1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DOMINGO PANIS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales &
Olongapo City, Branch III and SERAPIO ABUG, respondents.

CRUZ, J:
The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of P.D. 442, otherwise
known as the Labor Code, reading as follows:
(b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to
two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales
and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first
securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-
charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a
private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising
employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in violation of
Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code.
1

Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense
because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four
informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal
recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any
employment for a fee. "
2

Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted in the Orders of the trial
court dated June 24 and September 17, 1981. The prosecution is now before us on
certiorari.
3

The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article
39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However,
as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper
authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition of
recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.
The view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the
acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or mre persons as an
indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of
two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an
offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee. The
other acts mentioned in the body of the article may involve even only one person and are
not necessarily for profit.
Neither interpretation is acceptable. We fail to see why the proviso should speak only of an
offer or promise of employment if the purpose was to apply the requirement of two or more
persons to all the acts mentioned in the basic rule. For its part, the petitioner does not
explain why dealings with two or more persons are needed where the recruitment and
placement consists of an offer or promise of employment but not when it is done through
"canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers.
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to
provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that
the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing
with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of
employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers. "
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and
placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) win
constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The
proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of
a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or
entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and
placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for example,
regarding the failure of a public officer to produce upon lawful demand funds or property
entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall beprima facie evidence that he has put them to
personal use; in other words, he shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or property.
In the instant case, the word "shall be deemed" should by the same token be given the force
2

of a disputable presumption or of prima facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and
placement. (Klepp vs. Odin Tp., McHenry County 40 ND N.W. 313, 314.)
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for
lack of records of debates and deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the
Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential decree. The trouble with
presidential decrees is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued without previous
public discussion or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of
his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are rejection,
intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant case, certain
esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the
legislative journals.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against
illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a
better life in a foreign land, and investing hard- earned savings or even borrowed funds in
pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands
of theirown countrymen.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981, are set aside and the
four informations against the private respondent reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, CJ, Abad Santos, Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay,
Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 125044 July 13, 1998
IMELDA DARVIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No.
15624 dated January 31, 1996,
1
which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite, convicting accused-appellant, Imelda Darvin for simple
illegal recruitment under Article 38 and Article 39, in relation to Article 13 (b) and (c), of the
Labor Code as amended.
Accused-appellant was charged under the following information:
That on our about the 13th day of April 1992, in the Municipality of
Bacoor, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through fraudulent
representation to one Macaria Toledo to the effect that she has the
authority to recruit workers and employees for abroad and can facilitate
the necessary papers in connection thereof, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, hire, recruit and promise a job abroad to one
Macaria Toledo, without first securing the necessary license and permit
from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration to do so,
thereby causing damage and prejudice to the aforesaid Macaria Toledo.
Contrary to law.
2

The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of private respondent, Macaria
Toledo, shows that sometime in March, 1992, she met accused-appellant Darvin in the
latter's residence at Dimasalang, Imus, Cavite, through the introduction of their common
friends, Florencio Jake Rivera and Leonila Rivera. In said meeting, accused-appellant allegedly
convinced Toledo that by giving her P150,000.00, the latter can immediately leave for the
United States without any appearance before the U.S. embassy.
3
Thus, on April 13, 1992,
Toledo gave Darvin the amount of P150,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt stating that the
"amount of P150,000.00 was for U.S. Visa and Air fare."
4
After receiving the money, Darvin
assured Toledo that she can leave within one week. However, when after a week, there was
no word from Darvin, Toledo went to her residence to inquire about any development, but
could not find Darvin. Thereafter, on May 7, 1992, Toledo filed a complaint with the Bacoor
Police Station against Imelda Darvin. Upon further investigation, a certification was issued by
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) stating that Imelda Darvin is
neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.
5
Accused-
appellant was then charged for estafa and illegal recruitment by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cavite.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, testified that she used to be connected with Dale
Travel Agency and that in 1992, or thereabouts, she was assisting individuals in securing
3

passports, visa, and airline tickets. She came to know Toledo through Florencio Jake Rivera,
Jr. and Leonila Rivera, alleging that Toledo sought her help to secure a passport, US visa and
airline tickets to the States. She claims that she did not promise any employment in the U.S.
to Toledo. She, however, admits receiving the amount of P150,000.00 from the latter on
April 13, 1992 but contends that it was used for necessary expenses of an intended trip to
the United States of Toledo and her friend, Florencio Rivera
6
as follows. P45,000.00 for plane
fare for one person; P1,500.00 for passport, documentation and other incidental expenses
for each person; P20,000.00 for visa application cost for each person; and P17,000.00 for
services.
7
After receiving the money, she allegedly told Toledo that the papers will be
released within 45 days. She likewise testified that she was able to secure Toledo's passport
on April 20, 1992 and even set up a date for an interview with the US embassy. Accused
alleged that she was not engaged in illegal recruitment but merely acted as a travel agent in
assisting individuals to secure passports and visa.
In its judgment rendered on June 17, 1993, the Bacoor, Cavite RTC found accused-appellant
guilty of the crime of simple illegal recruitment but acquitted her of the crime of estafa. The
dispositive portion of the judgment reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Imelda Darvin is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Illegal
Recruitment for having committed the prohibited practice as defined by
paragraph (b) of Article 34 and punished by paragraph (c) of Article 39 of
the Labor Code, as amended by PD 2018.
Accused Imelda Darvin is hereby ordered to suffer the prison term of
Four (4) years, as minimum, to Eight (8) years, as maximum; and to pay
the fine of P25,000.00.
Regarding her civil liability, she is hereby ordered to reimburse the
private complainant the sum of P150,000.00 and attorney's fees of
P10,000.00.
She is hereby acquitted of the crime of Estafa.
SO ORDERED.
8

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this
petition.
Before this Court, accused-appellant assails the decision of the trial and appellate courts in
convicting her of the crime of simple illegal recruitment. She contends that based on the
evidence presented by the prosecution, her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
We find the appeal impressed with merit.
Art. 13 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides the definition of recruitment and placement
as:
. . .; b) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
On the other hand, Article 38 of the Labor Code provides:
a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-
licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and
Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints
under this Article.
xxx xxx xxx
Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements
need to be shown: (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment
activities; and (2) the said person does not have a license or authority to do so.
9

In this case, private respondent, Macaria Toledo alleged that she was offered a job in the
United States as nursing aide
10
by accused-appellant. In her direct examination, she testified
as follows:
Atty. Alejandro:
Q : How did you come to know the accused?
Witness : I was introduced by my two friends. One of
whom is my best friend. That according to them, this
accused has connections and authorizations, that she
can make people leave for abroad, sir.
Court : What connections?
Witness : That she has connections with the Embassy
and with people whom she can approach regarding
work abroad, your Honor.
4

xxx xxx xxx
Q : When you came to meet for the first time in Imus,
Cavite, what transpired in that meeting of yours?
A : When I came to her house, the accused convinced
me that by means of P150,000.00, I will be able to
leave immediately without any appearance to any
embassy, non-appearance, Sir.
Q : When you mentioned non-appearance, as told to
you by the accused, precisely, what do you mean by
that?
A : I was told by the accused that non-appearance,
means without working personally for my papers and
through her efforts considering that she is
capacitated as according to her I will be able to leave
the country, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Alejandro : What transpired after the accused
told you all these things that you will be able to
secure all the documents without appearing to
anybody or to any embassy and that you will be able
to work abroad?
Witness : She told me to get ready with my
P150,000.00, that is if I want to leave immediately,
Sir.
Atty. Alejandro : When you mentioned kaagad, how
many days or week?
Witness : She said that if I will able to part with my
P150,000.00. I will be able to leave in just one week
time, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
11

The prosecution, as evidence, presented the certification issued by the POEA that accused-
appellant Imelda Darvin is not licensed to recruit workers abroad.
It is not disputed that accused-appellant does not have a license or authority to engage in
recruitment activities. The pivotal issue to be determined, therefore, is whether the accused-
appellant indeed engaged in recruitment activities, as defined under the Labor Code.
Applying the rule laid down in the case of People v. Goce,
12
to prove that accused-appellant
was engaged in recruitment activities as to commit the crime of illegal recruitment, it must
be shown that the accused appellant gave private respondent the distinct impression that
she had the power or ability to send the private respondent abroad for work such that the
latter was convinced to part with her money in order to be so employed.
In this case, we find no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-ppellant offered a job to
private respondent. It is not clear that accused gave the impression that she was capable of
providing the private respondent work abroad. What is established, however, is that the
private respondent gave accused-appellant P150,000.00. The claim of the accused that the
P150,000.00 was for payment of private respondent's air fare and US visa and other
expenses cannot be ignored because the receipt for the P150,000.00, which was presented
by both parties during the trial of the case, stated that it was "for Air Fare and Visa to
USA."
13
Had the amount been for something else in addition to air fare and visa expenses,
such as work placement abroad, the receipt should have so stated.
By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual,
without more, can hardly qualify as recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of
private respondent, there is nothing to show that accused-appellant engaged in recruitment
activities. We also note that the prosecution did not present the testimonies of witnesses
who could have corroborated the charge of illegal recruitment, such as Florencio Rivera, and
Leonila Rivera, when it had the opportunity to do so. As it stands, the claim of private
respondent that accused-appellant promised her employment abroad is uncorroborated. All
these, taken collectively, cast reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
This Court can hardly rely on the bare allegations of private respondent that she was offered
by accused-appellant employment abroad, nor on mere presumptions and conjectures, to
convict the latter. No sufficient evidence was shown to sustain the conviction, as the burden
of proof lies with the prosecution to establish that accused-appellant indeed engaged in
recruitment activities, thus committing the crime of illegal recruitment.
In criminal cases, the burden is on the prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the
essential elements of the offense with which the accused is charged; and if the proof fails to
establish any of the essential elements necessary to constitute a crime, the defendant is
entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only
is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
14

At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion
that accused-appellant probably perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion alone is
insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt. When
the People's evidence fail to indubitably prove the accused' s authorship of the crime of
5

which he stands accused, then it is the Court's duty, and the accused's right, to proclaim his
innocence. Acquittal, therefore, is in order.
15

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 15624 dated January 31, 1996, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Imelda Darvin is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt. Accordingly, let the
accused be immediately released from her place of confinement unless there is reason to
detain her further for any other legal or valid cause. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 145734-35. October 15, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. VICENTA MEDINA LAPIS, ANGEL MATEO, AIDA
DE LEON (at large) and JEAN AM-AMLAW (at large), appellants.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Illegal recruiters prey on our gullible and impoverished people by inveigling them with
false or fraudulent promises of attractive employment in foreign shores. Such vultures
deserve the full sanction of the law.
The Case
Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel Mateo appeal the March 6, 2000 Joint Decision
[1]
of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City (Branch 138), finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and estafa. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court rules
1. In Criminal Case No. 99-1112[,] accused Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel
Mateo are pronounced guilty of violating Section 6, of Republic Act No. 8042, the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and they are both sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment. Pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 7, Republic Act No. 8042,
considering that both accused are non-licensers or non-holders of authority, they are both
sentenced to pay fines of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) each. Both accused are ordered
to indemnify both complainants jointly and severally of the amount of P118,000.00, the net
amount after deducting the recovery of P40,000.00. They are likewise ordered to pay both
complainants jointly and severally the amounts of P24,000.00 as reimbursement for traveling
expenses; P4,000.00 as rental for boarding house, and P100,000.00 as unrealized income;
2. In Criminal Case No. 99-1113[,] accused Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel
Mateo are guilty of violating Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code and they are both
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
No civil liability need be imposed considering that in Criminal Case No. 99-1112 the
same was already provided.
Let the case as against Jane Am-amlao and Aida de Leon be sent to the archives to be
revived upon arrest, surrender or acquisition of jurisdiction over their person.
SO ORDERED.
[2]

Two separate Informations,
[3]
both dated April 20, 1999, charged appellants with
syndicated illegal recruitment under Republic Act (RA) 8042
[4]
and estafa under paragraph 2
(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
[5]

In Criminal Case No. 99-1112, they were charged as follows:
That on or about March, 1998 and thereafter in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit
the herein complainants, MELCHOR F. DEGSI and PERPETUA L. DEGSI for employment as an
office worker and as a cook or mechanic in Japan, for and in consideration thereof, they were
required to pay the amount of P158,600.00 as alleged placement and processing fees, which
the complainants delivered and paid the amount ofP158,600.00 Philippine Currency, without
the accused having deployed the complainants despite the lapse of several months, to their
damage and prejudice.
[6]

In Criminal Case No. 99-1113, the Information reads:
That on or about March, 1998 and thereafter in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating with each other, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
recruit and promise employment to spouses MELCHOR and PERPETUA DEGSI in Japan for a
total consideration of one hundred fifty eight thousand and six hundred pesos (P158,600.00)
as placement and processing fees, knowing that they have no capacity whatsoever and with
6

no intention to fulfill their promise, but merely as a pretext, scheme or excuse to get or exact
money from said complainant as they in fact collected and received the amount
of P158,600.00 from said MELCHOR and PERPETUA DEGSI to their damage, loss and prejudice
for the aforesaid amount.
[7]

With the assistance of their counsel de oficio,
[8]
appellants pleaded not guilty to the
charges during their arraignment on July 27, 1999.
[9]

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) relates how appellants, despite their lack of
authority or license, represented themselves as persons who had the capacity to send the
victims abroad for employment. We quote its version of the facts as follows:
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, Melchor Degsi and Perpetua Degsi
(Complainants for brevity) and Priscilla Marreo (or Priscilla Marelo).
The prosecution and appellants stipulated that appellants are not licensed or authorized to
recruit workers for employment abroad, in lieu of the testimony of Senior Labor Researcher
Johnson Bolivar of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
Complainants are husband and wife, residents of Baguio City. They made a living earning an
average of P20,000.00 a month by selling fish and vegetables in a rented stall in said City, at
least until March 24, 1998 when they closed shop for reasons of attending to the demands of
the promised jobs for them in Japan. Both categorically identified Jane Am-amlao (or Jean
Am-amlaw), their co-vendor in Baguio City Market, as the person who approached them and
assured them that she knew a legal recruiter, an ex-POEA employee, who had the capacity to
send them both abroad. Jane Am-amlaw (or Am-amlaw for brevity) recruited complainants
and personally accompanied them on March 24, 1998 to meet the person she earlier
referred to, or Aida de Leon (or Alma de Leon), in the latters apartment at No. 7280 J. Victor
St., Pio del Pilar, Makati.
Complainants likewise categorically identified Aida de Leon (de leon for brevity) as the
person who arranged a meeting in her apartment on March 24, 1998 between complainants
and appellant Angel Mateo (Mateo for brevity) whom de Leon introduced as their contact
person for Japan-bound workers. In said meeting, Mateo represented himself as having the
capacity to send people abroad and showed complainants various documents to convince
them of his legitimate recruitment operations. Convinced that Mateo had indeed the
capacity to facilitate their employment as an office worker and as a cook or mechanic in
Japan, complainants, on that same day, handed Mateo P15,000.00 which Mateo required
them to pay for their processing fees. This was to be the first of a series of sums of money to
be extracted from complainants.
Complainants were able to positively identify Mateo in court as the contact person of de
Leon and who collected from them, from March 24, 1998 to June 23, 1998, sums of money
for the alleged necessary expenses relative to the promised jobs awaiting them in Japan in
the total amount of P158,600.00. Complainants likewise categorically identified Mateo as
the same person whose authorization was needed for the recovery of P40,000.00 of
the P45,000.00 they gave Mateo who in turn deposited it to Sampaguita Travel Agency under
his own name.
Complainants likewise positively identified appellant Vicenta Vicky Lapis (Lapis for brevity)
in Court as the person introduced to them by Mateo as his wife on April 29, 1998 at Maxs
Restaurant in Makati when Lapis required complainants to pay P49,240.00 for their plane
tickets and travel taxes. Lapis is, in fact, only the live-in partner of Mateo. Lapis told
complainants that she was helping to speed up the process[ing] of their papers relative to
the promised jobs awaiting them in Japan. Complainants met again Lapis, who was with
Mateo on May 2, 1998 at the Makati Restaurant, annex of Maxs Restaurant, when Lapis
assured them that Mateo could really send them abroad and even wrote in a piece of paper
appellants address at Phase I, Lot 14, Blk 13 Mary Cris Subd., Imus, Cavite. On May 17, 1998,
complainants once more met Lapis who was with Mateo, de Leon and de Leons husband in
Baguio City at the house of Priscilla Marreos daughter. Both appellants updated
complainant as to the status of their paper and reiterated their promise that complainants
would soon be leaving for Japan, then collected from complainants unreceipted amount
of P20,000.00. Complainants met again with Lapis, who was again with Mateo, on May 19,
1998 at the Sampaguita Travel Agency. Mateo extracted P45,000.00 from complainants and
deposited it under his name. On that occasion, Perpetua wanted to ask from the Sampaguita
Travel Agencys employees where to pay the P45,000.00 but failed to do so because Lapis
took her attention away from asking while Mateo asked Melchor to hand over to him said
sum.
Priscilla Marreo (Priscilla for brevity) is the sister of Melchor who loaned complainants part
of the P158,000.00 which appellants extracted from complainant[s]. Thus, she made herself
present in most of the meetings between complainants and appellants together with the two
other accused where she witnessed the assurances and promises made by appellants relative
to complainants immediate departure for Japan and their corresponding demands of sums
of money. The testimony of Priscilla underscored the testimony of complainants showing
that Am-amlaw, de Leon, Lapis and Mateo indeed corroborated and confederated in the
commission of illegal recruitment.
The prosecution presented documentary evidence, such as varied unofficial receipts all
bearing the signature of Mateo; Sinumpaang Salaysay of Perpetua L. Degsi executed on July
21, 1998; Affidavit executed by complainants on July 21, 1998; Requirement for Guarantee
Letter of Visa bearing the names of both private complainants; Request for Certification of
7

POEA-CIDG, Team to Mr. Hermogenes Mateo, Director II, Licensing Branch of POEA as
represented by Johnson Bolivar, Senior Labor Researcher of POEA, and the various
documents that complainants alleged to have been shown to them by Mateo to prove the
legality of his recruitment operations.
[10]
(Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
For their part, appellants deny that they were engaged in recruitment activities, and
that they promised foreign employment to the victims. Below is the version of the facts
presented by the defense:
VICENTA MEDINA LAPIS testified that she is the live-in partner of her co-accused
Mateo. They have been living together for almost three (3) years. According to her, she first
met both complainants at Maxs Restaurant in Makati when they talked to accused
Mateo. She was there only to accompany her live-in partner. The subject of the
conversation between the complainants and accused Mateo was a contract in Baguio
City. She did not see complainant deliver money to accused Mateo while they were in that
meeting. She also has no knowledge about the transaction between complainant and
accused Mateo. She admitted that she went to Baguio City together with accused Mateo to
talk to the City Mayor. She likewise admitted that the handwriting appearing in Exhibit F is
hers but the reason why she gave it was only to comply to the request of the complainant
Perpetua Degsi regarding a matter to be followed up at the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). The result of her follow-up rendered was that complainant Perpetua Degsi has a
pending case of estafa.
ANGEL MATEO averred that he is engaged in the importation of heavy equipment and
containers but he has never been engaged in recruitment. To prove that he was really
engaged in the delivery of heavy equipment, he presented a document of Import Service
signed by a certain Alexander Arcilla addressed to Honorable Timoteo Encar Jr., City Mayor,
Cavite City dated March 14, 1997 and were marked as Exhibit 1 and 1-a. He also
presented another document of Import Services issued by the Department of Trade and
Industry addressed to Honorable Mayor Maliksi as Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite; a
photocopy of a Bill of Lading from Trade Bulk cargoes by Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.; and
Invoice of used vehicles, airconditioners and washing machines and the packing list which
were all marked as Exhibits 3 to 5. Sometime in March 24, 1998, he met the complainants at
Pio del Pilar, in Makati City at the apartment of accused Aida de Leon. He went there to
follow-up their transaction about heavy equipment with Mayor Binay because, it was
accused de Leon who entered the transaction with Mayor Binay. While he was there, the
complainants were introduced to him by accused de Leon. He admitted meeting the
complainants on April 29, 1998 at Maxs Restaurant but the reason was for him to meet Mrs.
Marero in person and also because complainant Perpetua Degsi has a pending case for large
scale estafa and she needed a clearance. He denied having signed Exhibit B. He further
claimed that the topic of their meeting was to supply heavy equipment in Baguio City. He
denied having asked for P50,000.00 on May 6, 1999. He likewise denied signing the receipt
showing the total amount of P158,600.00.
[11]

The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court held that the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently established the
criminal liability of appellants for the crimes charged. It ruled in this manner:
Evidence for the prosecution clearly established that both complainants were enticed by
accused Mateo and were led to believe that the latter has the capacity to send them for
employment to Japan. Complainant Melchor Degsi and his wife Perpetua Degsi both testified
to this fact. Acting on their belief that indeed accused Mateo can deploy them to Japan,
amounts were disbursed by both complainants to accused Mateo to cover the processing
and placement fees. x x x The Court finds the evidence presented by the prosecution
sufficient to establish that accused Mateo violated Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 when
he demanded amounts for placement and processing fees but he failed to deploy both
complainants. The Court has a similar conclusion insofar as the accusation for estafa is
concerned as the evidence shows accused Mateo knew beforehand that he has no capacity
to deploy both complainants abroad and that the enticement to work abroad was merely a
scheme or plan to exact money from both complainants. Deception was proven.
Insofar as the accused Lapis is concerned it is to be noted that the theory of the prosecution
is that she acted in conspiracy with her co-accused Mateo who is her live-in
partner. Evidence for the prosecution shows that at least on three (3) occasions accused
Lapis was present when accused Mateo asked and received money from complainants in
connection with their intended employment in Japan. x x x The Court conclude[d] that
accused Lapis has knowledge of the intention of her co-accused Mateo in asking for money
from both complainants. There was active participation on her part in the recruitment of
both complainants and in deceiving them about the capacity to secure employment. The
Court believes that conspiracy was established beyond reasonable doubt. Her defense of
ignorance of the transaction cannot be considered given the positive evidence presented by
the prosecution which should prevail over her plain denial.
[12]

Hence, this appeal.
[13]

The Issues
In their Brief, appellants interpose the following assignment of errors:
I
8

The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violations of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995)
committed by a syndicate and Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
II
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellant Vicenta Medina Lapis guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and estafa.
III
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate.
IV
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code as amended.
[14]

The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue:
Syndicated Illegal Recruitment
Appellants aver that the finding of syndicated illegal recruitment by the lower court
was erroneous; its conclusion that the offense was committed by three (3) or more persons
had no factual or legal basis. Allegedly, without sufficient evidence, the trial court wrongfully
presumed that all of them had acted in conspiracy. According to them, the prosecution failed
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they had conspired and confederated in illegally
recruiting complainants. Appellants conclude that, if at all, they could only be held liable for
illegal recruitment in its simple form. We disagree.
Illegal recruitment is committed when these two elements concur: (1) the offenders
have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers, and (2) the offenders undertake any activity within
the meaning of recruitment and placement
[15]
defined in Article 13(b) or any prohibited
practices enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code.
[16]

Under Article 13(b), recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers[;] and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not. In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons
who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power
to send workers abroad for employment purposes.
[17]

We believe that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of the offense
sufficiently. The case records reveal that appellants did in fact engage in recruitment and
placement activities by promising complainants employment in Japan. Undisputed is the fact
that the former did not have any valid authority or license to engage in recruitment and
placement activities. Moreover, the pieces of testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by the prosecution clearly show that, in consideration of their promise of foreign
employment, they indeed received various amounts of money from complainants
totalling P158,600.
Where appellants made misrepresentations concerning their purported power and
authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process, collected from
complainants various amounts in the guise of placement fees, the former clearly committed
acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.
[18]
In fact, this Court held that illegal recruiters need
not even expressly represent themselves to the victims as persons who have the ability to
send workers abroad. It is enough that these recruiters give the impression that they have
the ability to enlist workers for job placement abroad in order to induce the latter to tender
payment of fees.
[19]

It is also important to determine whether illegal recruitment committed by appellants
can be qualified as a syndicated illegal recruitment or an offense involving economic
sabotage.
Section 6 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995, provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage when it is committed by a syndicate or carried out by a group of three or
more persons conspiring and confederating with one another.
In several cases, illegal recruitment has been deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with each
other in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under
Article 38(b) of the Labor Code.
[20]

In this case, it cannot be denied that all four (4) accused -- Jane Am-amlaw, Aida de
Leon, Angel Mateo and Vicenta Medina Lapis participated in a network of deception. Verily,
the active involvement of each in the various phases of the recruitment scam formed part of
a series of machinations. Their scheme was to lure complainants to Manila and to divest
them of their hard-earned money on the pretext of guaranteed employment abroad. The
prosecution evidence shows that complainants were convinced by Jane Am-amlaw to go to
9

Manila to meet someone who could find employment for them abroad. Upon reaching the
city, they were introduced to Aida de Leon and Angel Mateo; Mateo claimed to have the
contacts, the resources and the capacity to employ them overseas. After that initial meeting,
complainants made several payments to him, supposedly for the processing requirements of
their deployment to Japan. Later on, they met Vicenta Medina Lapis who volunteered her
assistance in the processing of their employment papers and assured them that Mateo could
easily send them abroad. Complainant Perpetua Degsi testified on the devious trail of
transactions with all of the accused as follows:
Q How did you come to know the accused in this case?
A They were introduced to me by one Aida de Leon and Jane Am-Amlao.
Q Who is this Jane Am-Amlao you are referring to?
A She is our co-member in Baguio.
Q What is she in relation to your recruitment by Angel Mateo and Vicenta
Lapis?
A She was the first one who mentioned to us that she knows somebody who
has the capacity to send us abroad.
Q When was this?
A March, 1998.
Q When Jane Am-Amlao told you that she knows somebody who has the
capacity to send you abroad what happened next?
A On March 24, 1998 Jane accompanied us here in Manila.
Q Where in Manila particularly?
A At No. 72 J. Victor Street, Pio del Pilar, Makati in the apartment of Aida de
Leon.
Q So what happened at the apartment of Aida de Leon?
A Jane told us that Aida de Leon was an ex-employee of POEA and she was able
to send many workers abroad.
Q Were you able to meet Aida de Leon?
A Yes, maam.
Q What happened when you met her?
A Aida called us by phone and according to her she has the contact person who
can explain [to] us the details on how to be able to work abroad.
Q After Aida called you up on the phone what happened next?
A We waited because according to her, that person is coming over to the
house.
Q A[fter] waiting what happened after that?
A ANGEL MATEO arrived and he was introduced to me as the contact person
and we could ask him how we could work abroad.
Q Who is this siya, you are referring to?
A ANGEL MATEO.
Q Who introduced you to ANGEL MATEO?
A AIDA DE LEON.
Q After introducing you to ANGEL MATEO what happened?
A ANGEL MATEO showed us some documents AND HE WAS ABLE TO convince
us that he has the capacity to send us abroad.
Q What documents were shown to you?
A Incorporation documents of two companies one, Philippine company and
one is Japan company and some other documents they made in order to
send workers abroad.
Q After convincing you that he can send you abroad what happened after that?
A He asked for a processing fee and I asked him how much.
Q What did he tell you?
A He told me that he does not know because AIDA DE LEON will be the one to
give us the price.
Q After that what happened?
A I asked AIDA how much and she answered, twenty thousand pesos.
Q After telling you that the amount is P20,000.00 what happened next?
A We went to the bank to withdraw P20,000.00 but we were only able to
withdraw P15,000.00 and then we handed the P15,000.00 to ANGEL
MATEO, in front of Jane Am-Amlaw.
Q After receiving said amount from you by ANGEL MATEO what happened
next?
A We parted ways.
Q Was there anything else that happened after that?
10

A Before we parted ways, [he] asked from us other documents like ID, birth
certificate, marriage contract in order for him to begin processing our
papers.
Q After that what happened next?
A On March 31, we went back to [him] and we gave [him] the other documents
needed and we also gave [him] the balance for the processing fee.
Q Who is this niya or he you are referring to?
A Angel Mateo.
Q Where did you meet?
A [He] called me and we met in the apartment of AIDA.
Q Were you able to meet ANGEL MATEO in the apartment of AIDA DE LEON?
A Yes.
Q What happened there?
A We gave [him] the documents and we started processing the documents
Q What are those documents that you gave to ANGEL MATEO?
A Birth certificate authenticated, marriage contract and passport IDs and then
we went to Pasay City to start the processing of the passport.
Q You told us that ANGEL MATEO asked for the balance of P5,000.00, were you
able to pay the said amount to ANGEL MATEO?
A Yes, maam.
x x x x x
x x x x
Q After receiving said amount of P5,000.00 what happened?
A After that meeting at Pasay City we parted ways but [he] did not issue us any
receipt so on April 15, [he] again called us up and told me that he needs
NBI clearance so we processed our NBI clearance.
Q You told us that ANGEL MATEO called you, where were you at that time?
A Baguio City.
Q Were you able to come here in Manila?
A Yes maam, we met in Quiapo.
Q Were you able to meet ANGEL MATEO in QUIAPO?
A [He] did not arrive in Quiapo.
Q So what did you do?
A We proceeded [to] the NBI and we called up AIDA and asked her why ANGEL
MATEO did not arrive and whom did AIDA talk to.
Q What was the reply of AIDA DE LEON?
A She told me that whatever ANGEL MATEO would tell us, thats what we
should follow.
Q After that what happened?
A The processing of our NBI clearance did not finish so on April 15 ANGEL
MATEO asked for P2,000.00 in order to help us process the NBI.
Q After calling you on April 15, what happened next?
A On April 29, 1998 me, my sister, Melchor, and Melchors sister together with
ANGEL MATEO met at Maxs Restaurant in Makati.
x x x x x
x x x x
Q Were you able to meet ANGEL MATEO?
A Yes maam, they arrived together with somebody whom [she] introduced to
us as [his] wife.
Q Who is this wife you are referring to?
A She is Vicky Lapis, and later on we found out that she is Vicenta Medina
Lapis.
Q What was this meeting all about?
A We were updated on what was happening on our papers and then ANGEL
MATEO AND VICENTA LAPIS asked for a plane ticket.
Q What was the update for the processing of your papers?
x x x x x
x x x x
A Vicenta Lapis told us that she is just helping to speed up the processing of
papers so that we could be sent abroad immediately and she even showed
us some documents and I even told her that I could help them in typing
those documents.
[21]

The foregoing testimony very clearly demonstrates that the individual actuations of all
four (4) accused were directed at a singular criminal purpose -- to delude complainants into
believing that they would be employed abroad. The nature and the extent of the formers
11

interactions among themselves as well as with the latter clearly show unity of action towards
a common undertaking. Certainly, complainants would not have gone to Manila to meet
Aida de Leon and Angel Mateo without the prodding of Am-amlaw. They would not have
made various payments for their travel and employment papers without the fraudulent
representations of Mateo De Leon. Moreover, they would not have complied with further
instructions and demands of Mateo without the repeated assurances made by Lapis.
Even assuming that the individual acts of the accused were not necessarily
indispensable to the commission of the offense, conspiracy would have still been present.
Their actions, when viewed in relation to one another, showed a unity of purpose towards a
common criminal enterprise and a concurrence in their resolve to commit it.
In People v. Gamboa,
[22]
the Court had occasion to discuss the nature of conspiracy in
the context of illegal recruitment as follows:
Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas contract workers was evident from the acts of the
malefactors whose conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime clearly
indicated that they were one in purpose and united in execution. Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as it may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused
pointing to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. As such,
all the accused, including accused-appellant, are equally guilty of the crime of illegal
recruitment since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
[23]
(Emphasis supplied)
To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof that all the
conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant
to the same objective.
[24]

Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated
by the performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed.
[25]

The OSG avers, as an incident to this issue, and in line with People v. Yabut,
[26]
that
complainants are entitled to recover interest on the amount of P118,000, which the trial
court awarded from the time of the filing of the Information until fully paid. We agree with
the OSGs observation and hereby grant the legal interest on the amount prayed for.
In a number of cases,
[27]
this Court has affirmed the trial courts finding that victims of
illegal recruitment are entitled to legal interest on the amount to be recovered as indemnity,
from the time of the filing of the information until fully paid.
Second Issue:
Appellants Liability for Estafa
Appellants argue that in a prosecution for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, it is indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting of
fraudulent representations or false statements of the accused, be made prior to or
simultaneous with the delivery of the thing; and that such misrepresentations or false
statements induce the complainants to part with the object of the crime. The former allege
that the prosecution failed to point out with certainty whether their misrepresentations or
false statements were made prior to or at least simultaneous with the latters delivery of the
money.
Under the cited provision of the Revised Penal Code, estafa is committed by any person
who defrauds another by using a fictitious name; or by falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business; by imaginary transactions or
similar forms of deceit executed prior to or simultaneous with the fraud.
[28]
Moreover, these
false pretenses should have been the very reason that motivated complainants to deliver
property or pay money to the perpetrators of the fraud. While appellants insist that these
constitutive elements of the crime were not sufficiently shown by the prosecution, the
records of the case prove otherwise.
During almost all of their meetings, complainants paid various amounts of money to
appellants only after hearing the feigned assurances proffered by the latter regarding the
formers employment prospects in Japan. Even as early as their first meeting in the house of
Aida de Leon, the payment by complainants of the initial amount of P15,000 was
immediately preceded by an onslaught of promises. These enticing, albeit empty, promises
were made by Angel Mateo, who even showed them documents purportedly evincing his
connections with various foreign companies. Equally important, they relied on such
misrepresentations, which convinced them to pay the initial amount as processing
fees. Complainant Melchor Degsi testified on the matter in this wise:
Prosecutor Ong:
So when Angel Mateo arrived at the apartment of Aida de Leon, what did he do,
if any?
Witness:
He introduced himself to us and told us that he can easily send us to Japan
because he knows many Japanese employers and he also showed us some
documents, maam. (Nagpakilala siya at ang sabi niya ay kayang-kaya niya
kaming padalhin sa Japan dahil marami siyang
kilalang Japanese employer at may ipinakita siyang mga dokumento,
maam).
Q What are these documents, if you remember, that were shown to you?
A Papers of Japanese companies, Clean Supplies Co. Ltd., Arabian Boy Express
Corporation and that is the reason why we were convinced, maam.
Q So, after being convinced that Angel Mateo can send you abroad, what did
you do after that?
12

A Nakumbinsi nga po kami at pagkatapos noon ay nag-usap-usap silang tatlo
nina Jean Am-amlaw at humihingi na sila ng processing fee na P20,000,
maam.
Q So what did you do when they were already asking for the amount
of P20,000 from you as processing fee?
A We told them that we do not have any money that time and we have to
withdraw from the bank and then we went to Pasay and we withdrew the
amount of P15,000.00 so that was the only amount we were able to give
them that time, maam.
Q Who were with you when you withdrew the said amount from the bank in
Pasay?
A Jean Am-amlaw and Angel Mateo, maam.
Q Who received the amount of P15,000?
A Angel Mateo in front of Jean Am-amlaw, maam.
[29]
(Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, it is evident that the false statements that convinced complainants
of the authenticity of the transaction were made prior to their payment of the various
fees. Indubitably, the requirement that the fraudulent statements should have been made
prior to or simultaneous with the actual payment was satisfied.
Verily, by their acts of falsely representing themselves as persons who had the power
and the capacity to recruit workers for abroad, appellants induced complainants to pay the
required fees.
[30]
There is estafa if, through insidious words and machinations, appellants
deluded complainants into believing that, for a fee, the latter would be provided overseas
jobs.
[31]

Although we agree with the ruling of the RTC convicting appellants of estafa, we note
that it failed to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law in imposing the penalty. Under
Section 1 of that law, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be the penalty
properly imposed, considering the attending circumstances; while the minimum term shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code.
[32]
Hence,
pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court should have fixed the minimum
and the maximum penalties.
[33]

The Revised Penal Code provides the penalties for estafa as follows:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). -- Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1
st
. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000.00 but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be. (Italics supplied)
Considering that complainants were defrauded in excess of the P22,000 limit fixed by
law, the maximum penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its minimum period, or six
(6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, plus one (1) year for each additional P10,000 in
excess of the P22,000 limit. The total amount defrauded from the complainants
wasP158,600 -- or P136,600 in excess of P22,000, which translates to an additional prison
sentence of thirteen (13) years based on the aforementioned computation. Accordingly, the
maximum penalty to be imposed should be nineteen (19) years and one (1) day to twenty-
one (21) years, thus raising the penalty to reclusion temporal. However, the penal provisions
for the crime of estafa provide that the total penalty to be imposed should not in any case
exceed twenty (20) years imprisonment.
In Criminal Case No. 99-1113 for estafa, consonant with the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, appellants should thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years
ofprision mayor which is the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the
offense to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Indeed, the expression the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by said Code for the offense, used in Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, means the penalty next lower than that determined by the court in the case
before it as the maximum.
[34]

Third Issue:
Liability as Co-conspirator
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court should not have convicted Vicenta
Medina Lapis because the prosecution evidence did not sufficiently prove her participation in
the conspiracy to defraud the victims. They maintain that she merely accompanied Angel
Mateo during his meetings with complainants and that she had no knowledge of the
intentions of her co-accused. They add that mere knowledge, acquiescence or agreement to
cooperate is not enough to constitute one as a co-conspirator.
We are not persuaded. As discussed earlier, Lapis not only knew of the conspiracy, but
she also offered her assistance in the processing of the employment requirements of
complainants. Contrary to her claim that she was merely an unknowing spectator in the
underhanded transactions, she deliberately inveigled them into pursuing the promise of
foreign employment. The records clearly belie her claim of innocence and indicate that her
participation in the criminal scheme transcends mere knowledge or
13

acquiescence. Complainant Melchor Degsi describes one of the many instances of how
deeply involved Lapis was in the whole recruitment charade:
Prosecutor Ong:
Mr. Witness, you testified a while ago that you were at Max Restaurant together
with Vicenta Lapis and Angel Mateo?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Q: Could you remember what Vicenta Medina [Lapis] said to you?
A: She promised that we will be sent to Japan sooner as OCW, maam.
Q: Could you recall how she said it?
A: She said Sigurado kay, makakapunta kayo ng Japan, maam.
Q: During that time that she was telling you sigurado kay makakapunta kayo
ng Japan, did she show you anything?
A: Tinanong namin ang address nila at kusang loob na ibinigay ni Vicenta
Medina [Lapis] sa amin ang address at direksyon para makapunta kami sa
Imus, Cavite, maam.
Q: What was the reason why Vicenta Medina Lapis gave you the address?
A: Para sigurado raw kami na hindi sila illegal kaya ibinigay niya ang address
nila, maam.
[35]
(Emphasis supplied)
Once conspiracy is established, the act of one becomes the act of all regardless of the
degree of individual participation.
[36]
Moreover, the precise modality or extent of
participation of each individual conspirator becomes merely a secondary
consideration.
[37]
Notwithstanding nonparticipation in every detail of the execution of the
crime, the culpability of the accused still exists.
[38]

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. 99-1112, appellants are ordered to pay legal interest on the
amount of P118,000 from the time of the filing of the Information until fully paid.
2. In Criminal Case No. 99-1113, appellants are sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

schedules as a result of (his) inability.
On September 26, 1989, respondent Esso International, through H. Regenboog, Personnel
Administrator, advised petitioner Millares that in view of his absence without leave, which is
equivalent to abandonment of his position, he had been dropped from the roster of crew
members effective September 1, 1989.
On the other hand, petitioner Lagda was employed by private respondent Esso International
as wiper/oiler in June 1969. He was promoted as Chief Engineer in 1980, a position he
continued to occupy until his last COE expired on April 10, 1989. He was then receiving a
monthly salary of US$1,939.00.
On May 16, 1989, petitioner Lagda applied for a leave of absence from June 19, 1989 up to
the whole month of August 1989. On June 14, 1989, respondent Trans-Globals President,
Michael J. Estaniel, approved petitioner Lagdas leave of absence from June 22, 1989 to July
20, 1989 and advised him to report for re-assignment on July 21, 1989.
On June 26, 1989, petitioner Lagda wrote a letter to G.S. Stanley, Operations Manager of
respondent Esso International, through respondent Trans-Globals President Michael J.
Estaniel, informing him of his intention to avail of the optional early retirement plan in view
of his twenty (20) years continuous service in the complaint.
On July 13, 1989, respondent Trans-global denied petitioner Lagdas request for availment of
the optional early retirement scheme on the same grounds upon which petitioner Millares
request was denied.
On August 3, 1989, he requested for an extension of his leave of absence up to August 26,
1989 and the same was approved. However, on September 27, 1989, respondent Esso
International, through H. Regenboog, Personnel Administrator, advised petitioner Lagda that
in view of his unavailability for contractual sea service, he had been dropped from the
roster of crew members effective September 1, 1989.
On October 5, 1989, petitioners Millares and Lagda filed a complaint-affidavit, docketed as
POEA (M) 89-10-9671, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of employee benefits against
private respondents Esso International and Trans-Global, before the POEA.
[5]

On July 17, 1991, the POEA rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit.
On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the POEA was affirmed on June 1, 1993 with the
following disquisition:
The first issue must be decided in the negative. Complainants-appellants, as seamen and
overseas contract workers are not covered by the term regular employment as defined
14

under Article 280 of the Labor Code. The POEA, which is tasked with protecting the rights of
the Filipino workers for overseas employment to fair and equitable recruitment and
employment practices and to ensure their welfare, prescribes a standard employment
contract for seamen on board ocean-going vessels for a fixed period but in no case to exceed
twelve (12) months (Part 1, Sec. C). This POEA policy appears to be in consonance with the
international maritime practice. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Brent School, Inc. vs.
Zamora, 181 SCRA 702, had held that a fixed term is essential and natural appurtenance of
overseas employment contracts to which the concept of regular employment with all that it
implies is not applicable, Article 280 of the Labor Code notwithstanding. There is, therefore,
no reason to disturb the POEA Administrators finding that complainants-appellants were
hired on a contractual basis and for a definite period. Their employment is thus governed by
the contracts they sign each time they are re-hired and is terminated at the expiration of the
contract period.
[6]

Undaunted, the petitioners elevated their case to this Court
[7]
and successfully
obtained the favorable action, which is now vehemently being assailed.
At the hearing on November 15, 2000, the Court defined the issues for resolution in
this case, namely:
I. ARE PETITIONERS REGULAR OR CONTRACTUAL EMPLOYEES WHOSE EMPLOYMENTS
ARE TERMINATED EVERYTIME THEIR CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT EXPIRE?
II. ASSUMING THAT PETITIONERS ARE REGULAR EMPLOYEES, WERE THEY DISMISSED
WITHOUT JUST CAUSE SO AS TO BE ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT AND BACKWAGES,
INCLUDING PAYMENT OF 100% OF THEIR TOTAL CREDITED CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
CONSECUTIVE ENLISTMENT INCENTIVE PLAN (CEIP)?
III. DOES THE PROVISION OF THE POEA STANDARD CONTRACT FOR SEAFARERS ON BOARD
FOREIGN VESSELS (SEC. C., DURATION OF CONTRACT) PRECLUDE THE ATTAINMENT BY
SEAMEN OF THE STATUS OF REGULAR EMPLOYEES?
IV. DOES THE DECISION OF THE COURT IN G.R. NO. 110524 CONTRAVENE INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME LAW, ALLEGEDLY PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND UNDER SECTION 2, ARTICLE II
OF THE CONSTITUTION?
V. DOES THE SAME DECISION OF THE COURT CONSTITUTE A DEPARTURE FROM ITS
RULING IN COYOCA VS. NLRC (G.R. NO. 113658, March 31, 1995)?
[8]

In answer to the private respondents Second Motion for Reconsideration and to
FAMEs Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention, petitioners maintain that they are
regular employees as found by the Court in the March 14, 2000 Decision. Considering that
petitioners performed activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of private respondents, they should be considered as regular employees
pursuant to Article 280, Par. 1 of the Labor Code.
[9]
Other justifications for this ruling include
the fact that petitioners have rendered over twenty (20) years of service, as admitted by the
private respondents;
[10]
that they were recipients of Merit Pay which is an express
acknowledgment by the private respondents that petitioners are regular and not just
contractual employees;
[11]
that petitioners were registered under the Social Security System
(SSS).
The petitioners further state that the case of Coyoca v. NLRC
[12]
which the private
respondents invoke is not applicable to the case at bar as the factual milieu in that case is not
the same. Furthermore, private respondents fear that our judicial pronouncement will spell
the death of the manning industry is far from real. Instead, with the valuable contribution of
the manning industry to our economy, these seafarers are supposed to be considered as
Heroes of the Republic whose rights must be protected.
[13]
Finally, the first motion for
reconsideration has already been denied with finality by this Court and it is about time that
the Court should write finis to this case.
The private respondents, on the other hand, contend that: (a) the ruling holding
petitioners as regular employees was not in accord with the decision in Coyoca v. NLRC, 243
SCRA 190; (b) Art. 280 is not applicable as what applies is the POEA Rules and Regulations
Governing Overseas Employment; (c) seafarers are not regular employees based on
international maritime practice; (d) grave consequences would result on the future of
seafarers and manning agencies if the ruling is not reconsidered; (e) there was no dismissal
committed; (f) a dismissed seafarer is not entitled to back wages and reinstatement, that
being not allowed under the POEA rules and the Migrant Workers Act; and, (g) petitioners
are not entitled to claim the total amount credited to their account under the CEIP.
[14]

Meanwhile, Intervenor Filipino Association of Mariners Employment (FAME) avers that
our decision, if not reconsidered, will have negative consequences in the employment of
Filipino Seafarers overseas which, in turn, might lead to the demise of the manning industry
in the Philippines. As intervenor FAME puts it:
xxx
7.1 Foreign principals will start looking for alternative sources for seafarers to man their
ships. AS reported by the BIMCO/ISF study, there is an expectancy that there will be an
increasing demand for (and supply of) Chinese seafarers, with some commentators
suggesting that this may be a long-term alternative to the Philippines. Moreover, the
political changes within the former Eastern Bloc have made new sources of supply available
to the international market. Intervenors recent survey among its members shows that 50
Philippine manning companies had already lost some 6,300 slots to other Asian, East Europe
and Chinese competition for the last two years;
7.2 The Philippine stands to lose an annual foreign income estimated at U.S. DOLLARS TWO
HUNDRED SEVENTY FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED FORTY NINE THOUSAND (US$
274,549,000.00) from the manning industry and another US DOLLARS FOUR BILLION SIX
HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND (US$ 4,650,760,000.00) from the
15

land-based sector if seafarers and equally situated land-based contract workers will be
declared regular employees;
7.3 Some 195,917 (as of 1998) deployed overseas Filipino seafarers will be rendered jobless
should we lose the market;
7.4 Some 360 manning agencies (as of 30 June 2000) whose principals may no longer be
doing business with them will close their shops;
7.5 The contribution to the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration by the sector, which is
USD 25.00 per contract and translates to US DOLLARS FOUR MILLION (US$
4,000,000.00)annually, will be drastically reduced. This is not to mention the processing fees
paid to POEA, Philippine Regulatory Commission (PRC), Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
and Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) for the documentation of these seafarers;
7.6 Worst, some 195,917 (as of 1998) families will suffer socially and economically, as their
breadwinners will be rendered jobless; and
7.7 It will considerably slow down the governments program of employment generation,
considering that, as expected foreign employers will now avoid hiring Filipino overseas
contract workers as they will become regular employees with all its concomitant effects.
[15]

Significantly, the Office of the Solicitor General, in a departure from its original position
in this case, has now taken the opposite view. It has expressed its apprehension in sustaining
our decision and has called for a re-examination of our ruling.
[16]

Considering all the arguments presented by the private respondents, the Intervenor
FAME and the OSG, we agree that there is a need to reconsider our position with respect to
the status of seafarers which we considered as regular employees under Article 280 of the
Labor Code. We, therefore, partially grant the second motion for reconsideration.
In Brent School Inc. v. Zamora,
[17]
the Supreme Court stated that Article 280 of the
Labor Code does not apply to overseas employment.
In the light of the foregoing description of the development of the provisions of the Labor
Code bearing on term or fixed-period employment that the question posed in the opening
paragraph of this opinion should now be addressed. Is it then the legislative intention to
outlaw stipulations in employment contracts laying down a definite period therefor? Are
such stipulations in essence contrary to public policy and should not on this account be
accorded legitimacy?
On the other hand, there is the gradual and progressive elimination of references to term or
fixed-period employment in the Labor Code, and the specific statement of the rule that:
Regular and Casual Employment The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer except where
the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee
or where the work or service to be employee is seasonal in nature and the employment is for
the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph;
provided that, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such
service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the
activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually
exists.
There is, on the other hand, the Civil Code, which has always recognized, and continues to
recognize, the validity and propriety of contracts and obligations with a fixed or definite
period, and imposes no restraints on the freedom of the parties to fix the duration of a
contract, whatever its object, be it specific, goods or services, except the general admonition
against stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy. Under the Civil code, therefore, and as a general proposition, fixed-term employment
contracts are not limited, as they are under the present Labor Code, to those by natural
seasonal or for specific projects with predetermined dates of completion; they also include
those to which the parties by free choice have assigned a specific date of termination.
Some familiar examples may be cited of employment contract which may be neither for
seasonal work nor for specific projects, but to which a fixed term is an essential and natural
appurtenance: overseas employment contracts, for one, to which, whatever the nature of
the engagement, the concept of regular employment with all that it implies does not
appear ever to have been applied. Article 280 of the Labor Code notwithstanding also
appointments to the positions of dean, assistant dean, college secretary, principal, and other
administrative offices in educational institutions, which are by practice or tradition rotated
among the faculty members, and where fixed terms are a necessity without which no
reasonable rotation would be possible. Similarly, despite the provisions of Article 280, Policy
Instructions. No. 8 of the Minister of Labor implicitly recognize that certain company officials
may be elected for what would amount to fix periods, at the expiration of which they would
have to stand down, in providing that these officials, xxx may lose their jobs as president,
executive vice-president or vice-president, etc. because the stockholders or the board of
directors for one reason or another did not reelect them.
There can of course be no quarrel with the proposition that where from the circumstances it
is apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by
the employee, they should be struck down or disregard as contrary to public policy, morals,
etc. But where no such intent to circumvent the law is shown, or stated otherwise, where
the reason for the law does not exists, e.g., where it is indeed the employee himself who
16

insists upon a period or where the nature of the engagement is such that, without being
seasonal or for a specific project, a definite date of termination is a sine qua non, would an
agreement fixing a period be essentially evil or illicit, therefore anathema? Would such an
agreement come within the scope of Article 280 which admittedly was enacted to prevent
the circumvention of the right of the employee to be secured in xxx his employment
As it is evident from even only the three examples already given that Article 280 of the Labor
Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of
employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would
also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely
stipulate within his employer the duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a
literal interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable
interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term
employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil
of employers using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of
tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by
lopping of the head.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.
Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead
to absurd or unreasonable consequences. That is a principle that goes back to In re Allen
decided on October 27, 1902, where it was held that a literal interpretation is to be rejected
if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. That is a strong argument against its
adoption. The words of Justice Laurel are particularly apt. Thus: the appellants would lead
to an absurdity is another argument for rejecting it.
Xxx We have, here, then a case where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the
application of the cardinal rule of statutory construction that such intent of spirit must
prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the
statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions
and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation
culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor code clearly appears to have been, as
already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employees right to be secure in his
tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or
oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein
should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out;
agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It should have no
application to instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly
and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being
brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his
consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each
other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by
the former over the latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to
apply to purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless
and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended consequences.
Again, in Pablo Coyoca v. NLRC,
[18]
the Court also held that a seafarer is not a regular
employee and is not entitled to separation pay. His employment is governed by the POEA
Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seamen.
XXX. In this connection, it is important to note that neither does the POEA standard
employment contract for Filipino seamen provide for such benefits.
As a Filipino seaman, petitioner is governed by the Rules and Regulations Governing
Overseas Employment and the said Rules do not provide for separation or termination
pay. What is embodied in petitioners contract is the payment of compensation arising from
permanent partial disability during the period of employment. We find that private
respondent complied with the terms of contract when it paid petitioner P42,315.00 which, in
our opinion, is a reasonable amount, as compensation for his illness.
Lastly, petitioner claims that he eventually became a regular employee of private respondent
and thus falls within the purview of Articles 284 and 95 of the Labor Code. In support of this
contention, petitioner cites the case of Worth Shipping Service, Inc., et al. v. NLRC, et
al., wherein we held that the crew members of the shipping company had attained regular
status and thus, were entitled to separation pay. However, the facts of said case differ from
the present. In Worth, we held that the principal and agent had operational control and
management over the MV Orient Carrier and thus, were the actual employers of their crew
members.
From the foregoing cases, it is clear that seafarers are considered contractual
employees. They can not be considered as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor
Code. Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign everytime they are rehired
and their employment is terminated when the contract expires. Their employment is
contractually fixed for a certain period of time. They fall under the exception of Article 280
whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for
the duration of the season.
[19]
We need not depart from the rulings of the Court in the two
aforementioned cases which indeed constitute stare decisis with respect to the employment
status of seafarers.
Petitioners insist that they should be considered regular employees, since they have
rendered services which are usually necessary and desirable to the business of their
employer, and that they have rendered more than twenty(20) years of service. While this
17

may be true, the Brent case has, however, held that there are certain forms of employment
which also require the performance of usual and desirable functions and which exceed one
year but do not necessarily attain regular employment status under Article 280.
[20]
Overseas
workers including seafarers fall under this type of employment which are governed by the
mutual agreements of the parties.
In this jurisdiction and as clearly stated in the Coyoca case, Filipino seamen are
governed by the Rules and Regulations of the POEA. The Standard Employment Contract
governing the employment of All Filipino seamen on Board Ocean-Going Vessels of the POEA,
particularly in Part I, Sec. C specifically provides that the contract of seamen shall be for a
fixed period. And in no case should the contract of seamen be longer than 12 months. It
reads:
Section C. Duration of Contract
The period of employment shall be for a fixed period but in no case to exceed 12 months and
shall be stated in the Crew Contract. Any extension of the Contract period shall be subject to
the mutual consent of the parties.
Moreover, it is an accepted maritime industry practice that employment of seafarers
are for a fixed period only. Constrained by the nature of their employment which is quite
peculiar and unique in itself, it is for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the
employer why the employment status must be contractual only or for a certain period of
time. Seafarers spend most of their time at sea and understandably, they can not stay for a
long and an indefinite period of time at sea.
[21]
Limited access to shore society during the
employment will have an adverse impact on the seafarer. The national, cultural and lingual
diversity among the crew during the COE is a reality that necessitates the limitation of its
period.
[22]

Petitioners make much of the fact that they have been continually re-hired or their
contracts renewed before the contracts expired (which has admittedly been going on for
twenty (20) years). By such circumstance they claim to have acquired regular status with all
the rights and benefits appurtenant to it.
Such contention is untenable. Undeniably, this circumstance of continuous re-hiring
was dictated by practical considerations that experienced crew members are more
preferred. Petitioners were only given priority or preference because of their experience and
qualifications but this does not detract the fact that herein petitioners are contractual
employees. They can not be considered regular employees. We quote with favor the
explanation of the NLRC in this wise:
Xxx The reference to permanent and probationary masters and employees in these
papers is a misnomer and does not alter the fact that the contracts for enlistment between
complainants-appellants and respondent-appellee Esso International were for a definite
periods of time, ranging from 8 to 12 months. Although the use of the terms permanent
and probationary is unfortunate, what is really meant is eligible for-re-hire. This is the
only logical conclusion possible because the parties cannot and should not violate POEAs
requirement that a contract of enlistment shall be for a limited period only; not exceeding
twelve (12)months.
[23]

From all the foregoing, we hereby state that petitioners are not considered regular or
permanent employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Petitioners employment have
automatically ceased upon the expiration of their contracts of enlistment (COE). Since there
was no dismissal to speak of, it follows that petitioners are not entitled to reinstatement or
payment of separation pay or backwages, as provided by law.
With respect to the benefits under the Consecutive Enlistment Incentive Plan (CEIP),
we hold that the petitioners are still entitled to receive 100% of the total amount credited to
him under the CEIP. Considering that we have declared that petitioners are contractual
employees, their compensation and benefits are covered by the contracts they signed and
the CEIP is part and parcel of the contract.
The CEIP was formulated to entice seamen to stay long in the company. As the name
implies, the program serves as an incentive for the employees to renew their contracts with
the same company for as long as their services were needed. For those who remained loyal
to them, they were duly rewarded with this additional remuneration under the CEIP, if
eligible. While this is an act of benevolence on the part of the employer, it can not, however,
be denied that this is part of the benefits accorded to the employees for services
rendered. Such right to the benefits is vested upon them upon their eligibility to the
program.
The CEIP provides that an employee becomes covered under the Plan when he
completes thirty-six (36) months or an equivalent of three (3) years of credited service with
respect to employment after June 30, 1973.
[24]
Upon eligibility, an amount shall be credited
to his account as it provides, among others:
III. Distribution of Benefits
A. Retirement, Death and Disability
When the employment of an employee terminates because of his
retirement, death or permanent and total disability, a percentage of the
total amount credited to his account will be distributed to him (or his
eligible survivor(s) in accordance with the following:
Reason for Termination Percentage
a) Attainment of mandatory retire- 100%
ment age of 60.
b) Permanent and total disability, 100%
18

while under contract, that is
not due to accident or misconduct.
c) Permanent and total disability, 100%
while under contract, that is
due to accident, and not due to
misconduct.
xxx
B. Voluntary Termination
When an employee voluntary terminates his employment with at least 36 months of credited
service without any misconduct on his part, 18 percent of the total amount credited to his
account, plus an additional of one percent for each month (up to a maximum of 164
months of credited service in excess of 36, will be distributed to him provided (1) the
employee has completed his last Contract of Enlistment and(2) employee advises the
company in writing, within 30 days, from his last disembarkation date, of his intention to
terminate his employment. (To advise the Company in writing means that the original letter
must be sent to the Companys agent in the Philippines, a copy sent to the Company in New
York).
xxx
C. Other Terminations
When the employment of an employee is terminated by the Company for
a reason other than one in A and B above, without any misconduct on his
part, a percentage of the total amount credited to his account will be
distributed to him in accordance with the following.
Credited Service Percentage
36 months 50%
48 75%
60 100%
When the employment of an employee is terminated due to his poor-
performance, misconduct, unavailability, etc., or if employee is not offered
re-engagement for similar reasons, no distribution of any portion of
employees account will ever be made to him (or his eligible survivor*s+).
It must be recalled that on June 21, 1989, Millares wrote a letter to his employer
informing his intention to avail of the optional retirement plan under the CEIP considering
that he has rendered more than twenty (20) years of continuous service. Lagda, likewise,
manifested the same intention in a letter dated June 26, 1989. Private respondent, however,
denied their requests for benefits under the CEIP since: (1) the contract of enlistment (COE)
did not provide for retirement before 60 years of age; and that (2) petitioners failed to
submit a written notice of their intention to terminate their employment within thirty (30)
days from the last disembarkation date pursuant to the provision on Voluntary Termination
of the CEIP. Petitioners were eventually dropped from the roster of crew members and on
grounds of abandonment and unavailability for contractual sea service, respectively, they
were disqualified from receiving any benefits under the CEIP.
[25]

In our March 14, 2000 Decision, we, however, found that petitioners Millares and
Lagda were not guilty of abandonment or unavailability for contractual sea service, as we
have stated:
The absence of petitioners was justified by the fact that they secured the approval of private
respondents to take a leave of absence after the termination of their last contracts of
enlistment. Subsequently, petitioners sought for extensions of their respective leaves of
absence. Granting arguendo that their subsequent requests for extensions were not
approved, it cannot be said that petitioners were unavailable or had abandoned their work
when they failed to report back for assignment as they were still questioning the denial of
private respondents of their desire to avail of the optional early retirement policy, which they
believed in good faith to exist.
[26]

Neither can we consider petitioners guilty of poor performance or misconduct since
they were recipients of Merit Pay Awards for their exemplary performances in the company.
Anent the letters dated June 21, 1989 (for Millares) and June 26, 1989 (for Lagda)
which private respondent considered as belated written notices of termination, we find such
assertion specious. Notwithstanding, we could conveniently consider the petitioners eligible
under Section III-B of the CEIP (Voluntary Termination), but this would, however, award them
only a measly amount of benefits which to our mind, the petitioners do not rightfully deserve
under the facts and circumstances of the case. As the CEIP provides:
III. Distribution of Benefits
xxx
E. Distribution of Accounts
When an employee terminates under conditions that would qualify for a distribution of more
than one specified in A, B or C above, the largest single amount, only, will be distributed.
19

Since petitioners termination of employment under the CEIP do not fall under Section
III-A (Retirement, Death and Disability) or Section III-B (Voluntary Termination), nor could
they be considered under the second paragraph of Section III-C, as earlier discussed; it
follows that their termination falls under the first paragraph of Section III-C for which they
are entitled to 100% of the total amount credited to their accounts. The private respondents
can not now renege on their commitment under the CEIP to reward deserving and loyal
employees as the petitioners in this case.
In taking cognizance of private respondents Second Motion for Reconsideration, the
Court hereby suspends the rules to make them conformable to law and justice and to
subserve an overriding public interest.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, THE COURT Resolved to Partially GRANT Private
Respondents Second Motion for Reconsideration and Intervenor FAMES Motion for
Reconsideration in Intervention. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
dated June 1, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION. The Private Respondents,
Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. and Esso International Shipping Co.,Ltd. are hereby jointly
and severally ORDERED to pay petitioners One Hundred Percent (100%) of their total
credited contributions as provided under the Consecutive Enlistment Incentive Plan(CEIP).
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., no part. Did not participate in the Decision.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 93666 April 22, 1991
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION and EARL TIMOTHY CONE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment, HON.
BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment,
and BASKETBALL COACHES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Sobrevinas, Diaz, Hayudini & Bodegon Law Office for petitioners.
Rodrigo, Cuevas & De Borja for respondent BCAP.
R E S O L U T I O N

FELICIANO, J.:
On 1 May 1989, the National Capital Region of the Department of Labor and Employment
issued Alien Employment Permit No. M-0689-3-535 in favor of petitioner Earl Timothy Cone,
a United States citizen, as sports consultant and assistant coach for petitioner General Milling
Corporation ("GMC").
On 27 December 1989, petitioners GMC and Cone entered into a contract of employment
whereby the latter undertook to coach GMC's basketball team.
On 15 January 1990, the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation approved petitioner Cone's application for a change of admission status from
temporary visitor to pre-arranged employee.
On 9 February 1990, petitioner GMC requested renewal of petitioner Cone's alien
employment permit. GMC also requested that it be allowed to employ Cone as full-fledged
coach. The DOLE Regional Director, Luna Piezas, granted the request on 15 February 1990.
On 18 February 1990, Alien Employment Permit No. M-02903-881, valid until 25 December
1990, was issued.
Private respondent Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines ("BCAP") appealed the
issuance of said alien employment permit to the respondent Secretary of Labor who, on 23
April 1990, issued a decision ordering cancellation of petitioner Cone's employment permit
on the ground that there was no showing that there is no person in the Philippines who is
competent, able and willing to perform the services required nor that the hiring of petitioner
Cone would redound to the national interest.
Petitioner GMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration and two (2) Supplemental Motions for
Reconsideration but said Motions were denied by Acting Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E.
Laguesma in an Order dated 8 June 1990.
Petitioners are now before the Court on a Petition for Certiorari, dated 14 June 1990, alleging
that:
1. respondent Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion when he
revoked petitioner Cone's alien employment permit; and
20

2. Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code is null and void as it is in violation of the enabling law as the
Labor Code does not empower respondent Secretary to determine if the
employment of an alien would redound to national interest.
Deliberating on the present Petition for Certiorari, the Court considers that petitioners have
failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on
the part of respondent Secretary of Labor in rendering his decision, dated 23 April 1990,
revoking petitioner Cone's Alien Employment Permit.
The alleged failure to notify petitioners of the appeal filed by private respondent BCAP was
cured when petitioners were allowed to file their Motion for Reconsideration before
respondent Secretary of Labor.
1

Petitioner GMC's claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer's prerogative has no legal
basis at all. Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien
must first obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor. Petitioner GMC's
right to choose whom to employ is, of course, limited by the statutory requirement of an
alien employment permit.
Petitioners will not find solace in the equal protection clause of the Constitution. As pointed
out by the Solicitor-General, no comparison can be made between petitioner Cone and Mr.
Norman Black as the latter is "a long time resident of the country," and thus, not subject to
the provisions of Article 40 of the Labor Code which apply only to "non-resident aliens." In
any case, the term "non-resident alien" and its obverse "resident alien," here must be given
their technical connotation under our law on immigration.
Neither can petitioners validly claim that implementation of respondent Secretary's decision
would amount to an impairment of the obligations of contracts. The provisions of the Labor
Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations requiring alien employment permits were
in existence long before petitioners entered into their contract of employment. It is firmly
settled that provisions of applicable laws, especially provisions relating to matters affected
with public policy, are deemed written into contracts.
2
Private parties cannot
constitutionally contract away the otherwise applicable provisions of law.
Petitioners' contention that respondent Secretary of Labor should have deferred to the
findings of Commission on Immigration and Deportation as to the necessity of employing
petitioner Cone, is, again, bereft of legal basis. The Labor Code itself specifically empowers
respondent Secretary to make a determination as to the availability of the services of a
"person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to
perform the services for which an alien is desired."
3
In short, the Department of Labor is the
agency vested with jurisdiction to determine the question of availability of local workers. The
constitutional validity of legal provisions granting such jurisdiction and authority and
requiring proof of non-availability of local nationals able to carry out the duties of the
position involved, cannot be seriously questioned.
Petitioners apparently also question the validity of the Implementing Rules and Regulations,
specifically Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules, as imposing a condition
not found in the Labor Code itself. Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules,
provides as follows:
Section 6. Issuance of Employment Permit the Secretary of Labor may
issue an employment permit to the applicant based on:
a) Compliance by the applicant and his employer with the requirements
of Section 2 hereof;
b) Report of the Bureau Director as to the availability or non-availability
of any person in the Philippines who is competent and willing to do the
job for which the services of the applicant are desired.
(c) His assessment as to whether or not the employment of the applicant
will redound to the national interest;
(d) Admissibility of the alien as certified by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation;
(e) The recommendation of the Board of Investments or other
appropriate government agencies if the applicant will be employed in
preferred areas of investments or in accordance with the imperative of
economic development;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 40 of the Labor Code reads as follows:
Art. 40. Employment per unit of non-resident aliens. Any alien seeking
admission to the Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic
or foreign employer who desires to engage an alien for employment in
the Philippines shall obtain an employment permit from the Department
of Labor.
The employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the
applicant employer after a determination of the non-availability of a
person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time
of application to perform the services for which the alien is desired.
21

For an enterprise registered in preferred areas of investments, said
employment permit may be issued upon recommendation of the
government agency charged with the supervision of said registered
enterprise. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners apparently suggest that the Secretary of Labor is not authorized to take
into account the question of whether or not employment of an alien applicant
would "redound to the national interest" because Article 40 does not explicitly
refer to such assessment. This argument (which seems impliedly to concede that
the relationship of basketball coaching and the national interest is tenuous and
unreal) is not persuasive. In the first place, the second paragraph of Article 40 says:
"[t]he employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant
employer after a determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines
who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the
services for which the alien is desired." The permissive language employed in the
Labor Code indicates that the authority granted involves the exercise of discretion
on the part of the issuing authority. In the second place, Article 12 of the Labor
Code sets forth a statement of objectives that the Secretary of Labor should, and
indeed must, take into account in exercising his authority and jurisdiction granted
by the Labor Code,
Art. 12. Statement of Objectives. It is the policy of the State:
a) To promote and maintain a state of full employment through improved
manpower training, allocation and utilization;
xxx xxx xxx
c) To facilitate a free choice of available employment by persons seeking
work in conformity with the national interest;
d) To facilitate and regulate the movement of workers in conformity with
the national interest;
e) To regulate the employment of aliens, including the establishment of a
registration and/or work permit system;
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, we find petitioners' arguments on the above points of constitutional law too
insubstantial to require further consideration.
Petitioners have very recently manifested to this Court that public respondent Secretary of
Labor has reversed his earlier decision and has issued an Employment Permit to petitioner
Cone. Petitioners seek to withdraw their Petition for Certiorari on the ground that it has
become moot and academic.
While ordinarily this Court would dismiss a petition that clearly appears to have become
moot and academic, the circumstances of this case and the nature of the questions raised by
petitioners are such that we do not feel justified in leaving those questions
unanswered.
4
Moreover, assuming that an alien employment permit has in fact been issued
to petitioner Cone, the basis of the reversal by the Secretary of Labor of his earlier decision
does not appear in the record. If such reversal is based on some view of constitutional law or
labor law different from those here set out, then such employment permit, if one has been
issued, would appear open to serious legal objections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
Fernan, C.J., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 114337 September 29, 1995
NITTO ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO CAPILI, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the
decision
1
rendered by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
22

Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products,
hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core
maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement
2
for a period of six (6) months from
May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the
applicable minimum wage.
At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass
which he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was
treated at a nearby hospital.
Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the
office premises which was not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press
machines without authority and in the process injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the
amount of P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private respondent.
The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letter
3
which reads:
A
u
g
u
s
t

2
,

1
9
9
0
Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang
experiensa kung papaano gamitin and "TOOL" sa pagbuhat ng salamin,
sarili niyang desisyon ang paggamit ng tool at may disgrasya at nadamay
pa ang isang sekretarya ng kompanya.
Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minute ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng
hapon siya ay pumasok sa shop na hindi naman sakop ng kanyang
trabaho. Pinakialaman at kinalikot ang makina at nadisgrasya niya ang
kanyang sariling kamay.
Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod:
Emergency and doctor fee P715.00
Medecines (sic) and others 317.04
Bibigyan siya ng kompanya ng Siyam na araw na libreng sahod hanggang
matanggal ang tahi ng kanyang kamay.
Tatanggapin niya ang sahod niyang anim na araw, mula ika-30 ng Hulyo
at ika-4 ng Agosto, 1990.
Ang kompanya ang magbabayad ng lahat ng gastos pagtanggal ng tahi ng
kanyang kamay, pagkatapos ng siyam na araw mula ika-2 ng Agosto.
Sa lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, hinihingi ng kompanya ang kanyang
resignasyon, kasama ng kanyang comfirmasyon at pag-ayon na ang lahat
sa itaas ay totoo.

Naiintindihan ko ang lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, at ang lahat ng ito ay
aking pagkakasala sa hindi pagsunod sa alintuntunin ng kompanya.
(
S
g
d
.
)

R
o
b
e
r
t
o

C
a
p
i
l
i
23


R
o
b
e
r
t
o

C
a
p
i
l
i
On August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of
petitioner for and in consideration of the sum of P1,912.79.
4

Three days after, or on August 6, 1990, private respondent formally filed before the NLRC
Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of
other monetary benefits.
On October 9, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of
private respondent as valid and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. The dispositive
portion of the ruling reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the termination is valid and for cause,
and the money claims dismissed for lack of merit.
The respondent however is ordered to pay the complainant the amount
of P500.00 as financial assistance.
SO ORDERED.
5

Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on gave two reasons for ruling that the dismissal of Roberto
Capilian was valid. First, private respondent who was hired as an apprentice violated the
terms of their agreement when he acted with gross negligence resulting in the injury not only
to himself but also to his fellow worker. Second, private respondent had shown that "he does
not have the proper attitude in employment particularly the handling of machines without
authority and proper training.
6

On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The respondent
is hereby directed to reinstate complainant to his work last performed
with backwages computed from the time his wages were withheld up to
the time he is actually reinstated. The Arbiter of origin is hereby directed
to further hear complainant's money claims and to dispose them on the
basis of law and evidence obtaining.
SO ORDERED.
7

The NLRC declared that private respondent was a regular employee of
petitioner by ruling thus:
As correctly pointed out by the complainant, we cannot understand how
an apprenticeship agreement filed with the Department of Labor only on
June 7, 1990 could be validly used by the Labor Arbiter as basis to
conclude that the complainant was hired by respondent as a plain
"apprentice" on May 28, 1990. Clearly, therefore, the complainant was
respondent's regular employee under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as
early as May 28,1990, who thus enjoyed the security of tenure
guaranteed in Section 3, Article XIII of our 1987 Constitution.
The complainant being for illegal dismissal (among others) it then
behooves upon respondent, pursuant to Art. 227(b) and as ruled in Edwin
Gesulgon vs. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993, 3rd Div.,
Feliciano, J.) to prove that the dismissal of complainant was for a valid
cause. Absent such proof, we cannot but rule that the complainant was
illegally dismissed.
8

On January 28, 1994, Labor Arbiter Libo-on called for a conference at which only private
respondent's representative was present.
On April 22, 1994, a Writ of Execution was issued, which reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, finding merit in [private respondent's] Motion for
Issuance of the Writ, you are hereby commanded to proceed to the
premises of [petitioner] Nitto Enterprises and Jovy Foster located at No. l
74 Araneta Avenue, Portero, Malabon, Metro Manila or at any other
places where their properties are located and effect the reinstatement of
herein [private respondent] to his work last performed or at the option of
the respondent by payroll reinstatement.
You are also to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his
backwages as called for in the dispositive portion, and turn over such
amount to this Office for proper disposition.
24

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
The issues raised before us are the following:
I
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS
NOT AN APPRENTICE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT
ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN
TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
We find no merit in the petition.
Petitioner assails the NLRC's finding that private respondent Roberto Capili cannot plainly be
considered an apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved
at the time the agreement was executed.
Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already
established an employer-apprentice relationship.
Petitioner's argument is erroneous.
The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides:
Contents of apprenticeship agreement. Apprenticeship agreements,
including the main rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued
by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship
shall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for
wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start
below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered
into only in accordance with apprenticeship program duly approved by
the Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop
standard model programs of apprenticeship. (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private
respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in
the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was
prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment.
However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the
absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship
agreement was enforced the day it was signed.
Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law.
It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice
shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the
Minister of Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship
program is, therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be
validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and
Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously
give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national
apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and government
and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection
of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any
apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such
apprenticeship agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship
programs and agreements cannot be debased.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has
no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the
DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery
boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a
regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
25

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph:Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such
activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)
and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare."
9

Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private respondent.
There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due
process, substantive and procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal
exists.
10
Without which, the dismissal becomes void.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due
process. This simply means that the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to
be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal
representation.
11

As held in the case of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC:
12

The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be
dismissed with two (2) written notices before termination of employee
can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the
subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's
decision to dismiss him (Sec. 13, BP 130; Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV, Book V, Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code as amended). Failure to
comply with the requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This
procedure is mandatory, in the absence of which, any judgment reached
by management is void and in existent (Tingson, Jr. vs. NLRC, 185 SCRA
498 [1990]; National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122; Ruffy vs.
NLRC. 182 SCRA 365 [1990]).
The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only
three days after he was made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such resignation was
not voluntary and deliberate.
Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner as a delivery boy
("kargador" or "pahinante").
He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned
resignation letter and quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner
made it clear to him that anyway, he did not have a choice.
13

Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating the
latter's alleged resignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A judicious
examination of both events belies any spontaneity on private respondent's part.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122917. July 12, 1999]
MARITES BERNARDO, ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE, REBECCA E. DAVID, DAVID P. PASCUAL,
RAQUEL ESTILLER, ALBERT HALLARE, EDMUND M. CORTEZ, JOSELITO O. AGDON
GEORGE P. LIGUTAN JR., CELSO M. YAZAR, ALEX G. CORPUZ, RONALD M. DELFIN,
ROWENA M. TABAQUERO, CORAZON C. DELOS REYES, ROBERT G. NOORA,
MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN, ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI, IKE CABANDUCOS, COCOY
NOBELLO, DORENDA CANTIMBUHAN, ROBERT MARCELO, LILIBETH Q.
MARMOLEJO, JOSE E. SALES, ISABEL MAMAUAG, VIOLETA G. MONTES, ALBINO
TECSON, MELODY V. GRUELA, BERNADETH D. AGERO, CYNTHIA DE VERA, LANI R.
CORTEZ, MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION, DINDO VALERIO, ZENAIDA MATA, ARIEL
DEL PILAR, MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA, THELMA SEBASTIAN, MA. JEANETTE
CERVANTES, JEANNIE RAMIL, ROZAIDA PASCUAL, PINKY BALOLOA, ELIZABETH
VENTURA, GRACE S. PARDO & RICO TIMOSA, petitioners vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION & FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
26

The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled persons be
granted the same terms and conditions of employment as qualified able-bodied
employees. Once they have attained the status of regular workers, they should be accorded
all the benefits granted by law, notwithstanding written or verbal contracts to the
contrary. This treatment is rooted not merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice
for all.
The Case

Challenged in the Petition for Certiorari
[1]
before us is the June 20, 1995 Decision
[2]
of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
[3]
which affirmed the August, 22 1994 ruling
of Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan. The labor arbiters Decision disposed as follows:
[4]

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the above-mentioned complaint for
lack of merit.
Also assailed is the August 4, 1995 Resolution
[5]
of the NLRC, which denied the Motion
for Reconsideration.
The Facts

The facts were summarized by the NLRC in this wise:
[6]

Complainants numbering 43 (p. 176, Records) are deaf-mutes who were hired on various
periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and
Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called Employment Contract for
Handicapped Workers. (pp. 68 & 69, Records) The full text of said agreement is quoted
below:
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR HANDICAPPED WORKERS
This Contract, entered into by and between:
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a universal banking corporation duly organized and
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with business address at FEBTC
Building, Muralla, Intramuros, Manila, represented herein by its Assistant Vice President, MR.
FLORENDO G. MARANAN, (hereinafter referred to as the BANK);
- and -
________________, ________________ years old, of legal age, _____________, and residing
at __________________ (hereinafter referred to as the (EMPLOYEE).
WITNESSETH: That
WHEREAS, the BANK, cognizant of its social responsibility, realizes that there is a need to
provide disabled and handicapped persons gainful employment and opportunities to realize
their potentials, uplift their socio-economic well being and welfare and make them
productive, self-reliant and useful citizens to enable them to fully integrate in the
mainstream of society;
WHEREAS, there are certain positions in the BANK which may be filled-up by disabled and
handicapped persons, particularly deaf-mutes, and the BANK ha[s] been approached by some
civic-minded citizens and authorized government agencies [regarding] the possibility of hiring
handicapped workers for these positions;
WHEREAS, the EMPLOYEE is one of those handicapped workers who [were] recommended
for possible employment with the BANK;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and in compliance with
Article 80 of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, the BANK and the EMPLOYEE
have entered into this Employment Contract as follows:
1. The BANK agrees to employ and train the EMPLOYEE, and the EMPLOYEE agrees to
diligently and faithfully work with the BANK, as Money Sorter and Counter.
2. The EMPLOYEE shall perform among others, the following duties and responsibilities:
i Sort out bills according to color;
ii. Count each denomination per hundred, either manually or with the aid of a counting
machine;
iii. Wrap and label bills per hundred;
iv. Put the wrapped bills into bundles; and
v. Submit bundled bills to the bank teller for verification.
3. The EMPLOYEE shall undergo a training period of one (1) month, after which the BANK
shall determine whether or not he/she should be allowed to finish the remaining term of this
Contract.
27

4. The EMPLOYEE shall be entitled to an initial compensation of P118.00 per day, subject
to adjustment in the sole judgment of the BANK, payable every 15
th
and end of the month.
5. The regular work schedule of the EMPLOYEE shall be five (5) days per week, from
Mondays thru Fridays, at eight (8) hours a day. The EMPLOYEE may be required to perform
overtime work as circumstance may warrant, for which overtime work he/she [shall] be paid
an additional compensation of 125% of his daily rate if performed during ordinary days and
130% if performed during Saturday or [a] rest day.
6. The EMPLOYEE shall likewise be entitled to the following benefits:
i. Proportionate 13
th
month pay based on his basic daily wage.
ii. Five (5) days incentive leave.
iii. SSS premium payment.
7. The EMPLOYEE binds himself/herself to abide [by] and comply with all the BANK Rules
and Regulations and Policies, and to conduct himself/herself in a manner expected of all
employees of the BANK.
8. The EMPLOYEE acknowledges the fact that he/she had been employed under a special
employment program of the BANK, for which reason the standard hiring requirements of the
BANK were not applied in his/her case. Consequently, the EMPLOYEE acknowledges and
accepts the fact that the terms and conditions of the employment generally observed by the
BANK with respect to the BANKs regular employee are not applicable to the EMPLOYEE, and
that therefore, the terms and conditions of the EMPLOYEEs employment with the BANK shall
be governed solely and exclusively by this Contract and by the applicable rules and
regulations that the Department of Labor and Employment may issue in connection with the
employment of disabled and handicapped workers. More specifically, the EMPLOYEE hereby
acknowledges that the provisions of Book Six of the Labor Code of the Philippines as
amended, particularly on regulation of employment and separation pay are not applicable to
him/her.
9. The Employment Contract shall be for a period of six (6) months or from ____ to ____
unless earlier terminated by the BANK for any just or reasonable cause. Any continuation or
extension of this Contract shall be in writing and therefore this Contract will automatically
expire at the end of its terms unless renewed in writing by the BANK.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties, have hereunto affixed their signature[s] this ____ day of
_________________, ____________ at Intramuros, Manila, Philippines.
In 1988, two (2) deaf-mutes were hired under this Agreement; in 1989 another two (2); in
1990, nineteen (19); in 1991 six (6); in 1992, six (6) and in 1993, twenty-one (21). Their
employment[s] were renewed every six months such that by the time this case arose, there
were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes who were employed by respondent under the said
employment agreement. The last one was Thelma Malindoy who was employed in 1992 and
whose contract expired on July 1993.
x x x x x x x x x
Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust
Company maintained that complainants who are a special class of workers the hearing
impaired employees were hired temporarily under [a] special employment arrangement
which was a result of overtures made by some civic and political personalities to the
respondent Bank; that complainant*s+ were hired due to pakiusap which must be
considered in the light of the context of the respondent Banks corporate philosophy as well
as its career and working environment which is to maintain and strengthen a corps of
professionals trained and qualified officers and regular employees who are baccalaureate
degree holders from excellent schools which is an unbending policy in the hiring of regular
employees; that in addition to this, training continues so that the regular employee grows in
the corporate ladder; that the idea of hiring handicapped workers was acceptable to them
only on a special arrangement basis; that it adopted the special program to help tide over a
group of handicapped workers such as deaf-mutes like the complainants who could do
manual work for the respondent Bank; that the task of counting and sorting of bills which
was being performed by tellers could be assigned to deaf-mutes; that the counting and
sorting of money are tellering works which were always logically and naturally part and
parcel of the tellers normal functions; that from the beginning there have been no separate
items in the respondent Bank plantilla for sorters or counters; that the tellers themselves
already did the sorting and counting chore as a regular feature and integral part of their
duties (p. 97, Records); that through the pakiusap of Arturo Borjal, the tellers were relieved
of this task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes without creating new
positions as there is no position either in the respondent or in any other bank in the
Philippines which deals with purely counting and sorting of bills in banking operations.
Petitioners specified when each of them was hired and dismissed, viz:
[7]

NAME OF PETITIONER WORKPLACE Date Hired Date Dismissed
1. MARITES BERNARDO Intramuros 12 NOV 90 17 NOV 93
2. ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE Intramuros 24 JAN 90 11 JAN 94
3. REBECCA E. DAVID Intramuros 16 APR 90 23 OCT 93
4. DAVID P. PASCUAL Bel-Air 15 OCT 88 21 NOV 94
28

5. RAQUEL ESTILLER Intramuros 2 JUL 92 4 JAN 94
6. ALBERT HALLARE West 4 JAN 91 9 JAN 94
7. EDMUND M. CORTEZ Bel-Air 15 JAN 91 3 DEC 93
8. JOSELITO O. AGDON Intramuros 5 NOV 90 17 NOV 93
9. GEORGE P. LIGUTAN, JR. Intramuros 6 SEPT 89 19 JAN
94
10. CELSO M. YAZAR Intramuros 8 FEB 93 8 AUG 93
11. ALEX G. CORPUZ Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG
93
12. RONALD M. DELFIN Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93
13. ROWENA M. TABAQUERO Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93
14. CORAZON C. DELOS REYES Intramuros 8 FEB 93 8 AUG 93
15. ROBERT G. NOORA Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93
16. MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN Intramuros 1 FEB 93 1 AUG 93
17. ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI Intramuros 22 JAN 93 22 JUL 93
18. IKE CABANDUCOS Intramuros 24 FEB 93 24 AUG 93
19. COCOY NOBELLO Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93
20. DORENDA CATIMBUHAN Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93
21. ROBERT MARCELO West 31 JUL 93
[8]
1 AUG 93
22. LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO West 15 JUN 90 21 NOV 93
23. JOSE E. SALES West 6 AUG 92 12 OCT 93
24. ISABEL MAMAUAG West 8 MAY 92 10 NOV 93
25. VIOLETA G. MONTES Intramuros 2 FEB 90 15 JAN 94
26. ALBINO TECSON Intramuros 7 NOV 91 10 NOV
93
27. MELODY V. GRUELA West 28 OCT 91 3 NOV 93
28. BERNADETH D. AGERO West 19 DEC 90 27 DEC 93
29. CYNTHIA DE VERA Bel-Air 26 JUN 90 3 DEC 93
30. LANI R. CORTEZ Bel-Air 15 OCT 88 10 DEC 93
31. MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION West 6 SEPT 90 6 FEB 94
32. DINDO VALERIO Intramuros 30 MAY 93 30 NOV
93
33. ZENAIDA MATA Intramuros 10 FEB 93 10 AUG 93
34. ARIEL DEL PILAR Intramuros 24 FEB 93 24 AUG 93
35. MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA Intramuros 27 JUL 90 4 FEB 94
36. THELMA SEBASTIAN Intramuros 12 NOV 90 17 NOV 93
37. MA. JEANETTE CERVANTES West 6 JUN 92 7 DEC 93
38. JEANNIE RAMIL Intramuros 23 APR 90 12 OCT 93
39. ROZAIDA PASCUAL Bel-Air 20 APR 89 29 OCT 93
40. PINKY BALOLOA West 3 JUN 91 2 DEC 93
41. ELIZABETH VENTURA West 12 MAR 90 FEB 94 [SIC]
42. GRACE S. PARDO West 4 APR 90 13 MAR 94
43. RICO TIMOSA Intramuros 28 APR 93 28 OCT 93
29

As earlier noted, the labor arbiter and, on appeal, the NLRC ruled against herein
petitioners. Hence, this recourse to this Court.
[9]

The Ruling of the NLRC

In affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed
regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, Respondent
Commission ratiocinated as follows:
We agree that Art. 280 is not controlling herein. We give due credence to the conclusion
that complainants were hired as an accommodation to [the] recommendation of civic
oriented personalities whose employment[s] were covered by xxx Employment Contract[s]
with special provisions on duration of contract as specified under Art. 80. Hence, as correctly
held by the Labor Arbiter a quo, the terms of the contract shall be the law between the
parties.
[10]

The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable,
considering the prevailing circumstances/milieu of the case.
Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners cite the following grounds in support of their cause:
I. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
petitioners - money sorters and counters working in a bank - were not regular employees.
II. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
employment contracts signed and renewed by the petitioners - which provide for a period of
six (6) months - were valid.
III. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in not applying
the provisions of the Magna Carta for the Disabled (Republic Act No. 7277), on proscription
against discrimination against disabled persons.
[11]

In the main, the Court will resolve whether petitioners have become regular
employees.
This Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than
six months and whose contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal
from employment was illegal.
Preliminary Matter: Propriety of Certiorari

Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company argues that a review of the findings of
facts of the NLRC is not allowed in a petition for certiorari. Specifically, it maintains that the
Court cannot pass upon the findings of public respondents that petitioners were not regular
employees.
True, the Court, as a rule, does not review the factual findings of public respondents in
a certiorari proceeding. In resolving whether the petitioners have become regular
employees, we shall not change the facts found by the public respondent. Our task is merely
to determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the law to
the established facts, as above-quoted from the assailed Decision.
Main Issue: Are Petitioners Regular Employees?

Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their
task as money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of
respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the
application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as
special workers and should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement
of the Bank.
[12]
Rather, they were special workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code.
Private respondent contends that it never solicited the services of petitioners, whose
employment was merely an accommodation in response to the requests of government
officials and civic-minded citizens. They were told from the start, with the assistance of
government representatives, that they could not become regular employees because there
were no plantilla positions for money sorters, whose task used to be performed by
tellers. Their contracts were renewed several times, not because of need but merely for
humanitarian reasons. Respondent submits that as of the present, the special position
that was created for the petitioners no longer exist[s] in private respondent [bank], after the
latter had decided not to renew anymore their special employment contracts.
At the outset, let it be known that this Court appreciates the nobility of private
respondents effort to provide employment to physically impaired individuals and to make
them more productive members of society. However, we cannot allow it to elude the legal
consequences of that effort, simply because it now deems their employment irrelevant. The
facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons,
30

indubitably show that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular
employees. As such, they have acquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect
and uphold, not as a matter of compassion but as a consequence of law and justice.
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be
trained for a period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not
they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the
employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless
renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the
term.
According to private respondent, the employment contracts were prepared in
accordance with Article 80 of the Labor Code, which provides:
ART. 80. Employment agreement. Any employer who employs handicapped workers shall
enter into an employment agreement with them, which agreement shall include:
(a) The names and addresses of the handicapped workers to be employed;
(b) The rate to be paid the handicapped workers which shall be not less than seventy five
(75%) per cent of the applicable legal minimum wage;
(c) The duration of employment period; and
(d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers.
The employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his
duly authorized representatives.
The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with the aforecited
provision. Succeeding events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons),
[13]
however, justify the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped
workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to
1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of
others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the
bank. More important, these facts show that they werequalified to perform the
responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them
unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled
employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-
bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:
Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.No disabled person shall be denied access
to opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to
the same terms and conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges,
benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person.
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the
employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the
rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor
Code, which provides:
ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. -- The provisions of written agreement to the
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in
nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service,
whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered as regular employee with
respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such
activity exists.
The test of whether an employee is regular was laid down in De Leon v. NLRC,
[14]
in
which this Court held:
The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the
usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary
or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be
determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme
of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing
the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely
intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient
evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the
employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such
activity exists.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the
business of respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed
these tasks for more than six months. Thus, the following twenty-seven petitioners should
be deemed regular employees: Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David,
David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George
31

P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino
Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B.
Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie
Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo.
As held by the Court, Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the
pernicious practice of making permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple
expedient of extending to them probationary appointments, ad infinitum.
[15]
The contract
signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during which the bank
determined the employees fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the contract after
the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular
employees.
[16]
No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees.
As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of tenure;
that is, their services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. Because
respondent failed to show such cause,
[17]
these twenty-seven petitioners are deemed illegally
dismissed and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges.
[18]
Considering the allegation of respondent that the job of
money sorting is no longer available because it has been assigned back to the tellers to
whom it originally belonged,
[19]
petitioners are hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement.
[20]

Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular
employees and hence not entitled to the same benefits.
Applicability of the Brent Ruling

Respondent bank, citing Brent School v. Zamora
[21]
in which the Court upheld the
validity of an employment contract with a fixed term, argues that the parties entered into
the contract on equal footing. It adds that the petitioners had in fact an advantage, because
they were backed by then DSWD Secretary Mita Pardo de Tavera and Representative Arturo
Borjal.
We are not persuaded. The term limit in the contract was premised on the fact that
the petitioners were disabled, and that the bank had to determine their fitness for the
position. Indeed, its validity is based on Article 80 of the Labor Code. But as noted earlier,
petitioners proved themselves to be qualified disabled persons who, under the Magna Carta
for Disabled Persons, are entitled to terms and conditions of employment enjoyed
by qualified able-bodied individuals; hence, Article 80 does not apply because petitioners
are qualified for their positions. The validation of the limit imposed on their contracts,
imposed by reason of their disability, was a glaring instance of the very mischief sought to be
addressed by the new law.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with
public interest.
[22]
Provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and
the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact
of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other.
[23]
Clearly, the
agreement of the parties regarding the period of employment cannot prevail over the
provisions of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners must be
treated as qualified able-bodied employees.
Respondents reason for terminating the employment of petitioners is
instructive. Because the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) required that cash in the bank be
turned over to the BSP during business hours from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., respondent
resorted to nighttime sorting and counting of money. Thus, it reasons that this task could
not be done by deaf mutes because of their physical limitations as it is very risky for them to
travel at night.
[24]
We find no basis for this argument. Travelling at night involves risks to
handicapped and able-bodied persons alike. This excuse cannot justify the termination of
their employment.
Other Grounds Cited by Respondent

Respondent argues that petitioners were merely accommodated employees. This
fact does not change the nature of their employment. As earlier noted, an employee is
regular because of the nature of work and the length of service, not because of the mode or
even the reason for hiring them.
Equally unavailing are private respondents arguments that it did not go out of its way
to recruit petitioners, and that its plantilla did not contain their positions. In L. T. Datu v.
NLRC,
[25]
the Court held that the determination of whether employment is casual or regular
does not depend on the will or word of the employer, and the procedure of hiring x x x but
on the nature of the activities performed by the employee, and to some extent, the length of
performance and its continued existence.
Private respondent argues that the petitioners were informed from the start that they
could not become regular employees. In fact, the bank adds, they agreed with the
stipulation in the contract regarding this point. Still, we are not persuaded. The well-settled
rule is that the character of employment is determined not by stipulations in the contract,
but by the nature of the work performed.
[26]
Otherwise, no employee can become regular by
the simple expedient of incorporating this condition in the contract of employment.
In this light, we iterate our ruling in Romares v. NLRC:
[27]

Article 280 was emplaced in our statute books to prevent the circumvention of the
employees right to be secure in his tenure by indiscriminately and completely ruling out all
written and oral agreements inconsistent with the concept of regular employment defined
therein. Where an employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, such employee is deemed a
regular employee and is entitled to security of tenure notwithstanding the contrary
provisions of his contract of employment.
32

x x x x x x x x x
At this juncture, the leading case of Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora proves instructive. As
reaffirmed in subsequent cases, this Court has upheld the legality of fixed-term
employment. It ruled that the decisive determinant in term employment should not be the
activities that the employee is called upon to perform but the day certain agreed upon the
parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship. But this
Court went on to say that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the periods have
been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be
struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy and morals.
In rendering this Decision, the Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias in
favor of the working class, but also the concern of the State for the plight of the
disabled. The noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled Persons are not based merely on
charity or accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment of qualified persons,
disabled or not. In the present case, the handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a
hindrance to their work. The eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of
their employment contracts. Why then should they be dismissed, simply because they are
physically impaired? The Court believes, that, after showing their fitness for the work
assigned to them, they should be treated and granted the same rights like any other regular
employees.
In this light, we note the Office of the Solicitor Generals prayer joining the petitioners
cause.
[28]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 20, 1995
Decision and the August 4, 1995 Resolution of the NLRC
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company is
hereby ORDERED to pay back wages and separation pay to each of the following twenty-
seven (27) petitioners, namely, Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David,
David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George
P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino
Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B.
Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie
Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo. The NLRC is
hereby directed to compute the exact amount due each of said employees, pursuant to
existing laws and regulations, within fifteen days from the finality of this Decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.