos directing them to appear at a formal hearing on
July 17, 1998 to explain their sides (regarding the petitioner's allegations that the two had
approved the change in her summer teaching schedule). During the hearing, the petitioner, in a
complete turn about of what she verbally told to Sister Ferraren, did not admit her mistake nor
make of record her decision for an early retirement.

The investigating committee proceeded with the hearing, and eventually reached the conclusion
that the petitioner was guilty of the charges stated in the show-cause memorandum. Even then,
the committee recommended to allow the petitioner's early retirement and the payment of her
benefits in acknowledgment of her desire to simply retire.

On October 6, 1998, the petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal
and non-payment of salaries against the herein private respondents. In his decision of
December 22, 1999, Labor Arbiter found for the petitioner. But on appeal by the private
respondents, the NLRC, in its decision of December 29, 2000, reversed that of the labor arbiter.
The petitioner went to the CA, the appellate court, in its decision affirmed that of the NLRC.

Hence, the petitioner's present recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES

1. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the NLRC's finding that the
private respondents have granted the petitioner an early retirement;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the NLRC's finding that the
private respondents have not illegally dismissed the petitioner and hence not entitled to
reinstatement with backwages and without loss of seniority rights and other benefits
appertaining to her position;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the NLRC's finding that
Sister Ferraren cannot be held personally liable for the petitioner's claims; and
4. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in not awarding moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees to the petitioner.

RULING

The petition is DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the CA is hereby AFFIRMED.

It bears emphasis that the petitioner has come to this Court via the vehicle of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In their Comment to the petition, the private respondents very
much put in issue the propriety of the remedy resorted to by the petitioner. We sustain the
private respondents.

One of the requisites for the issuance of a writ for certiorari is that there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is emphatic on this.

The special civil action of certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a suit fails to appeal a
judgment to the proper forum despite the availability of the remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not
and cannot be used as a substitute for appeal, where the latter remedy is available. If any, the
petitioner's proper recourse would have been to elevate the assailed CA decision to this Court
via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, let alone the fact that the petitioner erroneously resorted to Rule 65 when appeal by
way of a petition for review under Rule 45 was available. Hornbook is the rule that in a petition
for review, only errors of law may be raised (Section 1 of Rule 45).

On the other hand, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, only jurisdictional issues may be
raised, as when a court or tribunal has acted "without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." The extraordinary writ of
certiorari cannot legally be used for any other purpose. In a special civil action for certiorari, the
Court cannot correct errors of fact which the lower court or tribunal may have committed.

But even if we were to overlook the error in the mode of appeal and suspend the application of
procedural rules, as urged by the petitioner, still the petition must fail. As it is, the questions
raised in this recourse, be it under Rule 45 or Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, are basically one of
facts.

Hence, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65, judicial review does not go as far as to evaluate
the sufficiency of evidence upon which the NLRC based its determinations, the inquiry being
limited essentially to whether said tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. And an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as in
grave abuse of discretion when it is performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Here, there is no indication whatsoever that any grave abuse of discretion attended the
proceedings below.

[G.R. No. 179895. December 18, 2008.]

FERDINAND S. TOPACIO, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN GREGORY
SANTOS ONG and THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
By Carol Solatorio

Principle:
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested
public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought against the person who is alleged to
have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office, and may be commenced
by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be
entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. That private
person suing must show a clear right to the contested office and not just a mere preferential right to be
appointed thereto.

While denominated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the petition partakes of the nature of a
quo warranto proceeding with respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to declare null and void his
appointment as an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan for being unconstitutional. While the petition
professes to be one for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner even adverts to a "quo warranto" aspect of
the petition. Being a collateral attack on a public officer's title, the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition must be dismissed.

(Nasuya nis Topacio kay siya unta gusto mahimong Associate Justice muna iyang gipangitaan ug paagi ma disqualify si Greg Ong
ky aron siya ang mapuli; di ta ani oy, bad ni. Tungod wala ni support si OSG niya, ni file dayon siya ug Certiorari and Prohibition
against OSG kay naa daw grave abuse, but then, since good always prevails, dah gaba dismiss iyang petition ky in the nature of
quo warranto man maski denominated as certiorari and prohibition).


FACTS:
Ferdinand Topacio (petitioner) via the present petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks, in
the main, to prevent Justice Gregory Ong (Ong) from further exercising the powers, duties and
responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.

Before this instant petition, in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, Court enjoined Ong "from
accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming
the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully
completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to
show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and
citizenship."

Ong immediately filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City a Petition for the
"amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation of an entry in [his] Certificate of Birth"

Meanwhile, petitioner, by verified Letter-Request/Complaint implored respondent Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate post-haste a quo warranto proceeding against Ong in the
latter's capacity as an incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Invoking paragraph 1,
Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution, petitioner points out that natural-born citizenship is
also a qualification for appointment as member of the Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to
meet the citizenship requirement from the time of his appointment as such in October 1998.

The OSG, by letter, informed petitioner that it "cannot favorably act on [his] request for the
filing of a quo warranto petition until the [RTC] case shall have been terminated with finality".

Petitioner assails this position of the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion, aside
from Ong's continuous discharge of judicial functions. Hence this present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the OSG, in refusing to file a quo warranto proceeding against Justice Ong, acted with grave
abuse of disrection.

RULING:
No, OSGs refusal to act favorably on the petitioners request for the filing of quo warranto petition until
the RTC case shall have been terminated with finality, was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Petition is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi:

Certiorari with respect to the OSG
On the issue of whether the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the filing of a petition
for quo warranto, the Court rules in the negative.

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.

There is no abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, on the part of the OSG in deferring action on the
filing of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has been terminated with finality. A decision is not
deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected party disagrees with it.

The Solicitor General is the counsel of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its
officials or agents. In the discharge of its task, the Solicitor General must see to it that the best interest
of the government is upheld within the limits set by law.

The pertinent rules of Rule 66 on quo warranto provide:

SEC. 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be
commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office;
or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful
authority so to act.

SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when
directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case
specified in the preceding section can be established by proof, must commence such action.

SEC. 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may commence action with permission of court. The Solicitor General or a
public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in which the action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the
request and upon the relation of another person; but in such case the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the
expenses and costs of the action in an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at whose request and
upon whose relation the same is brought. (Italics and emphasis in the original)

In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the institution of an
action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons. Upon receipt of a case certified to him,
the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of the case. He may start the
prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all.
He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest and
the policy of the government on the matter at hand.

It appears that after studying the case, the Solicitor General saw the folly of re-litigating the same issue
of Ong's citizenship in the quo warranto case simultaneously with the RTC case, not to mention the
consequent risk of forum-shopping. In any event, the OSG did not totally write finis to the issue as it
merely advised petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case.

Certiorari and Prohibition with respect to Ong
While denominated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the petition partakes of the nature of a
quo warranto proceeding with respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to declare null and void his
appointment as an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan for being unconstitutional. While the petition
professes to be one for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner even adverts to a "quo warranto" aspect of
the petition.

Being a collateral attack on a public officer's title, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition must
be dismissed.

The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it
cannot be assailed collaterally, even through mandamus or a motion to annul or set aside order. In
Nacionalista Party v. de Vera, the Court ruled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of
the appointment of a public officer.

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested
public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought against the person who is alleged to
have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office, and may be commenced
by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be
entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. For a quo
warranto petition to be successful, the private person suing must show a clear right to the contested
office. In fact, not even a mere preferential right to be appointed thereto can lend a modicum of legal
ground to proceed with the action.

G.R. No. 12083
NEMESIO CAMPOS, vs ADOLPH WISLIZENUS, judge of first instance
of Cebu, and TEODORO ALDANESE, respondents.
Doctrine of the case:
Certiorari involves questions of law, not questions of facts, especially when there is nothing new
that you have to present.
Such a determination involves a mixed question of law and fact; and it is a rule, as stated in the
case cited, that, where the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the determination of a
question of fact and that question has been determined by the court after a hearing, that
determination is conclusive and can not be attacked collaterally.
It may be added that the determination of a question of fact on which its jurisdiction depends
does not of itself affect the court's jurisdiction. It has power to resolve the question of fact; and
its decision is within its powers whichever was it may go. Such a finding cannot be attacked by
certiorari (Navarro vs. Jimenez, above; Gala vs. Cui and Rodriguez, 25 Phil. Rep., 522).
FACTS of the case:
Nemesio Campus filed an election protest against Adolph Wislizenus (hes an American judge based in
Sibonga Cebu, because Philippiens during 1916 is still under American occupation) and Teodoro
Aldanese.
The service of protest made to Nemesio was made to Isisdro, the winners borther asserting that they
live in the same hosue. HOWEVER, the MUNICIPAL PRESIDENT was NOT SERVED a copy of the protest.
(In 1916, there was a different rule in election proceedings. Ehem, blame the Americans).
The court, after hearing the parties with regard to the service of the notice of protest on the
respondent Teodoro Aldanese, held that, under the facts submitted, no service of the protest
had been made on the respondent Teodoro Aldanese in the manner requires by law and that,
therefore, the court acquired no jurisdiction of the proceedings and accordingly dismissed the
protest.
FINDINGS of the court: As regards the rules of the Courts of First Instance, it does not appear
that the service has been made in accordance therewith; for it does not appear that the person
who signed and acknowledged receipt of the notice was residing in the house of the respondent
and was in charge thereof. CASE DISMISSED.
From the Court of First Instance of Sibonga, petitioner filed a CERTIORARI to Supreme Court and ask the
lower court to change its decision of dismissingthe case.
ISSUE: Is certiorari proper?
HELD: NO. (Certiorari is not proper in a case where you have all the time in the world to correct any
deficiencies in the lower court and now you want to delay the court after it rendered judgement.)
We said in the case of Navarro vs. Jimenez (23 Phil. Rep., 557):
After the entry of the judgment in favor of the defendant, a motion was made by the plaintiff to
vacate and set aside said judgment and to dismiss the whole proceeding upon the ground that
not all of said candidates had been notified of the protest as required by law. The motion was
heard. The question was litigated. The evidence was discussed and considered. The arguments
of counsel were presented. The court found form the evidence that all of the candidates had
been notified of the protest and that the notice was in the form and served in the manner and
within the time required by the statute. That question having been raised before the court below
and passed upon there, we are unable to see at this moment how an action of quo warranto can
be maintained, based upon the theory that such notice was lacking. That question having been
determined in the court below, and the decision never having been questioned in the only
manner in which such a decision can be, we must hold it conclusive in this action, quo warranto
not being a method by which that decision can be reviewed. We are, therefore, of the opinion
that the action must be dismissed.
In that case we also said:
We have to say, in amplification of our former opinion on this question, that the general rule is
that, where the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the existence of facts, and the court
judicially considers and adjudicates the question of its jurisdiction, and decides that the fact exist
which are necessary to give it jurisdiction of the case, the finding is conclusive and cannot be
controverted in a collateral proceeding.

Even though it be conceded that the court should have given the petitioner an
opportunity to present further evidence on the question of service the fact that the court
held that the petitioner had had his day in court with regard to that matter and that he
was not entitled to another opportunity at the expense of the respondent and the delay
which would necessarily follow does not go to the jurisdiction of the court and does not
subject him to a revision of his orders on certiorari.
Napa vs Weissenhagen

Doctrine: Erroneous Exercise of Jurisdiction (effect)

The writ of certiorari in so far as it was a method by which mere errors of an inferior court could be corrected no
longer exists. Its place is now taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court maintains jurisdiction, its errors
can be corrected only by that method (APPEAL). The writ in this country has been confined to the correction of
defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot be legally used for any other purpose.
If the judgment of the justice's court was void, it was nevertheless appealable, although the losing party might
have been able to rid himself of it by other means. Having been appealed, it stands upon substantially the same
footing in the appellate court, so far as the appeal itself is concerned, as any other judgment of a justice's court
and the jurisdiction of the appellate court in that appeal is as full and complete as it is any other.

Facts:

In February 1913, an action for the summary recovery of the possession of land under section 80 and following
sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff in the case at bar being the defendant there and the
defendants Julian Larong and Hermenegildo Bayla being the plaintiffs.

The Court of First instance found in favor of the plaintiff and ordered delivery of possession. The decision was
rendered on the 14th of April, 1913, and appeal was taken therefrom on the 29th of the same month.

The defendant filed for an appeal but was dismissed upon motion by the appellee on the ground that it had not
been perfected within the time required by law.

Issue:

Whether or not a writ of certiorari was proper for the revocation of the judgment entered upon the order granting
the motion to dismiss the appeal, and to set aside the whole proceeding to the ground that the court lacked
jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court having found that the contention of the respondents is correct, the petition is dismissed.

A mere statement of the case is sufficient to deny the relief prayed for:

It is clear at a glance that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to consider a motion to dismiss the
appeal and the exercise of that jurisdiction did not result in its loss, it having been exercised in accordance with
the established forms and methods of procedure prescribed by the practice of the country.

A writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that the court to which it is to be directed acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in performing the acts complained of.

Further, if a court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, decision upon all question pertinent to
the cause are decisions which its jurisdiction and however irregular or erroneous they may be, they cannot be
corrected by certiorari.

The Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal taken to it from a judgment of a justice's court and,
therefore, had jurisdiction to decide every question pertaining thereto.

In the case at bar, the consideration of the motion and the dismissal of the appeal as a consequence thereof are
not acts in excess of jurisdiction. It may be stated as a general rule that the decision by a court of one of the
fundamental question before it does not, except perhaps in cases involving a constitutional question, deprive it of
jurisdiction whichever way it may decide. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to
act in a case. The authority to decide a case at all and not the decision rendered therein is what makes up
jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter, the decision of all other question
arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.
The writ of certiorari in so far as it was a method by which mere errors of an inferior court could be corrected no
longer exists. Its place is now taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court maintains jurisdiction, its errors can
be corrected only by that method. The writ in this country has been confined to the correction of defects of
jurisdiction solely and cannot be legally used for any other purpose.
ANA DE GUIA SAN PEDRO and ALEJO DOPEO, Petitioners,
- versus
HON. FATIMA G. ASDALA, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 87; HON. MANUEL TARO, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 42; and the HEIRS OF SPOUSES APOLONIO V. DIONISIO and VALERIANA
DIONISIO (namely, ALLAN GEORGE R. DIONISIO and ELEANOR R. DIONISIO, herein represented by
ALLAN GEORGE R. DIONISIO), Respondents.

PRINCIPLE

Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil action for
certiorari will not be entertained remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal,
especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One
of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. Where an appeal was available, as in this case, certiorari will not prosper, even if the
groundtherefor is grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS

In July 2001, private respondents, heirs of spouses Apolonio and ValerianaDionisio, filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 42, a Complaint[2] against herein petitioners
and Wood Crest Residents Association, Inc., for AccionReivindicatoria, Quieting of Title and Damages,
with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Private respondents alleged that subject property
located in Batasan Hills, Quezon City, with an assessed value of P32,100.00, was titled in the name of
spouses Apolonio and ValerianaDionisio; but petitioners, with malice and evident bad faith, claimed
that they were the owners of a parcel of land that encompasses and covers subject property. Private
respondents had allegedly been prevented from entering, possessing and using subject property. It was
further alleged in the Complaint that petitioners' Transfer Certificate of Title over their alleged property
was spurious. Private respondents then prayed that they be declared the sole and absolute owners of
the subject property; that petitioners be ordered to surrender possession of subject property to them;
that petitioners and Wood Crest and/or its members be ordered to pay actual and moral damages, and
attorney's fees.

Petitioners, for their part, filed a Motion to Dismiss[3] said complaint on the ground that the MeTC had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, as the subject of litigation was incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

The MeTC then issued an Order[4] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion to dismiss, ruling that,
under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended, the MeTC had exclusive original jurisdiction over
actions involving title to or possession of real property of small value.

Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of said Order dated July 4, 2002 was denied.

Petitioners assailed the aforementioned Order by filing a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 87. However, the RTC dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the MeTC Presiding Judge.

Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari,insisting that both the
MeTC and RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by not
ordering the dismissal of the complaint for AccionReivindicatoria, for lack of jurisdiction over the same.

the CA dismissed the petition outright, holding that certiorari was not available to petitioners as they
should have availed themselves of the remedy of appeal. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of dismissal was denied

Thus, petitioners filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
Resolutions[1] of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction in denying the petition for certiorari and for failure to resolve the issue raised in the
certiorari regarding the jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial court to take cognizance of a case of
accionreinvindicatoria.

RULING
Petition lacks merit.

The settled rule is that appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of the CA should be by a
verified petition for review on certiorari, as provided for under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Thus, in Pasiona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court expounded as follows:

The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a decision or final order of the CA via Rule 65,
because such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the course of law. In this case, petitioner had an adequate remedy, namely, a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. A petition for review on certiorari, not a special
civil action for certiorariwas, therefore, the correct remedy.

x xxx

Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil
action for certiorari will not be entertained remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for a
lost appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such
loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal was available, as in this case, certiorari will not
prosper, even if the groundtherefor is grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner's resort to this Court
by Petition for Certiorari was a fatal procedural error, and the instant petition must, therefore,
fail.[11]

the CA, therefore, acted properly when it dismissed the petition for certiorari outright, on the ground
that petitioners should have resorted to the remedy of appeal instead of certiorari. Verily, the present
Petition for Certiorari should not have been given due course at all.

Moreover, since the period for petitioners to file a petition for review oncertiorari had lapsed by the
time the instant petition was filed, the assailed CA Resolutions have attained finality.

the RTC and the CA ruled correctly that the MeTC had jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint
for AccionReivindicatoria.

the Court reiterates the ruling inHeirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Spouses Lumocso,[12] to wit:
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of
title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases
that involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein.

x xxx

x xx Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is
one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of
B.P. 129, or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two
classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, which
expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions
which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or,
in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of
which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2)
of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the
real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the
overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice."[13]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit. The Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78978, dated September 15, 2003 and June 1, 2004, are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 181642 January 29, 2009
RUFINO S. CAMUTIN, EDDIE P. CAMUTIN, GINA P. CAMUTIN, represented by NOMINARIO SARIA, as Attorney-in-fact, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. NORBERTO POTENTE, and PASCUALA POTENTE, Respondents
FACTS: Petitioners were the registered owners of parcels of land covered who reside abroad, discovered upon coming back to the Philippines in 1998 that
the house and warehouse of respondents Spouses Norberto and Pascuala Potente were erected on the subject lots. Thereupon, respondents agreed to
pay petitioners a P1,000.00 monthly rental starting 1 January 1998 for the use of the lots. They also agreed that should the properties be sold, respondents
would have the right of first refusal and should respondents be unable to purchase the properties, they would peacefully vacate the premises.
However, respondents failed and refused to pay the agreed rentals. Neither were they able to purchase the lots. Consequently, petitioners sold a portion of
the lots to a third party who had it fenced.
respondents filed a complaint for partition against petitioners and the buyer of the properties before the RTC of Trece Martires City Civil Case No. TMSCA-
0023-06 . Respondents claimed they had a right over one-half of the property by virtue of the acknowledgment of rights allegedly executed by petitioners
deceased mother in 9 June 1970.
petitioners filed a complaint with the barangay to have respondents warehouse removed from the properties. During the conference on 13 October 2006,
the parties agreed to wait for the outcome of the hearing on the case for partition before the RTC. After the 13 October 2006 conference, the parties no
longer appeared before the Barangay.
4

On 20 November 2006, petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents before the MTC.Respondents filed an Answer with Motion to
Enforce the Agreement entered into before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of the Barangay. The Barangay Chairperson clarified that the agreement was only
to wait for the result of the RTCs 17 October 2006 hearing in the case for partition and not to wait for the termination of the case altogether.
7

the MTC issued an Order/Writ of Execution
8
where it noted the pendency of Civil Case No. TMSCA-0023-06 before the RTC and the existence of an
"amicable settlement to await first the resolution of the Court on the said pending civil case."
9
Apparently, the MTC treated the agreement as an amicable
settlement when the agreement was only to defer the barangay case pending the hearing before the RTC on 17 October 2006. The MTC thus ordered that
the proceedings in the ejectment case be indefinitely suspended and archived subject to its revival upon the final resolution of Civil Case No. TMSCA-
0023-06. The MTC also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order on 16 August 2007.
10

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss thereto, alleging that the petition for certiorari is
a prohibited pleading. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss.
Petitioners argued that the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and that the MTC likewise erred in suspending the proceedings in the case for
unlawful detainer until the final resolution of Civil Case No. TMSCA-0023-06 before the RTC. They allege that the MTC erroneously interpreted the
barangay agreement differently from the clear testimony of the Barangay Chairperson and acted capriciously and whimsically in ordering the case archived
without basis. Consequently, it was only proper for them to file the petition for certiorari before the RTC, which should have exercised its authority over the
MTC and corrected the error that the inferior court had committed instead of dismissing their petition. Petitioners thus prayed that the RTCs order be
annulled and declared null and void.
----------------
In their Comment dated 2 June 2008, respondents point out several technical errors supposedly committed by petitioners.
12

First, petitioners have availed of the wrong remedy. Since the assailed Order dated 23 January 2008 was rendered by the RTC i n the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, respondents argue that the correct mode of review is an appeal to the Court of Appeals under Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Second, the petition raises questions of fact, not of law, as petitioners seek a review and reexamination of the testimony of the Barangay Chairperson.
Third, petitioners ignored the rule on the hierarchy of courts for no apparent reason.
And lastly, the petition is patently bereft of merit. Petitioners assert that the MTC has already made a finding of fact that there was an agreement between
the parties to await the resolution of the case for partition before the RTC. In ordering the stay of the proceedings in the unlawful detainer case, the MTC
merely ordered the implementation of the agreement between the parties. The dismissal by the RTC of petitioners petition for certiorari is also in full
accord with the summary rules governing cases for ejectment and unlawful detainer, respondents conclude.
In a Manifestation/Motion, respondents state that the case at bar has become moot and academic in view of the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case
filed before the MTC and on that basis seek the dismissal of the petition for review.
13
Attached to the motion is a copy of the Order/Resolution dated 9
October 2008 issued by the MTC in Civil Case No. 805,
14
where it dismissed the unlawful detainer case in view of its findings that: (1) the legal
requirement of a barangay conciliation proceeding and/or barangay certificate to file action, a condition precedent for filing the ejectment case was not
complied with, the 13 October 2006 agreement not being the legal requirement contemplated by Sec. 12, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court; and (2) the fact of
unilateral demolition of respondents warehouse and petitioners possession of the lots which have rendered the pending unlawful detainer case ineffectual
and futile.
Petitioners filed their Opposition to the Manifestation/Motion,
15
claiming that respondents are misleading the Court into thinking that the dismissal of the
case is already final when the truth is respondents are aware that petitioners had filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTCs Order. The MTC, gave due course
to the notice of appeal and also ordered the elevation of the records of the case to the RTC.
17

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper NO
RULING: The petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic.
Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
18
While a petition for certiorari is not allowed against any interlocutory order issued by the court in the unlawful detainer or ejectment case,
19
in the
case at bar, the filing of a petition for certiorari challenging the MTCs Orders cannot be deemed a dilatory remedy resorted to by petitioners. On the
contrary, sustaining the MTCs orders would unnecessarily and unfairly delay the unlawful detainer case, a result contrary to the rules objective of speedy
disposition of cases. Petitioners could also not appeal from the orders of the MTC because these only ordered the indefinite suspension and archiving of
the case. The case was not resolved on the merits so there is actually no decision from which petitioners can appeal. Thus, the RTC could have validly
ruled on the petition for certiorari instead of dismissing it on the ground that it is a prohibited pleading.
However, the MTCs revival of the unlawful detainer case and its subsequent dismissal thereof on the grounds aforestated have rendered the resolution of
the present petition for review superfluous and unnecessary. In their petition for review, petitioners seek the nullification of the RTCs orders and the
subsequent recall of the MTCs orders suspending the proceedings in the unlawful detainer case and archiving it. The suspension of the unlawful detainer
case has apparently been lifted and the case has been decided. There is thus no more need for the Court to decide the present petition on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for being moot and academic. SO ORDERED.

f. EXCEPTIONS
CORAZON C. SIM vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
EQUITABLE PCI-BANK
G.R. No. 157376; October 2, 2007

PRINCIPLE:
Under Rule 65, the remedy of filing a special civil action for certiorari is available only
when there is no appeal; or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. A "plain" and "adequate remedy" is a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed order or resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the
filing of a special civil action for certiorari. This is to give the lower court the
opportunity to correct itself.
There are, of course, exceptions to the foregoing rule, to wit:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.

FACTS:
Corazon Sim (petitioner) filed a case for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter,
alleging that she was initially employed by Equitable PCI-Bank (respondent) in 1990
as Italian Remittance Marketing Consultant to the Frankfurt Representative Office.
Eventually, she was promoted to Manager position, until September 1999, when she
received a letter from Remegio David -- the Senior Officer, European Head of PCIBank,
and Managing Director of PCIB- Europe -- informing her that she was being dismissed
due to loss of trust and confidence based on alleged mismanagement and
misappropriation of funds.
Respondent denied any employer-employee relationship between them, and sought the
dismissal of the complaint.
On September 3, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered its Decision dismissing the case for
want of jurisdiction and/or lack of merit.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Labor
Arbiter's Decision and dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of merit.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC, petitioner went to the Court
of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In a Resolution dated October 29, 2002, the CA

dismissed the petition due to
petitioner's non-filing of a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was nonetheless denied by the CA
per Resolution dated February 26, 2003.
Hence, the present recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner alleges that:
I. The Court of Appeals departed from the accepted and usual concepts of
remedial law when it ruled that the petitioner should have first filed a Motion
for Reconsideration with the National Labor Relations Commission.
II. The National Labor Relations Commission decided a question of jurisdiction
heretofore not yet determined by the Court and decided the same in a manner
not in accord with law when it ruled that it had no jurisdiction over a labor
dispute between a Philippine corporation and its employee which it assigned to
work for a foreign land.


ISSUE:
Whether or not a prior motion for reconsideration is indispensable for the filing of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.

RULING:
Under Rule 65, the remedy of filing a special civil action for certiorari is available only
when there is no appeal; or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. A "plain" and "adequate remedy" is a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed order or resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the
filing of a special civil action for certiorari. This is to give the lower court the
opportunity to correct itself.
There are, of course, exceptions to the foregoing rule, to wit:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
Petitioner, however, failed to qualify her case as among the few exceptions. In fact, the
Court notes that the petition filed before the CA failed to allege any reason why a
motion for reconsideration was dispensed with by petitioner. It was only in her motion
for reconsideration of the CA's resolution of dismissal and in the petition filed in this
case that petitioner justified her non-filing of a motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner argues that filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC would be
merely an exercise in futility and useless. But it is not for petitioner to determine
whether it is so. As stressed in Cervantes v. Court of Appeals:
It must be emphasized that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never
demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial
discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the
manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the
Rules. Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of
whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with
the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must
show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so, which
petitioner failed to do. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the
petition. (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, the CA was not in error when it dismissed the petition. More so since
petitioner failed to show any error on the part of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in
ruling that she was dismissed for cause.
The rule is that the Court is bound by the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter or the
NLRC, unless it is shown that grave abuse of discretion or lack or excess of
jurisdiction has been committed by said quasi-judicial bodies. The Court will not
deviate from said doctrine without any clear showing that the findings of the Labor
Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC, are bereft of sufficient substantiation.
The Court notes, however, a palpable error in the Labor Arbiter's disposition of the
case, which was affirmed by the NLRC, with regard to the issue on jurisdiction. It was
wrong for the Labor Arbiter to rule that "labor relations system in the Philippines has
no extra-territorial jurisdiction."
Article 217 of the Labor Code provides for the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the
National Labor Relations Commission, viz.:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as
otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after
the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in
the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that
workers may file involving wage, rates of pay, hours of work and other
terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages
arising from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare
and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee
relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service,
involving an amount of exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
(b) The commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters.
Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, provides:
SECTION 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out
of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
Also, Section 62 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 8042
provides that the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all claims arising out of employer-employee
relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages,
subject to the rules and procedures of the NLRC.
Under these provisions, it is clear that labor arbiters have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, including
termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino
workers. In Philippine National Bank v. Cabansag, the Court pronounced:
x x x Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the
protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract
stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in
keeping with the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor,
promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex,
race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. For
the State assures the basic rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work [Article
3 of the Labor Code of the Philippines; See also Section 18, Article II and
Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution]. This ruling is likewise rendered
imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code which states that laws "which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determination or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country." (Emphasis supplied)
In any event, since the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the petition before it
for failure to file a prior motion for reconsideration with the NLRC, and considering
that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC's factual findings as regards the validity of
petitioner's dismissal are accorded great weight and respect and even finality when the
same are supported by substantial evidence, the Court finds no compelling reason to
relax the rule on the filing of a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a
petition for certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Case: Alcantara vs. Ermita
Topic: Prohibition against accomplished acts.
Doctrine:
If the thing is already done, it is obvious that the writ of prohibition cannot undo it, for
that would require an affirmative act, and the only effect of a writ of prohibition is to suspend
all action, and to prevent any further proceeding in the prohibited direction.In other words,
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain future action. Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie
to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.

Facts:
On August 19, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 453 entitled "CREATING A CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION TO PROPOSE THE REVISION OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION ON CONSULTATION WITH VARIOUS SECTORS OF SOCIETY." On
October 13, 2005, lawyers Samson S. Alcantara, Ed Vincent S. Albano, and Rene B. Gorospe,
herein petitioners, filed with this Court the instant petition for prohibition in their capacity as
Filipino citizens and taxpayers. They alleged that under Article XVII of the Constitution,
President Macapagal-Arroyo has no authority to participate in the process to amend or revise
the Constitution. Likewise, she has no power to create a Consultative Commission to study and
propose amendments and allocate public funds for its operations.

Important fact of the case:
On December 16, 2005, the Consultative Commission submitted to the President its report
recommending changes in the charter. Then the Consultative Commission ceased to exist.

Issue: WON prohibition is proper under the set of facts above.

Held: NO. The case is moot and academic. Prohibiton is not proper.

The instant petition has been overtaken by subsequent events. The Consultative
Commission is now defunct. Hence, there is no longer any issue to be resolved by this Court.
This case has become moot and academic.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the writ of prohibition is one which commands
the person to whom it is directed not to do something which he is about to do. If the thing is
already done, it is obvious that the writ of prohibition cannot undo it, for that would require an
affirmative act, and the only effect of a writ of prohibition is to suspend all action, and to
prevent any further proceeding in the prohibited direction.

In other words, prohibition is a
preventive remedy to restrain future action. Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an
act that is already a fait accompli.

The Consultative Commission has been dissolved.
Consequently, we find no more reason to resolve the constitutional issues raised by petitioners.

AUGUSTO, MEL JASON T.
CASE DIGEST

The Special Audit Team, Commission on Audit v. Court of Appeals
(GR No. 174788, April 11, 2013)


ANTECEDENTS
The COA created the SAT under Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO) Order No. 2004-093 for the purpose
of conducting a special audit of those transactions for the years of 2000 to 2004. When the SAT
immediately initiated a conference with GSIS management and requested copies of pertinent auditable
documents, the GSIS made an objection, prompting SAT to issue a subpoena duces tecum. The GSIS
challenged the said subpoena issued, contending that the COA has no authority and the members were
biased. The GSIS alleged that the SATs creation was not supported by COA Resolution 2002-005, which
was without force and effect. It was alleged that the 1987 Constitution did not give COA the power to
reorganize itself.

GSIS filed with the COA itself a petition for a PROHIBITION .

ISSUE
Whether or not prohibition is the correct remedy

RULING
The High Court said NO. Why? The Court said that COA itself has a mechanism for parties who are
aggrieved by its actions and are seeking redress directly from the commission itself.

The following are the different procedures, to wit:

Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 reads:
Appeal from decision of auditors. Any person aggrieved by the decision of an auditor of any government
agency in the settlement of an account or claim may within six months from receipt of a copy of the
decision appeal in writing to the Commission.

Additionally, Rule V, Section 1 of the 1997 COA Rules provides:
An aggrieved party may appeal from an order or decision or ruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in
a report, memorandum, letter, notice of disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement and
Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency under audit.

Rule VI, Section 1, continues the linear procedure, to wit:
The party aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Director may appeal to the Commission Proper.

Indeed, an administrative remedy was available. There is an appeal or a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy available.

Further, COA was NOT exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions when it issued LAO
Order No. 2004-093. Issuing the Order was not ministerial, because it required the exercise of discretion.
Ministerial acts do not require discretion or the exercise of judgment, but only the performance of a
duty pursuant to a given state of facts in the manner prescribed. The Order obviously involved
discretion, in both the choice of the personnel and the powers/functions to be given them.

A Rule 65 petition for prohibition can only be aimed at judicial, quasi-judicial, and ministerial
functions. Since the issuance of the LAO Order assailed was not characterized by any of the three
functions, then it follows that the GSIS chose the wrong remedy.

PIMENTEL et al versus OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETRY
G.R. Number 158088 July 6, 2005
FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which "shall have the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall
be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.
The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge d Affairs Enrique A.
Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations.
3
Its provisions, however, require that it be
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.
4

Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the
Senate of the Philippines for ratification.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and
international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to
transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with
respect to ratification of treaties.
The Office of the Solicitor General, commenting for the respondents, questioned the standing of
the petitioners to file the instant suit. It also contended that the petition at bar violates the rule on
hierarchy of courts. On the substantive issue raised by petitioners, respondents argue that the executive
department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.
The petition at bar was filed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. who asserts his legal standing to
file the suit as member of the Senate; along with other petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a
ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the
Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President.

HELD:
Supreme Court ruled in the negative. In our system of government, the President, being the
head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole
representative with foreign nations.
12
As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the
countrys mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain
diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.
13
In the
realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of
the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that "no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." The 1935 and the 1973
Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered into by the
executive. Section 10 (7), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provided:
Sec. 10. (7) The President shall have the power, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate, to make treaties xxx.
Section 14 (1) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution stated:
Sec. 14. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by a majority of all the Members of the BatasangPambansa.
The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to
provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations.
14
By requiring the concurrence of the
legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of
checks and balance necessary in the nations pursuit of political maturity and growth.
15

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to
giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
20
Hence, it is within the authority of
the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification,
refuse to ratify it.
21
Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is
a serious step that should not be taken lightly,
22
such decision is within the competence of the President
alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction
over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.
23
The Court,
therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its
jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome
Statute to the Senate.

G.R. No. 152163 November 18, 2002
SABDULLAH T. MACABAGO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAMAEL M. SALACOP, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
FACTS:
On May 22, 2001, petitioner Sabdullah T. Macabago was proclaimed by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers as the winning candidate for the position of Municipal Mayor of
Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. Petitioner had a lead of 198 votes over his adversary, private
respondent Jamael M. Salacop.
On June 1, 2001, private respondent filed a petition with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) against petitioner and the proclaimed Vice-Mayor and Municipal
Councilors, as well as the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, docketed as
SPC-01-234, to annul the elections and the proclamation of candidates in the
Municipality of Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur. Private respondent alleged that there was a
massive substitution of voters, rampant and pervasive irregularities in voting procedures
in Precincts Nos. 19, 20, 28 and 29, and a failure of the Board of Election Inspectors
(BEI) to comply with Sections 28 and 29 of Comelec Resolution No. 3743 and Section
193 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus rendering the election process in those
precincts a sham and a mockery and the proclamation of the winning candidates a
nullity. Private respondent further averred that if his petition were to be given due
course, he would win by a margin of one hundred ninety-four (194) votes over the votes
of petitioner. He thus prayed:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Commission that the election results in Precincts 19, 20, 28 and 29 be
ordered set aside and considered excluded and the proclamation of the winning
candidates in the said municipality be ANNULLED to reflect the genuine desire of the
majority of the people.
All other reliefs, deemed just and equitable under the circumstances are likewise prayed
for."
1

In support of his petition, private respondent appended thereto photocopies of random
Voters Registration Records (VRRs) evidencing the fraud and deceit that allegedly
permeated the electoral process, as well as affidavits tending to prove that serious
irregularities were committed in the conduct of the elections in the subject precincts.
2

In his answer, petitioner denied the truth of the material allegations in the petition and
averred that it raised a pre-proclamation controversy. He further alleged that the
grounds relied upon by private respondent would be proper in an election protest but
not in a pre-proclamation controversy.
3

The COMELEC En Banc took cognizance of the petition and on February 11, 2002,
issued an order directing the Election Officer of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur, to bring to and
produce before the COMELEC Office in Manila the original VRRs of the questioned
precincts for technical examination:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission hereby RESOLVES to direct Mr.
Ibrahim M. Macadato, the Election Officer of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur to produce the
subject original VRR's of the questioned precincts here in Manila for the appertaining
technical examination.
SO ORDERED."
4

In the same order, the COMELEC declared that contrary to petitioner's claims, the
petition did not allege a pre-proclamation controversy. The Commission characterized
the petition as one for the annulment of the election or declaration of failure of election
in the municipality, a special action covered by Rule 26 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Accordingly, the COMELEC set aside the docketing of the petition as a
Special Case (SPC) and ordered the redocketing thereof as a Special Action (SPA).
After its examination of the evidence submitted by petitioner, the COMELEC concluded
that there was convincing proof of massive fraud in the conduct of the elections in the
four (4) precincts that necessitated a technical examination of the original copies of the
VRRs and their comparison with the voters' signatures and fingerprints. The COMELEC
further noted that since the lead of Macabago was only 124 votes vis--vis the 474
voters of the contested precincts, the outcome of the petition would adversely affect the
result of the elections in the Municipality. In issuing said Order, the COMELEC relied on
its broad powers under the 1987 Constitution and the pronouncement of this Court in
Pantaleon Pacis vs. Commission on Elections,
5
and Tupay Loong vs. Commission on
Elections, et al.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC COMMITED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION?
RULING:
Petitioner avers that he was impelled to file the instant petition without first filing with the
COMELEC a motion for a reconsideration of its order because under the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, a motion for a reconsideration of an interlocutory order of the
COMELEC En Banc is a prohibited pleading, and that the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
order. Private respondent on the other hand insists that under Rule 64 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a special civil action for certiorari filed with this Court is proper
only for the nullification of a final order or resolution of the COMELEC and not of its
interlocutory order or resolution such as the assailed order in this case.
Section 1, Rule 64, as amended, reads:
"SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders
or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit."
8

Under Section 2 of the same Rule, a judgment or final order or resolution of the
COMELEC may be brought by the aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under Rule
65, as amended, except as therein provided. We ruled inElpidio M. Salva, et al. vs. Hon.
Roberto L. Makalintal, et al.
9
that Rule 64 of the Rules applies only to judgments or final
orders of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The rule does not
apply to interlocutory orders of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions or to its administrative orders. In this case, the assailed order of the
COMELEC declaring private respondent's petition to be one for annulment of the
elections or for a declaration of a failure of elections in the municipality and ordering the
production of the original copies of the VRRs for the technical examination is
administrative in nature.
10
Rule 64, a procedural device for the review of final orders,
resolutions or decision of the COMELEC, does not foreclose recourse to this Court
under Rule 65 from administrative orders of said Commission issued in the exercise of
its administrative function.
11

It bears stressing that under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, judicial power is
vested in the courts. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Judicial power is an antidote to and a safety net against whimsical,
despotic and oppressive exercise of governmental power. The aggrieved party may
seek redress therefrom through the appropriate special civil action provided by the
Rules of Court. As to acts of the COMELEC, the special civil action may be one for
certiorari pursuant to Article IX(A), Section 7 of the Constitution.
As a general rule, an administrative order of the COMELEC is not a proper subject of a
special civil action for certiorari.
12
But when the COMELEC acts capriciously or
whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing such an order, the aggrieved party may seek redress from this Court via a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.
13

Private respondent cannot find solace in the pronouncement in Ruperto Ambil, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections, et al.
14
because the subject matter of the petition therein was
an interlocutory order of a Division of the COMELEC. This Court held that the remedy of
the aggrieved party was first to file a motion for a reconsideration of the order with the
COMELEC En Banc. The raison d'etre therefor is that under Rule 3, Section 6(c) of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, any motion for a reconsideration of a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a Division of the COMELEC has to be referred to and
resolved by the Commission sitting En Banc. A motion for reconsideration filed with the
COMELEC En Banc of an order, ruling or resolution of a Division thereof is a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy therefrom.

26. Continuing Mandamus:

MMDA vs Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay
G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008

Doctrine:

Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus, the Court may, under
extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not
be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

Facts:

On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the
petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.

They alleged that, water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards
set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.

The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular
inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water
samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal
coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR
Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact
recreational activities, or the SB level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.

Petitioners - maintain that the MMDAs duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste
and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the
part of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make
decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking feasibility studies and
cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.

Respondents - counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners duty to comply
with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion.
According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to
choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the
same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not to
alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDAs ministerial
duty to attend to such services

RTC:

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. Finding merit in the complaint, the Court
ordered defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay
and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of
contact recreation.

To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6)
months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated,
coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.

In particular:

Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in
strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.

Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate
sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.

Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain
waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.

Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of
other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.

Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill
and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system
such as re-use or recycling of wastes.

Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in
Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.

Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and
rehabilitation of Manila Bay.

Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of
waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila
Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively
participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage
in the bay.

Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and
require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming
from septic tanks.

Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance
of preserving and protecting the environment.

Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay
from all forms of illegal fishing.

CA:

Sustained RTCs decision


Issues:

a) Whether or not pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of
specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.

b) Whether or not the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by
mandamus.


Held:

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial
duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. It connotes an act in
which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising
under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law. Mandamus is available to compel
action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion one way or the other.

We agree with respondents.

Petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are
to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the
MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very
act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by
mandamus.

The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in
the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper
waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their
judgment or conscience.

The aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and
complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We
need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.

The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the
long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as
important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the
rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any
cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water
quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other
relevant laws.

It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the
bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their
mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the
ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus, the Court may,
under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision
would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

The petition is DENIED and the decision of RTC is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.

G.R. No. 146531. March 18, 2005
DOMINGO R. MANALO, Petitioners,
vs.
PAIC SAVINGS BANK and THERESE V. VARGAS, Respondents.

Facts:
S. Villanueva Enterprises, Inc., represented by its president, Therese Villanueva
Vargas, impleaded as a respondent, obtained a P3,000,000.00 loan from PAIC Savings
and Mortgage Bank, also a respondent. As security for the loan, respondents
mortgaged two (2) lots situated in Pasay City. However, respondent Vargas failed to
pay the loan. Thereafter, the mortgages were foreclosed and were sold to public auction
to respondent bank for being the highest bidder. Consequently, a Certificate of sale was
issued to respondent bank and the lots were registered to the Registry of Deeds.
Seven years later, respondent Vargas filed with the Regional Trial Court a
complaint for the annulment of mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure against the
respondent bank. The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The decision of the Court of Appeals
became final and executor.
Sometime in 1992, respondent bank filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession which was granted by the court on April 2, 2008. However, respondent
Vargas sold the lots to Armando Angsico on December 1992 for an amount of P
18,000.500.00. Also, on August 1994, respondent Vargas leased a portion of the same
lots to petitioner, Domingo R. Manalo, consisting of an area of 450 sq. meters. Later on,
Angsingcoassigned and transferred to petitioner all his rights to the property.
Then, petitioner filed with the RTCa complaint for specific performance and
damages. He impleaded as defendants, respondent bank, its liquidator and/or receiver
PDIC, and respondent Vargas. Petitioner alleged that he has legal interest in the subject
lots, having initially leased a portion of the same from respondent Vargas and then
purchased the whole area from Angsico. He prayed that the trial court issue a writ
of mandamus compelling respondent bank (1) to allow him to redeem and/or
repurchase the subject lots for P18,000,000.00; and (2) to release to him TCT No. 6076.
On the part of respondent bank, it filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
following grounds: (1) the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject property; and (2)
the complaint fails to state a sufficient cause of action. Respondent bank averred that
petitioner has no legal interest in the subject lots since as early as December 4, 1985,
the title thereto was consolidated in its name when respondent Vargas, petitioners
predecessor-in-interest, failed to exercise her right of redemption.
The RTC issued an Order denying respondent banks motion. Thus, respondent
bank filed its answer alleging as affirmative defenses the grounds it alleged in its motion
to dismiss.
The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for "lack of an
enforceable cause of action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs
decision holding that petitioners complaint failed to state a cause of action.

Issue:
Whether or not a writ of mandamus should be granted to petitioner, Manalo.
Courts Ruling:
NO.
Mandamus is not the proper recourse to enforce petitioners alleged right of
redemption. To begin with, mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioners
right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. In varying language, the
principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if
those rights are well-defined, clear and certain.
On December 4, 1985 or when respondent Vargas failed to exercise her right of
redemption within the one (1) year redemption period, respondent bank ipso
facto became the absolute owner of the lots. Surprisingly, however, on December
23, 1992, she sold the property for P18,000,500.00 to Angsico, who eventually
transferred his rights to petitioner. Not only that, on August 24, 1994, respondent
Vargas still leased to petitioner a portion of the subject lots.
Verily, when respondent bank became the owner of the lots on December 4,
1985, respondent Vargas could no longer legally transfer, cede and convey the property
to petitioner.
Moreover, mandamus cannot be availed of as a remedy to enforce the
performance of contractual obligations. InCommission on Elections vs. Quijano-
Padilla, we held:
"No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not
lie to enforce the performance of contractual obligations. As early as
1924, Justice Street, in Quiogue vs. Romualdez, already set forth the
justification of this rule, thus:
Upon the facts above stated we are of the opinion that the writ of
mandamus is not the appropriate, or even an admissible remedy. It is
manifest that whatever rights the petitioner may have, upon the facts
stated, are derived from her contract with the city; and no rule of law is
better settled than that mandamus never lies to enforce the performance
of private contracts. . . . The petitioner's remedy, if any she has, is by an
original action in the Court of First Instance to compel the city to pay the
agreed price or to pay damages for the breach of contract.
x xx
It was not intended to aid a plaintiff in the enforcement of a
mere contract right, or to take the place of the other remedies
provided by law for the adjudication of disputed claims. Looking at
the case from the standpoint of appellant, it involves nothing more than an
ordinary breach of contract. If, as contended, the appellant had a valid
contract with the school board, it also had an adequate remedy at law to
recover damages for its breach; and to permit the writ of mandamus to
be used for the purpose of enforcing a mere contract right would be
a wide departure from the settled practice in respect to the character
of cases in which relief by mandamus may be obtained.


LAPID vs. LAUREA
RAMON ISIDRO P. LAPID and GLADYS B. LAPID, in behalf of their minor child CHRISTOPHER B.
LAPID,vs.HON. EMMANUEL D. LAUREA, Presiding Judge of RTC, BR. 169, MalabonST. THERESE OF
THE CHILD JESUS, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL., respondents.
G.R. No. 139607 October 28, 2002
DOCTRINE(MATERIAL DATE RULE):
There are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65.
1. the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received;
2. the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration was filed; and
3. The date when notice of the denial thereof was received.
In this case, the petition filed with the CA failed to indicate the second date, particularly the date of filing of
their motion for reconsideration As explicitly stated in the aforementioned Rule, failure to comply with any
of the requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.



FACTS:
On May 8, 1998, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against the private respondents
before the Regional Trial Court ofMalabon, Metro manila.
Spouses Ramon Isidro P. Lapid and Gladys B. Lapid are the parents of seven-year-old Christopher
B. Lapid, who was a Grade 1 pupil of St. Therese of the Child Jesus. The said child was suspended for five
days following the complaints received by the school from the parents of his classmates. Christopher
was a mischievous and had committed serious infractions when he hurt not only his classmates but also
his classroom teacher and one school employee. At one time, Christopher stabbed a classmate with a
pencil, and at another time, he hit a teacher with a backpack. These incidents were all recorded by the
classroom adviser and reported to the Guidance Counselor. The school tried to contact the spouses but
the effort had become futile.
Spouses averred that their son was summarily dismissed from school sans notice and hearing.
Petitioners denied any knowledge of the alleged letters of complaint filed by the parents whose children
were allegedly offended by Christopher. As a result of the strained relations between the Lapids and the
school management, Christopher was transferred to a different school immediately thereafter.
According to petitioners, the schools malicious imputation against their son tarnished their
good name and reputation. Petitioners said Mr. Lapid is a Bachelor of Laws graduate, a college
professor, and Branch Clerk of Court of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 41, Quezon City; while Mrs.
Lapid is an account analyst at the Philippine Airlines Administrative Office in Makati, and both of them
belonging to good and reputable families. They prayed for moral damages in the amount of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000), exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000, and another P100,000 for actual
and consequential damages.
Petitioners filed a motion to declare respondent school in default, which motion was denied by
the trial court. Also, motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
With the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals.
COURT OF APPEALS:
The appellate court dismissed the petition for failure to indicate the material date, particularly
the date of filing of motion for reconsideration with the RTC, as required by Supreme Court Circular No.
39-98, amending Section 3 of Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.7
In the appellate courts view, this formal requirement is needed to ascertain whether the
petition was filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the same rules,
also as amended by SC Circular No. 39-98.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but still without indicating the date as to when
their motion for reconsideration of the RTC order was filed. Hence, the motion was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioners on the ground of formal and procedural deficiency, i.e., the petitioners failure to state a
material date in their petition for certiorari
HELD:
No. There is no reversible error in the assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals because in
filing a special civil action for certiorari without indicating the requisite material date thereon,
petitioners violated basic tenets of remedial law, particularly Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
There are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under
Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received; second,
the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration was filed; and third, the date when notice of
the denial thereof was received. In the case before us, the petition filed with the CA failed to indicate
the second date, particularly the date of filing of their motion for reconsideration. As explicitly stated in
the aforementioned Rule, failure to comply with any of the requirements shall be sufficient ground for
the dismissal of the petition.
The rationale for this strict provision of the Rules of Court is not difficult to appreciate. As stated
in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the requirement is for purpose of determining the timeliness of the
petition, thus:
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of
determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41)
days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in
any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was
filed on time since the material dates were not stated. x xx (Stress supplied.)
Moreover, as reiterated in Mabuhay vs. NLRC, 288 SCRA 1, 6: "As a rule, the perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period prescribed by law is jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal as
required by law renders the judgment final and executory."
A liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to at least explain its failure to comply with the rules. In the instant case, the petition was
bereft of any persuasive explanation as to why petitioners Ramon and Gladys Lapid failed to observe
procedural rules properly. The record shows that through their counsel they failed not only once but
twice to indicate the material date required by law. Counsel for petitioners had all the opportunity to
comply with the rules, but counsel remained obstinate in her non-observance thereof even when she
sought reconsideration of the ruling of the respondent court dismissing her clients petition. Such
obstinacy is inconsistent with her late plea for liberality in construing the rules on certiorari. Thus, any
further delay that would inadvertently result from the dismissal of the instant petition is one purely of
petitioners own making, considering that it is an elementary principle in law that negligence of counsel
binds the client.
A final note. Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of
procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to
frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the prompt, proper and orderly disposition of
cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of these rules cannot
justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.24
All told, no reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals for dismissing the petition for
certiorari and later denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED..
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164715. September 20, 2006

ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, petitioner, vs. RAMON C. GONZALEZ, respondent.

FACTS: At around 10:05 a.m. of August 11, 2000, 61-year-old Ramon C. Gonzalez was driving his Nissan
Cefiro car with plate no. UPW-298 along the right outermost lane of the South-Luzon Expressway. He
was on his way to Makati City and had just passed the Sucat toll gate. Atty. Arnel C. Alcaraz, a Customs
Collector of the Bureau of Customs, Batangas Port, was driving his Nissan Infiniti car with plate no. CNH-
338. He was in the middle lane of the South-Luzon Expressway, between the Sucat and Bicutan
Interchange, on his way to Manila from Batangas City. He was armed with a .38 caliber pistol and had
with him Mission Order No. 699-2000, to expire on August 21, 2000. Since Alcaraz intended to use the
Skyway, he signaled, and proceeded to the right-most lane which was reserved for vehicles taking the
Skyway.

Gonzalez, who was on the right-most lane, was forced to swerve his car to the right to avoid colliding
with Alcaraz's vehicle and nearly hit the concrete island. Nonplussed, Gonzalez chased after Alcaraz,
opened his windows and shouted at Alcaraz, demanding to know why the latter suddenly cut into his
lane. Alcaraz retorted that he had signaled that he was swerving to the right. Gonzalez reproved Alcaraz
and drove on.

Alcaraz drove his car to Gonzalez's right. Upon nearing an island, Alcaraz raised his pistol towards
Gonzalez and fired twice: the first bullet hit the right front window of the vehicle and exited at the left
rear door; the second bullet hit the left rear window of Gonzalez's car. 3 Alcaraz hurriedly drove away
from the scene, but was intercepted by the PNCC guards at the Skyway toll gate. The guards confiscated
from Alcaraz the .38 pistol with 7 live bullets and 3 empty shells. 4

Gonzalez reported the matter to the Paraaque City Police Station where he gave a statement to the
police investigator, and filed a criminal complaint for attempted homicide against Alcaraz.

After the Office of the City Prosecutor conducted an inquest, an Information for attempted homicide
against Alcaraz was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Paraaque City.

On motion of Alcaraz, the MeTC ordered the City Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. 9

The Investigating Prosecutor resolved to maintain his finding of probable cause of attempted homicide
against Alcaraz and to retain the Information. Alcaraz filed a motion for reconsideration, and when it
was denied, filed a petition for review with the City Prosecutor's Office, Department of Justice.

On November 26, 2001, then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez issued a Resolution granting the
petition and ordering the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information.

According to the Justice Secretary, Gonzalez failed to prove beyond reasonable that Alcaraz had
intended to kill. Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Undersecretary of Justice denied
on January 29, 2003.

Gonzalez then filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the
CA, seeking the reversal of the Justice Secretary's Resolution. He claimed that the Secretary acted
beyond his authority in finding no probable cause to charge Alcaraz with attempted homicide and for
ordering the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information. He insisted that by invoking self-defense,
Alcaraz thereby admitted his intention to kill him (Gonzalez). He claimed that Alcaraz's claim of self-
defense should be ventilated during trial on the merits.

In his comment on the petition, Alcaraz averred that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction over the
petition, and that Gonzalez had no legal standing to file the petition. He insisted that the remedy from
an adverse resolution of the Justice Secretary is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, grounded on grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, not
one under Rule 43 of said Rule. He averred that the Justice Secretary is not a quasi-judicial officer under
Rule 43 whose resolutions may thus be reviewed by the CA. Alcaraz likewise pointed out that the CA was
without power to substitute its own judgment for that of the Justice Secretary regarding the existence
or non-existence of probable cause to charge him with attempted homicide.

On March 22, 2004, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and reversing the assailed
resolutions of the Secretary of Justice.

Alcaraz filed a motion for the reconsideration but on July 19, 2004, the CA resolved to deny Alcaraz's
motion, 18 holding that his grounds and objections had already been considered and passed upon by it
in its decision.

Alcaraz, now petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, alleging that

ITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE IN AN APPEAL BY WAY OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 43 OF THE 1997
REVISED RULES OF COURT.

IITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF
PROBABLE CAUSE AND/OR TO SUBSTITUTE ITS OWN FINDINGS OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO THAT OF THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE IN AN APPEAL BY WAY OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 43 OF THE 1997
REVISED RULES OF COURT.

III.THE RESPONDENT HAS NO LEGAL STANDING TO APPEAL BY WAY OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER
RULE 43 OF THE 1997 REVISED RULES OF COURT THE RESOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. 20

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

We agree with petitioner's contention that respondent resorted to an improper remedy when he filed a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, instead of filing a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.

It bears stressing that in the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, the
executive branch of government has full discretionary authority. Thus, the decision whether or not to
dismiss the criminal complaint against the private respondent is necessarily dependent on the sound
discretion of the Investigating Prosecutor and ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. Courts are not
empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch.

The resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who, under
the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of control and supervision over said Investigating
Prosecutor; and who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such prosecutor. 25 Thus, while
the CA may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may do so only in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave
abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. 26

It bears stressing that the Resolution of the Justice Secretary affirming, modifying or reversing the
resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is final. Under the 1993 Revised Rules on Appeals (now the
2000 National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeals), resolutions in preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations from the Justice Secretary's resolution, except the aggrieved party, has no more remedy
of appeal to file a motion for reconsideration of the said resolution of such motion if it is denied by the
said Secretary. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court since there is no more appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary course of law. 27

In the present case, respondent filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the resolutions of the Justice Secretary. Instead of dismissing the petition, however, the CA gave due
course to it and thereafter granted the petition, on its finding that the Justice Secretary erred in
reversing the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor which found probable cause against petitioner
for attempted homicide. Patently, the ruling of the CA is incorrect.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75589 are NULLIFIED.