11.

Where a statute is ambiguous, courts may examine both the printed pages of the published Act as well
as those extrinsic matters that may aid in construing the meaning of the statute, such as the history of its
enactment, the reasons for the passage of the bill and the purposes to be accomplished by the measure.
G.R. No. L!"#!$ August 1%, 1$%&
'())*++*(N,R (- '.+/()+, petitioner,
0s.
,++( +/AN1AR1 ,A+/,RN, *N'., 2-ormerly3 +tandard4acuum Re5ning 'orp. 26hil.7, respondent.

Appeal from the decision of the 'ourt of /ax Appeals re0ersing the 'ommissioner of 'ustoms8 decision
holding respondent ,++( +tandard ,astern, *nc., 2formerly the +tandard4acuum Re5ning 'orporation
26hil.7 and hereinafter referred to as ,++(7 liable in the total sum of 6%%&.9! as special import tax on
certain articles imported by the latter under Republic Act No. #"%, otherwise :nown as the 6etroleum Act of
1$;$.
Respondent ,++( is the holder of Re5ning 'oncession No. !, issued by the +ecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources on 1ecember $, 1$&%, and operates a petroleum re5ning plant in Limay <ataan. .nder
Article 1=# of Republic Act No. #"% which pro0ides3 >1uring the 50e years following the granting of any
concession, the concessionaire may import free of customs duty, all e?uipment, machinery, material,
instruments, supplies and accessories,> respondent imported and was assessed the special import tax
2which it paid under protest7 on the following separate importations3
17 (ne carton, scienti5c instruments with ' @ - 0alue of assessed a special import tax in the
amount of 6#1.$" 2Airport 6rotest No. 1=7A
!7 (ne carton of recorder parts with ' @ - 0alue of B!!1.&9A assessed special import tax in
the amount of 6;#."! 2Airport 6rotest No. 117A
#7 (ne carton of 0al0es with ' @ - 0alue of B#1=.&"A assessed special import tax in the
amount of 69=.%! 2Airport 6rotest No. 1!7A
;7 (ne box of parts for 'on0ersion boilers and Auxiliary ,?uipment with ' @ - 0alue of
B!,#"$.9$A assessed special import tax in the amount of 6;9%.== 2Airport 6rotest No. 1&7A
&7 (ne carton of Cray 5lms with ' @ - 0alue of B1#!."=A assessed special import tax in the
amount of 6!9.== 2Airport 6rotest No. 197A and
97 (ne carton of recorder parts with ' @ - 0alue of B%&=.#$A assessed special import tax in
the amount of 61;%.== 2Airport 6rotest No. 1%7.
1

/he 'ollector of 'ustoms on -ebruary 19, 1$9!, held that respondent ,++( was subDect to the payment of
the special import tax pro0ided in Republic Act No. 1#$;, as amended by R.A. No. !#&!, and dismissed the
protest.
!

(n )arch 1, 1$9!, respondent appealed the ruling of the 'ollector of 'ustoms to the 'ommissioner of
'ustoms who, on )arch 1$, 1$9&, aErmed the decision of said 'ollector of 'ustoms.
#

(n Fuly !, 1$9&, respondent ,++( 5led a petition with the 'ourt of /ax Appeals for re0iew of the decision of
the 'ommissioner of 'ustoms.
/he 'ourt of /ax Appeals, on +eptember #=, 1$9%, re0ersed the decision of herein petitioner 'ommissioner
of 'ustoms and ordered refund of the amount of 6%%&.9! to respondent ,++( which the latter had paid
under protest.
;

/his decision of the 'ourt of /ax Appeals is now before this 'ourt for re0iew.
6etitioner contends that the special import tax under Republic Act No. 1#$; is separate and distinct from
the customs duty prescribed by the /ariG and 'ustoms 'ode, and that the exemption enDoyed by
respondent ,++( from the payment of customs duties under the 6etroleum net of 1$;$ does not include
exemption from the payment of the special import tax pro0ided in R.A. No. 1#$;.
&

-or its stand petitioner puts forward this rationale3
A perusal of the pro0isions of R.A. No. 1#$; will show that the legislature considered the
special import tax as a tax distinct from customs duties as witness the fact that +ection !2a7
of the said law made separate mention of customs duties and special import tax when it
pro0ided that ... if as a result of the application of the schedule therein, the total re0enue
deri0ed from the customs duties and from the special import tax on goods, ... imported from
the .nited +tates is less in any calendar year than the proceeds from the exchange tax
imposed under Republic Act Numbered +ix Hundred and (ne, as amended, on such goods,
articles or products during the calendar year 1$&&, the 6resident may, by proclamation,
suspend the reduction of the special import tax for the next succeeding calendar year ....
*f it were the intention of 'ongress to exempt the holders of petroleum re5nery concessions
li:e the protestant 2respondent herein7, such exemption should ha0e been clearly stated in
the statute. ,xemptions are ne0er presumed. /hey must be expressed in the clearest and
most unambiguous language and not left to mere implication.
9

+peci5cally, petitioner in his brief submitted two assignment of errors allegedly committed by the 'ourt of
/ax Appeals in the contro0erted decision, to wit3
1st assignment of error:
/H, '(.R/ (- /AC A66,AL+ ,RR,1 *N H(L1*NG /HA/ /H, /,R) >'.+/()+ 1./I> *N
AR/*'L, 1=# (- R,6.<L*' A'/ N(. #"% *N'L.1,+ /H, +6,'*AL *)6(R/ /AC *)6(+,1 <I
R,6.<L*' A'/ N(. 1#$;A
2nd assignment of error:
/H, '(.R/ (- /AC A66,AL+ ,RR,1 *N H(L1*NG /HA/ ,C,)6/*(N -R() 6AI),N/ (-
'.+/()+ 1./*,+ .N1,R R,6.<L*' A'/ N(. #"% *N'L.1,+ ,C,)6/*(N -R() 6AI),N/ (-
/H, +6,'*AL *)6(R/ /AC.
(n the other hand, the 'ourt of /ax Appeals rationaliJed the ground for its ruling thus3
*f we are to adhere, as we should, to the plain and ob0ious meaning of words in consonance
with settled rules of interpretation, it seems clear that the special import tax is an impost or
a charge on the importation or bringing into the 6hilippines of all goods, articles or products
subDect thereto, for the phrase >import tax on all goods, articles or products imported or
brought into the 6hilippines> in explicit and unambiguous terms simply means customs
duties. *t is hardly necessary to add that >customs duties> are simply taxes assessed on
merchandise imported from, or exported to a foreign country.
And being a charge upon importation, the special import tax is essentially a customs duty, or
at least parta:es of the character thereof.
'iting numerous American decisions and de5nitions of terms >customs duties,> >duties,> >imposts,>
>le0ies,> >tax,> and >tolls,> and their distinctions, including some pronouncements of this 'ourt on the
subDect, the 'ourt of /ax Appeals in its decision, went to great lengths to show that the term >special
import tax> as used in R.A. No. 1#$; includes customs duties. *t sees the special import tax as nothing but
an impost or a charge on the importation or bringing into the 6hilippines of goods, articles or products.
%

/o clinch its theory the 'ourt of /ax Appeals cited the similarity in the basis of computation of the customs
duty as well as the similarity in the phraseology of +ection # of Republic Act No. 1#$; 2which established
the special import tax7 and +ection $=1 of the /ariG @ 'ustoms code 2the basic law pro0iding for and
regulating the imposition of customs duties and imposts on importations7.
"

-or its part, pri0ate respondent, ,++(, in its answer to the petition, leaned hea0ily on the same arguments
as those gi0en by the /ax 'ourt, the burden of which is that the special import tax law is a customs law. $
*t is clear that the only issue in0ol0ed in this case is whether or not the exemption enDoyed by herein
pri0ate respondent ,++( +tandard ,astern, *nc. from customs duties granted by Republic Act No. #"%, or
the 6etroleum Act of 1$;$, should embrace or include the special import tax imposed by R.A. No. 1#$;, or
the +pecial *mport /ax Law.
We ha0e examined the records of this case thoroughly and carefully considered the arguments presented
by both parties and We are con0inced that the only thing left to this 'ourt to do is to determine the
intention of the legislature through interpretation of the two statutes in0ol0ed, i.e., Republic Act No. 1#$;
and Republic Act No. #"%.
*t is a well accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous, as Republic Act No. 1#$; appears to be,
courts may examine both the printed pages of the published Act as well as those extrinsic matters that
may aid in construing the meaning of the statute, such as the history of its enactment, the reasons for the
passage of the bill and purposes to be accomplished by the measure.
1=

6etitioner in the 5rst assignment of error too: exception to the 5nding of the 'ourt of /ax Appeals that
>/he language of Republic Act No. 1#$; seems to lea0e no room for doubt that the law intends that the
phrase 8+pecial import tax8 is ta:en to include customs duties> and countered with the argument that >An
examination of the pro0isions of Republic Act No. 1#$; will indubitably re0eal that 'ongress considered the
special import tax as a tax diGerent from customs duties, as may be seen from the fact that +ection !2a7 of
said law made separate mention of customs duties and special import tax ...> /hus3
... if as a result of the application of the schedule therein the total re0enue deri0ed from the
customs duties and from the special import tax on goods, ... imported from the .nited +tates
is less in any calendar year than the proceeds from the exchange tax imposed under
Republic Act Numbered +ix Hundred and (ne, as amended, on such goods, articles or
products during the calendar year 1$&&, the 6resident may, by proclamation, suspend the
reduction of the special import tax for the next succeeding calendar year ...
6etitioner further argues3
'ustoms duties are prescribed by the /ariG and 'ustoms 'ode, while the special import tax
is pro0ided for by Republic Act No. 1#$;. *f our legislature had intended to classify the
special import tax as customs duty, the said Art would not ha0e expressly exempted from
payment of the special *mport tax importations of machinery, e?uipment, accessories, and
spare parts for use of industries, without distinguishing whether the industries referred to
are the industries exempt from the payment of 'ustoms duties or the nonexempt ones 2+ec.
97. *t is suEcient that the imported machinery, etc., is for the use of any industry.
11

A study of petitioner8s two assignments of errors shows that one is anchored on practically the same
ground as the other3 both in0ol0e the interpretation of R.A. No. #"% 2/he 6etroleum Act of 1$;$7 in relation
with R.A. No. 1#$; 2/he +pecial *mport /ax Law7.
While the petitioner harps on particular clauses and phrases found in the two cited laws, which in a way
was li:ewise resorted to by the respondent ,++(, it would do .s well to restate the fundamental rule in the
construction of a statute.
*n order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute
should not be ta:en as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and e0ery part thereof must be
considered in 5xing the meaning of any of its parts. *n fact e0ery statute should recei0e such construction
as will ma:e it harmoniJe with the preexisting body of laws. Antagonism between the Act to be interpreted
and existing or pre0ious laws is to be a0oided, unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that
such antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by implication.
Another rule applied by this 'ourt is that the courts may ta:e Dudicial notice of the origin and history of the
statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of facts which aGect their deri0ation,
0alidity and operation.
1!

Applying the abo0e stated rules and principles, let us consider the history, the purpose and obDecti0es of
Republic Act No. #"% as it relates to Republic Act No. 1#$; and other laws passed by the 'ongress of the
6hilippines insofar as they relate to each other.
Republic Act No. #"%, the 6etroleum Act of 1$;$, has this for its title, to wit3
AN A'/ /( 6R()(/, /H, ,C6L(RA/*(N, 1,4,L(6),N/, ,C6L(*/A/*(N, AN1 ./*L*KA/*(N
(- /H, 6,/R(L,.) R,+(.R',+ (- /H, 6H*L*66*N,+A /( ,N'(.RAG, /H, '(N+,R4A/*(N
(- +.'H 6,/R(L,.) R,+(.R',+A /( A./H(R*K, /H, +,'R,/ARI (- AGR*'.L/.R, AN1
NA/.RAL R,+(.R',+ /( 'R,A/, AN A1)*N*+/RA/*(N .N*/ AN1 A /,'HN*'AL <(AR1 *N
/H, <.R,A. (- )*N,+A /( A66R(6R*A/, -.N1+ /H,R,-(R,A AN1 -(R (/H,R 6.R6(+,+.
Art. 1=# of said Act reads3
AR/. 1=#. Customs duties. L 1uring the 50e years following the granting of any concessions,
the concessionaire may import free of customs duty, all e?uipment, machinery, material,
instruments, supplies and accessories.
Art. 1=! of the +ame law insofar as pertinent, pro0ides3
AR/. 1=!. Work obligations, taxes, royalties not to be charged. L ...A nor shall any other
special taxes or le0ies be applied to such concessions, nor shall concessionaires under this
Act be subDected to any pro0incial, municipal, or other local taxes or le0iesA nor shall any
sales tax be charged on any petroleum produced from the concession or portion thereof,
manufactured by the concessionaire and used in the wor:ing of his concession. ....
Art. 1=;, still of the same Act, reads3
AR/. 1=;. No export to be imposed. L No export tax shall be le0ied upon petroleum
produced from concessions granted under this Act.
/he title of Republic Act No. #"% and the pro0isions of its three articles Dust cited gi0e a clue to the intent of
the 6hilippine legislature, which is to encourage the exploitation and de0elopment of the petroleum
resources of the country. /hrough the instrumentality of said law, it declared in no uncertain terms that the
intensi5cation of the exploration for petroleum must be carried on unMinchingly e0en if, for the time being,
no taxes, both national and local, may be collected from the industry. /his is the une?ui0ocal intention of
the 6hilippine 'ongress when the language of the 6etroleum Act is examined. .ntil this law or any
substantial portion thereof is clearly amended or repealed by subse?uent statutes, the intention of the
legislature must be upheld.
Against this unambiguous language of R.A. No. #"%, there is the subse?uent legislation, R.A. No. 1#$;, the
+pecial *mport /ax Law, which, according to the herein petitioner, shows that the legislature considered the
special import tax as a tax distinct from customs duties.
Republic Act No. 1#$;, otherwise :nown as the +pecial *mport /ax Law, is entitled as follows3
AN A'/ /( *)6(+, A +6,'*AL *)6(R/ /AC (N ALL G((1+, AR/*'L,+ (R 6R(1.'/+
*)6(R/,1 (R <R(.GH/ *N/( /H, 6H*L*66*N,+, AN1 /( R,6,AL R,6.<L*' A'/+ N.)<,R,1
+*C H.N1R,1 AN1 (N,, ,*GH/ H.N1R,1 AN1 -(.R/,,N, ,*GH/ H.N1R,1 AN1 +,4,N/I
(N,, ,L,4,N H.N1R,1 AN1 +,4,N/I-*4,. ,L,4,N H.N1R,1 AN1 N*N,/I+,4,N AN1
/H*R/,,N H.N1R,1 AN1 +,4,N/I -*4,.
/he title indicates unmista:ably that it is repealing six prior statutes. As will be seen later, all these laws
dealt with the imposition of a special excise tax on foreign exchange or other form of le0y on importation
of goods into the country.
+ection * of Republic Act No. 1#$; reads as follows3
+,'/*(N 1. ,xcept as herein otherwise pro0ided, there shall be le0ied, collected and paid as
special import tax on all goods, articles or products imported or brought into the 6hilippines,
irrespecti0e of source, during the period and in accordance with the rates pro0ided for in the
following schedule3
*t would appear that by the pro0ision of +ection 1 of this Act, the pertinent pro0ision of the 6etroleum Law,
for which there appears to be no pro0iso to the contrary, has been modi5ed or altered.
+ection 9 of Republic Act No. 1#$; declares that the tax pro0ided for in its +ection * shall not be imposed
against importation into the 6hilippines of machinery andNor raw materials to be used by new and
necessary industries as determined in accordance with R A. No. $=1 and a long list of other goods, articles,
machinery, e?uipment, accessories and others.
We shall now examine the six statutes repealed by R.A. No. 1#$;, namely3
R.. No. !"1 is an Act imposing a special excise tax of 1%O on foreign exchange sold by the
'entral <an: or its agents. /his is :nown as the ,xchange /ax LawA
R.. No. #1$ amended +ections one, two and 50e and repealed +ections three and four of
R.A. No. 9=1A
R.. No. #%1 amended +ections one and two of R.A. No. 9=1, as amended earlier by R.A. No.
"1;A
R.. No. 11%& amended further +ections one and two of R.A. No. 9=1, as amendedA
R.. No. 11'% amended furthermore R.A. No. 9=1 as amended pre0iously by R.A. No. 11%&A
R.. No. 1(%& amended +ections one and two of R.A. No. 9=1 as amended by R.A. Nos. 11%&
and 11$%.
As can be seen from the foregoing, in one fell swoop, Republic Act No. 1#$; repealed and
re0o:ed six earlier statutes which had something to do with the imposition of special le0ies
andNor exemption of certain importations from the burden of the special import taxes or
le0ies. (n the other hand, it is apparent that R.A. No. #"%, the 6etroleum Act, had been
spared from the pruning :nife of 'ongress, although this latter law had granted more
concessions and tax exemption pri0ileges than any of the statutes that were amended,
repealed or re0o:ed by R.A. No. 1#$;. /he answer must be that the 'ongress of the
6hilippine saw 5t to preser0e the pri0ileges granted under the 6etroleum Law of 1$;$ in
order to :eep the door open to the exploitation and de0elopment of the petroleum resources
of the country with such incenti0es as are gi0en under that law.
/his ascertained will and intention of the legislature 5nds a parallelism in a case brought
earlier before this 'ourt.
A 5shpond owner was slapped with taxes as a >merchant> by the 'ollector of *nternal Re0enue. He paid
under protest and 5led an action to reco0er the taxes paid, claiming that he was an agriculturist and not a
merchant. When this 'ourt was called upon to interpret the pro0isions of the *nternal Re0enue Law on
whether 5sh is an agricultural product which falls under the exemption pro0isions of said law, it in?uired
into the purpose of the legislature in establishing the exemption for agricultural products. We held3
/he 5rst in?uiry, therefore, must relate to the purpose the legislature had in mind in
establishing the exemption contained in the clause now under consideration. *t seems
reasonable to assume that it was due to the belief on the part of the lawma:ing body that
by exempting agricultural products from this tax the farming industry would be fa0ored and
the de0elopment of the resources of the country encouraged. ....
1#

Ha0ing this in mind, particularly the manner in which extrinsic aids the history of the enactment of the
statute and purpose of the legislature in employing a clause or pro0ision in the law had been applied in
determining the true intent of the lawma:ing body, We are con0inced that R.A. No. #"%, /he 6etroleum Act
of 1$;$, was intended to encourage the exploitation, exploration and de0elopment of the petroleum
resources of the country by gi0ing it the necessary incenti0e in the form of tax exemptions. /his is the
raison d etre for the generous grant of tax exemptions to those who would in0est their 5nancial resources
towards the achie0ement of this national economic goal.
(n the contention of herein petitioner that the exemptions enDoyed by respondent ,++( under R.A. No.
#"% ha0e been abrogated by R.A. No. 1#$;, We hold that repeal by implication is not fa0ored unless it is
manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with
full :nowledge of all existing ones on the subDect, it is logical to conclude that in passing a statute it was
not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless the
repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable but also clear and con0incing as a result of the
language used, or unless the latter act fully embraces the subDect matter of the earlier.
1;

As obser0ed earlier, 'ongress lined up for re0ocation by Republic Act No. 1#$; six statutes dealing with the
imposition of special imposts or le0ies or the granting of exemptions from special import taxes. Iet,
considering the tremendous amount of re0enues it was losing under the 6etroleum Law of 1$;$, it failed to
include the latter statute among those it chose to bury by the +pecial *mport /aw Law. /he reason for this
is 0ery clear3 /he legislature wanted to continue the incenti0es for the continuing de0elopment of the
petroleum industry. *t is not amiss to mention herein passing that contrary to the theory of the herein
petitioner, R.A. No. #"% had not been repealed by R.A. No. !#&! which expressly abrogated +ection 9 of
R.A. No. 1#$; but did not repeal any part of R.A. No. #"%. /herefore, the exemption granted by Republic
Act No. #"% still stands.
WH,R,-(R,, ta:ing into consideration the weight gi0en by this 'ourt to the 5ndings and conclusions of
the 'ourt of /ax Appeals on a matter it is welle?uipped to handle, which 5ndings and conclusions We 5nd
no reason to o0erturn, the petition of the 'ommissioner of 'ustoms to re0erse the decision of the 'ourt of
/ax Appeals should be, as it is hereby, denied.
+( (R1,R,1.
1!. (pinions and rulings of oEcials of the go0ernment called upon to execute or implement administrati0e
laws command much respect and weight.
G.R. No. L##9$#$; )ay #1, 1$%$
)*+A,L 6. 4,RA, as 'ommissioner of *nternal Re0enue, and /H, -A*R /RA1, <(AR1, petitioner,
0s.
H(N. +,RA-*N R. '.,4A+, as Fudge of the 'ourt of -irst *nstance of )anila, <ranch *4, *N+/*/./, (-
,4A6(RA/,1 -*LL,1 )*LP
)AN.-A'/.R,R+ (- /H, 6H*L*66*N,+, *N'., '(N+(L*1A/,1 )*LP '()6ANI 26H*L.7 *N'., and )*LP
*N1.+/R*,+, *N'., respondents.
/his is a petition for certiorari with preliminary inDunction to re0iew the decision rendered by respondent
Dudge, in 'i0il 'ase No. &!!%9 and in +pecial 'i0il Action No. &!#"# both of the 'ourt of -irst *nstance of
)anila.
6laintiGs, in 'i0il 'ase No. &!!%9 pri0ate respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and
distribution of 5lled mil: products throughout the 6hilippines. /he products of pri0ate respondent,
'onsolidated 6hilippines *nc. are mar:eted and sold under the brand 1arigold whereas those of pri0ate
respondent, General )il: 'ompany 26hil.7, *nc., under the brand >LibertyA> and those of pri0ate respondent,
)il: *ndustries *nc., under the brand >1utch <aby.> 6ri0ate respondent, *nstitute of ,0aporated -illed )il:
)anufacturers of the 6hilippines, is a corporation organiJed for the principal purpose of upholding and
maintaining at its highest the standards of local 5lled mil: industry, of which all the other pri0ate
respondents are members.
'i0il 'ase No. &!!%9 is an action for declaratory relief with exparte petition for preliminary inDunction
wherein plaintiGs pray for an adDudication of their respecti0e rights and obligations in relation to the
enforcement of +ection 19$ of the /ax 'ode against their 5lled mil: products.
/he contro0ersy arose from the order of defendant, 'ommissioner of *nternal Re0enue now petitioner
herein, re?uiring plaintiGs pri0ate respondents to withdraw from the mar:et all of their 5lled mil: products
which do not bear the inscription re?uired by +ection 19$ of the /ax 'ode within 5fteen 21&7 days from
receipt of the order with the explicit warning that failure of plaintiGs8 pri0ate respondents to comply with
said order will result in the institution of the necessary action against any 0iolation of the aforesaid order.
+ection 19$ of the /ax 'ode reads as follows3
+ection 19$. )nscription to be placed on skimmed milk. * All condensed s:immed mil: and
all mil: in whate0er form, from which the fatty part has been remo0ed totally or in part, sold
or put on sale in the 6hilippines shall be clearly and legibly mar:ed on its immediate
containers, and in all the language in which such containers are mar:ed, with the words,
>/his mil: is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age,> or with other
e?ui0alent words.
/he 'ourt issued a writ of preliminary inDunction dated -ebruary 19, 1$9# restraining the 'ommissioner of
*nternal Re0enue from re?uiring plaintiGs8 pri0ate respondents to print on the labels of their riMed mil:
products the words, >/his mil: is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age or words
of similar import, > as directed by the abo0e ?uoted pro0ision of Law, and from ta:ing any action to enforce
the abo0e legal pro0ision against the plaintiGs8 pri0ate respondents in connection with their riMed mil:
products, pending the 5nal determination of the case, 'i0il 'ase No. &!!%9, on the merits.
(n Fuly !&, 1$9$, howe0er, the (Ece of the +olicitor General brought an appeal from the said order by way
of certiorari to the +upreme 'ourt.
1
*n 0iew thereof, the respondent court in the meantime suspended
disposition of these cases but in 0iew of the absence of any inDunction or restraining order from the
+upreme 'ourt, it resumed action on them until their 5nal disposition therein.
+pecial 'i0il Action No. &!#"#, on the other hand, is an action for prohibition and inDunction with a petition
for preliminary inDunction. 6etitioners therein pray that the respondent -air /rade <oard desist from further
proceeding with -/< *.+. No. *. entitled >Antonio R. de Foya 0s. *nstitute of ,0aporated )il: )anufacturers of
the 6hilippines, etc.> pending 5nal determination of 'i0il 'ase No. &!!%9. /he facts of this special ci0il
action show that on 1ecember %, 1$9!, Antonio R. de Foya and +ufronio 'arrasco, both in their indi0idual
capacities and in their capacities as 6ublic Relations 'ounsel and 6resident of the 6hilippine Association of
Nutrition, respecti0ely, 5led -/< *.+. No. 1 with -air /rade <oard for misleading ad0ertisement, mislabeling
andNor misbranding. Among other things, the complaint 5led include the charge of omitting to state in their
labels any statement suEcient to *dentify their 5lled mil: products as >imitation mil:> or as an imitation of
genuine cows mil:. and omitting to mar: the immediate containers of their 5lled mil: products with the
words3 >/his mil: is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age or with other
e?ui0alent words as re?uired under +ection 19$ of the /ax 'ode. /he <oard proceeded to hear the
complaint until it recei0ed the writ of preliminary inDunction issued by the 'ourt of -irst *nstance on )arch
1$, 1$9#.
.pon agreement of the parties, 'i0il 'ase No. &!!%9 and +pecial 'i0il Action No. &!#"# were heard Dointly
being intimately related with each other, with common facts and issues being also in0ol0ed therein. (n
April 19, 1$%1, the respondent court issued its decision, the dispositi0e part of which reads as follows3
Wherefore, Dudgment is hereby rendered3
)n Ci+il Case No. &22%!:
2a7 6erpetually restraining the defendant, 'ommissioner of *nternal Re0enue, his agents, or
employees from re?uiring plaintiGs to print on the labels of their 5lled mil: products the
words3 >/his mil: is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age> or
words with e?ui0alent import and declaring as nun and 0oid and without authority in law, the
order of said defendant dated +eptember !", 1$91, Annex A of the complaint, and the Ruling
of the +ecretary of -inance, dated No0ember 1!, 1$9!, Annex G of the complaintA and
)n ,pecial Ci+il ction No. &2(#(:
2b7 Restraining perpetually the respondent -air /rade <oard, its agents or employees from
continuing in the in0estigation of the complaints against petitioners doc:eted as -/< *.+. No.
!, or any charges related to the manufacture or sale by the petitioners of their 5lled mil:
products and declaring as null the proceedings so far underta:en by the respondent <oard
on said complaints. 2pp. != !1, Rollo7.
-rom the abo0e decision of the respondent court, the 'ommissioner of *nternal Re0enue and the -air /rade
<oard Doined together to 5le the present petition for certiorari with preliminary inDunction, assigning the
following errors3
*. /H, L(W,R '(.R/ ,RR,1 *N R.L*NG /HA/ +,'. /*(N 19$ (- /H, /AC '(1, HA+ <,,N
R,6,AL,1 <I *)6L*'A/*(N.
**. /H, L(W,R '(.R/ ,RR,1 *N R.L*NG /HA/ +,'/*(N 19$ (- /H, /AC '(1, HA+ L(+/ */+
/AC 6.R6(+,, AN1 /HA/ '())*++*(N,R N,',++AR*LI L(+/ H*+ A./H(R*/I /( ,N-(R',
/H, +A), AN1 /HA/ /H, 6R(6,R A./H(R*/I /( 6R()(/, /H, H,AL/H (- *N-AN/+ *+ /H,
-((1 AN1 1R.G A1)*N*+/RA/*(N, /H, +,'R,/ARI (- H,AL/H AN1 /H, +,'R,/ARI (-
F.+/*',, A+ 6R(4*1,1 -(R *N RA #%!=, N(/ /H, '())*++*(N,R (- *N/,RNAL R,4,N.,.
***. /H, L(W,R '(.R/ ,RR,1 *N R.L*NG /HA/ /H, 6(W,R /( *N4,+/*GA/, AN1 /(
6R(+,'./, 4*(LA/*(N+ (- -((1 LAW+ *+ ,N/R.+/,1 /( /H, -((1 AN1 1R.G
*N+6,'/*(N, /H, -((1 AN1 1R.G A1)*N*+/RA/*(N, /H, +,'R,/ARI (- H,AL/H AN1 /H,
+,'R,/ARI (- F.+/*',, AN1 /HA/ /H, -A*R /RA1, <(AR1 *+ W*/H(./ F.R*+1*'/*(N /(
*N4,+/*GA/, AN1 6R(+,'./, ALL,G,1 )*+<RAN1*NG, )*+LA<,LL*NG AN1N(R )*+L,A1*NG
A14,R/*+,),N/ (- -*LL,1 )*LP 6R(1.'/+. 2pp, ;&, Rollo7.
/he lower court did not err in ruling that +ection 19$ of the /ax 'ode has been repealed by implication.
+ection 19$ was enacted in 1$#$, together with +ection 1;1 2which imposed a +peci5c tax on s:immed
mil:7 and +ection 1%% 2which penaliJed the sale of s:immed mil: without payment of the speci5c tax and
without the legend re?uired by +ection 19$7. Howe0er, +ection 1;1 was expressly repealed by +ection 1 of
Republic Act No. #;;, and +ection 1%%, by +ection 1 of Republic Act No. ;9#. <y the express repeal of
+ections 1;1 and 1%%, +ection 19$ became a merely declaratory pro0ision, without a tax purpose, or a
penal sanction.
)oreo0er, it seems apparent that +ection 19$ of the /ax 'ode does not apply to 5lled mil:. /he use of the
speci5c and ?ualifying terms >s:immed mil:> in the headnote and >condensed s:immed mil:> in the text of
the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause >all mil:, in whate0er form, from which the
fatty pat has been remo0ed totally or in part.> *n other words, the general clause is restricted by the
speci5c term >s:immed mil:> under the familiar rule of e-usdem generis that general and unlimited terms
are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.
+:immed mil: is diGerent from 5lled mil:. According to the >1e5nitions, +tandards of 6urity, Rules and
Regulations of the <oard of -ood *nspection,> s:immed mil: is mil: in whate0er form from which the fatty
part has been remo0ed. -illed mil:, on the other hand, is any mil:, whether or not condensed, e0aporated
concentrated, powdered, dried, dessicated, to which has been added or which has been blended or
compounded with any fat or oil other than mil: fat so that the resulting product is an imitation or
semblance of mil: cream or s:im mil:.> /he diGerence, therefore, between s:immed mil: and 5lled mil: is
that in the former, the fatty part has been remo0ed while in the latter, the fatty part is li:ewise remo0ed
but is substituted with re5ned coconut oil or corn oil or both. *t cannot then be readily or safely assumed
that +ection 19$ applies both to s:immed mil: and 5lled mil:.
/he <oard of -ood *nspection way bac: in 1$91 rendered an opinion that 5lled mil: does not come within
the pur0iew of +ection 19$, it being a product distinct from those speci5ed in the said +ection since the
remo0ed fat portion of the mil: has been replaced with coconut oil and 4itamins A and 1 as fortifying
substances 2p. &", Rollo7. /his opinion bolsters the 'ourt8s stand as to its interpretation of the scope of
+ection 19$. (pinions and rulings of oEcials of the go0ernment called upon to execute or implement
administrati0e laws command much respect and weight. 2Asturias +ugar 'entral *nc. 0s. 'ommissioner of
'ustoms, G. R. No. L1$##%, +eptember #=, 1$9$, !$ +'RA 91%A /an, et. al. 0s. the )unicipality of 6agbilao
et. al., L1;!9;, April #=, 1$9#, % +'RA ""%A Grapilon 0s. )unicipal 'ouncil of 'arigara L1!#;%, )ay #=,
1$91, ! +'RA 1=#7.
/his 'ourt is, li:ewise, induced to the belief that 5lled mil: is suitable for nourishment for infants of all
ages. /he 6etitioners themsel0es admitted that3 >the 5lled mil: products of the petitioners 2now pri0ate
respondents7 are safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of all ages> 2p. ;;, Rollo7 and
that >up to the present, -ilipino infants fed since birth with 5lled mil: ha0e not suGered any defects, illness
or disease attributable to their ha0ing been fed with 5lled mil:.> 2p. ;&, Rollo7.
/here would seem, therefore, to be no dispute that 5lled mil: is suitable for feeding infants of all ages.
<eing so, the declaration re?uired by +ection 19$ of the /ax 'ode that 5lled mil: is not suitable for
nourishment for infants less than one year of age would, in eGect, constitute a depri0ation of property
without due. process of law.
+ection 19$ is being enforced only against respondent manufacturers of 5lled mil: product and not as
against manufacturers, distributors or sellers of condensed s:immed mil: such as +*)*LA', +)A, <R,)*L,
,N-A)*L, (LA', in which, as admitted by the petitioner, the fatty part has been remo0ed and substituted
with 0egetable or corn oil. /he enforcement of +ection 19$ against the pri0ate respondents only but not
against other persons similarly situated as the pri0ate respondents amounts to an unconstitutional denial
of the e?ual pro petition of the laws, for the law, e?ually enforced, would similarly oGend against the
'onstitution. Iic: Wo 0s. Hop:ins, 11" ..+. #&9,#= L. ed. !!=7.
As stated in the early part of this decision, with the repeal of +ections 1;1 and 1%% of the /ax 'ode,
+ection 19$ has lost its tax purpose. +ince +ection 19$ is de0oid of any tax purpose, petitioner
'ommissioner necessarily lost his authority to enforce the same. /his was so held by his predecessor
immediately after +ections 1;1 and 1%% were repealed in General 'ircular No. 4"& as stated in paragraph
*C of the 6artial +tipulation of facts entered into by the parties, to wit3
... As the act of sewing s:immed mil: without 5rst paying the speci5c tax thereon is no
longer unlawful and the enforcement of the re?uirement in regard to the placing of the
proper legend on its immediate containers is a subDect which does not come within the
Durisdiction of the <ureau of *nternal Re0enue, the penal pro0isions of +ection 1%% of the said
'ode ha0ing been repealed by Republic Act No. ;9#. 2p. 1=!, Rollo7.
6etitioner8s contention that he still has Durisdiction to enforce +ection 19$ by 0irtue of +ection # of the /ax
'ode which pro0ides that the <ureau of *nternal Re0enue shall also >gi0e eGect to and administer the
super0isory and police power conferred to it by this 'ode or other laws> is untenable. /he <ureau of
*nternal Re0enue may claim police power only when necessary in the enforcement of its principal powers
and duties consisting of the >collection of all national internal re0enue taxes, fees and charges, and the
enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties and 5nes connected therewith.> /he enforcement of +ection 19$
entails the promotion of the health of the nation and is thus unconnected with any tax purpose. /his is the
exclusi0e function of the -ood and 1rug Administration of the 1epartment of Health as pro0ided for in
Republic Act No. #%!=. *n particular, Republic Act No. #%!= pro0ides3
+ection $. ... *t shall be the duty of the <oard 2-ood and 1rug *nspection7, conformably with
the rules and regulations, to hold hearings and conduct in0estigations relati0e to matters
touching the Administration of this Act, to in0estigate processes of food, drug and cosmetic
manufacture and to subDect reports to the -ood and 1rug Administrator, recommending food
and drug standards for adoption. +aid <oard shall also perform such additional functions,
properly within the scope of the administration thereof, as maybe assigned to it by the -ood
and 1rug Administrator. /he decisions of the <oard shall be ad0isory to the -ood and 1rug
Administrator.
+ection !9. ...
2c7 Hearing authoriJed or re?uired by this Act shall be conducted by the <oard of -ood and
1rug *nspection which shall submit recommendation to the -ood and 1rug Administrator.
2d7 When it appears to the -ood and 1rug Administrator from the reports of the -ood and
1rug Laboratory that any article of food or any drug or cosmetic secured pursuant to +ection
!" of this Act is adulterated or branded he shall cause notice thereof to be gi0en to the
person or persons concerned and such person or persons shall be gi0en an opportunity to
subDect e0idence impeaching the correctness of the 5nding or charge in ?uestion.
2e7 When a 0iolation of any pro0isions of this Act comes to the :nowledge of the -ood and
1rug Administrator of such character that a criminal prosecution ought to be instituted
against the oGender, he shall certify the facts to the +ecretary of Fustice through the
+ecretary of Health, together with the chemists8 report, the 5ndings of the <oard of -ood and
1rug *nspection, or other documentary e0idence on which the charge is based.
2f7 Nothing in this Act shall be construed as re?uiring the -ood and 1rug Administrator to
certify for prosecution pursuant to subparagraph 2e7 hereof, minor 0iolations of this Act
whene0er he belie0es that public interest will be ade?uately ser0ed by a suitable written
notice or warning.
/he afore?uoted pro0isions of law clearly show that petitioners, 'ommissioner of *nternal Re0enue and the
-air /rade <oard, are without Durisdiction to in0estigate and to prosecute alleged misbranding, mislabeling
andNor misleading ad0ertisements of 5lled mil:. /he Durisdiction on the matters cited is 0ested upon the
<oard of -ood and 1rug inspection and the -ood and 1rug Administrator, with the +ecretary of Health and
the +ecretary of Fustice, also inter0ening in case criminal prosecution has to be instituted. /o hold that the
petitioners ha0e also Durisdiction as would be the result were their instant petition granted, would only
cause o0erlapping of powers and functions li:ely to produce confusion and conMict of oEcial action which
is neither practical nor desirable.
WH,R,-(R,, the decision appealed from is hereby aErmed en toto. No costs.
+( (R1,R,1.
1#. *n case of doubt as to what a pro0ision of a statute means, the meaning put to the pro0ision during the
legislati0e deliberations may be adopted.
G.R. No. 1=9%!; -ebruary $, 1$$;
/H, NA/*(NAL 6(L*', '())*++*(N, represented by its Acting 'hairman, 'esar +arino, /eodolo '.
Nati0idad, 4ice'hairman and ,xecuti0e (Ecer, <rig. Gen. 4irgilio H. 1a0id, ,dgar 1ula /orre, Guillermo 6.
,nri?ueJ, 'ommissioners, and 'hief +upt. Le0y 1. )acasiano 1irector for 6ersonnel, petitioners,
0s.
Honorable Fudge +al0ador de GuJman, Fr., 'hief +upt. Norberto ). Lina, 'hief +upt. Ricardo /rinidad, Fr., +r.
+upt. )anuel +uareJ, +upt. Fustito <. /agum, +r. +upt. /ran?uilino Aspiras, +r., +upt. Ramon *. Na0arro,
+r. +upt. Ramon *. Na0arro, +r. +upt. Fose 6. +uria, +r. +upt. Agaton Abiera, 'hief *nsp. <ien0enido /orres,
and the National 2R(/'7 Alumni Association *nc. 2NARRA7, represented by its 6resident 'ol. <enDamin
Gundran, and 1irector Hermogenes 6eralta, Fr., respondents.
/he case at bar had its origin in the implementation of the compulsory retirement of 6N6 oEcers as
mandated in +ec. #$, RA 9$%&, otherwise :nown as >An Act ,stablishing the 6hilippine National 6olice
.nder a ReorganiJed 1epartment of the *nterior and Local Go0ernment>, which too: eGect on
Fanuary !, 1$$1. Among others, RA 9$%& pro0ides for a uniform retirement system for 6N6 members.
+ection #$ thereof reads3
+ec. #$. Compulsory Retirement. L 'ompulsory retirement, for oEcer and nonoEcer, shall
be upon the attainment of age 5ftysix 2&97A .ro+ided, /hat, in case of any oEcer with the
ran: of chief superintendent, director or deputy director general, the 'ommission may allow
his retention in the ser0ice for an unextendible period of one 217 year.
<ased on the abo0e pro0ision, petitioners sent notices of retirement to pri0ate respondents who are all
members of the defunct 6hilippine 'onstabulary and ha0e reached the age of 5ftysix 2&97.
*n response, pri0ate respondents 5led a complaint on 1ecember 1$, 1$$1 for declaratory relief with prayer
for the issuance of an ex parte restraining order andNor inDunction 2doc:eted as 'i0il 'ase No. $1#;$"7
before the Regional /rial 'ourt of )a:ati, <ranch 1;!. *n their complaint, respondents a0er that the age of
retirement set at 5ftysix 2&97 by +ection #$ of RA 9$%& cannot be applied to them since they are also
co0ered by +ec. "$ thereof which pro0ides3
Any pro0ision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within the transition period of four
2;7 years following the eGecti0ity of this Act, the following members of the *N6 shall be
considered compulsorily retired3
a7 /hose who shall attain the age of sixty 29=7 on the 5rst year of the eGecti0ity of this Act.
b7 /hose who shall attain the age of 5ftynine 2&$7 on the second year of the eGecti0ity of
this Act.
c7 /hose who shall attain the age of 5ftyeight 2&"7 on the third year of the eGecti0ity of this
Act.
d7 /hose who shall attain the age of 5ftyse0en 2&%7 on the fourth year of the eGecti0ity of
this Act.
*t is the submission of respondents that the term >*N6> includes both the former members of the 6hilippine
'onstabulary and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the *ntegrated National 6olice 2*N67
by 0irtue of
61 %9& in 1$%&.
(n the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the ;year transition period pro0ided in +ection "$
applies only to the local police forces who pre0iously retire, compulsorily, at age sixty 29=7 for those in the
ran:s of 6oliceN-ire Lieutenant or higher 2+ec. ##, 61 11";7A while the retirement age for the 6' had
already been set at 5ftysix 2&97 under the A-6 law.
(n 1ecember !#, 1$$1, respondent Dudge issued a restraining order followed by a writ of inDunction on
Fanuary ", 1$$! upon posting of a 61==,===.== bond by pri0ate respondents.
After the parties ha0e submitted their respecti0e pleadings, the case was submitted for resolution and on
August 1;, 1$$!, the respondent Dudge rendered the assailed decision, the decretal portion of which reads3
WH,R,-(R,, the court hereby declares that the term >*N6> in +ection "$ of the 6N6 Law
includes all members of the present 6hilippine National 6olice, irrespecti0e of the original
status of the present members of the 6hilippine National 6olice before its creation and
establishment, and that +ection #$ thereof shall become operati0e after the lapse of the
fouryear transition period.
/he preliminary inDunction issued is made permanent.
+( (R1,R,1. 2Rollo, pp. !$#=7
6etitioners 5led the instant petition on (ctober ", 1$$! see:ing the re0ersal of the abo0e Dudgment. (n
Fanuary 1!, 1$$#, the 'ourt resol0ed to treat the respondents8 'omment as Answer and ga0e due course
to the petition.
*n ruling in fa0or of pri0ate respondents, respondent Dudge obser0ed, among others, that3
)t may ha+e been the intention of Congress to refer to the local police forces as the >)N.> but
the .N. /a0 failed to de1ne 0ho or 0hat constituted the )N.. /he natural recourse of the
court is to trace the source of the >*N6> as courts are permitted to loo: to prior laws on the
same subDect and to in0estigate the antecedents in0ol0ed. /here is nothing extant in the
statute boo:s except that which was created and established under
61 %9& pursuant to the mandate of Article C4 of the 1$%# 'onstitution pro0iding that the
>+tate shall establish and maintain an integrated national police force whose organiJation,
administration and operation shall be pro0ided by law.> Heretofore, *N6 was un:nown. And
the said law categorically declared the 6' >as the principal component of the *ntegrated
National 6olice> 2+ec. &, 61 %9&7.
2he court 0as supplied by respondents 3petitioners herein4 0ith excerpts taken from the
discussion amongst the members of Congress concerning the particular pro+ision of ,ection
#'. 2he court is not persuaded by said discussionA it was a simple matter for the members of
the legislature to state precisely in clear and une?ui0ocal terms their meaning, such as
>integrated police> as used in 61 %9&. *nstead, they employed >*N6>, a generic term that
includes the 6' as the principal component of the *N6, supra. )n failing to categorically
restrict the application of ,ection #' as the members of legislature are said to ha+e
intended, it ga+e rise to the presumption that it has not limited nor intended to limit the
meaning of the 0ord 0hen the bill 0as 1nally passed into la0. *t is not diEcult for the court
to also presume that in drafting the wording of the 6N6 Law, the legislators were aware of
the historical legislati0e origin of the >*N6>.
xxx xxx xxx
/he court ta:es particular note of the fact that +ection "$ is found in the /ransitory
6ro0isions of the law which do not pro0ide for any distinction between the former 6' oEcers
and those belonging to the ci0ilian police forces. /hese pro0ision are speci5cally enacted to
regulate the period co0ering the dissolution of the 6' and the creation of the 6N6, a period
that necessarily would be attended by imbalances and or confusion occasioned by the
wholesale and mass integration. *n fact, the retirement payment scheme of the *N6 is still to
be formulated, lea0ing the impression that nothing is really settled until after the transition
of four years has lapsed. +ection "$ therefore pre0ails o0er +ection #$ up to the year 1$$&
when the retirement age for the members of the 6N6 shall then be age &9A after the year
1$$&, +ection #$ shall then be the applicable law on retirement of 6N6 members. 2Rollo, pp.
!%!"A emphasis supplied7
6etitioners disagree and claim that the use of the term *N6 in +ec. "$ does not imply the same meaning
contemplated under 61 %9& wherein it is pro0ided3
+ec. 1. Constitution of the )ntegrated National .olice. L /here is hereby established and
constituted the *ntegrated National 6olice 2*N67 which shall be composed of the 6hilippine
'onstabulary as the nucleus, and the integrated police forces as established by 6residential
1ecrees
Nos. ;!1, ;"!, &#1, &"& and 9;1, as components, under the 1epartment of National
1efense.
(n the other hand, pri0ate respondents assert that being the nucleus of the *ntegrated National 6olice
2*N67 under 61 %9&, former members of the 6hilippine 'onstabulary 26'7 should not be discriminated
against from the co0erage of the term >*N6> in +ec. "$, RA 9$%&. 'learly, it is argued, the term >*N6> found
in +ection "$ of RA 9$%& refers to the *N6 in 61 %9&. /hus, where the law does not distinguish, the courts
should not distinguish.
1oes the law, RA 9$%&, distinguish *N6 from the 6'Q 6etitioners submit that it does and cite +ections !#
and "& to stress the point, +i5.3
+ec. !#. Composition. L +ubDect to the limitations pro0ided for in this Act, the 6hilippine
National 6olice, hereinafter referred to as the 6N6, is hereby established, initially consisting
of the members of the police forces who were integrated into the *ntegrated National 6olice
2*N67 pursuant to 6residential 1ecree No. %9&, and the oEcers and enlisted personnel of the
6hilippine 'onstabulary 26'7. . .
/he permanent ci0ilian employees of the present 6', *N6, Narcotics 'ommand, '*+ and the
technical command of the A-6 assigned with the 6', including NA6(L'() hearing oEcers
holding regular items as such, shall be absorbed by the 1epartment as employees thereof,
subDect to existing laws and regulations.
+ec. "&. .hase of )mplementation. L /he implementation of this Act shall be underta:en in
three 2#7 phases, to wit3
6hase * L ,xercise of option by the uniformed members of the 6hilippine 'onstabulary, the
6' elements assigned with the Narcotics 'ommand, '*+, and the personnel of the technical
ser0ices of the A-6 assigned with the 6' to include the regular '*+ in0estigating agents and
the operati0es and agents of the NA6(L'() *nspection, *n0estigation and *ntelligence
<ranch, and the personnel of the absorbed National Action 'ommittee on AntiHiDac:ing
2NA'AH7 of the 1epartment of National 1efense, to be completed within six 297 months from
the date of the eGecti0ity of this Act. At the end of this phase, all personnel from the *N6, 6',
technical +er0ices, NA'AH, and NA6(L'() *nspection, *n0estigation and *ntelligence <ranch
shall ha0e been co0ered by oEcial orders assigning them to the 6N6 . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Any 6'*N6 oEcer or enlisted personnel may, within the twel0emonth period from the
eGecti0ity of this Act, retire . . .
6hase *** L . . . /o accomplish the tas:s of 6hase ***, the 'ommission shall create a <oard of
(Ecers composed of the following3 NA6(L'() 'ommissioner as 'hairman and one 217
representati0e each from the 6', *N6, 'i0il +er0ice 'ommission and the 1epartment of
<udget and )anagement.
+ection "9 of the same law further pro0ides3
+ec. "9. ssumption by the .N. of .olice 6unctions. L /he 6N6 shall absorb the functions of
the 6', the *N6 and the Narcotics 'ommand upon the eGecti0ity of this Act.
-rom a careful perusal of the abo0e pro0isions, it appears therefore that the use of the term *N6 is not
synonymous with the 6'. Had it been otherwise, the statute could ha0e Dust made a uniform reference to
the members of the whole 6hilippine National 6olice 26N67 for retirement purposes and not Dust the *N6. /he
law itself distinguishes *N6 from the 6' and it cannot be construed that >*N6> as used in +ec. "$ includes
the members of the 6'.
And contrary to the pronouncement of respondent Dudge that the law failed to de5ne who constitutes the
*N6, +ec. $= of RA 9$%& has in fact de5ned the same. /hus,
+ec. $=. ,tatus of .resent N.7/C78, .C9)N.. L .pon the eGecti0ity of this Act, the present
National 6olice 'ommission and the 6hilippine 'onstabulary*ntegrated National 6olice shall
cease to exist. /he 6hilippine 'onstabulary, which is the nucleus of the 6hilippine
'onstabulary*ntegrated National 6olice shall cease to be a maDor ser0ice of the Armed
-orces of the 6hilippines. 2he )ntegrated National .olice, 0hich is the ci+ilian component of
the .hilippine Constabulary9)ntegrated National .olice, shall cease to be the national police
force and lieu thereof, a new police force shall be established and constituted pursuant to
this Act. 2emphasis supplied7
*t is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature failed to de5ne who the members of the
*N6 are. *n this regard, it is of no moment that the legislature failed to categorically restrict the application
of the transition period in +ec. "$ speci5cally in fa0or of the local police forces for it would be a mere
superMuity as the 6' component of the *N6 was already retirable at age 5ftysix 2&97.
Ha0ing de5ned the meaning of *N6, the trial court need not ha0e belabored on the supposed dubious
meaning of the term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such a situation, courts are not without recourse in
determining the construction of the statute with doubtful meaning for they may a0ail themsel0es of the
actual proceedings of the legislati0e body. *n case of doubt as to what a pro0ision of a statute means, the
meaning put to the pro0ision during the legislati0e deliberations may be adopted 21e 4illa 0. 'ourt of
Appeals,
1$& +'RA %!! R1$$1S citing 6alanca 0. 'ity of )anila, ;1 6hil. 1!& R1$!=SA Arenas 0. 'ity of +an 'arlos, "!
+'RA #1" R1$%"S7.
'ourts should not gi0e a literal interpretation to the letter of the law if it runs counter to the legislati0e
intent 2Iellow /axi and 6asay /ransportation Wor:ers8 Association 0. )anila Iellow /axi 'ab. 'o., "= 6hil. "#
R1$;"S7.
,xamining the records of the <icameral 'onference 'ommittee, we 5nd that the legislature did intent to
exclude the members of the 6' from the co0erage of +ec. "$ insofar as the retirement age is concerned,
thus3
/H, 'HA*R)AN. 2+,N. )A',1A7. Well, it seems what people really want is one common rule,
so if it is 5ftysix, 5ftysixA of course, the 6' wants sixty for e0erybody. (f course, it is not
acceptable to us in the sense that we tied this up really to the ?uestion of3 *f you are lax in
allowing their 2the 6'7 entry into the 6N6, then tighten up the retirement. *f we will be strict
in, li:e re?uiring examinations and other conditions for their original entry, then since we
ha0e sifted out a certain amount of undesirables, then we can allow a longer retirement age.
/hat was the rationale, that was the tieup. +ince we are relaxing the entry, we should speed
up . . .
/H, 'HA*R)AN. 2R,6. G./ANG7. ,xit.
/H, 'HA*R)AN. 2+,N. )A',1A7 . . . the retirement, the exit.
/H, 'HA*R)AN. 2R,6. G./ANG7. +o let me get it 0ery clear, )r. 'hairman. -iftysix, let8s say,
that will not ma:e any adDustment in the 6' because there 2they7 are 2retirable at age7 5fty
six.
/H, 'HA*R)AN. 2+,N. )A',1A7. Paya nga, wala na silang masasabi.
/H, 'HA*R)AN. 2R,6. G./ANG7. *n the case of the 6olice, since they are retireable now at
sixty, for the oEcers, it will be
applicable to them on a oneyear e0ery year basis for a total period of four years transition.
2<icameral 'onference 'ommittee on National 1efense, )arch 1!, 1$$=7
R,6. G./ANG. (n the 5rst year of eGecti0ity, the police will retire at 9= years.
/H, 'HA*R)AN. 2+,N. )A',1A7. +ixty.
R,6. G./ANG. (n the second year, &$.
/H, 'HA*R)AN. 2+,N. )A',1A7. (o.
R,6. G./ANG. (n the third year, &".
/H, 'HA*R)AN. 2+,N. )A',1A7. -iftyeight. +o 8yung &&, on the third year, &", doon siya re
retire.
R,6. G./ANG. (o.
+,N. +AG.*+AG. +o :ung &&, when the law becomes eGecti0e . . .
/H, 'HA*R)AN. 2+,N. )A',1A7. He will retire at &", doon siya aabot.
R,6. .N*'(. 6wede.
+,N. +AG.*+AG. 1ahil 8yon, may time to . . .
/H, 'HA*R)AN. 2+,N. )A',1A7. Walang problema dito sa transition ng pulis, acceptable ito,
eh.
/H, 'HA*R)AN. 2R,6. '(F.ANG'(7. +a 6'Q
/H, 'HA*R)AN. 2+,N. )A',1A7. 6', walang mawawala sa :anila, &9 ang retirement age
nilang talaga, eh. Paya ayaw :o
ngang dagdagan 8yung &9 nila at 8yon din ang sa Armed -orces, &9. 2)bid., )ay !!, 1$$=7
*n applying the pro0isions of +ec. "$ in fa0or of the local police force as established in 61 %9&, the 'ourt
does not, in any manner, gi0e any undue preferential treatment in fa0or of the other group. (n the
contrary, the 'ourt is merely gi0ing life to the real intent of the legislators based on the deliberations of
the <icameral 'onference 'ommittee that preceded the enactment of RA 9$%&.
/he legislati0e intent to classify the *N6 in such manner that +ection "$ of RA 9$%& is applicable only to the
local police force is clear. /he ?uestion now is whether the classi5cation is 0alid. /he test for this is
reasonableness such that it must conform to the following re?uirements3 217 *t must be based upon
substantial distinctionsA 2!7 *t must be germane to the purpose of the lawA 2#7 *t must not be limited to
existing conditions onlyA 2;7 *t must apply e?ually to all members of the same class 26eople 0s. 'ayat, 9"
6hil. 1! R1$#$S7.
/he classi5cation is based upon substantial distinctions. /he 6', before the eGecti0ity of the law 2RA 9$%&7,
were already retirable at age &9 while the local police force were retirable at 9=, and go0erned by diGerent
laws
26.1. 11";, +ec. ## and +ec. &=7. /he distinction is rele0ant for the purpose of the statute, which is to
enable the local police force to plan for their retirement which would be earlier than usual because of the
new law. +ection "$ is merely transitory, remedial in nature, and loses its force and eGect once the four
year transitory period has elapsed. -inally, it applies not only to some but to all local police oEcers.
*t may be appropriate to state at this point that it seems absurd that a law will grant an extension to 6'
oEcers8 retirable age from &9 to 9= and then gradually lower it bac: to &9 without any cogent reason at
all. Why should the retirement age of 6' oEcers be increased during the transitory period to the exclusion
of other 6' oEcers who would retire at age &9 after such periodQ +uch absurdity was ne0er contemplated
by the law and would defeat its purpose of pro0iding a uniform retirement age for 6N6 members.
WH,R,-(R,, the petition is GRAN/,1. /he writ of inDunction issued on Fanuary ", 1$$! is hereby L*-/,1
and the assailed decision of respondent Dudge is R,4,R+,1 and +,/ A+*1,.
+( (R1,R,1.
1;. 6enal laws are to be construed strictly against the state and in fa0our of the accused.
G.R. No. 11#=$! +eptember 1, 1$$;
)AR/*N ',N/,N(, .etitioner, 0s. H(N. 4*'/(R*A 4*LLAL(N6(RN*LL(+, 6residing Fudge of the Regional
/rial 'ourt of )alolos, <ulacan, <ranch 1=, and /H, 6,(6L, (- /H, 6H*L*66*N,+, Respondents.
R,GALA1(, :.:
*t is indeed unfortunate that a group of elderly men, who were mo0ed by their desire to de0ote their
remaining years to the ser0ice of their 'reator by forming their own ci0ic organiJation for that purpose,
should 5nd themsel0es enmeshed in a criminal case for ma:ing a solicitation from a community member
allegedly without the re?uired permit from the 1epartment of +ocial Welfare and 1e0elopment.
/he records of this case re0eal that sometime in the last ?uarter of 1$"&, the oEcers of a ci0ic
organiJation :nown as the ,amahang ;atandaan ng Nayon ng 2ikay launched a fund dri0e for the purpose
of reno0ating the chapel of <arrio /i:ay, )alolos, <ulacan. 6etitioner )artin 'enteno, the chairman of the
group, together with 4icente Ico, approached Fudge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of /i:ay, and
solicited from her a contribution of 61,&==.==. *t is admitted that the solicitation was made without a
permit from the 1epartment of +ocial Welfare and 1e0elopment.
As a conse?uence, based on the complaint of Fudge Angeles, an information
1
was 5led against petitioner
)artin 'enteno, together with Religio ,0aristo and 4icente Ico, for 0iolation of 6residential 1ecree No.
1&9;, or the +olicitation 6ermit Law, before the )unicipal /rial 'ourt of )alolos, <ulacan, <ranch !, and
doc:eted as 'riminal 'ase No. !9=!. 6etitioner 5led a motion to ?uash the information
!
on the ground that
the facts alleged therein do not constitute an oGense, claiming that 6residential 1ecree No. 1&9; only
co0ers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious
purpose such as the construction of a chapel. /his was denied
#
by the trial court, and petitioner8s motion
for reconsideration ha0ing met the same fate, trial on the merits ensued.
(n 1ecember !$, 1$$!, the said trial court rendered Dudgment
;
5nding accused 4icente Ico and petitioner
'enteno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to each pay a 5ne of 6!==.==. Ne0ertheless,
the trial court recommended that the accused be pardoned on the basis of its 5nding that they acted in
good faith, plus the fact that it belie0ed that the latter should not ha0e been criminally liable were it not for
the existence of 6residential 1ecree
No. 1&9; which the court opined it had the duty to apply in the instant case.
<oth accused 'enteno and Ico appealed to the Regional /rial 'ourt of )alolos, <ulacan, <ranch 1=.
Howe0er, accused Ico subse?uently withdrew his appeal, hence the case proceeded only with respect to
petitioner 'enteno. (n )ay !1, 1$$#, respondent Fudge 4illalon6ornillos aErmed the decision of the lower
court but modi5ed the penalty, allegedly because of the per0ersity of the act committed which caused
damage and preDudice to the complainant, by sentencing petitioner 'enteno to suGer an increased penalty
of imprisonment of 9 months and a 5ne of 61,===.==, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insol0ency.
&
/he motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the court.
/hus it is that a 5ne of 6!==.== imposed as a penalty by the lowest court in the Dudicial hierarchy
e0entually reached this highest tribunal, challenged on the sole issue of whether solicitations for religious
purposes are within the ambit of 6residential 1ecree No. 1&9;. Tuantitati0ely, the 5nancial sanction is a
nominal imposition but, on a ?uestion of principle, it is not a triMing matter. /his 'ourt is grati5ed that it
can now grant this case the bene5t of a 5nal adDudication.
6etitioner ?uestions the applicability of 6residential 1ecree No. 1&9; to solicitations for contributions
intended for religious purposes with the submissions that 217 the term >religious purpose> is not expressly
included in the pro0isions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludesA
2!7 penal laws are to be construed strictly against the +tate and liberally in fa0or of the accusedA and 2#7 to
subDect to +tate regulation solicitations made for a religious purpose would constitute an abridgment of the
right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the 'onstitution.
6residential 1ecree No. 1&9; 2which amended Act No. ;=%&, otherwise :nown as the +olicitation 6ermit
Law7, pro0ides as follows3
+ec. !. Any person, corporation, organiJation, or association desiring to solicit or recei0e
contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall 5rst secure a permit from the
Regional (Eces of the 1epartment of +ocial +er0ices and 1e0elopment as pro0ided in the
*ntegrated ReorganiJation 6lan. .pon the 5ling of a written application for a permit in the
form prescribed by the Regional (Eces of the 1epartment of +ocial +er0ices and
1e0elopment, the Regional 1irector or his duly authoriJed representati0e may, in his
discretion, issue a permanent or temporary permit or disappro0e the application. *n the
interest of the public, he may in his discretion renew or re0o:e any permit issued under Act
;=%&.
/he main issue to be resol0ed here is whether the phrase >charitable purposes> should be construed in its
broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose. We hold in the negati0e.
*. *ndeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing,
act, or conse?uence excludes all others. /his rule is expressed in the familiar maxim >expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.> Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. /he rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not ha0e made speci5ed enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict
its meaning and to con5ne its terms to those expressly mentioned.
%

*t will be obser0ed that the 1$"% 'onstitution, as well as se0eral other statutes, treat the words
>charitable> and >religious> separately and independently of each other. /hus, the word >charitable> is only
one of three descripti0e words used in +ection !" 2#7, Article 4* of the 'onstitution which pro0ides that
>charitable institutions, churches and personages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and impro0ements, actually,
directly, and exclusi0ely used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.> /here are certain pro0isions in statutes wherein these two terms are li:ewise dissociated and
indi0idually mentioned, as for instance, +ections !9 2e7 2corporations exempt from income tax7 and !" 2"7
2,7 2exclusions from gross income7 of the National *nternal Re0enue 'odeA +ection "" 2purposes for the
organiJation of nonstoc: corporations7 of the 'orporation 'odeA and
+ection !#; 2b7 2exemptions from real property tax7 of the Local Go0ernment 'ode.
/hat these legislati0e enactments speci5cally spelled out >charitable> and >religious> in an enumeration,
whereas 6residential 1ecree No. 1&9; merely stated >charitable or public welfare purposes,> only goes to
show that the framers of the law in ?uestion ne0er intended to include solicitations for religious purposes
within its co0erage. (therwise, there is no reason why it would not ha0e so stated expressly.
All contributions designed to promote the wor: of the church are >charitable> in nature, since religious
acti0ities depend for their support on 0oluntary contributions.
"
Howe0er, >religious purpose> is not
interchangeable with the expression >charitable purpose.> While it is true that there is no religious purpose
which is not also a charitable purpose, yet the con0erse is not e?ually true, for there may be a >charitable>
purpose which is not >religious> in the legal sense of the term.
$
Although the term >charitable> may
include matters which are >religious,> it is a broader term and includes matters which are not >religious,>
and, accordingly, there is a distinction between >charitable purpose> and >religious purpose,> except where
the two terms are ob0iously used synonymously, or where the distinction has been done away with by
statute.
1=
/he word >charitable,> therefore, li:e most other words, is capable of diGerent signi5cations. -or
example, in the law, exempting charitable uses from taxation, it has a 0ery wide meaning, but under
6residential 1ecree No. 1&9; which is a penal law, it cannot be gi0en such a broad application since it
would be preDudicial to petitioners.
/o illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions are generally construed strictly against the taxpayer. Howe0er,
there are cases wherein claims for exemption from tax for >religious purposes> ha0e been liberally
construed as co0ered in the law granting tax exemptions for >charitable purposes.> /hus, the term
>charitable purposes,> within the meaning of a statute pro0iding that the succession of any property
passing to or for the use of any institution for purposes only of public charity shall not be subDect to
succession tax, is deemed to include religious purposes.
11
A gift for >religious purposes> was considered as
a be?uest for >charitable use> as regards exemption from inheritance tax.

(n the other hand, to subsume the >religious> purpose of the solicitation within the concept of >charitable>
purpose which under 6residential 1ecree
No. 1&9; re?uires a prior permit from the 1epartment of +ocial +er0ices and 1e0elopment, under paid of
penal liability in the absence thereof, would be preDudicial to petitioner. Accordingly, the term >charitable>
should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for >religious> purposes. /hereby, we adhere to
the fundamental doctrine underlying 0irtually all penal legislations that such interpretation should be
adopted as would fa0or the accused.
-or, it is a wellentrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the +tate and liberally
in fa0or of the accused. /hey are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies
or e?uitable considerations. /hey are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new oGense, enlarge
the 5eld of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to
subDect it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the
accused. *f the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that
which operates in fa0or of a party accused under its pro0isions is to be preferred. /he principle is that acts
in and of themsel0es innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a clear and
une?ui0ocal expression of the legislati0e intent to ma:e them such. Whate0er is not plainly within the
pro0isions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its intendment.
/he purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a
technicality but to pro0ide a precise de5nition of forbidden acts.
1;
/he word >charitable> is a matter of
description rather than of precise de5nition, and each case in0ol0ing a determination of that which is
charitable must be decided on its own particular facts and circumstances.
1&
/he law does not operate in
+acuo nor should its applicability be determined by circumstances in the abstract.
-urthermore, in the pro0isions of the 'onstitution and the statutes mentioned abo0e, the enumerations
therein gi0en which include the words >charitable> and >religious> ma:e use of the disDuncti0e >or.> *n its
elementary sense, >or> as used in a statute is a disDuncti0e article indicating an alternati0e. *t often
connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either. When >or> is used, the 0arious
members of the enumeration are to be ta:en separately.
19
Accordingly, >charitable> and >religious,> which
are integral parts of an enumeration using the disDuncti0e >or> should be gi0en diGerent, distinct, and
disparate meanings. /here is no compelling consideration why the same treatment or usage of these
words cannot be made applicable to the ?uestioned pro0isions of 6residential 1ecree No. 1&9;.
**. 6etitioner next a0ers that solicitations for religious purposes cannot be penaliJed under the law for,
otherwise, it will constitute an abridgment or restriction on the free exercise clause guaranteed under the
'onstitution.
*t may be conceded that the construction of a church is a social concern of the people and, conse?uently,
solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily in0ol0e public welfare. 6refatorily, it is not implausible
that the regulatory powers of the +tate may, to a certain degree, extend to solicitations of this nature.
'onsidering, howe0er, that such an acti0ity is within the cloa: of the free exercise clause under the right to
freedom of religion guaranteed by the 'onstitution, it becomes imperati0e to del0e into the eEcaciousness
of a statutory grant of the power to regulate the exercise of this constitutional right and the allowable
restrictions which may possibly be imposed thereon.
/he constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subDect of religion has a double aspect. (n the one hand,
it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship.
-reedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organiJation or form of worship as the
indi0idual may choose cannot be restricted by law. (n the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of
the chosen form of religion. /hus, the constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to belie0e and
freedom to act. /he 5rst is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. 'onduct remains
subDect to regulation for the protection of society. /he freedom to act must ha0e appropriate de5nitions to
preser0e the enforcement of that protection. *n e0ery case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in
attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected
freedom.
Whence, e0en the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight incon0enience, in order that the
+tate may protect its citiJens from inDury. Without doubt, a +tate may protect its citiJens from fraudulent
solicitation by re?uiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any
purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. /he
+tate is li:ewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public
safety, peace, comfort, or con0enience.
*t does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that
e0erything which may be so called can be tolerated.
1$
*t has been said that a law ad0ancing a legitimate
go0ernmental interest is not necessarily in0alid as one interfering with the >free exercise> of religion
merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental eGect on the adherents of one or more religion.
!=

/hus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not in0ol0e any religious test
and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional
obDection, e0en though the collection be for a religious purpose. +uch regulation would not constitute a
prohibited pre0ious restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its
exercise.
,0en with numerous regulati0e laws in existence, it is surprising how many operations are carried on by
persons and associations who, secreting their acti0ities under the guise of bene0olent purposes, succeed
in cheating and defrauding a generous public. *t is in fact amaJing how pro5table the fraudulent schemes
and practices are to people who manipulate them. /he +tate has authority under the exercise of its police
power to determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for
unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. /hat solicitation of contributions under the guise of charitable
and bene0olent purposes is grossly abused is a matter of common :nowledge. 'ertainly the solicitation of
contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged the
power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the unworthy.
!!
/he obDectionable practices
of unscrupulous persons are preDudicial to worthy and proper charities which naturally suGer when the
con5dence of the public in campaigns for the raising of money for charity is lessened or destroyed.
!#
+ome
regulation of public solicitation is, therefore, in the public interest.
/o conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subDect to proper regulation by the +tate in the
exercise of police power. Howe0er, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious
purpose are not within the co0erage of 6residential 1ecree No. 1&9;, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner
cannot be held criminally liable therefor.
As a 5nal note, we reDect the reason ad0anced by respondent Dudge for increasing the penalty imposed by
the trial court, premised on the supposed per0ersity of petitioner8s act which thereby caused damage to
the complainant. *t must be here emphasiJed that the trial court, in the dispositi0e portion of its decision,
e0en recommended executi0e clemency in fa0or of petitioner and the other accused after 5nding that the
latter acted in good faith in ma:ing the solicitation from the complainant, an obser0ation with which we
fully agree. After all, mista:e upon a doubtful and diEcult ?uestion of law can be the basis of good faith,
especially for a layman.
/here is li:ewise nothing in the 5ndings of respondent Dudge which would indicate, impliedly or otherwise,
that petitioner and his coaccused acted abusi0ely or male0olently. /his could be reMecti0e upon her
obDecti0ity, considering that the complainant in this case is herself a Dudge of the Regional /rial 'ourt at
Paloo:an 'ity. *t bears stressing at this point that a Dudge is re?uired to so beha0e at all times as to
promote public con5dence in the integrity and impartiality of the Dudiciary,
!&
should be 0igilant against any
attempt to sub0ert its independence, and must resist any pressure from whate0er source.

WH,R,-(R,, the decision appealed from is hereby R,4,R+,1 and +,/ A+*1,, and petitioner )artin
'enteno is A'T.*//,1 of the oGense charged, with costs de o1cio.
+( (R1,R,1.
1&. 6enal laws are to be construed strictly against the state and in fa0our of the accused.
G.R. No. 11!1%= April 1=, 1$$9
',+AR*( .R+.A, petitioner,
0s.
'(.R/ (- A66,AL+ AN1 6,(6L, (- /H, 6H*L*66*N,+, respondents.

<,LL(+*LL(, :.:p
/his is a petition for re0iew of the decision of the 'ourt of Appeals which aErmed the con0iction of
petitioner by the Regional /rial 'ourt of 1a0ao 'ity for 0iolation of +ec. 1 of '.A. No. 1;!, as amended by
R.A. No. 9="&, otherwise :nown as >n ct to Regulate the <se of liases>.
1
6etitioner 'esario .rsua was a 'ommunity ,n0ironment and Natural Resources (Ecer assigned in
Pidapawan, 'otabato. (n $ )ay 1$"$ the 6ro0incial Go0ernor of 'otabato re?uested the (Ece of the
(mbudsman in )anila to conduct an in0estigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of
authority and gi0ing of unwarranted bene5ts by petitioner and other oEcials of the 1epartment of
,n0ironment and Natural Resources. /he complaint was initiated by the +angguniang 6anlalawigan of
'otabato through a resolution ad0ising the Go0ernor to report the in0ol0ement of petitioner and others in
the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegallycut logs in the area.
!
(n 1 August 1$"$ Atty. -rancis 6almones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the (Ece of the (mbudsman in
1a0ao 'ity re?uesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. 6almones then
as:ed his client .rsua to ta:e his letterre?uest to the (Ece of the (mbudsman because his law 5rm8s
messenger, (scar 6ereJ, had to attend to some personal matters. <efore proceeding to the (Ece of the
(mbudsman petitioner tal:ed to (scar 6ereJ and told him that he was reluctant to personally as: for the
document since he was one of the respondents before the (mbudsman. Howe0er, 6ereJ ad0ised him not
to worry as he could Dust sign his 26ereJ7 name if e0er he would be re?uired to ac:nowledge receipt of the
complaint.
#
When petitioner arri0ed at the (Ece of the (mbudsman in 1a0ao 'ity he was instructed by the security
oEcer to register in the 0isitors8 logboo:. *nstead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name
>(scar 6ereJ> after which he was told to proceed to the Administrati0e 1i0ision for the copy of the
complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. 6almones to the 'hief of the Administrati0e 1i0ision,
)s. Loida Pahulugan, who then ga0e him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he ac:nowledged by
writing the name >(scar 6ereJ.>
;
<efore petitioner could lea0e the premises he was greeted by an ac?uaintance, Fosefa Amparo, who also
wor:ed in the same oEce. /hey con0ersed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person
who introduced himself as >(scar 6ereJ> was actually petitioner 'esario .rsua, a customer of Fosefa
Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the 1eputy (mbudsman who recommended
that petitioner be accordingly charged.
(n 1" 1ecember 1$$=, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its e0idence, petitioner
without lea0e of court 5led a demurrer to e0idence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to pro0e that
his supposed alias was diGerent from his registered name in the local ci0il registry was fatal to its cause.
6etitioner argued that no document from the local ci0il registry was presented to show the registered name
of accused which according to him was a condition sine =ua non for the 0alidity of his con0iction.
/he trial court reDected his contentions and found him guilty of 0iolating +ec. 1 of '.A. No. 1;! as amended
by R.A. No. 9="&. He was sentenced to suGer a prison term of one 217 year and one 217 day of prision
correccional minimum as minimum, to four 2;7 years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all
the accessory penalties pro0ided for by law, and to pay a 5ne of 6;,===.== plus costs.
6etitioner appealed to the 'ourt of Appeals.
(n #1 )ay 1$$# the 'ourt of Appeals aErmed the con0iction of petitioner but modi5ed the penalty by
imposing an indeterminate term of one 217 year as minimum to three 2#7 years as maximum and a 5ne of
6&,===.==.
6etitioner now comes to us for re0iew of his con0iction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he
has not 0iolated '.A. No. 1;! as amended by R.A. No. 9="& as he ne0er used any alias nameA neither is
>(scar 6ereJ> his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another
name by which a person is also :nown. He claims that he has ne0er been :nown as >(scar 6ereJ> and that
he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of (scar 6ereJ himself. *t is
his position that an essential re?uirement for a con0iction under '.A. No. 1;! as amended by R.A. No. 9="&
has not been complied with when the prosecution failed to pro0e that his supposed alias was diGerent from
his registered name in the Registry of <irths. He further argues that the 'ourt of Appeals erred in not
considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law.
&
/ime and again we ha0e decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be
achie0ed and the e0ils sought to be remedied. /hus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment
should be :ept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and
purpose.
9
/he court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead
to absurdity, contradiction, inDustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawma:ers.
%
-or a clear understanding of the purpose of '.A. No. 1;! as amended, which was allegedly 0iolated by
petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent pro0isions
thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited. '.A. No. 1;!, which was appro0ed on %
No0ember 1$#9, and before its amendment by R.A. No. 9="&, is entitled n ct to Regulate the <se of
liases. *t pro0ides as follows3
+ec. 1. ,xcept as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name diGerent
from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been :nown since his
childhood, or such substitute name as may ha0e been authoriJed by a competent court. /he
name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
+ec. !. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings li:e those legally pro0ided to obtain Dudicial authority for a change of name.
+eparate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the
original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which Dudicial authority has been,
obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was granted.
Fudicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper ci0il register . . . .
/he abo0e law was subse?uently amended by R.A. No. 9="&, appro0ed on ; August 1$9$. As amended,
'.A. No. 1;! now reads3
+ec. 1. ,xcept as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, tele0ision, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic e0ents where the use of pseudonym is a normally
accepted practice, no person shall use any name diGerent from the one with which he was
registered at birth in the oEce of the local ci0il registry or with which he was baptiJed for the
5rst time, or in case of all alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration
upon entryA or such substitute name as may ha0e been authoriJed by a competent court3
.ro+ided, /hat persons whose births ha0e not been registered in any local ci0il registry and
who ha0e not been baptiJed, ha0e one year from the appro0al of this act within which to
register their names in the ci0il registry of their residence. /he name shall comprise the
patronymic name and one or two surnames.
+ec. !. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings
li:e those legally pro0ided to obtain Dudicial authority for a change of name and no person
shall be allowed to secure such Dudicial authority for more than one alias. /he petition for an
alias shall set forth the person8s baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the
ci0il registry, if diGerent, his immigrant8s name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has
such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the
desired alias. /he Dudicial authority for the use of alias, the 'hristian name and the alien
immigrant8s name shall be recorded in the proper local ci0il registry, and no person shall use
any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly
recorded in the proper local ci0il registry.
/he obDecti0e and purpose of '.A. No. 1;! ha0e their origin and basis in Act No. #""#, n ct to Regulate
the <se in >usiness 2ransactions of Names other than 2rue Names, .rescribing the ?uties of the ?irector
of the >ureau of Commerce and )ndustry in its @nforcement, .ro+iding .enalties for Aiolations thereof, and
for other purposes, which was appro0ed on 1; No0ember 1$#1 and amended by Act No. ;1;%, appro0ed
on !" No0ember 1$#;.
"
/he pertinent pro0isions of Act No. #""# as amended follow L
+ec. 1. *t shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt
including receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not 0eri5ed by a
notary public or on any written or printed e0idence of any agreement or business
transactions, any name used in connection with his business other than his true name, or
:eep conspicuously exhibited in plain 0iew in or at the place where his business is
conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a 5rm name or business
name or style without 5rst registering such other name, or such 5rm name, or business
name or style in the <ureau of 'ommerce together with his true name and that of any other
person ha0ing a Doint or common interest with him in such contract, agreement, business
transaction, or business . . . .
-or a bit of history, the enactment of '.A. No. 1;! as amended was made primarily to curb the common
practice among the 'hinese of adopting scores of diGerent names and aliases which created tremendous
confusion in the 5eld of trade. +uch a practice almost bordered on the crime of using 5ctitious names
which for ob0ious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the 'hinese who, rightly or
wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. '.A. No. 1;! thus penaliJed the act of using
an alias name, unless such alias was duly authoriJed by proper Dudicial proceedings and recorded in the
ci0il register.
$
*n Bu ;heng Chiau +. Republic
1=
the 'ourt had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill eGects of
the use of an alias within the pur0iew of '.A. No. 1;! when we ruled L
/here can hardly be any doubt that petitioner8s use of alias >Pheng 'hiau Ioung> in addition
to his real name >Iu 'heng 'hiau> would add to more confusion. /hat he is :nown in his
business, as manager of the Robert Reid, *nc., by the former name, is not suEcient reason to
allow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is :nown to his associates by both
names. *n fact, the Anselmo /rinidad, *nc., of which he is a customer, :nows him by his real
name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered certain diEculties in his transactions
with go0ernment oEces which re?uired him to explain why he bore two names, Dustify the
grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily a0oid said diEculties by simply using and
stic:ing only to his real name >Iu Pheng 'hiau.>
/he fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the 6hilippines, as shown by his
ha0ing 5led a petition for naturaliJation in <ranch 4 of the abo0ementioned court, argues
the more against the grant of his petition, because if naturaliJed as a -ilipino citiJen, there
would then be no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be contrary to the
usual -ilipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as well as business
transactions. And, as the lower court correctly obser0ed, if he belie0es 2after he is
naturaliJed7 that it would be better for him to write his name following the (ccidental
method, >he can easily 5le a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of the name >Iu
Pheng 'hian,> he can, abandoning the same, as: for authority to adopt the name Pheng
'hiau Ioung.>
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown
satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the afore?uoted pro0isions of
'ommonwealth Act No. 1;! and the Rules of 'ourt, to warrant the grant of his petition for
the use of an alias name.
'learly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or
baptiJed the 5rst time or substitute name authoriJed by a competent authority. A man8s name is simply
the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him
but sometimes a man is :nown by se0eral diGerent names and these are :nown as aliases.
11
Hence, the
use of a 5ctitious name or a diGerent name belonging to another person in a single instance without any
sign or indication that the user intends to be :nown by this name in addition to his real name from that day
forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in '.A. No. 1;! as amended. /his is so in the case at
bench.
*t is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the (Ece of the (mbudsman as >(scar 6ereJ,>
which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should ha0e brought the letter to that oEce in the
5rst place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely ser0ing the re?uest of his lawyer to obtain a copy of
the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. /here is no ?uestion then that >(scar 6ereJ> is not an
alias name of petitioner. /here is no e0idence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name
as his second name in addition to his real name. /he use of the name >(scar 6ereJ> was made by
petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not e0en legally re?uired to expose his real identity. -or,
e0en if he had identi5ed himself properly at the (Ece of the (mbudsman, petitioner would still be able to
get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the (Ece of the (mbudsman could not refuse him
because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone
under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be co0ered by other pro0isions of law, such does not constitute an oGense
within the concept of '.A. No. 1;! as amended under which he is prosecuted. /he confusion and fraud in
business transactions which the anti9alias la0 and its related statutes see: to pre0ent are not present here
as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting '.A.
No. 1;! as amended. /here exists a 0alid presumption that undesirable conse?uences were ne0er
intended by a legislati0e measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is
fa0ored, which will a0oid all obDectionable, mischie0ous, indefensible, wrongful, e0il and inDurious
conse?uences.
1!
)oreo0er, as '.A. No. 1;! is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the
+tate and in fa0or of the accused.
1#
/he reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights
of indi0iduals and the obDect is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which man:ind would be safe,
and the discretion of the court limited.
1;
*ndeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that
petitioner should be con0icted on a law that does not clearly penaliJe the act done by him.
WH,R,-(R,, the ?uestioned decision of the 'ourt of Appeals aErming that of the Regional /rial 'ourt of
1a0ao 'ity is R,4,R+,1 and +,/ A+*1, and petitioner ',+AR*( .R+.A is A'T.*//,1 of the crime
charged.
+( (R1,R,1.
19. 6enal laws are construed liberally in fa0our of the accused.
G.R. Nos. 1#91;$&1. +eptember 1$, !===S
6,(6L, (- /H, 6H*L*66*N,+, appellee, +s. WAL6AN LA1FAALA) y )*HAF*L alias WAR6AN, appellant.
Republic Act No. "!$; penaliJes simple illegal possession of 5rearms, pro0ided that the person arrested
committed no other crime. -urthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal
possession of 5rearms is an aggra0ating circumstance, but not a separate oGense. Hence, where an
accused was con0icted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for 5ring an unlicensed )1;
riMe at se0eral policemen who were about to ser0e a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the
separate oGense of illegal possession of 5rearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to ha0e
aggra0ated the direct assault.
Walpan LadDaalam y )ihaDil, also :nown as Warpan, appeals before us the +eptember 1%, 1$$" 1ecisionR1S
of the Regional /rial 'ourt 2R/'7 of Kamboanga 'ity 2<ranch 197, which found him guilty of three out of the
four charges lodged against him.
-iled against appellant were four *nformations,R!S all signed by Assistant Regional +tate 6rosecutor Ricardo
G. 'abaron and dated +eptember !&, 1$$%. /he 5rst *nformation R#S was for maintaining a den for the use
of regulated drugs. *t reads as follows3
/hat on or about +eptember !;, 1$$%, in the 'ity of Kamboanga, 6hilippines, and within the Durisdiction of
this Honorable 'ourt, the abo0enamed accused, Walpan LadDaalam being then the owner of a residential
house located at Rio Hondo,R;S this 'ity, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and
assisting x x x his coaccused wife Nurin LadDaalam and Ahmad +ailabbi y HaDaraini, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, maintain said house as a den, where regulated drug RwasS used in any
form.R&S
/he second *nformationR9S charged appellant with illegal possession of 5rearms and ammunition. We ?uote
it below3
/hat on or about +eptember !;, 1$$%, in the 'ity of Kamboanga, 6hilippines, and within the Durisdiction of
this Honorable 'ourt, the abo0enamed accused, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding
and assisting with one another, without any Dusti5able reason or purpose other than to use it in the
commission of crime, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously ha0e in their possession and
under their custody and control, the following weapons, to wit3 one 217 )1; riMe with +N 1&&&!!& with
magaJines and se0en 2%7 rounds of li0e ammunitionA two 2!7 magaJines with twenty 2!=7 and twentyRoneS
2!17 rounds of li0e RammunitionSA one 217 homemade caliber .#" re0ol0er with 50e 2&7 li0e ammunitionA one
217 )%$ 2single7 riMe with pouch and with 50e 2&7 empty shellRsSA one 217 home made caliber .#" with +N
#11=$! with 50e li0e ammunition and one empty shell of RaS cal. #" x x x +mith and WessonA two 2!7 .#"
'aliber palti: re0ol0er with +erial Number #11=$! and one defaced )%$ grenade launcher palti:, without
5rst ha0ing obtained the necessary license and or permit therefor from authorities concerned, in Magrant
0iolation of the aforementioned law.R%S
/he third *nformation,R"S for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was worded thus3
/hat on or about +eptember !;, 1$$%, in the 'ity of Kamboanga, 6hilippines, and within the Durisdiction of
this Honorable 'ourt, the abo0enamed accused being then armed with )1; Armalite RiMes, )19
Armalite RiMes and other assorted 5rearms and explosi0es, conspiring and confederating together,
mutually aiding and assisting x x x one another and with intent to :ill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to :ill +6(1 W*LL*A) <. F(N,+, FR., 6(# ,NR*T., '. R*4,RAR,S
+6(1 A)A1( A. )*RA+(L, FR., and +6(1 R*'AR1( F. LA'A+/,+AN/(+, in the following manner, to wit3 by
then and there 5ring their )1; x x x Armalite RiMes, )19 Armalite RiMes and other assorted 5rearms and
explosi0es, aimed and directed at the fatal parts of the bodies of the abo0enamed police oEcers, well
:nown to the accused as members of the 6hilippine National 6olice, Kamboanga 'ity 6olice (Ece, and as
such, agents of a person in authority, who at the time of the attac: were engaged in the performance of
their duties, that is, on the occasion when said oEcers were about to ser0e the +earch Warrant legally
issued by the Regional /rial 'ourt, this 'ity, to the person of the accused thus commencing the
commission of crime of multiple murder directly by o0ert acts, and if the accused did not accomplish their
unlawful purpose, that is, to :ill the abo0enamed 6olice (Ecers, it was not by reason of their own
0oluntary desistance but rather because of the fact that all the abo0enamed police oEcers were able to
see: co0er during the 5ring and were not hit by the bullets and explosi0es 5red by the accused and also by
the fact said police oEcers were able to wrestle with two 2!7 of the accused namely3 Walpan LadDaalam y
)ihaDil a.:.a. Warpan and Ahmad +ailabbi y HaDairani, who were subdued and subse?uently placed under
arrestA whereas accused 6(! Nurha:im /. HadDula was able to ma:e good his escape and has remained at
large.R$S
*n the fourth *nformation, appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs.R1=S
(n 1ecember !1, 1$$%, the cases against Nurin LadDaalam and Ahmad +ailabbi y HaDaraini were dismissed
upon motion of the (Ece of the 'ity 6rosecutor, which had conducted a rein0estigation of the cases as
ordered by the lower court. /he accused were conse?uently released from Dail.
/he arraignment of appellant on all four 2;7 charges too: place on Fanuary 9, 1$$", during which he
entered a plea of not guilty.R11S After pretrial, the assailed 1ecision was rendered, the dispositi0e part of
which reads3
WH,R,-(R,, the 'ourt 5nds accused WAL6AN LA1FAALA) y )*HAF*L a.:.a. WR.N
1. in 'riminal 'ase No. 1;9#9, G.*L/I <,I(N1 R,A+(NA<L, 1(.</ of 4iolation of +ection 1&A, Article ***,
of Republic Act No. 9;!&, otherwise :nown as the 1angerous 1rugs Act of 1$%!, as amended, and
+,N/,N',+ said accused to the penalty of R,'L.+*(N 6,R6,/.A and to pay a 5ne of -*4, H.N1R,1
/H(.+AN1 26&==,===.==7 and to pay the costsA
!. *n 'riminal 'ase No. 1;9#%, N(/ G.*L/I of 4iolation of +ection 19, Article ***, in relation to +ection !1,
Article *4, of Republic Act No. 9;!&, otherwise :nown as the 1angerous 1rugs Act of 1$%!, as amended,
and A'T.*/+ him of said crime with costs de o5cioA
#. in 'riminal 'ase No. 1;9#", G.*L/I <,I(N1 R,A+(NA<L, 1(.</ of the crime of *llegal 6ossession of
-irearm and Ammunition penaliJed under 6residential 1ecree No. 1"99, as amended by Republic Act. No.
"!$;, and +,N/,N',+ said accused to suGer an indeterminate penalty of +*C 297 I,AR+ of prision
correccional as minimum to ,*GH/ 2"7 I,AR+ of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a 5ne RofS /H*R/I
/H(.+AN1 26#=,===.==7 and pay the costsA
;. in 'riminal 'ase No. 1;9#$, G.*L/I <,I(N1 R,A+(NA<L, 1(.</ of the crime of 1irect Assault with
)ultiple Attempted Homicide and +,N/,N',+ said accused to an indeterminate penalty of /W( 2!7 I,AR+
and -(.R 2;7 )(N/H+ of prision correccional as minimum to +*C 297 I,AR+ of prision correccional as
maximum and to pay a 5ne of (N, /H(.+AN1 261,===.==7 and to pay the costs. 2emphasis in the original7
Hence, this appeal.R1!S
/he -acts
*n its <rief,R1#S the (Ece of the +olicitor General presents the facts in this wise3
At 13;& p.m. of +eptember !;, 1$$%, 6(# Allan )arcos (but 5led an application for the issuance of a
search warrant against appellant, his wife and some Fohn 1oes 2,xh. '7. After the search warrant was
issued about !3#= p.m. of the same day, a brie5ng was conducted inside the oEce of the Anti
4iceNNarcotics .nit of the Kamboanga 'ity 6olice (Ece in connection with the ser0ice of the search
warrant. /he brie5ng was conducted by +6(! -elipe Gaganting, 'hief of the Anti4iceNNarcotics .nit.
1uring the brie5ng, 6(# Renato 1ela 6ea was assigned as presentor of the warrant. +6(1 Ricardo
Lacastesantos and 6(# ,nri?ue Ri0era were designated to conduct the search. (ther policemen were
assigned as perimeter guards 2/+N, )arch #, 1$$", pp. ###97.
After the brie5ng, more than thirty 2#=7 policemen headed by 6olice +uperintendent ,dwin +oledad
proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on board se0eral police 0ehicles 2/+N,
)arch ;, 1$$", p. #!A April !!, 1$$", p. &;7. <efore they could reach appellants house, three 2#7 persons
sitting at a nearby store ran towards the house shouting, 6olice, raid, raid 2*bid., )arch #, 1$$", pp. ;1, ;#
;;A April !#, 1$$", p. ;7. When the policemen were about ten 21=7 meters from the main gate of the house,
they were met by a rapid burst of gun5re coming from the second Moor of the house. /here was also
gun5re at the bac: of the house 2*bid., )arch &, 1$$", pp. 1;197.
+6(1 )irasol, +6(! Lacastesantos, 6(# Ri0era, and 6(# 1ela 6ea who were with the 5rst group of
policemen saw appellant 5re an )1; riMe towards them. /hey all :new appellant. When they were 5red
upon, the group, together with +6(! Gaganting, 6(# (but and +uperintendent +oledad, sought co0er at
the concrete fence to obser0e the mo0ements at the second Moor of the house while other policemen
surrounded the house 2*bid., )arch ;, 1$$", pp. &=&17
*n front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence 2*bid., pp. ;&;9, &%&$,
%#%97. Gaganting, )irasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and (but entered the door of the extension building.
Gaganting opened the main 2steel7 gate of the house. /he other members of the team then entered.
Lacastesantos and )irasol entered the house through the main door and went inside the sala of the
ground Moor while other policemen surrounded the house. /wo 2!7 old women were in the sala together
with a young girl and three 2#7 children. (ne of the old women too: the children to the second Moor while
the young girl remained seated at the corner 2*bid., pp. 1$!17
Lacastesantos and )irasol proceeded to the second Moor where they earlier saw appellant 5ring an )1;
riMe at them through the window. While they were going upstairs, appellant noticed their presence. He
went inside the bedroom and, after brea:ing and remo0ing the Dalousies, Dumped from the window to the
roof of a neighboring house. +eeing this, )irasol rushed downstairs and as:ed help from the other
members of the raiding team to arrest appellant. Lacastesantos went to the second Moor and shouted to
the policemen outside not to 5re in the direction of the second Moor because there were children. )irasol
and +6(1 'esar Rabuya arrested appellant at the bac: of his house after a brief chase 2*bid., pp. !1!#7.
At the second Moor, Lacastesantos saw an )1; riMe 2,xh. <#7 with magaJine on top of the sofa at the sala
on the second Moor 2*bid., 6. !%7. /he riMe bore +erial No. 1&&&!!&. He remo0ed the magaJine from the riMe
and the bullet inside the chamber of the riMe. He counted se0enteen 21%7 li0e ammunition inside the
magaJine. He saw two 2!7 more )1; riMe magaJines on the sofa, one with twenty 2!=7 li0e ammunition
2,xh. G#7 and another with twentyone 2!17 li0e ammunition 2,xh. G;7. He li:ewise saw three 2#7 )19 riMe
magaJines 2,xh. G!7 in a corner at the second Moor 2/+N, )arch &, 1$$", pp. !##!, &#&%7
After Lacastesantos and )irasol entered appellants house, Ri0era, 1ela 6ea, Gregorio and (but followed
and entered the house. After identifying themsel0es as members of the 6N6 Anti4iceNNarcotics .nit, (but
presented to the old women a copy of the search warrant. 1ela 6ea and Ri0era then searched appellants
room on the ground Moor in the presence of 6unong <arangay ,lhano 2/+N, )arch #, 1$$", pp. ;1;#7. (n
top of a table was a pencil case 2,xh. F7 with 5fty 2&=7 folded aluminum foils inside 2,xhs. F1 to F&=7, each
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
(ther items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in diGerent denominations 2,xh. WA /+N,
April !", 1$$", pp. !#!&7, one 217 homemade .#" caliber re0ol0er 2,xh. <!7 with 50e 2&7 li0e
RammunitionS, one 217 )%$ single riMe with RaS pouch containing 50e 2&7 empty shells of an )%$ riMe 2,xh.
<;7, and one 217 empty shell of an )1; riMe 2/+N, April !#, 1$$", pp. #=#!7
Rino <artolome Locson was an informer of the Anti4iceNNarcotics .nit of the Kamboanga 6olice. R(Sn the
morning of +eptember !;, 1$$%, he was instructed by +6(! Gaganting to go to appellants house to buy
shabu. Locson :new appellant as a seller of shabu 2/+N, April !!, 1$$", p. &7 and had been to appellants
house about 5fteen 21&7 times before. He went to Rio Hondo and arri0ed at appellants house at #3!= p.m.
He bought 6#==.== worth of shabu from appellant. /he latter got three 2#7 dec:s of shabu from his waist
bag. Appellant instructed Locson to go behind the curtain where there was a table. /here were six 297
persons already smo:ing. /here was a lighted :erosene lamp made of a medicine bottle placed on the
table. /hey as:ed Locson to smo:e shabu and Locson obliged. He placed the three 2#7 dec:s of shabu he
bought on the table 2*bid., pp. "1&7.
While they were smo:ing shabu, Locson heard gun5re coming from appellants house. /hey all stood and
entered appellants compound but were instructed to pass RthroughS the other side. /hey met appellant at
the bac: of his house. Appellant told them to escape because the police are already here. /hey scampered
and ran away because there were already shots. Locson Dumped o0er the fence and ran towards the
seashore. .pon reaching a place near the -isheries +chool, he too: a tricycle and went home 2*bid., pp. 1%
1$7.
/he following day, +eptember !&, 1$$%, he went to the police station and executed an aEda0it 2,xh. )7
narrating what transpired at appellants house RoSn the afternoon of +eptember !;,
1$$%.chanrobles0irtuallawlibrary
After the search and before returning to the police station, 6=# 1ela 6ea prepared a Receipt for 6roperty
+eiJed 2,xh. 6 @ #7 listing the properties seiJed during the search. /he receipt was signed by 1ela 6ea as
the seiJure oEcer, and by 6unong <arangay HadDi Hussin ,lhano and radio reporter Fun 'ayona as
witnesses. A copy of the receipt was gi0en to appellant but he refused to ac:nowledge the properties
seiJed 2/+N, April !#, 1$$", pp. 111!7.
An examination conducted by 6olice *nspector )ercedes 1. 1iestro, -orensic 'hemist of the 6N6 'rime
Laboratory +er0ice (Ece $, on the paraEn casts ta:en from both hands of appellant yielded positi0e for
gunpowder nitrates 2,xh. A#7, gi0ing rise to the possibility that appellant had 5red a gun before the
examination 2/+N, )arch #, 1$$", p. 117. Gunpowder residue examinations conducted on +eptember !9,
1$$% showed that the following 5rearms were 5red 2,xh. <&73 a .#" caliber re0ol0er 2homemade7 with
+erial No. #11=$! 2,xh. <17, another .#" caliber re0ol0er 2homemade7 without a serial number 2,xh. <!7,
a 'al. %.9! mm )1; ..+. riMe with +erial No. 1&&&!!& 2,xh. <#7, and an )%$ riMe without a serial number
2,xh. <;7. /hey were 5red within 50e 2&7 days prior to the examination 2/+N, )arch #, 1$$", pp. 19!17.
With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by 6olice *nspector +usan ).
'ayabyab, li:ewise a -orensic 'hemist of the 6N6 'rime Laboratory +er0ice (Ece $, on the 5fty 2&=7
pieces of folded aluminum foils each containing white crystalline granules with a total weight of 1.%;!9
grams 2,xh. F1 to F&=7 yielded positi0e results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride
2shabu7 2,xh. L7. Howe0er, the examination of one 217 crystalline stone weighing "#.!9%; grams 2,xh. P7
yielded negati0e results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride 2,xh. L7.
/he records of the Regional (peration and 6lans 1i0ision of the 6N6 -irearm and ,xplosi0e +ection show
that appellant had not appliedN5led any application for license to possess 5rearm and ammunition or x x x
been gi0en authority to carry RaS 5rearm outside of his residence 2,xh. C7R1;S
?efenses Aersion
Appellant LadDaalam agrees with the narration of facts gi0en by the lower court.R1&S Hence, we ?uote the
pertinent parts of the assailed 1ecision3
Accused Walpan LadDaalam y )ihaDil a.:.a. Warpan, #= years old, married, ga0e his occupation as
smuggling 2tsn, p. !, )ay ;, 1$$"7. He used to go to Labuan in )alaysia and bring cigarettes to the
6hilippines without paying taxes 2tsn, pp. ;=;1, id7. He said that his true name RwasS Abdul Nasser
Abdura:man and that Warpan or Walpan LadDaalam RwasS only his alias. Howe0er, he admitted that more
people :new him as Walpan LadDaalam rather than Abdul Nasser Abdura:man 2tsn. pp. #$;=A ;9;%, id7.
He testi5ed that RoSn the afternoon of +eptember !;, 1$$%, when he was arrested by the police, he was
sleeping in the house of 1andao, a relati0e of his wife. He was alone. He slept in 1andaos house and not in
his house because they haRdS a sort of a conference as 1andaos daughter was lea0ing for +audi Arabia. He
noticed the presence of policemen in his neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo when he heard shots. He
wo:e up and went out of the house and that was the time that he was arrested. He said he was arrested
xxx CatD the other side of my houseE at the other side of the fence 0here ) 0as sleeping. xxx. t the back of
my house 2tsn, p. %, id.7. He does not :now who arrested him considering that the one 0ho arrested me
does not ha+e nameplate. He was arrested by four 2;7 persons. Not one of those who arrested him testi5ed
in 'ourt. He was handcuGed and placed inside a Deep par:ed at Rio Hondo ,lementary +chool. According to
him, he did not 5re a gun at the policemen from RtShe second Moor of his house. He said the policemen
RwereS the oneCsD 0ho 1reCdD at us 2tsn, p. &, id.7. *f he 5red a gun at the policemen for sure they RwouldS
die because the door is +ery near x x x the +icinity of my house. He does not own the )1; riMe 2,xh. <#7
which according to policemen, he used in 5ring at them. /he gun does not belong to him. He does not
ha0e a gun li:e that 2tsn, p. 1&, id.7. A policeman also owns an )1; riMe but he does not :now the
policeman 2tsn, pp. 191%, id7. He said that the )%$ riMe 2,xh. <;7, the three 2#7 empty )19 riMe
magaJines 2,xh. GA G1 to G!7, the two 2!7 )1; magaJines with li0e ammunition 2,xh. G#A G;7A the two
2!7 caliber .#" re0ol0ers 2,xhs. <1A <!7, the 5fty 2&=7 aluminum foils each containing shabu 2,xhs. F1 to F
&=7 placed inside a pencil case 2,xh. F, the assorted coins placed inside a blue bag 2,xh. W7 and the white
crystalline stone 2,xh. P7 all do not belong to him. He said that the policemen Dust produced those things
as their e0idence. /he 5rearms do not belong to him. /hey were brought by the policemen 2tsn, p. ;#, )ay
;, 1$$"7. Regarding the blue bag containing assorted coins, he said3 that is not ours, ) think this 3is4 theirs,
xxx they -ust brought that as their e+idence 2tsn, pp. 1&!;, id.7
Walpan LadDaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension house. He aErmed that
he owns that house. -our 2;7 persons were staying in the extension house. He could only recogniJe the
husband whose name is )omoy. /hey are from Folo. /hey left the place already because they were afraid
when the police raided the place. 2tsn, pp. "1=, )ay ;, 1$$"7. He does not :now prosecution witness Rino
Locson y <artolome. Although Locson recogniJed him, in his case he does not :now Locson and he does
not recogniJe him 2tsn, p.11, id7. He did not sell anything to Locson and did not entertain him. He is not
selling shabu but he :nows for a fact that there are plenty of person 0ho are engaged in selling shabu in
that place, in that area :nown as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. (ne of them is HadDi Agbi 2tsn, pp.111;, id7.
After his arrest Walpan LadDaalam was brought to the police station where he stayed for one day and one
night before he was transferred to the 'ity Dail. While at the police station, he was not able to ta:e a bath.
He smo:es two pac:s of cigarette a day. While he was at the police station, he smo:ed RaS cigarette gi0en
to him by his younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes with RaS match. -rom the police station, he was
brought to the 6N6 Regional (Ece at R./. Lim <oule0ard where he was subDect to paraEn examination
2tsn, pp. !;!9, )ay ;, 1$$"7.
1uring the raid conducted on his house, his cousin <oy LadDaalam, Ating +apadi, and Fecar 2,ikkal7 .sman,
the younger brother of his wife were :illed. Walpan LadDaalam said that he saw that it 0as the policeman
0ho shot themC,D only ) do not kno0 his name. 2hey 0ere killed at the back of his house. He said that no
charges were 5led against the one responsible for their death 2tsn, pp. #=## )ay ;, 1$$"7.
Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less "= years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan LadDaalam whom he
calls Fad-i )d at the time the police raided the house. +he is the mother of Ahma +ailabbi. +he was together
with <abo 1andan, two small children and a helper when soldiers entered the house. 3W4hen they arri+ed,
they kept on 1ring 3their guns4 e+en inside the house 2tsn, p.&, )ay &, 1$$"7. /hey were armed with short
and long 5rearms. /hey searched the house and scattered things and got what they wanted. /hey entered
the room of Walpan LadDaalam. /hey tried to open a bag containing Dewelry. When Anilhawa tried to bring
the bag outside the room, they grabbed the bag from her and po:ed a gun at her. At that time Walpan
LadDaalam was not in the house. Ahamad +ailabbi was also not in the house. A +earch Warrant was shown
to Anilhawa after the search was conducted and Dust before the policemen left the place. Anilhawa Ahamad
said that it 0as already late in the afternoonCED before they left that 0as the time the ,earch Warrant 30as4
gi+en to us by xxx >arangay Captain Fussin @lhano 2tsn, pp.9", )ay &, 1$$"7. <arangay 'hairman ,lhano
arri0ed already late in the afternoon, almost sundo0n 2tsn, p. $, id7. Anilhaw declared that aside from a
bag containing Dewelry and a bag full of money, she had not seen anything else that was ta:en from
Walpan LadDaalams house 2tsn, pp. $1!, id7.
A:mad 2Ahmad7 +ailabbi, #% years old, married testi5ed that about ;3== oUcloc: RoSn the afternoon of
+eptember !;, 1$$%, ha was standing in front of his house when policemen arri0ed and immediately
arrested him. He was about to go to the 'ity 6roper to buy articles he was intending to bring to +abah. He
had around .&","""."" placed inside a waist bag tied around his waist. /he policemen told him to lie down
in prone position and a policeman searched his bac:. /hey pulled his waist bag and too: his 1ia+tar wrist
watch. He was shot three times and was hit on the forehead lea0ing a scar. His inDury was not treated. He
was ta:en to the police station where he was detained for one day and one night. He was detained at the
'ity Fail for three months and 50e days after which he was released 2tsn, pp. !&!$, )ay &, 1$$"7.
)elba .sma, != years old, a widow, testi5ed that RoSn the afternoon of +eptember !;, 1$$%, she was in the
house of her parents lying together with her husband +i::al .sma. /here is only one house between her
parents house and the house of Walpan LadDaalam. Her husband +i::al .sman is the brother of Nurin
LadDaalam, Walpans wife. When )elba heard shots, she went downstairs. A policeman was loo:ing for her
husband. /he policeman called her husband. When her husband went down, he was instructed by the
policeman to lie down in prone position. /hen the policeman shot her husband. /he policeman had two
other companions who also shot her husband while he was lying down in prone position 2tsn, pp.!%, )ay
&, 1$$"7.
)ur:isa .sman, #= years old, married, declared that RoSn the afternoon of +eptember !;, 1$$%, she was
sitting at the door of her house watching her children playing when a motorcycle, dri0en by a person,
stopped near her house. /he dri0er was Gaganting whom she called a soldier. He went down from his
motorcycle, pulled a gun and po:ed it at )ur:isa. )ur:isa stood up and raised her hands. +he got her
children and when she was about to enter the room of her house, Gaganting again po:ed a gun at her and
there 0as a shot. As a result of 5ring, three persons died, namely, +i::al .sman, <oy LadDaalam and Atip
+apali +ali 2tsn, pp. "1=, )ay &, 1$$"7.
<arangay 'aptain HadDi Hussin ,lhano, &1 years old, testi5ed that about ;3== o cloc: RoSn the afternoon of
+eptember !;, 1$$%, he was fetched by two policemen at 'atabangan where he was attending a seminar.
<ecause of traEc along the way, they arri0ed at the Rio Hondo already late in the afternoon. He saw
policemen were already inside the house. .pon entering the gate, he saw Walpan at the gate already
handcuGed. Walpan called him but the police ad0ised him not to approach Walpan. /he search was already
o0er and things were already ta:en inside the house. When he went inside the house, he saw the things
that they 3policemen4 searched, the 1rearms and the shabu 2tsn, p. 1%. )ay ", 1$$"7. He did not see the
+earch Warrant. What was shown to him were the things reco0ered during the search which were being
listed. /hey were being counted and placed on a table. <pon seeing the things that 0ere reco+ered during
the search, ) -ust signed the receipt 3@xh. .E .914 of the things x x x taken during the search 3tsn, pp. 1%91#.
8ay #, 1''#4. He saw three dead bodies at the side of the fence when he went to the other side of the
house. /he three persons were :illed outside the fence of Walpan LadDaalam 2tsn, p. 1", id7.R19S
/he /rial 'ourts Ruling
/he trial court obser0ed that the house of appellant was raided on +eptember !;, 1$$% by 0irtue of +earch
Warrant No. != issued on the same day. Howe0er, the lower court nulli5ed the said Warrant because it had
been issued for more than one speci5c oGense,R1%S in 0iolation of +ection #, Rule 1!9 of the Rules of 'ourt.
R1"S /he court a =uo ruled3
*t should be stated at the outset that +earch Warrant No. != is totally null and +oid because it was issued
for more than one speci5c oGense x x x contrary to +ection #, Rule 1R!S9 of the Rules of 'ourt which
pro0ides that search 0arrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection 0ith one speci1c
oGense xxx. *n /ambasan 0s. 6eople, !;9 +'RA 1"; 21$$&7, the +upreme 'ourt ruled that a search warrant
for more than one oGense a scatter shot warrant 0iolates +ection #, Rule 1!9 of the Re0ised Rules of
'ourt and is totally null and 0oid.R1$S 2emphasis in the original7
Ne0ertheless, the trial court deemed appellants arrest as 0alid. *t emphasiJed that he had shot at the
oEcers who were trying to ser0e the 0oid search warrant. /his fact was established by the testimonies of
se0eral police oEcers,R!=S who were participants in the raid, and con5rmed by the laboratory report on the
paraEn tests conducted on the 5rearms and appellant.R!1S Additionally, the Dudge noted that Appellant
LadDaalam, based on his statements in his 'ounter AEda0it, impliedly contradicted his assertions in open
court that there had been no exchange of gun5re during the raid.R!!S /he trial court concluded that the
testimonies of these oEcers must pre0ail o0er appellantsU narration that he was not in his house when the
raid was conducted.
6residing from this point, the court a =uo 0alidated the arrest of appellant, reasoning thus3
.nder the circumstances, the policemen had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan /ad-aalam and
con1scate the 1rearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter his house to eGect said arrest
and con1scation of the 1rearm. .nder Rule 11#, +ection & 2a7, of the Rules of 'ourt, peace oHcer or a
pri+ate person may, 0ithout a 0arrant, arrest a person xxx 304hen in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an oGense. An oGense is
committed in the presence or within the 0iew of an oEcer, within the meaning of the rule authoriJing an
arrest without a warrant, when the oEcer sees the oGense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. At the time the policemen
entered the house of accused Walpan LadDaalam after he had 5red shots at the policemen who intended to
ser0e the +earch Warrant to him, the accused was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was pursued
and arrested after he committed the crime of shooting at the policemen who were about to ser0e the
+earch Warrant.R!#S
As a conse?uence of the legal arrest, the seiJure of the following was also deemed 0alid3 the )1; riMe
2with a magaJine containing se0enteen li0e ammunition7R!;S used by appellant against the police
elements, two )1; magaJines, and three other )19 riMe magaJines.R!&S

/he trial court obser0ed that
these items were in plain 0iew of the pursuing police oEcers. )oreo0er, it added that these same items
were e0idence RofS the commission of a crime andNor contraband and therefore, subDect to seiJureR!9S
since appellant had not applied for a license to possess 5rearm and had not been gi0en authority to carry
5rearm outside his residence.R!%S
-or being incredible and unsupported by e0idence, appellants claim that the items that were seiJed by the
police oEcers had been planted was disbelie0ed by the trial court. *t ruled that if the police oEcers wanted
to plant e0idence to incriminate him, they could ha0e done so during the pre0ious raids or those
conducted after his arrest. /o its mind, it was unbelie0able that they would choose to plant e0idence, when
they were accompanied by the barangay chairman and a radio reporter who might testify against them. *t
then dismissed these allegations, saying that frameup, li:e alibi, was an inherently wea: defense.R!"S
/he trial court also con0icted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. *t reasoned as follows3
/he testimony of Rino <artolome Locson, corroborated by +6(1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and +6(1 Amado
)irasol, Fr. clearly established that Walpan LadDaalam operated and maintained a drug den in his extension
house where shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, was sold, and where persons or
customers bought and used shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride by burning the said regulated drug
and sniEng its smo:e with the use of an aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or hideaway where
prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. *ts existence Rmay beS pro0ed not only by
direct e0idence but may also be established by proof of facts and circumstances, including e0idence of the
general reputation of the house, or its general reputation among police oEcers. /he uncorroborated
testimony of accused Walpan LadDaalam a.:.a. Warpan that he did not maintain an extension house or a
room where drug users who allegedly buy shabu from him inhales or smo:es shabu cannot pre0ail o0er the
testimonies of Locson, +6(1 Lacastesantos, and +6(1 )irasol. He admitted that he is the owner of the
extension house but he alleged that there were four 2;7 occupants who rented that extension house. He
:new the name of only one of the four occupants who are allegedly from Folo, a certain )omoy, the
husband. Aside from being uncorroborated, Walpans testimony was not elaborated by e0idence as to when
or for how long was the extension house rented, the amount of rental paid, or by any other document
showing that the extension house was in fact rented. /he defense of denial put up by accused Walpan
LadDaalam a.:.a. IWarpan is a wea: defense. 1enial is the wea:est defense and cannot pre0ail o0er the
positi0e and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 1enials, if unsubstantiated by clear and
con0incing e0idence, are negati0e and selfser0ing e0idence which deser0e no weight in law and cannot be
gi0en e0identiary weight o0er the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on aErmati0e matters. As
between the positi0e declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the negati0e statements of the accused,
the former deser0e more credence.R!$S
*n conclusion, the trial court explained appellants liability in this manner3
x x x. /he act of the accused in 5ring an )1; riMe to the policemen who were about to enter his house to
ser0e a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with multiple attempted homicideR,S not
multiple attempted murder with direct assaultR,S considering that no policeman was hit and inDured by the
accused and no circumstance was pro0ed to ?ualify the attempted :illing to attempted murder
/he accused Walpan LadDaalam a.:.a. Warpan cannot be held liable RforS the crime of 4iolation of +ection
19, Article ***, in relation to +ection !1, Article *4, of Republic Act 9;!& otherwise :nown as the 1angerous
1rugs Act of 1$$!, as amended, because the 5fty 2&=7 pieces of folded aluminum foils ha0ing a total
weight of 1.%;!9 grams all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in his
house are inadmissible as e0idence against him considering that they were seiJed after RaS search
conducted by 0irtue of +earch Warrant No. != which is totally null and 0oid as it was issued for more than
one oGense, and were not found in plain +ie0 of the police oEcers who seiJed them. Neither could the
accused be held liable for illegal possession of 5rearms and ammunition except for the 217 )1; riMe with
+erial Number 1&&&!!& and with magaJine containing 5fteen 21&7 li0e ammunition and two more )1; riMe
magaJines with twenty 2!=7 and twentyone 2!17 li0e ammunition respecti0ely considering that the
policemen who reco0ered or seiJed the other 5rearms and ammunition did not testify in court. /he blue
bag containing assorted coins cannot be returned to the accused Walpan LadDaalam a.:.a. Warpan because
according to the accused the blue bag and assorted coins do not belong to himRAS instead the said assorted
coins should be turned o0er to the National /reasury.R#=S
/he *ssues
*n his <rief, appellant submits the following Assignment of ,rrors3
*. /he trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan LadDaalam y )ihaDil RhadS 5red 5rst at the
police oEcers who went to his house to ser0e a search warrant upon him which led to an exchange of 5re
between LadDaalam and the police oEcer.
** ./he trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an ocular inspection of
the scene of the 5re5ght and where the house of the appellant RwasS located.
***
/he trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties
RexcludedS the claim of the appellant that the 5rearms and methamphetamine hydrochloride 2i.e. shabu7
were planted by the police.R#1S
*n the interest of simplicity, we shall ta:e up these issues seriatim3 2a7 denial of the re?uest for ocular
inspection, 2b7 credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and 2c7 the defense of frameup. *n addition, we
shall also discuss the proper crimes and penalties to be imposed on appellant.
/he 'ourts Ruling
/he appeal has no merit.
-irst *ssue3 ?enial of Re=uest for 7cular )nspection

Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his re?uest for an ocular inspection of the LadDaalam
residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would ha0e aGorded the lower court a better perspecti0e
and an idea with respect to the scene of the crime.R#!S We do not agree
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of the clear testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses.R##S We note in particular that the defense had e0en re?uested +6(1 Amado
)irasol Fr. to s:etch the subDect premises to gi0e the lower court a fairly good idea of appellants house.R#;S
4iewing the site of the raid would ha0e only delayed the proceedings.R#&S )oreo0er, the ?uestion whether
to 0iew the setting of a rele0ant e0ent has long been recogniJed to be within the discretion of the trial
Dudge.R#9S Here, there is no reason to disturb the exercise of that discretion.R#%S
+econd *ssue3 Credibility of .rosecution Witnesses

Appellant, in essence, ?uestions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.R#"S +uEce it to state that the
trial courts assessment of their credibility is generally accorded respect, e0en 5nality.R#$S After carefully
examining the records and 5nding no material inconsistencies to support appellants claim, we cannot
exempt this case from the general rule.R;=S Tuite the contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses
positi0ely showed that appellant had 5red upon the approaching police elements, and that he had
subse?uently attempted to escape. +6(1 Amado )irasol Fr.R;1S testi5ed thus3
6R(+,'./(R N.4AL3
T3 And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accusedQ
A3 Ies.
T3 And its there where you were met by a 0olley of 5reQ
A3 Ies, Iour Honor.
'(.R/3
T3 How far were you from the concrete fenRcSe when you were met by a 0olley of 5reQ ... Iou said you were
5red uponQ
A3 )ore or less, 50e 2&7 meters.
6R(+,'./(R N.4AL3
T3 Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your colleague -elipe
Gaganting ... * will reform that ?uestion.
T3 Who opened the gate )r. WitnessQ
A3 +6(! -elipe Gaganting, ,fren Gregorio and Allan )arcos (but.
T3 And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fenceQ
A3 Ies.
T3 Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, rightQ
A3 Ies.
T3 What did you see inside the houseQ
A3 *, together with +6(1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of Walfran RsicS
LadDaalam at the ground Moor. We went inside the sala on the ground Moor of his houseRAS * saw two old
woman.
6R(+,'./(R N.4AL3
T3 Now, what did you do with these two old womenQ
A3 * did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the ground Moor. * was
concentrating on the second Moor because LadDaalam was 5ring towards our group so, *, together with
Ricardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second Moor of the house.
T3 Were you able to go to the second Moor of the houseQ
A3 Ies. t happened when you were already on the second MoorQ
A3 While we were proceeding to the second Moor, Walfan RsicS LadDaalam, noticed our presence and
immediately went inside the bedroom RoSn the second Moor and he went immediately and Dumped from the
window of his house x x x leading to the roof of the neighbors house.
'(.R/3
Reform. /hat is leading
T3 What happened when you entered and he Dumped to the roo5ng of the neighbors houseQ
A3 *mmediately, * myself, we immediately went downstairs and as:ed the assistance of the members of the
raiding team to arrest Walfan LadDaalam.
6R(+,'./(R N.4AL3
T3 Were you able to go downQ
A3 Ies.
T3 What happened when you were thereQ
A3 We immediately went out and * as:ed the assistance of the members of the raiding team and the
in0estigator of the unit especially +6(1 'esar Rabuya. * was able to manage to arrest Walfan LadDaalam.
R;!S
What happened thereafter was narrated by +enior 6olice (Ecer Ricardo Lacastesantos,R;#S as follows3
T3 What did you notice RoSn the second MoorQ
A3 * went where the 5ring came from, so, * saw RanS )1; riMe and * shouted from the outside, do not 5re at
the second Moor because there RareS a lot of children here.
T3 Now, that riMe you said Rwas anS )1;, where did you 5nd thisQ
A3 At the sala set.
T3 /his sala set where is this locatedQ
A3 Located RonS the second Moor of the house.
T3 *s there a sala RoSn the second MoorQ
A3 Ies.
T3 'an you still identify that )1; riMe which you said you reco0ered from the sale setQ
A3 Ies.
T3 Why can you identify thatQ
A3 /he +erial No. of )1; is 1&&&!!& and * mar:ed it with my initial.
T3 Now, * ha0e here )1; riMeRAS will you please tell us where is the +erial No. of thisQ
A3 1&&&!!& and * put my initial, RFL
-*+'AL N.4AL3
/his is already mar:ed as our ,xhibit <# with magaJine, one magaJine and se0en round RammunitionS.
T3 After reco0ering this, what did you do with this 5rearmQc
A3 When * reco0ered it * remo0ed the bullets inside the chamberR.S * remo0ed the magaJine and * turned it
o0er to the in0estigator.
T3 Where did you turn it o0erQ
A3 At the crime scene.
T3 Now, that magaJine, can you still identify thisQ
A3 Ies.
T3 WhyQ
A3 * put x x x mar:ings.
'(.R/3
+o, aside from the magaJine attached to the )1; riMe you found six more magaJinesQ
A3 Ies, so, all in all six magaJines, three empty )19 riMe magaJines and three )1;.
T3 /he )19 magaJines RwereS emptyQ
A3 ,mpty.
T3 How about the )1;Q
A3 -ound with RammunitionS.
T3 +o, where are the three )19 magaJinesQ
A3 *n the corner.
T3 What did you do with RtheseS three magaJines of )19Q
A3 * turned RthemS o0er to the in0estigator.
T3 'an you identify themQ
A3 Ies, because of my initialsR.
T3 Where are your initialsQ
A3 (n the magaJines.
T3 RFLQ
A3 RFL.R;;S
/hese were con5rmed by the results of the paraEn tests conducted on appellant and on the weapons
seiJed during the raid. <oth of his hands as well as the weapons, particularly the )1; which he had used,
were positi0e for gunpowder nitrate. 6olice *nspector )ercedes 1el5n1iestro explained in open court3
T3 (:ay. Now, what was the result of your examination, )adam WitnessQ
A3 /he result of the examination RwasS that both hands of the subDect person, haRdS presence of gun
powder nitrates.
T3 What do you mean )adam Witness, what does that indicateQ
A3 *t indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.
J: Can 0e conclude that he 1red a gunK
: ) cannot conclude that he 1red a gun because there are so many circumstances C0hyD a person C0ould
beD positi+e on his hands for gun po0der nitrates.
T3 <ut, most li:ely, he 5red a gunQ
A3 Ies.
6R(+,'./(R N.4AL3
T3 What about, )adam Witness this ,xhibit <#, which is the )1; riMe. What did you do with thisQ
A3 +6(# Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein * obser0ed there RwereS blac:
and traces of brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.
T3 And, that indicates )adam Witness...Q
A3 *t indicates that the gun was 5red.
T3 RecentlyQ
A3 <ecause of the traces of brown residue, it could be possible that the gun was 5red before the incident x
x
'(.R/3
T3 /here is also blac: residueQ
A3 Ies.
T3 What does it indicateQ
A3 *t indicates that the 5rearm was recently 5red.
T3 And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this ,xhibitQ
A3 /his one.
6R(+,'./(R N.4AL3
)ay we as: that this be mar:ed as ,xhibit <#A
'(.R/3
T3 /he 5ring there indicates that the gun was recently 5red, during the incidentQ
A3 Ies.
T3 And also before the incident it was 5red because of the brown residueQ
A3 Ies, Iour Honor.R;&S 2emphasis supplied7
1uly pro0en from the foregoing were the two elementsR;9S of the crime of illegal possession of 5rearms.
.ndoubtedly, the established fact that appellant had 5red an )1; riMe upon the approaching police
oEcers clearly showed the existence of the 5rearm or weapon and his possession thereof. +uEcing to
satisfy the second element was the prosecutions 'erti5cationR;%S stating that he had not 5led any
application for license to possess a 5rearm, and that he had not been gi0en authority to carry any outside
his residence.R;"S -urther, it should be pointed out that his possession and use of an )1; riMe were
ob0iously unauthoriJed because this weapon could not be licensed in fa0or of, or carried by, a pri0ate
indi0idual.R;$S
/hird *ssue3 ?efense of 6rame9up

-rom the con0oluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that the main defense he raises
is frameup. He claims that the items seiJed from his house were planted, and that the entire Kamboanga
police force was out to get him at all cost.
/his 'ourt has in0ariably held that the defense of frameup is inherently wea:, since it is easy to fabricate,
but terribly diEcult to dispro0e.R&=S Absent any showing of an improper moti0e on the part of the police
oEcers,R&1S coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty, such defense
cannot be gi0en much credence.R&!S *ndeed, after examining the records of this case, we conclude that
appellant has failed to substantiate his claim. (n the contrary, his statements in his 'ounter AEda0it are
inconsistent with his testimony during the trial.R&#S He testi5ed thus3
T Now, )r. Witness, do you remember ha0ing executed an AEda0itN a 'ounterAEda0itQ
A * could not remember
T * ha0e here a 'ounterAEda0it and it was signed before this representation on the "th day of 1ecember
1$$%RAS tell us whose signature is this appearing abo0e the typewritten name
-*+'AL N.4AL3
T . . . . Walpan LadDaalam, whose signature is thisQ
2+howing7
A Ies, +ir. /his is mine.
T Now, in paragraphRsS 1,!,#,;,&,9,% and "A you stated in this 'ounterAEda0it which * ?uote3 that * was
resting and sleeping when * heard the gunshots and * noticed that the shots were directed towards our
house.. and * inspected and x x x we were attac:ed by armed persons.. and * was apprehended by the
persons who attac:ed x x x our houseA RtheS house you are referring to RinS this paragraph, whose house
Rare youS referring to, is this RwhatS you are referring to RasS your house or the house of your neighbors
RfromS which you said you heard gunshotsQ
A (ur house
T Now, in paragraph 9 of your 'ounterAEda0it you stated and * ?uote3 that RoSn that afternoon of
+eptember !;, 1$$%, * was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, <o. 'ampo )uslim, my companions in
my house RwereS the two old women and my children, is this correctQ
A /hey were not there.
T Now, in that statement )r. Witness, you said that you were at home in RyourS house at Aplaya, Riohondo,
<o. 'ampo )uslimRAS which is which now, you were in your house or you were in your neighborsRS house at
that time when you heard gunshotsQ
A * was in the house near my house.
T +o, your statement particularly paragraph 9 of your 'ounterAEda0it that you were at home in RyourS
house at Aplaya Riohondo <o. 'ampo )uslim, is x x x not correctQ
'rime and 6unishment
/he trial court con0icted appellant of three crimes3 217 maintenance of a drug den, 2!7 direct assault with
attempted homicide, and 2#7 illegal possession of 5rearms. We will discuss each of these.
8aintenance of a ?rug ?en
We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an oGense for which
he was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly established by the testimony of
6rosecution Witness Rino <artolome Locson, who himself had used the extension house of appellant as a
drug den on se0eral occasions, including the time of the raid. /he formers testimony was corroborated by
all the raiding police oEcers who testi5ed before the court. /hat appellant did not deny ownership of the
house and its extension lent credence to the prosecutions story.
?irect ssault 0ith 8ultiple ttempted Fomicide

/he trial court was also correct in con0icting appellant of direct assaultR&&S with multiple counts of
attempted homicide. *t found that RtShe act of the accused RofS 5ring an )1; riMe RatS the policemenR,S who
were about to enter his house to ser0e a search warrant x x x constituted such complex crime.R&9S
We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the penalty of prision correccional.R&%S
Hence, for the present complex crime, the penalty for direct assault, which constitutes the most serious
crime, should be imposed and applied in its maximum period.R&"S
)llegal .ossession of 6irearms

Aside from 5nding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court
con0icted him also of the separate oGense of illegal possession of 5rearms under 61 1"99, as amended by
RA "!$;, and sentenced him to 9 years of prision correccional to " years of prision mayor.
/he (Ece of the +olicitor General 2(+G7 disagrees, on the ground that the trial court should not ha0e
applied the new law. *t contends that under the facts of the case, the applicable law should ha0e been 61
1"99, as worded prior to its amendment by RA "!$;.chanrobles0irtuallawlibrary
/he trial courts ruling and the (+Gs submission exemplify the legal communityUs diEculty in grappling with
the changes brought about by RA "!$;. Hence, before us now are opposing 0iews on how to interpret
+ection 1 of the new law, which pro0ides as follows3
+,'/*(N 1. +ection 1 of 6residential 1ecree No. 1"99, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows3
+ection 1. <nla0ful 8anufacture, ,ale, c=uisition, ?isposition or .ossession of 6irearms or mmunition
)nstruments <sed or )ntended to be <sed in the 8anufacture of 6irearms or mmunition. /he penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period and a 5ne of not less than -ifteen thousand pesos 261&,===7
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, ac?uire, dispose, or possess
any low powered 5rearm, such as rim 5re handgun, .#"= or .#! and other 5rearm of similar 5repower, part
of 5rearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of any 5rearm or ammunition3 .ro+ided, /hat no other crime was committed.
/he penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a 5ne of /hirty thousand pesos 26#=,===7 shall be
imposed if the 5rearm is classi5ed as high powered 5rearm which includes those with bores bigger in
diameter than .#= caliber and $ millimetre such as caliber .;=, .;1, .;;, .;& and also lesser calibered
5rearms but considered powerful such as caliber .#&% and caliber .!! center5re magnum and other
5rearms with 5ring capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three3 .ro+ided, ho0e+er, /hat no
other crime was committed by the person arrested.
*f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed 5rearm, such use of an unlicensed
5rearm shall be considered as an aggra0ating circumstance.
*f the 0iolation of this +ection is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion
or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat, such 0iolation shall be absorbed as an element of the
crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat.
/he same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible
oEcer of any public or pri0ate 5rm, company, corporation or entity, who shall wilfully or :nowingly allow
any of the 5rearms owned by such 5rm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or
persons found guilty of 0iolating the pro0isions of the preceding paragraphs or wilfully or :nowingly allow
any of them to use unlicensed 5rearms or 5rearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their
residence in the course of their employment.
/he penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed 5rearm
outside his residence without legal authority therefore.
'iting .eople +. :ayson,R&$S the (+G argues that the foregoing pro0ision does not co0er the speci5c facts of
this case. +ince another crime direct assault with multiple unlawful homicides was committed,
appellant cannot be con0icted of simple illegal possession of 5rearms under the second paragraph of the
aforecited pro0ision. -urthermore, since there was no :illing in this case, illegal possession cannot be
deemed as an aggra0ating circumstance under the third paragraph of the pro0ision. <ased on these
premises, the (+G concludes that the applicable law is not RA "!$;, but 61 1"99 which, as worded prior
the new law, penaliJes simple illegal possession of 5rearms e0en if another crime is committed at the
same time.R9=S
Applying a diGerent interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be con0icted of illegal
possession of 5rearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. *t did not explain its
ruling, howe0er. 'onsidering that it could not ha0e been ignorant of the pro+isoR91S in the second
paragraph, it seemed to ha0e construed no other crime as referring only to homicide and murder, in both
of which illegal possession of 5rearms is an aggra0ating circumstance. *n other words, if a crime other than
murder or homicide is committed, a person may still be con0icted of illegal possession of 5rearms. *n this
case, the other crime committed was direct assault with multiple attempted homicideA hence, the trial
court found appellant guilty of illegal possession of 5rearms.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the statute. A
simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed 5rearm is used in the commission of any crime, there
can be no separate oGense of simple illegal possession of 5rearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or
homicide, illegal possession of 5rearms becomes merely an aggra0ating circumstance, not a separate
oGense. +ince direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can
no longer be held liable for illegal possession of 5rearms.
)oreo0er, penal laws are construed liberally in fa0or of the accused.R9!S *n this case, the plain meaning of
RA "!$;s simple language is most fa0orable to herein appellant. 4erily, no other interpretation is Dusti5ed,
for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislati0e intent to fa0or the accused.R9#S Accordingly,
appellant cannot be con0icted of two separate oGenses of illegal possession of 5rearms and direct assault
with attempted homicide. )oreo0er, since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or
murder, illegal possession of 5rearms cannot be deemed an aggra0ating circumstance.
We reDect the (+Gs contention that 61 1"99, as worded prior to its amendment by RA "!$;, should be
applied in this case. When the crime was committed on +eptember !;, 1$$%, the original language of 61
1"99 had already been expressly superseded by RA "!$; which too: eGect on Fuly 9, 1$$%.R9;S *n other
words, no longer in existence was the earlier pro0ision of 61 1"99, which Dusti5ed a con0iction for illegal
possession of 5rearms separate from any other crime. *t was replaced by RA "!$; which, among other
amendments to 61 1"99, contained the speci5c pro+iso that no other crime was committed.
-urthermore, the (+Gs reliance on .eople +. :aysonR9&S is misplaced. /rue, this 'ourt sustained the
con0iction of appellant for illegal possession of 5rearms, although he had also committed homicide. We
explained, howe0er, that the criminal case for homicide RwasS not before us for consideration.
Fust as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We 5nd no Dusti5cation for limiting the pro+iso
in the second paragraph to murder and homicide. /he law is clear3 the accused can be con0icted of simple
illegal possession of 5rearms, pro0ided that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. *f the
intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should ha0e
expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. 4erily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should
we.
/he 'ourt is aware that this ruling eGecti0ely exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an )1; riMe, an
oGense which normally carries a penalty hea0ier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the 5rst
is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. *ndeed, the accused may e0ade con0iction
for illegal possession of 5rearms by using such weapons in committing an e0en lighter oGense,R99S li:e
alarm and scandalR9%S or slight physical inDuries,R9"S both of which are punishable by arresto menor.R9$S
/his conse?uence, howe0er, necessarily arises from the language of RA "!$;, whose wisdom is not subDect
to the 'ourts re0iew. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to
'ongress. *ndeed, the 'ourt has no discretion to gi0e statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest
intendment and language of the legislature. (ur tas: is constitutionally con5ned only to applying the law
and DurisprudenceR%=S to the pro0en facts, and we ha0e done so in this case.
WH,R,-(R,, the appealed 1ecision is hereby 66)R8@? with the 87?)6)C2)7N that appellant is found
guilty only of two oGenses3 217 direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon,
for which he is sentenced to ! years and ; months to 9 years of prision correccionalA and 2!7 maintaining a
drug den, for which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua. 'osts against
appellant.
Let a copy of this 1ecision be furnished the 'ongress of the 6hilippines for a possible re0iew, at its sound
discretion, of RA "!$;.chanrobles0irtuallawlibrary
+( (R1,R,1.
1%. *n case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the go0ernment and liberally in fa0or
of the taxpayer, for taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute
expressly and clearly declares.
G.R. No. L9$#;; April !9, 1$$1
R,6.<L*' (- /H, 6H*L*66*N,+, .etitioner, 0s. *N/,R),1*A/, A66,LLA/, '(.R/ and +6(.+,+ AN/(N*(
and 'LARA 6A+/(R, Respondents.
GR*V(AT.*N(, :.:
/he legal issue presented in this petition for re0iew is whether or not the tax amnesty payments made by
the pri0ate respondents on (ctober !#, 1$%# bar an action for reco0ery of de5ciency income taxes under
6.1.8s Nos. !#, !1# and #%=.chanrobles0irtuallawlibrary
(n April 1&, 1$"=, the Republic of the 6hilippines, through the <ureau of *nternal Re0enue, commenced an
action in the 'ourt of -irst *nstance 2now Regional /rial 'ourt7 of )anila, <ranch C4*, to collect from the
spouses Antonio 6astor and 'lara Reyes6astor de5ciency income taxes for the years 1$&& to 1$&$ in the
amount of 61%,11%.=" with a &O surcharge and 1O monthly interest, and costs.
/he 6astors 5led a motion to dismiss the complaint, but the motion was denied. (n August !, 1$%&, they
5led an answer admitting there was an assessment against them of 61%,11%.=" for income tax de5ciency
but denying liability therefor. /hey contended that they had a0ailed of the tax amnesty under 6.1.8s Nos.
!#, !1# and #%= and had paid the corresponding amnesty taxes amounting to 61=,;== or 1=O of their
reported untaxed income under 6.1. !#, 6!,$&1.!= or !=O of the reported untaxed income under 6.1. !1#,
and a 5nal payment on (ctober !9, 1$%# under 6.1. #%= e0idenced by the Go0ernment8s (Ecial Receipt
No. 1=&!#"". 'onse?uently, the Go0ernment is in estoppel to demand and compel further payment of
income taxes by them.
/he parties agreed that there were no issues of fact to be litigated, hence, the case was submitted for
decision upon the pleadings and memoranda on the lone legal ?uestion of3 whether or not the payment of
de5ciency income tax under the tax amnesty, 6.1. !#, and its acceptance by the Go0ernment operated to
di0est the Go0ernment of the right to further reco0er from the taxpayer, e0en if there was an existing
assessment against the latter at the time he paid the amnesty tax.
*t is not disputed that as a result of an in0estigation made by the <ureau of *nternal Re0enue in 1$9#, it
was found that the pri0ate respondents owed the Go0ernment 61,!"#,9!1.9# as income taxes for the
years 1$&& to 1$&$, inclusi0e of the &=O surcharge and 1O monthly interest. /he defendants protested
against the assessment. A rein0estigation was conducted resulting in the drastic reduction of the
assessment to only 61%,11%.=".
*t appears that on April !%, 1$%", the pri0ate respondents oGered to pay the <ureau of *nternal Re0enue
the sum of 6&,=== by way of compromise settlement of their income tax de5ciency for the ?uestioned
years, but Assistant 'ommissioner <ernardo 'arpio, in a letter addressed to the 6astor spouses, reDected
the oGer stating that there was no legal or factual Dusti5cation for accepting it. /he Go0ernment 5led the
action against the spouses in 1$"=, ten 21=7 years after the assessment of the income tax de5ciency was
made.
(n a motion for Dudgment on the pleadings 5led by the Go0ernment, which the spouses did not oppose,
the trial court rendered a decision on -ebruary !", 1$"=, holding that the defendants spouses had settled
their income tax de5ciency for the years 1$&& to 1$&$, not under 6.1. !# or 6.1. #%=, but under 6.1. !1#,
as shown in the Amnesty *ncome /ax Returns8 +ummary +tatement and the tax 6ayment Acceptance (rder
for 6!,$&1.!= with its corresponding oEcial receipt, which returns also contain the 0ery assessment for the
?uestioned years. <y accepting the payment of the amnesty income taxes, the Go0ernment, therefore,
wai0ed its right to further reco0er de5ciency incomes taxes >from the defendants under the existing
assessment against them because3
1. the defendants8 amnesty income tax returns8 +ummary +tatement included therein the
de5ciency assessment for the years 1$&& to 1$&$A !. tax amnesty payment was made by
the defendants under 6residential 1ecree No. !1#, hence, it had the eGect of remission of
the income tax de5ciency for the years 1$&& to 1$&$A
#. 6.1. No. !# as well as 6.1. No. !1# do not ma:e any exceptions nor impose any conditions
for their application, hence, Re0enue Regulation No. %%# which excludes certain taxpayers
from the co0erage of 6.1. No. !1# is null and 0oid, and
;. the acceptance of tax amnesty payment by the plaintiGappellant bars the reco0ery of
de5ciency taxes. 2pp. #;, *A' 1ecision, pp. =#1=#!, Rollo.7
/he Go0ernment appealed to the *ntermediate Appellant 'ourt 2A' G.R. '4 No. 9"#%1 entitled, >Republic
of the 6hilippines 0s. Antonio 6astor, et al.>7, alleging that the pri0ate respondents were not ?uali5ed to
a0ail of the tax amnesty under 6.1. !1# for the bene5ts of that decree are a0ailable only to persons who
had no pending assessment for unpaid taxes, as pro0ided in Re0enue Regulations Nos. "%! and %%#.
+ince the 6astors did in fact ha0e a pending assessment against them, they were precluded from a0ailing
of the amnesty granted in 6.1.8s Nos. !# and !1#. /he Go0ernment further argued that >tax exemptions
should be interpreted strictissimi -uris against the taxpayer.>
/he respondent spouses, on the other hand, alleged that 6.1. !1# contains no exemptions from its
co0erage and that, under Letter of *nstruction L(* 1!$ dated +eptember 1", 1$%#, the immunities granted
by 6.1. !1# include3
***mmunities Granted.
.pon payment of the amounts speci5ed in the 1ecree, the following shall be obser0ed3
1. . . . .
!. /he taxpayer shall not be sub-ect to any in+estigation, 0hether ci+il, criminal or
administrati+e, insofar as his declarations in the income tax returns are concerned nor shall
the same be used as e0idence against, or to the preDudice of the declarant in any proceeding
before any court of law or body, whether Dudicial, ?uasiDudicial or administrati0e, in which he
is a defendant or respondent, and he shall be exempt from any liability arising from or
incident to his failure to 1le his income tax return and to pay the tax due thereon, as well as
to any liability for any other tax that may be due as a result of business transactions from
which such income, now 0oluntarily declared may ha0e been deri0ed.
/here is nothing in the L(* which can be construed as authority for the <ureau of *nternal Re0enue
to introduce exceptions andNor conditions to the co0erage of the law.
(n No0ember !#, 1$";, the *ntermediate Appellate 'ourt 2now 'ourt of Appeals7 rendered a decision
dismissing the Go0ernment8s appeal and holding that the payment of de5ciency income taxes by the
6astors under 61. No. !1#, and the acceptance thereof by the Go0ernment, operated to di0est the latter of
its right to further reco0er de5ciency income taxes from the pri0ate respondents pursuant to the existing
de5ciency tax assessment against them. /he appellate court held that if Re0enue Regulation No. %%# did
pro0ide an exception to the co0erage of 6.1. !1#, such pro0ision was null and 0oid for being contrary to, or
restricti0e of, the clear mandate of 6.1. No. !1# which the regulation should implement. +aid re0enue
regulation may not pre0ail o0er the pro0isions of the decree, for it would then be an act of administrati0e
legislation, not mere implementation, by the <ureau of *nternal Re0enue.
(n -ebruary ;, 1$"9, the Republic of the 6hilippines, through the +olicitor General, 5led this petition for
re0iew of the decision dated No0ember !#, 1$"; of the *ntermediate Appellate 'ourt aErming the
dismissal, by the 'ourt of -irst *nstance of )anila, of the Go0ernment8s complaint against the respondent
spouses.
/he petition is de0oid of merit.
,0en assuming that the de5ciency tax assessment of 61%,11%.=" against the 6astor spouses were correct,
since the latter ha0e already paid almost the e?ui0alent amount to the Go0ernment by way of amnesty
taxes under 6.1. No. !1#, and were granted not merely an exemption, but an amnesty, for their past tax
failings, the Go0ernment is estopped from collecting the diGerence between the de5ciency tax assessment
and the amount already paid by them as amnesty tax.
A tax amnesty, being a general pardon or intentional o0erloo:ing by the +tate of its
authority to impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty of e0asion or 0iolation of a
re0enue or tax law, parta:es of an absolute forgi0eness or wai0er by the Go0ernment of its
right to collect what otherwise would be due it, and in this sense, preDudicial thereto,
particularly to gi0e tax e0aders, who wish to relent and are willing to reform a chance to do
so and thereby become a part of the new society with a clean slate 2'ommission of *nternal
Re0enue 0s. <otelho 'orp. and +hipping 'o., *nc., != +'RA ;"%7.
/he 5nding of the appellate court that the de5ciency income taxes were paid by the 6astors, and accepted
by the Go0ernment, under 6.1. !1#, granting amnesty to persons who are re?uired by law to 5le income
tax returns but who failed to do so, is entitled to the highest respect and may not be disturbed except
under exceptional circumstances which ha0e already become familiar 2Rule ;&, +ec. ;, Rules of 'ourtA e.g.,
where3 217 the conclusion is a 5nding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conDectureA 2!7 the
inference made is manifestly mista:enA 2#7 there is gra0e abuse of discretionA 2;7 the Dudgment is based on
misapprehension of factsA 2&7 the 'ourt of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its 5ndings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appelleeA 297 the 5ndings of fact of the 'ourt of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial courtA 2%7 said 5ndings of fact are conclusions without citation of
speci5c e0idence in which they are basedA 2"7 the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner8s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondentsA and 2$7 when the 5nding of fact of the 'ourt of
Appeals is premised on the absence of e0idence and is contradicted by the e0idence on record 2/helma
-ernan 0s. 'A, et al., 1"1 +'RA &;9, citing /olentino 0s. de Fesus, &9 +'RA 9%A 6eople 0s. /raya, 1;% +'RA
#"17, none of which is present in this case. /he rule is that in case of doubt, tax statutes are to be
construed strictly against the Go0ernment and liberally in fa0or of the taxpayer, for taxes, being burdens,
are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute 2in this case 6.1. !1#7 expressly and clearly
declares 2'ommission of *nternal Re0enue 0s. La /ondena, *nc. and '/A, & +'RA 99&, citing )anila Railroad
'ompany 0s. 'ollector of 'ustoms, &! 6hil, $&=7.
WH,R,-(R,, the petition for re0iew is denied. No costs.
1". /ax exemption strictly construed against the taxpayer.
G.R. No. L1%""" (ctober !$, 1$9"
R,+*N+, *N'(R6(RA/,1, .etitioner, 0s. A.1*/(R G,N,RAL (- /H, 6H*L*66*N,+ and /H, ',N/RAL <ANP
(- /H, 6H*L*66*N,+, Respondents.
-,RNAN1(, :.:
6etitioner here, as did petitioner in Casco .hilippine Chemical Co., )nc. +. Limene5,
1
would see: a refund
!

from respondent 'entral <an: on the claim that it was exempt from the margin fee under Republic Act No.
!9=$ for the importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, used for the production of synthetic
glue of which it was a manufacturer. +ince the speci5c language of the Act spea: of >urea formaldehyde,>
#

and petitioner admittedly did import urea and formaldehyde separately, its plea could be granted only if
we could construe the abo0e pro0ision of law to read >urea and formaldehyde.> *n the abo0e Casco
decision, we could not see our way clear to doing so. We still cannot see it that way. Hence, this petition
must fail.
(ur inability to indulge petitioner in the aforecited Casco petition was made clear by the present 'hief
Fustice. /hus3 >Hence, 8urea formaldehyde8 is clearly a 5nished product, which is patently distinct and
diGerent from 8urea8 and 8formaldehyde8, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic
resins :nown as 8urea formaldehyde8. 6etitioner contends, howe0er, that the bill appro0ed in 'ongress
contained the copulati0e conDunction 8and8 between the terms 8urea8 and 8formaldehyde8, and that the
members of 'ongress intended to exempt 8urea8 and 8formaldehyde8 separately as essential elements in
the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called 8urea. fomaldehyde8 not the latter as a 5nished product,
citing in support of this 0iew the statements made on the Moor of the +enate, during the consideration of
the bill before said House, by members thereof. <ut, said indi0idual statements do not necessarily reMect
the 0iew of the +enate. )uch less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representati0es ...
-urthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term 8urea formaldehyde8 instead of
8urea and formaldehyde8 is conclusi0e upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
'ongress and appro0ed by the 6resident ... *f there has been any mista:e in the printing of the bill before it
was certi5ed by the oEcers of 'ongress and appro0ed by the ,xecuti0e on which we cannot speculate,
without DeopardiJing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curati0e legislation, not by Dudicial decree.>
/o which we can only add that deference to the scope and implication of the function entrusted by the
'onstitution to the Dudiciary lea0es us no other alternati0e. -or nothing is better settled than that the 5rst
and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law as they 5nd it, not as they would li:e it to be. -idelity to
such a tas: precludes construction or interpretation, unless application is impossible or inade?uate without
it.
;
+uch is not the case in the situation presented here. +o we ha0e held in Casco .hilippine Chemical Co.,
)nc. +. Limene5. We do so again.
/hen, again, there is merit in the contention of the +olicitor General, as counsel for respondent 'entral
<an:, and the Auditor General, that as a refund undoubtedly parta:es of a nature of an exemption, it
cannot be allowed unless granted in the most explicit and categorical language. As was held by us in
Commissioner of )nternal Re+enue +s. Luerrero3
&
>-rom 1$=9, in Catholic Church +s. Fastings to 1$99, in
@sso ,tandard @astern, )nc. +s. cting Commissioner of Customs, it has been the constant and uniform
holding that exemption from taxation is not fa0ored and is ne0er presumed, so that if granted it must be
strictly construed against the taxpayer. AErmati0ely put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation,
hence, an exempting pro0ision should be construed strictissimi -uris.> 'ertainly, whate0er may be said of
the statutory language found in Republic Act !9=$, it would be going too far to assert that there was such
a clear and manifest intention of legislati0e will as to compel such a refund.
(ne last matter. 6etitioner would assail as de0oid of support in law the action ta:en by the respondent
Auditor General in an indorsement to the respondent 'entral <an:
9
causing it to o0errule its pre0ious
resolution and to adopt the 0iew in such indorsement to the eGect that the importation of urea and of
formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the pur0iew of the statutory language that granted
such exemption. *t does not admit of doubt that the respondent Auditor General8s interpretation amounts
to a literal adherence to the statute as enacted. As such, it cannot be said to be contrary to law. As a
matter of fact, it is any other 0iew, as is e0ident from the abo0e, that is susceptible to wellfounded
criticism, as lac:ing legal basis. .nder the circumstances, the respondent Auditor General was merely
complying with his duty in thus calling the attention of respondent 'entral <an:.
/he limit of his constitutional function was clearly set forth in Lue+ara +. Limene5,
%
the opinion being
rendered by the present 'hief Fustice. /hus3 >.nder our 'onstitution, the authority of the Auditor General,
in connection with expenditures of the Go0ernment is limited to the auditing of expenditures of funds or
property pertaining to, or held in trust by, the Go0ernment or the pro0inces or municipalities thereof
2Article C*, section !, of the 'onstitution7. +uch function is limited to a determination of whether there is a
law appropriating funds for a gi0en purposeA whether a contract, made by the property oEcer, has been
entered into in comformity with said appropriation lawA whether the goods or ser0ices co0ered by said
contract ha0e been deli0ered or rendered in pursuance of the pro0isions thereof, as attested to by the
proper oEcerA and whether payment therefor has been authoriJed by the oEcials of the corresponding
department or bureau. *f these re?uirements ha0e been ful5lled, it is the ministerial duty of the Auditor
General to appro0e and pass in audit the 0oucher and treasury warrant for said payment. He has no
discretion or authority to disappro0e said payment upon the ground that the aforementioned contract was
unwise or that the amount stipulated therein is unreasonable. *f he entertains such belief, he may do no
more than discharge the duty imposed upon him by the 'onstitution 2Article C*, section !7, 8to bring to the
attention of the proper administrati0e oEcer expenditures of funds or property which, in his opinion, are
irregular, unnecessary, excessi0e or extra0agant.8 /his duty implies a negation of the power to refuse and
disappro0e payment of such expenditures, for its disappro0al, if he had authority therefor, would bring to
the attention of the aforementioned administrati0e oEcer the reasons for the ad0erse action thus ta:en by
the General Auditing oEce, and, hence, render the imposition of said duty unnecessary.>
*n the same way that the Auditor General, by 0irtue of the abo0e function, which is intended to implement
the constitutional mandate that no money can be paid out of the treasury except in the pursuance of
appropriation made by law,
"
must carefully see to it that there is in fact such statutory enactment, no
refund, which li:ewise represents a diminution of public funds in the treasury, should be allowed unless the
law clearly so pro0ides. /he Auditor General would be sadly remiss in the discharge of his responsibility
under the 'onstitution if, ha0ing the statute before him, he allows such a refund when, under the terms
thereof, it cannot be done. His actuation here cannot be stigmatiJed as 0iolati0e of any legal preceptA as a
matter of fact, it is precisely in accordance with the constitutional mandate.
WH,R,-(R,, this petition is denied, with costs against petitioner.
1$. 'ontracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in fa0or of the insured and strictly against the
insurer.
G.R. No. 1==$%= +eptember !, 1$$!
-*N)AN G,N,RAL A++.RAN', '(R6(RA/*(N, petitioner,
0s.
/H, H(N(RA<L, '(.R/ (- A66,AL+ and F.L*A +.R6(+A, respondents.
=uino and ssociates for petitioner.
.ublic ttorneyIs 7Hce for pri+ate respondent.

N('(N, :.:
/his is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and preliminary
mandatory inDunction to annul and set aside the decision of the 'ourt of Appeals dated Fuly 11, 1$$1,
1

aErming the decision dated )arch !=, 1$$= of the *nsurance 'ommission
!
in ordering petitioner -inman
General Assurance 'orporation to pay pri0ate respondent Fulia +urposa the proceeds of the personal
accident *nsurance policy with interest.
*t appears on record that on (ctober !!, 1$"9, deceased, 'arlie +urposa was insured with petitioner
-inman General Assurance 'orporation under -inman General /eachers 6rotection 6lan )aster 6olicy No.
!==& and *ndi0idual 6olicy No. ="$!; with his parents, spouses Fulia and 'arlos +urposa, and brothers
'hristopher, 'harles, 'hester and 'lifton, all surnamed, +urposa, as bene5ciaries.
#
While said insurance policy was in full force and eGect, the insured, 'arlie +urposa, died on (ctober 1",
1$"" as a result of a stab wound inMicted by one of the three 2#7 unidenti5ed men without pro0ocation and
warning on the part of the former as he and his cousin, Winston +urposa, were waiting for a ride on their
way home along RiJalLocsin +treets, <acolod 'ity after attending the celebration of the >)as:arra Annual
-esti0al.>
/hereafter, pri0ate respondent and the other bene5ciaries of said insurance policy 5led a written notice of
claim with the petitioner insurance company which denied said claim contending that murder and assault
are not within the scope of the co0erage of the insurance policy.
(n -ebruary !;, 1$"$, pri0ate respondent 5led a complaint with the *nsurance 'ommission which
subse?uently rendered a decision, the pertinent portion of which reads3
*n the light of the foregoing. we 5nd respondent liable to pay complainant the sum of
61&,===.== representing the proceeds of the policy with interest. As no e0idence was
submitted to pro0e the claim for mortuary aid in the sum of 61,===.==, the same cannot be
entertained.
WH,R,-(R,, Dudgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent to pay complainant the sum
of 61&,===.== with legal interest from the date of the 5ling of the complaint until fully
satis5ed. With costs.
;
(n Fuly 11, 1$$1, the appellate court aErmed said decision.
Hence, petitioner 5led this petition alleging gro0e abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court in
applying the principle of >expresso unius exclusio alterius> in a personal accident insurance policy since
death resulting from murder andNor assault are impliedly excluded in said insurance policy considering that
the cause of death of the insured was not accidental but rather a deliberate and intentional act of the
assailant in :illing the former as indicated by the location of the lone stab wound on the insured. /herefore,
said death was committed with deliberate intent which, by the 0ery nature of a personal accident
insurance policy, cannot be indemni5ed.
We do not agree.
/he terms >accident> and >accidental> as used in insurance contracts ha0e not ac?uired any
technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common
acceptation. /hus, the terms ha0e been ta:en to mean that which happen by chance or
fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and
unforeseen. An accident is an e0ent that ta:es place without one8s foresight or expectation
L an e0ent that proceeds from an un:nown cause, or is an unusual eGect of a :nown cause
and, therefore, not expected.
. . . /he generally accepted rule is that, death or inDury does not result from accident or
accidental means within the terms of an accidentpolicy if it is the natural result of the
insured8s 0oluntary act, unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the death or inDury.
/here is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional, unexpected,
independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of
inDury or death. *n other words, where the death or inDury is not the natural or probable result
of the insured8s 0oluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act
which produces the inDury, the resulting death is within the protection of the policies insuring
against death or inDury from accident.
&
As correctly pointed out by the respondent appellate court in its decision3
*n the case at bar, it cannot be pretended that 'arlie +urposa died in the course of an
assault or murder as a result of his 0oluntary act considering the 0ery nature of these
crimes. *n the 5rst place, the insured and his companion were on their way home from
attending a festi0al. /hey were confronted by unidenti5ed persons. /he record is barren of
any circumstance showing how the stab wound was inMicted. Nor can it be pretended that
the malefactor aimed at the insured precisely because the :iller wanted to ta:e his life. *n
any e0ent, while the act may not exempt the un:nown perpetrator from criminal liability, the
fact remains that the happening was a pure accident on the part of the 0ictim. /he insured
died from an e0ent that too: place without his foresight or expectation, an e0ent that
proceeded from an unusual eGect of a :nown cause and, therefore, not expected. Neither
can it be said that where was a capricious desire on the part of the accused to expose his life
to danger considering that he was Dust going home after attending a festi0al.
9
-urthermore, the personal accident insurance policy in0ol0ed herein speci5cally enumerated only ten 21=7
circumstances wherein no liability attaches to petitioner insurance company for any inDury, disability or
loss suGered by the insured as a result of any of the stimulated causes. /he principle of > expresso unius
exclusio alterius> L the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing L is therefore
applicable in the instant case since murder and assault, not ha0ing been expressly included in the
enumeration of the circumstances that would negate liability in said insurance policy cannot be considered
by implication to discharge the petitioner insurance company from liability for, any inDury, disability or loss
suGered by the insured. /hus, the failure of the petitioner insurance company to include death resulting
from murder or assault among the prohibited ris:s leads ine0itably to the conclusion that it did not intend
to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.
Article 1#%% of the 'i0il 'ode of the 6hilippines pro0ides that3
/he interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not fa0or the party who
caused the obscurity.
)oreo0er,
it is well settled that contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in fa0or of the
insured and strictly against the insurer. /hus ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract
should be interpreted in fa0or of its bene5ciary.
%
WH,R,-(R,, 5nding no irre0ersible error in the decision of the respondent 'ourt of Appeals, the petition
for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary inDunction is hereby 1,N*,1 for lac: of merit.
+( (R1,R,1.
!=. Labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in fa0or of the applicant.
G.R. No. "9=!= August &, 1$$;
RA)(N '(R6(RAL, petitioner,
0s.
,)6L(I,,+8 '()6,N+A/*(N '())*++*(N and G(4,RN),N/ +,R4*', *N+.RAN', +I+/,), respondents.
.ublic ttorneyIs 7Hce for petitioner.

T.*A+(N, :.:
/his is a petition for certiorari ?uestioning the decision of the ,mployees8 'ompensation 'ommission which
denied petitioner8s claim for death bene5ts under 6residential 1ecree No. 9!9, as amended.
*
Norma 6eralta 'orporal was employed as a public school teacher with assignment in Fuban, +orsogon. (n
No0ember !" to No0ember #=, 1$%%, she was con5ned at the ,ste0es )emorial Hospital for acute
coronary insuEciency and premature 0entricular contractions.
(n Fune #=, 1$"#, she was assigned to the <anadero ,lementary +chool in 1araga, Albay. Norma had to
wal: three :ilometers to and from said school as no transportation was a0ailable to ferry her and other
teachers from the national highway to the school. 1uring her fourth pregnancy, Norma suGered a complete
abortion and was hospitaliJed for two days at the Albay 6ro0incial Hospital. After her maternity lea0e,
Norma reported bac: to wor:.
*n )arch of 1$";, she again concei0ed. Howe0er, in +eptember of the same year, she was transferred to
the Pilicao ,lementary +chool, where she had to wal: more than one :ilometer of rough road. (n
1ecember !, 1$";, she ga0e birth to a baby boy with the help of a >hilot.> An hour later, she was rushed to
the *mmaculate 'onception Hospital due to profuse 0aginal bleeding. +he underwent a hysterectomy but
unfortunately, she died on the same day due to >shoc:, se0ere hemorrhage> resulting from a >prolapse2d7
uterus post partum.> Norma was ;= years old when she died.
Her husband, Ramon 'orporal, petitioner herein, 5led a claim for compensation bene5t with the
Go0ernment +er0ice *nsurance +ystem 2G+*+7. /he G+*+ denied petitioner8s claim thus3
6lease be ad0ised that on the basis of the proofs and e0idences 2sic7 submitted to the
+ystem, the cause of death of your wife, +hoc: secondary to +e0ere Hemorrhage, .terine
6R(LA6+, is not considered an occupational disease as contemplated under the abo0e
mentioned law 26.1. No. 9!97. Neither was there any showing that her position as /eacher,
),'+, Albay had increased the ris: of contracting her ailment 2Rollo, p. !#7.
6etitioner 5led se0eral motions for the reconsideration of the denial of his claim to no a0ail, because a re
e0aluation of the claim by the )edical ,0aluation and .nderwriting Group of the G+*+ showed that there
was >no basis to alter its pre0ious action of denial for the same reason . . . that her cause of death is non
wor:connected as contemplated under the law> and neither did her Dob as a teacher increase the ris: of
contracting her ailment 2Rollo, p. !&7.
6etitioner appealed to the ,mployees8 'ompensation 'ommission 2,''7. /he ,'' re?uested the G+*+ to
ree0aluate petitioner8s claim and to 5nally determine compensability, with instruction that in case the
claim is denied once more by the +ystem, the entire record of the case be ele0ated to the ,''. /he G+*+
reiterated its denial of petitioner8s claim.
(n +eptember %, 1$"", the ,'' rendered a decision also denying petitioner8s claim. *t said3
)edical studies show that 6rolapsed .terus may occur in infants and nulliparous women as
well as multiparas. 1efects in inner0ation and in the basic integrity of the supporting
structures account2s7 for prolapse2d7 in the 5rst two and childbirth trauma for the latter. /he
cer0ix usually elongates because the weight of the nagging 0aginal tissues pulls it
downward, whereas the attached but wea: cardinal ligaments tend2s7 to support it. *n third
degree or complete prolapse2d7 both the cer0ix and the body of the uterus ha0e passed
through the introitus and the entire 0aginal canal is in0erted. 2(bstetrics and Gynecology,
Wilson, <eecham, 'arrington, #rd ,dition, p. &"&7.
(n the other hand Acute 'oronary *nsuEciency are terms often used to describe a syndrome
characteriJed by prolonged substernal pain, usually not relie0ed by 0asodilators of a short
period of rest due to a more se0ere inade?uacy of coronary circulation. /he symptoms in this
condition are more intense and prolonged than in angina pectoris, but abnormal ,'G and
other laboratory 5ndings associated with myocardial infarction are absent. /he syndrome is
co0ered by a temporary inability of one8s coronary arteries to supply suEcient oxygenated
blood to the heart muscle. 2)erc:, )anual of 1iagnosis @ /herapy, pp. 1==1=17.
<ased on the abo0e medical discussion of the subDect ailments, we belie0e that the
de0elopment of the fatal illness has no relation whatsoe0er with the duties and wor:ing
conditions of the late teacher. /here is no showing that the nature of her duties caused the
de0elopment of prolapse of the uterus. /he ailment was a complication of childbirth causing
profuse 0aginal bleeding during the late stage. We also consider Acute 'oronary
*nsuEciency as nonwor:connected illness for the reason that it is caused by temporary
inability of one coronary arteries 2sic7 to supply oxygenated blood to the heart muscle. /here
is no damage to heart muscle. *n 0iew thereof, we ha0e no recourse but to sustain
respondent8s denial of the instant claim 2Rollo, pp. !$#17.
Hence, petitioner 5led the instant petition, asserting compensability of the death of his wife.
**
6etitioner contends that although prolapsed uterus is not one of occupational diseases listed by the ,'',
his claim should proper under the increased ris: theory. He anchors such claim on the fact that as early as
Fanuary 1$"; or before Norma8s 5fth pregnancy, he had noticed a spherical tissue which appeared li:e a
tomato protruding out of Norma8s 0agina and rectum. He a0ers that such condition was attributable to
Norma8s long wal:s to and from her place of teaching L <anadero ,lementary +chool, which is situated on
the side of the )ayon 4olcano. )oreo0er, the roads leading to the school are full of ruts and roc:s, and,
during the rainy season, are Mooded and slippery. 6etitioner asserts that inspite of these, Norma continued
to discharge her duties as a public ser0ant, notwithstanding her pregnancy and her prolapsed uterus.
6etitioner also contends that the 5ndings of the respondents contra0ene the constitutional pro0ision on
social Dustice. He alleges that since the wor:men8s compensation law is a social legislation, its pro0isions
should be interpreted liberally in fa0or of the employees whose rights it intends to protect.
.nder 6.1. No. 9!9, as amended, for sic:ness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable,
the claimant must show either3 2a7 that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the
Amended Rules on ,mployees8 'ompensation with the conditions set therein satis5edA or 2b7 that the ris:
of contracting the disease is increased by the wor:ing conditions 2+antos 0. ,mployees8 'ompensation
'ommission, !!1 +'RA 1"! R1$$#SA TuiJon 0. ,mployees8 'ompensation 'ommission, !=# +'RA ;!9
R1$$1S7. 'learly, then, the principle of aggra0ation and presumption of compensability under the old
Wor:men8s 'ompensation Act no longer applies 2Latagan 0. ,mployees8 'ompensation 'ommission, !1#
+'RA %1& R1$$!S7.
+ince petitioner admits that his wife died of an ailment which is not listed as compensable by the ,'' and
he merely anchors his claim on the second rule, he must positi0ely show that the ris: of contracting
Norma8s illness was increased by her wor:ing conditions. 6etitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge the
onus imposed by law.
/he fact that Norma had to wal: six :ilometers e0eryday and thereafter, a shorter distance of more than
one :ilometer Dust to reach her place of wor:, was not suEcient to establish that such condition caused her
to de0elop prolapse of the uterus. 6etitioner did not e0en present medical 5ndings on the 0eracity of his
claim that Norma had a tomatoli:e spherical tissue protruding from her 0agina and rectum.
Norma de0eloped prolapse of the uterus because she was multiparas, or one who had more than one child,
and ?uite beyond the safe childbearing age when she ga0e birth to her 5fth child L she was already forty
years old. No+akIs 2extbook on Lynecology describes prolapse of the uterus 2descensus uteri7 as follows3
n extremely common condition, being far more fre=uent in elderly than in young patients.
/his is explained by the increasing laxity and atony of the muscular and fascial structures in
later life. /he eGects of childbirth inDuries may thus ma:e themsel0es e0ident, in the form of
uterine prolapse, many years after the last pregnancy. 6regnancies in a prolapsed uterus
may lead to numerous complications, as noted by 6i0er and +peJia.
2he important factor in the mechanism of the prolapse is undoubtedly in-ury or
o+erstretching of the pel+ic Moor, and especially of the cardinal ligaments 38ackenrodt4 in
the bases of the broad ligaments. 'ombined with this there is usually extensi0e inDury to the
perineal structures, producing mar:ed 0aginal relaxation and also fre?uent inDury to the
fascia or the anterior or posterior 0aginal walls, with the production of cystocele or rectocele.
.sually, 0arious combinations of these conditions are seen, although at times little or no
cystocele or rectocele is associated with the prolapse. 7ccasional cases are seen for that
matter, in 0omen 0ho ha+e ne+er borne children, and in these the prolapse apparently
represents a hernia of the uterus through a defect in the pel+ic fascial Moor 2,mphasis
supplied7.
/he 1'#! Current 8edical ?iagnosis N 2reatment also describes the condition as follows3
.terine prolapse most commonly occurs as a delayed result of childbirth inDury to the pel0ic
Moor 2particularly the trans0erse cer0ical and uterosacral ligaments7. .nrepaired obstetric
lacerations of the le0ator musculature and perineal body augment the wea:ness.
Attenuation of the pel0ic structures with aging and congenital wea:ness can accelerate the
de0elopment of prolapse.
/he determination of whether the prolapse of Norma8s uterus de0eloped before or after her 5fth pregnancy
is therefore immaterial since this illness is the result of the physiological structure and changes in the body
on pregnancy and childbirth.
With the e0idence presented in support of the claim, petitioner8s prayer cannot be granted. While as a rule
labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in fa0or of the applicant, 2/ria 0.
,mployees8 'ompensation 'ommission, !=" +'RA "#; R1$$!S7, there is also the rule that such liberal
construction and interpretation of labor laws may not be applied where the pertinent pro0isions of the
Labor 'ode and 6.1. No. 9!9, as amended, are clear and lea0e no room for interpretation.
/he 'ourt commiserates with the petitioner and his children for the loss of a lo0ed one. We also recogniJe
the importance of the ser0ices rendered by public elementary school teachers inspite of their meager
salaries which are not proportionate to their immense responsibility in molding the 0alues and character of
the youth in this country 21e 4era 0. ,mployees8 'ompensation 'ommission, 1## +'RA 9"& R1$";S7.
<ut under the legal milieu of the case, we can only suggest, not mandate, that respondents grant ex gratia
some form of relief to their members similarly situated as petitioner8s wife.
WH,R,-(R,, the petition is 1,N*,1.
+( (R1,R,1.
!1. 1oubts in interpretation of Wor:menUs 'ompensation and Labor 'ode should be resol0ed in fa0or of the
wor:er.
G.R. No. L;;"$$ April !!, 1$"1
)AR*A ,. )ANAHAN, petitioner,
0s.
,)6L(I,,+8 '()6,N+A/*(N '())*++*(N and G+*+ 2LA+ 6*VA+ ).N*'*6AL H*GH +'H((L7, respondents.

-,RNAN1,K, :.:
/his is a petition to re0iew the decision of the ,mployees8 'ompensation 'ommission in ,'' 'ase No.
==%= 2NaJario )anahan, Fr., deceased7, entitled O8aria 8anahan, ppellant, +ersus Lo+ernment ,er+ice
)nsurance ,ystem, 3/as .iPas 8unicipal Figh ,chool4, RespondentO aErming the decision of the
Go0ernment +er0ice *nsurance +ystem which denied the claim for death bene5t.
1
/he claimant, petitioner herein, )aria ,. )anahan, is the widow of NaJario )anahan, Fr., who died of
>,nteric -e0er> while employed as classroom teacher in Las 6iWas )unicipal High +chool, Las 6iWas RiJal,
on )ay ", 1$%&.
/he petitioner 5led a claim with the Go0ernment +er0ice *nsurance for death bene5t under 6residential
1ecree 9!9. *n a letter dated Fune 1$, 1$%&, the Go0ernment +er0ice *nsurance denied the claim on a
5nding that the ailment of NaJario )anahan, Fr., typhoid fe0er, is not an occupational disease.
/he petitioner 5led a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the deceased, NaJario )anahan, Fr.,
was in perfect health when admitted to the ser0ice and that the ailment of said deceased was attributable
to his employment.
/he Go0ernment +er0ice *nsurance +ystem aErmed the denial of the claim on the ground that enteric
fe0er or paratyphoid is similar in eGect to typhoid fe0er, in the sense that both are produced by +almonella
organisms.
/he petitioner appealed to the ,mployees8 'ompensation 'ommission which aErmed the decision of the
Go0ernment +er0ice *nsurance +ystem on a 5nding that the ailment of the deceased, enteric fe0er, was
not induced by or aggra0ated by the nature of the duties of NaJario )anahan, Fr. as a teacher.
!
/o support her theory that the disease of NaJario )anahan, Fr., enteric fe0er, resulted from his employment
as classroom teacher of the Las 6iWas )unicipal High +chool, the petitioner cites the following authority3
@.)?@87/7LB N? .2F7/7LB
76 @N2@R)C 6@A@R
/H, +(.R', (- *N-,'/*(N is feces or urine from patients and carriers. -amily contacts may
be transient carriers and ! to &O of patients become chronic carriers. *n poorly sanitiJed
communities, water is the most fre?uent 0ehicle of transmissionA food, especially mil:, is the
next most important. *n modern urban areas, food, contaminated by healthy carriers who
are food handlers, is the principal 0ehicle. -lies may spread the organism from feces to food.
1irect contact infection is infre?uent.
/he organism enters the body through the gastrointestinal tract, in0ading the blood stream
by way of the lymphatic channels. /here is hyperplasia and often ulceration of 6yeris
patches, especially in the ileum and cecum. When the ulcers heals, no scar results. /he
:idneys and li0er usually show cloudly swelling and the latter may re0eal a patchy necrosis
/he spleen is enlarged and soft. Rarely, the lungs show pneumonic changes. 2)erc: )anual
1=th ,dit., 6. ";!7
#

/he factual 5ndings of the respondent 'ommission indicate that the deceased was in perfect health when
he entered go0ernment ser0ice on Fuly !=, 1$9$, and that in the course of his employment in 1$%;, he was
treated for epigastric pain. He succumbed to enteric fe0er on )ay ", 1$%&.
,nteric fe0er is referred to in medical boo:s as typhoid fe0er 21orlands *llustrated )edical 1ictionary, !;th
,d., p. &;"7 or paratyphoid fe0er 2Harrison8s 6rinciples of *nternal )edicine, 9th ,d., p. "1%7. *ts symptoms
include abdominal pain 2id., p. "1=7. *n discussing the clinical manifestations of the disease, )r. Harrison
states that reco0ery 2from enteric or paratyphoid fe0er7 may be followed by continued excretion of the
causati0e organism in the stools for se0eral months 2id., p. "1%7. /his lingering nature of the species
producing enteric fe0er points out the possibility that the illness which aXicted the deceased in 1$%; was
the same as, or at least, related to, his 1$%& illness.
/he medical record of the deceased shows that he had a history of ulcerli:e symptoms 2p. #, ,'' rec.7.
/his butresses the claimant8s claim that her husband had been suGer from ulcer se+eral months before his
death on )ay ", 1$%&. /his is li:ewise sustained by the medical certi5cate 2p. 1!, ,'' rec.7 issued by 1r.
A?uilles <ernabe to the eGect that >NaJario )anahan was treated for epigastric pain probably due to
hyperacidity on 1ecember 1=, 1$%;.> ,pigastric pain is a symptom of ulcer, and ulcer is a common
complication of typhoid fe0er. /here is e0en such a thing as >typhoidal ulcer> 2p. "1!, supra7.
<ecause of these circumstances, the illness that claimed the life of the deceased could ha0e had its onset
months before 1ecember 1=, 1$%;. +uch being the case, his cause of action accrued before 1ecember 1=,
1$%;.
*n the case of Corales +s. @C) 2L;;=9#, -eb. !%, 1$%$7, We ruled that3
... Article !$;, /itle *** 2/ransitory and -inal 6ro0isions7 of the New Labor 'ode pro0ides that
all actions and claims accruing prior to the eGecti0ity of this 'ode shall be determined in
accordance with the laws in force at the time of their accrual and under the third paragraph
of Article !$!, /itle 11 6rescription of (Genses and 'laims, wor:men8s compensation claims
accruing prior to the eGecti0ity of this 'ode and during the period from No0ember 1, 1$%;
up to 1ecember #1, 1$%; shall be processed and adDudicated in accordance with the laws
and rules at the time their causes of action accrued. Hence, this 'ourt applied the pro0isions
of the Wor:men8s 'ompensation Act, as amended, on passing upon petitioner8s claim.
6ursuant to such doctrine and applying now the pro0isions of the Wor:men8s 'ompensation Act in this
case, the presumption of compensability subsists in fa0or of the claimant.
*n any case, We ha0e always maintained that in case of doubt, the same should be resol0ed in fa0or of the
wor:er, and that social legislations Y li:e the Wor:men8s 'ompensation Act and the Labor 'ode Y should be
liberally construed to attain their laudable obDecti0e, i.e., to gi0e relief to the wor:man andNor his
dependents in the e0ent that the former should die or sustain an inDury.
)oreo0er, the constitutional guarantee of social Dustice and protection to labor ma:e .s ta:e a second loo:
at the e0idence presented by the claimant.
As a teacher of the Las 6iWas )unicipal High +chool at Las 6iWas RiJal, the deceased used to eat his meals
at the school canteen. He also used the toilet and other facilities of the school. +aid the respondent
'ommission,> ... it is not improbable that the deceased might ha0e contracted the illness during those rare
moments that he was away from his family, since it is medically accepted that enteric fe0er is caused by
salmonella organisms which are ac?uired by ingestion of contaminated food or drin:s. 'ontamination of
food or water may come from the excretion of animals such as rodents Mies, or human beings who are sic:
or who are carriers, or infection in meat of animals as food. )eat, mil: and eggs are the foods most
fre?uently in0ol0ed in the transmission of this type of species, since the organism may multiply e0en
before ingestion. ...> /hese 5ndings of the respondent 'ommission lead to the conclusion that the ris: of
contracting the fatal illness was increased by the decedent8s wor:ing condition.
*n 0iew of the foregoing, the petition for re0iew is meritorious.
WH,R,-(R,, the decision of the ,mployees8 'ompensation 'ommission sought to be re0iewed is hereby
set aside the Go0ernment +er0ice *nsurance +ystem is ordered3
1. /o pay the petitioner the amount of +*C /H(.+AN1 6,+(+ 269,===.==7 as death compensation bene5tA
!. /o pay the petitioner the amount of +*C H.N1R,1 6,+(+ 269==.==7 as attorney8s feesA
#. /o reimburse the petitioner expenses incurred for medical ser0ices, hospitaliJation and medicines of the
deceased NaJario )anahan, Fr., duly supported by proper receiptsA and
;. /o pay administrati0e fees.
+( (R1,R,1.
!!. Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in fa0or of the retiree because the intention is to pro0ide for
the retireeUs sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning his li0elihood.
G.R. No. $9;!! -ebruary !", 1$$;
-RAN'*+'( +. /AN/.*'(, FR., petitioner,
0s.
H(N. ,.-,)*( 1()*NG(, in his capacity as 'hairman of the 'ommission on Audit, ,+/,L*/( +AL4A1(R,
)ARGAR*/( +*L(/, 4AL,N/*NA ,.+/AT.*(, AN*'*A 'H*'( and G,R)*N*A 6A+'(, respondents.
;enny F. 2antuico for petitioner.
2he ,olicitor Leneral for respondents.

T.*A+(N, :.:
/his is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for temporary restraining order or
preliminary inDunction, under Rule 9& of the Re0ised Rules of 'ourt.
/he petition mainly ?uestions the withholding of onehalf of petitioner8s retirement bene5ts.
*
(n Fanuary !9, 1$"=, petitioner was appointed 'hairman of the 'ommission on Audit 2'(A7 to ser0e a
term of se0en years expiring on Fanuary !9, 1$"%. 6etitioner had discharged the functions of 'hairman of
the '(A in an acting capacity since 1$%&.
(n 1ecember #1, 1$"&, petitioner applied for clearance from all money, property and other
accountabilities in preparation for his retirement. He obtained the clearance applied for, which co0ered the
period from 1$%9 to 1ecember #1, 1$"&. /he clearance had all the re?uired signatures and bore a
certi5cation that petitioner was >cleared from money, property andNor other accountabilities by this
'ommission> 2Rollo, p. ;;7.
After the ,1+A Re0olution, petitioner submitted his courtesy resignation to 6resident 'oraJon '. A?uino.
He relin?uished his oEce to the newly appointed 'hairman, now ,xecuti0e +ecretary /eo5sto Guingona, Fr.
on )arch 1=, 1$"9. /hat same day, he applied for retirement eGecti0e immediately.
6etitioner sought a second clearance to co0er the period from Fanuary 1, 1$"9 to )arch $, 1$"9. All the
signatures necessary to complete the second clearance, except that of 'hairman Guingona, were obtained.
/he second clearance embodies a certi5cate that petitioner was >cleared from money, property andNor
accountability by this 'ommission> 2Rollo, p. ;$7. 'hairman Guingona, howe0er, failed to ta:e any action
thereon.
'hairman Guingona was replaced by respondent 'hairman. A year later, respondent 'hairman issued '(A
(Ece (rder No. "%1=1"! 2Rollo, p. &=7, which created a committee to in0entory all e?uipment ac?uired
during the tenure of his two predecessors.
(n )ay %, 1$"%, respondent 'hairman indorsed petitioner8s retirement application to the Go0ernment
+er0ice *nsurance +ystem 2G+*+7, certifying, among other matters, that petitioner was cleared of money
and property accountability 2Rollo, p. &!7. /he application was returned to the '(A pursuant to R.A. No.
1&9", which 0ests in the '(A the 5nal appro0al thereof.
(n +eptember !&, 1$"%, the in0entory committee 5nally submitted its report, recommending petitioner8s
clearance from property accountability inasmuch as there was no showing that he personally gained from
the missing property or was primarily liable for the loss thereof 2Rollo, pp. &#&"7.
Not satis5ed with the report, respondent 'hairman issued a )emorandum directing the in0entory
committee to explain why no action should be 5led against its members for failure to complete a physical
in0entory and 0eri5cation of all e?uipmentA for exceeding their authority in recommending clearances for
petitioner and 'hairman GuingonaA and for recommending petitioner8s clearance in total disregard of
+ection 1=! of 6.1. No. 1;;& 2Go0ernment Auditing 'ode of the 6hilippines7. /he members of the
committee were subse?uently administrati0ely charged.
(n Fanuary !, 1$"", respondent 'hairman created a special audit team for the purpose of conducting a
5nancial and compliance audit of the '(A transactions and accounts during the tenure of petitioner from
1$%9 to 1$"; 2'(A (Ece (rder ""1=9%%A Rollo, pp. 999%7.
(n -ebruary !", 1$"$, the special audit team submitted its report stating3 2i7 that the audit consisted of
selecti0e re0iew of postaudit transactions in the head oEces and the +tate Accounting and Auditing
'enterA 2ii7 that the audit disclosed a number of de5ciencies which ad0ersely aGected the 5nancial
condition and operation of the '(A, such as 0iolations of executi0e orders, presidential decrees and related
rules and regulationsA and 2iii7 that there were some constraints in the audit, such as the una0ailability of
records and documents, and personnel mo0ements and turno0er. While the report did not ma:e any
recommendation, it instead mentioned se0eral oEcials and employees, including petitioner, who may be
responsible or accountable for the ?uestioned transactions 2Rollo, pp. %#, 1;%1&17.
Respondent 'hairman rendered a 1ecision dated No0ember !=, 1$"$, in the administrati0e case 5led
against the principal members of the 5rst in0entory committee. He found them guilty as charged and
issued them a reprimand. /he other members were meted a stern warning, except for one who was
exonerated for not ta:ing part in the preparation of the in0entory report.
*n a letter dated 1ecember !1, 1$"$, a copy of which was recei0ed by petitioner on 1ecember !%, 1$"$,
respondent 'hairman informed petitioner of the appro0al of his application for retirement under R.A. No.
1&9", eGecti0e as of )arch $, 1$"9 2Rollo, pp. 9"9$7. Howe0er, respondent 'hairman added3
. . . *n 0iew, howe0er, of the audit 5ndings and in0entory report ad0erted to abo0e, payment
of only onehalf 2Z7 of the money 0alue of the bene5ts due you by reason of such retirement
will be allowed, subDect to the a0ailability of funds and the usual accounting and auditing
rules. 6ayment of the balance of said retirement bene5ts shall be subDect to the 5nal results
of the audit concerning your 5scal responsibility andNor accountability as former 'hairman of
this 'ommission.
*n a letter dated Fanuary !!, 1$$=, petitioner re?uested full payment of his retirement bene5ts.
6etitioner was furnished a copy of the report of the special audit team in the letter dated 1ecember !1,
1$"$ of respondent 'hairman on Fanuary !$, 1$$=, nearly a year after its completion. Attached to a copy
of the report was a letter dated No0ember 1;, 1$"$ from respondent 'hairman, who re?uired petitioner to
submit his comment within #= days 2Rollo, p. 1&#7.
6etitioner submitted a lettercomplaint, wherein he cited certain defects in the manner the audit was
conducted. He further claimed that the reaudit was not authoriJed by law since it co0ered closed and
settled accounts.
.pon petitioner8s re?uest, he was furnished a set of documents which he needed to prepare his comment.
He was li:ewise gi0en another #=days to submit it.
A series of correspondence between petitioner and respondent 'hairman ensued. (n +eptember 1=, 1$$=,
petitioner re?uested a copy of the wor:ing papers on which the audit report was based. /his was denied by
respondent 'hairman, who claimed that under the +tate Audit )anual, access to the wor:ing paper was
restricted. 6etitioner8s reconsideration was li:ewise denied and he was gi0en a nonextendible period of
50e days to submit his comment.
*nstead of submitting his comment, petitioner sought se0eral clari5cations and speci5cation, and
re?uested for $= days within which to submit his comment, considering that the report co0ered a tenyear
period of postaudited transactions. *gnoring petitioner8s re?uest, respondent 'hairman demanded an
accounting of funds and a turn o0er of the assets of the -iscal Administration -oundation, *nc. within #=
days.
**
6etitioner then 5led the instant petition. As prayed for by petitioner, this 'ourt issued a temporary
restraining order on Fanuary 1%, 1$$1.
6etitioner argues that notwithstanding the two clearances pre0iously issued, and respondent 'hairman8s
certi5cation that petitioner had been cleared of money and property accountability, respondent 'hairman
still refuses to release the remaining half of his retirement bene5ts L a purely ministerial act.
6etitioner was already issued an initial clearance during his tenure, eGecti0e 1ecember #1, 1$"& 2Rollo, p.
;;7. All the re?uired signatures were present >is cleared from money, property andNor accountabilities by
this commission> with the following notation3
No property accountability under the 'hairman8s name as the person. -inal clearance as
'(A 'hairman subDect to the completion of ongoing reconciliation of Accounting @ 62roperty7
records and to complete turno0er of '(A property assigned to him as agency head.
xxx xxx xxx
/he responsibility of the 'hairman for the disbursement and collection accounts of this
'ommission for 'Is +ept. 8%& to Aug. 8"&, were completely postaudited, howe0er as of 1ec.
#1, 1$"&, the suspensions and disallowances in the amounts of 6#9,1$9,$9!.11 and
6!",%9!.#9 respecti0ely are still in the process of settlement 2Rollo, pp. ;;;&7.
6etitioner also applied for a second clearance to co0er the period from Fanuary 1 to )arch $, 1$"9, which
application had been signed by all the oEcials, except the 'hairman 2Rollo, p. ;$7.
Whate0er in5rmities or limitations existed in said clearances were cured after respondent 'hairman
fa0orably indorsed petitioner8s application for retirement to the Go0ernment +er0ice *nsurance +ystem and
recommended its appro0al to ta:e eGect on )arch 1=, 1$"9. *n said endorsement, respondent 'hairman
made it clear that there were no pending administrati0e and criminal cases against petitioner 2Rollo, p.
&!7.
Regardless of petitioner8s monetary liability to the go0ernment that may be disco0ered from the audit
concerning his 5scal responsibility as former '(A 'hairman, respondent 'hairman cannot withhold the
bene5ts due petitioner under the retirement laws.
*n Romana Cru5 +. Fon. 6rancisco 2antuico, 199 +'RA 9%= 21$""7, the National /reasurer withheld the
retirement bene5ts of an employee because of his 5nding that she negligently allowed the anomalous
encashment of falsi5ed treasury warrants.
*n said case, where petitioner herein was one of the respondents, we found that the employee had been
cleared by the National /reasurer from all money and property responsibility, and held that the retirement
pay accruing to a public oEcer may not be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the go0ernment.
*n 2antuico, we cited Fustice Laurel8s essay on the rationale for the benign ruling in fa0or of the retired
employees, thus3
. . . 6ension in this case is a bounty Mowing from the graciousness of the Go0ernment
intended to reward past ser0ices and, at the same time, to pro0ide the pensioner with the
means with which to support himself and his family. .nless otherwise clearly pro0ided, the
pension should inure wholly to the bene5t of the pensioner. *t is true that the withholding
and application of the amount in0ol0ed was had under +ection 9!; of the Administrati0e
'ode and not by any Dudicial process, but if the gratuity could not be attached or le0ied upon
execution in 0iew of the prohibition of +ection # of Act No. ;=&1, the appropriation thereof by
administrati0e action, if allowed, would lead to the same prohibited result and enable the
respondent to do indirectly what they can not do directly under +ection # of the Act No.
;=&1. Act No. ;=&1 is a later statute ha0ing been appro0ed on -ebruary !1, 1$##, whereas
the Administrati0e 'ode of 1$1% which embodies +ection 9!; relied upon by the
respondents was appro0ed on )arch 1= of that year. 'onsidering +ection # of Act No. ;=&1
as an exception to the general authority granted in +ection 9!; of the Administrati0e 'ode,
antagonism between the two pro0isions is a0oided 2Hunt 0. HernandeJ, 9; 6hil. %&# R1$#%S7.
.nder +ection ; of R.A. No. 1&9" 2An Act to 6ro0ide Life 6ension to the Auditor General and the 'hairman
or Any )ember of the 'ommission of ,lections7, the bene5ts granted by said law to the Auditor General
and the 'hairman and )embers of the 'ommission on ,lections shall not be subDect to garnishment, le0y
or execution. Li:ewise, under +ection ## of 6.1. No. 11;9, as amended 2/he Re0ised Go0ernment +er0ice
*nsurance Act of 1$%%7, the bene5ts granted thereunder >shall not be subDect, among others, to
attachment, garnishment, le0y or other processes.>
Wellsettled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in fa0or of the retiree because the
intention is to pro0ide for the retiree8s sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning his
li0elihood 26rofeta 0s. 1rilon, !19 +'RA %%% R1$$!S7.
6etitioner also wants us to enDoin the reaudit of his 5scal responsibility or accountability, in0o:ing the
following grounds3
1. /he reaudit in0ol0ed settled and closed accounts which under +ection &! of the Audit
'ode can no longer be reopened and re0iewedA
!. /he reaudit was initiated by respondent 'hairman alone, and not by the 'ommission as a
collegial bodyA
#. /he report of the special audit team that recommended the reaudit is faulty as the team
members themsel0es admitted se0eral constraints in conducting the reaudit, e.g.
una0ailability of the documents, fre?uent turno0er and mo0ement of personnel, etc.A
;. /he reaudit co0ered transactions done e0en after petitioner8s retirementA
&. He was not gi0en prior notice of the reauditA
9. He was not gi0en access to the wor:ing papersA and
%. Respondents were barred by res -udicata from proceeding with the reaudit 2Rollo, pp. 1$
;=7.
/he petition must fail insofar as it see:s to abort the completion of the
reaudit. While at the beginning petitioner raised obDections to the manner the audit was conducted and
the authority of respondents to reopen the same, he subse?uently cooperated with the examination of his
accounts and transactions as a '(A oEcial.
With respect to the legal obDections raised by petitioner to the partial 5ndings of the respondents with
respect to his accountability, such 5ndings are still tentati0e. As petitioner has re?uested, he is entitled to
a reasonable time within which to submit his comment thereon.
<ut in order to prepare his comment, petitioner should be gi0en access to the wor:ing papers used by the
special audit team. /he audit report co0ered a period of ten years 21$%91$"&7 and in0ol0ed numerous
transactions. *t would be unfair to expect petitioner to comment on the '(A8s 5ndings of the report without
gi0ing him a chance to 0erify how those 5ndings were arri0ed at.
*t has been se0en years since petitioner8s retirement. +ince then he was only paid half of his retirement
bene5ts, with the other half being withheld despite the issuance of two clearances and the appro0al of his
retirement application. As of the 5ling of this petition on 1ecember !1, 1$$=, no criminal or administrati0e
charge had been 5led against petitioner in connection with his position as former Acting 'hairman and
'hairman of the '(A.
WH,R,-(R,, the petition is GRAN/,1 insofar as it see:s to compel respondent 'hairman of the '(A to
pay petitioner8s retirement bene5ts in full and his monthly pensions beginning in )arch 1$$1.
/he petition is 1,N*,1 insofar as it see:s to nullify '(A (Ece (rder No. ""1=9%% and the audit report
dated -ebruary !", 1$"$ but petitioner should be gi0en full access to the wor:ing papers to enable him to
prepare his comment to any ad0erse 5ndings in said report. /he temporary restraining order is L*-/,1.
+( (R1,R,1.
!#. Laws cannot be gi0en retroacti0e eGect in the absence of a statutory pro0ision for retroacti0ity or a
clear implication of the law to that eGect.
G.R. No. L#9==% )ay !&, 1$""
-,RNAN1( GALLAR1(, petitionerappellant,
0s.
F.AN <(RR(),(, respondentappellee.
:oselito Coloma for petitioner.
>ureau of grarian /egal ssistance for respondent.

GR*V(AT.*N(, :.:
Appeal by certiorari to re0iew the decision dated (ctober !;, 1$%! of title 'ourt of Appeals in 'AR),N G.R.
No. ==1;&R aErming in toto the decision dated April !, 1$%1 of the 'ourt of Agrarian Relations, -ourth
1istrict of Guimba, Nue0a ,ciDa, dismissing the complaint which the petitioner -ernando Gallardo 5led on
1ecember %, 1$9# to terminate the leasehold of the respondent tenant so he 2plaintGf7 may culti0ate it
himself as he had retired from his go0ernment Dob as a letter carrier.
/he respondent alleged that the petitioner has no :nowledge of 5ling ng and that his only purpose is to
eDect the respondent 5ling armi from the landholding.
/he trial court in its decision dated April !1, 1$%1, dismissed the petition and ordered the petitioner to
maintain respondent in the peaceful possession of the landholding.
6etitioner appealed to the 'ourt of Appeals which on (ctober !;, 1$%!, rendered Dudgment aErming in
toto the decision of the 'ourt of Agrarian Relations. Applying +ection %, Republic Act 9#"$, it held that the
landowner8s desire to culti0ate the land himself is not a 0alid ground for dispossessing the tenant.
*n this petition for re0iew on certiorari, the only issue is whether the 'ourt of Appeals correctly ga0e
retroacti0e application t o +ection % of R.A. 9#"$.
/he applicable law when Gallardo 5led his supplementary complaint was paragraph 217 of +ection #9 of
R.A. #";; which pro0ided3
+ec. #9. .ossession of landholding @xceptions. L Notwithstanding any agreement as to the
period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enDoyment
and possession of his landholding except when his disposition has been authoriJed by the
'ourt in a Dudgment that is 5nal and executory. if after due hearing it is shown that3
217 2he agricultural9lessor9o0ner or a member of his immediate family 0ill personally
culti+ate the landholding or 0ill con+ert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential,
factory, hospital, or school site or other useful nonagricultural purposes3 6ro0ided, /hat the
agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation e?ui0alent to 50e years
rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under +ections twenty50e and thirtyfour,
except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor is not more than 50e
hectares, in which case, instead of disturbance compensation the lessee maybe entitled to
ad0ance notice of at lease one agricultural year before eDectment proceedings are 5ling Mied
against him3 6ro0ided, further, /hat should the landholder not culti0ate the land himself for
three years or fail to substantially carry out such con0ersion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant
shall ha0e the right to demLand5ling possession of the land and reco0er damages for any
loss 5ling inmmd by him because of said dispossession.
Howe0er, the abo0e pro0ision was amended on +eptember 1=, 1$%1, by Republic Act No. 9#"$ which
eliminated the landowner8s desire to personally culti0ate the landholding, as a ground for the eDectment of
the tenant.
Howe0er, consonant with Article ; of the New 'i0il 'ode which pro0ides that >laws shall ha0e no
retroacti0e eGect unless therein otherwise pro0ided,> this 'ourt ruled in the cases of Nilo +s. Court of
ppeals, 1!" +'RA &1$ and 'astro 0s. 'astro, 1!" +'RA &1$ and reiterated in 1iga 0s. Adriano, 1## +'RA
;!1, that R.A. No. 9#"$ cannot be gi0en retroacti0e eGect in the abscence of a statutory pro0ision for
retroacti0ity or a clear implication of the law to that eGect. As We stated in Nilo +s. Court of ppeals, supra3
A sound canon of statutory construction is that statute operates prospecti0ely only and
ne0er retroacti0ely, unless the legislati0e intent to threatened contrary is made manifest
either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. ... No court will hold a
statute to be retroacti0e when the legislature has not said so. ... 2-arrel 0s. 6ingree R1"""S, &
.tah, ;;#A 19 6ac., ";#A Greer 0. 'ity of Ash0ille h0ille Ash0ille R1"$;S, 11; N.'. ;$&A .nited
+tates -idelity @ Guaranty 'o. Ash0ille +trtithers Wells 'o. R1$=%S, !=$ ..+., #=97.
+ince 'ongress failed to express an intention to ma:e Republic Act No. 9#"$ retroacti0e, it may not apply
to eDectment cases then already pending adDudication by the courts.
We, therefore, hold that the 9&year old petitioner, who is a ,go0ernment retiree may terminate the
tenancy of the pri0ate respondent and till his own land as pro0ided in +ection #9 of R.A. #";;, which was
the applicable law when he 5led is petition.
WH,R,-(R,, Dudgment is hereby rendered setting aside the decision of the Agrarian 'ourt and the 'ourt
of Appeals ordering the respondentappellee to 0acate his leasehold and to surrender its possession to the
petitionerappellant. No costs. /his decision is immediately executory and no motion for extension of time
to 5le a motion for reconsideration will be entertained.
+( (R1,R,1.
!;. Laws should only be applied prospecti0ely unless the legislati0e to gi0e the retroacti0e eGect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.
G.R. No. 1=;!1& )ay ", 1$$9
,R,'/(R+, *N'., petitioner,
0s.
NA/*(NAL LA<(R R,LA/*(N+ '())*++*(N, H(N. F.L*( AN1R,+, FR. and -L(R,N'*( <.RG(+,
respondents.

6.N(, :.:p
6etitioner ,rectors, *nc. challenges the Durisdiction of respondent Labor Arbiter Fulio -. Andres, Fr. to hear
and decide the complaint
1
for underpayment of wages and nonpayment of o0ertime pay 5led by pri0ate
respondent -lorencio <urgos, an o0erseas contract wor:er.
/he facts are undisputed3
*n +eptember 1$%$, petitioner recruited pri0ate respondent to wor: as ser0ice contract dri0er in +audi
Arabia for a period of twel0e 21!7 months with a salary of .+B19&.== and an allowance of .+B19&.== per
month. /hey further agreed that pri0ate respondent shall be entitled to a bonus of .+B1,===.== if after the
1!month period, he renews or extends his employment contract without a0ailing of his 0acation or home
lea0e. /heir contract dated +eptember !=, 1$%$, was duly appro0ed by the )inistry of Labor and
,mployment.
/he aforesaid contract was not implemented. *n 1ecember, 1$%$, petitioner noti5ed pri0ate respondent
that the position of ser0ice dri0er was no longer a0ailable. (n 1ecember 1;, 1$%$, they executed another
contract which changed the position of pri0ate respondent into that of helperNlaborer with a salary of
.+B1=&.== and an allowance of .+B1=&.== per month. /he second contract was not submitted to the
)inistry of Labor and ,mployment for appro0al.
(n 1ecember 1", 1$%$, pri0ate respondent left the country and wor:ed at petitioner8s <uraidah +ports
'omplex proDect in +audi Arabia, performing the Dob of a helperNlaborer. He recei0ed a monthly salary and
allowance of .+B!1=.==, in accordance with the second contract. 6ri0ate respondent renewed his contract
of employment after one year. His salary and allowance were increased to .+B!#1.==.
6ri0ate respondent returned to the 6hilippines on August !;, 1$"1. He then in0o:ed his 5rst employment
contract. He demanded from the petitioner the diGerence between his salary and allowance as indicated in
the said contract, and the amount actually paid to him, plus the contractual bonus which should ha0e been
awarded to him for not a0ailing of his 0acation or home lea0e credits. 6etitioner denied pri0ate
respondent8s claim.
(n )arch #1, 1$"!, pri0ate respondent 5led with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against the petitioner for
underpayment of wages and nonpayment of o0ertime pay and contractual bonus.
(n )ay 1, 1$"!, while the case was still in the conciliation stage, ,xecuti0e (rder 2,.(. No. %$% creating
the 6hilippine (0erseas ,mployment Administration 26(,A7 too: eGect. +ection ;2a7 of ,.(. No. %$% 0ested
the 6(,A with >original and exclusi0e Durisdiction o0er all cases, including money claims, in0ol0ing
employeremployee relations arising out of or by 0irtue of any law or contract in0ol0ing -ilipino wor:ers for
o0erseas employment.>
!
1espite ,.(. No. %$%, respondent Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case on the merits. (n +eptember !#,
1$"#, he rendered a 1ecision
#
in fa0or of pri0ate respondent, the dispositi0e portion of which reads3
WH,R,-(R,, Dudgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent to pay the complainant
as follows3
1. /he sum of .+B!,;$9.== in its peso e?ui0alent on August !&, 1$"1 as diGerence between
his allowance as +er0ice 1ri0er as against his position as HelperNLaborerA
!. /he sum of .+B1,===.== in its peso e?ui0alent as of the same date, as his contractual
bonus.
/he complaints for nonpaymentNunderpayment of o0ertime pay and unpaid wages or
commission are 1*+)*++,1 for lac: of merit.
;
6etitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations 'ommission 2NLR'7. *t ?uestioned the
Durisdiction of the Labor Arbiter o0er the case in 0iew of the enactment of ,.(. No. %$%.
*n a Resolution dated Fuly 1%, 1$$1,
&
respondent NLR' dismissed the petitioner8s appeal and upheld the
Labor Arbiter8s Durisdiction. *t ruled3
/o begin with, the Labor Arbiter has the authority to decide this case. (n )ay !$, 1$%", the
Labor Arbiters were integrated into the Regional (Eces under 6.1. 1#$1. (n )ay 1, 1$"=,
6.1. 19$1 was promulgated gi0ing the Regional (Eces of the )inistry of Labor and
,mployment the original and exclusi0e Durisdiction o0er all cases arising out of or by 0irtue
of any law or contract in0ol0ing -ilipino wor:ers for o0erseas employment. /here is no
dispute that the Labor Arbiter had the legal authority o0er the case on hand, which accrued
and was 5led when the two abo0e mentioned 6residential 1ecrees were in force.
9
6etitioner 5led this special ci0il action for certiorari reiterating the argument that3
/he NLR' committed gra0e abuse of discretion tantamount to lac: of Durisdiction in aErming
the Labor Arbiter8s 0oid Dudgment in the case a =uo.
%
*t asserts that ,.(. No. %$% di0ested the Labor Arbiter of his authority to try and resol0e cases arising from
o0erseas employment contract. *n0o:ing this 'ourt8s ruling in >riad gro ?e+elopment Corp. +s. ?ela
Cerna,
"
petitioner argues that ,.(. No. %$% applies retroacti0ely to aGect pending cases, including the
complaint 5led by pri0ate respondent.
/he petition is de0oid of merit.
/he rule is that Durisdiction o0er the subDect matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.
$
(n )arch #1, 1$"!, at the time pri0ate respondent 5led his complaint
against the petitioner, the pre0ailing laws were 6residential 1ecree No. 19$1
1=
and 6residential 1ecree No.
1#$1
11
which 0ested the Regional (Eces of the )inistry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with >original and
exclusi0e Durisdiction o0er all cases in0ol0ing employeremployee relations including money claims arising
out of any law or contracts in0ol0ing -ilipino wor:ers for o0erseas employment.>
1!
At the time of the 5ling
of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear Durisdiction o0er the same.
,.(. No. %$% did not di0est the Labor Arbiter8s authority to hear and decide the case 5led by pri0ate
respondent prior to its eGecti0ity. Laws should only be applied prospecti0ely unless the legislati0e intent to
gi0e them retroacti0e eGect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.
1#
We
fail to percei0e in the language of ,.(. No. %$% an intention to gi0e it retroacti0e eGect.
/he case of >riad gro ?e+elopment Corp. +s. 1ela 'erna
1;
cited by the petitioner is not applicable to the
case at bar. *n >riad, the 'ourt applied the exception rather than the general rule. *n this case, <riad Agro
1e0elopment 'orp. and L.). 'amus ,ngineering 'orp. challenged the Durisdiction of the Regional 1irector
of the 1epartment of Labor and ,mployment o0er cases in0ol0ing wor:ers8 money claims, since Article !1%
of the Labor 'ode, the law in force at the time of the 5ling of the complaint, 0ested in the Labor Arbiters
exclusi0e Durisdiction o0er such cases. /he 'ourt dismissed the petition in its 1ecision dated Fune !$, 1$"$.
1&
*t ruled that the enactment of ,.(. No. 111, amending Article !1% of the Labor 'ode, cured the Regional
1irector8s lac: of Durisdiction by gi0ing the Labor Arbiter and the Regional 1irector concurrent Durisdiction
o0er all cases in0ol0ing money claims. Howe0er, on No0ember $, 1$"$, the 'ourt, in a Resolution,
19

reconsidered and set aside its Fune !$ 1ecision and referred the case to the Labor Arbiter for proper
proceedings, in 0iew of the promulgation of Republic Act 2R.A.7 9%1& which di0ested the Regional 1irectors
of the power to hear money claims. *t bears emphasis that the 'ourt accorded ,.(. No. 111 and R.A. 9%1&
a retroacti0e application because as curati0e statutes, they fall under the exceptions to the rule on
prospecti0ity of laws.
,.(. No. 111, amended Article !1% of the Labor 'ode to widen the wor:ers8 access to the go0ernment for
redress of grie0ances by gi0ing the Regional 1irectors and Labor Arbiters concurrent Durisdiction o0er cases
in0ol0ing money claims. /his amendment, howe0er, created a situation where the Durisdiction of the
Regional 1irectors and the Labor Arbiters o0erlapped. As a remedy, R.A. 9%1& further amended Article !1%
by delineating their respecti0e Durisdictions. .nder R.A. 9%1&, the Regional 1irector has exclusi0e original
Durisdiction o0er cases in0ol0ing money claims pro0ided3 217 the claim is presented by an employer or
person employed in domestic or household ser0ice, or househelper under the 'odeA 2!7 the claimant, no
longer being employed, does not see: reinstatementA and 2#7 the aggregate money claim of the employee
or househelper does not exceed 6&,===.==. All other cases are within the exclusi0e and original Durisdiction
of the Labor Arbiter. ,.(. No. 111 and R.A. 9%1& are therefore curati0e statutes. A curati0e statute is
enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to 0alidate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public
authorities which would otherwise be 0oid for want of conformity with certain existing legal re?uirements.
/he law at bar, ,.(. No. %$%, is not a curati0e statute. *t was not intended to remedy any defect in the law.
*t created the 6(,A to assume the functions of the (0erseas ,mployment 1e0elopment <oard, the
National +eamen <oard and the o0erseas employment functions of the <ureau of ,mployment +er0ices.
Accordingly, it ga0e the 6(,A >original and exclusi0e Durisdiction o0er all cases, including money claims,
in0ol0ing employeremployee relations arising out of or by 0irtue of any law or contract in0ol0ing -ilipino
wor:ers for o0erseas employment, including seamen.>
1
% /he rule on prospecti0ity of laws should therefore
apply to ,.(. No. %$%. *t should not aGect Durisdiction o0er cases 5led prior to its eGecti0ity.
(ur ruling in .hilippine9,ingapore .orts Corp. +s. N/RC
1"
is more apt to the case at bar. *n this case, 6+6'
hired Fardin to wor: in +audi Arabia. Fardin 5led a complaint against 6+6' for illegal dismissal and reco0ery
of bac:wages on Fanuary #1, 1$%$ with the Labor Arbiter. 6+6' ?uestioned the Durisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter because at that time, the power to hear and decide cases in0ol0ing o0erseas wor:ers was 0ested in
the <ureau of ,mployment +er0ices. We held3
When Fardin 5led the complaint for illegal dismissal on Fanuary #1, 1$%$, Art. !1% 2&7 of the
Labor 'ode pro0ided that Labor Arbiters and the NLR' shall ha0e >exclusi0e Durisdiction to
hear and decide> all cases arising from employeremployee relations >unless expressly
excluded by this 'ode.> At that time Art. 1& of the same 'ode had been amended by 6.1. No.
1;1! which too: eGect on Fune $, 1$%". /he pertinent pro0ision of the said presidential
decree states3
Art. 1&. <ureau of ,mployment +er0ices. L
2a7 . . .
2b7 /he <ureau shall ha0e the original and exclusi0e Durisdiction o0er all matters or cases
in0ol0ing employeremployee relations including money claims, arising out of or by 0irtue of
any law or contracts in0ol0ing -ilipino wor:ers for o0erseas employment, except seamen.
/he decisions of the <ureau shall be 5nal and executory subDect to appeal to the +ecretary of
Labor whose decision shall be 5nal and inappealable.
'onsidering that pri0ate respondent Fardin8s claims undeniably arose out of an employer
employee relationship with petitioner 6+6' and that pri0ate respondent wor:ed o0erseas or
in +audi Arabia, the <ureau of ,mployment +er0ices and not the Labor Arbiter had
Durisdiction o0er the case. . . .
Art. 1& was further amended by 6.1. No. 19$1 which too: eGect on )ay 1, 1$$=. +uch
amendment ?uali5es the Durisdiction of the <ureau of ,mployment +er0ices as follows3
2b7 /he regional oEces of the )inistry of Labor shall ha0e the original and exclusi0e
Durisdiction o0er all matters or cases in0ol0ing employeremployee relations including money
claims, arising out of or by 0irtue of any law or contracts in0ol0ing -ilipino wor:ers for
o0erseas employment except seamen3 .ro+ided that the <ureau of ,mployment +er0ices
may, in the case of the National 'apital Region, exercise such power, whene0er the )inister
of Labor deems it appropriate. /he decisions of the regional oEces or the <ureau of
,mployment +er0ices if so authoriJed by the )inister of Labor as pro0ided in this Article,
shall be appealable to the National Labor Relations 'ommission upon the same grounds
pro0ided in Article !!# hereof. /he decisions of the National Labor Relations 'ommission
shall be 5nal and inappealable.
Hence, as further amended, Art. 1& pro0ided for concurrent Durisdiction between the regional
oEces of the then )inistry of Labor and <ureau of ,mployment +er0ices >in the National
'apital Region.> *t is noteworthy that 6.1. No. 19$1, while li:ewise amending Art. !1% of the
Labor 'ode, did not alter the pro0ision that Labor Arbiters shall ha0e Durisdiction o0er all
claims arising from employeremployee relations >unless expressly excluded by this 'ode.>
2he functions of the >ureau of @mployment ,er+ices 0ere subse=uently assumed by the
.hilippine 7+erseas @mployment dministration 3.7@4 on 8ay 1, 1'#2 by +irtue of
@xecuti+e 7rder No. %'% by granting the .7@ >original and exclusi+e -urisdiction o+er all
cases, including money claims, in+ol+ing employer9employee relations arising out of or by
+irtue of any la0 or contract in+ol+ing 6ilipino 0orkers for o+erseas employment, including
seamen.> 2+ec. ; 2a7A ,astern +hipping Lines 0. 6hilippine (0erseas ,mployment
Administration R6(,AS, !== +'RA 99# R1$$1S7. /his de0elopment showed the legislati0e
authority8s continuing intent to exclude from the Labor Arbiter8s Durisdiction claims arising
from o0erseas employment.
2hese amendments not0ithstanding, 0hen the complaint for illegal dismissal 0as 1led on
:anuary (1, 1'%', under rt. 1&, as amended by ..?. No. 1$12, it 0as the >ureau of
@mployment ,er+ices 0hich had -urisdiction o+er the case and not the /abor rbiters. )t is a
settled rule that -urisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action 2)unicipality of +ogod 0. Rosal, !=1 +'RA 9#!, 9#% R1$$1S7.
6.1. 19$1 which ga0e the regional oEces of the )inistry of Labor concurrent Durisdiction with
the <ureau of ,mployment +er0ices, was promulgated more than a year after the complaint
was 5led. 2emphasis supplied7
*n sum, we hold that respondent NLR' did not commit gra0e abuse of discretion in upholding the
Durisdiction of respondent Labor Arbiter o0er the complaint 5led by pri0ate respondent against the
petitioner.
*N 4*,W WH,R,(-, the 6etition is 1*+)*++,1. 'osts against petitioner.
+( (R1,R,1.
!&. 6enal laws shall ha0e a retroacti0e eGect insofar as they fa0or the person guilty of a felony who is not
a habitual criminal.
G.R. No. 1==%%9 (ctober !", 1$$#
AL<*N( +. '(, petitioner,
0s.
'(.R/ (- A66,AL+ and 6,(6L, (- /H, 6H*L*66*N,+, respondents.
ntonio .. >arredo for petitioner.
2he ,olicitor Leneral for the people.

NAR4A+A, C.:.:
*n connection with an agreement to sal0age and reMoat asun:en 0essel L and in payment of his share of
the expenses of the sal0age operations therein stipulated L petitioner Albino 'o deli0ered to the sal0aging
5rm on +eptember 1, 1$"# a chec: drawn against the Associated 'itiJens8 <an:, postdated No0ember #=,
1$"# in the sum of 6#91,&!".==.
1
/he chec: was deposited on Fanuary #, 1$";. *t was dishonored two
days later, the terselystated reason gi0en by the ban: being3 >'L(+,1 A''(.N/.>
A criminal complaint for 0iolation of >atas .ambansa >ilang 22
!
was 5led by the sal0age company against
Albino 'o with the Regional /rial 'ourt of 6asay 'ity. /he case e0entuated in 'o8s con0iction of the crime
charged, and his being sentenced to suGer a term of imprisonment of sixty 29=7 days and to indemnify the
sal0age company in the sum of 6#91,&!".==.
'o appealed to the 'ourt of Appeals. /here he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was re0ersible
error for the Regional /rial 'ourt to ha0e relied, as basis for its 0erdict of con0iction, on the ruling rendered
on +eptember !1, 1$"% by this 'ourt in Jue +. .eople, 1&; +'RA 19= 21$"%7
#
L i.e., that a chec: issued
merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is ne0ertheless co0ered by <.6. <lg. !!. /his was
because at the time of the issuance of the chec: on ,eptember 1, 1'#(, some four 2;7 years prior to the
promulgation of the Dudgment in Jue +. .eople on ,eptember 21, 1'#%, the deli0ery of a >rubber> or
>bouncing> chec: as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable oGense, an oEcial
pronouncement made in a 'ircular of the )inistry of Fustice. /hat 'ircular 2No. ;7, dated ?ecember 1&,
1'#1, pertinently pro0ided as follows3
!.#.;. Where issuance of bouncing chec: is neither estafa nor 0iolation of <.6. <lg. !!.
Where the chec: is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of
an obligation, whether preexisting or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa
or 0iolation of <.6. <lg. !! 2Res. No. ;#", s. 1$"1, 4irginia )ontano 0s. Fose5no Gal0eJ, Fune
1$, 1$"1A Res. No. %=%, s. 1$"$A Alice TuiJon 0s. Lydia 'alingo, (ctober !#, 1$"1, Res. No.
%9$, s. 1$"1, Alfredo Guido 0s. )iguel A. )ateo, et. al., No0ember 1%, 1$"1A Res. No. &"$, s.
1$"1, Kenaida LaJaro 0s. )aria A?uino, August %, 1$"17.
/his administrati0e circular was subse?uently re0ersed by another issued on August ", 1$"; 2)inistry
'ircular No. 1!7 L almost one 217 year after Albino 'o had deli0ered the >bouncing> chec: to the
complainant on +eptember 1, 1$"#. +aid 'ircular No. 1!, after obser0ing inter alia that 'ircular No. ; of
1ecember 1&, 1$"1 appeared to ha0e been based on >a misapplication of the deliberation in the <atasang
6ambansa, . . . 2or7 the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penaliJe the
issuance of a chec: to secure or guarantee the payment of an obligation,> as follows3
;
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrati0e agency ha0ing interpreting
authority may re0erse its administration interpretation of a statute, but that its re0iew
interpretation applies only prospecti0ely 2Waterbury +a0ings <an: 0s. 1anaher, 1!" 'onn.,
;%9A != a!d ;&& 21$;17, in all cases in0ol0ing 0iolation of <atas 6ambansa <lg. !! 0here the
check in =uestion is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee
or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation collection 0ill no longer be considered a
+alid defense.
'o8s theory was reDected by the 'ourt of Appeals which aErmed his con0iction. 'iting ,enarillos +.
Fermosisima, 1=1 6hil. &91, the Appellate 'ourt opined that the Jue doctrine did not amount to the
passage of new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a preexisting one, i.e., <6 !!,
enacted on April #, 1$%$.
-rom this ad0erse Dudgment of the 'ourt of Appeals, Albino 'o appealed to this 'ourt on certiorari under
Rule ;& of the Rules of 'ourt. <y Resolution dated +eptember $, 1$$1, the 'ourt dismissed his appeal. 'o
mo0ed for reconsideration under date of (ctober !, 1$$1. /he 'ourt re?uired comment thereon by the
(Ece of the +olicitor General. /he latter complied and, in its comment dated 1ecember 1#, 1$$1,
extensi0ely argued against the merits of Albino 'o8s theory on appeal, which was substantially that
proGered by him in the 'ourt of Appeals. /o this comment, Albino 'o 5led a reply dated -ebruary 1;, 1$$!.
After deliberating on the parties8 arguments and contentions, the 'ourt resol0ed, in the interests of Dustice,
to reinstate Albino 'o8s appeal and adDudicate the same on its merits.
Fudicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the 'onstitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the 6hilippines,> according to Article " of the 'i0il 'ode. >Laws shall ha0e no
retroacti0e eGect, unless the contrary is pro0ided,> declares Article ; of the same 'ode, a
declaration that is echoed by Article !! of the Re0ised 6enal 'ode3 >6enal laws shall ha0e, a
retroacti0e eGect insofar as they fa0or the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal . . .
&
/he principle of prospecti0ity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. /hese
include3 <uyco 0. 6N<, $91 ! +'RA 9"! 2Fune #=, 1$917, holding that Republic Act No. 1&%9 which di0ested
the 6hilippine National <an: of authority to accept bac: pay certi5cates in payment of loans, does not
apply to an oGer of payment made before eGecti0ity of the actA /argado +. 8asaganda, et al., & +'RA &!!
2Fune #=, 1$9!7, ruling that RA !91#, s amended by RA #=$= on Fune, 1$91, granting to inferior courts
Durisdiction o0er guardianship cases, could not be gi0en retroacti0e eGect, in the absence of a sa0ing
clauseA /arga +. Ranada, :r., 9; +'RA 1", to the eGect that +ections $ and 1= of ,xecuti0e (rder No. $=,
amending +ection ; of 61 1%&!, could ha0e no retroacti0e applicationA .eople +. Jue .o /ay, $; 6hil. 9;=,
holding that a person cannot be con0icted of 0iolating 'ircular No. != of the 'entral, when the alleged
0iolation occurred before publication of the 'ircular in the (Ecial GaJetteA >alta5ar +. C.., 1=; +'RA 91$,
denying retroacti0e application to 6.1. No. !% decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of
the soil, and 6.1. No. #19 prohibiting eDectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the
promulgation of rules and regulations implementing 6.1. No. !%A Nilo +. Court of ppeals, 1!" +'RA &1$,
adDudging that RA 9#"$ whichremo0ed >personal culti0ation> as a ground for the eDectment of a tenant
cannot be gi0en retroacti0e eGect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroacti0ityA 2ac9n +. C,
1!$ +'RA #1$, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrati0e 'ode by RA ;!&! could not be accorded
retroacti0e eGectA >allardo +. >orromeo, 191 +'RA &==, holding that RA 9#"$ should ha0e only prospecti0e
applicationA 2see also <onifacio 0. 1iJon, 1%% +'RA !$; and <alatbat 0. 'A, !=& +'RA ;1$7.
/he prospecti0ity principle has also been made to apply to administrati0e rulings and circulars, to wit3 >,9
C>N >roadcasting Corporation +. C2, (ct. 1!, 1$"1, 1=" +'RA 1;!, holding that a circular or ruling of the
'ommissioner of *nternal Re0enue may not be gi0en retroacti0e eGect ad0ersely to a taxpayer3 ,anche5 +.
C78@/@C, 1$# +'RA #1%, ruling that Resolution No. $==&$= of the 'ommission on ,lections, which
directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroacti0e applicationA Romualde5 +. C,C, 1$% +'RA
19", where it was ruled that '+' )emorandum 'ircular No. !$, s. 1$"$ cannot be gi0en retrospecti0e
eGect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired
before the 'ircular was issued.
/he principle of prospecti0ity has also been applied to Dudicial decisions which, >although in themsel0es not
laws, are ne0ertheless e0idence of what the laws mean, . . . 2this being7 the reason whyunder Article " of
the New 'i0il 'ode, 8Fudicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the 'onstitution shall form a part
of the legal system . . .8>
+o did this 'ourt hold, for example, in .eo. +. :abinal, && +'RA 9=%, 9113
*t will be noted that when appellant was appointed +ecret Agent by the 6ro0incial
Go0ernment in 1$9!, and 'on5dential Agent by the 6ro0incial commander in 1$9;, the
pre0ailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by .s in .eople +. 8acarandang 21$&$7
and .eople +. /ucero 21$&"7.
9
(ur decision in .eople +. 8apa,
%
re0ersing the aforesaid
doctrine, came only in 1$9%. /he sole ?uestion in this appeal is3 should appellant be
ac?uitted on the basis of (ur rulings in 8acarandang and /ucero, or should his con0iction
stand in 0iew of the complete re0erse of the )acarandang and Lucero doctrine in )apaQ . . .
1ecisions of this 'ourt, although in themsel0es not laws, are ne0ertheless e0idence of what
the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article " of the New 'i0il 'ode, >Fudicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the 'onstitution shall form a part of the legal
system . . .>/he interpretation upon a law by this 'ourt constitutes, in a way, a part of the
law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this 'ourt8s construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislati0e intent that the law thus construed intends to
eGectuate. /he settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal
maxim Olegis interpretation legis +im obtinetO L the interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law. /he doctrine laid down in /ucero and
8acarandang was part of the Durisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time
appellant was found in possession of the 5rearm in ?uestion and where he was arraigned by
the trial court. *t is true that the doctrine was o0erruled in the )apa case in 1$9%, but when
a doctrine of this 'ourt is o0erruled and a diGerent 0iew is adopted, the new doctrine should
be applied prospecti0ely, and should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old doctrine
and acted on the faith thereof. /his is especially true in the construction and application of
criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishment of an act be reasonably foreseen for
the guidance of society.
+o, too, did the 'ourt rule in ,pouses Lau+ain and >ernardita >en5onan +. Court of ppeals, et al. 2G.R.
No. $%$%#7 and ?e+elopment >ank of the .hilippines +. Court of ppeals, et al 2G.R. No $%$$"7, Fan. !%,
1$$!, !=& +'RA &1&, &!%&!"3
"
We sustain the petitioners8 position, *t is undisputed that the subDect lot was mortgaged to
1<6 on -ebruary !;, 1$%=. *t was ac?uired by 1<6 as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale
on Fune 1", 1$%%, and then sold to the petitioners on +eptember !$, 1$%$.
At that time, the pre0ailing Durisprudence interpreting section 11$ of R.A. 1;1 as amended
was that enunciated in 8onge and 2upas cited abo0e. /he petitioners <enJonan and
respondent 6e and the 1<6 are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article " of the 'i0il
'ode >Dudicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the 'onstitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the 6hilippines.> <ut while our decisions form part of the law of
the land, they are also subDect to Article ; of the 'i0il 'ode which pro0ides that >laws shall
ha0e no retroacti0e eGect unless the contrary is pro0ided.> /his is expressed in the familiar
legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law loo:s forward not bac:ward. /he rationale
against retroacti0ity is easy to percei0e. /he retroacti0e application of a law usually di0ests
rights that ha0e already become 0ested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional 2-rancisco 0s. 'erteJa, # +'RA &9& R1=91S7.
/he same consideration underlies our rulings gi0ing only prospecti0e eGect to decisions
enunciating new doctrines. /hus, we emphasiJed in .eople +. :abinal, && +'RA 9=%
R1$%;S> . . . when a doctrine of this 'ourt is o0erruled and a diGerent 0iew is adopted, the
new doctrine should be applied prospecti0ely and should not apply to parties who had relied
on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
A compelling rationaliJation of the prospecti0ity principle of Dudicial decisions is well set forth in the oft
cited case of Chicot County ?rainage ?ist. +. >axter ,tates >ank, #=" .+ #%1, #%; R1$;=S. /he 'hicot
doctrine ad0ocates the imperati0e necessity to ta:e account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its
nulli5cation, as an operati0e fact negating acceptance of >a principle of absolute retroacti0e in0alidity.
/hus, in this 'ourt8s decision in 2aPada +. 2u+era,
$
promulgated on April !;, 1$"& L which declared >that
presidential issuances of general application, which ha0e not been published,shall ha0e no force and
eGect,> and as regards which declaration some members of the 'ourt appeared >?uite apprehensi0e about
the possible unsettling eGect . . . 2the7 decision might ha0e on acts done in reliance on the 0alidity of these
presidential decrees . . .> L the 'ourt said3
. . . . /he answer is all too familiar. *n similar situation is in the past this 'ourt, had ta:en the
pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County ?rainage ?istrict +s. >axter >ank
2#=" ..+. #%1, #%;7 to wit3
/he courts below ha0e proceeded on the theory that the Act of 'ongress, ha0ing found to be
unconstitutional, was not a lawA that it was inoperati0e, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence aGording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton 0s. +helby 'ounty,
11" .+ ;!&, ;;!A 'hicago, *. @ L. Ry. 'o. 0. Hac:ett, !!" .. +. &&$, &99. *t is ?uite clear,
howe0er, that such broad statements as to the eGect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be ta:en with ?uali5cations. /he actual existence of a statute, prior
to such a determination, is an operati0e fact and may ha0e conse?uences which cannot
Dustly be ignored. /he past cannot always be erased by a new Dudicial declaration. /he eGect
of the subse?uent ruling as to in0alidity may ha0e to be considered in 0arious aspects L
with respect to particular conduct, pri0ate and oEcial. Tuestions of rights claimed to ha0e
become 0ested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to ha0e 5nality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its pre0ious
application, demand examination. /hese ?uestions are among the most diEcult of those
who ha0e engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an allinclusi0e statement of a principle of absolute retroacti0e
in0alidity cannot be Dusti5ed.
)uch earlier, in ?e gbayani +. .N>, #" +'RA ;!$ L concerning the eGects of the in0alidation of >Republic
Act No. #;!, the moratorium legislation, which continued ,xecuti0e (rder No. #!, issued by the then
6resident (smeWa, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations
payable by war suGerers,> and which had been >explicitly held in Rutter 0. ,steban 2$# 6hil. 9" R1$&#S
1=
. . . 2to be7 in 1$&# 8unreasonable and oppressi0e, and should not be prolonged a minute longer . . .> L
the 'ourt made substantially the same obser0ations, to wit3
11
. . . . /he decision now on appeal reMects the orthodox 0iew that an unconstitutional act, for
that matter an executi0e order or a municipal ordinance li:ewise suGering from that
in5rmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it Dustify any oEcial act
ta:en under it. *ts repugnancy to the fundamental law once Dudicially declared results in its
being to all intents and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . *t is understandable why it
should be so, the 'onstitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislati0e or executi0e
act contrary to its terms cannot sur0i0e.
+uch a 0iew has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may not howe0er
be suEciently realistic. *t does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such
challenged legislati0e or executi0e act must ha0e been in force and had to be compiled with.
/his is so as until after the Dudiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its in0alidity,, it is
entitled to obedience and respect. 6arties may ha0e acted under it and may ha0e changed
theirpositions, what could be more 5tting than that in a subse?uent litigation regard be had
to what has been done while such legislati0e or executi0e act was in operation and
presumed to be 0alid in all respects. *t is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being
nulli5ed, its existence is a fact must be rec:oned with. /his is merely to reMect awareness
that precisely because the Dudiciary is the go0ernmental organ which has the 5nal say on
whether or not a legislati0e or executi0e measure is 0alid, a, period of time may ha0e
elapsed before it can exercise the power of Dudicial re0iew that may lead to a declaration of
nullity. *t would be to depri0e the law of its ?uality of fairness and Dustice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adDudication.
*n the language of an American +upreme 'ourt decision3 8/he actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination Rof unconstitutionalityS, is an operati0e fact and may ha0e
conse?uences which cannot Dustly be ignored. /he past cannot always be erased by a new
Dudicial declaration. /he eGect of the subse?uent ruling as to in0alidity may ha0e to be
considered in 0arious aspects, L with respect to particular relations, indi0idual and
corporate, and particular conduct, pri0ate and oEcial 2'hicot 'ounty 1rainage 1ist. 0.
<axter +tates <an:, #=" .+ #%1, #%; R1$;=S7. /his language has been ?uoted with appro0al
in a resolution in Araneta 0. Hill 2$# 6hil. 1==! R1$&#S7 and the decision in )anila )otor 'o.
*nc. 0. -lores 2$$ 6hil. %#" R1$&9S7. An e0en more recent instance is the opinion of Fustice
Kaldi0ar spea:ing for the 'ourt in -ernandeJ 0. 'uer0a and 'o. 2L!111;, No0. !", 1$9%, !1
+'RA 1=$&7.
Again, treating of the eGect that should be gi0en to its decision in 7laguer +. 8ilitary Commission No ($,
1!

L declaring in0alid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against ci0ilians, which
had resulted in the con0iction and incarceration of numerous persons L this 'ourt, in 2an +s. >arrios, 1$=
+'RA 9"9, at p. %==, ruled as follows3
*n the interest of Dustice and consistently, we hold that (laguer should, in principle, be
applied prospecti0ely only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet 5nal when that
decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroacti0e nulli5cation of 5nal
Dudgments, whether of con0iction or ac?uittal, rendered by military courts against ci0ilians
before the promulgation of the (laguer decision. +uch 5nal sentences should not be
disturbed by the +tate. (nly in particular cases where the con0icted person or the +tate
shows that there was serious denial of constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity
of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the 0iolation of the
constitutional rights of the accused and not on the (laguer doctrine. *f a retrial is no longer
possible, the accused should be released since Dudgment against him is null on account of
the 0iolation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.
xxx xxx xxx
/he trial of thousands of ci0ilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and
commissions during the tenyear period of martial rule 21$%11$"17 which were created
under general orders issued by 6resident )arcos in the exercise of his legislati0e powers is
an operati0e fact that may not Dust be ignored. /he belated declaration in 1$"% of the
unconstitutionality and in0alidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their
conse?uences which occurred long before our decision in (laguer was promulgated and
which now pre0ent us from carrying (laguer to the limit of its logic. /hus did this 'ourt rule
in )unicipality of 8alabang +. >enito, !% +'RA &##, where the ?uestion arose as to whether
the nullity of creation of a municipality by executi0e order wiped out all the acts of the local
go0ernment abolished.
1#
*t would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in fa0or of the proposition that the 'ourt8s
decision of +eptember !1, 1$"% in Jue +. .eople, 1&; +'RA 19= 21$"%7
1;
that a chec: issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is ne0ertheless co0ered by <.6. <lg. !! L should not be gi0en
retrospecti0e eGect to the preDudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the oEcial
opinion of the )inister of Fustice that such a chec: did not fall within the scope of <.6. <lg. !!.
*n0eighing against this proposition, the +olicitor General in0o:es <.,. +. Lo Chico, 1; 6hil. 1!", applying
the familiar doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or moti0e of the oGender is inconse?uential,
the only rele0ant in?uiry being, >has the law been 0iolatedQ> /he facts in Lo Chico are substantially
diGerent from those in the case at bar. *n the former, there was no oEcial issuance by the +ecretary of
Fustice or other go0ernment oEcer construing the special law 0iolatedA
1&
and it was there obser0ed,
among others, that >the defense . . . 2of7 an honest misconstruction of the law under legal ad0ice>
19
could
not be appreciated as a 0alid defense. *n the present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance
was placed, not on the opinion of a pri0ate lawyer but upon an oEcial pronouncement of no less than the
attorney of the Go0ernment, the +ecretary of Fustice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great
weight and on which reliance may be placed by pri0ate indi0iduals is reMecti0e of the correct interpretation
of a constitutional or statutory pro0isionA this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the 0ery nature
and scope of the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their 0iolation.
1%
,enarillos +s.
Fermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent 'ourt of Appeals, is crucially diGerent in that in said
case, as in <.,. +. Lo Chico, supra, no administrati0e interpretation antedated the contrary construction
placed by the 'ourt on the law in0o:ed.
/his is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be
resol0ed in fa0or of the accused. ,0erything considered, the 'ourt sees no compelling reason why the
doctrine of mala prohibita should o0erride the principle of prospecti0ity, and its clear implications as herein
abo0e set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.
WH,R,-(R,, the assailed decisions of the 'ourt of Appeals and of the Regional /rial 'ourt are re0ersed
and set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accusedpetitioner is 1*+)*++,1, with costs de
o1cio.
+( (R1,R,1.
!9. 6rocedural laws ha0e retroacti0e application.
G.R. No. $1"&9 (ctober &, 1$$=
IAP.L/ 6H*L*66*N,+ AN1 LARRI +AL4A1(, petitioner,
0s.
'(.R/ (- A66,AL+, W,N',+LA( ). 6(L(, in his capacity as 6residing Fudge of <r. 1$ of the R/' of )anila,
and R(I 'A)A+(, respondents.
2omas R. /eonidas for petitioners.
?a+id >. goncillo for pri+ate respondent.

GAN'AI'(, :.:
'an a ci0il action instituted after the criminal action was 5led prosper e0en if there was no reser0ation to
5le a separate ci0il actionQ /his is the issue in this petition.
(n 1ecember !;, 1$"!, a 50eyear old boy, Roy 'amaso, while standing on the sidewal: of ). de la -uente
+treet, +ampaloc, )anila, was sideswiped by a Iamaha motorcycle owned by Ia:ult 6hilippines and dri0en
by its employee, Larry +al0ado.
+al0ado was charged with the crime of rec:less imprudence resulting to slight physical inDuries in an
information that was 5led on Fanuary 9, 1$"# with the then 'ity 'ourt of )anila, doc:eted as 'riminal 'ase
No. =!%1";. (n (ctober 1$, 1$"; a complaint for damages was 5led by Roy 'amaso represented by his
father, 1a0id 'amaso, against Ia:ult 6hilippines and Larry +al0ado in the Regional /rial 'ourt of )anila
doc:eted as 'i0il 'ase No. ";!%#1%.
*n due course a decision was rendered in the ci0il case on )ay !9, 1$"$ ordering defendants to pay Dointly
and se0erally the plaintiG the sum of 61#,==9.#= for actual expenses for medical ser0ices and hospital
billsA 6#,===.== attorney8s fees and the costs of the suit. Although said defendants appealed the Dudgment,
they ne0ertheless 5led a petition for certiorari in the 'ourt of Appeals challenging the Durisdiction of the
trial court o0er said ci0il case.
6etitioners8 thesis is that the ci0il action for damages for inDuries arising from alleged criminal negligence of
+al0ado, being without malice, cannot be 5led independently of the criminal action under Article ## of the
'i0il 'ode. -urther, it is contended that under +ection 1, Rule 111 of the 1$"& Rules on 'riminal 6rocedure
such a separate ci0il action may not be 5led unless reser0ation thereof is expressly made.
*n a decision dated No0ember #, 1$"$, the 'ourt of Appeals dismissed the petition.
1
A motion for
reconsideration thereof 5led by petitioners was denied on Fanuary #=, 1$$=. Hence this petition.
/he petition is de0oid of merit.
+ection 1, Rule 111 of the 1$"& Rules of 'riminal 6rocedure pro0ides as follows3
+,'. 1. )nstitution of criminal and ci+il actions. L When a criminal action is instituted, the
ci0il action for the reco0ery of ci0il liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the oGended party wai0es the ci0il action, reser0es his right to institute it separately,
or institutes the ci0il action prior to the criminal action.
+uch ci0il action includes reco0ery of indemnity under the Re0ised 6enal 'ode, and damages
under Articles #!, ##, #; and !1%9 of the 'i0il 'ode of the 6hilippines arising from the same
act or omission of the accused.
A wai0er of any of the ci0il actions extinguishes the others. /he institution of, or the
reser0ation of the right to 5le, any of said ci0il actions separately wai0es the others.
/he reser0ation of the right to institute the separate ci0il actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its e0idence and under circumstances aGording the oGended
party a reasonable opportunity to ma:e such reser0ation.
*n no case may the oGended party reco0er damages twice for the same act or omission of
the accused.
When the oGended party see:s to enforce ci0il liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the 5ling fees for such ci0il action as pro0ided in
these Rules shall constitute a 5rst lien on the Dudgment except in an award for actual
damages.
*n cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information, the corresponding 5ling fees shall be paid by the oGended party upon the 5ling
thereof in court for trial. 21a7
Although the incident in ?uestion and the actions arising therefrom were instituted before the
promulgation of the 1$"& Rules of 'riminal 6rocedure, its pro0isions which are procedural may apply
retrospecti0ely to the present case.
!
.nder the aforecited pro0isions of the rule, the ci0il action for the reco0ery of ci0il liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action unless the oGended party wai0es the ci0il action, reser0es his right to
institute it separately or institutes the ci0il action prior to the criminal action.
+uch ci0il action includes reco0ery of indemnity under the Re0ised 6enal 'ode, and damages under Articles
#!, ##, #; and !1%9 of the 'i0il 'ode of the 6hilippines arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.
*t is also pro0ided that the reser0ation of the right to institute the separate ci0il action shall be made
before the prosecution starts to present its e0idence and under circumstances aGording the oGended party
a reasonable opportunity to ma:e such reser0ation.
*n this case, the oGended party has not wai0ed the ci0il action, nor reser0ed the right to institute it
separately. Neither has the oGended party instituted the ci0il action prior to the criminal action. Howe0er,
the ci0il action in this case was 5led in court before the presentation of the e0idence for the prosecution in
the criminal action of which the Dudge presiding on the criminal case was duly informed, so that in the
disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded.
/he ci0il liability sought arising from the act or omission of the accused in this case is a =uasi delict as
de5ned under Article !1%9 of the 'i0il 'ode as follows3
AR/. !1%9. Whoe0er by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. +uch fault or negligence, if there is no
preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a =uasi9delict and is go0erned
by the pro0isions of this 'hapter.
/he aforecited re0ised rule re?uiring such pre0ious reser0ation also co0ers =uasi9delict as de5ned under
Article !1%9 of the 'i0il 'ode arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Although the separate ci0il action 5led in this case was without pre0ious reser0ation in the criminal case,
ne0ertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented e0idence in the criminal action, and
the Dudge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the actual 5ling of the ci0il action is e0en
far better than a compliance with the re?uirement of an express reser0ation that should be made by the
oGended party before the prosecution presents its e0idence.
/he purpose of this rule re?uiring reser0ation is to pre0ent the oGended party from reco0ering damages
twice for the same act or omission.
/hus, the 'ourt 5nds and so holds that the trial court had Durisdiction o0er the separate ci0il action brought
before it.
WH,R,-(R,, the petition is 1,N*,1. /he ?uestioned decision of the 'ourt of Appeals dated No0ember #,
1$"$ and its resolution dated Fanuary #=, 1$$= are hereby A--*R),1.
+( (R1,R,1.
!%. A special law pre0ails o0er a general law regardless of their date of passage and the special law is to
be considered as remaining an exception to the general law.
G.R. No. "%11$ April 19, 1$$1
H(N. G,)*L*AN( '. L(6,K, FR., in his capacity as 'ity )ayor of )anila, petitioner,
0s.
/H, '*4*L +,R4*', '())*++*(N, H(N. 1AN*L( R. LA'.NA, in his capacity as 4ice)ayor and 6residing
(Ecer of the 'ity 'ouncil of )anila, and /H, '*/I '(.N'*L (- )AN*LA, respondents.
2he City /egal 7Hcer for petitioner.
/acuna, >ello N ssociates /a0 7Hces for ?anilo >. /acuna.

+AR)*,N/(, :.:p
/he only ?uestion in this petition, denominated as a >direct appeal under Article 4***, +ection & 2!7 2e7, of
the 'onstitution and +ection $2#7, of <atas <lg. 1!$,> is whether the 'ity 'ouncil of )anila still has the
power to appoint 'ouncil oEcers and employees under Republic Act No. ;=$, otherwise :nown as the
'harter of the 'ity of )anila, or whether the power is now 0ested with the 'ity )ayor pursuant to Republic
Act No. &1"&, the 1ecentraliJation Law, and <atas <lg. ##%, the Local Go0ernment 'ode. /he facts are as
follows3
(n +eptember 1#, 1$"", the 4ice)ayor of )anila and 6residing (Ecer of the 'ity 'ouncil of )anila, the
Hon. 1anilo R. Lacuna, submitted to the 'i0il +er0ice 'ommission, through the Regional 1irector of the
National 'apital Region, the appointments of nineteen oEcers and employees in the ,xecuti0e +taG of the
(Ece of the 6residing (Ecer, 'ity 'ouncil of )anila, pursuant to the pro0isions of +ection 1&, of said
Republic Act No. ;=$, as amended, which reads3
+ec. 1&. . . . .
. . . /he <oard shall appoint and the 4ice )ayor shall sign all appointments of the other
employees of the <oard.
1
/he 'ity <udget (Ecer of )anila later sought from the 6ersonnel <ureau of the )ayor8s oEce >comment
andNor recommendation> on whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees of the 'ity 'ouncil may
be paid on the basis of appointments signed by the 4ice)ayor.
!
/he 6ersonnel <ureau then forwarded the
?uery to the 'ity Legal (Ecer who, in a #rd endorsement dated +eptember 1$, 1$"",
#
rendered an
opinion that the proper appointing oEcer is the 'ity )ayor and not the 'ity 'ouncil. /his opinion was
transmitted by the +ecretary to the 'ity )ayor to the 'ommission.
(n -ebruary 1, 1$"$, the 'ommission promulgated Resolution No. "$=%&, and held that contrary to the
opinion of the 'ity Legal (Ecer, it is the 'ity 'ouncil to which the appointing power is 0ested. /he
dispositi0e portion thereof is as follows3
WH,R,-(R,, foregoing premises considered, the 'ommission resol0ed to rule, as it hereby
rules that the proper appointing authority of the oEcers and employees of the 'ity 'ouncil
of )anila is the 'ity 'ouncil and the signatory of indi0idual appointments thus issued is the
'ity 4ice)ayor of )anila.
;
As we stated at the outset, the issue is whether or not +ection 1&, supra, of the 'harter of the 'ity of
)anila has been repealed, and as a result, the 'ity 'ouncil can no longer tender appointments to 'ouncil
positions.
As we also mentioned at the outset, this petition has been brought by way of a >direct appeal> from the
resolution of the 'i0il +er0ice 'ommission pursuant supposedly to the 'onstitution and <atas <lg. 1!$. *n
this connection, we ha0e held that no appeal lies from the decisions of the 'i0il +er0ice 'ommission, and
that parties aggrie0ed thereby may proceed to this 'ourt alone on certiorari under Rule 9& of the Rules of
'ourt, within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof, pursuant to +ection %, Article *C, of the
'onstitution. We ?uote3
+ec. %. .nless otherwise pro0ided by this 'onstitution or by law, any decision, order, or
ruling of each 'ommission may be brought to the +upreme 'ourt on certiorari by the
aggrie0ed party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
&
As we held, the 'i0il +er0ice 'ommission, under the 'onstitution, is the single arbiter of all contests
relating to the ci0il ser0ice and as such, its Dudgments are unappealable and subDect only to this 'ourt8s
certiorari Durisdiction.
9
/he petitioner8s omission notwithstanding, we are ne0ertheless accepting the petition and because of the
important public interest it in0ol0es, we are considering it as a petition for certiorari under Rule 9&,
considering further that it was 5led within the thirtyday period.
%
As the petitioner contends, +ection 1& of Republic Act No. ;=$ as amended has supposedly been repealed
by Republic Act No. &1"&, speci5cally, +ection ; thereof, which we ?uote, in part3
/he 'ity Assessor, 'ity Agriculturist, 'ity 'hief of 6olice and 'ity 'hief of -ire 1epartment
and other heads of oEces entirely paid out of city funds and their respecti0e assistants or
deputies shall, subDect to ci0il ser0ice law, rules and regulations, be appointed by the 'ity
)ayor3 .ro+ided, ho0e+er, /hat this section shall not apply to Fudges, Auditors, -iscals, 'ity
+uperintendents of +chools, +uper0isors, 6rincipals, 'ity /reasurers, 'ity Health (Ecers and
'ity ,ngineers.
All other employees, except teachers, paid out of pro0incial, city or municipal general funds,
road and bridge funds, school funds, and other local funds, shall, subDect to ci0il ser0ice law,
rules and regulations, be appointed by the 6ro0incial Go0ernor, 'ity or )unicipal )ayor upon
recommendation of the oEce head concerned. . . .
"
and by <atas <lg. ##%, we li:ewise ?uote3
+ec. 1%1. 'hief ,xecuti0eA 'ompensation, 6owers, and
1uties. L
2!7 /he city mayor shall3
2h7 Appoint, in accordance with ci0il ser0ice law, rules and regulations, all oEcers and
employees of the city, whose appointments are not otherwise pro0ided in this 'odeA
$
/here is no doubt that Republic Act No. ;=$, which pro0ides speci5cally for the organiJation of the
Go0ernment of the 'ity of )anila, is a special law, and whereas Republic Act No. &1"& and <atas <lg. ##%,
which apply to municipal go0ernments in general, are general laws. As the +olicitor General points out, and
we agree with him, it is a canon of statutory construction that a special law pre0ails o0er a general law L
regardless of their dates of passage L and the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the
general.
1=
+o also, e0ery eGort must be exerted to a0oid a conMict between statutes. *f reasonable construction is
possible, the laws must be reconciled in that manner.
Repeals of laws by implication moreo0er are not fa0ored, and the mere repugnancy between two statutes
should be 0ery clear to warrant the court in holding that the later in time repeals the other.
11
Why a special law pre0ails o0er a general law has been put by the 'ourt as follows3
. . . /he Legislature consider and ma:e pro0ision for all the circumstances of the particular
case. /he Legislature ha0ing specially considered all of the facts and circumstances in the
particular case in granting a special charter, it will not be considered that the Legislature, by
adopting a general law containing pro0isions repugnant to the pro0isions of the charter, and
without ma:ing any mention of its intention to amend or modify the charter, intended to
amend, repeal, or modify the special act. 2Lewis 0s. 'oo: 'ounty, %; *11. App., 1&1A
6hilippine Railway 'o. 0s. Nolting #; 6hil., ;=1.7
1!
*n one case, we held that Republic Act No. &1"& did not di0est the )ayor of )anila of his power under the
'harter of the 'ity of )anila to appro0e the city budget.
1#
We also agree with the 'i0il +er0ice 'ommission that the pro0isions of Republic Act No. &1"&, gi0ing
mayors the power to appoint all oEcials >entirely paid out by city funds
1;
and those of <atas <lg. ##%,
empowering local executi0es with the authority to appoint >all oEcers and employees of the city,>
1&
were
meant not to 0est the city mayors per se with comprehensi0e powers but rather, to underscore the
transfer of the power of appointment o0er local oEcials and employees from the 6resident to the local
go0ernments and to highlight the autonomy of local go0ernments. /hey were not meant, howe0er, to
depri0e the 'ity 'ouncil of )anila for instance, its appointing power granted by existing statute, and after
all, that arrangement is suEcient to accomplish the obDecti0es of both the 1ecentraliJation Act and the
Local Go0ernment 'ode, that is, to pro0ide teeth to local autonomy.
*n the light of an the foregoing, we do not 5nd any gra0e abuse of discretion committed by the respondent
'ommission.
WH,R,-(R,, the petition is 1*+)*++,1. No costs.
+( (R1,R,1.
!". A substanti0e law cannot be amended by a procedural law.
G.R. No. L;9=$& No0ember !#, 1$%%
6H*L*66*N, NA/*(NAL <ANP, petitioner,
0s.
H(N(RA<L, ,L*A+ <. A+.N'*(N, -A<AR *N'(R6(RA/,1, F(+, )A. <ARR,1(, 'AR),N <. <(RR(),( and
/()A+ L. <(RR(),(, respondents.

6hilippine National <an: 2hereafter referred to as the petitioner7, on Fanuary 19, 1$9#, granted in fa0or of
respondent -abar *ncorporated 0arious credit accommodations and ad0ances in the form of a discounting
line, o0erdraft line, temporary o0erdraft line and letters of credit co0ering the importation of machinery
and e?uipment. 6etitioner li:ewise made ad0ances by way of insurance premiums co0ering the chattels
subDect matter of a mortgage securing the aforementioned credit accommodations. +aid credit
accommodations had an outstanding balance of 6",;;$,19$.$" as of )ay 1#, 1$%%.
All of the abo0e credit accommodations are secured by the Doint and se0eral signatures of Fose )a.
<arredo, 'armen <. <orromeo and /omas L. <orromeo 2pri0ate respondents herein7 and )anuel H. <arredo
-or failure of pri0ate respondents to pay their obligations notwithstanding repeated demands, petitioner
instituted a case for collection against all pri0ate respondents and )anuel H. <arredo in a complaint dated
(ctober #1, 1$%!, and which was 5led before the sala of the Honorable ,lias <. Asuncion, Fudge of the
'ourt of -irst *nstance of )anila, <ranch C** 2hereafter referred to as the respondent 'ourt7.
(n )ay 1$, 1$%&, before the case could be decided, )anuel H. <arredo died. *n a )anifestation dated Fune
9, 1$%&, counsel for pri0ate respondents informed the respondent 'ourt of said death.
+ubse?uently, respondent 'ourt issued an (rder of dismissal dated No0ember !$, 1$%9, which is
hereinbelow ?uoted as follows3
*n 0iew of the death of defendant )anuel <arredo, the 'ourt hereby dismisses this case
since the present suit is for a money claim which does not sur0i0e the death of said
defendant.
6ursuant to the pro0isions of +ection 9, Rule "9 of the Re0ised Rules of 'ourt, which
pro0ides3
Where the obligation of the decedent is solidary with another debtor, the claim shall be 5led
against the decedent as if he were the only debtor, without preDudice to the right of the
estate to reco0er contribution from the other debtor ...
the claim of plaintiG may be 5led with the estate proceedings of the decedent.
6etitioner thereupon 5led a )otion dated 1ecember 1;, 1$%9 praying for the reconsideration of
respondent 'ourt8s (rder dismissing the case as against all the defendants, contending that the dismissal
should only be as against the deceased defendant )anuel H. <arredo.
*n an order dated Fanuary !9, 1$%%, respondent 'ourt denied petitioner8s motion for reconsideration for
lac: of meritorious grounds.
Hence, this instant petition for re0iew on certiorari.
6etitioner, in its lone assignment of error, alleged that the respondent 'ourt erred in dismissing the case
against all the defendants, instead of dismissing the case only as against the deceased defendant and
thereafter proceeding with the hearing as against the other defendants, pri0ate respondents herein.
6etitioner8s contention is well ta:en. Respondent 'ourt8s reliance on +ection 9, Rule "9 of the Re0ised Rules
of 'ourt was erroneous.
A cursory perusal of +ection 9, Rule "9 of the Re0ised Rules of 'ourt re0eals that nothing therein pre0ents
a creditor from proceeding against the sur0i0ing solidary debtors. +aid pro0ision merely sets up the
procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor chooses to pursue his claim against the estate of the
deceased solidary debtor. /he rule has been set forth that a creditor 2in a solidary obligation7 has the
option whether to 5le or not to 5le a claim against the estate of the solidary debtor. *n construing +ection
9, Rule "% of the old Rules of 'ourt, which is the precursor of +ection 9, Rule "9 of the Re0ised Rules of
'ourt, this 'ourt said, in the case of 8anila ,urety N 6idelity Co., )nc. +s. Aillarama, et al. 21=% 6hil. "$17
that3
*t is e0ident from the foregoing that +ection 9 of Rule "% 2of the 7ld Rules of 'ourt7 pro0ides
the procedure should the creditor desire to go against the deceased debtor, but there is
certainly nothing in the said pro0ision ma:ing compliance with such procedure a condition
precedent before an ordinary action against the sur0i0ing debtors, should the creditor
choose to demand payment from the latter, could be entertained to the extent that failure to
obser0e the same would depri0e the court Durisdiction to 8ta:e cogniJance of the action
against the sur0i0ing debtors. .pon the other hand, the 'i0il 'ode expressly allow the
creditor to proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously.
*t is crystal clear that Article 1!19 of the New 'i0il 'ode is the applicable pro0ision in this matter. +aid
pro0ision gi0es the creditor the night to >proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of
them simultaneously. >/he choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to determine against whom he
will enforce collection. *n case of the death of one of the solidary debtors, he 2the creditor7 may, if he so
chooses, proceed against the sur0i0ing solidary debtors without necessity of 5ling a claim in the estate of
the deceased debtors. *t is not mandatory for him to ha0e the case dismissed as against the sur0i0ing
debtors and 5le its claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor, as was made apparent in the
afore?uoted decision. -or to re?uire the creditor to proceed against the estate, ma:ing it a condition
precedent for any collection action against the sur0i0ing debtors to prosper, would depri0e him of his
substanti0e rights pro0ided by Article 1!19 of the New 'i0il 'ode.
As correctly argued by petitioner, if +ection 9, Rule "9 of the Re0ised Rules of 'ourt were applied literally,
Article 1!19 of the New 'i0il 'ode would, in eGect, be repealed since under the Rules of 'ourt, petitioner
has no choice but to proceed against the estate of )anuel <arredo only. (b0iously, this pro0ision
diminishes the <an:8s right under the New 'i0il 'ode to proceed against any one, some or all of the
solidary debtors. +uch a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to re?uire
citation, that a substanti0e law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. (therwise stated, +ection 9, Rule
"9 of the Re0ised Rules of 'ourt cannot be made to pre0ail o0er Article 1!19 of the New 'i0il 'ode, the
former being merely procedural, while the latter, substanti0e
)oreo0er, no less than the New 'onstitution of the 6hilippines, in +ection &, Article C, pro0ides that rules
promulgated by the +upreme 'ourt should not diminish, increase or modify substanti0e rights.
WH,R,-(R,, F.1G),N/ *+ H,R,<I R,N1,R,1 )(1*-I*NG /H, A66,AL,1 (R1,R+ (- R,+6(N1,N/
'(.R/ 1A/,1 N(4,)<,R !$, 1$%9 AN1 FAN.ARI !9, 1$%% *N /H, +,N+, /HA/ A+ AGA*N+/ /H,
1,',A+,1 )AN.,L H. <ARR,1(, /H, 'A+, *+ 1*+)*++,1, <./ A+ AGA*N+/ ALL /H, (/H,R +(L*1ARI
1,</(R+, /H, 'A+, *+ R,)AN1,1 /( R,+6(N1,N/ '(.R/ -(R -.R/H,R 6R(',,1*NG+.
N( '(+/+.
+( (R1,R,1.
!$. Whene0er there is a conMict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must gi0e way.
G.R. No. L!9%=! (ctober 1", 1$%$
F.AN A.G.+/( <. 6R*)*'*A+, plaintiGappellee,
0s.
/H, ).N*'*6AL*/I (- .R1AN,/A, 6ANGA+*NAN, ,/ AL., defendantsappellants.

/he main issue in this appeal is the 0alidity of (rdinance No. #, +eries of 1$9;, enacted on )arch 1#,1$9;
by the )unicipal 'ouncil of .rdaneta, 6angasinan, which was declared null and 0oid by the 'ourt of -irst
*nstance of Lingayen, 6angasinan, in its decision dated Fune !$, 1$99, the dispositi0e portion of which
reads as follows3
WH,R,-(R,, this 'ourt renders decision declaring (rdinance No, #, +eries of 1$9;, to be
null and 0oidA ma:ing the writ of preliminary inDunction heretofore issued against the
defendant, -elix 1. +oriano de5nite and permanentA and further restraining the defendants,
Amadeo R. 6ereJ, Fr., LorenJo G. +uyat and ,stanislao Andrada, from enforcing the said
ordinance all throughout .rdanetaA and ordering the said defendants to return to the plaintiG
his dri0ers 2sic7 license '*N =1%9;;, a copy of which is ,xhibit 11, and to pay the costs of
suit.
1

-rom the aforecited decision, defendants appealed to this 'ourt. /he antecedent facts of this case are as
follows3
!

(n -ebruary ", 1$9&, Fuan Augusta <. 6rimacias plaintiG appellee, was dri0ing his car within the Durisdiction
of .rdaneta when a member of .rdaneta8s )unicipal 6olice as:ed him to stop. He was told, upon stopping,
that he had 0iolated )unicipal (rdinance No. #, +eries of 1$9;, >and more particularly, for o0erta:ing a
truc:.> /he policeman then as:ed for plaintiG8s license which he surrendered, and a temporary operator8s
permit was issued to him. /his incident too: place about !== meters away from a school building, at <arrio
Nancamaliran, .rdaneta.
/hereafter, a criminal complaint was 5led in the )unicipal 'ourt of .rdaneta against 6rimicias for 0iolation
of (rdinance No. #, +eries of 1$9;. 1ue to the institution of the criminal case, plaintiG 6rimicias initiated an
action for the annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary inDunction for the
purpose of restraining defendants )unicipality of .rdaneta, )ayor 6ereJ, 6olice 'hief +uyat, Fudge +oriano
and 6atrolman Andrada from enforcing the ordinance. /he writ was issued and Fudge +oriano was enDoined
from further proceeding in the criminal case.
After trial, the 'ourt of -irst *nstance rendered the ?uestioned decision holding that the ordinance was null
and 0oid and had been repealed by Republic Act No. ;1#9, otherwise :nown as the Land /ransportation
and /raEc 'ode. Now, defendants, appellants herein, allege that the lower court erred in3
#

1. declaring that )unicipal (rdinance No. # 2+eries of 1$9;7 of .rdaneta is null and 0oidA
!. re?uiring the municipal council of .rdaneta in the enactment of said ordinance to gi0e
maximum allowable speed and to ma:e classi5cation of highwaysA
#. holding that said ordinance is in conMict with section #& par. b2;7 of Republic Act ;1#9A
;. re?uiring that said ordinance be appro0ed by the Land /ransportation 'ommissionerA
&. holding that said ordinance is not clear and de5nite in its termsA
9. issuing exparte a writ of inDunction to restrain the proceedings in criminal case no. #1;=.
/he ordinance in ?uestion pro0ides3
;

+,'/*(N 1 /hat the following speed limits for 0ehicular traEc along the National Highway
and the 6ro0incial Roads within the territorial limits of .rdaneta shall be as follows3
a. /hru crowded streets approaching intersections at 8blind corners, passing
school Jones or thic:ly populated areas, duly mar:ed with sign posts, the
maximum speed limit allowable shall be != :ph.
+,'/*(N ! /hat any person or persons caught dri0ing any motor 0ehicle 0iolating the
pro0isions of this ordinance shall be 5ned 61=.== for the 5rst oGenseA 6!=.== for the second
oGenseA and 6#=.== for the third and succeeding oGenses, the )unicipal Fudge shall
recommend the cancellation of the license of the oGender to the )otor 4ehicle8s (Ece
2)4(7A or failure to pay the 5ne imposed, he shall suGer a subsidiary imprisonment in
accordance with law.
Appellants contend that the (rdinance is 0alid, being >patterned after and based on +ection &#,
&
par. ; of
Act No. #$$!, as amended 2Re0ised )otor 4ehicle Law7.> *n so arguing, appellants fail to note that Act No.
#$$! has been superseded by Republic Act No. ;1#9, the Land /ransportation and 8/raEc 'ode, which
became eGecti0e on Fune !=, 1$9;, about three months after the ?uestioned ordinance was appro0ed by
.rdaneta8s )unicipal 'ouncil. /he explicit repeal of the aforesaid Act is embodied in +ection 9#, Republic
Act No. ;1#9, to wit3
Act Numbered thirtynine hundred ninetytwo 2#$$!7 as amended, and all laws, executi0e
orders, ordinance, resolutions, regulations or paints thereof in conMict with the pro0isions of
this Act are repealed.
<y this express repeal, and the general rule that a later law pre0ails o0er an earlier law,
9
appellants are in
error in contending that >a later enactment of the law relating to the same subDect matter as that of an
earlier statute is not suEcient to cause an implied repeal of the original law.> 6ursuant to +ection 9#,
Republic Act No. ;1#9, the ordinance at bar is thus placed within the ambit of Republic Act No. ;1#9, and
not Act No. #$$!. /he 0alidity of (rdinance No. #, +eries of 1$9;, must therefore be determined 0isa0is
Republic Act No. ;1#9, the >mother statute> so to spea:, which was in force at the time the criminal case
was brought against 6rimicias for the 0iolation of the said ordinance.
An essential re?uisite for a 0alid ordinance is, among others, that is >must not contra0ene . . . the statute,>
%
for it is a >fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the
laws of the state.>
"
-ollowing this general rule, whene0er there is a conMict between an ordinance and a
statute, the ordinance >must gi0e way.
$

+ince the (rdinance is aimed at regulating traEc, 'hapter *4 /raEc Rules7, Article * 2+peed Limits and
Peeping to the Right7, consisting of sections #&, to #" of Republic Act No. ;1#9, particularly +ections #&,
#9, #" contain the pro0isions material to its 0alidity. +ection #& 2b7, Republic Act No. ;1#9, which too: the
place of +ection &#, par. 2;7, Act No. #$$!, pro0ides restrictions as to speed thus3
)AC*).) ALL(WA<L, +6,,1+
6assenger cars and )otor truc:s
motorcycle and buses
1. (n open country roads, with
>blind corners> not closely bordered
by habitation. "= :m. &= :m.
!. (n through streets or per hour per hour
boule0ards, clear of traEc, with >no
blind corners> when so designated. ;= :m. #= :m.
#. (n city and municipal per hour per hour
streets, with light traEc, when not
designated >through streets.> #= :m. #= :m.
;. /hrough crowded streets ap per hour per hour
proaching intersection at >blind cor
ners,> passing school Jones, passing
other 0ehicles which are stationary, or
for similar circumstances. != :m. != :m.
per hour per hour
A loo: at the aforecited section and +ection 1, par. 2a7 of the (rdinance shows that the latter is more or
less a restatement only of number 2;7, par. 2b7, +ection #&. As obser0ed by the trial court, the (rdinance
>refers to only one of the four classi5cations mentioned in paragraph 2b7, +ection #&.>
1=
limiting the rates
of speed for
0ehicular traEc along the national highway and /he pro0incial roads within the territorial
limits of .rdaneta to != :ilometers per hour without regard to whether the road is an open
country roads 2six7, or through streets or boule0ards, or city or municipal streets with light
traEc.
11

As also found correctly by the lower court, the )unicipal 'ouncil of .rdaneta did not ma:e any
classi5cation of its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit re?uirement laid down by +ection #", Republic
Act No. ;1#9, which pro0ides3
'lassi5cation of highways. 6ublic highways shall be properly classi5ed for traEc purposes
by the pro0incial board or city council ha0ing Durisdiction o0er them, and said pro0incial
board, municipal board or city council shall pro0ide appropriate signs therefor, subDect to the
appro0al of the 'ommissioner. *t shall be the duty of e0ery pro0incial, city and municipal
secretary to certify to the 'ommissioner the names, locations, and limits of all >through
streets> designated as such by the pro0incial board, municipal board or council.
.nder this section, a local legislati0e body intending to control traEc in public highways
1!
is supposed to
classify, 5rst, and then mar: them with proper signs, all to be appro0ed by the Land /ransportation
'ommissioner. /o hold that the pro0isions of +ection #" are mandatory is sanctioned by a ruling
1#
that
statutes which confer upon a public body or oEcer . . . power to perform acts which concern
the public interests or rights of indi0iduals, are generally, regarded as mandatory although
the language is permissi0e only since the are construed as imposing duties rather than
conferring pri0ileges.
/he classi5cations which must be based on +ection #& are necessary in 0iew of +ection #9 which states
that >no pro0incial, city or municipal authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance or resolution specifying
maximum allowable speeds other than those pro0ided in this Act.> *n this case, howe0er, there is no
showing that the mar:ing of the streets and areas falling under +ection 1, par. 2a7, (rdinance No. #, +eries
of 1$9;, was done with the appro0al of the Land /ransportation 'ommissioner. /hus, on this 0ery ground
alone, the (rdinance becomes in0alid. +ince it lac:s the re?uirement imposed by +ection #", the
pro0incial, city, or municipal board or council is enDoined under +ection 9! of the Land /ransportation and
/raEc 'ode from >enacting or enforcing any ordinance or resolution in conMict with the pro0isions of this
Act.>
Regarding the contention that the lower court erred in holding that said >(rdinance is not clear and
de5nite in its terms.> We agree with the 'ourt a =uo that when the )unicipal 'ouncil of .rdaneta used the
phrase >0ehicular traEc> 2+ection 1, (rdinance7 it >did not distinguish between passenger cars and motor
0ehicles and motor truc:s and buses.>
1;
/his conclusion is bolstered by the fact that nowhere in the
(rdinance is >0ehicular traEc> de5ned. 'onsidering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness,
de5niteness and certainty are all the more important so that >an a0erage man should be able with due
care, after reading it,, to understand and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or
courses of conduct.>
1&
*n comparison, +ection #&2b7, Republic Act No. ;1#9 on which +ection 1 of the
(rdinance must be based, stated that the rates of speed enumerated therein refer to motor 0ehicle,
19

specifying the speed for each :ind of 0ehicle. At the same time, to a0oid 0agueness, Art. 11, +ection #
de5nes what a motor 0ehicle is and passenger automobiles are.
(n the issue of whether a writ of inDunction can restrain the proceedings in 'riminal 'ase No. #1;=, the
general rule is that >ordinarily, criminal prosecution may not be bloc:ed by court prohibition or inDunction.>
1%
,xceptions howe0er are allowed in the following instances3
1. for the orderly administration of DusticeA
!. to pre0ent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressi0e and 0indicti0e mannerA
#. to a0oid multiplicity of actionsA
;. to aGord ade?uate protection to constitutional rightsA
&. in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was held in0alid.
1"

/he local statute or ordinance at bar being in0alid, the exception Dust cited obtains in this case. Hence, the
lower court did not err in issuing the writ of inDunction against defendants. )oreo0er, considering that >our
law on municipal corporations is in principle patterned after that of the .nited +tates, >
1$
it would not be
amiss for .s to adopt in this instance the ruling that to enDoin the enforcement of a 0oid ordinance,
>inDunction has fre?uently been sustained in order to pre0ent a multiplicity of prosecutions under it.>
!=

*n 0iew of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby aErmed.
+( (R1,R,1.