1.

0 INDIAN POLICE SERVICE:

EVOLUTION THROUGH A PASSAGE OF TIME
1.1. The Indian Police Service Today - A Factsheet
1.2. Police Administration in India - The Structural Context
1.3. Indian Police Service - Growing Citizen Expectations
1.4. Growing Citizen Expectation - Structural Changes
1.5. Evolution of the Indian Police Service - Pre Independence Period
1.6. Evolution of the Indian Police Service- Post Independence Developments
2.0 PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF PAY
2.1. Introduction
2.2. International Practices
A. Lord Edmund-Davies Committee
B. Sheehy Commission
C. The Winsor Report
2.3. Comparison with Private Sector
2.4. General Principles of determination of Pay
2.5. Principles of Determination of Pay Common to All Services
CONTENTS
01
17
3.0 CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
3.1. Introduction
3.2. Long Working Hours in the Police
3.3. Occupational and Situational Risks Specific to Police
3.4. Impact of Stress on Police Officers
3.5. Police Job Demands and Alienation from Families
3.6. Health Hazards and their Manifestations
3.7. Arguments for Extra Compensation for Adverse Work Conditions
4.0 STRUCTURAL ISSUES, PAY PARITY AND
CAREER PROGRESSION ISSUES
4.1. Introduction
4.2. Parity of Pay with IAS and IFS
4.3 Anomalies in Implementing 6
th
CPC Reccomendation on Edge
4.4. Misrepresentation of the 2 year Gap Between IAS and Other Services
4.5. Intra Service Parity
4.6. Abolition of the Rank of DIG
4.7. Abolition of the HAG+ Scale
4.8. Reinforcing the All India Character of the Service
4.9. Inequities in the Central Staffing Scheme
5. 0 PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF ALLOWANCES,
ADVANCES AND INCENTIVES
5.1. Introduction
5.2. General Allowances and Advances
5.3. Allowances Specific to Police
5.4. Allowances Specific for Working Couples and Women
5.5. Performance linked Incentive Scheme
6.0 PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF PENSION
6.1. Basic Principles of Determination of Pension
6.2. Problems with the New Pension Scheme
6.3. One Rank One Pension
6.4. Inequitous Pension Fixation Formula
6.5. Making Pension Tax Free
6.6. Raising the Family Pension
6.7. Gallantry Medal Allowance
7. 0 TRAINING AND CAPACITY BUILDING THROUGH
A COMPETENCY BASED MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
8.0 CONCLUSION
ANNEXURES
A - List of IPS Matyrs
B - Cities with Police Commissioner System
ENDNOTES
31
51
85
99
117
123
128
132
1 6
INDIAN POLICE SERVICE:
EVOLUTION THROUGH A
PASSAGE OF TIME
1.1. THE INDIAN POLICE SERVICE
TODAY - A FACTSHEET
1.1.1 The officers of the Indian Police
Service, being vested with the mandate
to ensure Rule of Law, prevent and
detect crime, and safeguard the countrys
internal security, occupy an extremely
significant place in the architecture of
governance. With a cadre strength of
4720, organised into 24 State/Union
Territory Cadres, the service provides
leadership to a force of 31,93,808
police personnel spread across State
and Central police Forces. In the year
2013, it supervised investigations of
66,40,378 fresh criminal cases, handled
multifarious agitations, and oversaw
apprehension of 74,20,091 persons in
the course of protecting and upholding
the rule of Law. While these statistics
are in themselves mindboggling, they
constitute and capture only a minor part
of the immense contribution of the police.
Their real impact, however, resting
largely on intangible outcomes, are not
amenable to statistics but fall within
the nebulous realm of perception of
being secure . Officers of the service
man 711 police districts (of which 176
are terrorist/ LWE affected), as well
as the higher formations in the Central
and State police Organisations. This
mandate is discharged with a meagre
strength of 122.5 civil policemen per
lakh population, which stands barely half
of the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) reported global
average of 341.8
1
. In the discharge of
these duties, in the service of the nation,
32 IPS officers (Annexure A) made the
supreme sacrifice of laying down their
lives, fighting terrorism, insurgency and
organised crime.
PUNJAB TERRORISM: THE SAGA OF POLICE
VALOUR AND SACRIFICE
Between 1982 and 1992, Punjab witnessed a severe form
of terrorist violence. The leadership of Punjab Police,
through a series of doctrinal innovations, moulded the
force into Indias most effective counter-terrorist force,
launched a synchronized counter-offensive that wiped out
militancy in Punjab within a short span. The young officers
of the Indian Police Service led the force from the front,
and were extensively involved in the control of terrorism
at the field level. Cohesiveness in ranks, professionalism
of the highest order and the dictum of duty before self,
kept Punjab Police in very high spirits despite the fact
that the mindless and brutal killers amongst militant
ranks, not only ambushed the policemen on duty, but also
killed them even off-duty and while on leave.
The brutality extended to cold-blooded killing of
relatives of Punjab Police personnel. They had to fight
their own kith and kin who had gravitated to terrorism
being indoctrinated, armed, and trained by agencies
of a neighbouring country. The saga of commitment of
Punjab Police to its duty, in a situation when the entire
state machinery had crumbled, resulted in restoration of
peace in Punjab and put the state back on the track of
development. Punjab police paid a heavy price with the
martyrdom of over 1,700 of its men besides the cowardly
killings hundreds of their relatives by the terrorists. Six
IPS officers made the supreme sacrifice of their life in the
cause of the nation.
3 2
1.2. POLICE ADMINISTRATION
IN INDIA - THE STRUCTURAL
CONTEXT
1.2.1. The police in India undertake
its responsibilities under extremely
challenging circumstances. India is today
a maturing democracy, with a large
citizenry, that is both conscious and
assertive of their rights. The country
is home to a rare plurality of ethnicity,
religion and culture, and brings with it
many issues of difference and dissent.
The country is today an emerging
economic powerhouse, and is subject
to consequent churnings, displacements
and migrations. Millions of youth, with
rising aspirations, seek to dislodge
the existing status quo of inequity and
discrimination imposed by the weight
of history. The globalised village that
we live in has brought in considerable
interconnectedness that governance
must necessarily grapple with. Indias
distinctive constitutional architecture,
which is unitary in character, but federal
in spirit, renders provision of uniform
administration across the nation a
serious challenge. All of the above, in
multifarious ways, has made policing
an extremely difficult, albeit a highly
enriching experience.
1.3. INDIAN POLICE SERVICE -
GROWING CITIZEN EXPECTATIONS
1.3.1. The Indian citizen has high
expectations from the IPS. Most importantly,
(s)he expects the Service to set in place
a mechanism to provide a sense of
security- physical and psychological,
so as to freely go about their lives,
without undue concern.S(h)e expects
that the Rule of Law is in place, and that
if wronged, access to justice in a time
bound manner is available as a matter
of right. The citizen expects the IPS, as
the visible arm of the Government, to
ensure that the system delivers as an
effective first responder in distress of any
kind in addition to upholding the rule of
law. (S)he expects the police to manage
Indias unique diversity, allowing citizens
to celebrate their differences, while
bringing in order and social cohesion
to manage dissonance. The nation
expects the police to create an enabling
environment to facilitate individual
and collective growth, assuring the
fundamental rights of the citizen. Most
importantly, the citizen expects the
police to ensure that India is secure from
within and outside.
1.3.2. In order to accomplish these
critical responsibilities, the Indian citizen
expects an IPS officer to be the repository
of a daunting array of intellectual and
administrative skills. The officer is
expected to lead from the front, bringing
to bear qualities of courage- both physical
and moral, professional excellence,
daring innovation and strategic vision
to the tasks at hand. (S)he is expected
to be a team builder, crisis manager and
negotiator. The citizen expects him/her
to work extremely long hours, display a
high degree of industry, perseverance and
unflagging enthusiasm, and be alert and
available for him round the clock. The IPS
officer is expected to bring about change
in remote and difficult places, at times
face real risk to life and limb, as well as
meet the increasing, often unrealistic,
public expectations.
1.3.3. As will be made clear at length
in the third chapter, the police work
under extremely stressful circumstances
of being understaffed, overworked, and
underpaid, all of which takes a heavy
toll on ones mental and physical health.
Besides the obvious deleterious effect
on health, these circumstances lead to
extreme frustration, which have very
often manifested itself in sub-optimal
behaviour at work, and at home. As
well as fighting such frustrations within
oneself, the Indian Police Service officer
has the onerous task of motivating, taking
care of and getting the best out of such
a force which is far from contended and
well-provided for.
5 4
1.4. GROWING CITIZEN
EXPECTATION - STRUCTURAL
CHANGES
1.4.1. The growing citizen expectation
has found expression in a series of reform
directives issued by the constitutional
courts. These directives have led to a
slow but sure footed movement towards
police reforms, aimed at converting the
Indian police into a people friendly and
public service oriented institution. The
most significant of these, seven steps
towards a functionally independent and
accountable police, were laid down
by the Honble Supreme Court of
India in Prakash Singh v. Union of India
(2006)
2
. It called for a State Security
Commission, to lay down broad policy
and evaluate police functioning, Police
Establishment Board to independently
decide on transfers and postings and
Police Complaints Authorities as an
independent oversight mechanism
and so on. The judiciary has been in
the forefront of ensuring unfettered
investigation, the latest example being
the Supreme Court decision in Centre for
Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India,
(2014)
3
, in respect of curbs on initiating
investigation, under the Delhi Special
Police Establishment Act, 1946.
Various State Governments, recognizing
the need to have a more independent
Police, have established Police
Commissionerates in 47 cities of India (as
on date)
4
. Internally, police leaders have
transformed themselves as change agents
to improve internal sub-culture, better
processes and meet emerging challenges.
The global trend towards greater-
community engagement, both as a tool
of understanding citizen priorities, as
well as in transforming law enforcement
into a shared endeavor between the
police and the policed, has been a
product of citizens expectations
5
. All
of this brings us in line with progressive,
mature democracies across the world.
The IPS plays a highly critical role in this
transformation.
1.4.2. The enhanced citizen expectation
has not only changed the way the
IPS undertakes business, but has also
substantially altered its roles and
functions. Maintenance of internal
security continues to be a significant
component of the IPS charter. However,
post 9/11 it has been considerably
integrated with foreign policy, as well
as across all the development sectors.
The varied roles played by IPS officers in
Indian establishments abroad, as well as
the primacy of its role in development
across theatres- urban/LWE/terrorism
infested, all point to the same fact.
1.4.3. The present focus on internal
security again highlights the critical
role played by the Indian Police Service.
From single-handedly fighting the Punjab
insurgency, to effectively bringing back
normalcy into Jammu and Kashmir
and the North-East, the Indian Police
Service, by effective leadership of the
State and Central police formations
under its command, has fought to
safeguard the internal security of the
country. In the post-2000s, where
terrorism and naxalism in the hinterland,
have dominated the public discourse, the
Indian Police Service has again been in
the forefront of fighting the menace,
both at the policy and operational levels.
1.4.4. With the advances in
communication and transport, national
boundaries no longer bind down
the criminal. Conspiracy, planning,
recruitment, logistics and actual
execution, are spread across multiple
jurisdictions, with the criminal taking
recourse to the best available resource.
On the other hand, the law enforcement
agency is tied down not merely by
jurisdiction, but by multiple issues of
red-tape, conflicting laws, lack of co-
operation, amongst others. This brings in
sharp focus the role of the IPS officer, who
is best positioned to put forth practical
domain issues, across diplomatic and
ministerial bottlenecks, and effectively
produce results.
1.4.5. There has also been a growing
recognition of the necessity of the
participation of IPS officers in policy
formulation. The appointment of
IPS officers as Governors in strife torn
areas, or as National Security Advisor/
Dy National Security Advisor
6
,
indicates the considerable skill sets and
experience they bring to the task. The
creation of specialized agencies, and
new-age Central Police Organisations -
like the National Investigation Agency
(NIA), National Technical Research
Organisation (NTRO), National Disaster
Response Force (NDRF) etc., attests to
the importance of the internal security
dimension. Police Modernization plans
7 6
have also endorsed these changes.
1.4.6. Besides the above, taking
into account their unique skills of
human resource management, policy
implementation, public engagement,
inter-agency coordination and quick
incident response, there is an increasing
trend towards induction of IPS officers
in departments like transport, tourism,
sports, and in regulatory bodies, both
at the Central and State level. This is an
acknowledgement of the multifarious
competencies of IPS officers in addition
to their core competence in discharging
functions as Chief Vigilance Officers in
Public Sector Undertakings.
1.4.7. In a nutshell, the IPS today
straddles the entire realm of governance
from a police chowki to foreign policy!
1.5. EVOLUTION OF THE
INDIAN POLICE SERVICE - PRE
INDEPENDENCE PERIOD
1.5.1 The modern police system in India
was introduced by Lord Cornwallis, but
the first steps towards a unified police
administration, under the British took
roots in the mid eighteen hundreds in
Sindh, Bombay, and Madras. However, it
was the Indian Police Commission of
1860, which was the first effort to have
a comprehensive look at the police in
India. Interestingly, while its constitution
arose from a concern for a more efficient
and effective police force, its terms of
reference were essentially tailored to
bring about savings in public finances
7
.
The transition from the military police
to the civil police was recommended
by the Commission, as the method of
achieving the same
8
. The commission
recommended that the lower rank of
the constabulary should be divided into
three grades, the lowest of which should
receive a pay equal at least to the average
ordinary wages of unskilled labour, the
pay of the head constables and sergeants
should be sufficient to place them above
temptation, and to make promotion
to these appointments, an object of
ambition, open to the inferior grades.
1.5.2 The Public Service Commission,
1886 (Aitchinson Commission),
recommended an overhaul of the system
of recruitment to superior grades, so
as to ensure that candidates with good
educational qualifications, and habits
of industry are recruited
9
. It also
unanimously suggested that the abuses in
the lower ranks were entirely on account
of poorer pay.
1.5.3 The Indian Police Commission
(1902-03) (Fraser Commission) is the
next milestone in the history of Indian
police. The Commission identified five
reasons for poor police performance
which include:
i. Unsatisfactory training and recruitment
of superior officers of the department
ii. Undue interference with the police by
Magistrates and Commissioners
iii. Inadequate staff-both superior and
subordinate
iv. Insufficient remuneration of all ranks
10

1.5.4 The Commission, commenting
on recruitment and training found fault
with the system of nominations, as well
as with the practice of sending men to
India as Assistant Superintendents of
Police, who were too young, without
proper training in criminal law, languages
and Indian history. It suggested that
the pay and prospects of the superior
police officers should be improved, as
they were not adequate as compared to
the other officers in other departments,
and the initial pay was too little for a
young man to live on respectably
11
.
However, when the suggestion of a
common examination, and its variants
were put forth, the Commission adopted
a specious reasoning having no bearing
on administrative requirements, and at
variance with their earlier exhortations.
It said: The Commission have rejected both
these suggestions partly because they are not
prepared to say that precisely the same age or
class of men is required for the police as well
as the civil service; and mainly because they
think that men would not work contentedly
in the police in the same district or province,
alongside of their contemporaries in the Civil
Service, unless the Government were prepared
to make the former as attractive as the latter.
1.5.5 The Royal Commission on
Public Services, 1916 (Islington
Commission), did not make considerable
changes to the police system, as the
Fraser Commission had only recently put
forth its recommendations. However,
they recommended retention of the
existing system of recruitment wherein
candidates between 19-21 years, would
appear for a competitive examination, to
be selected to the Service.
9 8
1.5.6 The Royal Commission on
the Superior Civil Services in India,
1924 (Lee Commission), was of the
view that the best type of Indian is not
being obtained for the Indian Police
Service, partly out of the inadequacy
of emoluments, and partly because of
the hardships of a career in the police
Services
12
. It recognised that conditions
have changed, and that whilst more
specialized training is now necessary to equip
the present day police officer, for the efficient
discharge of his duties, his responsibilities on
the other hand, have become more onerous
and irksome, and require greater intelligence
and resource. Consequently, while it
agreed to improve basic pay, to avoid
disturbing the relative position of the
Service to other Services, they did not
alter the maximum basic pay. They also
recommended differential overseas pay
to the detriment of the Indian Police
Service, on account of the fact that they
are recruited at a lower age, and hence,
are likely to be married at a later date
in their service life, than their peers in
other services
13
.
1.5.7 During its initial years, the
Indian Police Service had very often
been plagued by a lack of clarity on its
structure, and organisation. The initial
recruits to the service, were from
the military, and later on involved a
combination of nominated and selected
candidates. The first open competition
for the police was held in England in
June 1893, and the top ten candidates
were appointed as probationary Assistant
Superintendents of Police. They were
characterised by various names- the
Indian Imperial Police, superior grades
of police force etc, but were not backed
by any official promulgation for the same.
In 1907, the Secretary of States officers
were directed to wear the letters I.P
on their epaulettes to distinguish them,
from officers recruited otherwise. They
were still however, referred to as the
Imperial Branch of the Police Service.
The Islington Commission referred to
the Indian Police Service, where-after the
name stuck. In 1932, in deference to the
wishes of the Indian Police Association,
the word Service was dropped, and the
simpler designation of the Indian Police
was officially adopted
14
. Consequently,
while the IPS traces its roots to the Indian
Police Act, 1861 and its consequent
developments, it never gained purpose
and character in the manner it is today,
till the advent of independence.
1.6. EVOLUTION OF THE
INDIAN POLICE SERVICE-
POST INDEPENDENCE
DEVELOPMENTS
1.6.1. The advent of independence, the
necessity to protect a nascent democracy,
as well as its transformed role in the
service of the people, brought in
substantial changes to the Indian Police
Service. The First Pay Commission
(1950), recognizing the above changes,
recommended recruitment in the same
manner and by the same standards in
accordance with the standards of Class
I service. Accordingly, recruitment and
pay rules were modified, and the IPS was
re-positioned in the Indian administrative
framework, at par with other Class I
Central Services
15
.
1.6.2. The framers of the Constitution,
recognizing the significance of the Indian
Police Service, introduced Article 312
in the Constitution of India, by which
the IPS along with the IAS was deemed
to be an All India Service, created by
Parliament, and carried with it, various
Constitutional protections. The necessity
of the same was ferociously defended by
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, in the Constituent
Assembly when he said: We have difficult
times ahead. We are talking here under
security kept in very difficult circumstances.
These people are the instruments. Remove
them and I see nothing but a picture of chaos
all over the country.
16
In fact, contrary
to the first draft, which only created an
enabling architecture for the All India
Services, reference to the IAS and the
IPS was made in the Constitution, at the
insistence of Sardar Patel
17
. Successive
Pay Commissions as well as other
Commissions constituted to go into the
issue of police reform, have by and large,
followed this progressive trend, and have
provided strength to the IPS and the
cause of police reform.
1.6.3. The Second Pay Commission
(1957-59) did not discuss the pay
structure of the All India Services, as
the same did not fall within its ambit.
However, pursuant to the revision of
pay scales for the Central Services, the
Government of India, looked into the
matter and proposed pay scales for the IPS
comparable to Class I Central Services.
11 10
1.6.4. The Study Team on Recruitment,
Selection, Union Public Service
Commission, the State Public Service
Commissions and Training, under the
aegis of the Administrative Reforms
Commission, 1967, went into the
issue of recruitment, and suggested that
there must be integrated recruitment
to the Higher Civil Services. They also
suggested minimisation of the disparities
between the services, and recommended
that totally identical pay scales for all the
higher services would be the ideal solution.
They did not however recommend the
same, merely for the reason that they did
not want a situation, where a new entrant
would prefer the easier jobs in the Central
Services to the hazards, stresses and
higher responsibility positions, of the IAS
and the IPS
18
. The first Administrative
Reforms Commission, also
emphasised the importance of proper
personnel planning, cadre management,
and recommended that recruitment to
all Class I services, must only be through
a single competitive examination. They
also recommended greater mobility in
the services, with staff appointments
in the headquarters organisations in
the Centre and State being filled up on
the basis of a competitive examination,
to ward against the tendency to
compartmentalise careers
19
.
1.6.5. The Report of the Committee
on Police Training, 1971 (MS Gore
Committee), went to considerable
lengths to assess the need for quality
improvement in the IPS and said: Officers
of the IAS and the IPS who have to run the
district administration, face the same difficult
and complex situations, arising out of the
problems of social and political confrontation
and change, from the beginning of their
career. They have to deal with the same
crisis situations, and meet the same public
criticism. They must have the same qualities
of leadership, capacity to take decisions, and
ability to rise to the occasion. The calibre,
temperament and character of the members
of the two services should therefore be of the
same standard. We are convinced that this is
not ensured in the present system of selection.
For all these reasons, we recommend that the
lower age limit for the IPS should be raised
to 21 years, and the written examination and
the marks should be the same as for the IAS
20
.
. The report also went on to say: A change
in the system of recruitment alone will not
ensure that candidates of the required calibre
are attracted to the service. The testimony
of the witnesses who appeared before us
and the replies that we have received show
that the main factors which inhibit better
quality candidates from entering the IPS,
are the general unpopularity of the service
due to an unattractive pay structure, not
commensurate with the responsibilities and
the arduous and hazardous nature of police
duties, meagre promotion prospects, lack of
social recognition vis--vis other services, and
sense of uncertainty arising from political
situations.
21
1.6.6. The Third Pay Commission
(1973)
22
deliberated at length on the
need to attract capable talent for the IPS,
and increased a host of allowances to have
the effect of reducing the existing disparity
between the IAS and IPS scales of pay.
1.6.7. The Kothari Commission
(Committee on Recruitment Policy
and Selection Methods) (1976),
recommended a common examination
for all civil services in all respects.
Justifying the same, they said that even
though the professional expertise required of
a general administrator, or a diplomat or a
police officer or a member of any of the other
Central Services vary, their general qualities
of competence, traits of character and sense
of commitment necessarily have a common
denominator. The same applies to other qualities
needed in an officer such as intellectual
cohesion, articulation, sense of awareness and
purpose, integrity, depth of understanding,
courage of conviction and ability to respond
to changing socio-economic and political
situations. In support of the above,
they relied upon the Administrative
Reform Commissions Report on
Personnel Administration (1969) and
Committee on Police Training (Gore
Committee) (1971)
23
. Accordingly, from
1979, the recruitment to the IPS as well
as other Civil Services, including the IAS,
was through a common examination.
1.6.8. The National Police
Commission, headed by Shri Dharam
Vira, a retired ICS officer and Governor
of Punjab, West Bengal and Karnataka,
was setup in 1977, and produced eight
reports between February 1979 and May
1981. It was a watershed development in
the history of Indian police.
The sixth report submitted in March
1981, dealt with the police leadership,
particularly the Indian Police Service. It
stated: As the functions of the IPS officers
have not only multiplied manifold, but are
becoming more complex, hard and hazardous,
calling for higher professional and technical
skills and competence, special measures to
attract some of the ablest officers from the
lower echelons and also from the outside
world are required. This means that the
terms and conditions of this service should
be comparable with those of the best services.
13 12
There appears, therefore, no justification for
the emoluments and prospects of the IPS being
in any way inferior to those of the IAS. The
minor improvements in the various pay scales
of the IPS did not adequately improve the
career value of the service because the yawning
gap with the IAS has remained. At present the
country is facing such serious dangers that
its very integrity and unity are threatened.
Needed in the IPS are men whose calibre is
not only equal to that of the IAS officers but
who also profess certain mental qualities,
courage and higher physical standards,
that are specially needed for effective police
work. Therefore, the present differentials are
counter-productive and it would be cost-
effective for the Government to improve the
quality of recruitment, emoluments and career
prospects of the IPS by bringing them on par
with those of the IAS. This recommendation is
made because of the importance of stability in
society and, therefore, to improve the calibre
and performance of this most essential service.
This recommendation also flows logically
from the recommendations of the Kothari
Committee which should be implemented
in full.
24
It went on to add: There is
persistent public criticism of the police and
its role in society which is in contradiction
to the glamour associated with some other
services. A service which is thus associated
with a high degree of personal risk and
professional hazards, which suffers from lack
of status because of the very nature of Its
work and which does not have within its pay
structure and service conditions an adequate
element of compensation cannot be expected to
be popular with young men while choosing a
career from among a number of avenues open
to them specially when, in some services, the
hazards and risks are negligible, conditions
of work are not so exacting, emoluments and
benefits are greater and social status and
recognition better. While the handicaps and
drawbacks inherent in police work cannot be
removed they can partially be compensated
for, by putting them on par with officers of
other services. That is why the equality in the
pay scales and parity in prospects of the IPS
with the IAS is recommended.
25
1.6.9. The Fourth Pay Commission
(1986) brought about measures to
improve the career progression in the
IPS by merging ranks, as well as by
recommending induction of an IPS officer
as member of cadre review committee
26
.
1.6.10. The Fifth Pay Commission
(1994-96), emphasized the significance of
the AIS, and made various recommendations
to improve the backbone and quality of
AIS officers. They also introduced the rank
of ADG, recommended inclusion of non-
IAS Secretary in the Civil Services Board.
1.6.11. In 1998, a Committee was set
up under Mr. Julio F. Ribeiro. The
Committee was to review action taken
to implement the recommendations
of the National Police Commission,
National Human Rights Commission and
the Vohra Committee, and to suggest
ways and means to implement the
pending recommendations of the above
Commissions/Committee. The Supreme
Court also asked the Committee to
review action taken to implement
the recommendations of the NPC. It
submitted two reports in Oct 1998
and March 1999, providing a host of
recommendations to further the cause
of police reform. It recommended the
formation of a Police Performance and
Accountability Commission, a Police
Establishment Board, and a Police
Complaints Authority, amongst others.
1.6.12. Padmanabhaiah Committee
on Police Reform, (2000), headed
by K Padmanabhaiah, a former Home
Secretary, continued on the lines of the
earlier reform proposals, proposing
a fixed tenure policy, admissibility of
confessions of the Police, reform of the
criminal justice administration etc.
1.6.13. A committee on the Criminal
Justice system (2000) under Justice
VS Malimath was constituted which
evolved wide-ranging proposals for the
comprehensive reform of the criminal
justice administration. Besides this,
a Review Committee on Police
Reforms was set up by Ministry of Home
Affairs in 2004, which zeroed in on 49
recommendations for implementation.
15 14
1.6.14. An Expert Committee was
constituted in September 2005 under
Soli J Sorabjee, an eminent lawyer, who
served as Attorney General, to draft a
new Model Police Act which submitted its
report on 30th October 2006. The model
Act provides for well-defined duties
and responsibilities of the police and
responsiveness, sensitivity of the police
towards public especially the weaker and
vulnerable sections, accountability to the
rule of law Community policing through
village police system, policing in urban
areas through constitution of citizen
policing committee, policing in Public
Order & Internal Security challenges with.
1.6.15. Prakash Singh v. Union of
India, as already mentioned at pre para
1.4.1, was the most significant step in
police reform since the recommendations
of the National Police Commission.
The implementation of the same was
monitored by a Committee chaired
by Justice KT Thomas
27
, a retired
judge of the Supreme Court of India.
As on date, 15 states have enacted new
legislations, and 14 states have issued
executive orders, in deference to the
orders of the Supreme Court.
1.6.16. The Sixth Pay Commission
(2006-08) recognized the pivotal role of
the AIS in upholding the rule of law, and the
principles of democratic governance. It went
on to state that they are expected to provide
a uniformly high standard of administration
and play a critical role in our federal
structure. They recommended an Apex
scale for DsGP in the Centre, which was
subsequently extended by Government
to all State DsGP.
As can be evinced from the discussions
above, a plethora of recommendations
were made by various commissions
for police reform, right from the pre
independence days. However, successive
Pay Commissions approached the issues
related to Indian Police Service from a
limited perspective of determination of remuneration and allowances, and
have often been found wanting in recognising the need to create enabling
conditions for attracting the right talent into the service under right
conditions for the service officers to occupy their rightful space in the
governance structure and leading the process of reforms recommended by
various Commissions as demanded by the people of India. The Association
therefore, sincerely looks to the 7thPay Commission to act as a catalytic
agent in transformation of Indian police completely into a people friendly
and public service oriented institution.
17 16
2.1. INTRODUCTION
2.1.1. The first duty of the institutions of
the state is the protection and the safety
of the people. The police is therefore
the most essential of public services of
any form of government, and especially
in a democratic form of government.
It follows that the resources of the
police and the uses to which they are
put are of the highest importance. The
predominant resource of the police is its
human capital. By extension, the quality
of the senior leadership will define how
well the human capital of the police is
nurtured and utilized to deliver effective
and efficient public service of the highest
standards to its nations citizens.
2.1.2. The betterment of the police
leadership today will beneficially and
materially affect the police service
and public interest for many years to
come. It is therefore necessary that the
government provides the police officers a
system of remuneration and conditions of
service which not only respects and values
the unique nature of policing as a public
service, its role in a nascent democracy
and the commitment risks, demands
and sacrifices that it entails; but also
over a course of time embeds a culture
of professionalism and high achievement
across the police levels and raises the
performance of the Indian policing to
those of mature democracies; which is
the right of every citizen of the country.
2.2. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES
2.2.1. The police system in India, like
various other organs of the government,
is a legacy of the erstwhile British rule
in the country. As such, there is a great
degree of similarity in the job content,
responsibilities and functions of the
various civil services including the police
operating in the two countries.
PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION OF PAY
THE SATYAM SCAM INVESTIGATION
Satyam scam which is the biggest corporate fraud in
independent India and one of the top 10 corporate
frauds in the world was investigated by a Multi-
Disciplinary Investigation Team (MDIT) headed by
an IPS officer of the rank of DIG with another IPS
officer of rank of Superintendent of Police as the
Chief Investigating Officer (CIO) of the case. The
MDIT which consisted of CBI investigators, Auditors,
Cost Accountants, Bankers, forensic experts,
software professionals, legal experts, and tax analysts
investigated the case in record time and the first
charge sheet was filed in 46 days from the date of
registration of the case, and the supplementary charge
within 9 months.
The investigation warranted a multi-disciplinary
approach that looked into the aspects of forensic audit,
cyber forensics, layered banking transaction analysis,
corporate law, network forensics, study of financial
statements, stock market analysis, investigation of
shares transactions, analysis of money-laundering,
benami transactions, enterprise software skills,
and involved extensive coordination with other
enforcement agencies.
This scam involved accounting fraud amounting
to more that Rs 5400 crores, loss to investor of Rs
12000 crores and a wrongful gain of around Rs 2700
crores to the accused. This sensational scam had
far reaching implications on the economy and was
investigated successfully with the leadership provided
by IPS officers.
19 18
2.2.2. However, the high policing
standards in mature democracies like
the United Kingdom have not evolved
on their accord. These have come about
because of an early realization by
the concerned governments that
policing is a unique public service
and hence must be appropriately
compensated.
The process of improving the police
delivery system in the UK started in
the late 1970s with a realization that
better policing can be achieved only by
improving the quality of human capital
in the police by improving their pay and
service conditions.
2.2.3. As a result of these reforms,
the service conditions of the police in
the UK gradually improved along with
substantial improvements in police
performance on both tangible and
intangible factors. For example,
not only has crime in UK has fallen
by 50% since 1995 as per the British
Crime Survey
28
, but UK police
is now universally recognized as
one of the best police forces in the
world. Some of the key events / mile
stones in this process of metamorphosis
of British police are as below
A. LORD EDMUND-DAVIES
COMMITTEE
In the United Kingdom as early as 1978,
the Committee of Enquiry chaired by
Lord Edmund-Davies recommended
a substantial increase (of the order
of 45%) in police pay and that police
constables pay should be annually
updated in accordance with an index of
private sector non manual worker pay.
The Edmund-Davies Inquiry concluded
that police pay should be linked to some
general index because of the special
features of policing:
i) the police had no right to strike and
one should not be granted;
ii) the risks of assault and injury;
iii) disruption to family life;
iv) the then manpower and recruitment
problem;
v) The increased responsibilities and
workloads falling to the police service
since the previous review.
vi) In doing so, the Edmund-Davies
committee sought to ensure that police
officers should neither financially benefit
nor suffer, in comparison with the
community that they police.
B. SHEEHY COMMISSION -
The Sheehy Commission was appointed
in July 1992 under the chairmanship of
Sir Patrick Sheehy to examine the rank
structure, emoluments and conditions
of service of the police in England and
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland
which submitted its report in June,
1993. The recommendations of the
Commission are reproduced below in
their own words.
The police service and other professions
Police officers are ordinary citizens with
extraordinary powers. They have a special
position under the law but many of the qualities
and skills which are required by police officers
of various ranks are common to a number of
other professions and organizations. These
include the ability to:
i) articulate clear and measurable objectives,
gain internal and external support for
them, and ensure that the organization
and individuals within it are judged on
achievement;
ii) identify priorities and plan coherently
across a wide spectrum of activities;
iii) manage sometimes small, sometimes
significant human and other resources so as
to provide a quality service and achieve value
for money;
iv) Communicate and consult effectively at
all levels within the organization, and with
all sections of the community, not all of them
necessarily well disposed towards the service.
A number of features are particular to
policing and require its officers to possess
special qualities and skills. These are:
i) the extraordinary nature of police powers,
in particular police monopoly of the use of
legitimate force;
ii) the exceptionally high level of integrity
required by the nature of police functions;
iii) The sensitive, quite often dangerous and
sometimes explosive situations in which police
are expected to exercise control, often at
considerable risk to themselves.
Pay levels
As Chapter 8 makes clear, we consider that
there should be a formula approach to increases
in police basic pay and that this should reflect
private sector pay settlements. This is on the
basis that, like the 1982 Megaw Commission
on Civil Service Pay, we consider that private
sector pay settlements provide a more accurate
reflection of the economic climate and the
market than pay settlements in public sector.
They avoid the circular effect of comparing
public sector pay settlements with one another.
21 20
Our reasons for concluding that a private
sector based formula approach is justified
(which are set out more fully in Chapters 7
8) are:
i) to recognize, on grounds of equity, the
absence of right to strike;
ii) to secure a smooth progression in pay
rates reflecting the economic climate and the
market;
iii) to avoid the management problems associated
with pay-related inconsistencies between the
calibre of officers recruited over time;
iv) to recognize the professional nature of the
policing role and reflect the overall package
we are recommending;
v) to recognize the importance of securing,
as indicated in our Terms of Reference, the
recruitment, retention and motivation of
officers of the right quality, and
vi) To recognize the importance of
policing to society, particularly in terms
of powers that the police alone are able to
exercise, including their monopoly of the
exercise of legitimate force.
On this basis we conclude that police officers
of high calibre are and will continue to be
required and that this should be reflected in
choosing the benchmark against which police
pay level should be judged.
The Commissioner of Police of
Metropolis: external pay links
We recognize that this recommendation will
break the existing pay link between the rate for
the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
and the rate for the Permanent Secretary of
the Home Department. We recommend that
the link should be broken; in our view the
special features of policing mean that the
jobs are not comparable. Since the link was
established there has also been substantial
reallocation of responsibilities within the
Home Office and between the Home Office
and other departments.
Bonus levels
Within this system, performance at constant
level with no change to scope of role,
circumstances or experience/skills will not
achieve progression. We recommend, however,
that one-off non-pensionable individual
bonuses should be available as should team
bonuses.the bonuses we have recommended
will allow individuals performing satisfactorily
to benefit not only from increases in the value
of scale points as the basic scale is uprated
(see Chapter 8) but also to be rewarded for
special contributions they or their team have
made during the year in question (Chapter 9
discusses bonus allocation).
C. THE WINSOR REPORT
The Government of UK in 2010
commissioned the Independent Review
of Police Officers and Staff Remuneration
and Conditions. The report of this review,
known as the Winsor Report provides
the best summary of the existing state of
police pay in the UK and the developed
world. As per the Report
i) The pay scales of police officers in
the UK are typically 10-15% higher
than those of the emergency services
and those of similar ranks in the armed
forces
29

ii) Earnings of police officers are
comparable to those of many white collar
and professional occupations.
iii) The police pension scheme has
remained the most generous of public
pension schemes through a combination of
early normal pension age and accelerated
accrual of pension rights after 20 years
of service. This has remained so even
after the shift to the new police pension
scheme in 2006 with one of the highest
contributions into the scheme by both
the employer and employee.
iv) Police officers pay the highest
contribution rate of any public pension
scheme, but contributions from
employers to the scheme are also among
the highest in public pension schemes.
There are roughly 131,000 contributors
to the 1987 pension scheme (and 13,000
to the 2006 scheme), but almost 125,000
pension recipients and a further 20,000
deferred beneficiaries. This high ratio of
pensioners to contributors is a significant
cost burden. Combined pension
contributions as a percentage of earnings
are over 35% in the 1987 scheme and
almost 34% in the 2006 scheme.
23 22
v) The report further states that the
police pay in other countries with
similar police structures like the
Commonwealth countries of Australia,
Canada and New Zealand lies at similar
points in the earnings distribution in
their country while the average police
pay in the Northern European countries
like Denmark, Germany and Sweden is
closer to the national average earnings
in the country, thus reflecting a lower
positive differential.
vi) Comparisons with police pay in the
US is difficult as police is locally recruited
and its pay is locally bargained, leading
to wide differences and incomparability
of data.
vii) For Chief Police Officers,
remuneration rises from just over
140,000 to over 226,000. In
comparison, the pay of Permanent
Secretaries in the Civil Service varies
between 140,000 and 190,000. The
table below gives the salaries of some
senior police officers in UK.
2.3. COMPARISON WITH
PRIVATE SECTOR
2.3.1. Policing today is far from the
relatively simple occupation it was many
years ago. The sophistication, intelligence
and resources of some who are engaged
in crime, the malignancy of their motives
and methods, and the technology
available to all citizens, mean that the
profession of policing will continue to
require people of the highest integrity,
intelligence and skill. The needs of the
police service for such qualities are
intensified by the complexity and weight
of the modern criminal law, and the
demands and expectations of the public
and other agencies of the state.
2.3.2. For these reasons, it is important
that police officers with skills and
competencies which are of importance
in modern policing are rewarded
appropriately for their development and
use. Secondly, people should be paid for
what they do, the skills they have and are
applying in their work, and conditions
under which the jobs are performed.
2.3.3. At the same time, fairness is an
essential part of any system of pay and
service conditions. Fairness means not
only fairness to the police officers but also
to the public, and to the police service. As
such it is essential that a scientific system
of job evaluation is used to compare and
determine the relative weight of a police
officers job vis--vis private sector jobs
and those in other public services.
2.3.4. The previous Pay Commissions
did not adopt Job evaluation as a
method for comparing the different
jobs / services, despite the fact that it
is a universally accepted technique for
comparing and evaluating disparate jobs.
For example, the Third Pay Commission
did not adopt the job evaluation method
as it considered the following limitations
with the system,
i) that there was non-availability of
required data
ii) that it had so far been applied mostly
to industrial jobs and rarely to highest
paid jobs
Metropolitian Police Commissioner
FORCE- LONDON SALARY (2010)
Metropolitian Police Deputy Commissioner
City of London Commissioner
City of London Assistant Commissioner
Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioners (4)
Metropolitan Police Deputy Assistant Commissioners (8)
Source: Police Regulations and Determinations 2003sioners (8)
260,088
214,722
160,902
132,714
181,455
139,119
LONDON POLICE: COMMISSIONER, ASSISTANT AND
DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER SALARIES
25 24
iii) that it is time-consuming and
iv) That the subjective element is still
there in any job evaluation.
2.3.5. However, these objections are not
valid in light of the actual experience and
practices all over the world in the field
of job evaluation and the developments
in technology that have made the
collection and analysis of large volumes
of data relatively easy. In fact, despite
the unique nature of policing, in a survey
of UK Police forces, 25 out of the total
43 forces responded that they use a job
evaluation scheme to evaluate roles in
the organization
30
.
2.3.6. However, it is accepted that such
system in the police would need to be
customised due to the unique nature of the
police service. As such it is suggested that
i) Job evaluation study requires to be
commissioned by the 7th CPC and
outcome of the same may be made an
important input into the process of
relative assessment of jobs/services.
ii) Instead of evaluating jobs, job classes
may be evaluated.
2.3.7. A scientific system of job
evaluation would not only help objectively
compare services and jobs within the
government service but would also lead
to an objective assessment of different
government services like the police vis a
vis the private and the public sector.
2.3.8. This is especially relevant
in the present times when the chief
differentiators of government service viz
an assured pension and security of tenure
have been negated. The new pension
scheme has, in a way removed the chief
attraction of government service i.e. of an
assured and defined pension. In addition,
the pressures of service including the
threat of suspension and the reality of
frequent transfers have made government
service particularly that in the IPS as
stressful and uncertain as employment
in a private organization, if not more. At
the same time, the fact that government
salaries are significantly lower than private
sector salaries needs no substantiation
and has been well accepted by subsequent
Pay Commissions themselves.
2.4. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
DETERMINATION OF PAY
2.4.1. Based on the above, the following
basic principles for the determination of
pay for the police in India are proposed.
A. FAIRNESS The system of pay should be
fair in its procedure, conduct of the review,
its analysis and its recommendations for
the different sections of employees.
B. COMPENSATION FOR SKILLS,
EXPERIENCE AND JOB COMPLEXITY
Policing has over the years become
a complex, onerous and intellectual
exercise, a far cry from what the service
used to be at the turn of the century. The
role of a Superintendent of Police in a
district is infinitely more complex than
the role of a Lt Col in an Army battalion
or a Superintendent of Post or a Manager
in a private company. Similarly, there
is little parallel in the current times
between the role of a police constable
and an Army sepoy, a postman or a
clerk in a private company. In addition,
the numbers of specialist roles, such as
counter-terrorism, organised crime,
cyber-crime, forensics, VIP protection
and fraud investigation have significantly
increased. As such, the changed role of
police officers must be recognized and
they must be compensated for the job
performed by them in all its complexity.
C. DIFFICULT CONDITIONS OF
WORK SHOULD BE COMPENSATED
- Proper weight must be given to the
difficult demands which the occupation
places on police officers and their
families and the ways in which they live
their lives, including the long working
hours, risks of personal injury and death,
and public responsibility and scrutiny
if things go wrong. Successive studies
have also shown that night working and
rotating shift patterns can significantly
and adversely affect an individuals
physical health
31
. Similarly the effects
of continued stress on the health and
longevity are well documented.
D. MERIT AND GOOD
PERFORMANCE MUST BE REWARDED
Progression up the pay scales based
purely on length of service is unfair. High
performers should be paid more than
those who perform adequately and higher
again than those who perform poorly.
27 26
E. TALENT OF HIGH CALIBRE
SHOULD BE ATTRACTED AND
RETAINED - The pay and service
conditions for the IPS will affect the
calibre of the people who wish to
join, their motivation through their
career, their retention in service; and
consequently the effectiveness and
efficiency of policing in India. A motivated
and committed police leadership is the
starting point for any attempt at reform
in police functioning and inculcating
a culture of professionalism and high
achievement across all levels in Indian
police. Thus, it is essential that pay
and service conditions are such that
the police system delivers service of a
quality that the citizens of the country
demand and deserve.

F. SIMPLICITY AND FLEXIBILITY
Lastly, the system of pay and allowances
should be simple to administer and not
be too rigid.
2.5. PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION
OF PAY COMMON TO ALL SERVICES
2.5.1. The Pay Commission has
circulated a questionnaire in April 2014,
which contains some questions on salaries
and pay scales, on which the individual
departments responded. The response of
the IPS association on the relevant issues
thereof, subject to any fundamental
changes on account of job evaluation
study, proposed above, is as under:
A. THE CONCEPT OF PAY BANDS:
The concept of pay bands has worked
well and the association recommends for
retention of the system.
B. MINIMUM MAXIMUM SALARY
RATIO:
The sixth Pay Commission fixed the
minimum-maximum salary ratio as 1:12
and observed that while fixing the ratio,
differentials that exist between the salaries in
the private, public and the Government sectors
may also need to be kept in view
32
. The same
report, quoting the commission assigned
XLRI study report on comparison with the Private sector observed, while
the compensation provided by the Government is higher at Group C and D levels,
private sector compensation packages are marginally higher for employees comparable
to Group B employees and substantially higher for posts comparable to Group A
officers in the Government
33
. When the actual scales were worked out this
factor was not taken into consideration and on the contrary, much of the
benefit of the minimum- maximum ratio was absorbed by the lower ranks.
This can be explained by the following table:
PB-1 7000 - -
PB-2 13500 1.93 1.93
PB-3 21000 1.56 3
PB-4 46100 2.2 6.59
HAG 67000 1.4 9.57
HAG+ 75500 1.13 10.79
Apex Scale 80000 1.06 11.43
STARTING
POINT OF
THE PAY BAND
BASIC +GRADE
PAYAT THE
LOWEST LEVEL
(IN RS.)
JUMP FROM
THE PREVIOUS
PAY BAND
CUMULATIVE
JUMP
29 28
The association feels that All India Services officers and officers of Group
A enter at PB-3 level and spend most of their career at the PB-3 and PB-4
levels. Similarly, for direct entrants at Group B and Group C respectively,
promotion will be more rewarding and a better recognition of their merit if
there is higher pay jump. Therefore for the purpose of attracting suitable
talent into the highest level direct recruits and to incentivise
promotion of the Group B and Group C recruits into higher grades,
the minimum to maximum salary may be slightly enhanced to 1:14
and restructure the inter pay band jump in the following manner.
C. MERGING OF THE PAY SCALES:
The association recommends for total
abolition of the HAG+ scale and removal
of Rs.8900/-- grade pay for the IPS for the
reasons to be explained in chapter 4.
D. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE GRADE
PAY SYSTEM: The sixth Pay Commission
recognised the concept of grade pay for
providing fitment benefit, and uniformly
applied the formula of 40% of the
highest level of the previous pay scale for
calculation of the grade pay . When it was
implemented, there was no uniformity
in grade pay elevation among successive
pay scales. Also, the levels of grade pay
34

within respective pay band were not
uniform. The association recommends
for a uniform grade pay progression
formula that from PB-1 to PB-4, within
each pay band there may be four grades.
There should be equal spacing between
the grades both within and across the pay
bands. At present, the ratio between the
highest and the lowest grade pay is a little
less than 1:6. The ratio may be slightly
enhanced to 1:8, and to distribute the
grade pay into 16 equal increments.
E. ANNUAL INCREMENTS: There has
been a constant demand from various
associations for a 5% annual increment,
in line with the PSUs and Banks. The IPS
Association recommends the same.
STARTING
POINT OF THE
PAYBAND
JUMP FROM THE
PREVIOUS PAY BAND
CUMULATIVE JUMP
PB-1 - -
PB-2 1.75 1.75
PB-3 2 3.5
PB-4 2 7
HAG 1.5 10.5
HAG+ Recommended for
abolition for reasons
explained in chapter.
-
Apex Scale 1.33 14
31 30
CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
3.1. INTRODUCTION
3.1 The primary purpose of this
memorandum is to present the case of IPS
officers. However, this chapter as well
as chapter 5 of the memorandum also
presents facts, figures and submissions
on behalf of the entire police fraternity.
This has been done as non gazetted
ranks of police are not permitted by
statute to form associations and it is the
responsibility of IPS officers, as leaders
of the force, to advance the cause of
their subordinates.
3.2. LONG WORKING HOURS IN
THE POLICE
3.2.1. The issue of long working hours
of police personnel is often discussed in
various fora. One of the earliest available
empirical evidence on this issue is job
analysis conducted by National
Productivity Council in 1977. Para 2.19
of the 1st National Police Commission
Report highlighted the fact that the
job analysis conducted by the National
Productivity Council has shown that the
working hours of the subordinate police
officers range from 10 to 16 hours every
day for all seven days in a week. It also
revealed that a computerized survey
conducted by Tamil Nadu police during
that period had shown that an average
Constable worked for 14 hours every day
without any respite. It points out: ....long
and arduous hours of work without facilities
for rest and recreation, continuous employment
on jobs under extreme conditions of stress and
strain, both mental and physical, prolonged
stagnation in the same rank without even
one rank promotion throughout their service
THE INDIAN MUJAHIDEEN GRAND
CONSPIRACY CASE
In September 2012, the National Investigation Agency
registered a case against the leadership of Indian
Mujahideen (IM) to investigate a conspiracy to wage war
against the Government of India. The investigation was
taken up in a context where the banned organisation was
conducting attacks with impunity and at regular intervals
across India. The gigantic investigation not only spanned
many states but also extended to countries as disparate as
Netherlands, Canada, United States of America, Dubai,
Pakistan and Bangladesh. The assiduous investigation
jointly conducted by young IPS officers and others,
intricately supervised by IPS officers of the level of IG/
DIG, uncovered the entire IM terror enterprise, including
their complex financial and cyber trails, which included
proxy Servers, TORs, encryption tools, Virtual Private
Networks, and virtual currency transactions. Central
intelligence agencies, NIA, as well as State Police forces
were instrumental in collecting high quality intelligence
and effecting important arrests in the face of physical
risk. Thirty three people were arrayed as accused in the
case, in which two charge-sheets have been laid till date.
This case is a model investigation which demonstrates
complexities in conducting transnational investigations,
underlining extensive requirements of information
technology, forensic accounting, and international law
skills, besides high level of coordination, team building,
and the courage to face physical risks, which IPS officers
exhibited in ample measure.
33 32
for a majority of them, constant exposure to
criticism and ridicule by a demanding public,
a totally inadequate pay structure with no
compensation for the handicaps and privation
they undergo in their jobs, low status and lack
of involvement in planning and executing
field jobs with a full understanding of the
objectives set by the police organization,
etc., have all had their telling effect on the
morale of the constabulary throughout the
country. The increasing educational level
of the Constables-a trend noticeable in the
recent years-has sharpened the edge of their
frustration with their existing lot within the
police system. During our visits to several police
stations and discussions with the constabulary,
their highly demoralized state was strikingly
noticeable. They have nothing to motivate them
into meaningful and positive performance of
police tasks with a full understanding of the
implications and objectives of police action.
They function as automatons in situations
where they are required to exercise their
discretion and judgment. They function rigidly
in circumstances which require flexibility of
approach and understanding of the opposite
point of view. We are convinced that mere
changes in their training schedule will not
bring about the necessary improvement
in their motivation or performance unless
some serious deficiencies in their living and
working conditions which have long been
neglected are immediately taken up and
remedied. We consider this exercise to be of
primary importance in any attempt at police
reform..
3.2.2. All the issues mentioned in the
report are still very much relevant even
after more than 35 years. Moreover
the challenges faced by police officers
have increased manifold. The police
officers working in the police stations
and other field formations have to face
the perennially growing challenges of
terrorism, left wing extremism, threat
to internal security from our hostile
neighbours, increased crime, caste and
communal strife, student and labour
unrest, increasing use of police resources
for law and order duties. This hypothesis
has been substantiated by subsequent
studies.
3.2.3. A survey conducted by McKinsey
& Co. in 2003 of approximately
1400 officers and constables across
commissionerates and districts in
Maharashtra identified a very demanding
lifestyle driven by long working hours
(average of 14 hours per day) and limited
leave (average of 35 days in a year against
an entitlement of 90 days, including 52
weekly offs) as the prominent key factor
responsible for low motivation and high
stress levels.
3.2.4. Another study of 286 police
officers working in police stations in
Karnataka has revealed that many police
officers stated that they work an average
of 12 to 16 hours a day without any
weekly or monthly days off
35
.
3.2.5. While preparing this memorandum,
a survey was conducted in 14 police
stations spread over six districts in 4
different states to see as to whether the
observations of NPC report of 1977
are still relevant or not. Since most of
the police work is police station based,
data about the number of hours police
officers work at police stations was
collected from few police stations in
districts/ cities- Lucknow, Bhiwani,
Karimnagar, Adilabad, Khammam and
New Delhi. After March 2014, there had
been increase in police activity due to
the General Election; therefore the data
was gathered for the month of January
2014 (presumed to be a normal working
month). The number of hours of duty
was calculated on the basis of arrival/
departure information in General Diary
(GD) maintained in the police station.
In all, the study captures data regarding
the average working hours of 680 police
personnel based at the police stations. The
findings were, in average civil police staff
in the police stations work between 12-
13 hours a day. Quite often, they report
to duty on Sundays. Moreover their duty
hours are staggered due to the nature of
police work. A typical police officer in
the police station may be working 4-6
hours in the morning and 6-8 hours in
the evening. This clearly means that even
if that officer may have actually worked
for 12-13 hours, but adding up the time
for commuting, the actual time spent
was much more.
3.2.6. Ever increasing responsibilities
and perennial shortage of staff contribute
to shouldering of additional burden
by available hands. If we compare the
relative availability of police officers per
lakh of population, we find that in India
we have 122.5 civil police officers per
lakh of population as compared to global
average of 341.8
36
.
35 34
Nobody can dispute the fact that nature
of job is much more challenging and the
responsibilities shouldered by police
officers in India are significantly higher
than police officers of several other
countries.
Indian police is not adequately equipped
with force multipliers such as vehicles
and technological tools compared with
the police forces in developed countries
where manpower is greatly supplemented
by the extensive use of technology.
Therefore in practical terms the shortage
of staff is even more acute than what the
figures indicate.
3.3. OCCUPATIONAL AND
SITUATIONAL RISKS SPECIFIC TO
POLICE
3.3.1. As compared to several other
professions related to public service,
police officers are exposed to a
disproportionate risk of occupational
hazards. Main categories of occupational
hazards faced by the police include risk
of physical assault, accidents, stress and
fatigue and risk of lifestyle and area
specific diseases. As per Crime in India,
2013 published by National Crime
Records Bureau 3,714 police personnel
died during the year 2013 as compared
to 3,375 deaths in the year 2012 showing
an increase of 10.3.% over the previous
year. During the same period, 3723
personnel were injured in the line of
duty, showing an increase of 10.2 % over
the previous year.
3.3.2. Risk of physical assault: Foremost
amongst the occupational hazards faced
by police officers is the risk of assault.
Several professional situations which
police officers face while performing
their day to day duties such as public
disorder situations, dealing with disputes,
arresting suspects, escorting prisoners,
and conducting anti-militancy operations
make them vulnerable to physical assault.
3.3.3. Risk of accidents: Police personnel
face enhanced risk of accidents, while
chasing criminals, diffusing explosive
devices, driving in extremely hostile
weather conditions, performing border
duties and managing traffic.
3.3.4. Risk of fatigue induced stress:
Police personnel are obliged by law to
be available for duty round the clock to
meet emergencies, even when they are
off duty. They suffer fatigue induced
stress due to constant exposure to danger,
traumatic events, short-staffed stations,
and continuous work in isolated rural
areas. Additionally persons stationed in
armed guards, escorts and static pickets,
where the nature of work requires
constant alertness but no physical action,
coupled with uncertainty of facing
unforeseen threats, experience fatigue
due to drudgery of the work. Excessive
fatigue often has long term consequences
for mental and physical health, which
will be discussed in a later sub section.
37 36
3.3.5. Other risks: There are a wide
variety of other risks that police
personnel face during the performance
of their duties. Police personnel working
in the Traffic police, in addition to facing
greater risks of accidents, are also prone
to contact lung and respiratory diseases
due to the continuous exposure to toxic
emissions. Police personnel deployed
in long running agitations face the risk
of contracting lung infections from
continuous inhalation of tear-gas. Bomb
squad and Investigating Officers may
inhale harmful vapours while inspecting
crime scenes involving explosions. Such
examples may be too many to compile an
exhaustive list but there is no gainsaying
that police personnel given the nature
of their jobs- are more susceptible to
physical and internal injury than are
most, if not all, other professions related
to public service.
3.4. IMPACT OF STRESS ON
POLICE OFFICERS
3.4.1. Police personnel deal on a
regular basis with an assortment of
unique situations and stressors. Unlike
other jobs, the police officers start
the day with bad news. There is only
negative feedback in terms of how many
murders and robberies have taken place
the previous night. The job pattern of
a policeman is not structured like his
counterparts in other departments.
His work life follows a sequence of
unpredictable events with uncertain
consequences - crimes by their very
nature do not follow a linear time cycle;
receiving a phone call in the middle of
the night is a recurring, yet unpredictable
experience which is invariably linked to
a call of emergency; there is always a
split second difference between a crowd
turning into a mob. Often he ends up
disappointing members of the public
who approach him, as the visible symbol
of the government, on matters on which
he has no mandate to intervene.
Saha et. al. (2010) evaluated cardio-vascular risk
factors in police officers and reported comparative
health complaints of police officers in relation to non-
police personnel as depicted in table below. The risk of
having a heart attack in fact doubles with each decade
of law enforcement service (Jahnavi et al; 2012).
COMPLAINTS OF POLICE OFFICERS
(OCCURRENCE IN PERCENTAGE) ABOUT
HEALTH PROBLEMS
(Source: Jahnavi G; Patra, S. R; Chandrasekhar C. H and
Rao N. B. (2012) Unmasking the health problems faced
by the police personnel. Global Journal of Medicine and
Public health. Vol. 1(5). Pp: 64-69
Saha A., Saha, S and Paul G. (2010) Evaluation of cardio-
vascular risk factor in police officers. International Journal
of Pharma and Bio Sciences. Vol.1: Issue-4)
Type of Complaints
Gastro Intestinal Problems 45.8 16.3
38.2 21.2
52.8 15.3
24.8 11.2
50.5 2.2
30.3 25.3
Cardio vascular problems
Pain in different body parts
Sleep disturbance
Other Problems
Nervousness/ Anxiety
problems
Police Officers
Non Police
personnel
Occurrences increase after
joining the job
39 38
A Human Rights Watch report in August 2009 highlights the poor working
conditions of the police officers and the fact that low ranking police are over-
worked and often exhausted due to requirement that they be available for duty
for 24 hours a day. Page 29 of the Report reveals:....police are required to be
available for work 24 hours day, 7 days a week a gruelling cruelty for constables and
other low ranking officers. As Government employees, police are allowed paid leave.
However, in practice, the police chief or district officials may order standing orders to
recall officers on vacation and some- times no leave is permitted for a certain period or
when there are exigencies or staff shortages. Superior officers often deny leave because
of staff shortages........
(Accessed at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/india0809web.pdf-
accessed on 20/05/2014)
Xavier and Prabhakar (2013) reported that in the Indian police force,
policemen in higher ranks have increased work load and areas of jurisdiction.
Further, there are conflicting job demands, responsibilities of subordinates,
time pressure and deadlines, physical strain of work environment, long hours
and having to cope with changes at work and at the expense (monetary and
career) of making mistakes. It is seen that since subordinates are incapable
of performing their tasks properly, the senior officers tend to take on their
responsibilities also. Increased accountability of any act within their area of
jurisdiction, political interference, fear of explanation of any indiscipline
or irresponsibility on the part of subordinates, fear of the unknown, lack of
communication and cooperation from other departments result in unresolved
frustrations and personal conflicts which further lead to stress and anxiety
among officers at higher levels.
(Source: Xavier P. and Prabhakar K. (2013) Stress among Indian Police and
conceptual issues. Abhinav. Vol. II; pp. 60-66.)
Officers who experience high levels of occupational stress report a high
incidence of physical ailments and psychological problems that affect their
work performance. Specifically, they commonly have poor health (Kirkcaldy et
al; 1995), experience burnout (Brown et al; 1996), are dissatisfied with their
jobs and because of weak organizational commitment, they may not fully invest
themselves in their work or they may retire prematurely (Kop et al; 1999).
When individuals are overwhelmed by occupational stress they suffer from
increased chronic stress, depression, heart disease, stomach disorders, alcohol
and drug use and abuse, divorce, and even suicide attempts (Walker, 1997).
Brown, J., Cooper C. L. and Kirkcaldy B. (1996). Occupational stress among
senior police officers. British Journal Psychology, 87, 31-41.
Kirkcaldy B., Cooper C. L. and Ruffalo P. (1995), Work stress and health in a
sample of U.S. police. Psychological Reports, 76, 700-702
Anger has also been found to have negative impacts on emotional as well as the
physical well-being of the people (Sharma et al., 1996). Mearns and Mauch
(1998) observed that anger and hostility predispose people to serious health
problems. They also observed that police officers who reported more anger
also reported more distress. For police personnel, the inability to effectively
manage stress has its most dangerous consequences in decision making during
the line of duty. Stress management programmes have been implemented
successfully by police organizations in the West (Wagner, 1981).
(Source: Sharma, S., Ghosh, S. N., and Spielberger, C. D. (1996). Anxiety,
Anger Expression and Chronic Gastric Ulcer. Psychological Studies, 187-191
Mearns, J., &Mauch, T. G. (1998). Negative mood regulation expectancies
predict anger among police officers and buffer the effects of job stress. Journal
of Nervous and Mental Disease, 186(2), 120-125.
Wagner, M. (1981). Action and Reaction: The Establishment of a counseling
service in the Chicago Police Department. In Territo, L., & Vetter, H. J. (Eds.),
Stress and Police Personnel. Boston: Allyn& Bacon, Inc.)
41 40
Agitations are collective expression of
dissatisfaction with the state authorities
and others on a variety of issues like
education, essential services, transport
facilities, wages etc. and a policeman who
is on the forefront to perform his duty is
often the target for venting the public
anger and frustration. A policeman is
always under public gaze -a momentary
lapse of concentration due to fatigue
and consequent error of judgement is
captured and magnified through the lens
of a 24x7 media and haunts him with a
lifelong taint. The shock of each tragedy
and violent event takes cumulative
physical and mental toll on each police
officer in some way or the other. Increased
demands of work impinging upon home
life, lack of control over workload and
inadequate support have been identified
as the potential factors responsible for
the stress in the policemen
37
.
3.4.2. From the Bureau of Police
Research and Deveopment publication
data on police organisations 2013, it
can be seen that police faced 78,444
agitations in the year 2012 which was
6.96% higher than the previous year.
In these agitations, 13 civilians and 6
policemen were killed whereas 354
civilians and 863 policemen were injured.
The hostile clientele with which police
personnel deal and interact predisposes
them to additional stressors
38
. Two
types of stressors that police officers
experience have been identified - those
that engender anxiety and those that
arouse anger and hostility
39
. Anger-
related stress is particularly important in
interactions with hostile clientele, and its
negative effects are heightened because
officers are prohibited by the decorum of
their job from publicly expressing anger
and hostility. The police subculture tends
to protect the macho image of the police
and informally teaches its members to
follow a code of silence.
They are conditioned to respond to
a variety of situations and be under
complete emotional control while doing
so. Suppression of emotions like anger,
fear, and grief has negative consequences
on the immune system which causes
deterioration of physical health.
40
To
alleviate stress the police officers tend
to go into maladaptive behaviours like
drinking, smoking and overeating,
which contribute significantly, to this
deterioration.
3.4.3. Frequent transfers are another
problem faced among various ranks, more
prominently by young IPS officers. Such
transfers cause emotional disturbance to
the entire family of the officer too. The
above-mentioned BPR&D study reports
that 221 district SPs were transferred in
less than a years tenure and 173 in less
than two years, which means that even
after discounting some multiple transfers,
nearly half the district superintendents
in the country are unable to complete
the minimum tenure as stipulated by the
government. The corresponding figures
for the range DIGs are, as against 178
ranges, 35 range DIGs were transferred
within one year and 38 were transferred
within two years of posting. Reply to a
Right to Information Act petition in 2013
disclosed that 43 officers were transferred
for more than 40 times in their career in
the state of Uttar Pradesh alone, which
was widely reported by the media
41
.
43 42
3.5. POLICE JOB DEMANDS AND
ALIENATION FROM FAMILIES
3.5.1. Civil police personnel feel
alienation from their families for most
of their career. A significant proportion
of the civil police also are unable to
keep their families with them because of
their rural postings. Even those who are
fortunate to keep the family with them
are unable to spend quality time with
them because of the long hours of duty,
including on weekends and holidays.
3.5.2. Consequent to the Mckinsey
Maharashtra study conducted in 2004,
it was reported that on festive days,
police force is on the streets rather than
celebrating festivals
42
. This means that
police officers and other ranks in the
commissionerate cannot avail holidays
or leave due to this. For various reasons,
police work in 12 hour shifts while the
labour law provides for an 8 hour shift.
In view of the shortage of man power
heavy crime work and uncertain law and
order duties, policemen have to work for
16 hours at a strech. They are also not able
to avail weekly holidays, casual leave,
earned leave and the other gazetted
holidays.
3.5.3. Insufficient time for the family has
been among the top ranking stressors
43
.
During festivals, constables often work
for more than 24 hours at a stretch, away
from their families, and while on duty
they see the rest of the world celebrating
and enjoying their holiday. The families
of police personnel are often neglected
when head of the family is out on duty.
The classic model of a police line or a
battalion can only partially take care of
their burden, as only about 30% of the
police personnel are fortunate to get
government quarters. Therefore by and
large, the families are not unable to get
the care and attention by the department
in organized manner nor the individuals
are able to do so themselves because of
commitment of duty in terms of time and
place. This keeps on hurting policeman
internally
44
.
He understands that he is neither able to
fulfil aspirations of parents and spouse
nor able to bestow love and guidance to
their kids during their growing age. This
results mostly in violent and insensitive
manifestation in his behaviour.
3.5.4. A study conducted in Delhi police
shows that policemen deployed at police
stations, railways, traffic, intelligence,
security, PCR and Armed Police account
for 81.72 % of the sanctioned strength. A
deeper analysis conducted in 2 districts
West and South West- shows that only
7.85 % of policemen posted in these
units are able to avail leave on festivals.
Thus about 76.8% of policemen are not
able to meet their families to celebrate such
festivals. In Delhi police the satisfaction
percentage of housing has been hovering
around 18% to 20% for last 25 years.
Rest of the policemen are forced to keep
their families in villages as they cant
afford the high rents and other costs of
living in Delhi. Therefore, a policeman is
not able to visit his family for weeks and
sometimes months together. He spends
his off duty time in the barracks and has
to be available on call. Therefore, it is not
just the issue of spending 12 to 14 hours
on the job but also of the poor quality of
rest in the barracks where he is mentally
preoccupied waiting for an emergency
call to respond to.
45 44
3.6. HEALTH HAZARDS AND
THEIR MANIFESTATIONS
3.6.1. The Apex court acknowledged
through various judgements that Right
to health care is an integral part of right
to life guaranteed under article 21 of
the Constitution of India. Stress is an
important factor contributing to poor
health of police personnel. The stressful
nature of the police work affects the
health and family lives of many officers
which encourages alcoholism and other
vices amongst them. A majority of
police personnel suffer from various
problems such as high blood pressure,
heart disease, diabetes, mental stress
disorder etc. due to job induced stress.
Stress and related health and personal
problems should therefore be the
concern of every police administrator
not only because of the humanitarian
aspects but also because a failure to
deal with them can have a profoundly
negative effect upon the overall
performance of the police organization.
3.6.2. At the psychological level, the
stress of police work may result in
chronic negative emotions such as anger,
anxiety or depression. Police officers
operating under severe and chronic
stress may well be at greater risk of error
and over-reaction that can compromise
their performance and public safety. The
unrealistic expectations imposed by this
occupational culture discourage officers
from admitting feeling stressed and
openly expressing negative emotions.
3.6.3. The sleep-wake cycle, under
the circadian control of endogenous
regulators or oscillators, is disrupted
by a misalignment between the
external demands of police work and
biological rhythms. This produces
mood disturbances, decreased work
performance, general physical malaise;
sleep-wake complaints and increased
intake or addiction to alcohol besides
drugs and suicidal tendencies.
3.7. ARGUMENTS FOR EXTRA
COMPENSATION FOR ADVERSE
WORK CONDITIONS
3.7.1. Increased level of education
of junior police officers, increased
awareness and constant comparison
with other similarly placed government
servants has given rise to lot of
resentment. This has a huge impact on
the delivery of police services. A feeling
has developed that despite working
for longer hours, performing duty on
holidays and festivals and many times not
being able to avail leave due to nature
of job, the police officers are not being
suitably compensated.
3.7.2. Non gazetted police officers in
several police departments including the
Delhi police, are presently compensated
for extra work by giving them extra salary
for one month in Delhi police. However
this is highly inadequate and does not
compensate for the extra work done
by the police. Moreover many police
officers are not able to avail the leave
because many times leave is temporarily
stopped by the supervisory officers
due to exigencies of duty. If one only
considers the average 72 hours of work
per week and not count the work done
during the gazetted holidays, which is
much higher than the standard norm of
40 hours of work per week; one month s
extra pay is far less compensator even by
the aforementioned modest calculation.
In addition, taking into account the stress
in job due to constant threat to life and
injury, unnatural working hours, difficult
working condition and staying away from
family, they deserve much higher increase
in the compensation package.
3.7.3. A police officer, including
starting level of a civil police constable,
under various sections of the Criminal
Procedure Code and various statutes
has the power to stop and search person
or premises; to arrest anyone under
reasonable suspicion of his having
committed an offence; to interrogate,
47 46
to use force to disperse a mob, refrain a
person from evading arrest. Apart from
the negative powers of restraining people,
(s) he needs to use immense amount of
discretion, make quick decisions and at
times take unpopular decisions in the
larger interest of the society. Successive
pay Commissions missed the point
that remuneration package to level of
government functionaries who has the
power to impact upon any persons life
and liberty has to be commensurate with
the need to attract, motivate and retain
right kind of talent.
3.7.4. Police reforms mandated by the
Honble Supreme Court are lagging
behind in many states in spite of the
continuous court driven monitoring.
Contribution of the cutting edge level
police officers will be highly critical for
the success of police reform agenda.
As already submitted in the beginning
the Pay Commission can make a vital
contribution and act as a catalyst for the
much needed police reforms through
its recommendation. Remuneration
and allowances commensurate with the
responsibilities of police will greatly
help in intake of quality human resources
and upkeep of their motivation levels
throughout their career. Further,
cardinal to success of the police reforms
and turning the Indian police truly into a
peoples police is shedding of the colonial
vestiges, one of which is the fairly static
and low status of the constable. While
the primary responsibility for effecting
structural reforms is of the central
government, attraction of right talent
being one of its terms of reference, Pay
Commission can play a proactive role in
this regard.
3.7.5. Successive Pay Commissions have
carried forward the legacy of equating
a constable with a semi-skilled worker
which is an anachronistic approach
for the 21st century policing needs. In
most of the states the basic qualification
level for a civil police constable is now
class XII and quite often majority of
the successful candidates are graduates.
After recruitment, constables undergo
two years of rigorous training where
considerable enhancement of knowledge
and skill takes place ranging from inputs
in Law (all three major Criminal Acts),
Constitution, investigation techniques,
managing law and order, forensic
science and medicine, criminology apart
from skills of weapon, explosive and
riot handling, swimming, field craft,
operations and survival skills.
3.7.6. Government of India constituted
a Committee in September 2005 to draft
a new Police Act to replace the Police
Act of 1861. The Committee was chaired
by Shri Soli Sorabjee, former Attorney
General. The committee had submitted a
Model Police Act in 2006, which formed
the basis of recommendations of the Apex
court in the Prakash Singh case (already
mentioned in a previous section) and
also a guiding document for enactment
of Police Acts in various states. As per
the report, the rank structure of Group
C posts in the Civil Police shall consist
of Civil Police Officer Grade II, Civil
Police Officer Grade I, Sub Inspector and
Inspector. The committee also proposed
that, Every Civil Police Officers Grade II will
undergo three years intensive training before
being posted to the Service as a stipendiary
cadet, and will, upon successful completion of
training, have a graduation degree in police
studies. Their scales of pay and conditions
of service shall therefore be commensurate
with ranks in other services under the state,
which require similar levels of educational
qualifications and training.
3.7.7. In view of the above discussion,
the IPS Association sincerely urges the
Pay Commission to consider adopting
a similar approach as the Soli Sorabjee
committee and consider the following
scales of pay, which essentially would
involve stepping up the existing levels of
grade to the next level.
49 48
3.7.8. The above discussion amply demonstrates
the extreme challenges faced by the police in
discharging their duties under poor conditions of
service. Even a B class police district has about
2,000 to 3,000 policemen, and 4-6 sub divisions
with 3-4 staff wings. An IPS officer therefore leads
thousands of men. This calls for a high order of
management skills and sound knowledge of HRM
practices. The stress levels increase manifold at the
level of SP and above, due to accumulation of stress
inducing circumstances and events in their areas
of responsibility. It is therefore very important
to acknowledge this factor while deciding on the
remuneration for the IPS officers.
EXISTING
RANK
PROPOSED
RANK
MODE OF
RECRUITMENT
PROPOSED SALARY
(AS PER THE
PRESENT SCHEME,
SUBJECT TO
TH
REVISION BY THE 7
CPC)
Constable Civil Police
Ofcer- Grade II
Direct Recruitment of
class XII passed
candidates. Will be
imparted three years
training after which a
degree is awarded to
them.
Pay revision
corresponding to the
existing PB1- Rs. 5200-
20020 + grade pay 2400/-
Head
Constable
Civil Police
Ofcer- Grade I
By promotion Pay revision
corresponding to the
existing PB1- Rs. 5200-
20020 + grade pay 2800/-
Sub Inspector Pay revision corresponding to the existing scales, but the allowances need to
be revised
Inspector Pay revision corresponding to the existing scales, but the allowances need to
be revised
51 50
STRUCTURAL ISSUES, PAY PARITY
AND CAREER PROGRESSION ISSUES
4.1. INTRODUCTION
4.1. One of the terms of reference
before the Commission is To work out
the framework for an emoluments structure
linked with the need to attract the most
suitable talent to Government service,
promote efficiency, accountability and
responsibility in the work culture, and foster
excellence in the public governance system to
respond to the complex challenges of modern
administration and the rapid political, social,
economic and technological changes, with
due regard to expectations of stakeholders,
and to recommend appropriate training and
capacity building through a competency based
framework. Keeping in view the complex
governance challenges before the country
and in recognition of the critical
contribution of the Indian Police Service
in ensuring good governance and
effectively implementing police reforms,
there is a need to identify and rectify
the issues that are causing impediments
to attracting and retention of right
talent in the Indian Police Service and
their career progression. The following
paragraphs highlight some of the
concerns of the service officers and
suggest recommendations to set right the
existing anomalies.
TRANSPARENT RECRUITMENT PROCESS
(TRP) IN UTTAR PRADESH POLICE
UP Police Recruitment and Promotion Board,
set up in Dec 2008, showed the way for the rest of
the Police forces in the country by effecting merit
based, transparent, corruption free and intervention
free recruitment to the posts of 35000 constables
from among a staggering 7,50,000 applicants. It
simultaneously conducted scrutiny of documents
and Physical standards test at 75 locations, Physical
Efficiency Test at 25 locations, written examination
at over 450 centres, and decentralised scanning at
18 locations. Each process was conducted using the
latest scientific tools including RFID chips, biometric
devices, CCTV cameras, barcoded OMR sheets, with
all processes logged and reported in real time. Scanned
individual OMR answer sheets, answer keys, and mark
lists were all placed online to ensure transparency.
Each process was managed by separate teams so that
no individual would be able to form an interest into
the outcome of a particular candidate.
This successful experiment was lauded as a social
revolution in UP and recommended by the then Union
Home Minister to all CMs and compliance on TRP was
linked with grant of modernisation funds. In its 5th year
of operation, most states have not only implemented
it, but have also improved upon it with technological
upgradation thereby facilitating a positive impact on
police public image.
53 52
4.2. PARITY OF PAY WITH IAS
AND IFS
4.2.1 Parity of pay with the Indian
Administrative Service and Indian Foreign
Service has been consistently sought
by officers of the Indian Police Service
officers with successive Pay Commissions
but the same has not found favour with
the commission. Unfortunately, the
reasons for turning down the request
were never based on merit but through
direct acceptance of flawed arguments
made by the other side on the basis of
specious premises. The approach was
status-quoist, aimed at perpetuation of
colonial practices. Instead of addressing
legitimate concerns expressed by IPS,
IFoS and the Central services on merits
from an analytic perspective, the issue
was often erroneously examined with a
colored view from a inter service rivalry
perspective. In view of the importance of
the issue not only to the All India Services
but across the entire group-A central
services, the association sincerely urges
this commission to examine threadbare
the contentions being made and resolve
it through a reasoned speaking decision.
4.2.2 Before venturing into the parity
argument, certain historical facts are
being presented below for the kind
perusal of the Commission.
4.2.3 In the constituent assembly,
when the clause for creating All India
Services was moved it was accepted
with the observations of the president
that All-India Services will be desirable,
I take it, in cases where you wish to attract
to the highest services the best material that
may be available in the country, and you will
have to transgress provincial boundaries for
the purpose of attracting this material if you
want such material to take service whether
under the Provincial Governments or under
the Federal Government
45
. Further, Dr.
B. R. Ambedkar had clarified to the
Constituent Assembly on Thursday, the
4th November 1948, Indias Constitution
provides that there shall be an All India
Service recruited on an all-India basis
with common qualifications, with
uniform scale of pay and the members of
which alone could be appointed to these
strategic posts throughout the Union
46
.
This underscores two points; that the
makers of constitution considered
all India services as a single class and
supported the need to attract the best
talent for all the All India Services and
not just one service.
4.2.4 In the British India, the Secretary
of State controlled the recruitment and
service conditions of the Indian Civil
Service and the Indian Police and
the article 244 of the Government of
India Act, 1935 reinforced the status
and distinctively mentions the services
in addition to a third service, The
Indian Medical Service. The origin of
the respective services, qualification
requirements of aspirants and the
method of recruitment were different.
Therefore a distinct classification existed
in the pre independence time. However,
the situation was altered after adoption
of the Constitution: Article 312 of the
Constitution does not distinguish among
the All India Services and laid down
a uniform process for the creation,
regulation of the recruitment, and
laying down the conditions of service.
Therefore in the absence of any specific
constitutional sanction of the further
classification of the All India Services,
any such legal provision determining
the service condition by virtue of any
act or rule shall have to necessarily pass
the doctrine of reasonable classifcation
under article 14 of the Constitution.
The All India Services Act 1951 was
enacted for the purposes of creation and
regulation of service conditions of the
All India Services. Rules framed under
section 3 of the said Act, which are
amended for time to time, address issues
concerning service conditions. While
some of the rules, such as conduct rules
and rules on allowances and benefits are
common to all the three services, some
others such as the pay and cadre rules are
different with each service. Significantly,
except the pay rules rest of the service
specific rules are identically worded.

55 54
4.2.5 Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India lays down the
principle of equal pay for equal work. The spirit of this article can
be reasonably interpreted in the present context that services and
posts whose duties and responsibilities are comparable should carry
substantially same or comparable remuneration
47
.
4.2.6 After the adoption of the Constitution of India, since 1951
although officers for the civil services were recruited through
the same process by the Union Public Service Commission, the
services were divided, for the purposes of examination, into three
categories as below:
4.2.7 The Committee on Recruitment
Policy and Selection Methods (1976),
popularly known as the Kothari
Commission recommended a common
examination for all civil services in all
respects. In support of the above, they
relied upon the Administrative Reform
Commissions Report on Personnel
Administration (1969) and Committee
on Police Training (Gore Committee)
(1971). The Government accepted the
recommendations of the Commission
and 1979 onwards; officers of the IAS,
IPS and Central Services Group A are
presently being recruited through a
common examination.
4.2.8 The IPS has consistently, especially
post 1979 been among the most preferred
service in the Civil Service examination
by the candidates. Statistics collected
on the basis of the data from the recent
batches of the civil services examinations
(from the table below), indicates that
these days candidates equally prefer
IPS and the Indian Foreign Service. If
the artificial edge provided to IAS/
IFS is removed, some of the candidates
who presently prefer to joining these
services, even though they have aptitude
for Police, will definitely change their
preference in favour of IPS over IAS.

S.NO. CATEGORY
PAPERS IN CIVIL SERVICES
EXAMINATION
1 Category I Services
(IAS & IFS)
5 optional subjects &3 compulsory subjects
2 Category II Services
(IPS & Police Service Class II
of Union Territories)
2 optional subjects &3 compulsory subjects
3 Category III Services
(Central Services
Class I and II)
3 optional subjects & 5 compulsory subjects
57 56
4.2.9 Various commissions beginning
from the Kothari Commission have
consistently advocated the principle
of aptitude based choice of service
selection. The Kothari commission had
recommended that the allotment of
service may be done after the final stage
of their three-stage sequential process,
i.e. Prelims, Mains and Post Training
exams. The Alagh Committee, 2001 had
also looked at the question of allotment
of services. To help selected candidates
to make an informed choice of service,
it recommended that: the selected
candidates may be required to exercise their
service preferences only on the completion
of the Foundation Course at LBSNAA but
the allocation would continue to be on the
basis of the original merit list prepared
by the UPSC. The 2nd Administrative
Reforms Commission, 2008 also agreed
with the recommendation of the Alagh
Committee and recommended that
allotment of services to the successful
candidates should be done only on the
completion of the Foundation Course,
on the basis of the merit list prepared
by the UPSC. The Hota Committee,
2004 also recommended that aptitude
and leadership tests may be introduced
for selection, and that probationer
may be allowed one months time after
commencement of training to exercise
their option for Services.
SERVICE PREFERENCE TRENDS 2005-12
2005
56 43 1 0 63 9 2 0
2006
50 35 0 0 75 10 9 1
2007
78 46 1 1 92 8 4 0
2008
81 50 1 1 103 12 7 2
2009
70 49 1 1 108 13 12 0
2010
83 56 0 0 140 17 21 2
2011
97 77 0 0 162 22 19 7
2012
116 76 0 0 134 14 4 1
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59 58
4.2.10 Position taken by Pay
Commissions in the pre Kothari
commission era on relativities of
pay scales among various services:
For having a correct perspective on the
parity issue, it would be worthwhile to
divide the successive Pay Commission
recommendations into two different
periods, i.e. pre Kothari commission
and post Kothari commission. The pre
independence commissions and the
first three Pay Commissions covered
the pre Kothari Commission period
and the position taken by the respective
commissions on relativity of pay scales is
as under:
i) At Paragraph 66 (page 41) of the
First pay Commission report it was
acknowledged that the reasons for lower
pay scales to the Indian Police Service
in comparison was earlier age of entry
and lower educational qualifications. The
commission had advocated for common
standards of recruitment with the Class-I
services and in consequence of the same
pay structure with the class I services
but less than IAS/IFS, which were to be
recruited through different standards.
ii) While the Second Pay Commission
(1957-59) did not discuss the pay
structure of the All India Services, but
pursuant to the revision of pay scales for
the Central Services the Government
looked into the matter and proposed pay
scales for the IPS as compared to Class I
Central Services
48
.
iii) The Third Pay Commission
(1973) deliberated at length on the need
to attract capable talent for the IPS,
acknowledged the job complexities and
recommended parity with the IAS in the
Junior Scale
49
. Although parity was not
maintained with the senior scale onwards,
the commission had recommended for
increasing some allowances to have
the effect of reducing the existing disparity
between the IAS and IPS scales of pay
50
.
As regards relativities between the IAS
and the Class I services, the commission
came to a conclusion that there was a
case for gradual narrowing down of the
difference over the years depending upon
the prevailing circumstances
51
.
4.2.11 Flawed justifications adopted
by the previous Pay Commissions
to deny parity with the IAS/IFS:
Post the Kothari Commission report;
officers of the Indian Police Service from
1980 batch onwards are being recruited
through a common examination under
uniform criteria for selection. However,
successive Pay Commissions thereafter
have still denied the parity of pay among
the services and continued to allow edge
to the IAS/IFS officers in their initial
career. Some of the reasons quoted for
continuation of status quo are presented
below, with the inherent flaws in the
justifications offered therein.
4.2.12 The Fourth Pay Commission
(1986) made a passing mention of
the suggestions made by various
services on the issue of parity
52
but
evaded a discussion on the subject.
Instead, the commission recommended
improvements in the career progression
aimed at reducing disparities. This is a
flawed approach, particularly since the
third Pay Commission had elaborately
dealt with the issue in an objective
and highly analytical manner and set
a platform for visiting the issue by the
future commissions on the basis of
relative importance of the respective
services as per the prevailing situation
of governance priorities. Specific
to the IPS, the commission brought
about measures to improve the career
progression by merging ranks, as well
as by recommending induction of an
IPS officer as member of cadre review
committee.
4.2.13 The approach of the Fifth
Pay Commission was status quoist.
Firstly the commission erroneously
equated performance in the civil service
examination as the criterion for pay
determination and observed,It is not
correct to compare the last man of the IAS with
the frst man of the Central Services the fact
is that there is a split-second difference between
a gold medallist and the also ran in an Olympic
race
53
. In fact, just for preservation of
the status quo, the commission went on
to the extent of recommending scrapping
of the common civil service examination
system which was introduced with a
public interest in mind
54
.
61 60
If the commissions logic of examination
performance as a pay determinator is
accepted, all the candidates higher on
the merit list who joined the IPS in
preference to IAS/IFS
55
should draw
pay equal to them and as a consequence
their pay would be more than their other
batch mates of the IPS and as a further
consequence this defeats the concept
of equal pay for equal work! In any
case determination of emoluments is
not an exercise of providing incentive
for examination performance, but as
the third Pay Commission had rightly
approached issue, it should be based
on the complexity and difficulty of
the duties and responsibilities of the
job. Without discussing merits of the
other arguments placed by the service
associations, the commission abruptly
concluded by stating that
56
As far as the
edge enjoyed by the IAS and IFS over the other
Services is concerned,we do not fnd any persuasive
reason that would impel us to do away with the
edge currently enjoyed by them. Curiously,
on the question of parity between IPS
and Indian Forest service the argument
of parity were accepted.
4.2.14 The Sixth Pay Commission
attempted to give a functional justification
for retaining the edge, but again the logic
was flawed. The commission observed,
The role of IAS is still very important in the
overall scheme of governance. They have an
important coordinating, multi-functional and
integrating role in the administrative framework
with wide experience of working across various
levels in diverse areas in Government. They
hold important feld level posts at the district
level and at the cutting edge at the start of
their careers with critical decision making
and crisis management responsibilities. The
leadership function, the strategic, coordinating
and integrative role at this level requires the best
talent available. The existing position would,
therefore, need to be maintained. It will ensure
that IAS offcers near the beginning of their
career are given slightly higher remuneration
vis--vis other services and act as an incentive
for the brightest candidates to enter this service.
This is essential as the initial postings of IAS
offcers are generally to small places, they face
frequent transfers and the pulls and pressures
they have to stand up to early in their career
are much more intense. The slight edge in the
initial stages of their career would, to an extent,
neutralize these problems
57
. It essentially
laid down three principles, i.e. i) The
functions of coordination, integration
and experience of working across various
levels in diverse areas in Government
are considered superior within the
administrative framework; ii) Slight edge
in the initial career helps in attracting
the brightest talent which is required for
performing such roles; and iii) Sight edge
mitigates the hardships faced by the IAS
officers in their initial careers and also
rewards the leadership roles exercised.
The flaws in this line of argument will be
dealt with in the following paragraphs.
4.2.15 Arguments in support of
parity in the initial career: As per
the sixth Pay Commission, the edge of
pay between IPS and the IAS/IFS extends
from senior scale to the selection grade,
i.e. from the fifth to fifteenth year of
service. As explained above the arguments
behind the recommendations of the
previous Pay Commissions are flawed,
they do not satisfy the test of reasonable
classification in favour of IAS /IFS and
are liable to be rejected for use by the
present Pay Commission. The following
are some arguments in favour of a full
parity, for the kind consideration of the
commission which find strength from the
extensive discussion made above.
i) For achieving objectives of
governance, the multi dimensional
specialists role of an IPS is as
important the multi dimensional
generalists role of an IAS officer:
Ensuring Rule of Law, Public Order
and Internal Security rank among top
governance priorities of any country,
as absence of the same can threaten
the very existence of the nation. As
already explained in chapter-I, the
Police in India currently undertake
these responsibilities under extremely
challenging circumstances. Successive
Pay Commissions have failed to
recognise the importance of these
issues, more often accorded primacy
to the departments concerned with the
general administration, development,
revenue collection, finance and audit
activities, and successively ignored the
fact that the working mandate of Police
is highly complex and it occupies a
multi dimensional specialists role as
compared to the multi dimensional
generalists role of an IAS and uni-
dimensional specialized roles of an IFS
officer. Country needs best talent in
equal measure in each of these services
for achieving its governance objectives.
ii) It is incorrect to state that
the Central Government attaches
a premium to the functions of
coordination, integration and
experience of working in diverse
areas, as a matter of policy: The
6th CPC succeeded in propagating a
misconception that it is the governments
policy that functions of coordination,
integration and experience of working
across various levels in diverse areas in
63 62
government are considered superior
within the higher echelons of the
administrative framework, and therefore
it is necessary to attract the best possible
talent towards the IAS, the job profile
of which matches the aforementioned
description. On the contrary, the policy
of the Central Government for selecting
officers for manning the senior posts is
through the Central Staffing Scheme
58

and the stated policy of selection to the
CSS posts has been expressed as, The
raison detre is the Centres need for fresh inputs
at senior levels in policy planning, formulation
of policy and implementation of programmes
from diverse sources, viz., the All-India Services
and the participating organised Group A
Services. Therefore, no such premium is
attached to a particular service by the
government as a policy.
iii) Persons recruited through
the same examination for the
comparable jobs should be treated
at par: Justifying the recommendation
for having a common examination, the
Kothari Commission said even though the
professional expertise required of a general
administrator, or a diplomat or a police officer
or a member of any of the other Central Services
vary, their general qualities of competence,
traits of character and sense of commitment
necessarily have a common denominator.
The same applies to other qualities needed
in an officer such as intellectual cohesion,
articulation, sense of awareness and purpose,
integrity, depth of understanding, courage of
conviction and ability to respond to changing
socio-economic and political situations.
With the acceptance of recommendations
of the Kothari commission, Government
had long back accepted the principle
of common denominator of traits for a
civil service aspirant, and implemented a
system uniform examination with equal
opportunity to the selected candidates
to choose a particular service as per
their aptitude. Inducement into two
specific services through offer of extra
increments goes against the policy.
iv) Complete parity would spur
the candidates with right kind of
aptitude and inclination to opt
for the service: The requirements
of modern day policing are different
from the conventional policing.
While the erstwhile regimental police
administration model may, to some
extent, still serve the needs of the
conventional policing requirements of
maintaining Law & Order and handling
of localized crime, the same is highly
inadequate to handle complex organised
and economic crimes, cyber crimes,
transnational organised crimes and
terrorism, human rights issues, mega
city policing, crimes against women and
weaker sections etc. There is an increasing
need for attracting persons with right
kind of aptitude and inclination to opt
for the service. The edge factor is driving
even those candidates having aptitude
for police into the IAS, as a result not
only is police at a loss but IAS is also
saddled with persons without any special
aptitude for generalized administrators
work. The service preference trend table
at Para 3.1.2.6 demonstrate that in spite
of adverse pay conditions there are still
some persons every year opting for IPS
out of their passion and special aptitude
in preference to the other services , but
instead of getting rewarded they are
being unfairly discriminated throughout
their career. As already submitted, if
the impeding factors are removed,
candidates will choose services as
per aptitude and will be motivated
to perform better.
v) Adequate Compensation to
mitigate the hardships and risks:
IPS officers face more risks in their
career than any other civil service: As
the table enclosed in Annexure A shows,
since Independence 32 members of the
IPS have made the supreme sacrifice
in the service of the nation across all
corners of the country. The job of an IPS
officer is not becoming any safer by day.
In fact the young officers at the level of
SDPOs and SPs are increasingly being
called upon to lead their men from the
front at grave risk to their life and well
being. The government needs to have a
comprehensive HR policy in place that
provides adequate incentives for those
fighting Indias domestic wars but this
issue was sidelined by the 6th CPC. The
arguments of posting to smaller places,
frequent transfers, pulls and pressure
etc. are more prominent in the case of
IPS compared to IAS.
Also, IFS officers, who are posted either
in foreign countries or in New Delhi, do
not face such difficulties at all but they
are rewarded with same pay scales as IAS.
65 64
vi) Changed dynamics of district
administration has altered the
traditional relativities of DM and
SP: The role of a District Magistrate in
relation to district policing has witnessed
a paradigm change over a period of time.
As per the 1861 police act, the District
Magistrate was the executive head of the
administration and administration of the
police was vested in a Superintendent
of police under the general control and
direction of such Magistrate. However,
in the past decade, after the model police
act of the Soli Sorabjee committee was
circulated by the government and after
the directives of the Honble Supreme
Court were significantly based on the
model act, 15 states have so far enacted
their respective police acts and a majority
of them are drafted on the basis of the
model act. Remaining states are at various
stages of legislative process. In these
acts, the role of the district magistrate is
that of a coordinator and does not wield
general control and direction on police,
and as such justification of an edge as a
symbol of superior authority does not
exist any longer. These changes have
taken place after the implementation
of the recommendations of the 6th
cpc and therefore highly relevant for
the consideration of the 7th cpc. As
for the argument of whether DM as a
coordinator should draw more pay than
all the others posted in the district, the
same was rarely the case even in the past,
as it was a fairly common experience
that some of the ADMs and almost all
of the district heads of the technical
departments were many a time drawing
higher pay by virtue of their longevity in
service, and that had never affected the
efficiency of coordination functions.
4.3 ANOMALIES IN
IMPLEMENTING 6TH CPC
RECCOMENDATION ON EDGE
4.3.1 While a discussion has been made
in the previous paragraphs regarding
the edge allowed to two services in an
unjustified manner by the previous Pay
Commissions, the Association submits to
the commission that glaring anomalies
were created in the fitment tables prepared
for implementation of the government
decisions made in this regard, which
caused greater benefit than what
was allowed to these services. In spite
of representations from several services
which found support from the DOPT,
the Ministry of Finance, Department of
Expenditure has so far resisted to set
right the anomalies. The matter therefore
deserves attention of the present Pay
Commission not only for prevention of
carry forward of the irregularly awarded
inflated edge, but also to set right the
previous Pay Commission fitment tables
with a retrospective effect.
4.3.2 Pursuant to the cabinet resolutions
on the recommendations of the sixth Pay
Commission, the Government of India
issued a Gazette Notification No 470
dated 29 August, 2008
59
notifying the
Central Civil Services (Revised Pay)
Rules, 2008. In continuation, an Office
Memorandum (F.No.1/1/2008-IC) dated
30th August, 2008
60
has been issued for
fixation of salaries. As per the Gazette
notification, two increments were allowed
in three grades, viz. senior time scale,
junior administration grade and the non
functional selection grade (NFSG) in the
form of two increments @3% which will
be adjusted in the pay band.
4.3.3 However, the actual
implementation had resulted extra
benefits, because the 2 additional
increments given to the IAS at the STS
grade in the running pay band PB3 and at
the NFSG grade in the running pay band
PB4 continue to get carried forward
to JAG grade in PB3 and SAG grade in
PB4, respectively. In effect, IAS has
been given at least 2 additional
increments over other services
throughout their career. This is
against the Cabinet decision to
limit the edge to middle levels and
that too limited to two increments.
67 66
4.3.4 In addition, certain further
anomalies had crept in due to wrong
fitment tables. Following table shows the
anomaly in fixation of pay in respect of
pre-revised scale of Rs.14300-400-18300
(S-24) which is Non Functional Selection
Grade (NFSG) of all services vis--vis
pre-revised pay scale of Rs.15100-400-
18300 (S-25) which is NFSG of IAS:
4.3.5 From the above chart, it is clear
that IAS had been given 2 extra
increments over and above the 2
year edge they already had built
into the scale S-25. Hence, if an IAS
officer got into the NFSG on 1.1.2006,
his pay in pay band was fixed at 39690,
whereas the pay of an officer of other
service gets fixed at Rs 39690 after
completion of four years of service.
Thus, the edge increases to 4
increments at the start of PB-4.This
was not the decision of the Cabinet.
An IAS officer drawing a basic pay of
Rs 15100 will get Rs 39690 as per the
fitment table, whereas officers of other
services drawing the same basic pay of Rs
15100 will get Rs 38530. There cannot
be any difference in fixation of
equal pay of the two NFSGs with
equal grade pay. It may be noted that
in PB-3, the pre-revised pay of Rs 10650
in S-20, which is 2 increments ahead of
starting pay of Rs10000 in S-19, has been
fixed at the same level that is indicated
by the fitment table of S-19 at Rs 19810.
Similarly, the pre-revised pay of Rs
12750 in S-22, which is 2 increments
ahead of starting pay of Rs 12000 in
S-21, has been fixed at the same level
that is indicated by the fitment table of
S-21, Rs 23720.Thus, in PB-4, a pay
of Rs 15100 in S-24 must be fixed at
the same level that is indicated by
the fitment table of S-25, i.e. 39690.
In order to fix pay in compliance
of the decision of the Cabinet, the
fitment tables should be modified
as suggested at Para 3.3.5 below.
PRE-REVISED
BASIC PAY
REVISED PAYIN THE
PAY BAND IN CASE OF
ALL OTHER SERVICES
REVISED PAYIN
THE PAY BAND IN
CASE OF IAS
14300 37400
14700 37400
15100 38530 39690
15500 38530 39690
15900 39690 40890
69 68
4.3.6 The following table shows the relativities in fixation of pay in respect of pre-
revised scale of Rs.16400-450-20000 (S-26) for Conservator of Forests for IFS/DIG
of Police for IPS and other CPMFs/Brigadiers of Armed Forces/SEs of Engineering
Services/Scientific Officers Grade F, etc vis--vis pre-revised NFSG of IAS pay scale
of Rs.15100-400-18300 (S-25):
4.3.7 From the above chart, it is clear that the basic pay of Rs.16400/- for IFS/IPS/
SE/Brigadier, etc has been fixed as Rs.39690/- whereas the basic pay of Rs.15100/-
for IAS has been fixed at the same stage though there was a difference of Rs.1300/- at
initial stage itself in the pre-revised scales. The basic pay of Rs.16400/- for IFS/IPS/SE/
Brigadier, etc has been fixed as Rs.39690/- whereas the lower basic pay of Rs.16300/-
for IAS has been fixed as Rs.40890/-. In the pre-revised pay, officer in NFSG of IAS,
even after three increments, was at a lower basic pay (Rs 16300) than IFS/IPS/SE/
Brigadier, etc (Rs 16400). However, in the new fitment table, the officer of IAS on entry
to NFSG will get the same pay of Rs 39690 as a Conservator of IFS/DIG of IPS/SE/
Brigadier, etc. This has adversely impacted the existing relativities between the services.
Thus, the Super time Scale-I of IFS/IPS/SE/Brigadier, etc has been downgraded even
below NFSG of IAS. This was neither the
recommendation of the Pay Commission,
nor decision of the Cabinet. Thus, the
fitment tables should be modified as
suggested at Para 3.3.5 below.
4.3.8 Suggested Fitment table: The
following fitment table is suggested to be
worked by the seventh Pay Commission
as a starting point of working out the
recommendations, instead of compounding
the patent errors committed by the earlier
Pay Commissions.
PRE-REVISED BASIC
PAYIN THE PAY
SCALE OF RS.15100-
400-18300 (S-25)

FOR NFSG FOR IAS
REVISED PAYIN

THE PAY BAND FOR
NFSG FOR IAS
PRE-REVISED BASIC
PAYIN THE PAY
SCALE OF RS.16400-
450-20000 (S-26) FOR
CONSERVATOR/

DIG/BRIG/SE, ETC
REVISED PAYIN THE
PAYBAND FOR
CONSERVATOR/

DIG/BRIG/SE, ETC
15100 39690
15500 39690
15900 40890
16300 40890 16400 39690
16700 42120 16850 40890
17100 42120 17300 40890
17500 43390 17750 42120
17900 43390 18200 42120
PRE-
REVISED
BASIC PAY
IN THE PAY
SCALE OF
RS.15100-
400-18300
(S-25) NFSG
FOR IAS
REVISED
PAYIN THE
PAY BAND
PRE-REVISED
BASIC PAYIN

THE PAY SCALE
OF RS.14300-400-
18300 (S-24)

SELECTION
GRADE FOR
OTHER
SERVICES
PROPOSED
REVISED PAY
IN PAYBAND
PRE-REVISED
BASIC PAYIN

THE PAY SCALE
OF RS.16300-
450-20000 (S-26)

FOR IFS /IPS/SE/

BRIGADIER, ETC
PROPOSED
REVISED PAYIN

THE PAY BAND
14300 37400
14700 38530
15100 39690 15100 39690
15500 39690 15500 39690
15900 40890 15900 40890
16300 40890 16300 40890
16700 42120 16700 42120 16400 42120
17100 42120 17100 42120 16850 42120
17500 43390 17500 43390 17300 43390
17900 43390 17900 43390 17750 43390
18300 44700 18300 44700 18200 44700
18700 44700 18700 44700 18650 44700
19100 46050 19100 46050 19100 46050
19500 46050 19500 46050 19550 46050
20000 47440
20450 47440
71 70
4.4. MISREPRESENTATION OF
THE 2 YEAR GAP BETWEEN IAS
AND OTHER SERVICES
4.4.1. In order to mitigate the hardships
due to slow promotions in some of
the Group-A services, the sixth Pay
Commission has provided that; The
Government should, accordingly, consider
batch-wise parity while empanelling and/or
posting at Centre between respective batches of
IAS and other organised Group A services with
the gap being restricted to two years. Whenever
any IAS officer of a particular batch is posted
in the Centre to a particular grade carrying
a specific grade pay in pay bands PB-3 or
PB-4 , grant of higher pay scale on non-
functional basis to the officers belonging to
batches of organised Group A services that are
senior by two years or more should be given
by the Government
61
. The facility was
subsequently extended to IPS and IFS
in the states and the centre. What was
introduced as stagnation mitigation
measure has in practice being
misinterpreted as a mandatory gap
of two years between IAS and the
rest of the services.
4.4.2. It has been experienced many
a time that even when vacancies exist
and the officers of a particular batch
meet the minimum qualifying service
requirement, the promotions are stalled
unless two years junior to them in the
IAS get first promoted. This has no
only created demoralization among the
officers, but such a practice is against the
public interest since vacancies remain
unfilled. The commission should
address this issue and clarify that
the two years gap is the maximum
and not the minimum gap , and
further clarify that if the vacancies
exist and the pool of officers
meeting the eligibility criteria are
available, promotions should not be
stalled showing the two year gap.
4.5. INTRA SERVICE PARITY
4.5.1. As per the existing policy
of cadre allotment, IPS officers are
allotted different state cadres. While
the conditions of pay and service are
uniform across the cadres, in some
cadres promotions are delayed compared
to others and the gap sometimes extends
to more than two years. The delays
are often caused due to faulty cadre
management, sluggish response of the
state home departments etc. on which
the officers do not have any control .This
results in demoralization of the officers
of the affected cadres, who suffer because
of no fault from their side. In the sixth
Pay Commission the concept of grant of
higher pay scale on non-functional basis
to reduce the inter service gap, extending
the same principle, the commission
may recommend that whenever any IPS
officer of a particular batch is posted in a
state cadre to a particular grade carrying
a specific grade pay in pay bands PB-3 ,
PB-4 or HAG , grant of higher pay scale
on non-functional basis to the IPS officers
of the same batch belonging to the other
cadres or those serving in the centre.
4.6. ABOLITION OF THE RANK OF DIG
4.6.1. The super time scale for the
IAS/IFS and Central Services has
been uniformly fixed at Pay-Band -
4: Rs.37400-67000; plus Grade Pay
Rs.10000, where as in the case of IPS and
the IFoS the same has been split into two
levels, i.e. Grade pay Rs 8900/- (DIG/
Conservator of Forests) and the Grade
pay Rs 10000/-(IG/Chief Conservator
of forests). Historically this factor was
a major impediment in the promotion
prospects of IPS/IFS officers.
4.6.2. The police ranks were traditionally
equated with the corresponding ranks.
The rank of DIG was equated with the
rank of Brigadier in status, and his duties in
the states primarily included supervision
of policing in the ranges. Earlier there
were two levels of DIGs, and in their
endeavour to reduce the total number of
pay scales, the fourth Pay Commission
had amalgamated the levels, but the
exercise was of adverse consequence to
the service, as the amalgamation was into
the lower of the two levels.
73 72
On the contrary, the SAG grades of the
Central Services, which had also existed
in two levels, were merged into a single
level, which was at higher of the two.
The fifth Pay Commission had formally
given approval for creation of the
Additional Director General rank raising
the supervisory ranks above the SP into
four, i.e. DIG.IG.ADG and DG. Rank
proliferation continued with the sixth
Pay Commission, when the DG rank was
split into two levels, i.e. HAG+ level and
Apex scale.
4.6.3. From time to time, IPS Association
has been demanding for abolition of the
rank of DIG. When the matter came up
before the fifth Pay Commission, the
commission has declined the request
on the grounds of i) functional utility
of the scale as head of the range; and
ii) traditional relativities between the
armed forces and the police
62
. The
matter again came up before the sixth
Pay Commission. The Commission,
accordingly, recommends that the grade
o be retained on similar grounds as
mentioned in the fifth Pay Commission
report. However, the commission had
left the option for reconsideration on
the issue, by stating that, the government
may, however, review the position in future in
case functional justification for continuing
with this grade ceases to exist completely
63
.
4.6.4. The Association recommends
for abolition of entry of the
super time scale of the IPS having
grade pay of Rs 8900/- and direct
promotion from the NFSG to the
Super time scale having grade pay
Rs 10, 000/-, as is the case with the
IAS/IFS and other central Services. In
order to achieve parity among the All
India services, the scale should be started
at 16th year of service as in the IAS. For
implementing this recommendation, half
of the existing cadre posts of DIG can be
upgraded to the rank of IG and the rest
half can be downgraded to the rank of SP
(NFSG). Typically IPS officers spend four
years time as DIGs, and for the purpose
of avoiding reversions, a gradual up
gradation /down gradation exercise may
be undertaken over a period of time. The
justification for the abolition of scale is
presented below:
i) Reduction of levels in police
does not adversely affect the
functionality: In the IPS, majority
of the posts (more than 80%) are with
the states. In a democracy charter of
responsibilities of the armed forces and
the civil police are vastly different and
their mutual interaction is very minimal,
except in the Border States or disturbed
states. Therefore relativity argument
with the armed forces does not stand the
scrutiny of ground realities. Coming to
the aspect of functional utility, range level
supervision is an important component
of the state police functioning. In the
distant past, IGP was head of state police
and DIG was the only intermediate rank
between the district superintendent of
police and the IGP. Therefore only a DIG
rank officer could have head the police
range. However, at present there are
three intermediate ranks between the
head of the state police, i.e. DGP and the
District Superintendent of Police- These
are ADG, IG and the DIG. Therefore,
it is not mandatory that only a DIG
rank officer should head the range- the
function can be performed by the IG as
well. In fact such a system has already
been successfully implemented in various
states, as observed by the commission
itself. Further, the IAS counter part of
DIG is the Divisional Commissioner,
who is an officer equivalent to IG in
police. Usually, the District Collector
and the Superintendent of Police are of
comparable seniority and most of the
time they would be at similar stages of
the time scales. Therefore, it is logical
to extend similar working relation at the
division /range level.
ii) Abolition of DIG posts in the
states will provide more hands
for the field level posts: At present
the eligibility level for promotion to
the rank of DIG is 14 ears. IPS officers
typically serve for more than 30 years
and 14 years is not even the mid-point
of their career. Therefore, allowing them
to serve as SsP for at least two more
years will benefit the system, with more
number of experienced officers available
for field postings.
iii) Uniformity of ranks across the
civil services is in the interest of
harmonious working relations in
the states: Although officers of the rank
of DIG are placed at a lesser grade pay
than their IAS counter parts in the Super
time scales and end up getting promoted
later to the equivalent rank of IG, the
fact that the post is termed as super time
scale and the IPS officers usually get
promoted in their 14th year of service
to that scale, heart burn is experienced
by their IAS counterparts and in the past
this had triggered a race for reducing the
qualifying service. In fact, in the year 2008
the qualifying service for super time scale
was reduced to 14 years for the IAS, but
after realizing the folly that officers are
getting promoted at a very early stage of
their career which is depriving the system
of the capable hands for field postings,
the earlier position of 16 years eligibility
criterion was restored. Uniformity of
ranks between the IAS and IPS therefore,
is in the interest of harmonious working
relations in the states.
75 74
iv) Functionality in the Central
Armed Police Forces(CAPF) can be
maintained by retaining the rank
of DIG at grade pay of Rs. 8700/:
IPS being an All India Service, it is
expected that an appropriate number
of posts are created at the centre for
enabling officers to come on deputation.
At present there are about 120 posts of
DIG earmarked for IPS officers in the
CAPFs. As the CAPFs are organized
similar to Army pattern, relativities with
the armed forces have a functional utility
in maintaining inter organizational
coordination. Therefore the rank of DIG
may be allowed to remain intact for the
purposes of central deputation.
v) Retention of DIG posts in centre
with lesser grade pay does not
conflict with the service rules:
The practice of IPS officers of the rank
of DIG and even the IAS officers already
promoted in their cadres to the grade pay
of 10,000/- join as directors (for which
the qualifying service is 14 years, same as
for DIG), in the central staffing scheme
with a reduced grade pay of Rs 8700/-.
Having IPS officers join CAPFs with grade
pay of Rs 8700/- does not set any new
precedent in the government of India.
All of the central deputation posts are
non cadre posts and their pay is regulated
by schedule II under rules 10 and 11 of
the IPS (pay) rules as amended from time
to time. Therefore a simple amendment
of the schedule II-B would suffice to
implement the changes, and that is not a
big issue since the pay rules any way get
amended after every Pay Commission.
Now coming to inter personal relations
between the IPS officers with Rs 8700/-
grade pay and their CAPF colleagues
with Rs 8900/- grade pay, firstly the
difference is very minimal, and secondly,
there are precedents available in the states
where IAS and IPS officers posted in the
districts get lesser pay even compared to
not only their state service colleagues
but even their subordinates. Further, if
the government desires it can adjust the
tiny gap in the grade pays through award
of personal pay to the concerned officers.
vi) There will be no additional
financial burden on the exchequer:
At present the level jump between DIG
and IG is Rs 1100/- . Also, it is being
proposed to upgrade only half of the
existing posts of DIG, which are roughly
250 cadre posts and 26% more state
deputation reserve/ex-cadre posts.
Therefore the financial burden of the
exercise is miniscule minimum.
4.7. ABOLITION OF THE HAG+
SCALE
4.7.1. The DG rank in the IPS now
carries two pay scales; i) Apex Scale of
Rs.80, 000 (fixed) which is allowed
to DGs of most of the CPOs, IB, CBI,
RAW etc. and one DG in each State who
is HoPF (Head of Police Force); and ii)
HAG+ Scale of Rs.75, 500-80,000 for
other DGs in the States and some CPOs.
4.7.2. Due to the classification of DGs
into Apex scale and the HAG+ scale
several difficulties have arisen while
implementation in the states resulting
in several petitions in the courts/
tribunals. Quite often selection to the
post of HoPF is not done on the basis
of seniority, selection process is not
transparent and HoPFs are sometimes
transferred out without adhering to
the two years tenure rule. The legal
challenges arise when: an apex scale
DGP (HoPF) is removed to a post
carrying the inferior HAG+ scale and his
pay scale is reduced from apex to HAG+.
This technically amounts to demotion
without disciplinary proceedings; and
when a junior DG is posted to the apex
scale post, superseding the senior DG
who languishes in the inferior scale.
This results in subversion of the NBR
(Next below Rule). The aforementioned
situation has resulted in a plethora of
litigations all over the country against the
Govt as well as against the superseded
officers. Government has so far not one
a single case.
4.7.3. The Government erroneously
insists that grant of apex scale to one of
the DGs is not a promotion though it is
a superior scale. It ignores the fact that
the status/rank of an officer is defined
solely by the Pay Scale. The following
facts clearly prove the superiority of
Apex Scale over HAG+ scale:
i) In the Order of Precedence, an Apex
Scale holder precedes all the others;
ii) In respect of official residential
accommodation, Apex Scale officers are
entitled to the highest category type
houses in Delhi. No such priority is given
to the HAG+ officers who are placed in
the general waiting list;
iii) CPOs like CRPF and BSF are headed
by a DG in the Apex Scale. Under him
are two more DGs designated as special
DGs to distinguish them from the head
DG. They are placed in the HAG+ scale.
They are directly subordinate to the DG
holding the Apex Scale;
77 76
iv) Officers who retire from the HAG+
scale draw significantly draw fewer
pensions compared to their colleagues
who retire in the Apex scale.
Vide Notification No. G.S.R 692(E) dated
27th September, 2008 of Government
of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public
Grievances and Pensions regarding the
recommendations of the 6th Central
Pay Commission dealing with Indian
Police Service (Pay) Rules, 2007, the
post of Director-General of Police
as head of police force was identified
and given a higher pay scale [the Apex
Scale of Rs 80,000/- (fixed)] while the
rest of the DGs were given a lower pay
scale of HAG+ of Rs 75,500-80,000,
as extracted: Rule 3(D) (iii) Apex Scale:
Rs 80000 (fixed), Grade Pay: nil (by up
gradation of one existing post of Director
General of Police as head of police force in
each State cadre [with effect from the date
of issue of notification of the Indian Police
Service (Pay) Rules, 2008
4.7.4. Thus, on the one hand, the Govt
says DGP (HoPF) is not a promotion/
up gradation while, on the other hand,
it clearly describes the post as up
gradation. These contradictions remain
unexplained by the Govt till date and no
corrective action has been taken so far.
4.7.5. Factually speaking, the use of
the word up gradation in the above
amendment is legally untenable, as it goes
against the Cabinet decision taken vide
GOI Gazette Notification No.1/1/2008-
IC dated 29.8.08. This notification is
regarding the implementation of the
accepted Recommendations of the Sixth
CPC. It mentions about up gradation to
the Apex Scale of Rs. 80,000/- (Fixed)
only of the additional posts of two DGs
of CPOs, namely, DGs of SSB and ITBP.
There is no mention of the up gradation
of the posts of DGPs of States / HoPF
to the Apex Scale. In the Schedule, it
specifically mentions that in each State,
one of the DGPs, who is the HoPF, will
be placed (as against upgraded) in the
Apex Scale. It is to be noted that the
GOI (Transaction of Business) Rules,
1961, particularly Schedule II, clearly
forbids any Ministry, Minister and/
or Department etc from superseding,
amending, modifying or changing any
decision of the Union Cabinet. Only
the Union Cabinet is empowered to do
so. It clearly proves that the use of the
word up gradation in the above DOPT
Notification is wrong.
4.7.6. After the revision of the pay
scale of the post of DGP (HoPF), there
is no additional qualification added for
appointment to that post nor there is
any change at all in the responsibilities,
powers and functions of the post which
the previous incumbents did not exercise.
The so called up gradation is absolutely
illusory, a mere re-designation of a
particular post in the rank of DGP with
a higher pay scale. Whenever there is
change in the power structure in the State
Government, very often, the incumbent
DGP (HoPF) is removed to an innocuous
post. If the argument of the Government
about up gradation is accepted, then
how can an officer holding a superior
post are transferred to an inferior post
without framing charges against him for
disciplinary action? How can a person
be demoted without any departmental
proceedings? This only confirms that all
posts of DG are equal and they exercise/
draw powers from an equivalent post.
What logic, therefore, can there be to
discriminate between DGs and allow the
benefit of higher pay to only one DG? The
facts are clear: there is no up gradation of
the post but merely up gradation of the
pay scale of the same post.
4.7.7. In view of the above reasons,
and also keeping in view the fact that
government has been consistently losing
all the cases on this issue, the commission
may consider confirming the principle
that discrimination between DGs is
arbitrary and all the DGs are entitled to
the same Apex Scale.
79 78
4.8. REINFORCING THE ALL INDIA
CHARACTER OF THE SERVICE
4.8.1. As per the scheme of the All India
Services, officers serve both in the states
and the centre. For facilitating such
movement, a central deputation reserve
at the scale of 40% of the cadre posts has
been created in the state cadres. As per
the present strength of IPS, there is a
requirement of 1022 posts for fulfilling
the central deputation obligations as
per the cadre rules. At present there are
only 569 posts (just a little more than
50% of the CDR quota) available with
the CAPFs/CPOs for deputation of IPS
officers. Therefore there is a need to
identify more posts where IPS officers
can be inducted at the centre. It is also
relevant to mention here that between
the years 1999- 2003, intake in the
service was drastically reduced to 30-35
officers per year implement a downsizing
strategy. Therefore states were highly
reluctant to spare the officers for
central deputations since there was huge
shortage of officers at the field level, and
as a consequence there was not much
pressure on the central deputation posts
in the ranks of SP and DIG.
4.8.2. Subsequent cadre reviews had
realized the need to increase the number
of officers in order to tackle the difficult
internal security challenges, and as a
result the intake in the past 10 years has
sharply increased. Between the years
2005-2013, the intake was as much as
1189. These trends indicate that in the
near future there will be significant
pressure on the central deputation posts.
Also, the profile of the officers inducted
into the IPS indicates that most of them
are highly educated with professional
degrees
64
. This, added with the exposure
to complex governance challenges which
they receive in their initial career in the
state police grooms them to develop
rich domain knowledge on public order,
security, human resource management,
regulatory and enforcement functions,
handling natural disasters, elections and
major events etc. which will make them
suitable candidates for competing to the
central staffing scheme posts. Therefore,
in addition to maintaining the present
strength of earmarked posts in CPOs/
CAPFs there is also a need to create a level
playing field for enabling IPS officers to
compete in the open competition posts,
including the Central Staffing Scheme for
reinforcing the spirit of All India Service
character of the IPS as well as gainfully
utilizing the domain expertise of the
IPS officers in the Central Government
Ministries/departments.
4.8.3. At present, when the country is
facing highly complex internal security
problems which include Terrorism,
Insurgency, Left Wing Extremism,
and Transnational Organised Crime
in addition to onerous challenges of
managing Police force of more than
30 lakhs in strength, out of which 10
lakhs are under the direct control of the
Union Government, policy framing and
effective handling of these issues would
essentially require domain expertise.
Also, the matters related to internal
security require dedicated and undivided
attention, as any delay in response
from the Government could have dire
consequences leading to irreparable
damage. At present the Internal Security
Department within the Ministry of
Home Affairs is headed by an IPS officer
of the rank of Special Secretary but the
formations down below do not have
representation from the IPS. On the other
hand, other ministries such as External
Affairs, Railways, Ministry of Statistics
and Programme Implementation, and all
the Scientific Departments are run by
the officers of the respective specialized
cadres. Therefore, there is a strong case
for restructuring the Department of
Internal Security as an independent
department within the Ministry of
Home Affairs, headed by an IPS officer
with adequate representation of the IPS
officers in the ranks of Joint Secretaries
and below.
4.9. INEQUITIES IN THE CENTRAL
STAFFING SCHEME
4.9.1. The central staffing scheme has
been existing for almost the past 50 years
in the present form. Postings under the
central staffing scheme are done as per
the instructions contained in the DOPT
office memorandum no. 36/77/94 EO
(SM I), dt. 5th January, 1996. As already
submitted earlier, as per the stated policy,
The raison detre is the Centres need for fresh
inputs at senior levels in policy planning,
formulation of policy and implementation of
programmes from diverse sources, viz., the All-
India Services and the participating organised
Group A Services. If one goes by the
letter, it provides equal opportunity for
selection to 37 participating services and
is mutually beneficial to service cadres
and Government of India. However, in
operation the system secures neither.
81 80
The sixth Pay Commission aptly summed up the situation in its report as While
the system appears to be very equitous on paper, it is non-transparent and does not
inspire confidence amongst the concerned officers about its fairness
65
.
4.9.2. In addition to the opaqueness of the process, there is ample evidence
to suggest that it is highly iniquitous and does not value domain expertise of
various competing services. The following table explains the breakup of the
officers at various points of time.
4.9.3. Although no separate figures are
available in respect of the IPS and IFoS
for the years of 1972, 1984 and 1995
it will not be inaccurate to assume that
they had accounted for less than 10%.
The trends clearly indicate that there is a
skewed distribution in favour of a single
service, and that over a period of time,
instead of becoming more egalitarian,
the distribution is getting more skewed.
4.9.4. Much of the unfairness of the
system could be attributed to a flawed
Process of Empanelment. Annual
exercise of drawing suitability lists of
eligible officers from the participating
services, known as empanelment has
been the biggest bottleneck for non-IAS
officers to get appointments under the
Central Staffing Scheme. The following
table shows the service wise status of
empanelment. Huge gap among services
in empanelment is highly unusual and
this causes serious doubts in the minds
of the officers regarding the fairness of
the system.
4.9.5. Unfairness of the present
system has been a matter of scrutiny
of several commissions in the past. The
2nd Administrative Commission has
remarked, The Commission is of the view
that the present procedure for empanelment
of officers to the level of Joint/Additional
Secretary and above needs to be replaced
by a transparent, objective and a fair
placement system
67
. The Commission
recommended that an independent
Authority should deal with matters of
assignment of domains, preparing panels
for posting of officers at the level of SAG
and above, fixing tenures for various
posts, deciding on posts which could be
advertised for lateral entry
68
etc. Similar
recommendations were also made by
the Surindernath Committee (2003)
to review and make recommendations
with regard to the present systems of
performance appraisal, promotions and
lateral movement in respect of the All
India Services and other Group a services;
and by the P.C.Hota Committee on Civil
Service Reforms (2004).
# Based on the fifth CPC report (page 470); @Based on the Centre for Good
Governance Report
66
.
LEVEL
#
1972
#
1984
#
1995
@
2010
Secy. 30 15 0 36 25 0 71 21 0 69 2 5 1 13
AS 20 11 1 27 38 1 72 12 0 44 0 0 0 3
JS 86 60 23 50 1 44 4 198 7 3 3 60
*
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A
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S
*
A
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A
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G
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A
*
A
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83 82
The sixth Pay Commission observed
that, The Commission is fully aware that in
theory these posts are already open to all AIS
as well as Central Group A Services., However,
in practice, the selection procedure for these
posts has been made so non-transparent that
the credibility of the entire selection procedure
is now being questioned. The pressing need
is to ensure a selection process that is open,
transparent and gives equitable chance to all
the eligible officers
69
.
4.9.6. After comprehensively dealing
with the issue, Sixth Pay Commission
recommended a new system of appointment,
vide paras 6.1.8 to 6.1.12 of the report as
per which all the posts filled by deputation
in the Senior Administrative Grade and
Higher Administrative Grade should be
filled through an open selection process
conducted by an independent agency.
The function of the independent
agency should be done by the UPSC
by involving few outside experts in the
relevant field. The commission has
also recommended for doing away
with preparation of panels and
observed that, for officers belonging to
AIS, appointment of any one officer of the
service in any State cadre in the scale attached
to the posts in SAG or HAG, as the case
may be, would be a sufficient condition for
consideration of all the officers of a particular
year of allotment.
4.9.7. Unfortunately, the DOPT did not
act further on the recommendations, and
continued with the earlier system. As a
consequence, huge frustration has set
in the cadres of IPS, IFoS and Group A
central services. This Pay Commission may
therefore address this important issue.

S.No.
Name of the Service Junior-most
Batch
Empanelled
for
appointment
to Secretary,
Special
Secretary &
Secretary
Equivalent at
the Centre
Junior-
most Batch
Empanelled
for
Additional
Secretary &
Additional
Secretary
Equivalent
at the
Centre
Junior-most
Batch
Empanelled
for Joint
Secretary &
Joint
Secretary
Equivalent
at the
Centre
1
Indian
Administrative
Service (IAS)
1980 1984 1995

Indian Police Service
(IPS)
- - 1990


2
Indian Revenue
Service (IT)
1977 1979
3
Indian Forest Service
(IFoS)
1977 1981 1988
4
Indian Audit &
Accounts Service
1977 1981 1993
6
Indian Economic
Service (IES)
1976 1979 1986
7
Indian Revenue
Service (C&CE)
1976 1980 1985

85 84
5.1. INTRODUCTION
5.1.1 Allowances, Advances and
Incentives for police personnel should be
based on following basic principles:
i) Reasonable expenses incurred in the
course of police work should be promptly
reimbursed.
ii) Police duty often places officers in
extenuating and difficult circumstances.
In such cases, the Government should
attempt to provide relief to the affected
officer through appropriate monetary
compensation.
iii) Police officers should neither benefit
nor suffer a loss from the payment of
allowances.
iv) Allowances should remain stagnant
and net value should not erode with
inflation
v) Advances should be realistic with
respect to market trends
vi) Incentives should be introduced as
means to reward exceptional performance
and integrity and progression up the pay
scales based purely on length of service
is unfair.
5.1.2 A number of allowances are
payable to Central Government
employees at present, which can be
categorized into those which are
common to all the services, and those
which are specific to the police service.
Submissions in respect of the commonly
granted allowances, in the context of
police officers, are presented separately.
In addition, allowances specific to
women, couples in government service,
and incentives for police personnel have
also been discussed.
PRINCIPLES OF DETERMINATION
OF ALLOWANCES, ADVANCES
AND INCENTIVES
THE GREYHOUNDS SUCCESS STORY
Greyhounds is a professionally trained and well -
motivated specialist commando force of the Andhra
Pradesh Police, visualized, conceptualized and raised
in 1989 by late Shri. K.S. Vyas IPS to combat Left-
Wing extremist violence in the State. It was conceived
as being a force self- sufficient in all respects - capable
of staying and operating in interior and inhospitable
jungles for one week at a stretch with a view to take
on extremists in their strong holds. It is presently
capable of reaching inaccessible, remote and interior
forest areas throughout the State and border areas
in the shortest possible time and conducting swift
operations, excelling with speed, surprise and skill. It
is a 100% deputationist force so as to ensure that the
force is always young and fighting fit, with personnel
drawn from various State Police Units. Willingness,
physical fitness, mental alertness and age are the
main criteria for induction, and they are rewarded
with sufficient incentives and protected with strong
welfare measures.
Over the last 25 years, IPS officers have provided
outstanding, continuous and dynamic leadership in
undertaking result-oriented anti-extremist operations
and in revitalizing the elite force with modern training
strategies, professional skills and conflict resolution
tactics. Shri. K.S. Vyas IPS , Shri. Pardesi Naidu IPS
and Shri. C. Umesh Chandra IPS laid down their lives
in this cause.
87 86
5.2. GENERAL ALLOWANCES
AND ADVANCES
5.2.1. Extension of the NE/J&K
allowance to LWE affected and
other hard areas- Presently the
Government of India grants a hardship
allowance to personnel posted to J&K
and the North Eastern States. However,
in the recent years, LWE has emerged as
a major threat to the peace and security
of the nation and government employees
working in LWE affected districts face a
grave threat to their well being and also
suffer from various hardships. Hence it is
requested that the NE / J&K allowance
be extended to the notified LWE affected
districts in the country also. In addition,
as a matter of principle, there should be
a uniform yardstick for granting hardship
allowance to all such government servants
who are faced with comparable hostile
working conditions and life threatening
situation in remote and isolated areas.
5.2.2. Automatic adjustment of
allowances with increase in DA-
As per 6th CPC recommendations all
allowances automatically increase by
25% for every 50% increase in DA.
This increase is not commensurate with
inflation to retain the value of allowances
granted. Hence, it is proposed that all
allowances should be fully neutralized
with the DA, and enhanced whenever DA
crosses 25%.
5.2.3. Travelling Allowance/Daily
Allowance The sixth Pay commission
had recommended an increase of
allowances under this head and it is
urged that the present Pay Commission
may also continue the same with the
following revisions:
i) Many of the district SPs are in the grade
pay of Rs 6600/-. They are required to
frequently travel to state head quarters/
range head quarters, which are in bigger
cities where the hotel charges are higher
and police mess facilities are limited. The
present level of reimbursement of Hotel
charges is insufficient to cover their
expenses. Therefore they may be allowed
the same rates as Rs 7600/- grade pay
officers.
ii) For local transport, Taxi charges up to
50 Km are reimbursed. In case of X and Y
category cities this should be enhanced to
100 KM and 75 KM respectively because
of the distances involved.
iii) Reimbursement of expenses
incurred on food are too less for the
ranks up to Rs 6600/- grade pay. In fact,
when it comes to food, the nutritional
requirements of individuals are similar
irrespective of pay scales / grade pay
and difference is only in terms of the
higher cost associated with the type of
restaurants expected to be visited by
officers of the higher scales. Therefore it
is recommended to have only two slabs
under this sub head, one up to PB-2 and
one above.
5.2.4. Children Education Allowance
As the cost of education is considerably
higher in metros and other cities in
comparison to smaller towns, it is
proposed that CEA should be granted
based on classification of various cities/
towns (as is the case of HRA) where
the employee is posted. CEA initially
granted by 6th CPC was Rs. 12000 per
annum, which has increased to Rs. 18000
per annum now, consequent to two
increases in DA by 50% between 2006
and 2014. This increase is insufficiently
keeping pace with increase in cost of
education especially in metros and bigger
cities. Hence it is proposed for CEA to
be granted as a percentage of pay of the
employee. It can initially be pegged at
7% and 5% of the basic pay +grade pay
of employee per month per child up to
two children, for metro cities and other
cities respectively with a lower cap of
Rs. 1500/- per child per month and
upper cap of Rs. 3,000/- per month
per child (neutralised with DA). Also,
the benefit may be extended for college
going children.
5.2.5. Transport Allowance: Entire
amount of transport allowance should
be exempted from taxation and the
allowance should be indexed with petrol
prices and not with the D.A. rates, to
render it realistic.
5.2.6. Deputation Allowance:
At present deputationists transferred from
the same station are paid a reduced allowance
of 5%. In some of the central police
organisations like CBI/NIA, induction of
officers on deputation from the local police
works to the advantage of the organisation
and reduced Deputation Allowance is
mutually disadvantageous to the employee
and the organisation. Therefore same rate of
deputation allowance should be applied in
all the cases.

89 88
5.2.7. Higher Deputation
Allowance for the All India Service
Officers: CDTA as a percentage of
the minimum basic pay of the post has
considerably diminished over a period of
time for the IPS officers. Between 1948
(when it was in the nature of special pay)
to 1986 it came down from 50% to 16% of
the basic pay, in case of officers of the rank
of SP and in almost similar proportion
in case of the rest. As already explained
earlier, in order to reinforce the All India
Service character of the IAS, IPS and IFtS
and to ensure that the Central Deputation
Reserve is filled up, the government
should create sufficient incentives to
attract officers to serve in the central
deputation. At present the comparative
incentive structure in the states and the
centre discourages officers to come on
deputation. Keeping this in view, it is
recommended that CDTA rates for All
India Services may be enhanced to 20%
subject to the ceiling that the aggregate
of pay in the pay band and Deputation
(Duty) Allowance/Central (Deputation
on Tenure) Allowance does not exceed the
starting point of the HAG scale.
5.2.8. Extension of Child Care Leave
to Male employees: The provision of
Child Care Leave should be extended to
single parent male employees.
5.2.9. Enhancement of Paternity
Leave: At present, the male employee
is entitled to 15 days paternity leave
on birth of a child. It is felt that this
paternity leave may be increased to 30
days from the existing 15 days (for up to
two living children) so as to ensure that
the employee is able to take care of his
wife and the new-born child. However,
the paternity leave may be restricted
from the date of delivery to 6 months
after child birth.
5.2.10. Issues related to Government
Housing: Lack of proper housing is
a considerable de-motivating factor.
Government housing at present suffers
from a number of shortcomings viz.
inadequate housing stock in metro cities,
poor maintenance and poor management.
The Government should ensure that
these deficiencies are taken care of. In
addition, there are also issues related to
allotment of government housing. The
well accepted principle of allotment of
housing is that it should be done on the
basis of grade pay. However, often there is
an attempt to frame rules in a manner to
circumvent this basic principle in order
to favour a few. This should be avoided
and it is suggested that Pay Commission
may consider making a specific
recommendation that grade pay alone
should be the criterion for determining
the seniority and the inter-se seniority
among the same grade pay holders should
be the number of years of service put in
by the officer in the pay band.
5.2.11. Advances: Some of the
advances extended by government to its
employees like HBA and Vehicle purchase
Advance are not realistic and in tune with
present day requirements. Besides, many
of these advances are usually not granted
for lack of fund allocation leaving the
employee with the only option of availing
bank loans at higher interest rates. Public
sector banks extend soft loans to their
employees towards their requirements
of housing, conveyance etc. Hence, it is
proposed that the government extend to
police personnel interest subsidy of 2%
in respect of advances and loans availed
through public sector banks towards
requirements of housing, car, and other
basic amenities.
5.3. ALLOWANCES SPECIFIC TO
POLICE
5.3.1. Police Service Pay: At present
defence personnel are getting Military
Service Pay. On similar lines, police
personnel should also be granted Police
Service Pay as police is also a uniformed
service of the government with a
unique set of roles and responsibilities.
This demand is also supported by the
international practices for police pay. As
per the Winsor Report quoted earlier
in Chapter II, the pay scales of police
officers in the UK are typically 10-15%
higher than those of the emergency
services and those of similar ranks in
the armed forces
70
. More importantly,
this position of police officers in the
earnings structure has remained roughly
constant in the last decade and is strongly
correlated with improvements with the
crime scenario in the country.
91 90
5.3.2. Uniform Allowance The following rates of Uniform Allowances
are presently payable to the personnel and officers of CPMFs/CPOs /IPS.
The IPS (Uniform) Rules 1954 mention 39 different uniform related items
for an IPS officer. In view of the high rate of inflation, initial grant of Rs.
14000/- is highly inadequate and the officers are compelled to meet the
expenses from their pocket. The grant therefore needs to be enhanced. As
a minimum, it needs to be doubled. The renewal grant of Rs. 3000/- after
every 3 years is also highly inadequate. The uniform allowance, therefore,
may be revised as under:
5.3.3. Kit Maintenances Allowance
(KMA) / Washing AllowancePolice
personnel are presently paid KMA at
the rates mentioned along side:
As evident, the amount of KMA is
highly inadequate. The DA as on
1.1.2014 stands at 100%, meaning
thereby that the cost of living has
doubled since 1.1.2006. The 7th CPC
recommendations are likely to be
implemented w.e.f. 1.1.2016, which is
still two years away. The inflation over
the next 2 years is going to further
increase the cost of living. Therefore,
the KMA needs to be enhanced as along
side:
GRANT PRESENT RATE
Initial grant Rs. 14000
Renewal grant
Rs. 3000
(payable after every three years)
GRANT PROPOSED RATE
Initial grant Rs. 30000
Renewal grant
Rs. 15000
(payable after every two years)
Constable Rs. 90
Head
Constable
Rs. 90
Assistant Sub
Inspector
Rs. 90
Sub Inspector Rs. 450
Inspector Rs. 450
Dy. Sp Rs. 450
IPS Ofcer Rs. 450
Constable Rs. 200
Head
Constable
Rs. 200
Assistant Sub
Inspector
Rs. 200
Sub Inspector Rs. 1000
Inspector Rs. 1000
Dy. Sp Rs. 1000
IPS Ofcer Rs. 1000
93 92
5.3.4. Training Allowance
Deputationist trainers working as faculty
members in National/Central Training
Academies and Institutes are paid training
allowance @ 30 % of the basic pay. On
the other hand, those working in Police
Training Academies and Police Training
Colleges are paid training allowance only
at the rate of 15% of the basic pay. There
is a strong need to attract and retain the
best talent in Police Academies/Colleges.
Therefore their training allowance should
also be increased to 30% of the basic
pay. Similarly, the Sumptuary Allowance
in Police Training Academies/Colleges
should also be paid on the same scale as is
being done in National/Central Training
Academies.
5.3.5. Allowance to the medal
awardees: At present, monetary
allowance is limited to the awardees of
the President Police Medal for Gallantry
and Police Medal for Gallantry at the rate
of Rs 3,000 and Rs 2,000 respectively.
No monetary allowance is provided to
the recipients of the Presidents Police
Medal for Distinguished Service and the
Police Medal for Meritorious Service,
which are awarded at the national level
to a select few on the basis of their
outstanding track record over a period
of decades. Hence, it is proposed that
recipients of Presidents Police Medal for
Distinguished Service and Police Medal
for Meritorious Service be granted at
the rate of Rs 2,000/- and Rs 1,500/
respectively per month which should be
neutralised with DA increase.
5.3.6. Special Compensatory Earned
Leave Surrender facility: Presently,
Cash Compensatory Allowance equal to
one month pay and allowances in a calendar
year is admissible to the executive police
officials from the rank of constable to
Inspector in lieu of working late hours
and on holidays. As explained in chapter
III, one month pay is highly inadequate
to compensate for the extra hours of
work and the alienation from families for
duties performed on gazetted holidays/
festival days. As such, this facility needs
to be significantly enhanced. Firstly, the
upper cap should be increased to at least
45 days as a compensation for working
on weekends, and this should apply to
all ranks of police including IPS officers
working in field / operational duties.
Also, police officers should be eligible
to earn two-days of additional EL per
each day of duty performed on gazetted
holidays/ festivals, and allow encashment
on yearly basis subject to a maximum of
30 days per financial year. Police officers
of all ranks should also be allowed to
accumulate EL up to 450 days in their
career. Similar practices are also followed
in the private sector and international
police organizations. The Winsor report
(2011-12) has alsorecommended for
UK police staff double over time rates
for working on public holidays while
recommending plain over time rates for
additional working on Sundays .
5.3.7. Insurance cover to police
personnel: As discussed in Chapter-III,
police personnel and their families are
exposed to a great degree of occupational
risk in comparison to any other class of
government servants except defence
forces. In case of death in action or
permanent total disability, the police
officer and his family would be left to
fend for themselves till a dependant is
enrolled in government service as per
the existing policy of central/ state
government. This issue would be of
greater concern to post-2004 batches of
policemen and officers covered under
the New Pension Scheme; without any
provision for family pension. It is worth
mentioning that even if an individual
police officer wishes to avail life/ risk
cover, insurers normally do not cover
occupational risk of police personnel in
term policies and often charge additional
premium towards occupational risk cover
in other life insurance policies. Hence,
it is proposed that police personnel be
provided by the government with term
insurance cover for their life and against
permanent total disability through public
sector insurers.
5.3.8. Overtime Allowance:
Unpredictable demands on a police
officers time mean that he may have
to work beyond his ordinary scheduled
hours. A police officer is subject to
restrictions on his private life, one of
which is the obligation to obey an order
to return to duty. As explained in Chapter
III, the usual duty hours of a police officer
in India are 14 to 16 hours / day. Hence
there is a need to introduce an Overtime
Allowance for police personnel. In
the UK, the Winsor report (2011-12)
concluded that it is important to ensure
that police officers are being adequately
paid for the role they undertake, which in
some cases requires the regular working
of overtime.
95 94
5.3.9. Allowance for Un-Social
Hours: Similarly working unsocial hours
(8:00pm to 6:00am) is an accepted part of
life for a police officer, depending on the
type of role to which he has been deployed.
To offset this effect, an Allowance for Un-
Social Hours should be paid to all affected
police personnel. Winsor report (2011-12)
recommended additional 10% in pay for
each unsocial hour worked by officers while
recommending payment to police staff at
the rate of 100% uplift in pay (double time)
for each unsocial hour worked.
5.3.10. Health Insurance schemes: The
CGHS cover provided to central government
employees also suffers from a number of
deficiencies, chiefly for specialist treatment.
As explained in chapter III, police personnel
face extra health risks, and even those who
get injured while performing duties have
to suffer the indignity of poor and casual
treatment. As such the government should
make special provisions to ensure that at least
police personnel who are wounded / injured
in action get the best possible treatment. A
scheme similar to Andhra Pradesh Arogya
Bhadrata or Maharashtra Kutumb Arogya
Yojana that provides the benefit of cashless
entry to designated private and multi-
speciality hospitals needs to be offered to
police officers.
5.4. ALLOWANCES SPECIFIC FOR
WORKING COUPLES AND WOMEN
5.4.1. LTC: As per the existing CCL
(LTC) Rules, when husband and wife
both are government servants they can
choose to declare separate home towns
and can claim LTC separately. But this
is subject to the condition that if the
husband or wife avails the facility as a
member of the family of the other, he or
she is not entitled for claiming the LTC
for independently for himself / herself.
Thus, practically in case of couples even
if they have declared separate home
towns, they are put to disadvantage by
being treated as member of family of one
of them. Hence, it is proposed that for
claiming LTC, couples who have declared
separate home towns should be treated at
par with other officers i.e. non-couples
and allowed to claim LTC independently
for themselves and their families.
5.4.2. Transfer Allowance: At present,
in case of couples when they are
transferred either together or within 6
months of each other to the same station,
transfer allowance is not admissible to
both of them as independent government
servants. It is generally observed that
posting and relieving of couples greatly
varies and one of the spouses may be
relieved on transfer much earlier to the
other. More often than not the couple
actually has to continue to live at two
separate stations and the displacement
for the family occurs in a piecemeal
manner. It is, therefore, proposed that if
the transfer and relieving of the couple
is not within one month of each other
then Transfer Allowance and Composite
Grant may be given to both of them as
independent government servants.
5.4.3. Transport Allowance during
Transfer: As per extant rules, like
Transfer allowance, transport allowance
is also applicable for only one of the
spouses in case of transfer of the spouses
for same station to another similar
station. In the eyes of the government.
both govt. servants are taken as any
other house-hold unit. This is a faulty
assumption as due to higher mobility in
case of working couples in terms often
being posted separately and special
requirements of working women, the
composition of house-hold articles is
very different to that of other house-
holds. In most cases they have duplicate
consumer durables and vehicles to meet
the individual needs especially when they
had been posted separately.
97 96
Hence, this provision needs to be revised
to meet the requirements of these realities.
It is proposed that even if both spouses
are transferred from the same station
to another same station, both should be
eligible for transport allowance separately.
5.4.4. Distress Allowance: As per
DoPT instructions, couples are required
to be posted together at the same station as
far as possible. It is generally observed that
in practice for a large part of their service
career couples remain posted far away
from each other. Separate postings result in
maintenance of two households by a single
family unit which results in extra financial
burden. Hence, it is proposed that distress
allowance @ 20% of Basic Pay + DA may
be paid to one spouse.
5.4.5. Child Care Allowance:
Women in Govt. service have to perform
dual roles - that of an employee and
also that of the nurturer of the family.
In order to perform both these roles,
women employees need to take help of
outsiders (individuals or facilities) to
take care of their children. It is proposed
that Child Care Allowance @ 10% of
Basic Pay + Dearness Allowance may be
given to the women employees till their
children attain the age of 18 years.
5.4.6. Special Uniform allowance
for Women: Pregnancy and child birth
during service takes a toll and impacts
the female police officer more than any
other service. As she wears a uniform,
it needs no further justification that she
needs to get new uniforms stitched,
which entail a cost twice as much as her
male counterparts. It is proposed that
Women police officers who are given
maternity leave should also be given
special uniform allowance to cater for
stitching of new uniforms to cater to the
change in dimensions due to pregnancy
and child birth. This may be given
coterminous with maternity leave as a
special allowance over and above uniform
allowance otherwise applicable to them.
5.5. PERFORMANCE LINKED
INCENTIVE SCHEME
5.5.1. Progression up the pay scales
based purely on length of service is
unfair. High performers should be paid
more than those who perform adequately
and higher again than those who perform
poorly. Hence, there is a need to introduce
the concept of incentives as means to
reward exceptional performance and
integrity. However, given the unique
nature of policing it is necessary
to exercise caution in the design of
incentives. This is because excellence in
policing and internal security is not only
the outcome of several quantitative and
qualitative factors, but also marked more
by an absence, rather than a presence of
tangible outcomes.
5.5.2. A solution to this problem is to
grant incentives by ranking individuals
on a forced distribution curve method.
This will not only avoid the common
problem of incentives being received
by the overwhelming majority rather
than minority of employees, but will
also ensure that the supervisory officer
retains the freedom to choose his own
priorities and incentivize accordingly.

99 98
6.1. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF
DETERMINATION OF PENSION
6.1.1. Retirement benefits, particularly
in Government, are essentially deferred
wages for work done today, rightfully due
to an employee. Unfortunately in public
perception, they have very often been
characterised as doles, which encourages
Governments to adopt a step-motherly
treatment to its pensioners. The CIPSA
believes that the pensioner must be given
his rightful due, and that pensions must be
inflation adjusted and linked to a basket
of basic goods and services necessary to
maintain a certain basic quality of life
in the non- productive years. In todays
time, there are grave issues across the
spectrum in respect of pensions, both
as regards the existing pensioner as
well as the existing and prospective
employee. The Government must desist
from adopting short run solutions of
addressing issues of fiscal constraint
through reduced emoluments and
pension, without takings hard steps to
improve productivity. In other words,
CIPSA requests that the Pay Commission
require that the government must remain
a model employer.
6.1.2. The terms of reference vests
the Seventh Pay Commission with the
mandate to examine issues relating to
pension as below:
To examine the principles which should govern
the structure of pension and other retirement
benefits, including revision of pension in the
case of employees who have retired prior to
the date of effect of these recommendations,
keeping in view that retirement benefits of all
Central Government employees appointed on
and after 01.01.2004 are covered by the New
Pension Scheme (NPS).
PRINCIPLES OF
DETERMINATION OF PENSION
MAHA KUMBHMELA IN ALLAHABAD-
THE MEGA EVENT
Maha Kumbh Mela is known as the greatest
congregation on this earth, where millions of pilgrims
from all over the world converge to have a holy dip
in the Holy Ganges. The event is spread over 50
days, with five peak days, and on the day of Mauni
Amavasya 2012, the estimated figure of devotees
was around 3 crores. This makes the management
of the event, particularly the policing arrangements
extremely challenging and unique. Innovations and
improvisations in policing the Kumbh Mela have been
structured to make working practices in organizing
mega events. Managing security, traffic, crowd
control, team building, leadership, management
of critical situations and fail proof communication
systems are the key areas which have been integrated.
Leading a police force of seventeen thousand men
drawn from fifteen different formations is an
outstanding example of team building, leadership
and inter-agency coordination across over 50 civilian
departments. Securing a porous area of hundreds of
square Kilometers with innovative techniques is by no
means an easy task, but which has been successfully
achieved at every Kumbh over the past decades. The
successful policing of this event by the IPS leadership
has caught the imagination of police forces across the
world and has been recognized by leading institutions
including IIM Ahmedabad, Cambridge University and
Harvard University.
101 100
6.2. PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW
PENSION SCHEME
6.2.1. The NPS started by the
Government of India for employees joining
government service after 1/1/2004 is an
ill-conceived scheme, whose deficiencies
have been compounded by its poor
implementation. As the affected parties
are junior government employees, who
further form a minority, little attention
has been paid to the plight of these
affected officers. CIPSA strongly urges
the 7th CPC to conduct an in depth
evaluation of the NPS as grave injustice
is being done to these budding officers,
especially in cases where the officer dies
in harness or resigns for some reason.
6.2.2. The deficiencies in the NPS are
enumerated below
i) Retirement benefits are essentially
deferred wages for work done today,
rightfully due to an employee. By paying
two employees doing the same job (A
pre 2004 and a post 2004 employee),
a different net present value of wages
(current salary plus pension), the
Government is violating the fundamental
right to equality. SC judgment of D.C.
Nakara & Others Vs. UOI (1982) has
upheld that under article 14 of the
constitution, Pensioners forms one class.
ii) Further, all categories of Central Civil
pensioners are not included in NPS viz.
President, Vice-President, MPs, Armed
forces which is against the fundamental
right to equality under Article 14 of
the Constitution of India. In fact, the
Government has taken a step in the
opposite direction in case of the Armed
forces by committing to a One Rank One
Pension Scheme, which has significantly
increased its pension liability for the
Defence personnel in one stroke.
iii) The current scheme does not take
care of employees belonging to backward
classes. Because as per the existing rules,
candidates from SC/ST category can
enter the services as late as 35 years in
central Government and 45 years in some
of the state Governments. This late entry
has adverse impact on the rate on return.
For central Government employees
their contribution will accrue for only
25 years (if they enter at the age of 35
and for only 15-20 years if they enter in
State Government). This does not ensure
that they will be getting basic minimum
pension suitable to sustain themselves or
family after retirement. Thus NPS does
not ensure social security to these strata,
after retirement.
iv) NPS was implemented in a hurry
through a presidential ordinance. NPS
should have been implemented only
after framing the rules and getting inputs
from the stakeholders. Scheme should
be implemented after it gets proper
legislative sanction & with prospective
effect only i.e. it should be made
applicable to the batches coming after
this Act has come into force. As per the
OM of Government of India, Rules under
any legislation need to be framed within
2 years of the enactment of the Act or
personal responsibility is to be fixed.
In the instant case, Act itself was passed
after about ten years of ordinance.
v) NPS modelled defined contribution
pension scheme has been in force in Latin
American & African countries, where it
has failed miserably.
vi) In discussion paper of PFRDA, it
has been stated that there has been
increase of total pension liability of the
government over the past decades. But
having a close look at the figures, we can
see that total liability of the government
on account of pension of Central
government employees has increased
from 0.6% of GDP in 1993-94 to 1.66%
of GDP in 2002-03. This increase was
with respect to the total pension liability
of Government and not only for Central
Civil employees. However report has not
given any bifurcation of the increase due
to armed forces and that on account of
central civil employees, who are the only
target group under NPS. Figures at point
no. 2.5 of the paper give details of number
of employees under various categories
for the year 2002-03. Analysis of this
data brings out that ratio of pensioners
to the total employees is 0.55% for
civilian & 1.68% for defence. Thus, the
amount of financial burden of pension
is much higher for defence personnel as
compared to the civilian employees and
that too without adding the additional
burden due to One Rank One Pension.
The data unequivocally brings out that
the civilian government employees have
been discriminated against and a grave
injustice done to them.
vii) State Governments have adopted
NPS, but at different points of time,
which has already caused inequality/
disparity with respect to the amount
credited for investment to NSDL. This
will have long term impact in return,
which NPS subscribers will get after
investment of mandatory contribution.
103 102
Further, for majority of NPS subscribers,
deductions have been started by the State
governments after 2010. No directions
have been provided on contribution and
rates to be applied on the contribution
from 1.1.2004 till the NPS is notified by
the State governments.
viii) Return promised by PFRDA
was 14-29% p.a. (as per lecture
details of chairman of PFRDA), while
in the past 4 years, return given by
PFRDA averaged at 9% p.a. for central
government employees & approx. 6-7%
for state government employees. At this
rate of return, it is unlikely that NPS
subscribers will get intended returns,
which will reduce the amount of pension
annuity that an individual will receive on
retirement on purchase from the PFM.
ix) No disclosure has yet been made
by PFRDA for the amount of pension
that NPS subscriber will get, category/
grade pay wise. If they come out with
any data in future, it should convey
factors like Net Present Value of future
pension, what is the rate of inflation they
have taken into consideration etc. It is
doubtful if PFRDA/Market forces can
assure minimum 50% pension & dearness
relief thereon for normal pension &
30% family pension as applicable to all
pensioners at present.
x) Though selection of fund
managers has been proposed to be
based on their track record and ability
to offer guaranteed returns, however,
Indian stock markets have seen a history
of scams and failure of the regulatory
agencies to monitor financial sector
agencies. Any major market shock at
the time of retirement will expose the
subscriber retiring at that time to market
risk which will cause disparity in the
pension of subscribers.

xi) Performance snapshot of fund
managers given on page 24 of SFC
report (2010-11) give glaring picture of
diminishing returns every year as against
the promises made by PFRDA, which is
worrying. The same has been highlighted
by SFC also.
xii) As per details in Standing Finance
Committee Report shortfall in the return
needs to be made up by the government
from the yearly budget. Modalities of the
same have not been spelt out and are also
not being done at present. In addition, in
case of major market crash in any year,
or recession which may last for more
than a year, the total government liability
in those particular year/years can be
exceptionally high.
xiii) The Act provides for a penalty
of Rs. 1 Lakh per day by the Insurance
Company with the maximum penalty of
Rs. 1 crore for violation of the provisions
of the Act. This amount is insignificant
when compared to the quantum of
monthly contribution which runs into
thousands of crores.
xiv) Under NPS, option has been
given to subscribers to invest in tier-
II contribution. But this contribution
is taxable and average return on this
investment has been less than 7 %. It is
requested that, instead of this possibility
may be explored for continuation of GPF
facility to NPS subscribers. This will
ensure that at certain exigencies, NPS
subscribers will have at least one secured
source of finance. Further no withdrawal
option should be there for Tier I. This
will ensure at least basic minimum
pension to the pensioner on retirement
as withdrawal from Tier I will reduce the
total contribution based on which NPS
subscribers are liable to get Annuity.
xv) 6th CPC recommendations of
additional pension are not applicable
to NPS subscribers. Their pension is
based on annuity purchased for Annuity
Service Providers which will not take
into consideration effects of inflation or
additional benefits related to age.
xvi) Service gratuity given under Rule
49 of CCS Pension Rules 1972 is not
given under NPS.
xvii) Death cum retirement gratuity
under rule 50 of CCS Pension Rules
not given under NPS, as their returns is
totally dependent on market forces.
xviii) DA relief on pension for which
government has taken full responsibility
is not given to NPS subscribers.

xix) As per the existing CCS pension
Rules, 1972, after completion of 10 years
of service, minimum guaranteed pension
is 50% of last pay drawn or average of
10 months, whichever is more beneficial.
This kind of minimum guarantee cannot
be there, if the money is invested in the
capital market
.
xx) No advances admissible under
NPS for educational/personal /house
building purposes as available under GPF
for the old pensioners (U/Rule 15 of
GPF rules).
xxi) Investment return on NPS
contribution has been between 8-9% for
central government employees and it is
6-8% for state government employees.
105 104
xxii) The Government has not
conducted any actuarial estimation
of the proportion of its contribution
required to obtain a certain pension
payout level, but has arbitrarily fixed the
Governments contribution as a matching
contribution of 10%, which is extremely
low. The practice the world over with
well run defined contribution pension
schemes is that the government assures
a level of pension based on the salary
earned over an employees service and
then estimates the yearly contribution
required to reach this pension level.
Typically the employees contribution is
fixed at 10% of the salary and the balance
(in the range of 25%) is contributed by
the Government. The Government also
commits to make good any unfunded
liability as and when it arises.
xxiii) The Governments problems with
respect to the NPS have occurred as it has
tried to shirk its responsibility and has
attempted to give an impression of fiscal
consolidation through unrealistic means.
The current NPS is presently significantly
unfunded and poorly managed. The
outcome would be that either the future
governments would have to make a
significant addition of cash to make good
the unfunded liability or the government
would shirk its responsibility to the
pensioners under the NPS.
6.2.3. CIPSA urges the 7th CPC to
study some of the well run international
defined contribution schemes so as to
adopt their best practices. In this respect
the New Police Pension Scheme of the UK
Government deserves mention. Some of
the salient features of this scheme which
was introduced in 2006 are as below.
i) The New Police Pension Scheme 2006
(NPPS) allows officers to earn one 70th
of final salary for each year of service for
35 years.
This provides a target pension of half
final salary. Officers also earn four 70ths
of final salary for each year of service for
35 years, to provide a target lump sum of
twice final salary. Officers in the NPPS
currently pay contributions of 9.5% of
their pensionable pay; Police Authorities
pay the employer contribution of 24.2%.
ii) The scheme has been open to new
entrants since 6 April 2006. The normal
minimum pension age under NPPS is 55.
It also provides a more modern range of
benefits, including survivor pensions for
nominated unmarried partners.
iii) In addition to ordinary pensions
paid on normal retirement, the scheme
provides for compulsory retirement on
the grounds of ill-health, age or in the
interests of the effectiveness and efficiency
of the police force. In the case of ill-health
retirement, an ill-health pension will be
paid, as an officer is required to retire
when permanently disabled for police
duty. In case of compulsory retirement on
other grounds, the appropriate ordinary
pension is payable.
iv) There is also a system of police
injury benefits, which is separate
from the pension schemes and funded
from forces operating accounts. This
provides additional payments to former
officers who have left the police and
are permanently disabled as a result of
receiving an injury in the execution of
duty. In the event of an officers death as
the result of such an injury, the scheme
provides for certain payments to be made
to the deceased officers surviving family.
107 106
6.3. ONE RANK ONE PENSION
6.3.1. CIPSA strongly feels that as IPS
is a uniformed service, it must also be
brought under the One Rank One Pension
scheme recently offered to the Defence
services. As earlier mentioned, police
in developed countries like the UK,
Canada and Australia is typically receive
remuneration which is 10-15% higher
than other public servants including the
armed forces. The practice in India on
the contrary is the opposite, which must
be rectified, particularly as the police in
India perform not only the basic policing
duties but also roles typically performed
by the armed forces due to high internal
security threats that the country faces.
6.4. INEQUITOUS PENSION
FIXATION FORMULA
6.4.1. Clause 4.2 of the Office
Memorandum No. F.No.38/37/08-
P&PW(A) dated 1.9.08 of the Department
of Pension & Pensioners Welfare,
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances
& Pensions, Govt of India, Lok Nayak
Bhawan, New Delhi-110003 reads as
under
71
:-
The fixation of pension will be subject to the
provision that the revised pension, in no case,
shall be lower than 50% of the minimum of
the pay in the pay band plus the grade pay
corresponding to the pre-revised pay scale from
which the pensioner had retired. In the case of
HAG+ and above scales, this will be 50% of
the minimum of the revised pay scale.
6.4.2. The above formula, as analysed
below, is arbitrary and devoid of logic
and rationale as it has led to ridiculous
consequences in that the seniors draw
less pension than juniors of not only the
same rank but also of the lower rank.
6.4.3. As per the formula, in case of
HAG+ scale (applicable to DG rank in the
IPS), basic pension cannot be more than
50% of the minimum of the revised pay
scale (Rs.75,500-80,000), i.e. Rs.37,750
though no such rider has been placed on
other ranks and pay scales. This renders
the formula arbitrary and irrational
because in the pre-revised scale (Rs.24,
050-650-26,000), most of the DG rank
officers had retired at the maximum of
the scale, i.e. Rs.26, 000. Their pension
was fixed at 50% of their last pay, i.e. at
Rs.13, 000. Fixing their pension in the
revised scale at the minimum, instead of
the maximum, of the scale deprives them
of the benefit of the increments they had
earned and the number of years they had
remained in DG rank while in service. A
reasonable and logical fixation of pension
should have been at the corresponding
(maximum) level of the revised pay, i.e.
50% of Rs.80, 000 = Rs.40, 000 instead
of Rs.37, 750. Fixation of pension at the
minimum of the revised scale makes pre-
2006 retiree DGs inferior to the post-
2006 retiree DGs most of whom retire at
the maximum of the scale and draw Rs.40,
000 as pension. Not only this, it makes
pre-2006 retiree DGs inferior even to
the post-2006 retiree ADGs whose HAG
pay scale is Rs.67, 000-79,000. Their
maximum pay takes them to Rs.79, 000,
thus fixing their pension at Rs.39, 500
against Rs.37, 750 of pre-2006 retiree
DGs. In effect, a pre-2006 retiree gets
demoted to the level of a beginner in
that rank. This reduction of Rs.2250 in
basic pension becomes Rs.4275 p.m.
on adding the current DA/DR of 90%
(which is revised every 6 months).
The sad truth is that this discrepancy
is recurring, cumulative and life-long.
The loss increases with every increase in
Dearness Relief. This cascading financial
loss is not confined to the present but
will continue to operate in the future
as well. It further has the evil effect of
reducing the quantum of family pension
also after the death of the Pensioner.
6.4.4. A junior officer who retired as
DG on 1.1.2006 gets more pension than
a senior officer who retired only a day
earlier on 31.12.2005. Almost all the
DGs, who retired on or after 1.1.2006,
are getting basic pension of Rs.40, 000
per month. There is absolutely no change
in duties, powers and functions of the
Pre-2006 and post-2006 DGs which
could justify the reduction in pension.
Both the above officers and several
others had stagnated at the maximum
of the DGs scale for several years when
they were in service. But all these factors
get ignored in fixing the pension in the
revised scale which is prima facie unjust
and needs to be corrected.
6.4.5. The posts of ADGs are the feeder
posts for promotion to the rank of DG.
Still, they have been granted more
pension than their bosses.
6.4.6. This discrimination continues
despite crystal clear Orders of the
Supreme Court of India to the contrary
in two cases: (i) D.S. Nakara & Others Vs.
Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 (at page
323), AIR 1983 SC 130 and (ii) Union of
India Vs. Major General (Rtd) SPS Vains,
(2008) 9 SCC 125. Light has been thrown
on these rulings in subsequent paras.
109 108
6.4.7. A legal analysis of the irrational
pension formula is presented below:
i) Last Pay and Not Last Pay Scale
Relevant for Pension Fixation: As per
Rule 18 of the All India Services (DCRB)
Rules, 1958, the pension of an officer is
fixed on his retirement on the basis of the
average of the pay drawn during the last 10
months or the last pay drawn, whichever
is more beneficial to the retiree. The
pension is thus fixed only on the basis of
the last pay drawn and not on the basis
of the last pay scale drawn. Pay Scale
is relevant only for the serving officers,
but is irrelevant for pensioners for whom
the last Pay drawn is the only relevant
issue and criterion to determine their
pension. Obviously, the pay scale from
which this pay is drawn has no relevance
for fixation of pension. Pension once
sanctioned cannot be revised/reduced
subsequently to the disadvantage of the
pensioner except as a punishment or to
correct a clerical error in calculation of
the original pension.
ii) Wrong Classification of Pensioners:
Pensioners have been wrongly divided
into two classes: pre-2006 retirees and
post-2006 retirees. This is contrary
to the crystal clear Orders of the
Supreme Court of India in two cases:
(i) D.S. Nakara & Others Vs. Union of
India and (ii) Union of India vs. Major
General (Rtd) SPS Vains. These cases
will be discussed in subsequent paras. To
elaborate the above point, if an officer
X retired from the pre-revised running
HAG+ scale of Rs.24050-650-26000
and his last pay drawn was Rs.26000,
then, as per rule, his pension was fixed
at Rs.13000 p.m. Likewise, if another
officer Y retired from the pre-revised
Apex Pay Scale of Rs.26000 (Fixed),
then also his pension was fixed at an
identical figure of Rs.13000 p.m. This
created perfect equality between both
types of pensioners, X and Y irrespective
of their retiring pay scales which become
irrelevant and only the last pay drawn
matters for fixation of initial pension.
This clearly implies that retired officers
receiving the same basic pension belong
to the same class and the principle of
equality applies to them. Their pension
revision to Rs.37,750 p.m. in the case of
X and to Rs.40,000 p.m. in the case of Y
after the 6th Pay Commission amounts
to creation of two different classes of
pensioners who were identical and
belonged to the same class at the time of
retirement.
iii) Violation of Article 14
(Fundamental Right to Equality):The
instance of X and Y quoted above
contemptuously goes against the above
cited Supreme Court orders, leading to
an unwarranted disadvantage to X, in
clear and patent violation of the principle
of natural justice and the fundamental
rights guaranteed under Article 14
(equality before law). A fundamental
principle of law settled in several cases
is that Article 14 of the Constitution
forbids class legislation. Equals have
been made unequals and vice versa. Since
Pension rules determine pension on the
basis of last pay drawn (and not last pay
scale drawn), pension so determined
once cannot be later revised arbitrarily in
a discriminatory way so as to create two
different classes of pensioners who were
earlier drawing identical pensions. Such
discrimination is clearly a violation of the
fundamental right to equality enshrined
in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
iv) Prejudicially Affecting Retrospective
Effect Not Permissible: The pay
revision notification certifies that its
implementation would not adversely
affect any pensioner but it clearly does.
Section 3(1A) of the All India Services
Act, 1951 deals with the rule making
power of the Government and requires
that .... no retrospective effect shall be given
to any rule so as to prejudicially affect the
interests of any person to whom such rule may be
applicable. The All India Services (DCRB)
Rules, 1958 have been framed under the
aforesaid rule-making power under the
All India Services Act. Therefore, it is
not permissible to prejudicially affect
the interests of the old pensioners by
a subsequent provision that came into
effect after their retirement.
v) Violation of Supreme Court Rulings:
Honble Supreme Court of India has
laid down certain principles which are a
settled law in D.S. Nakara etc. Vs. Union
of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 (page 323),
AIR 1983 SC 130:The highlights of this
case are: Constitution Bench of the Supreme
Court held that the fixation of a cut off date,
as a result of which equals were treated as
unequals, was wholly arbitrary. One of the
questions posed in the aforesaid decision was
whether a class of pensioners could be divided
for the purpose of entitlement and payment
of pension into those who retired by a certain
date and those who retired thereafter. The
question was answered by the Constitution
Bench that such division, being both arbitrary
and unprincipled; the classification did not
stand the test of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. The question regarding creation of
different classes within the same cadre on the
basis of the Doctrine of Intelligible differentia
having nexus with the object to be achieved was
111 110
taken up in this case by a Constitution Bench.
It was observed that the date of retirement of
an employee cannot form a valid criterion for
classification, for if that is the criterion, those
who retired by the end of the month will form a
class by themselves. It was held that Article 14
of the Constitution had been wholly violated,
in as much as, the pension rules being statutory
in character, the amended rules, specifying
a cut off date resulted in differential and
discriminatory treatment of equals in the
matter of calculation of pension. It was further
observed that it would have a traumatic effect
on those who retired just before that date. The
division which classified pensioners into two
classes was held to be artificial and arbitrary
and not based on any rational principle and
whatever principle, if there was any, had
not only no nexus to the objects sought to
be achieved by amending the Pension Rules,
but was counterproductive and ran counter
to the very object of the pension scheme. It
was ultimately held that the classification
did not satisfy the test of Article 14 of the
Constitution. Liberalisation in computation
of pension effective from specified date divides
pensioners so as to confer benefit on some
while denying it to others. Such classification
was held arbitrary, devoid of rational nexus
to object of liberalisation and violative of
Article 14.All pensioners entitled to receive
pension under the relevant rules form a class
irrespective of the dates of their retirement
and there cannot be a mini-classification
within this class. The differential treatment
accorded to those who had retired prior
to the specified date is violative of Article
14 as the choice of specified date is wholly
arbitrary and the classification based on the
fortuitous circumstance of retirement before or
subsequent to the specified date is invalid.
vi) HELD: Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness
in State action and ensures fairness and
equality of treatment. It is attracted where
equals are treated differently without any
reasonable basis. The principle underlying
the guarantee is that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike, both in
privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.
Equal laws would have to be applied to all
in the same situation and there should be
no discrimination between one person and
another if as regards the subject-matter of
the legislation, their position is substantially
the same. Article 14 forbids class legislation
but permits reasonable classification for the
purpose of legislation. The classification must
be founded on an intelligible differentia
which distinguishes persons or things that are
grouped together from those that are left out
of the group and that differentia must have
a rational nexus to the object sought to be
achieved by the statute in question. In other
words, there ought to be causal connection
between the basis of classification and the
object of the statute. It is indisputable that
pensioners for payment of pension form a
class. When the State considered it necessary
to liberalise the pension scheme in order
to augment social security in old age to
government servants, it could not grant the
benefits of liberalisation only to those who
retired subsequent to the specified date and
deny the same to those who had retired prior
to that date. The division which classified
the pensioners into two classes on the basis
of the specified date was devoid of any
rational principle and was both arbitrary and
unprincipled, being unrelated to the object
sought to be achieved by grant of liberalised
pension and the guarantee of equal treatment
contained in Article 14 was violated in
as much as the pension rules, which were
statutory in character, meted out differential
and discriminatory treatment to equals in the
matter of computation of pension from the
dates specified in the impugned memoranda.
vii) Union of India Vs. Major General
(Rtd) SPS Vains, (2008) 9 SCC 125:In this
case, the issue was whether there could
be a disparity in payment of pension
between officers of the same rank who
had retired prior to the introduction
of the revised pay scales and those who
retired thereafter. The dispute arose due
to disparity in determination of pension
of pre-1.1.96 and post-1.1.96 retirees
who retired from Defence services
as Major General or equivalent. The
Pension of the pre-1.1.96 retiree Major
Generals was fixed lower than the post-
1.1.96 retiree Major Generals. The
Court held that the date of retirement
was immaterial. The highlights of this
case are as under:-The judgement was
rendered on the touchstone of Article 14 of
the Constitution and in consonance with
the principle of administrative fair play.
Differentiation between officers holding the
same rank on the date of retirement is wholly
erroneous and violative of the provisions of
Article 14 of the Constitution.
113 112
The said decision of the Central Govt does
not address the problem of a disparity having
created within the same class so that two
officers both retiring as Major Generals, one
prior to 1.1.96 and the other after 1.1.96,
would get two different amounts of pension.
While the officers who retired prior to 1.1.96
would now get the same pension as payable
to a Brigadier on account of the stepping up
of pension in keeping with the Fundamental
Rules, the other set of Major Generals who
retired after 1.1.96 will get a higher amount
of pension since they would be entitled to
the benefit of the revision of pay scales after
1.1.96. In our view, it would be arbitrary to
allow such a situation to continue since the
same also offends the provisions of Article 14
of the Constitution. It has to be kept in mind
that the rank of Brigadier is a feeder post for
the promotional rank of Major General having
higher and more onerous responsibilities.The
object sought to be achieved was not to create
a class within a class, but to ensure that the
benefits of pension were made available to
all persons of the same class equally. To hold
otherwise would cause violence to the provisions
of Article 14 of the Constitution. It could not
also have been the intention of the authorities
to equate the pension payable to officers of
two different ranks by resorting to the step up
principle envisaged in the Fundamental Rules
in a manner where the other officers belonging
to the same cadre would be receiving a higher
pension. It was directed that the pay of all
pensioners in the rank of Major General and
its equivalent rank in the two other Wings of
the Defence Services be notionally fixed at
the rate given to similar officers of the same
rank after the revision of pay scales with effect
from 1.1.1996, and, thereafter, to compute
their pensionary benefits on such basis with
prospective effect from the date of filing of the
writ petition and to pay them the difference
within three months from date with interest at
10% per annum.
viii) The principle laid down by the
Supreme Court is squarely applicable
to all the services. By this judgement, a
principle has clearly been laid down that
a senior shall not draw less pension than
a junior. The Governments view in GOI,
DOP&PW F.No. 38/37/08-P&PW(A)
dated 18/11/2009, stating that the
judgment dated 9-9-08 in CA No. 5566
of 2008 SLP (Civil) No. 12357/2006,
UOI vs Maj. Genl. SPS Vains, would not
apply in the case of civil pensioners is
misconceived and amounts to Contempt
of the Apex Court. The Supreme Court
has nowhere limited the principles
propounded in this Order to the defence
personnel and has not said anywhere that
these will not apply to the civilians.
6.4.8. A such, a suggested pension
fixation formula, briefly stated is
presented below:
i) The pension fixation formula
should give due weightage to the length of
service in the last rank and to the number
of increments one had earned in that
rank. There is absolutely no justification
in forfeiting the increments which should
be kept intact in the replacement scale.
ii) The equivalent of the last pay
drawn must not be diluted in the
replacement scale.
iii) As per the settled law, the formula
should clearly state that seniors (intra-
service seniors as well as rank seniors)
will not draw less pension than juniors.
6.4.9. Keeping the settled law in view,
the pension fixation formula may be
modified as under:-
i) The fixation of pension will be
subject to the provision that the revised
pension, in no case, shall be lower than
50% of the equivalent of the last pay
drawn in the pay band plus the grade
pay corresponding to the pre-revised
pay scale from which the pensioner
had retired, subject to the following
conditions:-
ii) The same number of increments
which the pensioner had earned while
in service in the last rank and equivalent
of the last pay drawn before retirement
will be taken into account for fixation of
pension in the revised pay scale;
iii) The revised pension will, in no
case, be lower than the pension of the
lower rank retirees;
iv) Further, the revised pension will,
in no case, be lower than the pension
of the intra-service juniors as per the
seniority list of the same/similar rank.
115 114
6.5. MAKING PENSION TAX FREE
6.5.1. Pension is described in Section
60 of the CPC and Section 11 of the
Pension Act as a periodical allowance
or stipend granted on account of past
service, particular merits, etc. It involves
three essential features: firstly, pension
is a compensation for the past service,
secondly, it owes its relationship to a
past employer-employee relationship or
master servant relationship. Lastly, it is
paid on the basis of earlier relationship
or agreement of service as opposed to
an agreement for service. Therefore,
pension is on an entirely different footing
and cannot be equated with salary. It was
held by the Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court in D.S. Nakara etc. Vs.
Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 (page
323), AIR 1983 SC 130 that the pension
payable to a Government employee is
earned by rendering long and efficient
service and, therefore, can be said to be
a deferred portion of the compensation
for the service rendered.
6.5.2. By a general analogy and
understanding, compensation is not
taxable. The difficulty is caused by
Section 17(1) (ii) of the Income Tax Act
which defines salary to include pension
as well though both are distinct. There
is no justification to include pension in
the definition of salary. Pension of UN
personnel, pension of the recipients of
medals like gallantry, Paramveer Chakra,
Mahaveer Chakra etc. is exempt from tax
under Section 10 of the Income Tax Act.
Similarly, most of the retirement benefits
like gratuity, leave encashment, GPF and
commuted pension are tax exempt. On
the same reasoning, pension of Govt
employees (who earn their pension
by way of compensation for the past
service) should be delinked from salary
and exempted from income tax as a social
welfare measure for senior citizens.
6.6. RAISING THE FAMILY PENSION
6.6.1. Family pension is calculated at the
uniform rate of 30% of the basic pay. Our
submission is that the family pension be
raised to 50% of the basic pay including
the increments earned by the retiree. This
is justified because the family pensioners,
particularly the women, who become
helpless after the death of the pensioner,
need more sympathy in supporting them
financially and otherwise.
6.7. GALLANTRY MEDAL
ALLOWANCE
6.7.1. As per orders of the Secretariat
of the President of India this allowance
for holders of Gallantry Medal is payable
by the Government of the State to which
state cadre an IPS officer is allotted.
This causes problems to those who are
drawing pension from the Central Govt.
and not the State Govt. of the Cadre.
It is suggested that the VII CPC may
recommend that all those IPS pensioners
who opt to draw pension from GOI may
also get the Gallantry Medal Allowance
from the GOI.
117 116
7.1 Competency and competencies
may be defined as the behaviours (and,
where appropriate, technical attributes)
that individuals must have, or must
acquire, to perform effectively at work
that is, the terms focus on the personal
attributes or inputs of the individual
which may relate to a system or set
of minimum standards required for
effective performance at work. Simply
put, a competency based framework
sets out how we want officers at various
levels of Police Service to work. Keeping
the desired outcome in the frame, an
assessment is required to be undertaken of
the knowledge, skills, attitudes required
to perform tasks or jobs performed by
virtue of being at the level in question,
while at every stage reinforcing the
values of honesty, integrity, objectivity
and impartiality.
7.2 Competencies are gained through
a multitude of wayslife experience;
formal education; apprenticeship; on-the-
job experience; self-help programs; and
also training and development programs.
All of these together contribute to job
competence in an officer.
7.3 Capacity building measures within
a competency based framework can only
effect sustainable changes if they are
consciously linked to a comprehensive
and long term reform strategy. That
strategy is initiated and sustained by
a determined political will on the part
of the Government, articulated in
appropriate changes in legislation and
given direction by a Policing Plan with
clear, realistic and achievable priorities
and objectives. Next the organisation
structure and staffing will be reviewed in
TRAINING AND CAPACITY BUILDING
THROUGH A COMPETENCY BASED
MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
POLICE EFFORTS DURING CYCLONE
PHAILIN: A LANDMARK ACHIEVEMENT IN
DISASTER MANAGMENT & INTER
DEPARTMENTAL COORDINATION
PHAILIN, the 2nd strongest tropical cyclone to ever
hit India, made landfall on 12/13.10.2013 at Gopalpur
in Ganjam District, Odisha. The first and foremost
challenge before the Police was to save precious lives at
any cost and for this, Police had to ensure that each and
every person within 5 KMs from the Coast was shifted
to the cyclone shelter or safer areas. The task was not
easy, as nobody was willing to leave their homes but it
was performed with patience and dedication. After the
cyclone, in Ganjam district, almost every residential
house within the affected region was damaged. The
District police played a prominent role in providing
shelter to the displaced person in addition to their
regular mandate.The police also organized camp,
KARUNA, which provided cooked food and drinking
water to the distressed and homeless, for thousands of
people for over a fortnight. This was when the police
themselves had no shelter as their own barracks and
houses had been damaged due to the cyclone. Due
to the commitment and devotion towards duty and
exemplary initiative shown by the police leadership, no
lives were lost.
Post cyclone relief were distributed to around one
million people in Ganjam District alone. No incidents
of looting or disruption in distribution of relief material
took place and the Civil administration could perform
their work in peace as the Police provided them with
conducive work environment.
119 118
the light of these priorities and objectives
and, where necessary, subject to carefully
managed changes. Within this context of
institution building measures, capacity
building provides police with the
necessary knowledge, skills, character
traits, attitudes and values to achieve
the priorities and objectives through
a systematic process of establishing
desired performance standards and
identifying gaps in actual performance.
Training and development is directly
linked to capacity building.
7.4 Police training, which shall be based on
the fundamental values of democracy, the rule
of law and the protection of human rights, shall
be developed in accordance with the objectives of
the police. (Article 26, Recommendation
(2001)10 of the Committee of Ministers
to member states on the European Code
of Police Ethics.
7.5 The SVP National Police Academy,
Hyderabad is tasked with training of IPS
officers for almost 20 months after a four
month Foundation Course at LBSNAA
Mussoorie. The Foundation Course at
Mussoorie is conducted for All India
Services and introduces the officers to
the concept of civil services, law, public
administration, economics, public policy
and planning, apart from facilitating an
interaction across officers of all services
with a view to encourage coordination
in future.
7.6 The professional training at NPA
grooms the IPS officer for his future
responsibilities, provides him with the
requisite knowledge, skills, and attitudes
and inculcates the right kind of values in
the officer to enable him to efficiently
and effectively lead the men under him
and deliver the desired outcome. If
consistency is required to be brought
about in policing all over the country,
NPA must serve as the focal point and be
reinforced accordingly.
7.7 Competency based framework for
the police with a view to use training to
effect capacity building would entail the
following:
i) Defining the objectives, desired
performance level, assessing the actual
performance level and identifying the gap.
ii) Setting about planning how to bridge
the gap through a systematic approach
iii) Job assessment - listing out of jobs /
tasks required to be performed by each
level in the IPS.
iv) Identifying the core competencies
required to perform the above jobs/ tasks.
This would include functional, technical
as well as behavioural competencies.
v) Listing out the Knowledge, Skills,
Attitudes (KSA) required to acquire the
core competencies identified above.
vi) Assessing the pre- training level of
the officer with respect to KSA on the
basis of which he was selected through
the common examination. Officers come
in from diverse educational, social and
regional backgrounds.
vii) Bringing the subject coordinators
on board and working out a modular
based approach to design the right
training methodology for imparting the
above to the officers as per their pre-
training levels.
viii) Supporting training material and
reading material, lesson plans would
then be finalised.
ix) Developing a time line and a time
frame within which the KSA is required
to be imparted to the officer.
x) Spreading this proposed input over
the basic course and various subsequent
in-service courses, as also deciding at
which year of service or at which rank
or even for which post pertinent KSA is
required to be imparted.
xi) Specialization in any of the core
competencies. Each officer must be
facilitated to attain a desired level
of specialization along with a post
graduation, diploma or a certification, as
the subject may require, at 10 - 20 years
of service, in an area of police expertise,
of his choice, or as his post demands.
xii) Listing out the reputed and
established institutions, universities
where officers could be sent to attain
such specialization and certification.
xiii) Having attained specialization, the
officer must then be used for the core
competency that he has expertise in.
He should be posted where he can be
used fruitfully. Using the wrong man for
the job or ensuring that the right man
languishes for not being able to manage
the system or be tactful is the bane
of any Civil Service. It is all the more
for the IPS due to the very specialized
nature of the job impacting the security
of all individuals that exist within our
jurisdiction, which collectively extends
the length and breadth of India. Therefore
the right man with the right skills
for the right job should be ensured.
121 120
xiv) Evaluation, impact assessment
and a ten-year review may be undertaken
to ensure constant up gradation.
7.8 Commissioning studies:
Points i to viii above have already been
taken care of by SVP NPA and basic
training is constantly upgraded to suit the
needs of the changing scenario. However
inputs are increased to the detriment of
quality and a comprehensive review is
required to stem unnecessary additions to
training input while seriously considering
some deletions. What has largely been
an in-house exercise so far now requires
professional validation. Formal studies by
experts need to be commissioned for Job
Assessment, Training Needs Assessment
and Competency Mapping with respect
to Police Service.
7.9 Systematic approach to training
design and identifying appropriate
stage of delivery of inputs: Point ix
needs to be dealt with on a top priority
after such studies are concluded to assess
the appropriate time for delivering inputs.
The Mid Career Training Programmes
interspersed during the career span of IPS
officers have attempted to take care of a
staggered delivery of inputs. However,
post the study, a review of Mid Career
Training Programmes being conducted
by SVP NPA would be required. SVP NPA
must also be given the administrative
and financial independence as well as
adequate budget to ensure that the
quality of such programmes attains the
desired outcome.
7.10 Specialization: Specialization
will eventually define us and have a
force multiplier effect with respect to
the quality of service we are able to
provide, thereby positively impacting the
internal and external security of India,
in particular and providing the much
desired boost to all-round development,
in general.
7.11 Point xi entails another study
by the Bureau of Police Research and
Development. This may be commissioned
to be concluded within the timeframe
of the 7th CPC so as to provide a
comprehensive report which will
stipulate the nature of the study, time
intervals and the Institution(s) whose
qualifications are acceptable, as the
Commission seeks. This will also ensure
better utilisation of Domestic Funding
for Foreign Training (DFFT).
7.12 Utilisation of study leave:
Two years Study leave is permitted as
per rules. However it is looked upon as
a sabbatical by sanctioning authorities
and made hard-to-get. IPS officers must
be encouraged or even sent to reputed
universities to avail of study leave,
twice during their career span at the
junior (5 to 15 years service) and senior
levels (20 to 25 years service), during
which they could acquire a professional
specialization of their choice and a post-
graduate degree or diploma from the
best universities in the world.
123 122
8.1 The IPS (Central) Association has
prepared this memorandum in response to
the opportunity provided by the Seventh
Central Pay Commission to all the service
associations, unions, institutions, other
organisations and interested individuals
to send memoranda containing their
views on the issues which find place in
the terms of reference of the commission.
In pursuance of the associations belief
that improved service conditions of IPS
officers, are a sine qua non, in ensuring
effective discharge of its duties, as well
as advancing the cause of police reform,
the association has made sincere efforts
to focus on the task on hand, and has
compiled and presented its views in the
previous chapters.
8.2 In the first chapter, the
memorandum has sought to lay out the
evolution of the Indian Police Service
through history to the present, the
present structural context in which
duties are performed, and the citizens
growing expectations from the service.
Notable achievements, experience with
successive pay commissions, and the
relevance and importance of the service
in the scheme of governance have been
discussed.
8.3 In the second Chapter, the
principles of determination of pay,
including some of the best practices
internationally have been discussed. In
addition to assessing the feasibility of
comparison with Private Sector, specific
suggestions have been made as to how
the 7th Pay Commission should address
the issues of determination of Pay scale
and of Pay Bands, Grade pay within the
Pay Bands, Maximum/Minimum Salary
Ratio, Merging of Pay Scales, and the
rate of Annual Increments.
CONCLUSION
THE JANAMAITHRI SURAKSHA PROJECT
AND THE STUDENT POLICE CADET
PROJECT- KERALA POLICE EXPERIMENTS IN
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT
Written into the Kerala Police Act, the Janamaithri
Suraksha Project, or the Kerala model of community
policing, was envisaged as a distinct method of
policing which seeks the communitys cooperation,
understands and gives priority to community needs,
and, taking into account the resources available within
the community, attempts to streamline the activities
of police personnel at local police stations to address
their particular problems. Launched in twenty selected
Police Stations in March, 2008 after extensive public
deliberations, the Project is presently implemented in
half of Keralas Police Stations and has won complete
bipartisan support, and peoples confidence.
The Student Police Cadet, is a school-based youth
development initiative that trains high school students
to evolve as future leaders of a democratic society
by inculcating within them respect for the law,
discipline, civic sense, empathy for vulnerable sections
of society and resistance to social evils. Resting on
a unique partnership between the local schools and
the jurisdictional police station, the project boasts
of nearly 16,000 Student Police Cadets, and is being
studied by NCC. Both the projects have been feted at
various international fora, are the subject of various
academic studies and are being replicated in various
other States, with the active intervention of the Union
Home Ministry.
125 124
8.4 In Chapter 3, difficulties faced
by all ranks of Police, which include
long working hours, occupational and
situational risks, factors that induce
stress and fatigue, and health hazards
faced by the police have been explained
with empirical research findings on
the subject. The arguments have been
summed up by making a case for adequate
compensation to the Police personnel for
working under extremely challenging
and stressful conditions.
8.5 Structural, pay parity and career
progression related issues have been
discussed in Chapter 4. A strong case
has been presented for complete parity
with IAS/IFS, in addition to specific
suggestions on removal of anomalies,
rationalization of Pay Scales, abolition
HAG+ and Rs 8900/- grade pay posts,
adequate representation of the IPS in the
Central Deputation and removing the
inequities in the Central Staffing Scheme.
8.6 Chapter 5 deals with the
principles which should govern various
allowances and incentives which are
applicable generally to all Services,
especially to Police and specifically to
working couples and women employees.
Rational arguments have been presented
for extension of hardship allowance
for new areas, enhancement of TA/DA
(to certain ranks), Children Education
Allowance, Deputation Allowance,
Uniform Allowance etc. It has been
advocated that Police Service Pay needs
to be introduced similar to the Military
Service Pay. Special Compensatory
Earned Leave, Overtime allowance and
Un-Social Time allowance are some of
the concepts presented for consideration,
in line with similar facilities available in
other countries. Considering the harsh
conditions of service faced by the police,
a better health insurance scheme in the
lines of those existing in some states
has also been recommended. A separate
section has been dedicated to discuss the
special problems faced by the working
couples and women police officers.
8.7 Chapter 6 has dealt with the issues
of pension and a case has been presented
for discontinuation of New Pension
Scheme. The removal of anomalies created
by pension formula worked out by the
previous Pay Commission, introduction
of some new allowances, enhancement
of rates for certain categories and a more
liberal approach are some of the other
recommendations.
8.8 Chapter 7 has discussed training
and capacity-building issues through
a competency based management
framework and recommended an
overhaul of the present system. With
the goal of ensuring that the right man
with the right skills are available for
the right job, specific recommendations
for commissioning studies, systematic
approach to training design identifying
appropriate stage of delivery of inputs,
and rationalisation of study leave policies
have been suggested.
8.9 CIPSAs expectations from
the 7th CPC are both with respect to
the outcomes expected to result from
the recommendations of the 7th Central
Pay Commission as also of the process to
be followed by the Commission to arrive
at these recommendations. While the
outcomes have been well delineated in
the preceding chapters, in particular, it
is expected that the Commission would
ensure optimal utilization of domain
expertise in governance, resolve pre-
existing anomalies in pay patterns and
central staffing, as well as recognise and
reward the pivotal role played by the
Police in the governance of the nation.
8.10 In respect of processes, it is urged
that the Commission follow certain
processes, which would considerably
assist the Commission in arriving at a
proper understanding of the issues that
plague the Services. CIPSA urges that the
7th Central Pay Commission hold regular
dialogues with all stakeholders both by
interacting with the service associations
and also by visiting the various theatres
of operations of IPS officers, especially in
their early career in districts, including
those in LWE/NE States, State Police
HQs besides the CPOs. This will enable
the members to gain a first-hand exposure
to the adversities faced by the IPS officers
especially early in their career.
127 126
8.11 The Police force in this country has
very often been treated as instruments of
colonial oppression, rather than as instruments
of democratic governance on which the people
have reposed their faith and trust. CIPSA
requests that the 7th Central Pay Commission,
win the hearts and minds of the over thirty lakh
strong police force by not only being fair but
also by being perceived to be fair and equitable.
This would in itself ensure that the Police force
in the country is motivated and geared up to
meet the challenges of 21st century.

8.12 CIPSA further believes that the role
of the 7th Central Pay Commission is not to
be confined to mere issues of incremental
pay hikes, or provision of allowances to
momentarily satisfy the government employee.
It has a fundamental role in bringing about
reform of governance structures, ushering in
police reform, and in effectively safeguarding
the internal security of the nation. We believe
that the Commission will rise up to the
challenge, and leverage its terms of reference,
so as to achieve these ends.
Cowardice asks the question Is it safe?
Expediency asks the question Is it politic?
Vanity asks the question Is it popular?
But Conscience asks the question Is it right?
And there comes a time...
When one must take a position that is...
Neither safe, nor politic, nor popular...
but one must take it because it is Right.
Martin Luther King
129 128
ANNEXURES
A - LIST OF IPS MATYRS
SL

NO
NAME OF THE MARTYR
IPS OFFICERS
S/Shri
BATCH CADRE
1 G.S. Arya 1950 UP
2 L.B. Sewa 1958 A&M
3 K Panchapagesan 1974 UT
4 A.S. Atwal 1964 Punjab
5 V.K. Mehta 1971 WB
6 A.K. Arora 1984 RAJ
7 A.S. Brar 1979 Punjab
8 K.R.S. Gill 1982 Punjab
9 Sital Dass 1976 Punjab
10 Vandan Malik 1987 M/T
11 Gobind Ram 1975 Punjab
12 Daulat Singh 1976 A&M
13 R.P. Verma 1974 Bihar
14 Ajit Singh 1968 Punjab
15 K.S. Vyas 1974 A.P.
16 G. Paradesi Naidu 1987 A&M
1990
25 PK Lohia 1993 A&M
26 Jaswinder Singh 1990 Orissa
27 Mohammad Amin Bhat 1990 J&K
28 T. Harikrishna 1983 Karnatak
29 SK Deb 1973 A&M
30 Hemant Karkare 1982 Mah
31 Ashok Kamte 1989 Mah
32 Narendra Kumar 2009 MP
17 Ved Prakash 1989 Nagaland
18 Raman Prakash 1990 Gujarat
19 R.N.Hopingson 1992 M/T
20 Ravi Kant Singh 1987 A&M
21 C. Umesh Chandra 1990 AP
22 Ajay Kumar Singh 1995 Bihar
23 KC Surendra Babu 1997 Bihar
24 A.P.

Thang Thuam 1979 M/T
131 130
SERIAL

NUMBER
STATES/ UTS
NUMBER
OF CITIES
NAME OF CITIES
1 Andhra Pradesh 4
Visakhapatnam, Vijayawada,

Hyderabad, Cyberabad
2 Punjab 3 Amritsar, Jalandhar, Ludhiana
3 Gujarat 4
Baroda, Ahmedabad,

Rajkot, Surat
4 Haryana 3
Gurgaon, Faridabad,

Ambala-Panchkula
5 Karnataka 4
Bangalore City, Mysore City, Hubli-
Dharwad City, Mangalore City
6 Kerala 5
Thiruvananthapuram City, Kochi

City, Kozhikkode City, Kollam City,
Thrissur City
7 Maharashtra 10
Mumbai, Nashik, Aurangabad,

Solapur, Pune, Thane, New
Mumbai, Nagpur, Amravati,
R.Mumbai
8 Odisha 2 Bhubaneshwar, Cuttack
9 Rajasthan 2 Jaipur, Jodhpur
10 Tamil Nadu 6
Greater Chennai, Salem,
Coimbatore, Madurai, Trichy,
Tirunelveli
11 West Bengal 3
Howrah, Asansol-Durgapur,
Kolkata
12 NCT Delhi 1 NCT Delhi
TOTAL 47
B - CITIES WITH POLICE COMMISSIONER SYSTEM
(Data as on 1.1.2013, Source: Data on Police Organisation, BPR&D, 2013)
133 132
1
International data on crime and criminal justice: UN office on
Drugs and Crime 201; http://www.unodc.org/documents/
data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/International_Statistics_on_
Crime_and_Justice.pdf
2
JT 2006(12) SC225, 2006(4) KLT482 (SC), 2006(9) SCALE444,
(2006)8SCC1.
3
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 38 OF 1997 (Dr. Subramanian Swamy
v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr) with Writ Petition
(Civil) no. 21 OF 2004
4
List of cities with Police Commissionerate system may be seen at
Annexure B. Police Commissionerate system is a system envisaged
under S.8, and S.20(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
wherein all or any of the powers of the executive magistrate in
a metropolitan area, is vested in the Commissioner of Police. In
states of Haryana, Punjb and Rajasthan Police Commissionerates
have been created under the respective state police acts.
5
Community Policing, as an acceptable and effective method of
policing has been recognised and adopted in various jurisdictions
over the last three decades. In some states like Kerala, the system
has been written into the new Police legislation.
6
Out of the five National Security Advisors, two of them, including
the incumbent is an officer of the Indian Police Service, as is the
present Deputy National Security Advisor.
7
Griffiths, Percival, To Guard My People- The History of the Indian
Police, Allied Publisher, Bombay, p.88.
ENDNOTES
8
Indian Police Commission, 1860, para 18.
9
Report of the Public Service Commission, 1886, para 116-117.
10
Griffiths, p.98.
11
Griffiths, p.100.

12
Royal Commission on Superior Civil Services, p.19
13
Ibid, at p.28-31.
14
Griffith, at p.95-97.
15
First Pay Commission, 1950, para 63
16
Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol X, p.51.
17
Shiva Rao, B.(ed), The framing of Indias Constitution- A Study,
Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1968, p.711
18
Study team on recruitment, selection, Union Public Service
Commission, State Public Service Commissions, and training,
Administrative Reforms Commission, New Delhi, 1967, p.19-21.
19
Ibid at p.9.
20
Report of the Committee on Police Training, 1971, p.36
21
Ibid at p.37.
22
Report of the Third Central Pay Commission, 1973, Volume 1, p.120.
23
Report of the Committee on Recruitment Policy and Selection
Methods, 1976, p.50
24
National Police Commission, Sixth Report, March 1981, Paras
44.14, 44.15 and 44.16
25
Ibid, Paras 44.20, 44.21 and 44.22
135 134
26
Report of the Fourth Central Pay Commission, Part I, June
1986, p.212
27
The status of the implementation may be seen at http://www.
humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/aj/police/india/initiatives/
SC_Compliance_Chart_Feb_2014.pdf
(Accessed 26-07-14)
28
Crime in England and Wales 2009/10, Home Office Statistical
Bulletin 12/10, Ed. J. Flatley, C. Kershaw, K. Smith, R. Chaplin
& D. Moon, London, Home Office, July 2010
29
Independent Review of Police Officers and Staff Remuneration
and Conditions - Part I Report, Government of United Kingdom,
march 2011, Page 13
30
Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration
and Conditions Final Report, Page 537
31
Quality of life, life satisfaction and happiness in shift and non-
shiftworkers, K. Lipovcan, P. Larsen, N. Zganec, Revista de Saude
Publica 38 (2004) suppl; pages 3-10.
32
Para 2.2.17 Page 43, 6 CPC report
33
Para 2.2.13 Page 34, 6 CPC report
34
Para 1.7 page 7 6CPC
35
A Profile of Junior Rank of Karnataka Police A Survey of Their
Attitude, Behaviour, Mental Make Up and Stress Levels- December
2008 (http://media.ksp.diqtech.com/files/Survey_of_attitudes.
htm, accessed on 20/05/2014).
36
International data on crime and criminal justice: UN office
on Drugs and Crime 201; http://www.unodc.org/documents/
data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/International_Statistics_on_
Crime_and_Justice.pdf
37
Collins and Gibbs; 2003; Gisli et. al. 1985
38
Can be accessed at http://bprd.nic.in/showfile.asp?lid=1216
39
Sarason, I. G., Johnson, J. H., Berberich, J. P. and Siegel, J. M.
(1979). Helping Police Officers to Cope with Stress:
A CognitiveBehaviour Approach. American Journal of Community
Psychology, 7, 593-603.
40
Leal H. (2006) Benefits of physical fitness for police officers Texas
Police Journal; April, 2006.
41
May be accessed at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
india/43-IPS-officers-in-UP-transferred-40-times-in-their-career/
articleshow/20202799.cms
42
Umranikar, J. Y. (2009) Police Reforms in India, A Sisyphean Saga,
Functional Review of Indian Police, A step towards good
governance, AmeyaPrakashan, Pune, p. 292.
43
Kumar, B. M. (1995). Stress Profiles of Police Personnel Posted in
the Police Stations of Hyderabad City. NPA Magazine, 47(1), SVP
Hyderabad: NPA Press.
44
Nagar D. (2009) A study of occupational stress and health in
police personnel. The Indian Police Journal; Vol. LVI-No.4,
October-December.
45
Debate of Tuesday, the 29th July 1947 which can be accessed at
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol4p12.htm
46
Debate of Thursday, the 4th November 1948 which can be accessed at
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol7p1b.htm
47
This argument finds support from the second Pay Commission report
(Chapter X; Section I; Para 8; page 103) and the third Pay Commission
report Chapter 11.
137 136
48
Para 39; Chapter 11 (Page 117) of the Third Pay Commission report
49
Para42-43; Chapter 11 (Page 118) of the Third Pay Commission report
50
Para 54; Chapter 11 (Page 120) of the Third Pay Commission report
51
Para 20; Chapter 11 (Page 113) of the Third Pay Commission report
52
Para 12.9; Chapter 12 (Page 212) of the Fourth Pay Commission report
53
Para 47.30 Chapter 47(page 519) of the fifth Pay Commission report
54
Para 47.36 (i)Chapter 47(page 520) of the fifth Pay Commission report
55
There a significant number of such candidates as the table in the
following paragraph 3.7 would indicate
56
Para 47.36 (ii)Chapter 47(page 520) of the fifth Pay Commission report
57
Para 3.2.7 (Page 167) of the sixth Pay Commission report
58
Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and
Pensions, Department of Personnel and Training O.M. N0.36177194-
EO(SM-I) dated the 5th January, 1996
59
May access at http://finmin.nic.in/6cpc/6cpcdecision.pdf
60
May access at http://finmin.nic.in/6cpc/6cpcmemo.pdf
61
Para 3.3.12 page 173 6 CPC report
62
Para 47.46 page 523 of the 5
th
CPC report
63
Para 3.2.9 page 1686th CPC report
64
The education profile of the IPS Probationers who received training at
the SVP National Police Academy in the recent past has been:
65
Para 6.1.7 page No. 355 of the 6th cpc report
66
Survey on Status of the civil services in India, conducted
by the Centre for Good Governance in 2010, commissioned
by the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public
Grievances and Pensions, Department of Administrative
Reforms & Public Grievances
67
Chapter 9, para 9.3.8, page 204
68
Chapter 9, para 9.7, pages 210-11
69
Para 6.1.9 page 356 6 cpc
70
Independent Review of Police Officers and Staff
Remuneration and Conditions - Part I Report, Government
of United Kingdom, march 2011, Page 13
71
http://circulars.nic.in/WriteReadData/CircularPortal/D3/
D03ppw/pensiontable_sixthpc.pdf (Accessed on 28 July 2014)