[ G.R. No.

132529, February 02, 2001 ]

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, PETITIONER, VS. SUSAN YEE CARIO, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose
"death benefits" is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married.

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which
affirmed in toto the decision
[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.

During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao
Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.

In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November
23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total
of P146,000.00 from "MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,"
[3]
while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from
"GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS)."
[4]


On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter
alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated
as "death benefits" which she (petitioner) received from "MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig." Despite service of summons,
petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.

Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous
marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the
deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab
initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate
of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number;
[5]
and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads -
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married
in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records
of this archives.

This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose it may serve.
[6]

On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of
death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
[7]

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND
UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN
MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE.
[8]

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
[9]
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the
parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case.
[10]
In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
[11]


It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is
essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject "death benefits" of the deceased.

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage,
[12]
and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,
[13]
renders the marriage void ab initio.
[14]


In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license
requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,
[15]
the Court held that such a certification is adequate to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the
burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default
before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court
of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in
jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.

It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the
"death benefits" under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.

Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the
second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial
decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased
is, likewise, void ab initio.

One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property
regime.
[16]
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on "Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage."

Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man,
[17]
-
"... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions ..."
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and
salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or
spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
[18]


Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence
of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.

The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly
renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee
presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits.
Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever
to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said "death benefits" of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the
legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
x x x x x x x x x

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties
in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto.
[19]

Conformably, even if the disputed "death benefits" were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-
ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties
of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject "death benefits" under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her
share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children
with Susan Nicdao.

In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,
[20]

where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that:
"... [S]ince the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not
ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate
upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an
interest in the husband's share in the property here in dispute...." And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although
the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial
declaration of its nullity, "[t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half
in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage."
[21]

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.

In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,
[22]
however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of
nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to
contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said
second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties
are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case
for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a
party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid.
Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine
the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,
[23]
the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void"
in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Puno J., on official leave.


[1]
Rollo, pp. 43-47.

[2]
Rollo, pp. 49-55.

[3]
Exhibit "F", Records, p. 38.

[4]
Ibid.

[5]
Exhibit "D-1", Records, p. 36

[6]
Exhibit "E", Records, p. 37.

[7]
Rollo, p. 55.

[8]
Rollo, p. 18.

[9]
Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993].

[10]
Nial, et al., v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000.

[11]
Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra.

[12]
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
[13]
ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.

[14]
ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
x x x x x x x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;
x x x x x x x x x

[15]
236 SCRA 257, 261-262; citing the Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 29.

[16]
Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support
of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
x x x x x x x x x
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
x x x x x x x x x

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited
in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent
spouse;
x x x x x x x x x

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage
and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.
[17]
Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 233-234 (1995).

[18]
Id., p. 234.

[19]
Id., p. 230.

[20]
37 SCRA 316 [1971].

[21]
Id., p. 326.

[22]
Supra.

[23]
Supra.

[ G.R. No. 109975, February 09, 2001 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CV No. 34378, which affirmed the decision of the
Regi onal Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.
[2]
The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on
October 20, 1988.

Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978; and Eden M. Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982.
[3]
Their
birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988.

Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the house of their in-laws.
[4]
A week after the wedding,
Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again.
During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to
submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her.
[5]


On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job in Olongapo City as a
manicurist to support herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime,
[6]
and that he escaped from jail
on October 22, 1985.
[7]
A certification therefor dated February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to
date.

On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
[8]
Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the
Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17, 1990.
[9]
Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish
jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, on December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda
testified and presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness.

Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live in Olongapo City but they spend their vacations at the house
of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the
couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied Erlinda and the children.
[10]


Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to manifest in writing
whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed
submitted for decision.

In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties.
However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence.
[11]


On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's manifestation dated December 5, 1990, the trial court rendered a
decision
[12]
declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family Code, disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between
Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September 1975 to be null and void.

The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into his Book of Marriage this declaration after this decision shall have
become final and executory.

SO ORDERED."
On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered
since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence.

The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with
the evidence and the law. After requiring Erlinda to comment, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated August 21,
1991 as follows:
[13]

"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated December 27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-General. The
observation of the movant is to the effect that `Mere alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough to show psychological incapacity. Nor is
abandonment. These are common in marriage. There must be showing that these traits, stemmed from psychological incapacity existing at the time
of celebration of the marriage.'

In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife and children since 1983. The defendant, while in jail escaped and
whose present whereabouts are unknown. He failed to support his family for the same period of time, actuations clearly indicative of the failure of the
husband to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage defined and enumerated under Article 68 of the Family Code. These findings of
facts are uncontroverted.

Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and became manifest only after the marriage. In rerum natura, these
traits are manifestations of lack of marital responsibility and appear now to be incurable. Nothing can be graver since the family members are now
left to fend for themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-General, these are not common in marriage.

Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to assuage the sensibilities of the more numerous church, is a substitute for
divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in order to dissolve marriages that exist only in name.

WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED"
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO AVELINO DAGDAG NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.
[14]

On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
[15]
affirming the decision of the trial court, disposing thus:
"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because
he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the right to seek the judicial
declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of such obligations is
continously (sic) destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992
Ed., p. 46)."
[16]

Hence, the present petition for review,
[17]
filed by the Solicitor General.

The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the
Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase "psychological incapacity" and an
incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case. Respondent, in her Comment, insists that the facts constituting psychological incapacity were
proven by preponderance of evidence during trial.

At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic,
and a fugitive from justice.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides -
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the
law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another
case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
[18]


In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,
[19]
the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code:
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only
in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated
to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
[20]
as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
[21]
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."
[22]

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda
failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the
allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged.
The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely
rendered.

In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,
[23]
we affirmed the dismissal of the trial court and Court of Appeals of the petition for annulment on the
ground of dearth of the evidence presented. We further explained therein that -
"Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in
order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court
is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra.)"
[24]

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CV No. 34378 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.


[1]
Rollo, pp. 28-38.

[2]
Id. at 29.

[3]
Id. at 30-31.

[4]
TSN, December 17, 1990, p. 6; Records, p. 47.

[5]
Rollo, p. 29.

[6]
The records did not specify what crime.

[7]
Records, p. 32.

[8]
Originally, Article 39 of the Family Code provided: "Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe. However, in the case of marriage celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall
prescribe in ten years after this Code shall have taken effect." However, Republic Act No. 8533 was eventually enacted and approved on February
23, 1998, which amended Article 39 to read as follows: "Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe."

[9]
RTC Records, p. 16.

[10]
TSN, December 17, 1990, pp. 22-23.

[11]
RTC Records, p. 33.

[12]
Id. at 38-40.

[13]
Id. at 96.

[14]
Rollo, p. 10.

[15]
Id. at 28-38.

[16]
Id. at 37-38 only.

[17]
Id. at 6-26.

[18]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, 214 (1997), Padilla, J., Separate Statement.

[19]
268 SCRA 198 (1997).

[20]
Article 68, Family Code. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.

Art. 69, Family Code. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. x x x

Art. 70, Family Code. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations
shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency
or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate properties.

Art. 71, Family Code. The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be
paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.

[21]
Article 220, Family Code. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards
the following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in
keeping with their means;

(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate
their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;

(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;

(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them
from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

(6) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;

(7) To demand from them respect and obedience;

(8) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and

(9) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions
of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

Art. 225. The father and the mother shall, jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child without the
necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a
bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee
the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.

A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign
country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.

The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations
referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.

The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a
stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.

[22]
Id. at 209-213.

[23]
320 SCRA 76 (1999).

[24]
Id. at 88.

[ A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 (formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ), March 08, 2001 ]
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, INFANTA, PANGASINAN, RESPONDENT.

R E S O L U T I O N
DAVIDE JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the
instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-
Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on
12 May 1999.

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel
Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.
[1]
Four children were born out of that marriage.
[2]
On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted
another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.
[3]
When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to
know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know
that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the
benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.
[4]
According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have
advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for
lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.

On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.

For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He
therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits
[5]
of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member
of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia
Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their
families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he
agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

We find merit in the complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry
each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no
legal impediment to their marriage.
[6]

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and
sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in
their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage
null and void.
[7]
In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano's and Payao's subsisting previous marriage, as the same
was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the
Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage
bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds
true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as
husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe
the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry
each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of
the law excuses no one" has special application to judges,
[8]
who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.
[9]
And when the
law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
[10]


ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be
imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.


[1]
Annex "A" of Complaint.

[2]
Annexes "B" to "E" of Complaint.

[3]
Annex "F" of Complaint.

[4]
Attached to the Marriage Contract (Annex "F" of Complaint).

[5]
Annexes "B" and "C" of Respondent Judge's Manifestation.

[6]
DISIDERIO P. JURADO, CIVIL LAW REVIEWER 63 (1989).

[7]
Article 41, Family Code.

[8]
Espiritu v. Jovellanos, 280 SCRA 579, 589 [1997]; Vercide v. Hernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1265, 6 April 2000.

[9]
Macasasa v. Imbing, 312 SCRA 385, 395 [1999].

[10]
Madredijo v. Loyao, 316 SCRA 544, 568 [1999]; Agunday v. Tresvalles, 319 SCRA 134, 146 [1999]; Villanueva v. Almazan, A.M. No. MTJ-99-
1221, 16 March 2000.

[ G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001 ]
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, PETITIONER, VS. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void
ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.

Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City.
After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in
college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later,
the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally
resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay together - when respondent was on
vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.

It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of "psychological incapacity" to perform his marital
covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a
habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least,
minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in
the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.

Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no
longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change.
But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.

On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children. She
was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as
contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight physical
injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.

This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner
likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite.

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As respondent failed
to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion
between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence to establish that
there was collusion between the parties.

On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same, although filed late, was admitted by the court. In
his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of
the complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.

On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.

Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred, particularly, in holding that there was legal
basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. The
appellate court said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage
and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the
incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.

"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."
[1]


Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs.
Court of Appeals,
[2]
promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,
[3]
promulgated
on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the
guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of the
Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.

Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been shown
to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined in Santos.

Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.

The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained
by the Court in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase `psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's `Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting form the
Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's `Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases'). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our
law on marriage. Thus correlated, `psychological incapacity' should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of `psychological incapacity' to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."

The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim - "legis interpretado legis vim obtinet" - that the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
[4]
The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may
have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith
[5]
under
the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

The phrase "psychological incapacity," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent
enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to
the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity
on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family
[6]
that the State cherishes and
protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship,
however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.

WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.


[1]
Rollo, pp. 42-43.

[2]
240 SCRA 20

[3]
268 SCRA 198.

[4]
People vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607.

[5]
Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 285; Tanada vs. Guingona, 235 SCRA 507; Columbia Pictures, Inc., vs. Court
of Appeals, 261 SCRA 144.

[6]
See Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution.

[ G.R. No. 138322, October 02, 2001 ]
GRACE J. GARCIA, A.K.A. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, PETITIONER,VS. REDERICK A. RECIO, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision
[1]
and the March 24, 1999
Order
[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan
City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."
[3]


The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.
[4]
They lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,
[5]
a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian
government.
[6]
Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.
[7]
In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."
[8]


Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
[9]


On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
[10]
in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.
[11]
He
contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989;
[12]
thus, he was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.

On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able
to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."
[13]


Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action.
[14]
The Office of the Solicitor
General agreed with respondent.
[15]
The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.
[16]
After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.
[17]


Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It
deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage;
thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

Hence, this Petition.
[18]

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"1

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to
Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a
substantial requisite voiding the petitioner's marriage to the respondent
"3

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this
case.
"5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to
remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."
[19]


The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our
ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between
Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
[20]

petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to
establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the
place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity
of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
[21]
A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of
Articles 15
[22]
and 17
[23]
of the Civil Code.
[24]
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26
[25]
of the Family Code allows the former
to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."
[26]
A
divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.
[27]


A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that
"aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law."
[28]

Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
[29]
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11,
13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the
proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

x x x x x x x x x

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;

x x x x x x x x x"

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or
baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce,
or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.

"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the
delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall
not affect their persons."

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a written official act of an Australian family court.
Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence.
[30]
A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself.
[31]
The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
[32]


Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested
[33]
by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
[34]


The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.
[35]
However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.
[36]
The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.
[37]
Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure
to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
[38]


Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal
laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
[39]
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil
rights belonging to a citizen.
[40]
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a
foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia,
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts;
thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense
of an action."
[41]
In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer;
and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.
[42]
Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
[43]
Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
[44]
The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity
to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she
concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry
under Australian law.

Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after
marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa
et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
[45]
There is no showing in the case at
bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is
effected.
[46]


Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other
jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited
from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.
[47]


On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of
bigamy."
[48]



This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based
on Section 48, Rule 39
[49]
of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree
obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate
of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a
marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in
Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.
[50]


As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this
Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" - Complaint;
[51]
(b) Exhibit "B" -
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City,
Nueva Ecija;
[52]
(c) Exhibit "C" - Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in
Malabon, Metro Manila;
[53]
(d) Exhibit "D" - Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between
Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;
[54]
and (e) Exhibit "E" - Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;
[55]
(2)
for respondent: (a) Exhibit "1" -- Amended Answer;
[56]
(b) Exhibit "2" - Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court
of Australia;
[57]
(c) Exhibit "3" - Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;
[58]
(d) Exhibit "4" - Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in
the Family Court of Australia Certificate;
[59]
and Exhibit "5" -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J.
Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.
[60]


Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his
status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that
under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious
course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that,
then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated
January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the
ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.


[1]
Penned by Judge Feliciano V. Buenaventura; rollo, pp. 7-9.

[2]
Rollo, p. 10.

[3]
Ibid., p. 9.

[4]
Rollo, p. 37.

[5]
Ibid., p. 47.

[6]
Id., p. 44.

[7]
Id., p. 36.

[8]
Annex "1"; temporary rollo, p. 9.

[9]
The couple secured an Australian "Statutory Declaration" of their legal separation and division of conjugal assets.

See Annexes "3" and "4" of Respondent's Comment; rollo, p. 48.

[10]
Id., pp. 33-35.

[11]
Id., p. 39.

[12]
Amended Answer, p. 2; rollo, p. 39.

[13]
Id., pp. 77-78.

[14]
Id., p. 43.

[15]
Rollo, pp. 48-51.

[16]
TSN, December 16, 1998, pp. 1-8; records, pp. 172-179.

[17]
RTC Order of December 16, 1998; ibid., p. 203.

[18]
The case was deemed submitted for decision on January 11, 2000, upon this Court's receipt of the Memorandum for petitioner, signed by Atty.
Olivia Velasco-Jacoba. The Memorandum for respondent, signed by Atty. Gloria V. Gomez of Gomez and Associates, had been filed on December
10, 1999.

[19]
Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 242-243.

[20]
43 Phil. 43, 49, March 3, 1922.

[21]
Ruben F. Balane, "Family Courts and Significant Jurisprudence in Family Law," Journal of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 1
st
& 2
nd
Quarters,
2001, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, p. 25.

[22]
"ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad."

[23]
"ART. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they
are executed.

x x x x x x x x x

"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country."

[24]
Tenchaves v. Escano 15 SCRA 355, 362, November 29, 1965; Barretto Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67, 71-72, March 7, 1933.

[25]
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5), and (6), 36, 37, and 38. (71a)

"Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." (As amended by EO 227, prom.
July 27, 1987)

[26]
Cf. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., 139 SCRA 139, 143-144, October 8, 1985; and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653, 663, June 30, 1989.

[27]
Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., supra.

[28]
Ibid., p. 143.

[29]
For a detailed discussion of Van Dorn, see Salonga, Private International Law, 1995 ed. pp. 295-300. See also Jose C. Vitug, Compendium of
Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 16;

[30]
"SEC. 19. Classes of documents.--For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
"Public documents are:

"(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether
in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.

x x x x x x x x x."

[31]
Burr W. Jones, Commentaries on the Law of Evidence in Civil Cases, Vol. IV, 1926 ed., p. 3511; 3, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides
that "when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself."

[32]
"SEC. 19. Classes of documents.-- For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether
in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.

x x x x x x x x x."

[33]
"Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. - Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under
the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court."

[34]
"Sec. 24. Proof of official record.--The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office."

See also Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539, 550-551, September 25, 1998; Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 161 SCRA 122, 133-134, May 6, 1988.

[35]
The transcript of stenographic notes states that the original copies of the divorce decrees were presented in court (TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 5;
records, p. 176), but only photocopies of the same documents were attached to the records (Records, Index of Exhibits, p. 1.).

[36]
TSN, December 15, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.

[37]
TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.

[38]
People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941, 945, November 28, 1955; Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1, 3, November 10, 1908; People v. Diaz, 271 SCRA 504, 516,
April 18, 1997; De la Torre v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 196, 203-204, August 14, 1998; Maunlad Savings & Loan Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
GR No. 114942, November 27, 2000, pp. 8-9.

[39]
Art. 15, Civil Code.

[40]
Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 566.

[41]
Ricardo J. Francisco, Evidence: Rules of Court in the Philippines, second edition, p. 382.

[42]
Ibid., p. 384.

[43]
Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 119602, October 6, 2000, p. 7.

[44]
Francisco, p. 29, citing De los Angeles v. Cabahug, 106 Phil. 839, December 29, 1959.

[45]
27A CJS, 15-17, 1.

[46]
Ibid., p. 611-613, 161.

[47]
27A CJS, 625, 162.

[48]
Rollo, p. 36.

[49]
"SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.--The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

x x x x x x x x x

"(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

"In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact."

[50]
In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with the formal requirement for procuring a
marriage license. Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage
license issued without that certificate. (Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-126; Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1997
reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria Jr., Persons and Family
Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.)

[51]
Records, pp. 1-3.

[52]
Ibid., p. 4.

[53]
Id., p. 5.

[54]
Id., p. 180.

[55]
Id., pp. 170-171.

[56]
Id., pp. 84-89.

[57]
Id., pp. 181-182.

[58]
Id., pp. 40-41.

[59]
Id., p. 183.

[60]
Id., pp. 184-187.

[ G.R. No. 126010, December 08, 1999 ]
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, PETITIONER VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals, dated January 30, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.

Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite
on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A).
[2]
Three children were born to them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B),
[3]
Lyra, born on May 22,
1985 (Exh. C),
[4]
and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D).
[5]


On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to
private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing
of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting
most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with
another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private
respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was
irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be
ordered to give support to their three children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and
that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased during
the marriage, as well as the jeep which private respondent took with him when he left the conjugal home on June 12, 1992.
[6]


On October 8, 1992, because of private respondents failure to file his answer, the trial court issued an order directing the assistant provincial
prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was collusion between the parties.
[7]
Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on
November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial.
[8]


Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows:
[9]


Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmarias, Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than
private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two
consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer private respondents teacher. On January 1, 1981,
they were married.

Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition fees, while petitioner provided his allowances and other
financial needs. The family income came from petitioners salary as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented her
earnings by selling Tupperware products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron.

From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would help petitioner in her businesses by delivering
orders to customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift and had other women, petitioners business suffered. Private respondent
often had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered
two love letters written by a certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose husband was working in
Saudi Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extra-marital affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with
Villena to end her relationship with private respondent. For his part, private respondent said he would end the affairs, but he did not keep his
promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When private respondent came back, however, petitioner
accepted him, despite private respondents infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage.

Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmarias,
Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991, because he availed himself of the early retirement plan
offered by the company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount for the needs of the family, private
respondent spent the money on himself and consumed the entire amount within four months of his retirement.

While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing became worse. Petitioner
discovered that private respondent carried on relationships with different women. He had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie,
who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a Japayuki; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master Drivers School in Bayan, Dasmarias,
Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989
(Exh. E).[10] When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as a result of which she was confined
at the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F).
[11]


According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent
contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from
October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H).
[12]


Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a year old. Private
respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them.

On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J)
[13]
with F & C Realty Corporation whereby she agreed to buy from the latter a
parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26,
1987, after full payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from monthly installments, a deed of absolute sale (Exh. K)
[14]
was
executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M)
[15]
was duly issued.

According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten letter
[16]
to private respondent expressing her frustration over the fact that her
efforts to save their marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell their owner-type jeepney
[17]
and to
divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also told private respondent of her intention to file a petition for the annulment of
their marriage.

It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioners letter. By this time, he had already abandoned petitioner and their children. In
October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent left for the Middle East. Since then, private respondents whereabouts had been unknown.

Ester Alfaro, petitioners childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University, testified during the hearing on the petition for
annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979, petitioner introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the formers sweetheart. Alfaro said she
was not impressed with private respondent who was her student in accounting. She observed private respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of
his time with campus friends. In November 1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming wedding,
Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because she thought private respondent was not ready for married life as
he was then unemployed. True enough, although the couple appeared happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter that
private respondent started drinking with his friends and going home late at night. Alfaro corroborated petitioners claim that private respondent was a
habitual drunkard who carried on relationships with different women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed that petitioner
was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the first year of petitioners marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private
respondent, but the latter accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent was not close to his children and that he
had abandoned petitioner.
[18]


On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision
[19]
dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of
the decision reads:
[20]

The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) -
not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as follows:

Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;

. . . .

(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

. . . .

(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;

. . . .

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.

. . . .

If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a
marriage, has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not have been
enumerated as grounds for legal separation.

In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the
Philippines, as there is no dispute that the gonorrhea transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after
petitioners marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in
conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code, and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of
this ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment of petitioners marriage with the respondent on this ground,
as alleged and proved in the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling
in Santos v. Court of Appeals,
[21]
the Court of Appeals held:
[22]

It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage, must
exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not
grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.

We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her respondent-husband was psychologically incapacitated at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly, petitioner-appellants declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husbands
character was on the borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go-lucky, could not constitute the psychological incapacity in
contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husbands youth and very
good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened to be the college professor of her
respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant even described her respondent-husband not as a problem student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8,
1992).

The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage and there is no proof that the same have already existed at
the time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.

II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS.

III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO
PETITIONER.

IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,000.00 PER CHILD.

V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the ground of private respondents
psychological incapacity.

Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that private respondents psychological incapacity existed at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. She argues that the fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the
celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage.

Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
[23]

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,
[24]
we held:
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity
of the void marriage to be legitimate.

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and
other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be
helpful or even desirable.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, private
respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of
the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity
of a psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to
work for his family. Private respondents parents and petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling, although he eventually found a
job, he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he received on himself. For a greater part of
their marital life, private respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in
philandering, and later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondents condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their
union and defeating the very objectives of marriage.

However, private respondents alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts
are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state, and not merely due to private respondents youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As pointed out in
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:
[25]

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in
order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court
is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.
[26]
Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
[27]


We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the trial courts finding with regard to
the non-existence of private respondents psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and even finality.
[28]
Only
where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can these be overturned.

The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioners contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children,
the amount for their respective support, and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more
appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner
may bring.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.


[1]
Per Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros and concurred in by Justices Jorge S. Imperial (Chairman) and B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz.

[2]
RTC Records, p. 7.

[3]
Id., p. 8.

[4]
Id., p. 9.

[5]
Id., p. 10.

[6]
Petition, RTC Records, pp. 1-4.

[7]
RTC Records, p. 24.

[8]
Id., p. 25.

[9]
TSN, pp. 6-56, Nov. 13, 1992; pp. 3-31, Dec. 8, 1992.

[10]
RTC Records, p. 37.

[11]
Id., p. 38.

[12]
Id., pp. 39-40a.

13]
Id., pp. 41-43.

[14]
Id., pp. 44-45.

[15]
Id., p. 47.

[16]
Id., pp. 49-51.

[17]
17 Id., p. 48.

[18]
TSN, pp. 32-68, Dec. 8, 1992.

[19]
Per Acting Presiding Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero.

[20]
RTC Records, pp. 58-59.

[21]
310 Phil. 22 (1995).

[22]
Rollo, pp. 44-46.

[23]
As amended by E.O. No. 227 dated July 17, 1987.

[24]
Supra, at 40-41.

[25]
335 Phil. 664, 676-680 (1997).

[26]
See Art. II, 12; Art. XV, 1-2.

[27]
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra.

[28]
Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169 (1996).

[ G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a
marriage, namely, psychological incapacity. Since the Codes effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages
void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the
herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled -- exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration -- Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the world. Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need
to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals
[2]
in CA-G.R. CV
No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
[3]
Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church
[4]

in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a
husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that
sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from
her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couples best interest
to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that
their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridels strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after
their marriage; (2) Roridels refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridels failure to run the household and
handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;

3.That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as
of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits A to E-1. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase psychological
incapacity (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case, adding that the
appealed Decision tended to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture.

In denying the Solicitor Generals appeal, the respondent Court relied
[5]
heavily on the trial courts findings that the marriage between the parties
broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities. Then, it added its own opinion that the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter
referred to as the Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights x x x. It concluded that:
As a ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in
the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the
union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that opposing and conflicting personalities is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that
such ground is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
[6]
this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,
[7]
Justice Vitug wrote that the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be
more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconciliable differences
and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not
physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of
the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:
[8]

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of thoughtfulness and
gentleness on Reynaldos part and of being conservative, homely and intelligent on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is not indicative
of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows loves temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the
novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts in interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two
amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,
[9]
Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno,
[10]
a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which
they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Courts own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code
are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
[11]
recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are
to be protected by the state.

The Family Code
[12]
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis,
[13]
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only
in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated
to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.
[14]


Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our
law on evidence -- what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to
be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church -- while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other -- shall walk together
in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of
the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo
Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur
Padilla, J., See Separate Statement.
Romero, J., See Separate Statement.
Vitug, J., Please see Concurring opinion.


[1]
Rollo pp. 25-33.

[2]
Sixteenth Division composed of J. Segundino G. Chua, ponente and chairman; JJ. Serafin V.C. Guingona and Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring.

[3]
Presided by Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps.

[4]
Solemnized by Fr. Jesus G. Encinas.

[5]
The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion of the RTC Decision as follows:

To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his marital obligations, petitioner testified that he is immature,
irresponsible, dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, a chronic liar, and an infidel. These characteristics of respondent are based on petitioners
testimony that the former failed to be gainfully employed after he was relieved from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel sometime in
February, 1986, leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of the family. Also when they were separated in fact, respondent practically abandoned
both petitioner-mother and son except during the first few months of separation when respondent regularly visited his son and gave him a monthly
allowance of P1,000.00 for about two to four months. Respondent is likewise dependent on his parents for financial aid and support as he has no
savings, preferring to spend his money with his friends and peers. A year after their marriage, respondent informed petitioner that he bought a house
and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque for about a million pesos. They then transferred there only for the petitioner to discover a few months later that they
were actually renting the house with the respondents parents responsible for the payment of the rentals. Aside from this, respondent would also lie
about his salary and ability. And that at present, respondent is living with his mistress and their child, which fact he does not deny.

It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent turned sour if we look at the background of their relationship. During their
college days, when they were still going steady, respondent observed petitioner to be conservative, homely, and intelligent causing him to believe
then that she would make an ideal wife and mother. Likewise, petitioner fell in love with respondent because of his thoughtfulness and gentleness.
After a year, however, they decided to break their relationship because of some differences in their personalities. Almost five (5) years later, while
they were working in Manila, petitioner and respondent rekindled their love affair. They became very close and petitioner was glad to observe a more
mature respondent. Believing that they knew each other much better after two years of going steady, they decided to settle down and get married. It
would seem, therefore, that petitioner and respondent knew each other well and were then prepared for married life.

During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties cropped-up and dominated their life together. Unexpectedly on both their parts,
petitioner and respondent failed to respond properly to the situation. This failure resulted in their frequent arguments and fightings. In fact, even with
the intervention and help of their parents who arranged for their possible reconciliation, the parties could not come to terms.

It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities (sic). Neither of
them can accept and understand the weakness of each other. No one gives in and instead, blame each other for whatever problem or
misunderstanding/s they encounter. In fine, respondent cannot solely responsible for the failure of other (sic) marriage. Rather, this resulted because
both parties cannot relate to each other as husband and wife which is unique and requisite in marriage.

Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and woman with the basic objective of establishing a conjugal and family life.
(Article 1, Family Code). The unique element of permanency of union signifies a continuing, developing, and lifelong relationship between the
parties. Towards this end, the parties must fully understand and accept the (implications and consequences of being permanently) united in
marriage. And the maintenance of this relationship demands from the parties, among others, determination to succeed in their marriage as well as
heartfelt understanding, acceptance, cooperation, and support for each other. Thus, the Family Code requires them to live together, to observe
mutual (love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Failure to observe) and perform these fundamental roles of a husband and a
wife will most likely lead to the break-up of the marriage. Such is the unfortunate situation in this case." (Decision, pp. 5-8; Original Records, pp. 70-
73)

[6]
240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.

[7]
Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.

[8]
TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.

[9]
The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of the marriage tribunals of each archdiocese or diocese in the country. Aside
from heading the Appellate Tribunal, Most. Rev. Cruz is also incumbent president of the Catholic Bishop's Conferrence of the Philippines,
Archbishop of Dagupan Lingayen, and holds the degrees of Doctor of Canon Law and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was also Secretaary
General of the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines -PCP II- held from January 20, 1991 to February 17, 1991, which is the rough equivalent of
a parliament or constitutional convention in the Philippine Church, and where the ponente, who was a council member, had the privilege of being
overwhelmed by his keen mind and prayerful discernments.

[10]
Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired Minister of Justice, author, noted civil law professor and law practitioner.

[11]


ARTICLE XV

THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote
its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.

Section 3. The state shall defend;

(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and specialprotection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation
, and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income;

(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.

Section 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the state may also do so through just programs of social security."

[12]
"Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment
of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this code."

[13]
Salita vs. Magtolis 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.

[14]
This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the other hand, the text used un Santos vs. CA reads:

xxx xxx xxx

3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The differrence in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruzs Memorandum is due to the fact that the original Canon is written in Latin and both
versions are differently-worded English translations.

SEPARATE STATEMENT

PADILLA, J.:

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not
psychological incapacity exist in a given case calling for annulment of marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of
the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained,
and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of
the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is no all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual millieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

SEPARATE OPINION

ROMERO, J.:

The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling, upheld petitioner Solicitor Generals
position that opposing and conflicting personalities is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties.

In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much psychological incapacity as a difficulty, if
not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not
physical) illness.

I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of
insanity, there is a resultant defect or vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annullable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.

That the intent of the members of the U.P Law Centers Civil Code Revision Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential
nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent revisions.

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgement to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.


The twist and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.


Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature or marriage and to mentally incapacitated. It was explained that these phrases refer to defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea but lack of appreciation of ones mental obligation. There being a defect in consent, it is clear that
it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that
there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
[1]


My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lessor degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguio to use the term psychological or mental impotence, Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9,
1984 session that this term is an invention of some churchmen who are moralist but not canonist, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase and is incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented
that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the
possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and
Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.


The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special cases and special situations, hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the
Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological
in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with
the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: 3. (those who, because of causes of
psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a
properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which
entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by the Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully
into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more
strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet
unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of the civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-
in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon
Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally
inexistent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized
the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: Canon #1081 required persons to be capable according to law in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon 1087 (the force and
fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct
but related grounds for annulment, called lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due discretion means that the person did not
have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person
was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.

Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rote in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania
laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the
first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such
problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970.
Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifest themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert become increasingly important in such cases. Data about the
persons entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a
partys mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of
valid consent.

The church took no pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was
an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-
important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it
could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary
prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
[2]


Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, not only to sexual anomalies but all kinds of personality
disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage is not
merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole
of life; i.e., the right to a developing, lifelong relationship. Rotal decision since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to
accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and
that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to
fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.
[3]


Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:

The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2)
openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of
loyalty to persons or sense or moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxx xxx xxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts wether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties
inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties
incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibility and obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of
lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someones failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into.
[4]


In the instant case, opposing and conflicting personalities of the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in
Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her
husband for more than five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity.
[5]
Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable
and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.

However in the recent case of chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
[6]
this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in
declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months sleeping with his wife
never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove.
Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage, the wife brought the action in the lower court
to declare the marriage null.

The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila
(Branch I) on psychological incapacity, concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsumated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
I concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family
Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.

[1]
Justice Caguioas explanation in the Minutes of July 26, 1986 of the Civil Code Revision Committee of the U.P. Law Center.

[2]
Zwack, Joseph P., Annulment, A Step-by-Step Guide.

[3]
The Code of Canon Law, A Text and Commentary, The Canon Law Society of America, Paulist Press, New York, 1985.

[4]
Zwack, Ibid., p. 47.

[5]
G.R. No. 112019, 240 SCRA 20 (1995).

[6]
G.R. No. 119190 (1997).

CONCURRING OPINION

VITUG, J.:

I fully concur with my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he
prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 (THE FAMILY CODE of the Philippines). The
term psychological incapacity was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus-
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided bt experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decision of church tribunals which, although, not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
[1]

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law

Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those)

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage

that should give much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment.
[2]


The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in
determining the import of psychological incapacity under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other
grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or
Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that
these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.

I would wish to reiterate the Courts statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;
[3]
viz:
(T)he use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as. Likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances x x x. Article 36
of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must staned in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage.
Thus, correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharge by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code,include their mutual obligation to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. This provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
[4]



In fine, the term psychological incapacity, to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the
following test; viz:

First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;

Second, The psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume and discharge the basic marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;

Third, the psychologic conditions must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations may occur only thereafter; and

Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of
absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be an alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has
failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better; if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons
to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how
the State should regard marriage and the family, thus

Section 2, Article XV:

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution x x x.

Section 1, Article XV:

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote
its total development. (The 1987 Constitution)

The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set.
The Court has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest
such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by discharging them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on
marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a
meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

[1]
Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, quoting Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100.

[2]
In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20.

[3]
Supra.

[4]
At pages 34-35.