The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides individual protection

from unreasonable searches and seizures. Article I 8 of the Pennslvania Constitution

e!tends this protection to its citizens and reco"nizes an even "reater protection of privac.
An unla#ful search of a person or place occurs #hen an individual has a sub$ective
e!pectation of privac in somethin" #hich societ reco"nizes as reasonable% and the
"overnment has violated this e!pectation of privac #ith a search.
Article I 8 of the Pennslvania Constitution presumes that to be reasonable% actions of
the "overnment amountin" to a search must be authorized b a valid search #arrant% and
searches not supported b such a #arrant are per se unreasonable.
A seizure of a person happens if in vie# of all the relevant circumstances% an ob$ectivel
reasonable person in the vie# of the defendant #ould not feel that the #ere free to
leave.
In Pennslvania% a chase&pursuit of a suspect is considered to be a seizure for #hich there
must be reasonable suspicion to support. An officer's approach carries #ith it indicia of
some form of intended detention or restriction on the individual's freedom( therefore% PA
la# re)uires reasonable suspicion or probable cause to be present( other#ise% an
relin)uishment that results #ill not be considered abandonment.
*elin)uishment durin" a mere encounter is deemed an abandonment.
In order to be valid a search #arrant must be sufficientl particular as to the person or
place to be searches and the person or thin" to be seized. The overall )uestion is #hether
the description in the #arrant is sufficient to limit the discretion of the e!ecutin" officials
and prevent a search of an area defined b the officer's inclination alone. If an
unreasonable discrepanc e!ists bet#een the items for #hich probable cause is
established and the description in the search #arrant% then suppression of the seized
evidence is re)uired.
Part of the Fourth Amendment's and Article I 8's re)uirement of reasonableness
includes that officers must use reasonable means to e!ecute a search #arrant.
Pennslvania has codified this in Pennslvania *ule of Criminal Procedure +,-. *ule
+,-% also .no#n as the /0noc. and Announce *ule%1 re)uires an officer to "ive% or ma.e
a reasonable effort to "ive% notice of the officer's identit% authorit% and reason of the
officer's entr to the e!ecute the #arrant to the occupant. The rule further re)uires the
officer to #ait a reasonable amount of time for a response b the occupant% absent e!i"ent
circumstances% before entr into the home. This rule e!ists because reasonableness
re)uires that an individual have an opportunit to peacefull surrender.
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If the court finds that the defendant #as sub$ected to a custodial interro"ation% the
Common#ealth must prove that the person #as advised of his ri"ht to be free from self
incrimination as described in Miranda v. Arizona. Custod is found more readil in
Pennslvania than in federal courts and #ill be found #hen3 425 la# enforcement officials
phsicall deprived a person of his freedom of action( 4+5 the person had a reasonable
belief that his freedom of movement and action #as restricted b interro"ation( 465 the
person #as sub$ect to police detention that% because of the totalit of the circumstances%
became so coercive as to become the functional e)uivalent of an arrest( or 475 because of
an officer's sho# of authorit% the person #as led to believe that he #as not free to
decline the officer's re)uest or other#ise terminate the encounter.
In addition to direct )uestionin"% and conduct li.el to elicit an incriminatin" response
amounts to an interro"ation. Rhode Island v. Innis.
8nce a defendant is in custod% he must ma.e a .no#in"% intelli"ent% and voluntar
#aiver of his Miranda ri"hts in order to ma.e a statement. Moran v. Burbine; Comm v.
DeJesus. The Prosecution has the burden of provin" that a defendant .no#in"l%
voluntaril% and intelli"entl #aived his privile"e a"ainst self9incrimination. To do this
the must prove that the :'s #aiver #as the product of free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation% coercion% or deception.
Those sub$ected to coercive police interro"ations have an automatic protection from the
use of their involuntar statements% or evidence derived from their statements% in an
subse)uent trial. US v. Patane; Adopted in PA b Comm v. Abbas.
;o#ever% if a statement is ta.en in violation of a :'s Miranda ri"hts% that statement is
sub$ect to suppression ho#ever it can be sued to support a subse)uent search #arrant and
evidence seized as a result of that #arrant is admissible.
The Si!th Amendment of the United States Constitution "uarantees a defendant a ri"ht to
counsel. 8fficiall% the ri"ht to counsel be"ins #hen formal adversar proceedin"s have
commenced. ;o#ever% before formal proceedin"s% the ri"ht to an attorne is contained in
Miranda as a <
th
Amendment protection. Therefore% a defendant has the ri"ht to counsel
as soon as the are in custod% but the defendant must specificall invo.e this ri"ht to it to
ta.e effect prior to $udicial proceedin"s.
The Confrontation Clause of the Si!th Amendment of the United States Constitution is
violated #hen at a criminal trial the Common#ealth attempts to offer into evidence a
testimonial statement of a currentl unavailable declarant #ho is unavailable for cross9
e!amination at trial and #ho #as not previousl cross9e!amined b the defendant. A
statement is considered to be testimonial if it #as made to a "overnment official #ith the
reasonable e!pectation that it #ould later be used prosecutorall.
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