Oxford Logic

THE LOGIC MANUAL
foi Intioduction to Logic

:oo8/:oo
Volkei Halbach
Oxfoid
8th August :oo8
Tis text is to be used by candidates
in theii fist yeai in :oo8/:oo. Te
set text foi Liteiae Humanioies stu-
dents sitting Modeiations in :oo is
Hodgess Logic.
Content
: Sets, Relations, and Aiguments ,
:.: Sets ,
:.: Binaiy Relations ,
:., Functions :,
:. Non-Binaiy Relations :,
:., Aiguments, Validity and Contiadiction :o
:.o Syntax, Semantics and Piagmatics :
: Syntax and Semantics of Piopositional Logic :o
:.: Quotation :o
:.: Te Syntax of the Language of Piopositional Logic :8
:., Rules foi Diopping Biackets ,o
:. Te Semantics of Piopositional Logic ,,
, Foimalisation in Piopositional Logic ,o
,.: Tiuth-Functionality ,:
,.: Logical Foim ,,
,., Fiom Logical Foim to Foimal Language oo
,. Ambiguity o:
,., Te Standaid Connectives o
,.o Natuial Language and Piopositional Logic oo
Te Syntax of Piedicate Logic ,,
.: Piedicates and Quantifcation ,,
.: Te Sentences of L
2
8:
., Fiee and Bound Occuiiences of Vaiiables 8
Volker Halbach :oo8/:oo
. Notational Conventions 8o
., Foimalisation 8,
, Te Semantics of Piedicate Logic ,
,.: Stiuctuies
,.: Tiuth
,., Validity, Logical Tiuths, and Contiadictions :o,
,. Counteiexamples :o8
o Natuial Deduction ::
o.: Piopositional Logic ::o
o.: Piedicate Logic ::8
, Foimalisation in Piedicate Logic ::
,.: Adequacy ::
,.: Ambiguity :,
,., Extensionality :,o
,. Piedicate Logic and Aiguments in English :,o
8 Identity and Defnite Desciiptions :o,
8.: Qualitative and Numeiical Identity :o,
8.: Te Syntax of L
=
:oo
8., Semantics :o,
8. Pioof Rules foi Identity :,o
8., Uses of identity :,,
8.o Identity as a Logical Constant :8:
Natuial Deduction Rules :8,
vvii:ci
Te Logic Manual is a ielatively biief intioduction to logic. I have tiied to
focus on the coie topics and have neglected some issues that aie coveied
in moie compiehensive books such as Foibes (:), Guttenplan (:,),
Hodges (:oo:), Smith (:oo,), and Tennant (:o). In paiticulai, I have
tiied not to include mateiial that is inessential to Pieliminaiy Examina-
tions and Modeiations in Oxfoid. Foi vaiious topics, I could not iesist
adding footnotes ofeiing extia infoimation to the cuiious ieadei.
Logic is usually taught in one teim. Consequently, I have divided the
text into eight chapteis:
:. Sets, Relations, and Aiguments
:. Syntax and Semantics of Piopositional Logic
,. Foimalisation in Piopositional Logic
. Te Syntax of Piedicate Logic
,. Te Semantics of Piedicate Logic
o. Natuial Deduction
,. Foimalisation in Piedicate Logic
8. Identity and Defnite Desciiptions
If the ieadei wishes to iead selectively, chapteis :, constitute a self-con-
tained pait, to which Section o.: (Natuial Deduction foi piopositional
logic) can be added; and chapteis :, yield an intioduction to piedicate
logic without identity.
I have set the coie defnitions, explanations, and iesults in italics like
this. Tis might be useful foi ievision and foi fnding impoitant passages
moie quickly.
In some cases, the end of an example oi a pioof is maiked by a squaie
. Te woid if is shoit foi if and only if.
I have wiitten an Exeicises Booklet that can be used in conjunction
with this Logic Manual. It is available fiom WebLeain. Teie also some
additional teaching mateiials may be found such as fuithei examples of
pioofs in the system of Natuial Deduction.
I amindebted to colleagues foi discussions and comments on pievious
veisions of the text. In paiticulai, I would like to thank Stephen Blamey,
Paolo Ciivelli, Geofiey Feiiaii, Lindsay Judson, Ofia Magidoi, David
McCaity, Petei Millican, Alexandei Paseau, Annamaiia Schiapaielli, Se-
bastian Sequoiah-Giayson, Maik Takkai, Gabiiel Uzquiano, and David
Wiggins. I am especially giateful to Jane Fiiedman and Chiistophei von
Blow foi theii help in piepaiing the fnal veision of the Manual.
: Sets, Relations, and Aiguments
:. : si1s
Set theoiy is employed in many disciplines. As such, some acquaintance
with the most basic notions of set theoiy will be useful not only in logic,
but also in othei aieas that iely on foimal methods. Set theoiy is a vast
aiea of mathematical ieseaich and of signifcant philosophical inteiest.
Foi the puiposes of this book, the ieadei only needs to know a fiagment
of the fundamentals of set theoiy.
:
A set is a collection of objects. Tese objects may be conciete objects
such as peisons, cais and planets oi mathematical objects such as numbeis
oi othei sets.
Sets are identical if and only if they have the same members. Teiefoie,
the set of all animals with kidneys and the set of all animals with a heait
aie identical, because exactly those animals that have kidneys also have
a heait and vice veisa.
:
In contiast, the piopeity of having a heait is
usually distinguished fiom the piopeity of having kidneys, although both
piopeities apply to the same objects.
Tat a is an element of the set M can be expressed symbolically by
: Teie aie vaiious mathematical intioductions to set theoiy such as Devlin (:,),
Moschovakis (:) oi the moie elementaiy Halmos (:oo). In contiast to iigoious
expositions of set theoiy, I will not pioceed axiomatically heie.
: I have added this footnote because theie aie iegulaily piotests with iespect to this
example. Foi this example, only complete and healthy animals aie being consideied. I
have been told that planaiians (a type of fatwoims) aie an exception to the heaitkidney
iule, so, foi the sake of the example, I should exclude them as well.
: Sets, Relations, and Arguments o
writing a M. If a is an element of M, one also says that a is in M or
that M contains a.
Tere is exactly one set that contains no elements, namely, the empty
set . Obviously, theie is only one empty set, because all sets containing
no elements contain the same elements, namely none.
Teie aie vaiious ways to denote sets.
One can write down names of the elements, or other designations of
the elements, and enclose this list in curly brackets.
Te set London, Munich}, foi instance, has exactly two cities as its
elements. Te set Munich, London} has the same elements. Teiefoie,
the sets aie identical, that is:
London, Munich} = Munich, London}.
Tus, if a set is specifed by including names foi the elements in cuily
biackets, the oidei of the names between the biackets does not mattei.
Te set the capital of England, Munich} is again the same set be-
cause the capital of England is just anothei way of designating London.
London, Munich, the capital of England} is still the same set: adding
anothei name foi London, namely, the capital of England, does not add
a fuithei element to London, Munich}.
Tis method of designating sets has its limitations: sometimes one
lacks names foi the elements. Te method will also fail foi sets with
infnitely many oi even just impiactically many elements.
Above I have designated a set by the phiase the set of all animals
with a heait. One can also use the following semi-foimal expiession to
designate this set:
x x is an animal with a heait }
Tis is iead as the set of all animals with a heait. Similaily, x x is a
natuial numbei biggei than 3 } is the set of natuial numbeis biggei than 3,
and x x is blue all ovei oi x is ied all ovei } is the set of all objects that
: Sets, Relations, and Arguments ,
aie blue all ovei and all objects that aie ied all ovei.
,
:. : vi:vv vii:1ios
Te expiession is a tigei applies to some objects, but not to otheis. Teie
is a set of all objects to which it applies, namely the set x x is a tigei }
containing all tigeis and no othei objects. Te expiession is a biggei city
than, in contiast, does not apply to single objects; iathei it ielates two
objects. It applies to London and Munich (in this oidei), foi instance,
because London is a biggei city than Munich. One can also say that the
expiession is a biggei city than applies to paiis of objects. Te set of all
paiis to which the expiession is a biggei city than applies is called the
binaiy ielation of being a bigger city than oi simply the ielation of being
a bigger city than.
Tis ielation contains all paiis with objects d and e

such that d is a biggei city than e.
,
Howevei, these paiis cannot be undeistood simply as the sets d, e},
such that d is a biggei city than e, because elements of a set aie not oideied
by the set: as pointed out above, the set London, Munich} is the same
set as Munich, London}. So a set with two elements does not have a
fist oi second element. Since London is biggei than Munich, but not
vice veisa, only the paii with London as fist component and Munich as
, Te assumption that any desciiption of this kind actually desciibes a set is pioblematic.
Te so-called Russell paiadox imposes some limitations on what sets one can postulate.
See Exeicise ,.o.
By the qualifcation binaiy one distinguishes ielations applying to paiis fiom ielations
applying to tiiples and stiings of moie objects. I will ietuin to non-binaiy ielations in
Section :..
, Ofen philosopheis do not identify ielations with sets of paiis. On theii teiminology
ielations need to be distinguished fiom sets of oideied paiis in the same way piopeities
need to be distinguished fiom sets (see footnote :). In set theoiy, howevei, it is common
to iefei to sets of oideied paiis as binaiy ielations and I shall follow this usage heie.
: Sets, Relations, and Arguments 8
second component should be in the ielation of being a bigger city than,
but not the paii with Munich as fist component and London as second
component.
Teiefoie, so-called oideied-paiis aie used in set theoiy. Tey aie
difeient fiom sets with two elements. Oideied paiis, in contiast to sets
with two elements, have a fist and a second component (and no fuithei
components). Te oideied paii London, Munich has London as its fist
component and Munich as its second. Munich, London is a difeient
oideied paii, because the two oideied paiis difei in both theii fist and
second components.
o
Moie foimally, an oideied paii d, e is identical
with f , g if and only if d = f and e = g. Te oideied paii the laigest
city in Bavaiia, the laigest city in the UK is the same oideied paii as
Munich, London, because they coincide in theii fist and in theii second
component. An oideied paii can have the same object as fist and second
component: London, London, foi instance, has London as its fist and
second component. Munich, London and London, London aie two
difeient oideied paiis, because they difei in theii fist components. Since
I will not be dealing with othei paiis, I will ofen diop the qualifcation
oideied fiom oideied paii.
uiiii1io :.:. A set is a binary relation if and only if it contains only
ordered pairs.
Accoiding to the defnition, a set is a binaiy ielation if it does not
contain anything that is not an oideied paii. Since the empty set does
not contain anything, it does not contain anything that is not an oideied
paii. Teiefoie, the empty set is a binaiy ielation.
Te binaiy ielation of being a biggei city than, that is, the ielation
that is satisfed by objects d and e if and only if d is a biggei city than e is
the following set:
o Using a nice tiick, one can dispense with oideied paiis by defning the oideied paii
d, e as {{d}, {d, e}}. Te tiick will not be used heie.
: Sets, Relations, and Arguments
|London, Munich, London, Oxfoid, Munich, Oxfoid,
Paiis, Munich, . . . |
In the following defnition I will classify binaiy ielations. Latei, I shall
illustiate the defnitions by examples. Heie, and in the following, I shall
use if as an abbieviation foi if and only if .
uiiii1io :.:. A binary relation R is
(i) refexive on a set S ip for all d in S the pair d, d is an element of R,
(ii) symmetric ip for all d, e. if d, e R then e, d R,
(iii) asymmetric ip for no d, e. d, e R and e, d R,
(iv) antisymmetric ip for no two distinct d, e. d, e R and e, d R,
(v) transitive ip for all d, e, f . if d, e R and e, f R, then also
d, f R,
(vi) an equivalence relation on S ip R is refexive on S, symmetric and
transitive.
In the following I shall occasionally diop the qualifcation binaiy.
As long as they aie not too complicated, ielations and theii piopeities
such as iefexivity and symmetiy can be visualised by diagiams. Foi
eveiy component of an oideied paii in the ielation, one wiites exactly
one name (oi othei designation) in the diagiam. Te oideied paiis in the
ielation aie then iepiesented by aiiows. Foi instance, the ielation
Fiance, Italy, Italy, Austiia, Fiance, Fiance,
Italy, Italy, Austiia, Austiia}
has the following diagiam:
Fiance
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Austiia
Italy
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
Te aiiow fiom Fiance to Italy coiiesponds to the paii Fiance,

Italy, and the aiiow fiom Italy to Austiia coiiesponds to the paii Italy,
: Sets, Relations, and Arguments :o
Austiia. Te thiee loops in the diagiam coiiespond to the thiee paiis
Fiance, Fiance, Italy, Italy, Austiia, Austiia.
Since Fiance, Italy and Austiia all have such a loop attached to
them, the ielation is iefexive on the set Fiance, Italy, Austiia}. Te
ielation is not iefexive on the set Fiance, Italy, Austiia, Spain}, because
the paii Spain, Spain is not in the ielation.
Te ielation is not tiansitive. Foi tiansitivity it is iequiied that if theie
is an aiiow fioma point d to a point e and one fiom e to f in the diagiam,
then theie must be a shoitcut, that is, a (diiect) aiiow fiom d to f . In the
diagiamabove theie is an aiiowfiomFiance to Italy and an aiiowfiom
Italy to Austiia, but theie is no aiiow fiom Fiance to Austiia. Hence
the ielation is not tiansitive. If the additional paii Fiance, Austiia weie
added to the ielation, then a tiansitive ielation would be obtained.
If a ielation is symmetiic, then theie aie no one-way aiiows. Tat
is, if theie is an aiiow fiom d to e, then theie must be an aiiow back to
d fiom e. Te ielation above is not symmetiic. Foi instance, the paii
Fiance, Italy is in the ielation, but not the paii Italy, Fiance. Tat is,
in the diagiam theie is an aiiow fiom Fiance to Italy but no aiiow back
fiom Italy to Fiance.
Te ielation is also not asymmetiic. If a ielation is asymmetiic and
d, e is in the ielation, then e, d cannot be in the ielation. Te paii
Fiance, Fiance is in the ielation, but the paii with its elements ieveised,
that is, Fiance, Fiance (which happens to be the same oideied paii
again), is in the ielation as well, theieby violating the condition foi asym-
metiy.
Geneially, in the diagiam of an asymmetiic ielation theie aie only
one-way aiiows: theie is nevei an aiiow fiom an object d to an object e
and then an aiiow back fiom e to d. Tis implies that in the diagiam of
an asymmetiic ielation theie cannot be any loops, because if theie is an
aiiow fiom d to d, theie is also, tiivially, an aiiow back fiom d to d: the
veiy same aiiow.
Te ielation in the diagiam on page is antisymmetiic: in an anti-
symmetiic ielation theie must not be two difeient objects with aiiows
: Sets, Relations, and Arguments ::
in both diiections between them. Tus, antisymmetiy is the same as
asymmetiy except that in an antisymmetiic ielation elements may have
loops attached to them. In the above diagiam theie aie objects with loops,
but no two difeient objects with aiiows in both diiections between them.
Teiefoie, the ielation is antisymmetiic.
I tuin to anothei example, a ielation with the following diagiam:
Mais
Pluto
Venus
Meicuiy

Tis ielation is iefexive on the set Mais, Pluto, Venus, Meicuiy}; it is
also symmetiic. It fails to be tiansitive since diiect aiiows aie missing,
foi instance, fiom Mais to Venus. Te ielation is not asymmetiic oi
antisymmetiic since theie aie paiis of objects such as Mais and Meicuiy
that have aiiows going back and foith between them .
Both ielations discussed so fai aie not equivalence ielations, as they
aie not tiansitive.
Te ielation has some peculiai piopeities: its diagiamis empty. It is
iefexive on the empty set , but on no othei set. It is symmetiic, as theie
is no aiiow foi which theie is not any aiiow in the opposite diiection.
But it is also asymmetiic and antisymmetiic because theie is no aiiow
foi which theie is an aiiow in the opposite diiection. is also tiansitive.
Consequently, is an equivalence ielation on .
Te ielation with the diagiam below is not iefexive on the set with
the two elements Ponte Vecchio and Eifel Towei, because theie is no loop
attached to Eifel Towei.
Eifel Towei

Ponte Vecchio
Te ielation is symmetiic, but not asymmetiic oi antisymmetiic. It is

also not tiansitive: theie is an aiiow fiom Eifel Towei to Ponte Vecchio
and an aiiow back fiom Ponte Vecchio to Eifel Towei, but theie is no
shoitcut fiom Eifel Towei diiectly to Eifel Towei, that is, theie is no
loop attached to Eifel Towei.
Now I tuin to a ielation that cannot easily be desciibed by a diagiam
oi by listing the paiis in the ielation, namely to the ielation that obtains
between peisons d and e if and only if d is at least as tall as e, that is, the
ielation that contains exactly those paiis d, e such that d is at least as
tall as e. Tis ielation is iefexive on the set of all peisons because eveiy
peison is at least as tall as themselves. Te ielation is not symmetiic: I am
tallei than my biothei, so I am at least as tall as he is, but he is not at least
as tall as I am. Tus the paii Volkei Halbach, Volkei Halbachs biothei
is an element of the ielation, while Volkei Halbachs biothei, Volkei
Halbach is not an element of the ielation. Te ielation is tiansitive: if d
is at least as tall as e and e is at least as tall as f , then suiely d is at least
as tall as f . Since the ielation is not symmetiic it is not an equivalence
ielation.
Te ielation of loving contains exactly those oideied paiis d, e such
that d loves e. Tis ielation is piesumably not iefexive on the set of all
peisons: some people do not love themselves. Much giief is caused by the
fact that this ielation is not symmetiic, and the foitunate cases of mutual
love show that the ielation is also not asymmetiic oi antisymmetiic. It
cleaily fails to be tiansitive: theie aie many cases in which d loves e and
e loves f , but in many cases d does not love his oi hei iival f .
Te ielation of not having the same hair colour is the set containing
exactly those paiis d, e such that d does not have the same haii coloui
as e. Tis ielation is suiely not iefexive on the set of all peisons, but
it is symmetiic: if ds haii coloui is difeient fiom es haii coloui, then
suiely es haii coloui is difeient fiom ds haii coloui. Te ielation fails to
be tiansitive: my haii coloui is difeient fiom my biotheis haii coloui
and his haii coloui is difeient fiom mine. If the ielation weie tiansitive,
then I would have a haii coloui that difeis fiom my own haii coloui.
Moie foimally, the paiis Volkei Halbach, Volkei Halbachs biothei and
Volkei Halbachs biothei, Volkei Halbach aie in the ielation, while
: Sets, Relations, and Arguments :,
Volkei Halbach, Volkei Halbach is not. Tis example illustiates again
that in the defnition of tiansitivity it is not piesupposed that d must be
difeient fiom f .
Te ielation of being boin on the same day is iefexive on the set of
all peisons; it is also symmetiic and tiansitive. Tus it is an equivalence
ielation on the set of all peisons.
I will now tuin to anothei veiy impoitant kind of ielation. It is so
impoitant that it deseives a section of its own.
:. , iUc1ios
uiiii1io :.,. A binary relation R is a function ip for all d, e, f . if
d, e R and d, f R then e = f .
Tus a ielation is a function if foi eveiy d theie is at most one e such
that d, e is in the ielation.
In the diagiam of a function theie is at most one aiiow leaving fiom
any point in the diagiam. In oidei to illustiate this, I will considei the
function with the following oideied paiis as its elements: Fiance, Paiis,
Italy, Rome, England, London, and the United Kingdom, London.
Te function has the following diagiam:
Fiance

Paiis
Italy

Rome
England

London
the United Kingdom
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
In this diagiam, theie aie aiiows fiom Fiance, Italy, England, and
the United Kingdom. Te set containing Fiance, Italy, England and the
: Sets, Relations, and Arguments :
United Kingdom is called the domain of the function. Te names of the
thiee cities ieceive aiiows; the set of these thiee cities is called the iange
of the function.
uiiii1io :..
(i) Te domain of a function R is the set d. there is an e such that
d, e R}.
(ii) Te range of a function R is the set e. there is a d such that d, e
R}.
(iii) R is a function into the set M if and only if all elements of the range
of the function are in M.
Te elements of the domain seive as inputs oi aiguments of the
function; the elements of the iange aie outputs oi values.
In the above example the set containing Fiance, Italy, England and the
United Kingdom is the domain of the function, while the set with Paiis,
Rome and London as its elements is the iange. Accoiding to (iii) of the
above defnition, the function is a function into the set of all Euiopean
cities, foi instance.
uiiii1io :.,. If d is in the domain of a function R one writes R(d} for
the unique object e such that d, e is in R.
Te ielation containing all paiis d, e such that d has e as a biological
mothei is a function: if d has e as biological mothei and d has f as
biological mothei, then e and f must be identical. Its domain is the set
of all people and animals, its iange the set of all female animals with
ofspiing.
In contiast, the ielation containing all paiis d, e such that d is the
biological mothei of e is not a function: my biothei and I have the same
biological mothei, yet we aie not identical.
:. o-vi:vv vii:1ios
Te ielations I have consideied so fai aie binaiy; they containonly oideied
paiis. Expiessions such as d loves e expiess binaiy ielations; the expies-
sion d loves e expiesses the ielation that contains exactly those oideied
paiis d, e such that d loves e. In contiast, the expiession d piefeis e
ovei f expiesses a teinaiy (3-place) ielation iathei than a binaiy one. In
oidei to deal with teinaiy ielations, oideied tiiples (oi tiiples foi shoit)
aie used. Tiiples aie veiy much like oideied paiis.
A triple d, e, f is identical with a triple g, h, i if and only if they
agree in the frst, second and third component, respectively, that is, if and
only if d = g, e = h and f = i.
,
Ternary relations are sets containing only triples.
Besides oideied paiis and tiiples theie aie also quadiuples and so on.
Tis canbe geneialisedto evenhighei aiities n: an n-tuple d
I
, d
2
, . . . , d
n
has n components. An n-tuple d

I
, d
2
, . . . , d
n
andan n-tuple e
I
, e
2
, . . . , e
n
aie identical if and only if d

I
= e
I
and d
2
= e
2
and so on up to d
n
= e
n
.
Now n-tuples allow one to deal with n-place ielations:
An n-place relation is a set containing only n-tuples. An n-place rela-
tion is called a relation of arity n.
Foi instance, theie is the ielation that contains exactly those 3-tuples
d, e, f , g, h such that d killed e with f in g with the help of h. Tis is
a 3-aiy ielation, which, foi instance, contains among otheis the 3-tuple
Biutus, Caesai, Biutus knife, Rome, Cassius.
I also allow I-tuples as a special case. I stipulate that d is simply
d itself. Tus a I-place oi unaiy ielation is just some set.
, As has been iemaiked in footnote o above, one can defne oideied paiis as ceitain sets.
Similaily one can defne the tiiple d, e, f using oideied paiis as d, e, f . So in the
end only sets aie needed.
:. , :vcUmi1s, v:iiui1v :u co1v:uic1io
In logic usually sentences aie taken as the objects that can be tiue oi false.
Of couise not eveiy sentence of English can be tiue oi false: a command
oi a question is neithei tiue noi false.
Sentences that are true or false are called declarative sentences. In what
follows I will focus exclusively on declarative sentences. I will ofen diop
the iestiiction declaiative, because I will be conceined exclusively with
declaiative sentences.
Whethei a sentence is tiue oi not may depend on who is utteiing the
sentence, who is addiessed, wheie it is said and vaiious othei factois. Te
sentence I amVolkei Halbach is tiue when I say it, but the same sentence
is false when utteied by you, the ieadei. It is iaining might be tiue in
Oxfoid but false in Los Angeles at the same time. So the tiuth of the
sentence depends paitly on the context, that is, on the speakei, the place,
the addiessee and so on. Dealing with contexts is tiicky and logicians
have developed theoiies about how the context ielates to the tiuth of a
sentence. I will tiy to use examples wheie the context of utteiance does
not ieally mattei, but foi some examples the context will mattei. Even in
those cases, what I am going to say will be coiiect as long as the context
does not shif duiing the discussion of an example. Tis will guaiantee
that a tiue sentence cannot become false fiom one line to the othei.
We ofen diaw conclusions fiom ceitain sentences, and a sentence
is ofen said to follow fiom oi to be a consequence of ceitain sentences.
Woids like theiefoie, so, oi hence, oi phiases such as it follows that
ofen maik a sentence that is supposed to follow fiom one oi moie sen-
tences. Te sentences fiom which one concludes a sentence aie called
piemisses, the sentence, which is claimed to be suppoited by the pie-
misses is called conclusion. Togethei piemisses and conclusion foim an
aigument.
uiiii1io :.o. An argument consists of a set of declarative sentences (the
premisses) and a declarative sentence (the conclusion) marked as the con-
cluded sentence.
Teie is no iestiiction on how the conclusion is maiked as such.
Expiessions like theiefoie oi so may be used foi maiking the conclusion.
Ofen the conclusion is found at the end of an aigument. Te conclusion,
howevei, may also be stated at the beginning of an aigument and the
piemisses, pieceded by phiases such as this follows fiom oi foi, follow
the conclusion.
In an aigument theie is always exactly one conclusion, but theie may
be aibitiaiily many piemisses; theie may be even only one piemiss oi no
piemiss at all.
Te following is an aigument with the single piemiss Zeno is a toi-
toise and the conclusion Zeno is toothless.
Zeno is a toitoise. Teiefoie Zeno is toothless.
A biologist will piobably accept that the conclusion follows fiom the pie-
miss Zeno is a toitoise, as he will know that toitoises do not have teeth.
Tat the conclusion follows fiom the piemiss depends on a ceitain biolog-
ical fact. Tis assumption can be made explicit by adding the piemiss that
toitoises aie toothless. Tis will make the aigument convincing not only
to biologists but also to people with no biological knowledge at all. Te
biologist, if piompted foi a moie explicit veision of the aigument, would
piobably iestate the aigument with the additional piemiss on which he
may have implicity ielied all along:
Zeno is a toitoise. All toitoises aie toothless. Teiefoie Zeno
is toothless.
Now no special knowledge of the subject mattei is iequiied to see that
the conclusion follows fiom the piemisses. Te conclusion follows fiom
the two piemisses puiely foimally oi logically: the conclusion is a conse-
quence of the piemisses independently of any subject-specifc assump-
tions. It does not mattei who Zeno is, what toitoises aie, what being
toothless is, oi which objects the aigument is thought to be about.
: Sets, Relations, and Arguments :8
In this aigument the conclusion follows fiom the piemisses indepen-
dently of what the piemisses and conclusion aie about. Whatevei they
aie taken to be about, in whatevei way the subject-specifc teims aie
(ie-)inteipieted, the conclusion will be tiue if the piemisses aie. Aigu-
ments of this kind aie called logically valid oi foimally valid. Tus
in a logically valid aigument the conclusion follows fiom the piemisses
independently of the subject mattei.
cu:v:c1ivis:1io :., (iocic:i v:iiui1v). An argument is logically
valid if and only if there is no interpretation under which the premisses are
all true and the conclusion is false.
8
In paiticulai, if all teims aie inteipieted in the standaid way, then,
accoiding to Chaiacteiisation :.,, the conclusion is tiue if the piemisses
aie tiue. Tus the conclusion of a logically valid aigument is tiue if the
piemisses aie tiue.
Te notion of an inteipietation employed in Chaiacteiisation :.,
needs some claiifcation: An inteipietation will assign meanings to the
subject-specifc teims such as Zeno, toitoise, and iiidium. It will also
deteimine which objects the aigument is taken to be about. Te logical
teims, that is, the subject-independent teims, such as all aie not subject
to any (ie-)inteipietation. Tese logical teims belong to the foim of the
aigument and they aie not afected by inteipietations.
In latei chapteis I shall piovide an exact defnition of inteipietations
oi stiuctuies, as I shall call them in the case of foimal languages. Tese
foimal accounts of logical validity can also be seen as attempts to elucidate
the notion of logical validity in natuial languages such as English at least
foi those paits of English that can be tianslated into the foimal languages.
Accoiding to the above chaiacteiisation of logical validity, the mean-
ings of the subject-specifc teims do not mattei foi the logical validity
of the aigument. Tus, one can ieplace these teims by othei teims and
8 A piecise and infoimative defnition of the logical validity of an aigument is not so easy
to give. Sainsbuiy (:oo:, chaptei :) piovides an ciitical intioductoiy discussion.
theieby obtain a logically valid aigument again. Te following aigument
has been obtained fiom the aigument about Zeno by such a substitution
of nonlogical, that is, subject-specifc teims:
Iiidium is a metal. All metals aie chemical elements. Teie-
foie iiidium is a chemical element.
Both the aigument about Zeno and the aigument about iiidium have the
same pattein; they shaie the same foim. Te conclusion follows fiom the
piemisses solely in viitue of the foim of the aigument. Tis is the ieason
foi calling such aiguments foimally valid.
Te notion of logical oi foimal validity is occasionally contiasted with
othei, less stiict notions of validity, undei which moie aiguments come
out as valid. Some aiguments in which the tiuth of the piemisses does
guaiantee the tiuth of the conclusion aie not foimally valid. Heie is an
example:
Hagen is a bacheloi. Teiefoie Hagen is not maiiied.
In this aigument the conclusion is bound to be tiue if the piemiss is tiue,
but it is not logically oi foimally valid, that is, valid in viitue of its foim.
Hagen is not maiiied follows fiom Hagen is a bacheloi in viitue of the
meaning of the woid bacheloi, which is subject-specifc.
Also, aiguments in which the piemisses do not guaiantee the tiuth of
the conclusion aie ofen called valid. Heie is an example:
All emeialds obseived so fai have been gieen. Teiefoie all
emeialds aie gieen.
Te piemiss may suppoit the conclusion in some sense, but it does not
guaiantee the tiuth of the conclusion. Such aiguments as the aigument
above aie said to be inductively valid. In logically valid arguments, in
contrast, the truth of the premisses guarantees the truth of the conclusion.
Logically valid arguments, are also called deductively valid.
In this book I will focus on logical validity and not considei othei, less
stiingent kinds of validity. Teiefoie, I shall ofen diop the specifcation
logical oi foimal: validity will always be undeistood as logical validity.
Teie aie good ieasons to focus on logically valid aiguments. Philoso-
pheis ofen suppiess piemisses in aiguments because they think that
these piemisses aie too obvious to state. Howevei, one philosopheis
obvious piemiss can be anothei philosopheis veiy contentious piemiss.
Tiying to make an aigument logically valid foices one to make all hidden
assumptions explicit. Tis may uneaith piemisses that aie not obvious
and uncontioveisial at all. Also, theie is usually not a unique way to
add piemisses to iendei an aigument logically valid, and it may iemain
contioveisial which piemisses weie implicitly assumed by the oiiginal
authoi, oi whethei he ielied on any implicit piemisses at all. At any iate,
if an aigument is foimally valid, then the validity does not iely on any
potentially contioveisial subject-specifc assumptions: all the assump-
tions needed to establish the conclusion will be explicitly laid out foi
inspection.
Tis is not to say that logical validity is always obvious: all iequiied
piemisses may have been made explicit, but it might not be obvious that
the conclusion follows fiom the piemisses, that is, one might not be able
to see easily that the aigument is logically valid. Chaiacteiisation :., of
logical validity does not demand an obvious connection between the
piemisses and the conclusion that is easy to giasp. Almost all of the
examples of logically valid aiguments consideied in this book aie toy
examples wheie it will be faiily obvious that they aie logically valid, but
showing that an aigument is logically valid can be extiemely dimcult.
Mathematicians, foi instance, aie mainly conceined with establishing
that ceitain sentences (theoiems) follow fiom ceitain piemisses (axioms),
that is, with showing that ceitain aiguments aie logically valid. Of couise
one can tiy to bieak up valid aiguments into chains of shoit and obvious
steps. In Chaptei o this task is taken up and a foimal notion of pioof is
developed.
A valid aigument need not have a tiue conclusion. In the following
example the non-logical teims of the logically valid aigument about Zeno
(oi iiidium) have been ieplaced in such a way as to make the conclusion
false:
Watei is a metal. All metals aie chemical elements. Teiefoie
watei is a chemical element.
Although the conclusion Watei is a chemical element is false, the aigu-
ment is logically valid: the conclusion still follows fiom the piemisses.
In a logically valid aigument the conclusion may be false as long as at
least one piemiss is false. In this case Watei is a metal is false. Teiefoie,
one cannot iefute the validity of an aigument by meiely pointing out a
false conclusion. If the conclusion of an aigument is false, then eithei at
least one of the piemisses is false oi the aigument is not logically valid
(oi both).
So fai I have used only one aigument foim (aigument pattein) in my
examples. Heie is an aigument of a difeient pattein:
Eithei CO
2
-emissions aie cut oi theie will be moie foods. It
is not the case that CO
2
-emissions aie cut. Teiefoie theie
will be moie foods.
Te aigument is logically valid accoiding to Chaiacteiisation :., of logi-
cally valid aiguments since the validity of the aigument does not depend
on the subject-specifc teims such as CO
2
-emissions and foods. Te
validity of the aigument depends on the logical teims eithei . . . oi . . .
and it is not the case that . . . .
In the aigument about Zeno I could ieplace vaiious teims, but not
complete sentences. In the piesent example one can ieplace entiie sen-
tences. In this case the aigument will still be valid afei ieplacing the
sentences CO
2
-emissions aie cut and Teie will be moie foods with
some othei sentences. Te pattein of the valid aigument is a pattein of
whole sentences. Valid aiguments of this kind aie said to be pioposi-
tionally valid. Tus an aigument is piopositionally valid if and only if
theie is no (ie-)inteipietation of the sentences in the aigument such that
all piemisses aie tiue and yet the conclusion is false. Tese patteins of
piopositionally valid aiguments aie studied in sentential oi piopositional
logic. Piopositional validity will be tieated in Chapteis : and ,.
Te aigument about Zeno can be adequately analysed in piedicate
logic only, and not in piopositional logic. Piedicate logic is based on
piopositional logic; fiom the technical point of view it is a iefnement of
piopositional logic. Tus I shall stait with piopositional logic and then
move on to piedicate logic.
Te notion of consistency is closely ielated to the notion of validity.
cu:v:c1ivis:1io :.8 (cosis1icv). A set of sentences is consistent if
and only if there is a least one interpretation under which all sentences of
the set are true.
Te negation of a sentence is obtained by wiiting It is not the case
that in fiont of the sentence (in English theie aie vaiious stylistically
moie elegant ways to expiess negation). A sentence is false if and only if
its negation is tiue.
Foi a valid aigument theie is no inteipietation undei which the pie-
misses aie all tiue and the conclusion is false. Tus, foi a valid aigument
theie is no inteipietation undei which the piemisses aie all tiue and the
negation of the conclusion is also tiue. Tus, if an aigument is valid, the
set obtained by adding the negation of the conclusion to the piemisses is
inconsistent; and if the set obtained by adding the negation of the conclu-
sion to the piemisses is inconsistent, then theie is no inteipietation undei
which all sentences of that set aie tiue, and, consequently, theie is no
inteipietation undei which all the piemisses aie tiue and the conclusion
is false. Hence one can defne validity in teims of consistency:
An aigument is valid if and only if the set obtained by adding
the negation of the conclusion to the piemisses is inconsis-
tent.
I have not imposed any iestiictions on the numbei of piemisses in
an aigument. In paiticulai, theie may be no piemisses at all. Aiguments
with no piemisses may still be logically valid. Te following aigument
does not have any piemisses but only a conclusion:
All metaphysicians aie metaphysicians.
Te sentence is tiue, and it is tiue foi any inteipietation of metaphysician,
which is the only non-logical, subject-specifc teimin the sentence. Teie-
foie, theie is no inteipietation undei which all piemisses aie tiue (theie
is none) and the conclusion is false. Teiefoie, the aigument is logically
valid. Te conclusion of a logically valid aigument with no piemisses is
also called logically tiue oi logically valid.
cu:v:c1ivis:1io :. (iocic:i 1vU1u). A sentence is logically true if
and only if it is true under any interpretation.
Teie aie also sentences that cannot be made tiue by any inteipieta-
tion. Tese sentences aie called logically false. Tey aie called contia-
dictions.
cu:v:c1ivis:1io :.:o (co1v:uic1io). Asentence is a contradiction
if and only if it is false under any interpretation.
If a sentence A follows logically fiom a sentence B and B follows
logically fiom A, that is, if the aigument with Aas its only piemiss and
B as conclusion, and the aigument with B as piemiss and Aas conclusion,
aie logically valid, then the sentences A and B aie logically equivalent.
Accoiding to Chaiacteiisation :.,, the aigument with A as piemiss and B
as conclusion and the aigument with B as piemiss and Aas conclusion
aie both logically valid if and only if A and B aie tiue undei the same
inteipietations:
cu:v:c1ivis:1io :.:: (iocic:i iqUiv:iici). Sentences are logically
equivalent if and only if they are true under exactly the same interpreta-
tions.
:. o sv1:x, sim:1ics :u vv:cm:1ics
In the following chapteis I will examine foimal languages. Tese lan-
guages aie in many iespects much less complicated than natuial languages
such as English oi Geiman. Tey aie intended to miiioi ceitain piop-
eities of natuial languages. Some philosopheis conceive of these foimal
languages as models foi natuial languages.
Usually, in analysing eithei natuial oi foimal languages one distin-
guishes thiee aspects of a language: syntax, semantics and piagmatics.
In oidei to use a language competently, one must mastei all thiee aspects
of it.
Syntax is conceined with the expiessions of a language baie of theii
meanings. In the syntax of a language it is specifed what the woids oi
sentences of the language aie. In geneial, the giammai of a language
belongs to the syntax of that language, and ofen syntax is identifed with
giammai. In oidei to use the language competently, one must know the
giammai of the language. In paiticulai, one must know how to foim
sentences in the language.
Semanticssemantics may be desciibed as the study of the meanings
of the expiessions of a language. Cleaily, to use a language one must not
only know what the woids and the sentences of the language aie; one
must also know what they mean.
Te expiession Im Mondschein hockt auf den Gibein eine wild
gespenstische Gestalt is a well-foimed Geiman declaiative sentence. In
a syntactic analysis of that sentence one may iemaik that hockt is a veib
in piesent tense, and so on. All this is meiely syntactic infoimation; it
does not tell one anything about the meaning of that sentence. In oidei
to undeistand the sentence, you need infoimation about meaning. Foi
instance, it is a semantic fact of Geiman that im Mondschein means in
the moonlight.
Te tiichotomy was intioduced by Moiiis (:,8).
Te thiid component, piagmatics, will not be studiedheie. Piagmatics
is, ioughly speaking, the study of language in use. Assume John calls
Maiy and asks hei whethei she wants to come along to the cinema. She
ieplies, I am ill. Obviously, John should not expect Maiy to come along,
but the sentence I am ill does not mean the same thing as I dont want
to come along to the cinema; the foimei sentence only says something
about Maiys health. But utteied by Maiy in this paiticulai situation, the
sentence I am ill, spoken by Maiy, conveys the infoimation that she will
not join John. Tus, John needs piagmatics in oidei to undeistand that
Maiy is not going to come along. Puie semantics would not tell him.
: Syntax and Semantics of Piopositional Logic
In this section I shall intioduce the language of piopositional logic. All
othei foimal languages that will be discussed in this manual aie based on
the language of piopositional logic.
Befoie intioducing the syntax of this language I will biiefy outline a
method foi talking emciently about the expiessions of a language and foi
desciibing the syntax of a language. Te method is by no means specifc
to the language of piopositional logic.
:. : qUo1:1io
By enclosing an expiession in quotation maiks one can talk about that
expiession. Using quotation maiks one can say, foi instance, that A is
the fist lettei of the alphabet and that Gli enigmi sono tie is an Italian
sentence. Te quotation of an expiession is that veiy expiession enclosed
in quotation maiks.
:
Quotation maiks allow one to designate single expiessions. Desciib-
ing the syntax of a language usually makes it necessaiy to talk about a
laige oi infnite numbei of expiessions. Foi instance, one would like to
be able to state that one can constiuct new sentences in English by com-
bining sentences using and (ignoiing capitalisation and punctuation).
: Cappelen and LePoie (Spiing :oo,) piovide an oveiview of the intiicacies of quotation
and of pioposed theoiies. A classical text on quotation is Quine (:o).
: Syntax and Semantics of Propositional Logic :,
Logicians would expiess that geneial claim by saying the following:
(:u) If and aie English sentences then and is an
English sentence.
It is iaining is an English sentence. If one takes It is iaining as both
and in the above iule, then the iule says that It is iaining and it is
iaining is also an English sentence (again we ignoie the absence of the
full stop and the missing capitalisation). One can then use It is iaining
and it is iaining as again and It is iaining as to conclude fiom the
iule that also It is iaining and it is iaining and it is iaining is an English
sentence. In this way one can constiuct longei and longei sentences and
theie is no limit to the iteiations.
I think that (:u) is faiily stiaightfoiwaid and should be easy to
undeistand. Teie is, howevei, something puzzling about it as well: the
pait of (:u) claiming that and is an English sentence is decidedly
not about the expiession in quotation maiks. Te letteis and aie
Gieek letteis, and the expiession with as fist symbol, followed by a
space, followed by and and anothei space, followed by , is defnitely
not an English sentence. Only once and aie ieplaced by English
sentences does and become an English sentence.
Te Greek letters used in this way are metavariables or metalinguistic
variables.
Tus, the above iule may also be expiessed in the following way:
AnEnglishsentence followedby and (inspaces) andanothei
oi the same English sentence is also an English sentence.
Tis way of iephiasing (:u) does not iely on quotation maiks but on
talking about expiessions following one anothei. Tis method is peihaps
safei than using (:u) with its quotation maiks and metavaiiables, but it
is also moie cumbeisome when applied to intiicate giammatical iules.
Tus, I will piesent defnitions in the style of (:u) iathei than talking
about expiessions following one anothei.
: Syntax and Semantics of Propositional Logic :8
Logicians haidly evei use the expiessions of foimal languages in
the way they use the expiessions of theii mothei tongue, but they ofen
talk and wiite about the expiessions of these foimal languages. Since
the expiessions of the foimal languages they aie conceined with difei
fiom expiessions of English, logicians usually diop the quotation maiks.
Instead of saying
(P (QR}} is a sentence of the language of piopositional
logic
they say,
(P (QR}} is a sentence of the language of piopositional
logic.
I will follow this convention and usually diop quotation maiks aiound
the expiessions of foimal languages in this manual. Tis also applies to
expiessions containing metavaiiables.
:. : 1ui sv1:x oi 1ui i:cU:ci oi vvovosi1io:i iocic
Now I can desciibe the syntax of the language L
I
of piopositional logic.
uiiii1io :.: (si1ici ii11ivs). P, Q, R, P
I
, Q
I
, R
I
, P
2
, Q
2
, R
2
, P
3
,
Q
3
, R
3
, and so on are sentence letters.
Using metavaiiables I will defne the notion of a sentence of the lan-
guage L
I
of piopositional logic.
uiiii1io :.: (si1ici oi L
I
).
(i) All sentence letters are sentences of L
I
.
(ii) If and are sentences of L
I
, then , ( }, ( }, ( }
and ( } are sentences of L
I
.
(iii) ôthing else is a sentence of L
I
.
Given what I have said about metavaiiables, (ii) implies that ( }
becomes a sentence of the language of piopositional logic when the Gieek
: Syntax and Semantics of Propositional Logic :
letteis and have been ieplaced by sentences of the language of
piopositional logic. Te Gieek letteis and themselves aie not
expiessions of the language L
I
.
As I explained on page :,, I could have foimulated pait (ii) of Defni-
tion :.: without using the metavaiiables and by expiessing (ii) in
the following way:
Te negation symbol followed by a sentence of L
I
is again a
sentence of L
I
. Te symbol ( followed by a sentence of L
I
,
followed by the symbol (oi , , ), followed by a
sentence (not necessaiily distinct fiomthe fist one), followed
by the symbol }, is a sentence of L
I
.
I hope that (ii) is not only shoitei but also easiei to giasp.
Te last clause in Defnition :.: says that only expiessions one can
obtain by using clauses (i) and (ii) aie sentences. Veiy ofen this last clause
is omitted and the clauses (i) and (ii) aie implicitly taken to be the only
means of aiiiving at sentences. At vaiious points in this manual I will
piovide defnitions that aie similai to Defnition :.:. In those cases I will
diop the analogues of clause (iii) foi the sake of simplicity.
Logicians also say the negation of iathei than . In this termi-
nology, is the negation of , and similarly ( } is the conjunction of
and , and is the disjunction of and . Te sentence (P Q},
foi instance, is the negation of (P Q}.
ix:mvii :.,. Te following expiessions aie sentences of the language L
I
:
((P P} Q
436
},
(R (P (P
3
Q
4
}}},
((P Q
4
} P}.
In the next example I show how to piove that the last sentence above
is indeed a sentence of L
I
.
ix:mvii :.. By Defnition :.:(i), P is a sentence of L
I
. Tus, by (ii),
P is also a sentence of L
I
. By (i) again, Q
4
is a sentence of L
I
. By (ii) and
: Syntax and Semantics of Propositional Logic ,o
by what has been said so fai, (PQ
4
} is a sentence, and by (ii) again and
by what has been said so fai, ((P Q
4
} P} is also a sentence of L
I
.
Te symbols , , , , are called connectives. Tey ioughly coi-
iespond to the English expiessions not, and, oi, if . . . , then . . . and if
and only if , iespectively.
name in English symbol alternative
used here symbols
conjunction and ., &
disjunction or +, v
negation it is not the ,
case that
arrow if . . . then ,
(material
implication,
conditional)
double arrow, if and only if ,
(biconditional
material
equivalence)
Te names in biackets and the symbols in the iightmost column aie used
by some othei authois; they will not be used heie.
Te expiessions in the in English column indicate how the connec-
tives aie commonly iead, iathei than theii piecise meanings.
:. , vUiis iov uvovvic vv:cxi1s
A sentence with many biackets can be confusing. Foi convenience I shall
employ ceitain iules foi diopping biackets. Tese iules aie not ievisions
of the defnition of a sentence and they do not foim pait of the omcial
syntax of the language L
I
of piopositional logic. Tese iules aie meie
conventions that allow one to wiite down abbieviations of sentences
instead of the sentences themselves in theii omcial foim.
: Syntax and Semantics of Propositional Logic ,:
Most logicians employ at least some of these iules. Foi instance, haidly
anyone wiites (P Q} instead of P Q. Tis, then, is the fist iule:
vv:cxi1ic covi1io :. Te outer brackets may be omitted from a
sentence that is not part of another sentence.
Foi instance, one may wiite P (Q P} instead of (P (Q P}}.
Howevei, this convention does not allow one to diop any biackets fiom
(P (Q P}}, because the sentence (P (Q P}} is wiitten heie as
a pait of the sentence (P (Q P}}.
Heie a waining is in oidei: Te syntactic defnitions in Section :.:
apply to L
2
-sentences but not to theii abbieviations. Foi instance, I have
defned the negation of the sentence as . Now one might think that
P Q is the negation of P Q. Tis is not the case, howevei. P Q is
shoit foi (P Q} accoiding to Convention :; and the negation of (P Q}
is (P Q} and not P Q, which is shoit foi (P Q}.
vv:cxi1ic covi1io :. Te inner set of brackets may be omitted
froma sentence of the form((}}. An analogous convention applies
to .
One may abbieviate ((P Q
2
} P
2
} as (P Q
2
} P
2
by Conven-
tion :, and then one may also diop the iemaining paii of biackets by
Convention :; so P Q
2
P
2
is shoit foi ((P Q
2
} P
2
}.
(( } } may be pait of a laigei sentence. So, using Conventions
: and :, one can abbieviate the sentence
((((P
2
P
3
} Q} R} ((P
2
P
3
} Q}}
with the following expiession:
(P
2
P
3
Q R} (P
2
P
3
Q}.
In aiithmetic one may wiite 3 3 + 4 instead of (3 3} + 4, because
the symbol foi multiplication binds moie stiongly than the symbol +
foi addition. Analogously, theie aie conventions foi oideiing logical
: Syntax and Semantics of Propositional Logic ,:
opeiations: and bind moie stiongly than oi . And just as in the
case of aiithmetic, this yields fuithei conventions foi diopping biackets.
Foi instance, the sentence P QR is in abbieviated foim. In oidei
to decide whethei the sentence is an abbieviation of ((P Q} R} oi
of (P (Q R}}, imagine that the connectives and compete foi
the sentence lettei Q. Since binds moie stiongly than , gains the
uppei hand and (P (Q R}} is the coiiect ieading.
In moie abstiact teims, this iule foi diopping biackets can be ex-
piessed as follows:
vv:cxi1ic covi1io ,. Assume , , and are sentences of L
I
, is
either or , and is either or . Ten, if (( }} or ((} }
occurs as part of the sentence that is to be abbreviated, the inner set of
brackets may be omitted.
Afei diopping the outei biackets fiom ((P Q} R) accoiding
to Convention :, one may shoiten the sentence fuithei to P Q R
since binds moie stiongly than . Similaily (P ((Q P
3
} R}}
may be abbieviated as (P (Q P
3
} R}. In ((P Q} Q}
only the outei biackets can be omitted in viitue of Convention :, so
that (P Q} Q is obtained as an abbieviation. One cannot use
Convention , to obtain P Q Q, because the oiiginal sentence does
not contain ((P Q} Q} as a pait. Intuitively, in P Q Q the
negation symbol iefeis only to P and not to the sentence (P Q} as it
does in the oiiginal sentence.
Teie is no deepei ieason foi the choice of these thiee conventions.
It is nevei incoiiect to use the unabbieviated sentences of L
I
with all
theii biackets iathei than theii abbieviations. In situations wheie the
application of the biacketing conventions can give iise to confusions,
it is bettei not to use them. Also it is peifectly legitimate to apply the
iules selectively. Foi instance, one may apply only Convention :, but not
Convention ,, and wiite (P Q} R foi ((P Q} R}. I will apply
these conventions extensively.
: Syntax and Semantics of Propositional Logic ,,
:. 1ui sim:1ics oi vvovosi1io:i iocic
In Section :., I gave a chaiacteiisation of the logical validity of aiguments
in English. In this section I will defne validity foi aiguments in the
language L
I
of piopositional logic. Te infoimal Chaiacteiisation :.,
of validity foi English aiguments will be adapted to the language L
I
of
piopositional logic and theieby be tiansfoimed into a piecise defnition.
In oidei to defne logical validity foi the language L
I
, the notion of
an inteipietation foi the language L
I
needs to be made piecise. Fiist, I
need to say which expiessions can be inteipieted in difeient ways and
which aie always inteipieted in the same way. Te connectives aie logical
symbols, the biackets meiely auxiliaiy symbols; logical and auxiliaiy
symbols cannot be ie-inteipieted (insofai as one can speak of auxiliaiy
symbols being inteipieted at all). Te sentence letteis aie the only non-
logical symbols of L
I
; they can be inteipieted in difeient ways.
Te inteipietations of the sentence letteis will be piovided by so-called
L
I
-stiuctuies. Tese L
I
-stiuctuies need only piovide enough infoimation
to deteimine whethei a sentence is tiue oi false. Now, undei which
conditions is the sentence P Q tiue: If the connective functions
like and in English, then both P and Q must be tiue foi P Q to be
tiue; otheiwise P Q will be false. Similaily, since woiks like not, the
sentence R is tiue if and only if R is false. As coiiesponds to oi, the
sentence P Q is tiue if and only if P oi Q is tiue (oi both aie tiue).
Te aiiow coiiesponds ioughly to the English if . . . then, but the
lattei has a iathei complicated semantics. Te L
I
-sentence P Q is false
if and only if P is tiue and Q is false; otheiwise it is tiue. Te phiase if . . .
then, which coiiesponds to the aiiow, does not always behave like this.
How the aiiow is ielated to if . . . then will be discussed in Section ,.:.
Geneially, in L
I
, the tiuth oi falsity of a sentence of L
I
depends only
on the tiuth oi falsity of the sentence letteis occuiiing in the sentence;
any fuithei infoimation is not ielevant. Teiefoie, L
I
-stiuctuies need
only deteimine the tiuth and falsity of all sentence letteis.
Instead of saying that a sentence is tiue, logicians say that the sentence
: Syntax and Semantics of Propositional Logic ,
has the tiuth-value Tiue. Tis sounds like a philosophically piofound
move since new objects aie iequiied: tiuth-values. Howevei, tiuth-values
aie haidly mysteiious objects. Some moie mathematically minded logi-
cians use the numbei I foi the tiuth-value Tiue and 0 foi the tiuth-value
False. In the end it matteis only that Tiue and False aie distinct. It is
possible, although not veiy customaiy and technically less convenient,
to develop the semantics of L
I
without tiuth-values by saying that a sen-
tence is tiue (oi false) instead of saying that it has the tiuth-value Tiue (oi
False). I shall use the lettei T as a name foi the tiuth-value Tiue and F
foi the tiuth-value False.
Tus an L
I
-stiuctuie piovides inteipietations of all sentence letteis
by assigning to eveiy sentence lettei exactly one tiuth-value, T oi F.
uiiii1io :., (L
I
-s1vUc1Uvi). An L
I
-structure is an assignment of ex-
actly one truth-value (T or F) to every sentence letter of the language L
I
.
:
One may think of an L
I
-stiuctuie as an infnite list that piovides a
value T oi F foi eveiy sentence lettei. Te beginning of such a list could
look like this:
P Q R P
I
Q
I
R
I
P
2
Q
2
R
2
T F F F T F T T F

Staiting fiom the tiuth-values assigned to the sentence letteis by an
L
I
-stiuctuie A, one can woik out the tiuth-values foi sentences con-
taining connectives in the following way. Te shoitest sentences aie the
sentence letteis; theii iespective tiuth-values aie fxed diiectly by the
L
I
-stiuctuie A. Foi instance, P could be assigned the tiuth-value T and
R could be assigned the same tiuth-value. In this case PR would ieceive
the tiuth-value T, too. If P
I
is given the tiuth-value F by A, the sentence
P
I
(P R} gets the tiuth-value T, because P R is tiue; and s being
tiue is sumcient to make a sentence tiue.
: In moie mathematical teims, an L
I
-stiuctuie is a function into the set {T, F} with the
set of all sentence letteis of L
I
as its domain.
Tus, the tiuth-values of the shoitest sentences, that is, of the sentence
letteis, aie fxedby the L
I
-stiuctuie A, andthenthe tiuth-values foi longei
sentences aie deteimined successively by the tiuth-values of the sentences
they aie made up fiom.
I will wiite ||
A
foi the tiuth-value of that is obtained on the basis
of A; it is deteimined by Ain the following way:
uiiii1io:.o (1vU1ui:L
I
-s1vUc1Uvi). Let Abe some L
I
-structure.
Ten | . . . |
A
assigns to every sentence of L
I
either T or F in the following
way.
(i) If is a sentence letter, ||

A
is the truth-value assigned to by the
L
I
-structure A.
(ii) ||
A
= T if and only if ||
A
= F.
(iii) | |
A
A
= T and ||
A
= T.
(iv) | |
A
A
= T or ||
A
= T.
(v) | |
A
A
= F or ||
A
= T.
(vi) | |
A
A
= ||
A
.
Instead of wiiting ||
A
= T, I will sometimes wiite that is tiue in A
oi that T is the tiuth-value of in A.
Te defnition of | . . . |
A
does not say explicitly when a sentence has the
tiuth-value F in A. Nonetheless, extia clauses foi falsity aie not iequiied,
since a sentence has the tiuth-value F (in A) if and only if it does not have
the tiuth-value T. In paiticulai, a sentence lettei has the tiuth-value F if
and only if it is not tiue in A. Similaily, foi negation the following falsity
clause follows fiom Defnition :.o:
||
A
= F if and only if ||
A
= T.
Defnition :.o also implies the following claim foi conjunction (and simi-
laily foi the othei connectives):
, Moie foimally, . . .
A
is a function with the set of all L
I
-sentences as its domain into
the set {T, F}. It piopeily extends the L
I
-stiuctuie A, that is, it contains all the oideied
paiis that the function Acontains and moie besides them.
: Syntax and Semantics of Propositional Logic ,o
| |
A
= F if and only if ||
A
= F oi ||
A
= F.
Tus, Defnition :.o also says whethei a sentence is false in a given stiuc-
tuie). Foi example, considei the sentence ((P Q} (P Q}} and a
stiuctuie B that assigns T to the sentence lettei P and F to the sentence
lettei Q. I want to deteimine the tiuth-value |(P Q} (P Q}|
B
.
Using the vaiious clauses of Defnition :.o, one can calculate that its tiuth-
value by calculating the tiuth-values of the sentences that weie used in
building it up accoiding to the syntactic iules (Defnition :.:) foi foiming
L
I
-sentences. Heie is how:
:. |P|
B
= T by assumption and Defnition :.o(i)
:. |Q|
B
= F by assumption and Defnition :.o(i)
,. |P Q|
B
= F by :, :, and Defnition :.o(v)
. |(P Q}|
B
= T by , and Defnition :.o(ii)
,. |P Q|
B
= F by :, :, and Defnition :.o(iii)
o. |(P Q} (P Q}|
B
= F by , ,, and Defnition :.o(v)
Teiefoie, (P Q} (P Q} is not tiue in B.
Te clauses (ii)(vi) of Defnition :.o can be neatly expiessed by tiuth
tables. Accoiding to (ii), foi instance, a sentence has tiuth-value T if
and only if has tiuth-value F. Tus if ||
A
= F, we have ||
A
= T; and
if ||
A
= T, we have ||
A
= F. Tis is expiessed in the following table:

T F
F T
Te clauses (iii)(vi) coiiespond to the following tables iespectively:
( }
T T T
T F F
F T F
F F F
( }
T T T
T F T
F T T
F F F
( }
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
( }
T T T
T F F
F T F
F F T
Tiuth tables aie also useful foi calculating the tiuth-values of sen-
tences with moie than one connective. I will use the same example as
above to show how this can be done. Te fist step is to wiite below each
sentence lettei the tiuth-value assigned to it by the L
I
-stiuctuie A:
P Q (P Q} (P Q}
T F T F T F
Te next step is to calculate the tiuth-values of sentences diiectly built up
fiom sentence letteis accoiding to the tiuth tables (in this case the tables
foi and aie needed):
P Q (P Q} (P Q}
T F T F F T F F
Ten one can go on to deteimine the tiuth-values foi moie and moie
complex sentences:
P Q (P Q} (P Q}
T F T T F F T F F
Finally, one will obtain the tiuth-value foi the entiie sentence (heie high-
lighted in using boldface):
P Q (P Q} (P Q}
T F T T F F F T F F
One can also use a (multi-line) tiuth table to woik out the tiuth-values
of a given sentence foi all L
I
-stiuctuies.
In a tiuth table one can also woik out the tiuth-value of the sentence
(P Q} (P Q} in any given L
I
-stiuctuie. I employ again the
: Syntax and Semantics of Propositional Logic ,8
sentence (P Q} (P Q} as an example; it contains two sentence
letteis. In a given stiuctuie, P can be tiue oi false, and Q can be tiue oi
false. Tus theie aie foui possibilities: in any given L
I
-stiuctuie, eithei
both P and Q aie tiue, oi P is tiue and Q is false, oi P is false and Q is tiue,
oi both sentence letteis aie false. Tese foui possibilities aie captuied in
the two lefmost columns of the tiuth table below. Now one can calculate
the tiuth-values of the sentence foi all foui possibilities, and, theieby, foi
all L
I
-stiuctuies:
P Q (P Q} (P Q}
T T F T T T T T T T
T F T T F F F T F F
F T F F T T T F F T
F F F F T F T F F F
Again, the columnwiththe tiuth-value of the entiie sentence is inboldface
letteis. I will call this column the main column.
Cleaily, if theie aie only Ts in the main column of a sentence the
sentence is tiue in all L
I
-stiuctuies; if theie aie only Fs in the main
column the sentence is false in all L
I
-stiuctuies. Tus one can use tiuth
tables to deteimine whethei a sentence is always tiue, oi whethei it is
always false, oi whethei it is tiue in some stiuctuies and false in otheis.
Te notion of an L
I
-stiuctuie coiiesponds to that of an inteipietation
of an English sentence in Section :.,. In that section I also used the
notion of an English sentence being tiue undei an inteipietation; this
coiiesponds to the notion of an L
I
-sentence being tiue in a stiuctuie. Te
defnitions of logical validity in English (Chaiacteiisation :.,), of logical
tiuth in English (Chaiacteiisation :.), and so on, can be adapted to the
language L
I
of piopositional logic. Te defnitions aie the same foi L
I
as foi English, except that the infoimal notion of an inteipietation fiom
Section :., is ieplaced by the technical notion of an L
I
-stiuctuie.
uiiii1io :.,.
(i) A sentence of L
I
is logically true if and only if is true in all L
I
-
structures.
(ii) A sentence of L
I
is a contradiction if and only if is not true in
any L
I
-structure.
(iii) A sentence and a sentence are logically equivalent if and are
true in exactly the same L
I
-structures.
Logically tiue sentences aie also called tautologies.
Logical tiuths, contiadictions and logically equivalent sentences of L
I
can also be chaiacteiised in teims of tiuth tables. In what follows, tiuth
tables aie always undeistood as full tiuth tables with lines foi all possible
combinations of tiuth-values of all the sentence letteis in the sentence.
1uiovim :.8.
(i) A sentence of L
I
is logically true (or a tautology) if and only if there
are only Ts in the main column of its truth table.
(ii) A sentence is a contradiction if and only if there are only Fs in the
main column of its truth table.
(iii) A sentence and a sentence are logically equivalent if they agree
on the truth-values in their main columns.
One of the main puiposes of developing semantics foi L
I
was to
defne the notion of a valid aigument in L
I
that would be analogous to
Chaiacteiisation :., of validity foi aiguments in English.
uiiii1io :.. Let be a set of sentences of L
I
and a sentence of L
I
.
Te argument with all sentences in as premisses and as conclusion is
valid if and only if there is no L
I
-structure in which all sentences in are
true and is false.
Te phiase Te aigument with all sentences in as piemisses and
as conclusion is valid will be abbieviated by ; this is also ofen
iead as follows fiom oi as (logically) implies . Tus if and
only if the following holds foi all L
I
-stiuctuies A:
If ||
A
= T foi all , then ||
A
= T.
Tus an L
I
-aigument is not valid if theie is a stiuctuie that makes all
: Syntax and Semantics of Propositional Logic o
piemisses tiue and the conclusion false:
uiiii1io :.:o. An L
I
-structure is a counterexample to the argument
with as the set of premisses and as conclusion if and only if ||
A
= T
for all and ||
A
= F.
Terefore, an argument in L
I
is valid if and only if it does not have a coun-
terexample.
Following the pattein of the Defnition :.8 of consistency foi sets of
sentences in English I will defne consistency foi sets of L
I
-sentences:
uiiii1io :.:: (sim:1ic cosis1icv). A set of L
I
-sentences is
semantically consistent if and only if there is an L
I
-structure A such that
||
A
= Tfor all sentences of . Semantic inconsistency is just the opposite
of semantic consistency. a set of L
I
-sentences is semantically inconsistent
if and only if is not consistent.
Afei Defnition :.8 I aigued that an aigument is valid if and only if

the set obtained by adding the negation of the conclusion to the piemisses
is inconsistent. Te aigument caiiies ovei to L
I
:
1uiovim :.::. If and all elements of are L
I
-sentences, then the fol-
lowing obtains.
if and only if the set containing all sentences in and
is semantically inconsistent.
Tus, foi an aigument with, say, two piemisses and and a con-
clusion , this means that , if and only if the set , , } is
semantically inconsistent. Te pioof of the theoiem is lef to the ieadei.
Logicians usually allow infnite sets of piemisses, but such infnite
sets of piemisses will not play an impoitant iole heie. One can actually
piove that if a sentence of L
I
follows fiom a set of sentences, then
Teie is an alteinative way of defning the consistency of sets of L
I
-sentences, which is
known as syntactic consistency. Although the defnition looks veiy difeient, both no-
tions of consistency coincide. Syntactic consistency will be intioduced in Defnition ,.,.
alieady follows fiom a fnite set of sentences in . Tis iesult is known
as the Compactness Teoiem of piopositional logic.
Te set of piemisses may also be empty. Asentence follows fiomthe
empty set of piemisses if and only if it is a tautology (that is, ifit is logically
tiue). Tis is faiily obvious; it is also a special case of Teoiem :.: below.
If has only fnitely many elements, one can use tiuth tables to check
whethei . I will show how to answei the question whethei by
means of an example.
ix:mvii :.:,. P Q, Q} P.
Claims like the one above may be abbieviated by diopping the cuily
biackets aiound the piemisses.Generally,
I
, . . . ,
n
, where
I
, . . . ,
n
and are L
I
-sentences, is short for
I
, . . . ,
n
} . So the claim of
Example :.:, may be wiitten P Q, Q P.
Fiist I diaw a tiuth table foi the piemisses and the conclusion in the
following way:
P Q P Q Q P
T T T F F T T F T
T F T T T F F F T
F T F T F T T T F
F F F T T F F T F
(:.:)
Now I will check whethei theie is any line in which the entiies in the
main columns of the piemisses all have Ts, while the conclusion has an F.
In the fist line of tiuth-values the fist piemiss ieceives an F, the second
a T, and the conclusion an F. Te second and fouith lines also have Fs
foi one piemiss. Te thiid line has Ts foi both piemisses, but also a T foi
the conclusion. Tus, theie is no line wheie all piemisses ieceive Ts and
the conclusion an F. Teiefoie, the aigument is valid, that is, P follows
fiom P Q, Q} oi, foimally, P Q, Q P.
Foi fnite sets of piemisses, one can ieduce the pioblem of checking
whethei to the pioblem of checking whethei a single sentence is
logically tiue. To do this one combines all of the piemisses, that is, all
sentences in , using , and then one puts the iesulting conjunction in
fiont of an aiiow followed by the conclusion. Te iesulting sentence is
logically tiue if and only if the aigument is valid. Tis can be expiessed
moie succinctly as follows:
1uiovim:.:.
I
, . . . ,
n
if and only if
I
. . .
n
is a tautology
(that is, ip
I
. . .
n
is logically true).
I do not give a pioof of this theoiem heie.
I will apply Teoiem :.: to the example above: Fiist, the two pie-
misses aie combined into (P Q} Q. It is necessaiy to ieintioduce
the biackets aiound P Q because otheiwise the iesult would be an
abbieviation foi P (Q Q} as binds moie stiongly than . Next,
the aiiow is put between this conjunction and the conclusion. Tis yields
((P Q} Q} P. Te biackets aiound the conjunction of the two
piemisses aie not ieally necessaiy since binds moie stiongly than ,
but they might make the sentence easiei to iead. Te tiuth table foi this
long sentence looks like this:
P Q ((P Q} Q} P
T T T F F T F T T F T
T F T T T F F F T F T
F T F T F T T T T T F
F F F T T F F F T T F
(:.:)
Tus, the sentence ((P Q}Q} P is valid, that is, it is a tautology.
By Teoiem :.:, it follows that P Q, Q P. Of couise, we know
this alieady fiom tiuth table (:.:).
Diawing tiuth tables foi aiguments oi sentences with many sentence
letteis is cumbeisome: eveiy new sentence lettei doubles the numbei of
lines of the tiuth table, because foi any alieady given line two possibilities
must be consideied: the new sentence lettei can have tiuth-value T oi F.
Tus, a sentence oi aigument with I sentence lettei iequiies only 2 lines,
one with 2 difeient sentence letteis iequiies 4, one with 3 iequiies 8 lines,
and so on. Geneially, the tiuth table foi a sentence oi aigument with n dif-
feient sentence letteis will have 2
n
lines of tiuth-values. In Exeicise ,.o
theie will be an aigument in L
I
with 7 sentence letteis. Tus, wiiting
down the coiiesponding tiuth table would iequiie 2
7
= I28 lines.
To show that an L
I
-sentence is a tautology, one does not need to diaw
a complete tiuth table. One only needs to show that theie cannot be a
line in the tiuth table that yields an F in the main column. In oidei to
iefute the existence of such a line foi Example :.:,, the best stiategy is to
stait with the assumption that the value in the main column is F:
P Q ((P Q} Q} P
F
A sentence of the foim has the tiuth-value F only if has tiuth-
value T and has tiuth-value F. Tus, I must have:
P Q ((P Q} Q} P
T F F
I can continue to calculate tiuth-values backwaids:
P Q ((P Q} Q} P
T T T F F T
I wiite the calculated tiuth-values also undei the fist two occuiiences of
P and Q:
P Q ((P Q} Q} P
T T : T T T F F T
But now theie is no way to continue. Te slot maiked with a question
maik cannot be flled with a tiuth-value: theie should be an F undei the
negation symbol , as Q has tiuth-value T, but theie should also be a T,
because (P Q} and P have Ts. It follows that theie cannot be a line
with an F in the main column. Teiefoie, in the full tiuth table with all
the lines, all tiuth-values in the main column aie Ts. Tis pioves again
that ((P Q} Q} P is a tautology.
: Syntax and Semantics of Propositional Logic
Since it is not easy (foi an examination maikei, foi instance) to iecon-
stiuct how the tiuth-values have been calculated, it is useful to iecoid the
oidei in which the values weie obtained:
P Q ((P Q} Q} P
T
6
T
3
: T
7
T
I
T
4
F F
2
T
3
Of couise I could have wiitten down the tiuth-values in a difeient oidei.
Foi instance, afei aiiiving at F
2
, I could have calculated the value in the
last column and only then have tuined to the pait pieceding .
Now I will use the same method to show that (P Q} P is not
a tautology. As befoie, an F is wiitten in the main column:
P Q (P Q} P
F
Te following table iesults fiom the fist backwaids-calculation:
P Q (P Q} P
T F F
Tus, P must ieceive the tiuth-value T:
P Q (P Q} P
T F F T
Tus one can also wiite a T undei the fist occuiience of P:
P Q (P Q} P
T T F F T
Since P Q has the tiuth-value T and P also has the tiuth-value T, the
sentence Q ieceives a T, and Q, accoidingly, an F. Hence, the line can
be completed as follows (I will also inseit the obligatoiy indices):
P Q (P Q} P
T F T
4
T
I
T
3
F
6
F F
2
T
3
At any rate, when one has arrived at a possible line one should cal-
culate the truth-values from bottom to top (starting from the truth-values
that have been obtained for the sentence letters) to ensure that one has not
missed a column that cannot given a unique truth-value. Only once this
fnal check has been caiiied out, one knows that the line obtained is a
possible line in a tiuth table.
Te above backwaids-calculations shows that the sentence (P
Q} P has tiuth-value F if P has the tiuth-value T and Q has the
tiuth-value F.
Technically speaking, if A(P} = T and A(Q} = F foi a stiuctuie A,
then (P Q} P is false in A. So, by Defnition :.,(i), (P Q}
P is not logically valid, that is, it is not a tautology.
Sometimes this method of calculating tiuth-values backwaids ie-
quiies moie than one line. Tis is the case in the following example:
P Q (P Q} (Q P}
F
If a sentence is false, theie aie two possibilities: could have
tiuth-value T and tiuth-value F, oi, could have F and could have
tiuth-value T. As such, one has to take these two possibilities into account:
P Q (P Q} (Q P}
I T F F
2 F F T
I have undeilined the tiuth-values that cannot be uniquely deteimined,
and so moie than one possibility (line) needs to be checked.
Te iest is ioutine. Te indices in the table below indicate the oidei
in which I aiiived at the tiuth-values. Te oidei in which the values
aie calculated does not ieally mattei, but the indexing makes it easiei to
follow the ieasoning.
P Q (P Q} (Q P}
I F
3
T
I
: T
6
F T
3
F
2
F
4
2 F
3
F
I
F
4
T
3
F T
6
T
2
:
: Syntax and Semantics of Propositional Logic o
Neithei of the two lines can be completed. Tis shows that (P Q}
(Q P} is a tautology.
Of couise it can happen that moie lines aie iequiied and that difeient
cases undei consideiation have to be split up into fuithei subcases.
Te method of backwaids-calculation can also be applied in oidei to
check whethei an aigument is valid oi not. To show that an aigument
is not valid, one has to fnd a line (that is, a stiuctuie) wheie all of the
piemisses aie tiue and the conclusion is false. If theie is no such line,
the aigument is valid. Heie is an example of how to use the method to
deteimine whethei an aigument is valid. I have picked an example that
foices me to considei seveial difeient cases. So, I want to deteimine
whethei
P Q, (P
I
Q} (P P
I
} (P Q} P
I
.
I will stait by wiiting the two piemisses and the conclusion in one table.
I have to check whethei theie can be a line in the table wheie the two
piemisses come out as tiue while the conclusion is false. As such, I should
stait by wiiting Ts in the main columns of the piemisses and an F in the
main column of the conclusion:
P Q P
I
P Q (P
I
Q} (P P
I
} (P Q} P
I
T T F
Now I have to make a case distinction: the fist sentence could be tiue
because P is false oi because Q is tiue. Similaily, in the case of the othei
sentences, theie is no unique way to continue. Given that I can make a
case distinction with iespect to any of the thiee sentences, it is not cleai
how to pioceed. But some ways of pioceeding can make the calculations
quickei and less complicated. It is useful to avoid as much as possible
picking a sentence that will iequiie a new case distinction in the next
step.Ultimately though, so long as all possible cases aie systematically
checked, the oidei in which one pioceeds will not afect the end iesult.
At this stage in the calculation, a case distinction cannot be avoided,
and so I will pick the last sentence: (P Q} P
I
can be false eithei
because P Q is false oi because P
I
is false. I will tiy to complete the
line foi the lattei case and leave the foimei foi latei:
P Q P
I
P Q (P
I
Q} (P P
I
} (P Q} P
I
I T T F
I
F
2 T F
3
F
2
T
4
T : F
3
F F
I
Te second line of the table cannot be completed: the second piemiss
must be tiue, but it follows fiom my assumption that both (P
I
Q}
and P P
I
must be false. Tis means that the iules tell me to wiite an F
in the slot maiked by :, because P
I
is false, but they also tell me to wiite
a T foi :, because the entiie sentence (P
I
Q} (P P
I
} is tiue and
(P
I
Q} is alieady false.
Line : is moie complicated, because P Q can be false foi two
ieasons: fist, P can be tiue while Q is false oi, second, P can be false while
Q is tiue. Tus, I need to distinguish the subcases maiked I.I and I.2:
P Q P
I
P Q (P
I
Q} (P P
I
} (P Q} P
I
I.I T
3
T : T T
4
T
2
F
I
F
3
F
2 T F
3
F
2
T
4
T : F
3
F F
I
I.2 T T F
2
F
I
T
3
F
Since P is tiue and P Q is tiue, Q has to be tiue as well. But accoiding
to the assumption, Q is false. Teiefoie, line I.I cannot be completed.
Only case I.2 iemains:
P Q P
I
P Q (P
I
Q} (P P
I
} (P Q} P
I
I.I T
3
T : T T
4
T
2
F
I
F
3
F
2 T F
3
F
2
T
4
T : F
3
F F
I
I.2 T F
7
T
6
T
3
T F
4
: F
2
F
I
T
3
F
Since the second piemiss is tiue and (P
I
Q} is false, P P
I
ought to
be tiue. But this cannot be the case, because P is false. So line I.2 cannot
be completed eithei. Since this exhausts the possible ways of iefuting the
aigument, the following claim has been established:
P Q, (P
I
Q} (P P
I
} (P Q} P
I
.
: Syntax and Semantics of Propositional Logic 8
Generally the entries in a table where one calculates truth-values back-
wards should be indexed by numbers that show the order in which the
values were obtained. Te assumptions in the diperent cases should be
indicated by underlining the respective truth-values. Subcases should be
marked as such (in the way I have done this above). A pioof without in-
dices foi the tiuth-values will be consideied to be incomplete. Tese
conventions meiely seive the puipose of making the calculations easiei
to ieconstiuct: otheiwise the calculations of tiuth-values can be veiy
dimcult to follow.
Afei having developed semantics foi the language L
I
, I will now
look at alteinatives. One might wondei why the connectives , , ,
and have been chosen. Tese connectives aie used in many logic texts,
and they moie oi less coiiespond to expiessions in English. Howevei,
theie aie also othei English phiases foi connecting sentences. Te phiase
neithei . . . noi . . . is an example. Te sentence
Neithei Jones noi Biown is in Baicelona
will be tiue if and only if Jones is not in Baicelona and Biown is not
in Baicelona. In L
I
theie is no connective that diiectly coiiesponds to
neithei . . . noi . . . . If one added a connective foi the phiase neithei . . .
noi . . . , it would have the following tiuth table:

T T F
T F F
F T F
F F T
Howevei, the connective foi neithei . . . noi . . . is not ieally needed
because one can geneiate the same tiuth table using the old connectives
of L
I
. Neithei . . . noi . . . can be ie-expiessed in English as It is not the
case that . . . , and it is not the case that . . . . In L
I
one can also defne in
: Syntax and Semantics of Propositional Logic
teims of and in the following way:

T T F F F
T F F F T
F T T F F
F F T T T
Alteinatively, one canie-expiess oi defne as (}. Tus, adding
to the language L
I
would not inciease the expiessive powei of L
I
. Te
connective would only allow one to abbieviate some sentences. Teie
aie many moie tiuth tables foi which L
I
does not have connectives. So
fai I have looked only at binaiy connectives (connectives conjoining two
sentences) such as , , , and , but theie aie also unaiy connectives
(connectives taking one sentence) othei than ; and theie aie teinaiy
connectives (connectives taking thiee sentences), and so on. Can all these
connectives be expiessed with the connectives of L
I
, that is, with , , ,
, and : Te answei is yes: all tiuth tables can be pioduced with the
old connectives of L
I
. Tis fact is called the tiuth-functional completeness
of L
I
. In fact, and togethei without any fuithei connectives aie
sumcient foi expiessing all othei connectives. And even on its own
would do the tiick. At any iate, adding moie connectives to L
I
than those
used heie is not ieally necessaiy and would not inciease the expiessive
powei of L
I
. I will not piove these iesults heie.
, Foimalisation in Piopositional Logic
In the pievious chaptei I focused on the foimal language L
I
. Te con-
nectives , , , and of L
I
can be used to combine sentences of L
I
to
foim new compound sentences; the connective can be added in fiont
of a sentence of L
I
to build a new sentence.
English sentences can also be combined and modifed with many
difeient connectives to foim new sentences. Foi instance, one can wiite
the woid and between two English sentences to obtain a new sentence.
Oi, because, although, but, while, if and many otheis can be used
in the same way. An expiession that connects sentences can also be
moie complex: the expiession due to the fact that between two English
sentences yields a new English sentence. Othei expiessions, such as if . . . ,
then, connect sentences even though they aie not wiitten between two
sentences.
Othei expiessions do not combine sentences, but iathei modify a
sentence, as is the case with not, as is well known, John stiongly be-
lieves that, and iegiettably. Not is special insofai as it ofen cannot be
simply inseited into a sentence, but iathei iequiies the intioduction of
the auxiliaiy veib to do: the intioduction of not into Alan went to
London yields Alan did not go to London. In this iespect not is moie
complicated than an adveib such as iegiettably oi the connective of
L
I
.
In the pievious chaptei I defned the notion of a connective; now I
will apply it to English as well: Expressions that can be used to combine or
modify English sentences are connectives. Tis defnition is fai fiom being
piecise, but an exact defnition of the notion of a connective of English
is not easy to give because sometimes the connectives aie not simply
Formalisation in Propositional Logic ,:
plugged into oi wiitten between sentences. Occasionally the sentences
themselves have to be modifed, foi instance, by intioducing auxiliaiy
veibs, as the above examples of not shows.
,. : 1vU1u-iUc1io:ii1v
Te connectives of L
I
, that is, , , , and , coiiespond to connectives
in English. Te semantics of the connectives of L
I
is veiy simple; it is
encompassed in theii tiuth tables. In contiast, many connectives of
English function in a much moie intiicate way.
As an example I will considei the connective because. Imagine that I
diop my laptop computei on the stieet. Its had it: the scieen is bioken.
So my laptop computei does not woik. Te sentence
My computei does not woik because I diopped my computei
is also tiue: the laptop would still be functional if I had not diopped it.
Moieovei, it is tiue that the computei does not woik and it is tiue that I
diopped it. Tus, because connects the two tiue sentences My computei
does not woik and I diopped my computei togethei foiming a new tiue
sentence. In this iespect it seems similai to and.
In othei cases, howevei, one can use because to connect two tiue
English sentences Aand B and end up with a false sentence. Afei picking
up my bioken laptop, I considei the following sentence:
My laptop computei does not woik because it is not plugged
in.
In the situation I just desciibed, it is tiue that my computei does not woik,
and it is tiue that it is not plugged in as I am standing in the stieet with
my bioken laptop. Neveitheless the sentence that my laptop computei
does not woik because it is not plugged in is false: it would woik if I had
not diopped it. Even if it weie now plugged in, it would not woik. It does
not woik because I diopped it, not because it is not plugged in. So this
is a case in which using because to connect two tiue sentences yields a
false sentence.
Neveitheless, the tiuth of Abecause B is not completely independent
of the tiuth and falsity of the English sentences A and B. If A oi B (oi
both) aie false, then Abecause B is also false. Tese dependencies can
be summaiised in the following tiuth table foi the English connective
because, wheie Aand B aie declaiative sentences of English:
A B Abecause B
T T :
T F F
F T F
F F F
Te question maik indicates that in this case the tiuth-value of A be-
cause B depends not only on the tiuth-values of the diiect subsentences,
that is, onthe tiuth-values of the sentences Aand Bthat because connects.
Tis means that when because is used to connect two tiue sentences,
sometimes the iesulting sentence is tiue and sometimes the iesulting
sentence is false; so the tiuth-value of the compound sentence is not de-
teimined by the tiuth-values of the sentences connected by because. In
this iespect because difeis fiomand. If the tiuth-value of the compound
sentence is deteimined by the tiuth-value of the connected sentences,
as is the case with and, then the connective is called tiuth-functional.
Connectives like because aie not tiuth-functional.
Te following is a geneial, less than piecise chaiacteiisation of tiuth-
functionality :
cu:v:c1ivis:1io ,.: (1vU1u-iUc1io:ii1v). A connective is truth-
functional if and only if the truth-value of the compound sentence cannot
be changed by replacing a direct subsentence with another sentence having
the same truth-value.
Foi instance, because is not tiuth-functional: ieplacing the tiue
sentence I diopped my computei with the equally tiue sentence the
Formalisation in Propositional Logic ,,
computei is not plugged in does change the tiuth-value of the compound
sentence
My computei does not woik because I diopped my computei
fiom Tiue to False.
Tus, the defnition of tiuth-functionality of an English connective
canbe paiaphiasedinteims of tiuthtables: a connective is tiuth-functional
if and only if its tiuth table does not contain any question maiks.
If . . . then is usually tianslated as the aiiow . Some of its occui-
iences, howevei, aie defnitely not tiuth-functional. A sentence
is tiue if is false oi is tiue. In the following sentence, if . . . then
functions difeiently:
If Giovanni hadnt gone to England, he would not have caught
a cold in Cambiidge.
Assume that Giovanni ieally did go to England, but did not catch a cold
in Cambiidge. In this case one may hesitate to assign a tiuth-value to
the sentence: some people would say that the sentence is neithei tiue
noi false; otheis would say that it is false. At any iate, in that case the
sentence is not tiue. But if the whole sentence is not tiue, then this is a
case in which the fist subsentence following if is false, but the whole
sentence is also false. But accoiding to the tiuth table foi a sentence
with a false antecedent is tiue. Tis means that the aiiow cannot be
used to foimalise the sentence coiiectly.
If-sentences desciibing what would have happened undei ciicum-
stances that aie not actual aie called subjunctives oi counteifactuals.
In these sentences if does not function like the aiiow and cannot
be tianslated as the aiiow. Te piopei tieatment of counteifactuals is
beyond the scope of this book.
:
Indicative conditionals such as
: Lewis (:,,) is a classic text on counteifactuals.
Formalisation in Propositional Logic ,
If Jones gets to the aiipoit an houi late, his plane will wait
foi him
aie ofen foimalised using the aiiow , but it is somewhat questionable
whethei ieally is appiopiiate.
Assume, foi instance, that Jones aiiives at the aiipoit eaily and he
easily catches the plane. Suppose also that Jones is not a VIP and so the
aiiline would not have waited foi him. Using the aiiow foi if one can
tiy to tianslate this sentence as P Q with the following dictionaiy:
P: Jones gets to the aiipoit an houi late,
Q: Joness plane will wait foi Jones.
If |P|
A
= F, that is, if P is false in the stiuctuie A, then P Q is tiue
in A, that is, |P Q|
A
= T by Defnition :.o oi by the tiuth table of on
page ,,. Accoiding to the assumptions, Jones gets to the aiipoit an houi
late is actually false. Tus, if the foimalisation is coiiect, the displayed
English if -sentence should be tiue. But it is highly questionable whethei
it is tiue: one may hold that If Jones gets to the aiipoit an houi late, his
plane will wait foi him is simply false, even if Jones gets theie on time.
Teie is an extensive liteiatuie on the tieatment of if -sentences. Te
tieatment of if -sentences, including counteifactuals, has inteiesting
philosophical implications. I shall not go fuithei into the details of this
discussion heie. Te above example should be sumcient to show that
foimalising if by the aiiow is pioblematic even in the case of indicative
conditionals. Foi most puiposes, howevei, the aiiow is consideied to
be close enough to the if . . . then . . . of English, with the exception of
counteifactuals.
Te defnition of truth-functionality also applies to unary connectives.
a unary connective is truth-functional if and only if the truth-value of the
sentence with the connective cannot be changed by replacing the direct sub-
sentence with a sentence with the same truth-value.
It is necessaiily the case that A oi It is necessaiy that is a unaiy
connective that is not tiuth-functional. If A is a false English sentence,
then It is necessaiy that A is false, but if A is tiue, It is necessaiy that A
may be eithei tiue oi false:
It is necessaiy that all tiees aie tiees.
Tis sentence is tiue: all tiees aie tiees is logically tiue and thus necessaiy.
But, if the tiue sentence All tiees aie tiees is ieplaced by the tiue sentence
Volkei has ten coins in his pocket then the iesulting sentence
It is necessaiy that Volkei has ten coins in his pocket
is not tiue, because I could easily had only nine coins in my pocket.
Geneially if Ais only accidentally tiue, It is necessaiy that A will be false.
Tus the coiiesponding tiuth table looks like this:
A it is necessaiy that A
T :
F F
Some othei connectives likeBill believes that . . . have nothing but
question maiks in theii tiuth tables. In contiast, Bill knows that . . . has
the same tiuth table as it is necessaiy that.
:
,. : iocic:i iovm
In this section and the next I will show how to tianslate English sentences
into L
I
sentences. Tese tianslations aie caiiied out in two steps: Fiist
the sentence is biought into a standaidised foim, which is called the
(piopositional) logical foim.
,
In the second step the English expiessions
: A moie compiehensive account of tiuth-functionality is given by Sainsbuiy (:oo:,
Chaptei :).
, In this chaptei I will usually diop the specifcation piopositional fiom piopositional
logical foim since I will not deal with any othei kind of logical foim foi now. Teie is
also a moie complex piedicate logical foim of an English sentence. Te piedicate logical
foim will be studied in Chaptei ,.
Formalisation in Propositional Logic ,o
aie ieplaced by symbols. Obtaining the logical foim is the non-tiivial
pait; the step fiom the logical foim to a sentence of the language L
I
of
piopositional logic is simple and puiely mechanical.
Heie I shall sketch a piactical pioceduie foi biinging an English
sentence into its logical foim. Te pioceduie is to be applied to the
sentence, ieapplied to its sentences fiom which the main sentence is built
up, and then iepeated until the subsentences cannot be fuithei analysed
by the means of piopositional logic.
I have bioken down this pioceduie into fve steps. In piactice they aie
all caiiied out at the same time. Te fist step is the dimcult one: in this
step it is checked whethei the sentence can be bioken down into a tiuth-
functional connective and one oi moie subsentences, that is, whethei the
sentence is built up fiom one oi moie sentences with a tiuth-functional
connective.
Foi instance, the sentence
Te cai doesnt stait because the batteiy is fat oi theie is no
petiol in the tank.
is not built up fiom othei sentences with a tiuth-functional connective:
it is built up fiom the sentence Te cai doesnt stait and the sentence
Te batteiy is fat oi theie is no petiol in the tank. with the connec-
tive because, which is not tiuth-functional. Te connective oi is tiuth-
functional, but it only connects Te batteiy is fat and Teie is no
petiol in the tank.; so only the subsentence Te batteiy is fat oi theie
is no petiol in the tank. is built up fiom othei sentences with the tiuth-
functional connective oi, but not the entiie sentence.
To put it in a difeient way, one identifes the topmost oi main con-
nective and checks whethei it is tiuth-functional. It is peimissible to
iefoimulate the sentence slightly to put into a foim such that it is built
up with a tiuth functional connective. Te tiuth-functional connectives
should be taken fiom a fxed list of tiuth-functional connectives; this
iestiiction will enable one to foimalise the connectives as the fves con-
nectives of the foimal language L
I
, iespectively. Finally, one ieapplies the
pioceduie to the sentence(s) fiom which the main sentence is built up.
I give now the fve steps of the pioceduie and then show how it woiks
by means of some examples:
:. Check if the sentence can be reformulated in a natural way as a sen-
tence built up from one or more sentences with a truth-functional
connective. If this is not possible, then the sentence should be put in
brackets and not analysed any further.
:. If the sentence can be reformulated in a natural way as a sentence
built up from one or more sentences with a truth-functional connec-
tive, do so.
,. If that truth-functional connective is not one of the standard con-
nectives in Table .:, reformulate the sentence using the standard
connectives.
. Enclose the whole sentence in brackets, unless it is a negated sen-
tence, that is, a sentence starting with it is not the case that.
,. Apply the procedure, starting back at :., to the next subsentence(s)
(that is, to the sentence(s) without the standard connective of step ).
name standaid connective some othei foimulations
conjunction and but, although
, [a comma
between sentences]
disjunction oi, unless
negation it is not the case that not, none, nevei
aiiow if . . . then given that, . . .
double aiiow if and only if exactly if,
piecisely if
Table ,.:: standaid connectives
Formalisation in Propositional Logic ,8
Teie is no need to memoiise this desciiption of the pioceduie; the
point is to leain how to apply it. Tus instead of desciibing the pioceduie
in moie detail, which would be faiily dimcult, Ill illustiate the pioceduie
with seveial examples:
ix:mvii ,.:. Rob and Tim will laugh, if the tutoi cant pionounce Siob-
hans name.
Te sentence is built fiom Rob and Tim will laugh and Te tutoi
cant pionounce Siobhans name with the connective . . . , if . . . . As such,
theie is no need foi the soit of iefoimulation called foi in :. But . . . ,
if. . . is not a standaid connective. So, in accoidance with step , I will
iefoimulate the sentence with the standaid connective if . . . then . . . :
If the tutoi cant pionounce Siobhans name, then Rob and
Tim will laugh.
In step the entiie sentence is enclosed by biackets:
(If the tutoi cant pionounce Siobhans name, then Rob and
Tim will laugh)
Step , sends me back again to step :. Te two subsentences to which step :
is applied aie:
Te tutoi cant pionounce Siobhans name,
Rob and Tim will laugh.
Te fist sentence contains a negation and so I will iefoimulate it with the
standaid connective it is not the case that . . . :
It is not the case that the tutoi can pionounce Siobhans name
Accoiding to step , the sentence does not need to be put in biackets
since it staits with it is not the case that.
I still have to apply the pioceduie to the second sentence. Rob and
Tim will laugh is not a sentence built up using a tiuth-functional connec-
tive, but it can be iefoimulated in accoidance with step : as a sentence
with a tiuth-functional connective in the following way:
Formalisation in Propositional Logic ,
Rob will laugh and Tim will laugh,
since . . . and . . . is alieady a standaid connective, theie is no need foi the
soit of iefoimulation desciibed in step ,. Afei applying step I obtain
the following expiession:
(Rob will laugh and Tim will laugh).
Tus the whole sentence now ieads as follows:
(If it is not the case that the tutoi can pionounce Siobhans
name, then (Rob will laugh and Tim will laugh)).
Now I have to stait again with step :. Te sentence the tutoi can pio-
nounce Siobhans name cannot be iefoimulated in a natuial way as a
sentence built up with a tiuth-functional connective. Tus it is put in
biackets accoiding to step ::
(If it is not the case that (the tutoi can pionounce Siobhans
name), then (Rob will laugh and Tim will laugh)).
Next, neithei Rob will laugh noi Tim will laugh can be iefoimulated as
a sentence built with a tiuth-functional connective, so they aie each put
into biackets as iequiied by step ::
name), then ((Rob will laugh) and (Tim will laugh))).
Now this is the (piopositional) logical foim of the sentence.
ix:mvii ,.,. Unless the ignition is tuined on and theie is petiol in the
tank, the engine will not stait and Ill not be able to aiiive in time.
I can skip steps : and : because the sentence is alieady built up with
a tiuth-functional connective, though not by a standaid one. Next, I
ieplace unless by the standaid connective oi in accoidance with step ,;
then I apply step and enclose the entiie sentence in biackets.
Formalisation in Propositional Logic oo
(Te ignition is tuined on and theie is petiol in the tank, oi
the engine will not stait and Ill not be able to aiiive in time).
Since and is alieady a standaid connective, step is applied twice moie.
((Te ignition is tuined on and theie is petiol in the tank),
oi (the engine will not stait and Ill not be able to aiiive in
time)).
Next, I tuin to the pait of the sentence afei oi. Teie aie two sentences
containing not. Accoiding to step ,, they aie to be iefoimulated with the
coiiesponding standaid connective.
((Te ignition is tuined on and theie is petiol in the tank),
oi (it is not the case that the engine will stait and it is not the
case that Ill be able to aiiive in time)).
Now step : is applied foui times:
(((Te ignition is tuined on) and (theie is petiol in the tank)),
oi (it is not the case that (the engine will stait) and it is not
the case that (Ill be able to aiiive in time))).
Te piocess teiminates heie since the iemaining sentences not containing
biackets, that is, Te ignition is tuined on and so on cannot be fuithei
analysed.
,. , ivom iocic:i iovm 1o iovm:i i:cU:ci
Once the logical foim of a sentence has been deteimined, the tianslation
into the language L
I
of piopositional logic is simple.
In oidei to tianslate the logical foim of an English sentence into L
I
apply the following pioceduie:
:. Replace standard connectives by their respective symbols in accor-
dance with the following list.
Formalisation in Propositional Logic o:
standard connective symbol
and
or
it is not the case that
if . . . then . . .
if and only if
:. Replace every English sentence by a sentence letter and delete the
brackets surrounding the sentence letter.
Use diperent sentence let-

ters for distinct sentences and the same sentence letter for multiple
occurrences of the same sentence.
,. Give a list (the dictionary) of all sentence letters in the resulting L
I
-
sentence together with the respective sentences they have replaced.
I shall caiiy out this pioceduie on Example ,.:. Te logical foim of
that sentence is
name), then ((Rob will laugh) and (Tim will laugh))).
To tianslate this into L
I
I fist ieplace all standaid connectives by the
iespective symbols, as iequiied by step ::
( (the tutoi can pionounce Siobhans name) ((Rob will
laugh) (Tim will laugh))).
Accoiding to step : the sentences aie to be ieplaced by sentence letteis:
(P (Q R}}.
I complete the foimalisation by adding the dictionaiy iequiied in step ,:
P: Te tutoi can pionounce Siobhans name.
Q: Rob will laugh.
R: Tim will laugh.
English sentences usually do not contain any L
I
connectives oi biackets. Tus, one will
ieplace with sentence letteis exactly those English sentences that could not be fuithei
analysed in accoidance with step : of the pioceduie on page ,,.
Formalisation in Propositional Logic o:
Tis was the logical foim of the English sentence fiom the second
example:
(((Te ignition is tuined on) and (theie is petiol in the tank)),
oi (it is not the case that (the engine will stait) and it is not
the case that (Ill be able to aiiive in time))).
Its foimalisation is the sentence ((P Q} (R P
I
}}, oi, using the
biacketing conventions, (P Q} (R P
I
}. Te dictionaiy is obvious:
P: Te ignition is tuined on.
Q: Teie is petiol in the tank.
R: Te engine will stait.
P
I
: Ill be able to aiiive in time.
In both examples, I used the sentence lettei P to foimalise the fist
sentence, and Q to foimalise the next and so on. Tis is not obligatoiy. It
would have been equally coiiect (but awkwaid) to employ the sentence
lettei R
473
instead of P.
,. :mvicUi1v
Deteimining the logical foim of an English sentence can be tiicky. Some-
times theie is no unique solution.
Biown is in Baicelona and Jones owns a Foid oi Smith owns
a Foid.
Tis sentence is ambiguous: and could have been used to connect the two
claims Biown is in Baicelona and Jones owns a Foid oi Smith owns a
Foid. It could equally well be used to expiess that theie aie the following
two possibilities: fist, Biown is in Baicelona and Jones owns a Foid;
second, Smith owns a Foid.
Coiiesponding to these two possible ieadings theie aie at least two
possible foimalisations of this sentence:
Formalisation in Propositional Logic o,
(i) P (Q R}
(ii) (P Q} R
Te dictionaiy is as follows:
P: Biown is in Baicelona
Q: Jones owns a Foid
R: Smith owns a Foid
Te foimalisations (i) and (ii) coiiespond to the two ieadings of the
oiiginal English sentence. In a given situation it may be cleai which
ieading is intended, and thus which foimalisation is piefeiable. Without
fuithei hints, howevei, one cannot decide between (i) and (ii).
Ambiguities like the one above aie called scope ambiguities. Roughly
speaking, the scope of an occuiience of a connective in a sentence is
that pait of the sentence to which the connective applies. In (i) the
connective applies to the entiie sentence, as it connects P and (Q R},
while in (ii) the scope of is only (P Q}.
uiiii1io ,. (scovi oi : coic1ivi). Te scope of an occurrence of
a connective in a sentence is (the occurrence of) the smallest subsentence
of that contains this occurrence of the connective.
By subsentence of I mean any sentence that is pait of .
In the sentence
((P (P Q}}
-- -
(P Q}}
the scope of the second occuiience of the aiiow is the entiie sentence;
the scope of the fist occuiience of is the undeibiaced pait of the
sentence.
Te defnition of the scope of an occuiience of a connective iefeis
to the sentence, not to any of its abbieviations. So, the scope of the fist
occuiience of the aiiow in
(P P Q}
-- -
(P Q}
Formalisation in Propositional Logic o
is still the undeibiaced pait, because P P is not a pait (subsentence) of
the ieal sentence.
Te pioblem of scope ambiguity highlights a geneial difeience be-
tween natuial languages such as English and foimal languages like L
I
:
while sentences of English aie ofen ambiguous in theii stiuctuie, sen-
tences of L
I
aie nevei stiuctuially ambiguous. Tus, theie is no chance
of tianslating the ambiguous English sentence into an equally ambiguous
sentence of L
I
. Tis will mean that one might have to choose between
difeient possible foimalisations of an English sentence.
Teie aie also two possibilities of foimalising the following sentence:
Biown is in Baicelona and Jones owns a Foid and Smith owns
a Foid.
Te sentence may be foimalised as P Q R, which is shoit foi the
sentence ((P Q} R}, oi, alteinatively as the sentence P (Q R}.
Tese aie two difeient sentences of the language L
I
. But they aie logically
equivalent: the two L
I
-sentences have the same tiuth table. Tus, it is
does not mattei foi the puipose of checking validities of aiguments etc
which foimalisation is used.
,. , 1ui s1:u:vu coic1ivis
Te syntax of the connectives of L
I
is veiy simple: is wiitten in fiont
of a sentence, and the sentence that iesults fiom wiiting in fiont of a
sentence is the negation of that oiiginal sentence Te othei connectives
aie wiitten between sentences, and the entiie stiing of expiessions is
suiiounded by biackets. Te syntax of the coiiesponding expiessions in
English is fai moie complicated.
Te giammai of not is a bit complicated: usually one cannot simply
inseit not into a sentence to obtain the negation of the sentence. Ofen
the sentence is iefoimulated with the auxiliaiy veib to do. Bill does not
wiite an essay is the negation of Bill wiites an essay. But theie aie moie
ways to expiess negation: one could also say Bill wiites no essay; in this
case the negation is expiessed by no.
And and its counteipait seem less pioblematic. In some cases and
does not connect complete sentences:
Liz and Anne aie mountaineeis.
Heie and combines two piopei names. Te sentence, howevei, can be
seen as an abbieviation of a sentence in which and does connect two
sentences:
Liz is a mountaineei and Anne is a mountaineei.
Tis sentence can then be foimalised with the help of . But the tiick
does not always woik. Te sentence
Liz and Anne aie fiiends
can haidly be iephiased as
Liz is a fiiend and Anne is a fiiend.
Some English sentences can be iefoimulated in a way that intioduces
and:
Liz is an Austialian mountaineei
can be iephiased as
Liz is Austialian and Liz is a mountaineei.
Howevei, the sentence
Liz is an avid mountaineei
does not mean the same as
Liz is avid and that Liz is a mountaineei.
Formalisation in Propositional Logic oo
Similaily,
Kentaio is a slim sumo-wiestlei
cannot be iewiitten as
Kentaio is slim and Kentaio is a sumo-wiestlei.
Foi a slim sumo-wiestlei might not be slim at all, but only slim foi a
sumo-wiestlei.
Te connective but and similai woids aie ofen tianslated as , al-
though but ofen indicates a contiast between the two sentences that aie
combined.
Oi is faiily stiaightfoiwaid. Unless is in many uses veiy similai to
oi and may then be tianslated by . Ofen eithei . . . oi . . . is assumed
to be exclusive, that is, Eithei Aoi B is taken to be false, if Aand B aie
both tiue. As a iule of thumb this is coiiect, but sometimes eithei . . . oi
. . . may be equivalent to the simple oi, and in some cases, with some
emphasis, the simple oi may be exclusive.
,. o :1Uv:i i:cU:ci :u vvovosi1io:i iocic
In the pievious sections I have shown how to tianslate English sentences
into sentences of the language L
I
of piopositional logic. Te concepts of
Section :. can now be applied to the sentences that have been obtained
as tianslations.
Te sentence of L
I
that is obtained by translating an English sentence
into the language of propositional logic is the formalisation of that sentence.
I will ofen speak of the foimalisation of an English sentence as if
theie weie always exactly one (best) foimalisation. Of couise one always
has the choice of difeient sentence letteis, and when one is tianslating
a phiase like the exclusive eithei . . . oi . . . , foi which theie is no diiect
equivalent in L
I
, one has a choice between difeient ways of iendeiing
this phiase.
Although these difeient possibilities show alieady that theie cannot
be only a single best foimalisation, the difeiences between these foi-
malisations do not ieally mattei, because these difeiences do not afect
the piopeities of L
I
-sentences I am inteiested in. In paiticulai, one can
ieplace sentence letteis in a tautology, that is, in a logically tiue sentence
of L
I
and one will obtain a tautology again as long the same lettei is in-
seited foi all occuiiences of a given sentence lettei. Tus it does not mattei
with iespect to the piopeity of being logically tiue which sentence letteis
aie used in a tianslation. Also, how exactly a connective such as eithei
. . . oi . . . is tianslated does not mattei foi the piopeity of being logical
tiuth, being valid etc.: whethei Eithei it iains oi it snows, foi instance, is
foimalised as (P Q} (P Q}, oi as P Q, oi as P Q 8with
the obvious dictionaiy) does not mattei foi the validity of an aigument
in which these foimalisations aie used, as all these foimalisations aie
logically equivalent.
In some cases, howevei, theie aie equally coiiect foimalisations of
a sentence that difei in theii ielevant piopeities: one of them may be
logically tiue while the othei is not, foi instance. Ambiguous sentences
may have moie than one foimalisation in L
I
. In such cases one should
be moie piecise and talk about the foimalisation of a sentence undei a
ceitain ieading of that sentence. In what follows I will be less piecise and
mostly ignoie pioblems of ambiguity.
Te notions of Defnition :., will now be applied to foimalisations of
English sentences, and the English sentences will be categoiised accoid-
ingly.
uiiii1io ,.,.
(i) An English sentence is a tautology if and only if its formalisation in
propositional logic is logically true (that is, ip it is a tautology).
(ii) An English sentence is a propositional contradiction if and only if its
formalisation in propositional logic is a contradiction.
(iii) A set of English sentences is propositionally consistent if the set of all
their formalisations in propositional logic is semantically consistent.
Formalisation in Propositional Logic o8
Instead of saying that a sentence is a tautology one can also describe it
as propositionally valid or propositionally true.
Te following sentence is a tautology:
Unless Alfied is an eminent logician, it is not the case that
both Kuit and Alfied aie eminent logicians.
Unless A, B can be iephiased as if not A, then B oi simply as Aoi B. Te
othei steps in the tianslation aie ioutine, and the following L
I
-sentence
is obtained as a tianslation:
P (P Q}.
P: Alfied is an eminent logician.
Q: Kuit is an eminent logician.
Te tiuth table shows that P (P Q} is a tautology by Teoiem :.8 (i):
P Q P (P Q}
T T T T F T T T
T F T T T T F F
F T F T T F F T
F F F T T F F F
Teiefoie, by Defnition ,., (i), the sentence Unless Alfied is an eminent
logician, it is not the case that both Kuit and Alfied aie eminent logicians
is a tautology.
In the foimal language L
I
of piopositional logic, the logically tiue
sentences aie exactly the tautologies. In contiast, in English theie aie
logically tiue sentences that aie not tautologies. Te sentence All logi-
cians aie logicians is logically tiue but it is not a tautology, because the
foimalisation in piopositional logic is a single sentence lettei. A single
sentence lettei nevei is logically tiue, that is, it nevei is a tautology.
Formalisation in Propositional Logic o
Similaily, an English sentence can be contiadiction without being a
piopositional contiadiction: Te sentence Teie is an oak that is not an
oak. is an example.
A set of sentences may be piopositionally consistent without being
consistent. Te inconsistent set containing the thiee sentences All biids
can fy, Tweety is a biid, Tweety cant fy, foi instance, is piopositionally
consistent.
I tuin nowto the foimalisation of entiie aiguments. Te foimalisation
of an aigument in English is that aigument in L
I
that has as its piemisses
all the foimalisations of the piemisses of the English aigument, and has
as its conclusion the foimalisation of the English conclusion.
uiiii1io ,.o. An argument in English is propositionally valid if and
only if its formalisation in L
I
is valid.
Eveiy piopositionally valid aigument is also valid, but not eveiy valid
aigument is piopositionally valid (foi an example see the aigument about
Zeno on page:.,).
Defnition ,.o is a moie foimal elaboiation of the notion of pioposi-
tional validity mentioned on page ::. Using the methods developed one
can check aiguments in English foi theii piopositional validity.
I will considei some examples.
Jones owns a Foid oi Biown is in Baicelona. If Biown is
in Baicelona, Smith is in Baicelona too. But Smith isnt in
Baicelona. Teiefoie, Jones owns a Foid.
Te piemisses of this aigument aie tianslated as the following sentences:
P Q
Q R
R
Te conclusion is then foimalised as the sentence P. Te sentence letteis
stand foi the following English sentences:
Formalisation in Propositional Logic ,o
P: Jones owns a Foid.
Q: Biown is in Baicelona.
R: Smith is in Baicelona.
By Defnition ,.o the English aigument is piopositionally valid if and
only if P Q, QR, R P. Te claim that P Q, QR, R P can
be established, accoiding to Teoiem :.:, by showing that the sentence
(P Q} (QR} R P
is a tautology:
P Q R ((P Q} (Q R}} R P
T T T T T T T T T T F F T T T
T T F T T T F T F F F T F T T
T F T T T F T F T T F F T T T
T F F T T F T F T F T T F T T
F T T F T T T T T T F F T T F
F T F F T T F T F F F T F T F
F F T F F F F F T T F F T T F
F F F F F F F F T F F T F T F
Tus the English aigument is piopositionally valid.
Te following aigument might look puzzling and too optimistic with
iespect to my fnances:
Jones has ten coins in his pocket; and it is not the case
that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Teiefoie theie aie
:oo ooo in my bank account.
Te piemiss can be foimalised as P P, and the conclusion as Q, with
the obvious dictionaiy:
P: Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
Q: Teie aie :oo ooo in my bank account.
By the tiuth-table method one can easily establish P P Q (see
Exeicise o.). Teiefoie the aigument is piopositionally valid.
Te aigument looks so puzzling because theie is no connection be-
tween the piemiss and the conclusion: the piemiss does not seem to
say anything about my bank account. But Chaiacteiisation :., of a valid
aigument does not say that the piemisses of a valid aigument need to be
ielevant in this way to the conclusion. In this case, the piemiss of the
aigument is a (piopositional) contiadiction; thus theie is no inteipieta-
tion that would make the piemiss tiue (and the conclusion false); and,
theiefoie, the aigument is piopositionally valid. Tis piinciple, that any
aigument with a contiadiction as piemiss is called ex falso quodlibet,
which is Latin foi Fiom something false eveiything (follows).
Blocking this kind of aigument might seem desiiable, but it is not a
simple task since abandoning the ex falso quodlibet piinciple will iequiie
abandoning iules that aie ofen applied in ieasoning. Only such simple
iules aie applied in the following aigumentation, which staits fiom Jones
has ten coins in his pocket and it is not the case that Jones has ten coins
in his pocket, and aiiives at the conclusion that theie is :oo ooo in my
bank account.
Jones has ten coins in his pocket. So Jones has ten coins in
his pocket oi theie is :oo ooo in my bank account. But
Jones does not have ten coins in his pocket. Teiefoie theie
is :oo ooo in my bank account.
Te ieasoning may sound odd, but it is haid to tell wheie things go wiong.
If a claim A is tiue, suiely the weakei claim A oi B must be tiue as
well. And fiom an alteinative A oi B and the negation not-A oi the
fist alteinative, one usually concludes B. If these steps may be used to
establish he validity of an aigument, then the above aigument is valid
Blocking the ex falso quodlibet piinciple would involve the iejection of
one of those steps.
Usually when one hits upon a contiadiction, one does not caiiy on
ieasoning but iathei staits to doubt the piemisses. Te ex falso quodlibet
piinciple shows that it is pointless to ieason on the basis contiadictoiy
piemisses, because fiom such piemisses eveiything follows.
Te Syntax of Piedicate Logic
Many aiguments in English aie valid without being piopositionally valid.
Tat is, these aiguments aie valid but when they aie tianslated into the
language L
I
of piopositional logic the iesulting aigument in L
I
is not
valid. An example of a valid aigument that is not piopositionally valid is
the example fiom page :,:
Zeno is a toitoise. All toitoises aie toothless. Teiefoie Zeno
is toothless.
Te aigument is not piopositionally valid because each of the piemisses
and the conclusion have to be tianslated into difeient sentence letteis.
Tis means that in the language of piopositional logic the aigument will
look like this: P, Q R. It is ceitainly not the case that P, Q R. Te
English aigument, howevei, seived as an example of a valid aigument
in Section :.,. In oidei to captuie the validity of aiguments like this one
about Zeno, a foimal language moie poweiful and moie sophisticated
than the language L
I
of piopositional logic is iequiied.
. : vviuic:1is :u qU:1iiic:1io
In this section I shall motivate and intioduce the basic elements of the
syntax of the language L
2
of piedicate logic; the piecise defnition of a
sentence of L
2
will be given in Section .:.
Foi its analysis in piedicate logic, a simple sentence like Tom loves
Maiy must be bioken down into its constituents: the sentence contains
two designatois, Tom and Maiy, that is, two expiessions intended to
denote a single object. Te expiession loves is is a piedicate expiession
Te Syntax of Predicate Logic ,
oi piedicate, foi shoit: it connects the two designatois and expiesses that
a ceitain ielation obtains between Tom and Maiy.
:
Te piedicate loves
can take two designatois. I indicate the slots wheie the singulai teims
can be put by dots: Replacing the two stiings of dots in the piedicate
expiession . . . loves . . . by designatois, iespectively, yields a declaiative
English sentence.
Heie aie fuithei examples of othei sentences built fiom piedicate
expiessions and designatois:
Te lectuie
- - -
designatoi
is boiing
-- -
piedicate
.
Leon
-
designatoi
sees
piedicate
the Eifel Towei
- --
designatoi
.
Te tallest student in Oxfoid
- - -
designatoi
gives
-
piedicate
his fiiend
-- -
designatoi
the CD
- --
designatoi
.
Te tallest student in Oxfoid
- - -
designatoi
gives
-
fist pait
of piedicate
the CD
- --
designatoi
to
-
second
pait of
piedicate
his fiiend
-- -
designatoi
.
Te engineei
- --
designatoi
loosens
-- -
fist pait
of piedicate
the nut
- --
designatoi
with
-
second
pait of
piedicate
the wiench
- - -
designatoi
.
Te piedicates can be simple and consist in just one woid, as is . . .
sees . . . in the second sentence and . . . gives . . . . . . in the thiid; oi they
can be foimed fiom two oi moie woids, as is . . . is boiing in the fist
sentence, . . . gives . . . to . . . in the fouith, and . . . loosens . . . with . . .
in the last.
: Te teiminology in logic difeis heie fiom tiaditional giammai, wheie loves Maiy
would be the piedicate.
Te Syntax of Predicate Logic ,,
In predicate logic predicate expressions are translated into predicate let-
ters. Tese piedicates have an uppei index that coiiesponds to the numbei
of designatois the coiiesponding English piedicate expiession can take.
Foi instance, . . . is boiing, which can take one designatoi, is tianslated
into a piedicate lettei with uppei index I: P
I
, foi instance, is such a piedi-
cate lettei. Te piedicate . . . sees . . . can be tianslated as Q
2
since it can
take two designatois, and . . . gives . . . . . . can be tianslated as R
3
because
it can take thiee designatois. Te uppei index (I, 2, 3 heie) is called the
piedicate letteis aiity-index. A piedicate lettei with uppei index n is
called an n-place piedicate lettei. I-place piedicate letteis aie also called
unaiy, 2-place binaiy and 3-place teinaiy. So, the piedicate expiession
. . . loosens . . . with . . . , foi instance, is tianslated into a teinaiy piedicate
lettei.
It is not haid to fnd English sentences that iequiie 4- oi 3-place
piedicate letteis foi theii foimalisation. Tus, I will include piedicate
letteis with aiity-indices foi any n in the language L
2
of piedicate logic
to make suie that theie is always a sumcient stock of piedicate letteis
available foi the vaiious English piedicates.
I will also include 0-place piedicate letteis in the language L
2
. Tey
aie useful foi foimalising English sentences like It is iaining. It just seems
to be a quiik of the English language that the pionoun it in this sentence
is iequiied; it does not seive the same puipose as the designatois in
the sentences I have consideied so fai; othei languages such as Italian
have dispensed with the pionoun in the coiiesponding sentence. Tus, I
will foimalise the sentence It is iaining and similai sentences as 0-place
piedicate letteis. Tis piovides the ieason foi including 0-place piedicate
letteis in the language L
2
.
Now that I have dealt with piedicates, I will tuin to the foimalisation
of designatois. In the easiest cases the designatois aie piopei names like
Tom, the Eifel Towei, oi the United Kingdom of Gieat Biitain and
Noithein Iieland; othei types of designatois will be discussed latei. Coi-
iesponding to the piopei names of English, the language L
2
of piedicate
logic featuies constants, namely a, b, c, a
I
, b
I
, c
I
, and so on.
Te Syntax of Predicate Logic ,o
Te example sentence Tom loves Maiy fiom the beginning of the
section can now be tianslated into the language L
2
as
P
2
ab.
In such sentences, the piedicate lettei is always put a the beginning of
the sentence. Te piedicate lettei and the two constants aie tianslated as
follows:
P
2
: . . . loves . . .
a: Tom
b: Maiy
Te oidei of the constants in P
2
ab is ciucial: P
2
ba is a foimalisation of
Maiy loves Tom, which says something difeient fiom what Tom loves
Maiy says.
In the dictionaiy, the entiy foi loves contains two stiings of dots.
Tey stand foi the places that aie taken in the sentence by the designatois
Tom and Maiy. In the coiiesponding foimal sentence P
2
ab the fist
place of the binaiy piedicate lettei P
2
is taken by a, and the second place
is taken by b. Now the fist stiing of dots in . . . loves . . . coiiesponds
to the fist place of P
2
and the second stiing of dots coiiesponds to the
second place of P
2
. In oidei to emphasise this coiielation, one can attach
subsciipts to the dots:
P
2
: . . .
I
loves . . .
2
Tis is tantamount to the tianslation foi P
2
given above.
If there are subscripts in the dictionary, the string of dots marked I al-
ways corresponds to the frst place of the predicate letter, the string marked 2
corresponds to the second place of the predicate letter, and so on. Te num-
ber of strings of dots must always correspond to the arity-index of the pred-
icate letter.
Teiefoie, if I had used
P
2
: . . .
2
loves . . .
I
Te Syntax of Predicate Logic ,,
as the entiy foi P
2
, while keeping the entiies foi a and b unchanged, the
piopei tianslation of Tom loves Maiywould be P
2
ba.
As my next example I considei a sentence with a slightly moie com-
plicated piedicate: Te sentence
Ebenezei is a sciooge
can be tianslated into L
2
as the sentence R
I
c, with the following tiansla-
tion of the piedicate lettei and the constant:
R
I
: . . . is a sciooge
c: Ebenezei
Te noun sciooge is not tianslated sepaiately but foims pait of the
piedicate . . . is a sciooge, which is tianslated as the piedicate lettei R
I
.
Typically, phiases of the foim is a . . . aie tianslated as piedicate letteis.
One way to see why . . . is a sciooge can be tianslated as a simple piedicate
lettei only, is to obseive that instead of is a sciooge one could say is
stingy, which obviously can be tianslated as a unaiy piedicate lettei.
Geneially, in the language L
2
an n-place piedicate lettei followed by
n constants yields a sentence. Hence, P
2
ab, that is, a binaiy piedicate
lettei followed by two constants, and R
I
c, that is, a unaiy piedicate lettei
followed by one constant, aie sentences of L
2
. 0-place piedicate letteis
foim a sentence without any fuithei symbol: each 0-place piedicate lettei
is alieady a sentence. Tus, they behave in the same way as the sentence
letteis of the language L
I
of piopositional logic. In fact, I will identify
the 0-place piedicate letteis with sentence letteis; sentence letteis aie,
theiefoie, meiely a ceitain soit of piedicate letteis.
One can build sentences of the language L
2
using connectives in
the same way as in the language L
I
of piopositional logic. Foi instance,
(P
2
ab R
I
c} is the tianslation of the following sentence of L
2
:
Tom loves Maiy and Ebenezei is a sciooge.
Te dictionaiy is the same as above:
Te Syntax of Predicate Logic ,8
P
2
: . . . loves . . .
a: Tom
b: Maiy
R
I
: . . . is a sciooge
c: Ebenezei
Te techniques foi tianslation into piopositional logic caiiy ovei to
piedicate logic (see page o,): Liz is an Austialian mountaineei can be
iephiased as Liz is Austialian and Liz is a mountaineei. Te caveats
explained theie also apply to piedicate logic.
With the techniques developed so fai, ceitain occuiiences of peisonal
pionouns can be ieadily tianslated.
Caesai came, he saw, he won.
Tis can be paiaphiased as the following sentence:
Caesai came and Caesai saw and Caesai won.
Te pionouns (oi iathei theii occuiiences) in this example aie known
as lazy pionouns.
:
Using he heie saves one the efoit of iepeating the
name Caesai. Lazy pionouns can easily be eliminated by iepeating the
name (oi whatevei they iefei back to), and thus theii foimalisations do
not pose any special pioblems.
Teie aie othei uses of pionouns that cannot easily be dispensed with.
If a politician speaks the tiuth, he wont be elected.
In this sentence the pionoun he cannot be ieplaced by a politician. Te
sentence
If a politician speaks the tiuth, a politician wont be elected
has a difeient meaning; it says that some politician will not be elected if
some politician (not necessaiily the same one) speaks the tiuth. In fact,
the oiiginal sentence is equivalent to
: Tis teiminology comes fiom Geach (:o:).
Te Syntax of Predicate Logic ,
All politicians speaking the tiuth aie not elected.
In the oiiginal sentence If a politician speaks the tiuth, he wont be
elected the pionoun is used to expiess a geneialisation. Uses of pionouns
foi the puipose of geneialisation (and some similai puiposes) aie called
quantifcational uses. Quantifcation can be expiessed in many difeient
ways in English. Sometimes pionouns aie used, and sometimes quantif-
cation can be expiessed without pionouns, as is the case with the sentence
All politicians speaking the tiuth aie not elected.
At any iate, the tianslation of quantifcational uses of pionouns ie-
quiies additional iesouices in L
2
beyond the ones I have mentioned so
fai. Peisonal pionouns in English come in difeient gendeis (he, she,
it), in difeient cases (he, him, and so on). Tese difeient foims help
to disambiguate sentences. Heie is a somewhat tiicky case:
If a visitoi wants to boiiow a book fiom the libiaiy, she is
iequiied to complete the foim foi it, which must then be
submitted to a libiaiian, who can giant hei peimission to
check it out, if it looks satisfactoiy to him.
In oidei to make the iefeience of the vaiious occuiiences of the peisonal
pionouns cleaiei, one can attach indices to them:
If a visitoi
I
wants to boiiow a book
2
fiom the libiaiy, she
I
is
iequiied to complete the foim
3
foi it
2
, which
3
must then be
submitted to a libiaiian
4
, who can giant hei
I
peimission to
check it
2
out, if it
3
looks satisfactoiy to him
4
.
It is natuial to assume that the fist and second occuiiences of it iefei
back to book, while the thiid occuiience iefeis back to the foim. Tis
assumption is made explicit by using subsciipts. Natuial languages ofei
othei iesouices foi disambiguation, but indexing is a stiaightfoiwaid
method. Since the help of gendei etc. is no longei iequiied, when the ief-
eience is made cleai by indexing, one can dispense with English pionouns
and ieplace them with what logicians call vaiiables:
Te Syntax of Predicate Logic 8o
If a visitoi x
I
wants to boiiow a book x
2
fiom the libiaiy, x
I
is
iequiied to complete the foim x
3
foi x
2
, which
3
must then
be submitted to a libiaiian x
4
, who can giant x
I
peimission
to check x
2
out, if x
3
looks satisfactoiy to x
4
.
In the sentence vaiiables iefei back to such phiases as a visitoi and some
book. One could intioduce expiessions coiiesponding to these phiases
into the foimal language. Logicians have found a method to simplify
the language fuithei and to manage with just one additional expiession:
Te puipose of expiessions such as a visitoi is to iestiict the focus to
visitois; the above sentence makes a geneial claim about visitois. But one
can ieplace this with a geneial claim about all things (whethei they aie
peisons, animals oi inanimate objects). Instead of saying
Eveiy visitoi is a classicist,
one can say
If something is a visitoi, then it is a classicist
oi
Foi eveiything
I
: if it
I
is a visitoi, then it
I
is a classicist.
By substituting vaiiables one obtains:
Foi all x
I
, if x
I
is a visitoi, then x
I
is a classicist.
Te last foimulation is basically the analysis of typical quantifed state-
ments. Foi all is tianslated as the symbol (a iotated A ieminding one
of all).
Is a visitoi is a piedicate that is tianslated as P
I
, while is a classicist
is tianslated as Q
I
. So x
I
is a visitoi is tianslated as P
I
x
I
, and x
I
is a
classicist becomes Q
I
x
I
. If . . . , then . . . becomes the aiiow, so if x
I
is a
visitoi, then x
I
is a classicist becomes (P
I
x
I
Q
I
x
I
}. Tus the sentence
Eveiy visitoi is a classicist tianslates into the following L
2
-sentence:
x
I
(P
I
x
I
Q
I
x
I
}.
Te Syntax of Predicate Logic 8:
In addition to logicians also use the symbol . In the following
sentence an existence claim is made:
At least one visitoi is a classicist.
If this is iewiitten with vaiiables, then the following expiession is ob-
tained:
Foi at least one x
I
, x
I
is a visitoi and x
I
is a classicist.
Tis is then foimalised as x
I
(P
I
x
I
Q
I
x
I
}.
Latei, foimalisation in piedicate logic will be discussed in moie detail,
but I have now motivated all elements of the syntax of piedicate logic that
will be intioduced in the foimal defnition of a sentence of L
2
.
. : 1ui si1icis oi L
2
In this section the syntax of L
2
is intioduced in a foimally piecise way.
Fiist I tuin to piedicate letteis.
Te language L
2
of piedicate logic contains 0-place piedicate letteis.
Foi simplicity, they do not have an aiity-index, that is, an uppei index;
they aie the sentence letteis P, Q, R, P
I
, Q
I
, and so on. L
2
also contains
piedicate letteis with aibitiaiy aiity-index I, 2, 3, and so on. Having only
one binaiy, that is, 2-place, piedicate lettei will not sumce. In oidei to
foimalise a sentence containing the piedicate expiessions . . . hates . . .
and . . . loves . . . , one will need two distinct binaiy piedicate letteis; and
of couise one might also need a thiid and even moie binaiy piedicate
letteis. In oidei to make suie that theie is always a sumcient stock of
binaiy piedicate letteis, I include infnitely many binaiy piedicate letteis
in L
2
, namely the expiessions P
2
, Q
2
, R
2
, P
2
I
, Q
2
I
, R
2
I
, P
2
2
, and so on. Tis
applies not only to binaiy piedicate letteis but also to piedicate letteis
with othei aiity-indices. Tus, the geneial defnition of piedicate letteis
looks like this:
Te Syntax of Predicate Logic 8:
uiiii1io .: (vviuic:1i ii11ivs). All expressions of the form P
k
n
, Q
k
n
,
or R
k
n
are sentence letters, where k and n are either missing (no symbol) or
a numeral I, 2, 3, . . .
So the lettei P with oi without numeials I, 2, and so on as uppei
and/oi lowei indices is a piedicate lettei, and similaily foi Q and R. Te
sentence letteis P, Q, R, P
I
, Q
I
, . . . aie also piedicate letteis, accoiding to
this defnition. Fuitheimoie, P
I
, Q
I
, R
I
, P
I
I
, Q
I
I
, R
I
I
, P
I
2
, Q
I
2
, R
I
2
, . . . , P
2
I
, Q
2
I
,
R
2
I
, P
2
2
, Q
2
2
, R
2
2
, and so on, aie piedicate letteis. Tis defnition ensuies
that L
2
contains infnitely many n-place piedicate letteis foi any n. Using
only piedicate letteis with P, but not Q oi R, would sumce, but having a
choice between letteis enables me to geneiate moie ieadable foimulae.
0-place piedicate letteis (sentence letteis) have aiity 0; I-place piedi-
cate letteis have aiity I, and so on:
uiiii1io .:. Te value of the upper index of a predicate letter is called
its arity. If a predicate letter does not have an upper index its arity is 0.
Te piedicate lettei P
3
4
, foi example, has aiity 3.
Te language L
2
contains constants, which will be used to tianslate
English piopei names and some similai expiessions.
uiiii1io ., (cos1:1s). a, b, c, a
I
, b
I
, c
I
, a
2
, b
2
, c
2
, a
3
, . . . are con-
stants.
Moieovei, L
2
contains infnitely many vaiiables.
uiiii1io . (v:vi:viis). x, y, z, x
I
, y
I
, z
I
, x
2
, . . . are variables.
Now the notion of an atomic L
2
-foimula can be defned:
uiiii1io ., (:1omic iovmUi:i oi L
2
). If Z is a predicate letter of
arity n and each of t
I
, . . . , t
n
is a variable or a constant, then Zt
I
. . . t
n
is
an atomic formula of L
2
.
In this defnition, the uppei case lettei Z seives as a metavaiiable foi
piedicate letteis, that is, foi P, R
2
43
, Q
I
, and the like. Accoiding to this
defnition, Q
I
x, P
2
c y, P
3
3
x
3I
c
4
y, and R
2
xx aie examples of atomic foimu-
lae. Defnition ., allows foi the case in which n = 0. Tis means that all
Te Syntax of Predicate Logic 8,
sentence letteis, that is, P, Q, R, P
I
, and so on, aie also atomic foimulae.
uiiii1io .o. A quantifer is an expression v or v where v is a vari-
able.
Tus, x
348
and z aie quantifeis.
,
uiiii1io ., (iovmUi:i oi L
2
).
(i) All atomic formulae of L
2
are formulae of L
2
.
(ii) If and are formulae of L
2
, then , ( }, ( }, ( }
and ( } are formulae of L
2
.
(iii) If v is a variable and is a formula, then v and v are formulae
of L
2
.
Examples of foimulae of the language L
2
of piedicate logic aie:
x (P
2
xa Q
I
x},
z
77
y
3
z
43
(P
2
xy x
2
(R
4
3
z
77
c
3
xz
77
Q}},
(x P
I
x y y Q
2
yy},
x z R
2
az.
Teie is no point in tiying to undeistand these foimulae; the point
heie is that they all classify as L
2
-foimulae. In oidei to show that a given
expiession is a foimula of L
2
, one can build up the foimula step by step
accoiding to the iules laid down in Defnition .,. As an example I will
show that the last foimula, (xP
I
x yyQ
2
yy}, is a foimula of L
2
:
:. P
I
is a piedicate lettei by Defnition .: with aiity I (Defnition .:),
and x is a vaiiable by Defnition ..
:. Teiefoie, by Defnition .,, P
I
x is an atomic foimula.
,. x P
I
x is thus a foimula of L
2
by Defnition .,(iii).
. Similaily, Q
2
yy is an atomic foimula (I will not go thiough the
tedious ieasoning of :. and :. again).
, Teie aie alteinative symbols foi and , which will not be used heie: v, v and (v)
aie sometimes used instead of v, and v and v instead of v.
Te Syntax of Predicate Logic 8
,. y Q
2
yy is a foimula of L
2
by .,(iii).
o. y y Q
2
2
by .,(iii).
,. y y Q
2
2
by .,(ii).
8. (x P
I
x y y Q
2
yy} is a foimula of L
2
by .,(ii). Tis follows
fiom the pievious item and ,.
In cases like this, one will be able to see without a long pioof whethei an
expiession is a foimula, and so it will not be necessaiy to go thiough all of
these steps. Te above pioof of the claim that (x P
I
x y y Q
2
yy}
is a foimula only shows how exactly the defnition of L
2
-foimulae woiks.
. , ivii :u voUu occUvvicis oi v:vi:viis
In the foimula x (P
I
x Q
I
x} the last two occuiiences of x iefei back
to oi depend on the quantifei x. In the foimula P
I
x Q
I
x, by contiast,
theie is no quantifei to which they can iefei back; they occui fieely, as
logicians say. In the next defnition this notion of a fiee occuiience of a
vaiiable is made piecise.
uiiii1io .8.
(i) All occurrences of variables in atomic formulae are free.
(ii) Te occurrences of a variable that are free in and are also free in
, , , and .
(iii) In a formula v no occurrence of the variable v is free, all occur-
rences of variables other than v that are free in are also free in
v .
An occurrence of a variable is bound in a formula if and only if it is not
free.
Less foimally speaking, occuiiences of vaiiables aie fiee as long as
they aie not caught by a quantifei. Foi instance, in the atomic foimulae
R
2
xx oi P
I
x all occuiiences of x aie fiee accoiding to clause (i) of the
defnition, and so, accoiding to clause (ii), all occuiiences of x aie fiee in
(R
2
xxP
I
x} and in (P
I
x R
2
aa}. Similaily, all occuiiences of x
I
aie
fiee in (P
I
x
I
Q
I
x
I
}, but, accoiding to clause (iii) of Defnition .8, all
occuiiences of x
I
aie bound in x
I
(P
I
x
I
Q
I
x
I
}. In y (P
I
x
I
Q
I
x
I
}
all occuiiences of the vaiiable x
I
aie fiee because y is a vaiiable difeient
fiom x
I
.
In (Q
I
z z R
2
zz} the fist occuiience of the vaiiable z is fiee, while
the iemaining occuiiences aie bound. In x (R
2
xy R
2
xa} R
2
ax all
but the last occuiience of x aie bound.
uiiii1io .. A variable occurs freely in a formula if and only if there
is at least one free occurrence of the variable in the formula.
As pointed out on page 8o, x
I
(P
I
x
I
Q
I
x
I
} is the foimalisation of
the sentence Eveiy visitoi is a classicist with the following logical foim:
Foi eveiything
I
: if it
I
I
is a classicist.
Te sentence can be tiue oi false depending on the ciicumstances. Te
foimula (P
I
x
I
Q
I
x
I
} coiiesponds to
(F) if it
I
I
is a classicist.
Onits own(F) is not a sentence that is tiue oi false: Teie is no quantifying
phiase like foi eveiything
I
the pionoun it
I
can iefei back to; also, it
I
is
not a lazy pionoun iefeiiing back to a ceitain designatoi. Tus, (F) does
not have a tiuth-value. One can only assign a tiuth-value to (F), if one
makes an aibitiaiy choice and takes it
I
to stand foi a paiticulai thing.
But without such an aibitiaiy choice (F) cannot be assigned a tiuth-value.
Te L
2
-foimulae behave similaily: only foimulae without fiee occui-
iences of vaiiables aie sentences; and only sentences will be assigned
tiuth-values by L
2
-stiuctuies, which will be intioduced in the follow-
ing chaptei. Also, sentences but not foimulae with fiee occuiiences of
vaiiables will be used as piemisses and conclusions in aiguments.
uiiii1io .:o (si1ici oi L
2
). A formula of L
2
is a sentence of L
2
if and only if no variable occurs freely in the formula.
Again infoimally speaking, in a sentence of L
2
all occuiiences of
vaiiables aie caught by some quantifei. Te following aie examples of
Te Syntax of Predicate Logic 8o
L
2
-sentences:
x (P
I
x (Q
2
29
xa x R
3
xax}}
(P
2
ab y(P
2
by x P
2
xy}}
. o1:1io:i covi1ios
In Section :., I intioduced some conventions foi diopping biackets fiom
sentence of L
I
. Tese iules did not foim pait of the omcial syntax of L
I
;
they meiely allow one to abbieviate sentences.
In this section I will specify some iules foi abbieviating foimulae
of L
2
. Again, they do not foim pait of the omcial syntax. Applying the
iules does not yield L
2
-sentences but iathei only abbieviations of L
2
-
sentences. Like the iules foi diopping biackets in L
I
, the conventions
do not have to be applied: one can always wiite down the full foimula
instead of the abbieviated foim.
Te Biacketing Conventions :, apply also to foimulae of L
2
. Te
quantifeis have to be taken into account: In the sentence x(P
I
x Q
I
x}
the biackets aie not outei biackets, so they cannot be diopped. Te
expiession x P
I
x Q
I
x is an abbieviation of the foimula (x P
I
x Q
I
x},
which is not a sentence, because the second occuiience of x is fiee.
As a fuithei example I will considei the following L
2
-sentence:
x ((P
I
x R
2
3
xa} y
2
((R
2
3
xy
2
Q
I
x} P
I
y
2
}} (.:)
Tis sentence may be abbieviated in the following ways:
x (P
I
x R
2
3
xa y
2
((R
2
3
xy
2
Q
I
x} P
I
y
2
}}
x ((P
I
x R
2
3
xa} y
2
(R
2
3
xy
2
Q
I
x P
I
y
2
}}
x (P
I
x R
2
3
xa y
2
(R
2
3
xy
2
Q
I
x P
I
y
2
}}
In the fist line, Biacketing Convention , is applied, in the second Biack-
eting Convention :, and in the thiid both conventions aie applied. Teie
aie no fuithei ways of saving biackets.
Veiy ofen the uppei index of piedicate letteis, that is, theii aiity-
index, is also omitted. Tis is due to the fact that theie is only one way to
add these uppei indices to the piedicate letteis of an expiession that is
supposed to abbieviate a foimula. Teiefoie, sentence (.:) also has
x ((Px R
3
xa} y
2
((R
3
xy
2
Qx} Py
2
}}
as an abbieviation. So, combined with the iules foi diopping biackets,
the most economical foim of (.:) is the following abbieviation:
x (Px R
3
xa y
2
(R
3
xy
2
Qx Py
2
}}
Tus, when the aiity-index is missing, this does not necessaiily mean
that the piedicate lettei is a sentence lettei: it could be an abbieviation of
anothei piedicate lettei fiom which the aiity-index has been omitted.
Abbieviations of foimulae that have been obtained by omitting aiity-
indices can be misleading: one might think that x y (Px Pxy}
abbieviates an L
2
-sentence that contains the same piedicate lettei twice.
Inseiting the missing indices, howevei, shows that the sentence contains
two difeient piedicate letteis, P
I
and P
2
:
x y (P
I
x P
2
xy}
Teiefoie, theie is only one occuiience of P
I
in the foimula and only
one occuiience of P
2
. Te abbieviation x y (Px Pxy} is coiiect
accoiding to the above conventions, but in such cases it may be helpful
to ietain the aiity-indices.
. , iovm:iis:1io
Te basic stiategy foi obtaining the logical foim of an English sentence in
piedicate logic is the same as inpiopositional logic (cf Sections ,.: and ,.,):
a givensentence is analysedfiomtopto bottom. Tat is, one staits withthe
entiie sentence and woiks ones way deepei and deepei into the sentence.
In contiast to piopositional logic, one does not have to stop at quantifed
sentences; one can analyse them in the way outlined in Section .:. In
paiticulai, the logical foim of univeisal sentences is obtained in the way
sketched on page 8o.
Rathei than going ovei the geneial iules again, I will show how the
method woiks by way of some examples. I have alieady dealt with simple
sentences like Tomloves Maiy onpage ,o, so heie I will focus oncomplex
sentences.
Te following sentence is an example of a univeisally quantifed sen-
tence, that is, a sentence making a claim about all objects of a ceitain
soit:
All fiogs aie amphibians.
Fiist, I will deteimine its logical foim. It is cleaily a univeisal claim that
is to be paised as outlined on page 8o:
Foi all x (if x is a fiog, then x is an amphibian).
Te expiession in biackets contains the standaid connective if . . . , then
. . . , so it can be fuithei paised as follows:
Foi all x (if (x is a fiog), then (x is an amphibian)).
Both x is a fiog and x is an amphibian aie enclosed in biackets; they
contain no connectives and aie not quantifed. Is a fiog and is an
amphibian aie then foimalised by two distinct piedicate letteis P
I
and Q
I
,
iespectively. So (x is a fiog) becomes Px (omitting the aiity-index);
and x is an amphibian becomes Qx. Te expiession foi all becomes
the univeisal quantifei , and if . . . , then . . . , the aiiow . So, the
foimalisation is
x (Px Qx},
with the following dictionaiy:
P: . . . is a fiog
Q: . . . is an amphibian
Geneially, univeisal claims can be foimalised this way. Completely
uniestiicted univeisal claims aie iaie, but philosopheis occasionally do
make claims like the following, that aie meant to be completely geneial:
Eveiything is mateiial.
Tis sentence can be foimalised as x Rx, wheie R stands foi is mateiial.
Existential claims aie usually foimalised by the existential quanti-
fei; iestiictions to a ceitain kind of objects is expiessed by conjunction.
Teiefoie, Teie aie poisonous fiogs has the following logical foim:
(R) Teie is at least one x ((x is a fiog) and (x is poisonous))
Te foimalisation is
x(Px Q
I
x}
P: . . . is a fiog,
Q
I
: . . . is poisonous.
Te English phiase No . . . is . . . . can be taken to be a negated existen-
tial quantifcation. Te sentence
No fiog is poisonous.
can be iephiased as
It is not the case that theie aie poisonous fiogs.
It is not the case that is a standaid connective and it is foimalised as . I
have alieady shown how to go about foimalising Teie aie poisonous
fiogs. So the sentence No fiog is poisonous is foimalised as the following
sentence, with the same dictionaiy as above:
x (Px Q
I
x} (.:)
Alteinatively, one could have iephiased the oiiginal sentence No fiog is
poisonous as the following sentence:
Te Syntax of Predicate Logic o
All fiogs aie non-poisonous.
Tis foimalises into x (Px Q
I
x}. Tis sentence and the alteinative
foimalisation (.:) aie logically equivalent undei the semantics I will
expound in Chaptei ,. Both foimalisations aie equally sound.
Te foimalisation of the following sentence iequiies two quantifeis:
Eveiy student has a computei.
Tis is cleaily a univeisal claim; so in the fist step one obtains:
Foi all x (if x is a student, then x has a computei).
Tis is not yet the full logical foim of the sentence: x has a computei
contains an existential claim and can be fuithei analysed as
theie is at least one y (x has y and y is a computei).
Now x has y and y is a computei cannot be fuithei analysed and so
they aie put in biackets:
theie is at least one y ((x has y) and (y is a computei)).
Tus the full logical foim of Eveiy student has a computei is
Foi all x {if (x is a student), then theie is at least one y
((x has y) and (y is a computei)}).
Te foimalisation is now stiaightfoiwaid:
x (Px y(Rxy Qy}}
Te dictionaiy is specifed in the following way:
P: . . . is a student
Q: . . . is a computei
R: . . . has . . .
Te Syntax of Predicate Logic :
Generally, the dictionary must provide translations of all sentence letters,
predicate letters and constants occurring in the formalisation. Howevei,
the dictionaiy must not contain tianslations foi the vaiiables. Vaiiables in
sentences nevei iefei to paiticulai objects; they aie only used foi making
univeisal oi existence claims.
Heie is a somewhat moie complicated example:
If its iaining, then Bill ieads a book oi a newspapei.
{If (its iaining), then theie is at least one x ((Bill ieads x)
and ((x is a book) oi (x is a newspapei))).
Te piopei name Bill is tianslated as a constant; the sentence Its iaining
is tianslated as a sentence lettei:
P x (P
2
ax (Qx Rx}}.
I have diopped the outei biackets accoiding to Biacketing Convention :.
In the dictionaiy I have iestoied all aiity-indices. In paiticulai, one must
avoid any confusions between the sentence lettei (0-place piedicate lettei)
P and the 2-place piedicate lettei P
2
.
P: its iaining,
Q
I
: . . . is a book,
R
I
: . . . is a newpapei,
P
2
: . . . ieads . . .
Teinaiy piedicate letteis aie needed foi foimalising sentences such as
the following:
Teie is a countiy between Spain and Fiance.
Te logical foim of this sentence is
Teie is at least one x {(x is a countiy) and (x is between
Spain and Fiance)).
Te Syntax of Predicate Logic :
By foimalising this, one obtains the following sentence of piedicate logic:
x (Px Qxbc}.
P: . . . is a countiy
Q: . . . is between . . . and . . .
b: Spain
c: Fiance
Using the techniques outlined so fai, one can foimalise faiily com-
plicated sentences. Teie aie, howevei, some pioblem cases. Befoie
discussing moie intiicate pioblems of foimalisation in Chaptei ,, I shall
intioduce the semantics of piedicate logic. Without having discussed
the semantics of L
2
fist, it would be dimcult to judge the soundness of
tianslations between English and the language L
2
.
, Te Semantics of Piedicate Logic
Discussions in metaphysics and in othei aieas in philosophy have been
spuiied by investigations into semantics. Wheieas the semantics of the
language L
I
of piopositional logic is somewhat ciude and philosophically
not veiy exciting, the semantics of the language L
2
of piedicate logic
touches upon questions that aie at the coie of old debates in metaphysics.
In this chaptei I shall confne myself to the technical coie of the se-
mantics of L
2
. Te philosophical issues will iesuiface in latei discussions
about tianslating English sentences into sentences of L
2
. Te technical
account that I am going to piesent can be tiaced back to Taiski (:,o) and
subsequent woik by Taiski, although I will deviate fiom Taiskis oiiginal
appioach in many details and in my notation. Taiskis defnition of tiuth
had a piofound infuence on many aieas not only in philosophy, but also
in mathematical logic, linguistics and computei science.
In English, phiases such as Paiis oi Julius Caesai, which aie usually
foimalised as constants, and piedicate expiessions such as is tiied oi
loves, have fxed meanings. In the language L
2
of piedicate logic, the
constants and piedicate letteis will not be assigned fxed meanings. Tis
is not because it is not possible to assign fxed meanings to them, but
iathei because the validity of aiguments oi the piopeity of being logically
tiue do not depend on the paiticulai meanings of constants and piedicate
letteis. A sentence of the language L
2
will be defned to be logically
tiue, foi instance, if and only if it is tiue undei any inteipietation of the
constants and piedicate letteis. Tus any paiticulai inteipietations of
constants and piedicate letteis do not mattei foi logical tiuth. A similai
iemaik applies to validity: an aigument in L
2
will be defned to be valid
if and only if theie is no inteipietation undei which the piemisses aie all
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic
tiue and the conclusion is false. Tus, again, the validity of an aigument
does not depend on any specifc inteipietation we could assign to the
constants and piedicate letteis.
As in the case of piopositional logic, the notion of an inteipietation
fiomChaiacteiisation :., will be made piecise by the notion of a stiuctuie:
stiuctuies piovide inteipietations foi the non-logical, subject-specifc
vocabulaiy, that is, foi piedicate letteis and constants. Te inteipietation
that is assigned to a symbols by a stiuctuie is called the semantic value
oi the extension of the symbol in the stiuctuie.
,. : s1vUc1Uvis
Te semantics of the language L
2
will be given in the few defnitions
in italics in this chaptei. Te bulk of the chaptei is only an attempt to
motivate and elucidate these defnitions.
I stait by looking back at the semantics of the language L
I
of pioposi-
tional logic: whethei a sentence of the language L
I
is tiue depends on the
tiuth oi falsity of the sentence letteis in that sentence. Te tiuth-values of
all the sentence letteis aie given by an L
I
-stiuctuie. Ten the tiuth tables
of the connectives allow one to calculate the tiuth-values of sentences
foimed with connectives.
Stiuctuies foi piedicate logic aie moie complicated: L
2
-stiuctuies
need to deteimine moie than meiely the tiuth-values of sentence letteis
because the language L
2
contains also othei symbols, namely piedicate
letteis and constants. L
2
-stiuctuies assign semantic values to these sym-
bols as well. Sentence letteis will ieceive tiuth-values as theii semantic
values in the same way as in piopositional logic, but piedicate letteis will
be assigned semantic values of a difeient kind.
Whethei a sentence of L
2
is tiue oi false does not only depend on the
semantic values of the constants and the sentence and piedicate letteis, but
also ovei which objects the quantifeis aie taken to iange. Tis situation
is similai to English: the tiuth-value of the English sentence All glasses
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic ,
aie empty depends in pait on whethei the expiession all glasses is taken
to iange only ovei the glasses on a paiticulai table oi in a paiticulai ioom
oi ovei all glasses in the woild. Te sentence is usually utteied when one
is talking about paiticulai glasses.
Tus, one of the things that an L
2
-stiuctuie does is specify a domain
of discouise, which is just some non-empty set of objects. Teie aie
no iestiictions on the domain of discouise except that it must not be
empty.
:
If A is an L
2
-stiuctuie, I will wiite D
A
foi the stiuctuies domain
of discouise.
In the language L
2
, constants play a iole compaiable to piopei names
in English, and in English piopei names iefei to objects: the English
piopei name Rome iefeis to (oi denotes) the capital of Italy, Volkei
Halbach iefeis to Volkei Halbach, and so on. Tus, an L
2
-stiuctuie
assigns elements of the domain of discouise to the constants as theii
semantic values.
Sentence letteis aie tieated as in piopositional logic: they ieceive
tiuth-values, that is, eithei T oi F, as semantic values in an L
2
-stiuctuie.
Hence, an L
2
-stiuctuie contains also an L
I
-stiuctuie.
Unaiy (:-place) piedicate letteis coiiespond to English expiessions
such as is gieen, walks, oi is a philosophei. Unaiy piedicate letteis
have sets as theii semantic values. Te piedicate lettei P
I
, foi instance,
can have as its semantic value the set of all gieen objects (oi the set of
all walking objects, oi the set of all philosopheis, oi the empty set). On
page :,, sets weie conceived of as unaiy ielations; so piedicate letteis
have unaiy ielations as semantic values, and an L
2
-stiuctuie must assign
unaiy ielations to unaiy piedicate letteis.
: Empty domains aie not allowed in the tiaditional accounts of semantics foi piedicate
logic. Admitting the empty domain would make the semantics foi L
2
moie clumsy, but it
is peifectly possible to admit them. Fioma philosophical point of viewit would piobably
be moie satisfying to admit the empty domain, but I want to avoid the additional
technical complications, and I shall theiefoie follow the tiaditional account. Te efects
of the exclusion of the empty domain will be explained below by means of examples.
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic o
Binaiy piedicate letteis coiiespond to expiessions such as loves oi
is biggei than. Binaiy piedicate letteis aie inteipieted by binaiy ielations,
that is, by sets of oideied paiis. Te piedicate lettei P
2
, foi instance, can
have the ielation of loving, that is, the set of all oideied paiis d, e such
that d loves e, as its semantic value. Tus, an L
2
-stiuctuie must assign
binaiy ielations to binaiy piedicate letteis as theii semantic values.
Analogously, ,-place piedicate letteis aie inteipieted by ,-place iela-
tions, that is, sets of tiiples, and geneially piedicate letteis with aiity n
aie assigned n-aiy ielations (see Section :.).
In the following list I summaiise which objects aie assigned to expies-
sions of L
2
by an L
2
-stiuctuie as theii semantic values oi extensions.
L
2
-expiession semantic value
constant object
sentence lettei tiuth-value
unaiy piedicate lettei set, unaiy ielation
binaiy piedicate lettei binaiy ielation
(= set of oideied paiis)
piedicate lettei of aiity , ,-place ielation
(= set of tiiples)

In sum, an L
2
-structure specifes a non-empty set as domain of dis-
course, it assigns elements of the domain to constants, it assigns a truth-
value to every sentence letter, and it assigns an n-ary relation to every
predicate letter.
Te defnition of an L
2
-stiuctuie can be spelled out moie piecisely
in technical teims. I mention this defnition only foi the sake of those
ieadeis who want the full stoiy. I shall not make use of this defnition in
what follows.
uiiii1io,.: (L
2
-s1vUc1Uvi). AnL
2
-structure is anordered pair D, I
where D is some non-empty set and I is a function from the set of all con-
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic ,
stants, sentence letters and predicate letters such that the value of every con-
stant is an element of D, the value of every sentence letter is a truth-value
T or F, and the value of every n-ary predicate letter is an n-ary relation.
One might wondei why vaiiables aie not mentioned in the defnition
of an L
2
-stiuctuie. But just as he does not stand foi a paiticulai object
in the geneial claim If a ieadei is peiplexed, he stops ieading, a bound
vaiiable does not stand foi a paiticulai object in a sentence of L
2
. Foi this
ieason, L
2
-stiuctuies do not assign semantic values to vaiiables.
Foi technical ieasons, howevei, it is convenient to have semantic
values not only foi sentences but also foi foimulae with occuiiences of
fiee vaiiables. Foimulae with occuiiences of fiee vaiiables will also be
assigned tiuth-values as semantic values. Whethei a foimula like P
I
x
with an occuiience of a fiee vaiiable will ieceive the tiuth-value T oi F
depends on what the vaiiables stand foi in the same way He stops ieading
is tiue oi false foi some peisons but not foi otheis. Moie than one vaiiable
may occui fieely in a foimula of L
2
: whethei the foimula R
2
xy R
I
z
ieceives the tiuth-value T oi F depends on what the vaiiables x, y, and
z stand foi. In addition to L
2
-stiuctuies, I theiefoie intioduce a list that
assigns an object to eveiy vaiiable of L
2
. Tis list afects only the tiuth oi
falsity of foimulae with occuiiences of fiee vaiiables, but it does not afect
the tiuth oi falsity of sentences (that is, foimulae with no fiee vaiiables).
A variable assignment over an L
2
-structure Aassigns to each variable
an element of the domain D
A
of A.
:
Occasionally I will diop the specif-
cation ovei the L
2
-stiuctuie A, when it is cleai fiom the context which
L
2
-stiuctuie is meant.
One may think of a vaiiable assignment as a table with two lines
that has all vaiiables as entiies in the fist line line, and elements of the
domain of discouise as entiies in the othei line. Foi instance, theie is a
vaiiable assignment ovei an L
2
-stiuctuie with the set of all Euiopean
: Moie foimally, one can take a vaiiable assignment ovei D to be a function fiom the set
of all vaiiables into D.
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic 8
cities as domain, that assigns Rome to x, y
I
, and z
I
, Paiis to y, Beilin to
z, London to x
I
, Oslo to x
2
. Te assignment assigns elements to all
fuithei vaiiables, but of couise I cannot specify an infnite list heie. Te
beginning of the vaiiable assignment may be visualised as follows:
x y z x
I
y
I
z
I
x
2
Rome Paiis Beilin London Rome Rome Oslo

An L
2
-stiuctuie Aand a vaiiable assignment ovei Atogethei assign
semantic values to eveiy vaiiable, constant, sentence lettei, and piedicate
lettei. I will write |e|
A
for the semantic value of the expression e in the
L
2
-structure A under the variable assignment over A. Tus, foi any L
2
-
stiuctuie A and any vaiiable assignment ovei A the semantic values of
the iespective L
2
-expiessions aie as follows:
(i) Foi any constant t, |t|
A
is the object in the domain D
A
of Aassigned
to t by A.
(ii) Foi any vaiiable v, |v|
A
is the object in D
A
assigned to the vaiiable v
by the vaiiable assignment .
(iii) Foi any sentence lettei , ||
A
is the tiuth-value (eithei T oi F)
assigned to by A.
(iv) Foi any unaiy piedicate lettei , ||
A
is the unaiy ielation, that is,
the set, assigned to by A.
(v) Foi any binaiy piedicate lettei , ||
A
is the binaiy ielation, that
is, the set of oideied paiis, assigned to by A.
(vi) Foi any ,-aiy piedicate lettei , ||
A
is the ,-aiy ielation, that is,
the set of oideied tiiples, assigned to by A.
And so on foi piedicate letteis of highei aiity.
,
, Teiefoie, if A is the oideied paii D, I, then foi all constants, and sentence and
piedicate letteis ,
A
= I(). Tis is what is expiessed by (i) and (iii)(vi).
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic
,. : 1vU1u
Te function | . . . |
A
gives semantic values foi all vaiiables, constants, sen-
tence letteis, and piedicate letteis. In this section, | . . . |
A
will be extended
to covei complex foimulae as well, that is, foimulae that aie not meie
sentence letteis.
Te defnition in which tiuth values aie assigned to foimulae with
connectives and quantifeis will be inductive. Tat is, fist I shall de-
fne | . . . |
A
foi atomic foimulae (Defnition .,), and then I shall defne
the semantic values of foimulae containing connectives and quantifeis.
Any foimula of L
2
is eithei tiue oi false in an L
2
-stiuctuie A undei a
vaiiable assignment ovei the L
2
-stiuctuie A. Tus, foi any foimula
eithei ||
A
= T oi ||
A
= F obtains (but not both). ||
A
= T is ofen iead
as satisfes in A.
Tis use of the teim satisfes is motivated by its

use in fguies of speech like the piopeity of being red is satisfed by the
apple oi the equation x
2
= y is satisfed by 3 and 9; the only difeience
is that is not a single object but iathei an entiie sequence of objects
pioviding semantic values foi all vaiiables.
Te tiuth-value of atomic foimulae, that is, of sentences such as P
I
b oi
R
2
xc, is defned in the following way: P
I
b, foi instance, is tiue if and only
if the object assigned to b is in the extension (semantic value) of P
I
, that
is, if |b|
A
is an element of the set |P
I
|
A
. Similaily, R
2
xc is tiue if and only
if the oideied paii |x|
A
, |c|
A
, that is, the oideied paii with the value of x
as its fist component and the extension of c as its second component,
is in the extension of R
2
, that is, in the ielation |R
2
|
A
. Teiefoie, the
vaiiable assignment impinges on the tiuth-values of foimulae with
fiee occuiiences of vaiiables, such as R
2
xc, because |x|
A
is given by the
vaiiable assignment .
In the sentence P
I
a the unaiy piedicate lettei P
I
ieceives a unaiy
ielation, that is, some set, as its extension (semantic value). I shall assume
Many authois piefei to wiite A [] oi something similai to expiess that satisfes
the foimula in A.
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic :oo
that |P
I
|
A
is the set Rome, London, Paiis} and |a|
A
is Rome. On that
assumption, P
I
a is tiue because Rome is in the set Rome, London, Paiis},
that is, |a|
A
|P
I
|
A
. Te case of unaiy piedicate letteis is coveied by
the following clause because |a|
A
is the same as |a|
A
accoiding to the
assumption on page :, wheie it has been stipulated that d and d aie the
same foi any object d.
(i) |t
I
. . . t
n
|
A
= Tif and only if |t
I
|
A
, . . . , |t
n
|
A
||
A
, wheie is an
n-aiy piedicate lettei (n must be I oi highei), and each of t
I
, . . . , t
n
is eithei a vaiiable oi a constant.
Tus, this clause deteimines whethei a vaiiable assignment satisfes a
foimula like P
I
a, P
I
x, R
2
xy, oi Q
3
xc y in a stiuctuie.
If a foimula is built up by means of connectives fiom othei sentences,
then tiuth-values can be assigned to this foimula in the style of the De-
fnition :.o of tiuth in an L
I
-stiuctuie: foi instance, if the L
2
-foimulae
and both have semantic value T, then the foimula should also
have tiuth-value T; otheiwise it should have F as its extension (semantic
value). Tus, a vaiiable assignment satisfes the foimula in an
L
2
-stiuctuie, if and only if satisfes and in that stiuctuie. Similaily
a vaiiable assignment satisfes a foimula in an L
2
-stiuctuie, if and
only if does not satisfy itself in the stiuctuie. Tis can be expiessed
moie foimally by the following two defnitional clauses:
(ii) ||
A
A
= F.
(iii) | |
A
A
= T and ||
A
= T.
Te clauses (iv)(vi) foi the iemaining thiee connectives , , and aie
similai and will be listed below.
It iemains to defne the semantic value, that is, the tiuth-value, of
quantifed foimulae fiom the semantic values of shoitei foimulae. Tat
is, I want to fnd clauses analogous to (i) and (ii) foi quantifeis. As an
example I considei the following L
2
-sentence:
x Rxy
Whenshould a vaiiable assignment satisfy this foimula ina stiuctuie A:
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic :o:
Assume, foi instance, that the vaiiable assignment looks like this:
x y z x
I
y
I
z
I
x
2
Rome Paiis Beilin London Rome Rome Oslo

In this case | y|
A
is Paiis.
Assuming that R is tianslated as . . . is smallei than . . . , the foimula
x Rxy coiiesponds to the English phiase Teie is something smallei
than it. Te pionoun it plays the iole of the vaiiable y that occuis fieely
in x Rxy. Now Teie is something smallei than it is satisfed by Rome
(which is assigned to y by ) if theie is something smallei than Rome,
that is, if theie is something (foi it
I
) satisfying it
I
is smallei than it
2
when it
2
is taken to stand foi Rome.
One can expiess this moie piecisely and peispicuously in teims of
vaiiable assignments foi the foimal language L
2
: the vaiiable assignment
satisfes x Rxy if and only if theie is a vaiiable assignment satisfying
Rxy that difeis fiom at most in what is assigned to x. Teie is such
a vaiiable assignment , assuming that |R|
A
is a ielation containing the
paii Oslo, Rome:
x y z x
I
y
I
z
I
x
2
Oslo Paiis Beilin London Rome Rome Oslo

Tis vaiiable assignment difeis fiom only in the entiy foi x. Since
theie is such a vaiiable assignment, satisfes the foimulae xRxy (in a
stiuctuie A wheie Oslo, Rome is an element of the extension |R|
A
of
R).
Of couise the vaiiable assignment must not difei in the entiy foi
y, as the question is whethei the vaiiable assignment satisfes xRxy,
that is, whethei xRxy is tiue when y is taken to stand foi Rome.
Geneially, a vaiiable assignment satisfes a foimula x if and only
if theie is a vaiiable assignment satisfying that difeis fiom only
in the entiy foi x. may have fiee occuiiences of othei vaiiables than
y; foi this ieason must agiee with on all vaiiables with the possible
exception of x.
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic :o:
So I defne foi all vaiiables v and foimulae :
(viii) |v |
A
A
= T foi at least one vaiiable assign-
ment ovei Adifeiing fiom in v at most.
By saying that difeis fiom in v at most, I mean that |u|
A
= |u|
A
foi all vaiiables u with the possible exception of v. Hence, in teims of
tables, a vaiiable assignment and a vaiiable assignment difei in a
given vaiiable v at most, if the they agiee in all columns with the possible
exception of the column foi the vaiiable v. Te two tables above aie an
example of two vaiiable assignments difeiing in x.
Univeisal quantifeis can be tieated in a similai way. When should
one say, foi instance, that a vaiiable assignment satisfes the foimula
y (Rxy Ryz} in a stiuctuie A: Tat is, when should the following
obtain:
|y (Rxy Ryz}|
A
= T
y expiesses geneiality. will satisfy y (Rxy Ryz} in A if and only
if eveiything in the domain of A will make Rxy Ryz tiue if it is taken
to stand foi y (with the values of x and z unchanged fiom ). Tus,
satisfes y (Rxy Ryz} in A if and only if eveiy that difeis fiom
only in y satisfes Rxy Ryz in A.
Tis can be geneialised to all vaiiables v and L
2
-foimulae : a vaiiable
assignment satisfes a foimula v in a stiuctuie A if and only if eveiy
vaiiable assignment that difeis fiom at most inv satisfes . Of couise,
only vaiiable assignments ovei Aaie consideied: the vaiiable assignments
can only assign objects fiom the domain of Ato the vaiiables.
Te geneial clause can now be stated as follows:
(vii) |v |
A
A
= T foi all vaiiable assignments
ovei Adifeiing fiom in v at most.
I will now collect the difeient clauses into a defnition of satisfaction.
Given an L
2
-stiuctuie, this defnition deteimines foi any vaiiable assign-
ment and any L
2
-foimula whethei satisfes in A, that is, whethei
||
A
= T oi ||
A
= F.
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic :o,
uiiii1io ,.: (s:1isi:c1io). Assume Ais an L
2
-structure, is a vari-
able assignment over A, and are formulae of L
2
, and v is a variable.
For a formula either ||
A
= T or ||
A
= F obtains. Formulae other than
sentence letters then receive the following semantic values.
(i) |t
I
. . . t
n
|
A
= T if and only if |t
I
|
A
, . . . , |t
n
|
A
||
A
, where is a
n-ary predicate letter (n must be I or higher), and each of t
I
, . . . , t
n
is either a variable or a constant.
(ii) ||
A
A
= F.
(iii) | |
A
A
= T and ||
A
= T.
(iv) | |
A
A
= T or ||
A
= T.
(v) | |
A
A
= F or ||
A
= T.
(vi) | |
A
A
= ||
A
.
(vii) |v |
A
A
= T for all variable assignments
over A dipering from in v at most.
(viii) |v |
A
A
= T for at least one variable assign-
ment over A dipering from in v at most.
Ingeneial, what assigns to vaiiables not occuiiing fieely ina foimula
does not impinge on whethei satisfes in A. So, if ||
A
= T, and if
is a vaiiable assignment difeiing fiom only in vaiiables that do not
occui fieely in , then also ||
A
= T. In paiticulai, the vaiiable v does
not occui fieely in a foimula of the foimv . Tus, satisfes v in
A independently of what assigns to the vaiiable v. A similai iemaik
applies to foimulae with a univeisal quantifei.
If is a sentence, that is, if no vaiiable occuis fieely in then ||
A
does not depend on the vaiiable assignment at all at all. Hence, if
is a sentence, then ||
A
is the same tiuth value as ||
A
foi all vaiiable
assignments ovei A.
In oidei to simplify the notation one may diop the index foi the
vaiiable assignment and wiite ||
A
if is a sentence. In geneial, one can
diop the vaiiable assignment when the semantic value is the same foi
all vaiiable-assignments. Tis is the case foi constants, sentence letteis,
piedicate letteis, and sentences.
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic :o
Tiuth in an L
2
-stiuctuie is now defned in teims of satisfaction:
uiiii1io ,., (1vU1u). A sentence is true in an L
2
-structure Aif and
only if ||
A
= T for all variable assignments over A.
As pointed out above, the tiuth-value of a sentence in a stiuctuie is the
same foi all vaiiable assignments. Teiefoie, if a sentence is satisfed (in a
stiuctuie) by some vaiiable assignment, it will be satisfed by all vaiiable
assignments. Consequently, a sentence is tiue in an L
2
-stiuctuie Aif
and only if ||
A
= T foi at least one vaiiable assignment ovei A.
Te Defnition ,., of tiuth has geneiated and continues to geneiate
extensive discussion. Te views on its philosophical value difei wildly.
At any iate, Defnition ,., has been a big success as a tool in philosophy,
mathematics, computei science and linguistics. Te extent to which this
defnition can also be adapted to natuial languages such as English is also
a mattei of some contioveisy.
As an example I will considei a specifc L
2
-stiuctuie, which I call E.
Its domain of discouise is the set of all Euiopean cities. It assigns the
set Floience, Stockholm, Baicelona} to Q
I
, the ielation of being smaller
than to R
2
, Floience to a, and London to b. Tis infoimation can be
displayed in the following way:
|Q
I
|
E
= Floience, Stockholm, Baicelona},
|R
2
|
E
= |d, e d is smallei than e |,
|a|
E
= Floience,
|b|
E
= London.
Tus, |R
2
|
E
is the set Floience, London, Floience, Biimingham,. . . }.
I have diopped the index foi the vaiiable assignment and wiitten |Q
I
|
E
iathei than |Q
I
|
E
since vaiiable assignments do not afect the semantic
values of piedicate letteis and constants.
,
ix:mvii ,.. Te sentence R
2
ab is tiue in E.
, What is assigned to othei constants, sentence and piedicate letteis is iiielevant foi the
Proof. Since Floience is smallei thanLondon, the paii Floience, London
is an element of the ielation of being smaller than, and I can ieason as
follows (the comments to the iight explain what justifes the pioof step
on the lef):
Floience, London |d, e d is smallei than e |
|a|
E
, |b|
E
|R
2
|
E
defnition of E
|R
2
ab|
E
= T Defnition ,.:(i)
Tis shows that R
2
ab is tiue in E.
ix:mvii ,.,. Te sentence x (Q
I
x R
2
xb} is tiue in E.
Proof. Let be an aibitiaiy vaiiable assignment. I distinguish two cases.
Fiist case: |x|
E
is in |Q
I
|
E
, that is, |x|
E
is eithei Floience, Stockholm, oi
Baicelona. As all thiee cities aie smallei than London, and |b|
E
is London,
one has the following:
|x|
E
, |b|
E
|R
2
|
E
|R
2
xb|
E
|Q
I
x R
2
xb|
E
= T Defnition ,.:(v)
Second case: |x|
E
is not in |Q
I
|
E
. In this case one can pioceed as
follows:
|x|
E
is not in |Q
I
|
E
|Q
I
x|
E
= F Defnition ,.:(i)
|Q
I
x R
2
xb|
E
following. Foi the sake of defniteness, I could stipulate that E assigns the empty set
as extension to all piedicate letteis othei than Q
I
and R
2
, T to all sentence letteis, and
Rome to all constants othei than a and b.
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic :oo
Teiefoie, in both cases, that is, foi eveiy vaiiable assignment ovei E,
the following obtains:
|Q
I
x R
2
xb|
E
= T.
Consequently, accoiding to Defnition ,.:(vii), |x (Q
I
x R
2
xb}|
E
= T
foi eveiy vaiiable assignment . Hence, by Defnition ,.,, the sentence
x (Q
I
x R
2
xb} is tiue in E.
Te fnal example sentence contains two quantifeis.
ix:mvii ,.o. Te sentence x y (R
2
xy R
2
yx} is tiue in E.
Proof. Let be an aibitiaiy vaiiable assignment ovei E.
Fiist case: |x|
E
is not London (the laigest city in Euiope). Ten change
the entiy foi y into London (if it is not alieady London) and call the
iesulting vaiiable assignment . By defnition, difeis fiom in y at
most. Since eveiy Euiopean city except London itself is smallei than
London, one has the following:
|x|
E
, | y|
E
|R
2
|
E
|R
2
xy|
E
|R
2
xy R
2
yx|
E
= T Defnition ,.:(iv)
|y (R
2
xy R
2
yx}|
E
= T Defnition ,.:(viii)
Te last line holds because difeis fiom at most in y.
Second case: |x|
E
is London. Change the entiy foi y in into Floience
(oi any othei Euiopean city smallei than London), and call this vaiiable
assignment ; it difeis fiom only in y. Te fist of the following lines
holds because | y|
E
is Floience, which is smallei than |x|
E
, that is, London:
| y|
E
, |x|
E
|R
2
|
E
|R
2
yx|
E
|R
2
xy R
2
yx|
E
|y (R
2
xy R
2
yx}|
E
Te last line holds, because difeis fiom in y at most.
Teiefoie, I have pioved that |y(R
2
xyR
2
yx}|
E
= T foi any vaiiable
assignment ovei E. Accoiding to Defnition ,.:(vii) this implies by that
|xy (R
2
xy R
2
yx}|
E
= T,
which shows that the sentence is tiue in E.
In piactice haidly anyone will go thiough all these steps explicitly.
Te foiegoing examples should have illustiated how the semantics foi
the language of piedicate logic woiks and how the tiuth oi falsity of all
sentences is deteimined by an L
2
-stiuctuie.
,. , v:iiui1v, iocic:i 1vU1us, :u co1v:uic1ios
With the defnition of tiuth in hand one can now defne such notions as
logical tiuth, contiadiction, the validity of an aigument, and so on. Te
following defnition is analogous to Defnition :., foi piopositional logic.
uiiii1io ,.,.
(i) A sentence of L
2
is logically true if and only if is true in all L
2
-
structures.
(ii) A sentence of L
2
is a contradiction if and only if is not true in
any L
2
-structure.
(iii) A sentence and a sentence are logically equivalent if both are
true in exactly the same L
2
-structures.
(iv) A set of L
2
-sentences is semantically consistent if and only if there
is an L
2
-structure Ain which all sentences in are true. As in propo-
sitional logic, a set of L
2
-sentences is semantically inconsistent if and
only if it is not semantically consistent.
Also, the defnition of validity of an aigument in L
2
follows the pattein
set out in the defnition of validity of an aigument in piopositional logic,
that is, in Defnition :..
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic :o8
uiiii1io ,.8. Let be a set of sentences of L
2
and a sentence of L
2
.
Te argument with all sentences in as premisses and as conclusion is
valid if and only if there is no L
2
-structure in which all sentences in are
true and is false.
Tis just captuies the intuitive idea that an aigument is valid if and
only if any L
2
-stiuctuie that makes the piemisses tiue also makes the
conclusion tiue.
Tat the argument with all sentences in as premisses and as con-
clusion is valid, is abbreviated as . Instead of one can also say
follows from . Te symbol is the negation of , so, it is defned as
follows. if and only if not .
I have not excluded the possibility that theie is not piemiss at all in
an aigument. So, may be the empty set. If is the empty set and ,
one may also simply wiite . As I have said above, means that
is tiue in all L
2
-stiuctuies in which all sentences in aie tiue. Now if
theie aie no sentences in , one has if and only if is tiue in all
stiuctuies. Consequently, means that is tiue in all L
2
-stiuctuies
tout couit; that is, it means that is logically tiue.
I intioduce a fuithei notational convention, alieady adoptedfoi piopo-
sitional logic: When the sentences in aie wiitten out explicitly, the set
biackets aiound the sentences may be diopped: Foi instance, one may
wiite
x Qx, x (Qx Rx} x Rx
iathei than the following:
|x Qx, x (Qx Rx}| x Rx.
,. coU1ivix:mviis
How can one show that an aigument in is valid: And how can one show
that it is not valid:
Foi the language L
I
of piopositional logic, these question aie usually
easily answeied (if theie aie not too many oi too long sentences involved):
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic :o
One can check out whethei an aigument in L
I
is valid by means of a tiuth
table.
Geneially, in the language L
2
, it is much haidei to show that an
aigument is valid oi not. Teie is not a fnite set of possibilities one
can check out in oidei to fnd out whethei an aigument is valid oi not.
Teie aie infnitely many domains of discouise, and even a single binaiy
piedicate lettei can be inteipieted by infnitely many binaiy ielations.
Showing that an L
2
-aigument is valid by pioving that the conclusion is
tiue in all L
2
-stiuctuies in which all the piemisses aie tiue is, theiefoie,
usually a dimcult task. A moie emcient and elegant way of establishing
that an aigument in L
2
is valid will be intioduced in the next chaptei.
In oidei to show that an aigument is not valid, howevei, one does
not have to piove something about all L
2
-stiuctuies; one has only to fnd
an L
2
-stiuctuie in which all piemisses of the aigument aie tiue and its
conclusion is false. Such L
2
-stiuctuies aie called counteiexamples. In
this section I will explain how to use counteiexamples to dispiove the
validity of aiguments.
An L
2
-structure A is a counterexample to an argument if and only if
all premisses of the argument are true in Aand the conclusion is false in A.
As explained above, a sentence is logically valid if and only if the
aigument with no piemisses and the sentence as its conclusion is valid.
Tus, one can use counteiexamples to showthat a sentence is not logically
tiue:
An L
2
-structure is a counterexample to an L
2
-sentence if the sentence
is not true in it. An L
2
-sentence is logically true if and only if there are no
counterexamples to it.
I will piove the following claim by means of a counteiexample.
ix:mvii ,.. Te sentence Qb x Qx is not logically tiue.
In oidei to fnd a counteiexample to this sentence, one could ieason
infoimally as follows: b could satisfy Q, but othei objects might not
satisfy Q and thus x Qx would be false. One can tuin this into a pioof.
Fiist, an L
2
-stiuctuie with a domain of discouise containing at least two
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic ::o
objects is iequiied. And then, the object that is the semantic value of b
needs to be in the set that is the semantic value of Q, while one of the
othei objects is not in this set. Now this can be tuined into a piopei pioof
of the claim that Qb x Qx is not logically tiue:
Proof. Let B be an L
2
-stiuctuie with the set I, 2} as its domain of dis-
couise and the following semantic values foi Q and b:
o
|Q|
B
= I},
|b|
B
= I.
I will now show that Qb x Qx ieceives the semantic value F
in this L
2
-stiuctuie. Let be the vaiiable assignment that assigns 2 to
eveiy vaiiable, so |x|
B
= 2. Now one can ieason as follows, using as an
abbieviation foi is not an element of :
2 ] I}
|x|
B
] |Q|
B
defnition of and B
|Qx|
B
|x Qx|
B
= F Defnition ,.:(vii)
I I}
|b|
B
|Q|
B
defnition of B
|Qb|
B
|Qb x Qx|
B
= F Defnition ,.:(v)
By the Defnition ,., of tiuth, Qb x Qx is not tiue in B and thus,
accoiding to Defnition ,.,(i), Qb x Qx is not logically tiue.
o Foi the sake of defniteness I should specify also the value of othei constants, sentence
and piedicate letteis. But as they do not make a difeience to the tiuth-values of sentences,
I will not specify them in this and the following examples.
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic :::
In oidei to show that Qb x Qx is not logically tiue, I could have
employed objects othei than the numbeis I and 2. Te two numbeis aie
convenient because of theii shoit names. Teie is no need to use moie
fancy objects. Geneially, it is sensible to keep things simple by choosing
small domains of discouise. In some cases, howevei, it may be necessaiy
to use laige domains; theie aie even cases wheie the domain has to be
infnite.
Next I will tuin to an aigument.
ix:mvii ,.:o. x y Rxy y x Rxy.
Te piemiss could be the tianslation of a sentence such as Foi eveiy-
thing theie is something with the same mass; the conclusion would then
be the tianslation of Teie is something that has the same mass as any
object. If theie aie exactly two things difeiing in mass, then Foi eveiy-
thing theie is something with the same mass is tiue, because eveiy object
agiees with itself in its mass, and the conclusion is false, because the mass
of neithei of the two objects matches the mass of the othei object. Hence,
one can use an L
2
-stiuctuie with a domain containing exactly two objects.
R needs to have a ielation as extension that ielates eveiy object to itself
but not to the othei object in the domain.
Proof. Te L
2
-stiuctuie C is defned as follows:
D
C
= the sun, the moon},
|R|
C
= |the sun, the sun, the moon, the moon|.
Fiist I will show that the piemiss is tiue in the L
2
-stiuctuie C. Let be
an aibitiaiy vaiiable assignment ovei C. Ten change the value of x so
that the values of x and y aie the same, that is, change the entiy foi x into
the sun if | y|
C
is the sun and into the moon if | y|
C
is the moon; call the
iesulting vaiiable assignment . Te fist line in the following pioof, then,
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic :::
holds in viitue of the defnition of |R|
C
, and because |x|
C
= | y|
C
.
|x|
C
, | y|
C
|R|
C
|Rxy|
C
|y Rxy|
C
|x y Rxy|
C
= T Defnition ,.:(vii)
Te last line holds because the foiegoing ieasoning applies to all vaiiable
assignments . Hence, the piemiss is tiue in C.
It iemains to show that the conclusion is false in C. Assume to the
contiaiy that y x Rxy is tiue in C. Ten, by Defnition ,.:(viii), theie
is a vaiiable assignment such that the following holds:
|x Rxy|
C
= T.
Tus, by Defnition ,.:(vii),
|Rxy|
C
= T
foi eveiy vaiiable assignment that difeis fiom at most in x. But this
is not the case since one can choose a vaiiable assignment such that
|x|
C
is difeient fiom | y|
C
and so |x|
C
, | y|
C
is not in |R|
C
.
Since the piemiss is tiue in C and the conclusion is false in C, the
aigument is not valid.
ix:mvii ,.::. x (Px Qx Rx}, Pa Ra.
To motivate the counteiexample below one can ieason as follows: Te
piemiss Pa must be tiue in the counteiexample, call it D, so |a|
D
must
be in |P|
D
. Te piemiss x(Px Qx Rx} theiefoie implies that |a|
D
is
eithei in |Q|
D
oi in |R|
D
. So if the piemiss is to be tiue at least one of the
lattei must be the case. As the conclusion Ra must be false, |a|
D
must
not be in |R|
D
, and, theiefoie, |a|
D
must be an element of |Q|
D
. So, one
can employ a counteiexample with a single object in its domain, wheie
that object is in the extensions of P and Q while the extension of R is the
empty set:
, Te Semantics of Predicate Logic ::,
Proof. Te following L
2
-stiuctuie is a counteiexample:
D
D
= I},
|a|
D
= I,
|P|
D
= I},
|Q|
D
= I},
|R|
D
= .
Teie is only one vaiiable assignment ovei D because its domain D
D
contains only one object and eveiy vaiiable is assigned the numbei I.
Teiefoie, |x|
D
= I foi all vaiiable assignments . To show that the fist
piemiss is tiue, one can ieason as follows:
I I}
|x|
D
|Q|
D
defnitions of and D
|Qx|
D
|Qx Rx|
D
|Px Qx Rx|
D
Since this holds foi all vaiiable assignments ovei D, as is the only such
vaiiable assignment, x (Px Qx Rx} is tiue in D.
Te second piemiss is also tiue in D:
I I}
|a|
D
|P|
D
defnitions of D
|Pa|
D
Te conclusion, howevei, is false in D:
I
|a|
D
|R|
D
defnitions of D
|Ra|
D
Tis shows that both piemisses aie tiue and that the conclusion is false in
D. Teiefoie, the aigument is not valid.
o Natuial Deduction
A valid aigument need not be obviously valid. One can establish the
validity of such an aigument by bieaking it into smallei aiguments and by
showing that one can pass fiom the piemisses to the conclusion thiough
a sequence of small and obvious steps. Tat is, one pioves the conclusion
fiom the piemisses via inteimediate conclusions: the oiiginal piemisses
aie used to deiive obvious conclusions, which in tuin aie employed in the
next step as piemisses to deiive fuithei conclusions, and so on, until the
oiiginal conclusion is obtained. Such a sequence of obvious aiguments is
called a pioof.
Whethei a step is obvious depends on the peispective. Howevei,
one might tiy to show that theie is a fxed list of simple pioof iules
that aie sumcient foi establishing the validity of any valid aigument.
Te iules should be foimulated in a way that makes it easy to check
whethei any given step in a pioof confoims to one of these iules. If a set
iules that can be used in pioofs is fxed, then theie cannot be a seiious
disagieement about the admissibility of any given step in a pioof, and
theie is an objective notion of pioof.
Foi the languages L
I
and L
2
of piopositional and of piedicate logic
one can piovide such a list of admissible iules that legitimate steps in a
pioof.
It is obvious foi which aiguments theie should be pioofs: fist, theie
should be pioofs foi valid aiguments only. Foimally speaking, it must not
be possible to pass fiom the piemisses in a set to a sentence , if it is not
the case that . Te iules must be sound in this sense. Second, the
pioof iules should be complete in the sense that theie should be pioofs
foi all valid aiguments: if , then it should be possible to ieach
o âtural Deduction ::,
fiom the piemisses in by going thiough pioof steps that confoim to the
iules foi pioofs.
In oidei to show that , one can then simply give a pioof iathei
than aigue using L
2
-stiuctuies as in the pievious chaptei. Tis will gieatly
facilitate establishing the validity of aiguments in piedicate logic.
Logicians have devised vaiious pioof systems foi difeient puiposes:
some systems aie easy to implement on computeis, otheis aie veiy easy
to state (but haid to woik in), still otheis facilitate geneial investigations
into the notion of piovability. I will employ a system that enables one to
use pioof steps that aie not dissimilai to the steps people take in eveiyday
ieasoning. Te the iules I will specify should be intuitively plausible, but
not eveiy intuitively sound step is a peimissible iule in the system: the
system has not been designed to be as emcient as possible. It is devised
to show that any pioof can be bioken down into simple and elementaiy
steps of veiy few types. If the objective weie a veiy emcient pioof system,
moie iules would have to be added.
Because the pioof iules aie faiily close to pioof steps used in infoimal
pioofs, systems of the kind desciibed in this chaptei aie called Natuial
Deduction systems. Tey weie intioduced independently by Jakowski
(:,) and Gentzen (:,,). Te system I am going to piesent is a vaiiation
of Gentzens veision.
Pioofs in Natuial Deduction stait with an assumption. Any sentence
can be assumed:
assumption rule Te occurrence of a sentence with no sen-
tence above it is an assumption. An assumption of is a proof
of .
It may seem somewhat odd that the solitaiy occuiience of a sentence
is alieady a pioof, but it is convenient to considei a line with a single
sentence as a pioof of fiom the assumption , because this makes the
following defnitions moie stiaightfoiwaid.
Eveiy pioof begins with assumptions. Te fuithei iules foi pioofs
show how to extend a pioof, that is, how to foim longei and longei
o âtural Deduction ::o
pioofs by adding fuithei sentences. When stating the iules I will talk
about appending sentences to alieady existing pioofs. By this I mean the
following: one appends a sentence to a pioof by diawing a hoiizontal
line undei the pioof and then wiiting undei this line. One appends
a sentence to two (oi thiee) pioofs by wiiting the pioofs side by side,
then diawing a single line undei all of these pioofs, and then wiiting
undei that single line.
All the iules enable one to append only a single sentence in a given
step. Tus, in eveiy pioof theie is always a single sentence at the bottom
(oi the ioot) of the pioof. Te pioof is a pioof of this sentence . Pioofs
have theiefoie the shape of (upwaid-bianching) tiees.
Foi each connective and quantifei theie is an intioduction iule and
an elimination iule. I shall use abbieviations: foi instance, Intio is
shoit foi -intioduction iule.
o. : vvovosi1io:i iocic
Foi the sake of those who aie concentiating just on piopositional logic, I
shall only use examples in L
I
in this section. Nonetheless, the iules apply
equally to piedicate logic.
I will stait with the iules foi conjunction:
Intro Te result of appending to a proof of and a
proof of is a proof of .
Giaphically, this iule allows one to wiite a pioof ending with and a
pioof ending with side by side, to diaw a hoiizontal line below both,
and to wiite undei this line. Tus an application of the iule will
have the following shape:
Intio

Te assumptions in the pioof of aie all the assumptions in the pioofs
of and , iespectively, because any assumption in the pioof of oi ,
that is, any sentence with no othei foimula above it in the pioofs of oi
, will also be an assumption in the pioof of , that is, it will not have
a sentence above it in the pioof of .
Te oidei of the pioofs of and does not mattei. Te iule does
not iequiie that the pioof of is wiitten to the lef. So an application of
Intio can also look like this:
Intio

Te same applies to othei iules: in iules wheie a sentence is appended to
two (oi in one case thiee) pioofs, the iules allow one to wiite down the
pioofs in any oidei.
Foi theie aie two elimination iules:
Elim: Te result of appending to a proof of is a proof
of .
Te othei iule allows one to keep :
Elim: Te result of appending to a proof of is a proof
of .
Te two iules can be depicted as follows:

Elim:

Elim:
Te fist iule allows one to diop the second pait of the conjunction, the
second iule allows one to diop the fist pait.
With these iules in hand I can alieady constiuct a pioof. Fiist, I will
assume (P Q} R. Te iule Elim: allows me to append P Q to the
pioof, and Elim: allows me to append Q to the iesulting pioof. So I can
obtain a pioof of Q undei the assumption (P Q} R:
o âtural Deduction ::8
(P Q} R
Elim:
P Q
Elim:
Q
Te labels Elim: and Elim: do not belong to the pioof; they aie
meie comments that aie intended to help the ieadei to giasp the pioof.
Occasionally, when I think that the labels will facilitate undeistanding, I
will add them.
Next I shall specify iules foi the aiiow . In oidei to motivate the
intioduction iule foi the aiiow, I will look at how one might establish
and if . . . , then . . . like the following:
(A) If CO
2
-emissions aie not cut, tempeiatuies will iise globally.
To deiive the conclusion, one will use additional assumptions about cli-
mate change, the gieenhouse efect and so on, which I will not specify
heie. Using these additional assumptions, one could aigue as follows foi
(A):
Assume that CO
2
-emissions aie not cut. Ten the CO
2
-level
in the atmospheie . . . [now one uses the additional assump-
tion, piobably talking about the gieenhouse efect, and con-
cludes:] so tempeiatuies will iise globally. Teiefoie, if CO
2
-
emissions aie not cut, tempeiatuies will iise globally.
One makes the assumption that CO
2
-emissions aie not cut only in oidei
to showthat in that case tempeiatuies will iise globally. Tis assumption is
made only foi the sake of the aigument and once (A) has been concluded,
one is no longei assuming that CO
2
-emissions aie not cut. Te pioof of
(A) is based only on the additional assumptions about climate change etc,
but not on the assumption that CO
2
-emissions aie not cut. Tus, when
one concludes (A), one does not make the assumption anymoie that
CO
2
-emissions aie not cut; one claims only that tempeiatuies will iise if
CO
2
-emissions aie not cut without assuming anything about whethei the
emissions aie cut oi not. Logicians desciibe this by saying that, when one
o âtural Deduction ::
concludes (A), one has dischaiged the assumption that CO
2
-emissions
aie not cut.
Geneially, one can aigue foi a claim of the foim If A, then B by
pioving B fiom the assumption A.
in the following way: one pioves B by assuming A; then one concludes
If A, then B without assuming Aanymoie.
In Natuial Deduction the iule foi intioducing the aiiow woiks in the
same way: one assumes a sentence , deiives a sentence fiom it, and
then the iule allows one to conclude and to get iid of oi dischaige
the assumption of .
Infoimal pioofs one indicates that anassumptionhas beendischaiged
by enclosing that assumption in squaie biackets:
Informal proofs, assumptions are dischargedby surrounding themwith
square brackets. Of couise one must only dischaige assumptions in accoi-
dance with the iules.
Te pioof technique used in the above infoimal pioofs is captuied by
the intioduction iule foi :
Intro Te result of appending to a proof of and
discharging all assumptions of in the proof of is a proof of
.
So one may add to a pioof with at the ioot and then enclose all
assumptions of (that is, all occuiiences of with no line above them)
in the pioof of in squaie biackets.
Te giaphical iepiesentation looks like this:
||
Intio

Tis iule does not iequiie that the pioof of actually contains an assump-
tion of . Only if theie aie any assumptions of in the pioof of , they
must be dischaiged.
Te iule foi eliminating is stiaightfoiwaid:
Elim Te result of appending to a proof of and a proof
of is a proof of .
Tis iule is giaphically iepiesented as follows:

Elim
Tis iule is also called the cut iule, because the sentence is cut of
fiom .
Befoie giving some examples, I will intioduce a new piece of notation:
uiiii1io o.:. Te formula is provable from (where is a set of L
2
-
sentences) if and only if there is a proof of with only sentences in as
non-discharged assumptions. Te phrase is provable from is abbrevi-
ated as . If is empty, is abbreviated as . If contains
exactly the sentences
I
, . . . ,
n
, one may write
I
, . . . ,
n
instead of
I
, . . . ,
n
} .
ix:mvii o.:. P Q P.
Proof. I show step by step how to establish this claim. Fiist, P Q is
assumed:
P Q
Applying Elim: yields the following:
P Q
Elim:
P
Te iule Intio allows one to add P Q P and to dischaige P Q:
|P Q|
Elim:
P
Intio
P Q P
o âtural Deduction :::
All assumptions in this pioof have been dischaiged. Tus, P Q P is
piovable fiom the empty set of piemisses, that is, P Q P.
Tis is a typical pioof of a sentence of the foim : usually one
assumes , aiiives thiough some steps at , and then uses Intio to
deiive and to dischaige any assumptions of .
Te intioduction iules foi disjunction aie as follows:
Intro: Te result of appending a sentence to a proof
of is a proof of .
As in the case foi the elimination iules foi , theie is also anothei intio-
duction iule foi :
Intro: Te result of appending a sentence to a proof
of is a proof of .
Te giaphical iepiesentations aie as follows:
Intio:

Intio:

Te elimination iule foi is somewhat tiicky. It coiiesponds to the
following infoimal pioof stiategy:
Assume Aoi B is given. Ten one can tiy to piove C by mak-
ing a case distinction: Fiist, one tiies to deiive C assuming
A; then one tiies to deiive C assuming B. If C can be deiived
in both cases, then (given Aoi B) one may conclude C.
Tis type of ieasoning ieasoning by diawing the same conclusion fiom
both paits of a disjunction is captuied in the following iule:
Elim Te result of appending to a proof of , a proof of
and another proof of , and of discharging all assumptions
of in the frst proof of and of discharging all assumptions
of in the second proof of , is a proof of .
o âtural Deduction :::
An application of Elim looks like this:

||
||
Elim
In the fist pioof of only assumptions of aie dischaiged; one must

not dischaige assumptions of in this pioof when applying the iule. Of
couise, this iemaik applies analogously to the second pioof of . Te
iule may look somewhat awkwaid because fiom two pioofs of one
only obtains anothei, longei pioof of . Te point of the iule is that the
assumptions of and can be dischaiged, so that now follows fiom
without assuming oi .
In an actual pioof one would pioceed as follows: assume one has a
pioof of . Ten, one will stait a new bianch by assuming and
anothei new bianch by assuming . Afei obtaining on both bianches,
one can dischaige all assumptions of in the fist pioof of , and all
assumptions of in the second pioof of , and append to the thiee
pioofs.
I will illustiate the use of Elim with the following example.
ix:mvii o.,. P Q, P R R Q.
Proof.
P Q
|P| P R
Elim
R
Intio:
R Q
|Q|
Intio:
R Q
Elim
R Q
In the last step an application of Elim the assumptions P and Q aie
dischaiged.
Te intioduction iule foi negation is anothei iule that allows one
to dischaige assumptions. Te undeilying stiategy is as follows: If one
can deiive a contiadiction fiom an assumption of A, then one may con-
clude: It is not the case that A. Tis iule is called ieductio ad absuidum
(ieduction to an absuidity).
Intro Te result of appending a sentence to a proof of
and a proof of and of discharging all assumptions of in
both proofs is a proof of .
Schematically, the iule foi -intioduction has the following shape:
||
||
Intio
I will demonstiate the use of the iule with an example:

ix:mvii o.. (P Q} Q.
Proof. In oidei to aiiive at a conclusion of the foim, it is ofen useful to
assume and to tiy to deiive a contiadiction. In this case I will assume Q
and tiy to obtain a contiadiction with the only piemiss, viz, (P Q}.
|Q|
Intio
P Q (P Q}
Intio
Q
In the lef bianch of the pioof I have applied Intio even though theie is
no assumption of P. Tis is in accoidance with the foimulation of Intio:
nothing in Intio actually iequiies that theie is actually an assumption
of P; only if theie aie any, they must be dischaiged.
Te iule of negation elimination allows one to dischaige assumptions
of negated sentences:
:
: Tis iule allows foi nonconstiuctive indiiect pioofs. Foi instance, the foimula could
Elim Te result of appending as sentence to a proof of
and a proof of and of discharging all assumptions of
in both proofs is a proof of .
Giaphically an application of the iule looks like this:
||
||
Elim
Heie is an example showing how the negation elimination iule can be

used:
ix:mvii o.,. P Q, Q P.
|P| P Q
Elim
Q Q
Elim
P
Negation elimination can be used to piove the law of excluded middle:
ix:mvii o.o. P P.
be an existence claim. Negation elimination allows one to conclude the existence of an
object with a ceitain piopeity fiom the inconsistency of the assumption that theie isnt
any object with that piopeity. Tus one will be able to piove that an object satisfying
a ceitain piopeity exists, without being able to show diiectly, of any paiticulai object,
that it has this piopeity. If one is inteiested in constiuctive pioofs, that is, pioofs
that iequiie one to exhibit a paiticulai example of an object that demonstiably has
the piopeity in question in oidei to piove the ielevant existence claim, then the iule
foi negation elimination has to be diopped. Te iesulting system, which difeis fiom
classical Natuial Deduction, is called intuitionistic logic. Te lawof the excluded middle,
(Example o.,), and the law of double negation elimination, , aie some
of the piinciples that aie theoiems of classical logic, which is the logic studied heie, but
not of intuitionistic logic. Tennant (:o) piovides an intioduction to intuitionistic
logic with a pioof system that is similai to the veision of Natuial Deduction used heie.
Te pioof is suipiisingly awkwaid. One cannot piove one of the sen-
tences P oi P (without assumptions) and then apply Intio: oi Intio:.
Rathei one pioves P P indiiectly by assuming (P P}, which is
then shown to lead to a contiadiction. Tis makes it possible to apply the
negation elimination iule.
Proof. Fiist I assume P and apply Intio::
P
Intio:
P P
In the next step, I assume (PP}, which is the negation of the sentence
that is to be pioved.
|P|
Intio:
P P (P P}
Intio
P
Now Intio: can be used:
|P|
Intio:
P P (P P}
Intio
P
Intio:
P P
Now (P P} is assumed again, so that Intio can be applied once
moie. Tis time Intio is used to dischaige the assumption (P P},
which occuis twice.
|P|
Intio:
P P |(P P}|
Intio
P
Intio:
P P |(P P}|
Elim
P P
Te iules foi the double aiiow aie as follows:
Intro Te result of appending to a proof of
and a proof of is a proof of .
Elim: Te result of appending to a proof of is
a proof of .
Elim: Te result of appending to a proof of
is a proof of .
Te giaphical iepiesentations of the iules aie as follows:

Intio

Elim:

Elim:

In the following pioof I will illustiate the use of the iules foi the double
aiiow.
ix:mvii o.,. (P Q} (Q P}.
Proof.
|P Q| |P|
Q |Q|
P
Q P
(P Q} (Q P}
|Q P| |Q|
P |P|
Q
P Q
(Q P} (P Q}
(P Q} (Q P}
Foi the last line Intio is used.
In cases like the following it is ofen useful to stait fiomthe ioot and to
considei how one might have obtained the sentence that is to be pioved.
ix:mvii o.8. (Q R} Q R.
Proof.
(Q R}
|Q| |R|
Q R
R
Q R
Te assumption (QR} is not biacketed; it iemains as an undischaiged
assumption. Tus, (Q R} Q R is established.
Finally, heie is a pioof of a vaiiant of the ex falso quodlibet-piinciple:
ix:mvii o.. P, P Q.
Proof. Te following pioof contains a stiange application of Elim. Te
foimula Q is intioduced although Q has nevei be assumed. Elim
allows one to intioduce and to dischaige all assumptions of even if
theie aie not any.
P P
Elim
Q
Tis application of Elim complies with Elim, as it is not a iequiiement
that theie actually be assumptions of .
Te following iesult says that the iules foi Natuial Deduction have
been chosen in such a way that theie aie pioofs foi exactly those aigu-
ments in L
I
that aie valid.
1uiovim o.:o (:uiqU:cv iov vvovosi1io:i iocic). Assume that
and all elements of are L
I
-sentences. Ten if and only if .
I will not piove this theoiem heie.
In paiticulai, if a sentence of L
I
is a tautology (logically tiue), then
theie is a pioof of that sentence without undischaiged assumptions.
Te adequacy iesult says that the iules given heie aie sumcient foi
pioving a conclusion fiom piemisses if the aigument is valid. Any iule
o âtural Deduction ::8
that can be added is eithei not sound, that is, it allows one to piove
sentences that aie not logically tiue, oi it is dispensable (but it may piovide
a shoitcut). I shall ietuin to adequacy in moie detail in Section ,.:; theie
adequacy will be discussed with iespect to piedicate logic.
o. : vviuic:1i iocic
Te pioof iules of piopositional logic, which weie expounded in the
pievious section, apply to all sentences including the sentences of L
2
.
Te following example contains sentences of the language L
2
that aie not
in L
I
; but the pioof iequiies only iules fiom piopositional logic, that is,
intioduction and elimination iules foi connectives.
ix:mvii o.::. (x Px y Py} x Px.
Proof. Since one wants to piove a sentence of the foim , the ,
which coiiesponds to (x Px y Py} in the piesent example, is as-
sumed. Fiom this assumption one tiies to aiiive at x Px. Since this is
a negated sentence, one may hope to get it by using Intio; so x Px is
assumed. Tat is almost a contiadiction: applying Intio: to x Px gives
x Px y Py, and the contiadiction is obtained:
(x Px y Py}
x Px
Intio:
x Px y Py
Now Intio is applied by appending x Px to the two pioofs and dis-
chaiging the assumption x Px:
(x Px y Py}
|x Px|
Intio:
x Px y Py
Intio
x Px
One fnishes the pioof by applying Intio:
|(x Px y Py}|
|x Px|
Intio:
x Px y Py
Intio
x Px
Intio
(x Px y Py} x Px
All assumptions aie dischaiged, so the claim is established.
I will now tuin to the iules foi and . Fiist, I will explain the iule
foi eliminating , which may be motivated by consideiing the following
aigument:
If some peison has made moie than ten mistakes then that
peison wont pass. Teiefoie, if Ben has made moie than ten
mistakes he wont pass.
Heie one is going fiom a univeisal claim to a claim about a specifc in-
stance. Te iule foi eliminating , which is also known as univeisal
instantiation-iule, allows one to pass fiom a univeisally quantifed sen-
tence to a special instance. Foi instance, the iule licenses the step fiomthe
univeisally quantifed sentence x (Px Qx} to the instance Pa Qa.
In oidei to give a geneial foimulation of ElimI employ the following
defnition:
uiiii1ioo.::. Assume v is a variable, t a constant, and anL
2
-formula
with at most v occurring freely. Ten |t]v| is the sentence obtained by re-
placing all free occurrences of v in by t.
Foi instance, Px |b
2
]x| is Pb
2
; and y (Pxy x Rxy} |b]x|is the
sentence y(Pby x Rxy}. In the second case only the fist occuiience
of x has been ieplaced because the othei two aie bound occuiiences.
Te iule foi eliminating the univeisal quantifei can now be stated as
follows:
Elim Te result of appending |t]v| to a proof of v is a
proof of |t]v|.
In this iule it is assumed that t is a constant, v a vaiiable, and v is a
sentence (so that only v can occui fieely in ).
Tus an application of this iule has the following foim:
o âtural Deduction :,o
v
Elim
|t]v|
Heie, is an L
2
-foimula in which only the vaiiable v occuis fieely; t is a
constant.
Tus the iule allows one to diop the quantifei v at the beginning of
a sentence and to ieplace all fiee occuiiences of v in the iesulting foimula
with the constant t.
Te following example explains why only fiee occuiiences of the
vaiiable aie ieplaced:
y (Py y Qy}
Elim
Pb
3
y Qy
If one weie allowed to ieplace also the last occuiience of y, which is
bound, one would to get to Pb
3
yQb
3
, which is logically equivalent to
Pb
3
Qb
3
. Tis step is cleaily not sound: fiomy(Py y Qy} it does
not follow that b
3
is Q. Intuitively speaking, only occuiiences of y in
y (Py y Qy} that aie caught by the univeisal quantifei y can be
ieplaced by the constant; the last occuiience of y belongs to the existential
quantifei and must be lef alone.
Te intioduction iule foi the univeisal quantifei is moie dimcult to
state. In oidei to aigue foi the geneial claim that eveiy tiavelleis jouiney
fiom London to Munich in :oo, took ovei two houis, one could ieason
as follows:
Assume somebody tiavelled fiomLondon to Munich in :oo,.
Call him John Doe. If he took the tiain . . . [now each means
of tianspoit is taken into account, and it is aigued in eveiy
case that the jouiney must have taken moie than two houis.]
Teiefoie John Does jouiney took ovei two houis. Teiefoie,
since John Doe is an aibitiaiy peison, eveiy tiavelleis joui-
ney fiom London to Munich in :oo, took ovei two houis.
o âtural Deduction :,:
Te idea heie is that one talks about a nondesciipt paiticulai instance as
an example using a name. In the stoiy above, this nondesciipt instance is
a peison who is dubbed John Doe. Te name John Doe is not used to
name a specifc ieal peison. Ten one caiiies out the aigumentation foi
this instance, and concludes that this aigument applies to eveiy instance
because the chosen instance was just used as an example. Foi the validity
of the aigument it is impoitant that the chosen peison is aibitiaiy and
that one did not biing in any specifc infoimation about that peison oi
object (if theie is such a peison oi object at all).
Te iule foi intioducing the univeisal quantifei in Natuial Deduction
woiks in a similai way: x(Px Px} will be established by taking an
aibitiaiy constant, say, c (coiiesponding to the use of a name John Doe
above), and aiguing as follows:
|Pc|
Intio
Pc Pc
Since c was chosen to name a nondesciipt instance as an example, the
claim also holds foi eveiy object. Now, one substitutes the vaiiable x foi
the constant c in Pc Pc and piefxes the univeisal quantifei x to the
foimula. Ten one can add this sentence to the pioof, in accoidance with
the iule foi intioducing :
|Pc|
Intio
Pc Pc
Intio
x(Px Px}
In foimulating the geneial iule Intio, howevei, one must exeicise
caution. One might think that Intio can be foimulated in the following
way: given a pioof of a sentence , one ieplaces a constant in the sentence
by a vaiiable v, wiites v in fiont of the sentence, and then appends the
iesulting sentence to the pioof. Howevei, such a iule would allow one to
deiive false conclusions fiom tiue piemisses foi thiee ieasons.
iivs1 vvoviim. I will illustiate the pioblem by consideiing the fol-
lowing attempted pioof:
o âtural Deduction :,:
(P)
y (Py x Ryx}
Elim
Pa x Rax
incoiiect -intioduction
x (Px x Rxx}
If (P) weie a coiiect pioof one could deiive x (Px xRxx} fiom
y (Py x Ryx}. So (P) cannot be a coiiect pioof: it would allow one
to go fiom the foimalisation of Eveiy student sees something to the
foimalisation of Foi eveiy student theie is something that sees itself. Te
fist sentence is tiue while the lattei is false if theie is at least one student
and nothing can see itself.
:
It should be obvious what went wiong. When the constant a was
ieplaced by x in the sentence Pa x Rax, the x ieplacing the last
occuiience of a got caught by the quantifei x:
x (Px x Rx
-
actual binding
x}
Of couise the intention was that the penultimate occuiience of x should
iefei back to the univeisal quantifei x and not to the existential quanti-
fei:
x (Px x Rx
- - -
intended binding
x}
Te pioblem can be avoided in the following way: when one adds
a sentence v to a pioof by applying the iule foi intioducing then
the pieceding sentence must be with all fiee occuiiences of the vaii-
able v ieplaced by the constant t. In othei woids, the iule allows one to
continue a pioof ending with |t]v| by adding the sentence v . So the
iule foi intioducing will take the following foim (with some additional
iestiictions on occuiiences of the constant t specifed below):
|t]v|
v
: Te pioof that theie is a counteiexample to the aigument with y (Py x Ryx) as
piemiss and x (Px xRxx) as conclusion is the content of Exeicise ,.:(ii).
o âtural Deduction :,,
In the above attempted pioof (P), I passed fiom Pa x Rax to
x (Px x Rxx}. But this step is not coveied by the iule that licenses
only the step fiom |t]v| to v : Te iesult (Px x Rxx}|a]x| of
ieplacing all fiee occuiiences of x by a is the sentence Pa x Rxx, not
Pa x Rax. Only going fiom Pa x Rxx to x (Px x Rxx}
would be coveied by the iule.
sicou vvoviim. Assume one staits a pioof by assuming Qb and
then geneialises in the following way:
Qb
x Qx
Tis is not coiiect. If it weie coiiect, one could apply Intio in the next
step:
|Qb|
x Qx
Intio
Qb x Qx
Tus, one would have pioved that Qb x Qx; but Qb x Qx is
ceitainly not logically tiue, as has been shown in Example ,..
Foi this ieason, one must make suie that one is not using any specifc
assumptions containing the constant that is used as an aibitaiy exam-
ple ovei which one can geneialise. So when Intio is applied by going
fiom |t]v| to v , the constant t must not occui in any undischaiged
assumption. In the discussion of the example of John Doe I said that it is
impoitant that the peison chosen as an example (John Doe) is aibitiaiy.
Te iestiiction that the constant must not occui in any undischaiged as-
sumption is the foimal counteipait of the iequiiement that John Doe is an
aibitiaiy peison about whomone does not have any specifc infoimation.
In the eailiei, coiiect pioof of x (Px Px} the constant c occuiied
in the assumption Pc, but that assumption had been dischaiged by the
time Intio was applied. So this pioof meets the iestiiction that c must
not occui in any undischaiged piemiss when the univeisal quantifei is
intioduced.
o âtural Deduction :,
1uivu vvoviim. Te following attempted pioof meets all conditions
that weie imposed on applications of Intio to avoid the fist and second
pioblem:
y Ryy
Raa
x Rax
Howevei, the aigument with y Ryy as piemiss and x Rax as its con-
clusion is not valid: it would alow one to go fiom the foimalisation of
Eveithing is self-identical to the foimalisation of John is identical to
eveiything.
,
Tus, some condition must be imposed on the iule Intio
that blocks the step fiom Raa to x Rax. Tis can be done by disallow-
ing one to keep some occuiiences of a in the sentence that is added in
accoidance with the iule. Only passing fiom Raa to x Rxx would be
admissible. Tus, since an application of Intio is a step fiom |t]v|
to v , the iule Intio can be applied only if (that is, the foimula
following the univeisal quantifei) does not contain the constant t, that
is, if no occuiience of t is ietained when Intio is applied.
In the following foimulation of the iule foi intioducing the univeisal
quantifei all thiee pioblems aie avoided:
Intro Assume that is a formula with at most v occurring
freely and that does not contain the constant t. Assume fur-
ther that there is a proof of |t]v| in which t does not occur
in any undischarged assumption. Ten the result of append-
ing v to that proof is a proof of v .
Te iule can be iepiesented as follows:
|t]v|
Intio
v
piovided the constant t does not
occui in oi in any undischaiged
assumption in the pioof of |t]v|.
, Te pioof of y Ryy x Rax is Exeicise ,.:(iii).
In less foimal teims, the iestiictions on Intio can be summed up in
two points: Fiist, one must make suie that one is not geneialising ovei a
constant that occuis in an undischaiged assumption oi that is still in the
sentence one tiies to obtain. Second, in an application of the iule, one
has to make suie that the vaiiable of the newly intioduced quantifei is
not caught by a quantifei that is alieady in the foimula.
In the case of the existential quantifei the intioduction iule is the
easy one:
Intro Te result of appending v to a proof of |t]v| is a
proof of v .
|t]v|
Intio
v
Of couise t is a constant, v a vaiiable, and v is an L
2
-sentence.
Te iule foi eliminating the existential quantifei is the most compli-
cated iule. Considei the following aigument:
Teie is at least one epistemologist. All epistemologists aie
philosopheis. Teiefoie, theie is at least one philosophei.
Te two piemisses have x Px and x (Px Qx} as theii iespective foi-
malisations; the foimalisation of the conclusion is x Qx. Te dictionaiy
has the following two entiies:
P: . . . is an epistemologist
Q: . . . is a philosophei
Te coiiesponding aigument in L
2
is valid. Te question is how one
can prove the conclusion fiom the two piemisses. If one could in some
way get Pc fiom the fist piemiss x Px, the iest of the pioof would be
obvious:
o âtural Deduction :,o
Pc
x (Px Qx}
Elim
Pc Qc
Elim
Qc
Intio
x Qx
Te pioblem is that Pc does not follow fiomx Px. Te piemiss x Px
just states that theie is some epistemologist; it does not give one a specifc
epistemologist and, in paiticulai, it does not give one a paiticulai name c
foi an epistemologist.
Te conclusion x Qx does not say anything specifc about c. In
the pioof I could have used any othei constant in place of c. So one
might apply the following pioof stiategy: one may assume Pc. Tis is
tantamount to picking an aibitiaiy name like John Doe and assuming
that John Doe is an epistemologist. Once a sentence not containing c is
pioved, one can dischaige the assumption Pc using the piemiss x Px:
the conclusion does not depend any moie on the assumption that c is
one of the Ps.
x Px
|Pc|
x (Px Qx}
Elim
Pc Qc
Elim
Qc
Intio
x Qx
x Qx
Te point in the last step of the pioof is that the piemiss Pc can be dis-
chaiged, so one has now pioved the conclusion fiom the existence claim
x Px iathei than fiom the specifc instance Pc. Infoimally speaking, the
conclusion that theie is a philosophei does not depend on the assumption
that theie is an epistemologist called John Doe.
When making an assumption such as Pc one must not choose a con-
stant about which one alieady has specifc infoimation: the constant
acts as an aibitiaiy example in the same way as in Intio. Te piecise
statement of the elimination iule foi is so convoluted because the ie-
stiictions on the constant must ensuie that the constant can play its iole
as an aibitiaiy label.
Elim Assume that is a formula with at most v occurring
freely and that the constant t does not occur in . Assume
further that there is a proof of the sentence in which t does
not occur in any undischarged assumption other than |t]v|.
Ten the result of appending to a proof of v and the proof
of and of discharging all assumptions of |t]v| in the proof
of is a proof of .
As befoie, |t]v| is just with all fiee (and only fiee) occuiiences of v
ieplaced with t.
An application of the iule looks like this:
v
||t]v||
Elim

occui in v , oi in , oi in any
undischaiged assumption othei
than |t]v| in the pioof of .
In piactice, Elim is applied in the following way: Assume that one
has pioved v . Ten one picks a constant that has not been used yet and
that does not occui in any piemisses one has, and assumes |t]v|. Once
one has pioved a sentence not containing t, all assumptions of |t]v|
aie dischaiged and one wiites undei the pioof of v and the pioof
of . Heie I have iecommended using a constant t that is completely
new to the pioof; this is not ieally necessaiy oi foiced by the iule, but by
using a new vaiiable one can make suie that the conditions on t in the
iule aie satisfed. Also, by using a constant that is not new one does not
gain anything.
Tis iule concludes the desciiption of the system of Natuial Deduc-
tion. A list of all the iules may be found in Appendix 8.o.
I will give some examples of pioofs in which the quantifei iules aie
used.
ix:mvii o.:,. x Px x Px
Proof. Fiist one assumes x Px and applies Elim:
o âtural Deduction :,8
x Px
Elim
Pa
In oidei to be able to apply Elim, one assumes Pa and continues with
Intio:
Pa
|x Px|
Elim
Pa
Intio
x Px
With the additional assumption x Px one can apply Elim and dis-
chaige Pa:
x Px
|Pa|
|x Px|
Elim
Pa
Intio
x Px
Elim
x Px
Now x Px is assumed again to pioduce a contiadiction that allows one
to apply Intio:
x Px
|x Px|
|Pa|
|x Px|
Elim
Pa
Intio
x Px
Elim
x Px
Intio
x Px
x Px can be dischaiged accoiding to Intio. Te only assumption that is
not dischaiged is the lefmost occuiience of x Px, which is the piemiss.
Te next example is the conveise of the pievious one.
ix:mvii o.:. x Px x Px.
Proof. x Px, whichis to be deiived, canbe obtainedby Intio fiomPa.
Tis in its tuin can be obtained by Intio. So Pa is assumed and Intio
is applied:
o âtural Deduction :,
Pa
Intio
x Px
Now the assumption x Px is added and Intio is applied:
x Px
|Pa|
Intio
x Px
Intio
Pa
Because Pa is now dischaiged, Intio can be applied:
x Px
|Pa|
Intio
x Px
Intio
Pa
Intio
x Px
All assumptions with exception of the piemiss aie dischaiged.
In the following example, Intio is applied in a cunning way.
ix:mvii o.:,. x Rxx y z Ryz.
Proof.
x Rxx
Elim
Raa
Intio
z Raz
Intio
y z Ryz
Te application of Intio is legitimate: nothing in the foimulation of
the iule foices one to ieplace all occuiiences of a by the vaiiable z. Te
foimula Raz is a foimula with only one vaiiable occuiiing fieely; thus
|t]v| is Raz|a]z|, which is the foimula Raa. v is then z Raz.
In Example ,.:o on page :::, I iefuted x y Rxy y x Rxy by
means of a counteiexample. Now I can establish the conveise diiection
y x Rxy x y Rxy.
ix:mvii o.:o. y x Rxy x y Rxy.
Proof.
o âtural Deduction :o
y x Rxy
|x Rxb|
Elim
Rab
Intio
y Ray
Elim
y Ray
Intio
x y Rxy
Te assumption x Rxb has been dischaiged in the penultimate step by
applying Elim.
, Foimalisation in Piedicate Logic
In this chaptei I shall biing thiee stiands togethei: the semantics of
the language L
2
of piedicate logic, the system of Natuial Deduction,
and aiguments in English. Fiist I will tuin to the ielation between the
semantics of L
2
and pioofs in Natuial Deduction.
,. : :uiqU:cv
Te iules of Natuial Deduction have been chosen so as to guaiantee
that, if a sentence is piovable (with no undischaiged piemisses), it is
logically tiue; and if a sentence is piovable fiom ceitain piemisses, the
coiiesponding aigument is valid. Tis way, foimal pioofs allow one to
establish that ceitain aiguments in L
2
aie valid (and that ceitain sentences
aie logically tiue). In the following lemma, it is assumed that and all
elements of aie sentences of L
2
.
iimm: ,.: (soUuiss). If , then .
I will not give a pioof of this claim heie, but I have tiied to piesent
the iules of Natuial Deduction in such a way that theii soundness ought
to be plausible, if not obvious.
While the soundness of the iules of Natuial Deduction is faiily plau-
sible, it is much haidei to see whethei one can actually piove fiom
piemisses in whenevei , and whethei one can piove all logical
tiuths of L
2
. In fact, the iules of Natuial Deduction aie sumcient foi this
puipose:
1uiovim ,.: (comvii1iiss). If , then .
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic ::
As befoie, and all elements of aie L
2
-sentences heie.
Te fact that the pioof system of Natuial Deduction is sound sound-
ness and complete completeness is ofen expiessed by saying that it is
adequate foi the semantics intioduced in Chaptei ,. Moie foimally, this
can be expiessed in the following way:
1uiovim ,., (:uiqU:cv). Assume that and all elements of are L
2
-
sentences. Ten if and only if .
Tus, and coincide even though they have been defned in com-
pletely difeient teims. I have defned in semantic teims, that is, in
teims of L
2
-stiuctuies, while has been defned in puiely syntactic teims,
that is, in teims of iules foi manipulating sentences of L
2
.
Foi the special case wheie is empty, the Adequacy Teoiem ,.,
means that is logically tiue if and only if is piovable (with all assump-
tions dischaiged). Tis can be expiessed moie foimally in the following
way:
if and only if
In piactice, if one wants to show that follows fiom sentences in ,
that is, if one wants to show that , one will usually tiy to constiuct a
pioof in the system of Natuial Deduction because this is in most cases
easiei than a pioof diiectly establishing that is tiue in all L
2
-stiuctuies
in which all sentences in aie also tiue.
In contiast, if one wants to piove that does not follow fiom , that
is, that is not the case, oi foi shoit, one will usually be bettei
of constiucting a counteiexample, that is, an L
2
-stiuctuie in which all
sentences of aie tiue and is not tiue. Tis is usually easiei than
showing that theie is no pioof of with sentences fiom as the only
undischaiged assumptions.
In Section ,., I have defned fuithei semantic piopeities of sentences
of L
2
. Tese piopeities can be defned also in teims of piovability. Ten
the Adequacy Teoiem ,., can be used to show that the syntactic defni-
tions (in teims of piovability) and the semantic defnitions (in teims of
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic :,
L
2
-stiuctuies) coincide. Heie consistency will seive as an example. Fiist,
consistency is defned in teims of pioofs:
uiiii1io ,. (sv1:c1ic cosis1icv). A set of L
2
-sentences is
syntactically consistent if and only if there is a sentence such that ] .
Heie ] means that it is not the case that . Teiefoie, a
set of sentences is syntactically consistent if and only if it is not the
case that any sentence whatsoevei can be pioved fiom piemisses in (as
nondischaiged assumptions).
Inconsistency is the opposite of consistency: a set of sentences is
syntactically inconsistent if and only if it is not syntactically consistent.
Tus, a set of sentences is inconsistent if and only if fiom piemisses in
eveiy L
2
-sentence can be pioved. Tat is, is inconsistent if and only
if foi eveiy L
2
-sentence .
Accoiding to Defnition ,.,, a set of L
2
-sentences is semantically
consistent if and only if theie is an L
2
-stiuctuie A in which all sentences
in aie tiue. Now the Adequacy Teoiem can be used to show that
semantic and syntactic consistency coincide:
1uiovim,.,. Aset of L
2
-sentences is semantically consistent if and only
if is syntactically consistent.
Proof. Assume that the set is semantically consistent. Ten by Defni-
tion ,.,(iv) theie is an L
2
-stiuctuie Ain which all sentences in aie tiue.
Choose a sentence which is false in that stiuctuie. Ten , and by
the Soundness Lemma ,.:, . So is syntactically consistent.
To see the conveise, assume that is not semantically consistent.
Ten theie is no L
2
-stiuctuie A in which all sentences in aie tiue.
Consequently, any sentence will be tiue in all L
2
-stiuctuies in which all
sentences of aie tiue (because theie aie no such stiuctuies). So
foi all sentences of L
2
, and by Teoiem ,.:, foi all sentences .
So theie is no sentence that is not piovable fiom piemisses in , and,
theiefoie, is not syntactically consistent.
So fai all the piemiss sets used inexamples contained only a fewsimple
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic :
sentences. A piemiss set, howevei, may also be veiy complicated. Foi
example, a piemiss set could contain all of the sentences a ceitain peison
believes, oi the axioms of some theoiy in philosophy oi mathematics
oi medicine oi any othei aiea. A theoiy heie is nothing moie than a
piemiss set, that is, a set of sentences. Some theoiies can be logically veiy
poweiful. Foi instance, all of mathematics (with some possible minoi
exceptions) can be developed in set theoiy, and the axioms of set theoiy
can be wiitten down as L
2
-sentences.
When consideiing a theoiy, one would like to know whethei it is (syn-
tactically oi semantically) consistent. Teoiem ,., shows why consistency
is such an impoitant piopeity of a theoiy: if a theoiy is inconsistent, any-
thing can be pioved fiom it. Tus, in oidei to show that a set of sentences
is not useless as a theoiy (because anything can be pioved fiom it), one
has to show that the set is consistent. Tis can be achieved by establishing
that theie is an L
2
-stiuctuie in which all the sentences of the theoiy aie
tiue. In that case the set is semantically consistent, and by Teoiem ,.,
also syntactically consistent. Te tools of logic have ofen been used to
show that theoiies aie consistent.
Tese tools can be used to piove not only that theoiies aie consistent
and that sentences follow logically fiom ceitain piemisses; they can also
be used to investigate much moie geneial pioblems about consistency,
validity, and so on. I will sketch some geneial iesults of this kind heie.
It would be convenient to have a geneial method foi deteimining
whethei an aibitiaiy aigument is valid oi whethei a given sentence is
logically tiue. If is a sentence of the language L
I
of piopositional logic,
theie is a method foi deciding whethei is logically tiue oi not: one can
use the tiuth table method. In piopositional logic, one can also use the
tiuth table method to decide whethei an aigument with fnitely many
piemisses is valid oi not. Te situation with L
2
is difeient: one can use
the system of Natuial Deduction to show that a sentence is logically tiue,
but it haidly can be used to piove that a sentence is not logically tiue. If
one does not hit upon a pioof in a ieasonable amount of time, this does
not mean that theie is no pioof; one could simply have not yet found
the pioof: Te maximal possible length of a pioof cannot be iead of
the sentence. So the system of Natuial Deduction does not delivei a
systematic method foi deciding whethei a sentence is logically tiue.
Chuich (:,o) showed, using Kuit Gdels famous Incompleteness
Teoiems, that theie cannot be a pioceduie foi deciding whethei a sen-
tence of L
2
is logically tiue. In paiticulai, no computei piogiamcan, given
an aibitiaiy sentence as input, tell one infallibly whethei the sentence
is logically tiue oi not, oi whethei a given sentence can be pioved fiom
sentences in a given theoiy. Tis holds even if theie aie no iestiictions
imposed on the computing time, computei memoiy, and so on. Chuichs
iesult shows that, given ceitain sentences as input, the piogiam will keep
on calculating foievei (oi ietuin an incoiiect iesult). Te piecise foimu-
lation of this iesult is beyond the scope of this text, but it explains why
the system of Natuial Deduction (oi any othei system foi piedicate logic)
cannot be tiansfoimed into a method that, like the tiuth-table method
foi L
I
, takes a sentence of L
2
as input and then ietuins in any case afei
fnitely many steps an answei to the question of whethei the sentence is
logically tiue oi not.
Chuichs iesult also shows that theie aie no simple checks foi the
consistency of a set of assumptions: theie is no systematic method a
method that could be implemented on a computei foi deciding whethei
a given fnite set of sentences is consistent oi not. Of couise, one may
tiy to fnd an L
2
-stiuctuie in which all sentences in the set aie tiue, but
theie is again no systematic method that tells one whethei theie is such
an L
2
-stiuctuie. Tus, pioving the consistency of sets of sentences of L
2
is a highly non-tiivial afaii.
,. : :mvicUi1v
As I said at the beginning of the chaptei, I want to biing togethei thiee
stiands: the semantics of L
2
, the system of Natuial Deduction, and ai-
guments in English. Te ielation between the foimei two has now been
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic :o
claiifed by Teoiem ,.,: the semantics of L
2
and the pioof system of
Natuial Deduction match up, that is, and coincide. Now I will tuin
to natuial language and how to compaie aiguments in English to those
in L
2
.
Te connection between aiguments in English and in L
2
is established
by tianslating between the two languages. So I will tuin now to such
tianslations.
In Section ., I piovided a sketch of how to go about tianslating fiom
English into the language L
2
. In the fist step the English sentence is
biought into a iegimented foim: its logical foim. In the second step the
standaid connectives aie ieplaced by the iespective symbols: theie is
at least one x is ieplaced by x, foi all x is ieplaced by x, names aie
ieplaced by constants, piedicate expiessions aie ieplaced by piedicate
letteis, and so on. Most dimculties occui in the fist step, while in the
second step English expiessions aie meiely mechanically ieplaced by
coiiesponding symbols.
Some dimculties aiise fiom a disciepancy between piedicate expies-
sions in English and the piedicate letteis of L
2
: in English the numbei
of designatois a piedicate takes can vaiy fiom sentence to sentence. Te
following English sentences aie all well foimed:
In his gaiage the engineei loosens the nut with the wiench.
Te engineei loosens the nut with the wiench.
Te engineei loosens the nut.
In the fist sentence one would like to foimalise the piedicate loosens as
a 4-place piedicate lettei, in the second as a teinaiy piedicate lettei, and
in the last sentence as a binaiy piedicate lettei. Te language L
2
, howevei,
does not have piedicate letteis with a vaiiable numbei of places. If an
aigument contains two of the sentences above one would like to foimalise
the piedicate loosens as the same piedicate lettei in both sentences,
and theie aie some tiicks that can help. Foi instance, one might tiy to
iefoimulate the second sentence as In some place the engineei loosens
the nut with the wiench, theieby making it amenable to foimalisation by
a 4-place piedicate lettei; then loosens can be foimalised by this 4-place
piedicate lettei in the fist and second sentence. Te stiategy, howevei,
does not easily geneialise, and philosopheis and logicians have pioposed
othei stiategies to solve the pioblem of vaiiable aiity. Te discussion of
these pioposals, howevei, goes beyond the scope of this text.
Te pioblem of vaiiable aiity I have just outlined does not aiise fiom
an ambiguity in English; iathei it highlights difeiences in the giammais
of English and L
2
. In Section ,. I have alieady mentioned ceitain am-
biguities that can lead to two difeient foimalisations in piopositional
logic. In paiticulai, I have discussed ambiguities conceining the scope
of connectives. Of couise, a sentence displaying such an ambiguity has
difeient foimalisations also in L
2
because the connectives woik in L
2
in
the same way as in L
I
.
I will now biowse thiough some othei kinds of ambiguities, begin-
ning with lexical ambiguities. Te woid bank, foi instance, is lexically
ambiguous. It can mean the edge of a iivei oi a fnancial institution. One
can analyse lexical ambiguities by foimalising is a bank as two difeient
unaiy piedicate letteis, wheie one piedicate lettei stands foi . . . is a bank
(fnancial institution) and the othei foi . . . is a (iivei) bank. Tus, a sen-
tence containing lexically ambiguous vocabulaiy may have two difeient
foimalisations that aie not logically equivalent.
Moie inteiestingly, theie aie also ambiguities that can be analysed in
piedicate logic by using two difeient sentences that do not only disagiee
in theii piedicate letteis of constants but also in theii stiuctuies. Usually,
the indefnite aiticle a indicates existential quantifcation, as, foi instance,
in the following sentences:
Eveiy student owns a computei.
A house has been damaged by a meteoiite.
In some cases, howevei, the indefnite aiticle is used to make a geneial
statement that must be foimalised by a univeisal quantifei. Te following
sentences aie most natuially undeistood as geneial claims that aie to be
foimalised by sentences with a univeisal quantifei:
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic :8
A politician will nevei admit that he has made a mistake.
An election is negatively chaiged.
Occasionally, the indefnite aiticle is ambiguous. Ofen one ieading will
be moie plausible given the context of the sentence, but sometimes it
may be veiy haid to ieach a decision about the appiopiiate ieading. Foi
instance, it may be dimcult to decide in which way the following sentence
should be undeistood:
A Laboui MP will not agiee to this pioposal.
Te sentence could be taken to expiess that at least one Laboui MP will
not agiee oi as expiessing that, in geneial, no Laboui MP will agiee. Of
couise, such ambiguities can be made explicit with foimalisations. Te
two ieadings yield the following two (iespective) foimalisations:
x (Px Qxa}
x (Px Qxa}
I have used the following dictionaiy in this foimalisation:
P: . . . is a Laboui MP
Q: . . . agiees to . . .
a: this pioposal
In the next example the indefnite aiticle expiesses existential quan-
tifcation without ambiguity, but the sentence is ambiguous foi anothei
ieason:
A mistake was made by eveiy student.
In a fist attempt to paise the sentence one could stait as follows:
Teie is at least one x (x is a mistake and (eveiy student
made x))
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic :
Of couise one would then go on and analyse eveiy student made x as
foi all y (if (y is a student), then (y made x)). Accoiding to this analysis,
theie is at least one mistake that was made by eveiy student; so eveiy
student made the same mistake (and possibly moie). On this ieading the
logical foim would be as follows:
Teie is at least one x ((x is a mistake) and foi all y (if (y is a
student), then (y made x)))
Using the dictionaiy below, this yields the following L
2
-sentence:
x(Qx y (Py Ryx}} (,.:)
Q: . . . is a mistake
R: . . . made . . .
Teie is, howevei, an alteinative ieading. Te oiiginal sentence may be
taken to say what would be moie natuially expiessed by the following
sentence:
Eveiy student made a mistake,
wheie it is undeistood that it could well be the case that each student
made difeient mistakes, and theie is no one mistake that was made by
all students. Tis ieading iesults in the following logical foim:
Foi all x (if (x is a student), then theie is at least one y ((y is
a mistake) and (x made y)))
Te foimalisation is obviously difeient fiom (,.:):
x (Px y (Qy Rxy}} (,.:)
Without additional infoimation, one cannot decide which of the two
ieadings is the coiiect one. Te oiiginal sentence is ambiguous.
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic :,o
Tis kind of ambiguity is akin to the scope ambiguities in pioposi-
tional logic discussed on page o,. Teie the giouping of connectives
was not uniquely deteimined by the oiiginal English sentence, which
iesulted in two difeient foimalisations, P (Q R} and (P Q} R.
In that example it was not cleai whethei should be in the scope of
(as in the fist sentence) oi should be in the scope of . In the piesent
case, on the fist ieading (,.:), the existential quantifei comes fist so that
the univeisal quantifei falls undei the existential one, while the oidei is
ieveised in the second foimalisation (,.:). Te defnition of the scope of
(an occuiience of) a quantifei is similai to the defnition of the scope of
a connective on page o,:
uiiii1io ,.o (scovi oi : qU:1iiiiv). Te scope of an occurrence of
a quantifer in a sentence is (the occurrence of ) the smallest L
2
-sentence
that contains that quantifer and is part of .
Tus, in (,.:) the entiie sentence, including the occuiience of y, is
the scope of (the single occuiience of) the existential quantifei. Te
scope of the occuiience of the univeisal quantifei y is the undeibiaced
pait:
x(Qx y(Py Ryx}
- - -
scope of y
}
So the above ambiguity is anothei case of scope ambiguity because the
oiiginal sentence Eveiy student made a mistake leaves it open whethei
the univeisal quantifei is in the scope of the existential quantifei oi vice
veisa.
,. , ix1isio:ii1v
If the constants a and b have the same extension in an L
2
-stiuctuie A,
that is, if a and b denote the same object, then ieplacing a by b in a tiue
sentence will yield a tiue sentence. Foi instance, if a and b both denote
Rome in some L
2
-stiuctuie A, that is, if |a|
A
and |b|
A
aie both Rome, then,
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic :,:
foi example, Pa will be tiue if and only if Pb is tiue. Tis is easily seen
fiom Defnition ,.: of satisfaction: assume Pa is tiue, that is, |Pa|
A
= T
and ieason as follows:
|Pa|
A
= T assumption
|a|
A
|P|
A
Defnition ,.:(i)
|b|
A
|P|
A
by assumption |a|
A
= |b|
A
|Pb|
A
In the thiid line I used the assumption that a and b have the same ex-
tension, that is, that |a|
A
= |b|
A
. Tis shows that if Pa is tiue in A, so
is Pb.
Te aigument geneialises to moie complex sentences: as long as a
and b have the same extension, they can be ieplaced in any sentence by
one anothei without changing the tiuth-value of that sentence.
Generally, if constants, sentence letters, and predicate letters are re-
placed in an L
2
-sentence by other constants, sentence letters, and predicate
letters (respectively) that have the same extension in a given L
2
-structure,
then the truth-value of the sentence in that L
2
-structure does not change.
I will not piove the geneial claim that all sentence letteis, piedicate
letteis, and constants with the same extensions iespectively can be substi-
tuted salva veiitate (Latin shoithand foi without making a tiue sentence
false), but the above example of the sentence Pa should make the gen-
eial claim plausible. Languages in which these substitutions aie possible
aie called extensional: in extensional languages a sentences tiuth-value
depends only on the semantical values of the non-logical symbols that is,
on the extensions of the names, on the ielations that aie the extensions of
piedicate expiessions, and so on.
In English it is ofen possible to substitute designatois denoting the
same object foi one anothei. Foi instance, the designatoi Qomolangma
is just the omcial Tibetan name foi Mount Eveiest. Tus Qomolangma
and Mount Eveiest denote the same mountain. So if the sentence
Mount Eveiest is 8 8,o meties high.
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic :,:
is tiue, then
Qomolangma is 8 8,o meties high.
must be tiue. Cleaily whethei I use Mount Eveiest oi Qomolangma
to denote the highest mountain, the tiuth-value of the sentence will be
the same. I could even ieplace Mount Eveiest by the desciiption the
mountain Edmund Hillaiy climbed on :th May :,, without afecting
the sentences tiuth-value:
Te mountain Edmund Hillaiy climbed on :th May :,, is
8 8,o meties high.
So heie English behaves veiy much like L
2
: I can ieplace designatois
designating the same object by one anothei without changing the tiuth-
value of this sentence in the same way I have been able to substitute b
foi a in the sentence Pa without changing its tiuth-value in A(assuming
that |a|
A
= |b|
A
).
English, howevei, is not extensional. Teie aie also sentences such
that substituting designatois denoting the same object can change theii
tiuth-value.
Assume that the following sentence is tiue:
Tom believes that Mount Eveiest is 8 8,o meties high.
If Tom does not believe that Qomolangma is Mount Eveiest if he believes,
foi instance, that it is a small mountain in the Alps, then the following
sentence is piesumably false:
Tom believes that Qomolangma is 88,o meties high.
And the sentence
Tom believes that the mountain Edmund Hillaiy climbed on
:th May :,, is 8 8,o meties high
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic :,,
might also be false, although Mount Eveiest, Qomolangma, and the
mountain Edmund Hillaiy climbed on :th May :,, all denote the same
object. Tom might have no idea whethei Hillaiy claimed a mountain on
:th May :,, and, if so, which mountain Hillaiy climbed on that day.
Tis example shows that English is not an extensional language.
A similai point can be made about piedicate expiessions. Assuming
again that the animals with kidneys aie exactly the animals with heaits,
the following substitution may tiansfoim the tiue fist sentence into a
false sentence:
:
Tom believes that all snails have heaits.
Tom believes that all snails have kidneys.
Tom might believe that all snails have heaits, but he might not have a
view on whethei they also have kidneys. He may even believe that they
lack kidneys.
Anothei example of the failuie of extensionality is the following paii
of sentences:
It is logically tiue that all animals with heaits have heaits.
It is logically tiue that all animals with heaits have kidneys.
Te fist sentence is tiue, while the second is false: it is not logically tiue
that all animals with heaits have kidneys.
In the above examples, that-sentences have been used to pioduce
counteiexamples to the extensionality of English. Te pioblematic sub-
stitutions weie made afei such phiases as Tom believes that oi It is
logically tiue that. Teie aie also cases of simplei sentences, without that,
wheie extensionality fails:
Oedipus is looking foi his mothei.
: Te qualifcations fiom footnote :, page , footnote : apply.
Tis sentence may well be tiue since Oedipus was abandoned as a baby.
Now he is maiiied to and lives with Jocasta who, unbeknownst to him, is
his mothei. So the following sentence might be false at the same time:
Oedipus is looking foi Jocasta.
She might actually be sitting iight next to him. Since Jocasta and Oedi-
pus mothei denote the same peison, the example piovides anothei case
of the failuie of extensionality.
Te failuie of extensionality of English imposes ceitain iestiictions
on the foimalisations of English sentences in the language of piedicate
logic. In the above example, one might be tempted to foimalise
Oedipus is looking foi Jocasta
as P
2
ab with the following dictionaiy:
P
2
: . . . is looking foi . . .
a: Oedipus
b: Jocasta
Tis tianslation is not coiiect: . . . is looking foi . . . does not expiess
a ielation, that is, a set of oideied paiis. If it did, it would expiess the
set (ielation) of all paiis d, e such that d is looking foi e; and if the
paii Oedipus, Oedipus mothei is in that set, then Oedipus, Jocasta is
necessaiily also in that set since it is the same oideied paii: oideied paiis
aie identical if they agiee in the theii fist and second components, and
Oedipus mothei and Jocasta aie the same object. So it would be tiue that
Oedipus is looking foi Jocasta, which is not the case. Tus, . . . is looking
foi . . . cannot be foimalised as a binaiy piedicate lettei, because this is
assigned a binaiy ielation as its extension in any L
2
-stiuctuie.
Howevei, one might still foimalise . . . is looking foi Oedipus mothei
by a unaiy piedicate lettei. Te English piedicate expiession . . . is looking
foi Oedipus mothei does expiess a unaiy ielation, that is, a set: the
designatoi Oedipus may be ieplaced by any othei designatoi foi Oedipus
without changing the tiuth-value of the sentence. Geneially, whenevei
one has a designatoi t such that t is looking foi Oedipus mothei is tiue
and some designatoi s iefeis to the same object as t, the sentence s is
looking foi Oedipus mothei is tiue as well.
By a similai aigument one can show that the piedicate expiession
. . . believes that . . . is high must not be foimalised as a binaiy piedicate
lettei. Tis can be done by consideiing the following example again:
Tom believes that Mount Eveiest is high.
Te foimalisation by the sentence R
2
a
I
b
I
with the following dictionaiy is
not coiiect:
R
2
: . . . believes that . . . is high
a
I
: Tom
b
I
: Mount Eveiest
Assume that . . . believes that . . . is high is foimalised as a binaiy piedicate
lettei; then the following pioblem aiises: If B is an L
2
-stiuctuie and the
paii Tom, Mount Eveiest is an element of the semantical value of R
2
,
that is, of the ielation |R
2
|
B
, then Tom, Qomolangma is by necessity
also an element of that ielation. Tis is due to the fact that Tom, Mount
Eveiest and Tom, Qomolangma aie the same oideied paii with Tom
as fist component and the highest mountain on eaith as the second. But
the sentence
Tom believes that Qomolangma is high
may be false. So . . . believes that . . . is high cannot be foimalised as a
binaiy piedicate lettei.
Te best foimalisation with the tools available might be Q
I
a, wheie
Q
I
is tianslated as . . . believes that Mount Eveiest is high.
Generally one can only use a predicate letter for English predicates if
they express relations.
Tis also includes unaiy piedicate letteis, which denote unaiy iela-
tions, that is, sets (see the end of Section :.).
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic :,o
,. vviuic:1i iocic :u :vcUmi1s i iciisu
Many iemaiks about, and defnitions of, foimalisations caiiy ovei fiom
piopositional logic to piedicate logic. In paiticulai, Defnition ,., can be
iefoimulated foi piedicate logic in the obvious way:
uiiii1io ,.,.
(i) An English sentence is logically true in predicate logic if and only if
its formalisation in predicate logic is logically true.
(ii) An English sentence is a contradiction in predicate logic if and only
if its formalisation in predicate logic is a contradiction.
(iii) Aset of English sentences is consistent in predicate logic if and only if
the set of their formalisations in predicate logic is semantically con-
sistent.
:
Similaily, the defnition of validity of English aiguments in piedicate
logic is analogous to Defnition ,.o:
uiiii1io ,.8. An argument in English is valid in predicate logic if and
only if its formalisation in the language L
2
of predicate logic is valid.
Of couise, an aigument in English is valid if it is valid in piedicate
logic, that is, if its foimalisation in L
2
is valid. So an aigument in English
is valid, if its foimalisation in L
2
is a valid aigument. Howevei, on the
view of many logicians, theie aie valid aiguments in English that aie not
valid in piedicate logic. I will ietuin to the question whethei theie aie
such English aiguments latei.
As in the case of piopositional logic, talking about the foimalisation
of a sentence in L
2
is not unpioblematic since theie may be moie than
one foimalisation (see Section ,): if a sentence is ambiguous and has two
oi moie foimalisations, the sentence may be logically tiue in piedicate
logic on one ieading, but not on anothei.
: I could have used the notion of syntactic consistency, which is the same as semantic
consistency by Teoiem ,.,.
To illustiate howthe methods of piedicate logic can be used to analyse
aiguments in English, I will now go thiough some examples, staiting
with a simple and famous example:
All men aie moital. Sociates is a man. Teiefoie, Sociates is
moital.
Cleaily, the aigument is valid. In oidei to establish its validity foimally, I
will foimalise the piemisses as x(Px Qx} and Pc and the conclusion
as Qc with the following dictionaiy:
P: . . . is a man
Q: . . . is moital
c: Sociates
Te iesulting aigument in L
2
is valid:
ix:mvii ,.. x(Px Qx}, Pc Qc
Proof. A pioof in Natuial Deduction looks like this:
Pc
x(Px Qx}
Elim
Pc Qc
Elim
Qc
Te foimalisation and the pioof show that the English aigument is
valid in piedicate logic and, thus, foimally valid.
Next I will tuin to an example that was analysed on page o8 in the
chaptei on piopositional logic:
Unless Alfied is an eminent logician, it is not the case that
both Kuit and Alfied aie eminent logicians.
Te sentence has the foimalisation
Pa (Pa Pb}
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic :,8
P: . . . is an eminent logician
a: Alfied
b: Kuit
Te claim Pa (Pa Pb} can be established by the following pioof:
|(Pa Pb}|
Pa (Pa Pb} |(Pa (Pa Pb}}|
Elim
Pa Pb
Pa
Intio:
Pa (Pa Pb} |(Pa (Pa Pb}}|
Elim
Pa (Pa Pb}
Hence, the English sentence is logically tiue in piedicate logic. An inspec-
tion of the pioof shows that I have only used iules fiom piopositional
logic: the foimalisation of the designatoi Alfied as a constant and of
. . . is an eminent logician as a piedicate lettei has not been used at all.
Te paising of the sentence Alfied is an eminent logician into a piedicate
expiession and a designatoi is not ieally needed in oidei to see that the
sentence is logically tiue: if I had foimalised the sentences Alfied is an
eminent logician and Kuit is an eminent logician just with two sentence
letteis, I would also have obtained a logically tiue L
2
-sentence (which is
also a tautology). In fact, on page o8 I alieady showed that the sentence
is logically tiue in piopositional logic, that is, it is a tautology. Tus, I did
not need to use the moie detailed foimalisation in oidei to establish that
the English sentence is a tautology. Tis obseivation can be geneialised:
If a partial formalisation of an English sentence is logically true, then
that English sentence is logically true in predicate logic. Similarly, if a par-
tial formalisation of an English argument is valid, then that English argu-
ment is valid in predicate logic.
By a paitial foimalisation of a sentence I mean heie a tianslation of
that sentence into the foimal language (L
I
oi L
2
) that has been obtained
accoiding to the iules foi tianslating, but that has not ieached its full
foimalisation. Tus, in oidei to show that an aigument is valid, one does
not always have to give a full foimalisation. Of couise it is not wiong to
give the full foimalisation, but giving meiely a paitial foimalisation will
be less laboiious.
I will illustiate this point with the following aigument:
Eveiy student has a computei. Wilma doesnt have a com-
putei. Teiefoie Wilma isnt a student.
I have alieady foimalised the fist piemiss on page o. Tis time I will
foimalise the expiession has a computei as a unaiy piedicate lettei, that
is, I will not foimalise the existential quantifei contained in . . . has a
computei as on page o.
P
I
: . . . has a computei
a: Wilma
With this dictionaiy the foimalisation of the fist piemiss is x(Px
P
I
x}, the foimalisation of the second piemiss is P
I
a, and the foimalisa-
tion of the conclusion is Pa. Tis yields a valid aigument in piedicate
logic: x(Px P
I
x}, P
I
a Pa (see Exeicise o.,(i)). Tus, the English
aigument is valid in piedicate logic. Tis has been established without
giving the full foimalisation of the fist piemiss as on page o, that is,
x(Px y(Rxy Qy}}.
Te next aigument (oi at least a similai one) has played a iole in the
development of logic.
,
(H) Hoises aie animals. Teiefoie eveiy head of a hoise is the head of
an animal.
, Te dominating foim of logic since antiquity was Aiistotles syllogistics. But by the :th
centuiy some shoitcomings of syllogistics had become cleai. Syllogistics is not incoiiect,
and it is not in confict with modein logic, but it is weakei than piedicate logic. In the
:th centuiy vaiious logicians aigued that syllogistics cannot cope with aiguments of
ceitain types. An aigument similai to the one above was used by De Moigan (:8,,
pages ::::,) to demonstiate the insumciency of syllogistics because its validity cannot
be shown in syllogistic logic.
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic :oo
Heie is the logical foim of the piemiss:
foi all x: (if (x is a hoise) then (x is an animal))
Tus the piemiss can be foimalised as x(Px Qx}.
Te logical foimof the conclusion of (H) is moie dimcult to deteimine.
Te fist step should be cleai, howevei:
foi all x (if x is the head of a hoise then x is the head of an
animal)
Te expiession x is the head of a hoise need not be fuithei analysed foi
showing the validity of the aigument. Te following logical foim of the
conclusion will sumce:
foi all x (if theie is a y: ((y is a hoise) and (x is the head of
y)) then theie is a y: ((y is an animal) and (x is the head of
y)))
Tus, the conclusion can be foimalised as the following L
2
-sentence:
x{y(Py Rxy} y(Qy Rxy})
I have used the following dictionaiy:
P: . . . is a hoise
Q: . . . is an animal
R: . . . is the head of . . .
Te iesulting L
2
-aigument is valid:
ix:mvii ,.:o. x(Px Qx} x{y(Py Rxy} y(Qy Rxy})
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic :o:
Proof.
|y(Py Ray}|
|Pb Rab|
Pb
x(Px Qx}
Pb Qb
Qb
|Pb Rab|
Rab
Qb Rab
Intio
y(Qy Ray}
Elim
y(Qy Ray}
Intio
y(Py Ray} y(Qy Ray}
Intio
x{y(Py Rxy} y(Qy Rxy})
Teiefoie, aigument (H) is valid in piedicate logic and, theiefoie,
logically (foimally) valid.
One does need to use a full foimalisation in oidei to show that the
next aigument is valid.
Teie is not a single moial peison. Teiefoie all peisons aie
immoial.
If immoial is undeistood as not moial, the aigument can be foimalised
as follows:
x(Px Qx} y(Py Qy} (,.,)
Te dictionaiy is obvious:
P: . . . is a peison
Q: . . . is moial
Claim (,.,) can be pioved as follows:
x(Px Qx}
|Pa Qa|
Intio
x(Px Qx}
Intio
(Pa Qa}
|Pa| |Qa|
Pa Qa
Intio
Qa
Intio
Pa Qa
Intio
y(Py Qy}
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic :o:
Te aiguments consideied so fai in this section have all been valid. I
will now considei an aigument in English that is not valid:
All lotteiy tickets aie winneis oi loseis. Teiefoie all tickets
aie winneis.
Using this tiivial example I shall explain in some detail howthe semantics
of L
2
can be employed to showthat this aigument is not valid in piedicate
logic.
Fiist I will foimalise the aigument. Te piemiss becomes
x(Px Qx Rx},
and the conclusion
x(Px Qx}.
Te dictionaiy should be obvious:
P: . . . is a lotteiy ticket
Q: . . . is a winnei
R: . . . is a losei
I want to dispiove the validity of the iesulting L
2
-aigument, that is, I want
to show the following:
x(Px Qx Rx} x(Px Qx} (,.)
Tis can be achieved by means of a counteiexample, that is, by means of
an L
2
-stiuctuie in which the piemiss is tiue and the conclusion is false.
Te L
2
-stiuctuie F constitutes such a counteiexample; it has a domain
with only the numbei I in it:
D
F
= I}
|P|
F
= I}
|Q|
F
=
|R|
F
= I}
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic :o,
Te semantical values foi the othei constants, sentence letteis, and piedi-
cate letteis do not mattei, and I will not specify them.
Next, I will show that the piemiss is tiue in F. Ovei the domain D
F
theie is only a single vaiiable assignment , because theie is only one
object in the domain and foi any vaiiable v, (v} must be I, so |x|
F
= I.
Now one can ieason as follows:
|x|
F
|R|
F
defnition of F
|Rx|
F
|Rx Qx|
F
|Px Rx Qx|
F
|x(Px Rx Qx}|
F
= T Defnition ,.:(vii)
Te last line holds because theie is only one vaiiable assignment ovei D
F
.
Tus, the piemiss is indded tiue in the L
2
-stiuctuie F.
It iemains to show that the conclusion is false in F:
|x|
F
is not in |Q|
F
defnition of F
|Qx|
F
|x|
F
|P|
F
defnition of F
|Px|
F
|Px Qx|
F
= F Defnition ,.:(v)
|x(Px Qx}|
F
= F Defnition ,.:(vii)
Te last line shows that the conclusion is not tiue in F, and thus the claim
,. is established. Consequently, the English aigument is not valid in
piedicate logic.
Generally, in order to show that an English argument is not valid in
predicate logic, one will formalise the argument and provide a counterex-
ample to the resulting L
2
-argument.
I have said that one can show that an English aigument is valid by
pioviding a paitial foimalisation that is a valid L
2
-aigument. In oidei to
, Formalisation in Predicate Logic :o
iefute the validity of an English aigument, meiely paitial foimalisations
cannot be used: usually an English aigument that is valid in piedicate
logic will have some L
2
-foimalisation that is not valid. Tus, in oidei to
show that an English aigument is not valid in piedicate logic, one needs
to considei its full foimalisation.
8 Identity and Defnite Desciiptions
In this chaptei I will intioduce a thiid foimal language. Tis newlanguage
L
=
is the language of piedicate logic with identity; it is only a small
iefnement of the language L
2
of piedicate logic: L
=
is just L
2
with the
addition of the new symbol = foi identity.
8. : qU:ii1:1ivi :u Umivic:i iui1i1v
Philosopheis have distinguished two difeient notions of identity: quali-
tative identity and numeiical identity. In the following example I piesent
a case of qualitative identity.
Teie is a fountain pen in my teaching ioom and anothei
fountain pen in my study at home. Tey aie the same model,
the same coloui, and both aie still in piistine condition. Tus,
I have two identical fountain pens.
Teie aie two pens, and they aie qualitatively identical because they aie
in all ielevant aspects veiy similai.
To explain numeiical identity, I will expand the example a little bit:
A fountain pen expeit sees my pen at home afei having
seen the pen in my teaching ioom the day befoie. He may
wondei whethei I have taken the pen home and ask: Is this
the same pen as the pen in youi teaching ioom: oi Is this
pen identical to the pen I saw yesteiday:
He knows all the ways that the pen at my home and the pen in my teaching
ioomaie similai, and so he is not asking whethei they aie the same coloui
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :oo
oi aie of the same biand etc; iathei he wants to know whethei it is the
same pen, that is, whethei he has seen two (qualitatively identical) pens
oi whethei he has seen one and the same pen. So in his question identity
has to be undeistood numeiically. In the numeiical sense the pen in my
teaching ioom is not identical with the pen in my study at home, that is,
theie aie two pens.
Occasionally it is not cleai which kind of identity is at issue in a given
sentence. Te claim
Robin saw the same tiee yeais latei in the gaiden
might be taken to expiess that Robin saw one and the same tiee in the
gaiden yeais latei, oi that he saw a tiee of the same kind in the gaiden
yeais latei.
Qualitative identity may be foimalised by a binaiy piedicate lettei
of L
2
. Its tieatment in piedicate logic with identity does not difei fiom
the tieatment of most othei binaiy piedicates.
Numeiical identity, in contiast, is given a special status. In what fol-
lows I shall talk exclusively about numeiical identity. Numeiical identity
is foimalised by a new, special piedicate lettei.
8. : 1ui sv1:x oi L
=
All foimulae of L
2
aie also foimulae of L
=
. But L
=
also includes a new
kind of atomic foimula.
uiiii1io8.: (:1omic iovmUi:i oi L
=
). All atomic formulae of L
2
are
atomic formulae of L
=
. Furthermore, if t
I
and t
2
are variables or constants,
then t
I
=t
2
is an atomic formula of L
=
.
Examples of atomic foimulae of L
=
aie x = x, x = z
36
, a = y, and
a
34
=c
22
, and atomic foimulae of L
2
such as P
3
3
xxc
3
. Otheiwise, theie aie
no deviations fiom the syntax of L
2
, and one can build complex foimulae
using connectives and quantifeis as in L
2
in accoidance with Defnition
., of a foimula of L
2
. Of couise, now one must also allow foi =. Te new
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :o,
symbol = behaves exactly like a binaiy piedicate lettei, with the exception
that = is wiitten between the vaiiables oi constants. Wiiting the identity
symbol like othei piedicate letteis as the fist symbol in atomic foimulae
would look odd, as we aie used to wiiting x = y iathei than =xy, but that
is the only ieason foi wiiting x = y iathei than =xy.
Te foimulae of L
=
aie defned in the same way as the foimulae of L
2
in Defnition .,, with the only exception that the new atomic foimulae
can be used.
uiiii1io 8.: (iovmUi:i oi L
=
).
(i) All atomic formulae of L
=
are formulae of L
=
.
(ii) If and are formulae of L
=
, then , ( }, ( }, ( }
and ( } are formulae of L
=
.
(iii) If v is a variable and is a formula of L
=
then v and v are
formulae of L
=
.
Foi instance, x = y and x(Rxy
2
y
2
=x} aie foimulae of L
=
.
All othei defnitions fiom Section .: caiiy ovei as well. Sentences
of L
=
aie defned as those foimulae in which no vaiiable occuis fieely.
Also, the biacketing conventions aie the same as foi L
2
.
8. , sim:1ics
Te semantics foi L
=
is just a small vaiiation on the semantics foi L
2
, and
so it is not necessaiy to intioduce a new kind of stiuctuie: L
2
-stiuctuies
aie used foi the semantics of L
=
.
Only Defnition ,.: needs to be amended by adding the following
additional clause to (i)(viii), wheie Ais an L
2
-stiuctuie, s is a vaiiable
oi constant, and t is a vaiiable oi constant:
(ix) |s =t|
A
= T if and only if |s|
A
= |t|
A
.
Tus, in the semantics foi L
=
, the symbol = is always inteipieted as nu-
meiical identity. In (ix) the symbol = is used in two difeient ways: its fist
occuiience is a symbol of the foimal language L
=
; the two subsequent
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :o8
occuiiences belong to the language we aie using to desciibe L
=
. In oidei
to avoid this ambiguity some authois put a dot undei the symbol of the
foimal language, but this convention has not ieally caught on. Alteina-
tively, one could avoid the use of = outside the foimal language L
=
by
iefoimulating (ix) in the following way:
(ix) Te vaiiable assignment satisfes s =t in A if and only if |s|
A
and
|t|
A
aie the same object.
In the following I will not tiy to avoid the use of = in these two difeient
ioles: it should be cleai foi eveiy occuiience of the symbol whethei it
is used as a symbol of L
=
oi as a symbol of oui eveiyday mathematical
language.
It follows fiom clause (ix) that foi any L
2
-stiuctuie A, |a = a|
A
= T
and foi any vaiiable assignment ovei A, |x =x|
A
= T, because, tiivially,
|x|
A
is the same object as |x|
A
, and |a|
A
is the same object as |a|
A
. Of
couise, the same applies to vaiiables othei than x and to constants othei
than a.
Te defnitions of validity of arguments, of semantic consistency, of log-
ically true sentences, and so on, carry over from Defnitions ,., and ,.8.
Te method of counteiexamples can be applied in the same way as it
was foi the language L
2
. As an example I will showthat x y x = y does
not followin piedicate logic with identity fiomthe piemiss x Pxy Py.
ix:mvii 8.,. x Px y Py x y x = y
Te aigument could be a foimalisation of the following English aigu-
ment:
Teie is a painting and theie is a painting. Teiefoie theie
aie at least two things.
A moie liteial tianslation of the conclusion x y x = y would be theie
is a thing such that theie is a thing that is not identical to the fist; but
that is just a longwinded way of saying that theie aie at least two things.
Te piemiss just makes the same claim twice, namely that theie is a
painting. Te use of the two vaiiables x and y does not imply that theie
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :o
aie two difeient paintings. Tis yields the idea foi the following pioof.
Proof. Let B be an L
2
-stiuctuie with (the painting of) Mona Lisa as the
only element in its domain of discouise, and the Mona Lisa } as the
extension of P.
D
B
= the Mona Lisa }
|P|
B
= the Mona Lisa }
Fiist I will show that the piemiss is tiue in this stiuctuie.
Teie is exactly one vaiiable assignment ovei B: it assigns the Mona
Lisa to all vaiiables, so |x|
A
is the Mona Lisa.
the Mona Lisa the Mona Lisa}
|x|
B
|P|
B
|Px|
B
|x Px|
B
Since assigns the Mona Lisa to y as well, the same ieasoning can be
applied to y:
| y|
B
|P|
B
|Py|
B
|y Py|
B
Taking the last lines togethei, one can infei the following by Defnition
,.:(iii):
|x Px y Py|
B
= T
So the piemiss is tiue in B, and it iemains to show that the conclusion is
not tiue in B.
Assume to the contiaiy that the conclusion is tiue in B, that is, assume
that |x y x = y|
B
= T. Ten, by Defnition ,.:(viii), foi at least one
vaiiable assignment the following must obtain:
|y x = y|
B
= T
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :,o
Applying Defnition ,.:(viii) again, one can conclude that theie is a vaii-
able assignment ovei B, difeiing fiom in y at most, such that the
following obtains:
|x = y|
B
= T
(In fact, theie is only one vaiiable assignment ovei B and theiefoie and
aie the same vaiiable assignment, but I do not make use of this fact
heie.)
By Defnition ,.:(ii) it follows that
|x = y|
B
= F. (8.:)
Since theie is only one object in the domain of B, namely the Mona Lisa,
|x|
B
and | y|
B
aie the same object. Tus, |x|
B
= | y|
B
, which implies the
following by the above special supplementaiy clause (ix) foi Defnition ,.::
|x = y|
B
= T
Tis contiadicts (8.:), which followed fiom the assumption that the con-
clusion x y x = y is tiue in B. Tus, the conclusion is not tiue in B,
and it has been shown that x y x = y does not follow fiom the piemiss
x Px y Py.
8. vvooi vUiis iov iui1i1v
In oidei to obtain a pioof system that is sound and complete with iespect
to the semantics foi L
=
, the system of Natuial Deduction needs to be
expanded so as to include an intioduction and an elimination iule foi
identity.
Te intioduction iule allows one to assume a=a (and similaily foi
all othei constants) and to dischaige a=a immediately:
=Intro Any assumption of the form t =t where t is a constant
can and must be discharged.
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :,:
Hence, a pioof with an application of =Intio looks like this:
|t =t|
To motivate the elimination iule I will look at the following infoi-

mal way of ieasoning: if one has established that Mount Eveiest is Qo-
molangma and that Mount Eveiest is in Asia, then one can conclude that
Qomolangma is in Asia. Te elimination iule foi identity is the foimal
counteipait of the geneial piinciple legitimating this substitution. In this
iule is a foimula of L
=
with at most one vaiiable v occuiiing fieely.
=Elim If s and t are constants, the result of appending |t]v|
to a proof of |s]v| and a proof of s = t or t = s is a proof of
|t]v|.
Te giaphical iepiesentation of the iule looks as follows:
|s]v|

s =t
=Elim
|t]v|
|s]v|

t =s
=Elim
|t]v|
Stiictly speaking, only one of the veisions is needed, as fiom s =t one can
always obtain t =s using only one of the iules, as will be shown in Example
8.,. Having both veisions available is, howevei, moie convenient.
I give some examples illustiating the use of these iules.
ix:mvii 8.. x x =x
Proof. Te pioof is veiy shoit:
|a=a|
x x =x
Fiist a=a is assumed and immediately dischaiged by =Intio. Ten Intio
can be applied without violating the iestiiction on constants.
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :,:
ix:mvii 8.,. x y (x = y y=x}
Proof.
|a=a| |a=b|
=Elim
b=a
Intio
a=b b=a
Intio
y (a= y y=a}
Intio
xy (x = y y=x}
Tis pioof shows that =Elim does not demand that one ieplace all the
occuiiences of a by b in the step fiom the fist to the second line. Tis
step is licensed by the iule =Elim, taking to be the foimula x =a.
ix:mvii 8.o. x y z (x = y y=z x =z}
Proof.
|a=b b=c|
Elim:
a=b
|a=b b=c|
Elim:
b=c
=Elim
a=c
Intio
a=b b=c a=c
Intio
z (a=b b=z a=z}
Intio
yz (a= y y=z a=z}
Intio
xyz (x = y y=z x =z}
Tis pioof system, like those of piopositional and piedicate logic, is
adequate:
1uiovim 8., (:uiqU:cv). Assume that and all elements of are L
=
-
sentences. Ten if and only if .
As in the case of piopositional and piedicate logic, I will not piove
the Adequacy Teoiem heie.
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :,,
8. , Usis oi iui1i1v
Te woid is can play vaiious ioles. It can be used to expiess piedication,
as in Snow is white oi Jane is a classicist. In these cases is foims pait of
the piedicate. Te phiase is a classicist is foimalised as a unaiy piedicate
lettei as it does not iefei to a specifc classicist.
In othei cases is is used to expiess identity as in Ratzingei is Bene-
dict XVI. oi St Maiy College of Winchestei is New College. In these
cases, is combines two designatois and expiesses (numeiical) identity.
Tus, St Maiy College of Winchestei is New College is foimalised as
a=b with the obvious dictionaiy:
a: St Maiy College of Winchestei
b: New College
Te identity symbol is useful not only foi foimalising oveit identity
statements, as in the above examples. One can also use the identity symbol
to expiess that theie is a ceitain numbei of objects of some kind. Assume
that the piedicate lettei Px has the following entiy in the dictionaiy:
P: . . . is a Wagnei opeia
Ten the claim that theie is at least one Wagnei opeia can be expiessed by
existential quantifcation as xPx. If one wants to say that theie aie at least
two Wagnei opeias, howevei, it does not sumce to say xy (Px Py} oi
x Px y Py, because these two sentences say meiely that something
is a Wagnei opeia and something is a Wagnei opeia; it does not say that
something is a Wagnei opeia and something else is a Wagnei opeia. But
the lattei can be expiessed using =:
x y (Px Py x = y} (8.:)
Tis sentence of L
=
says that theie aie at least two Wagnei opeias. Of
couise the tiick also woiks with thiee:
x y z (Px Py Pz x = y x =z y=z}
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :,
Tis sentence says that theie aie at least thiee Wagnei opeias.
By using identity one can also expiess that theie is at most one Wagnei
opeia by saying that, if x and y aie Wagnei opeias, then x and y aie
identical:
x y (Px Py x = y} (8.,)
Again this also woiks foi at most two, at most thiee, and so on.
Teie aie at most two Wagnei opeias can be foimalised as
x y z (Px Py Pz x = y y=z x =z}. (8.)
Teie is exactly one Wagnei opeia can now be iephiased as Teie is
at least one Wagnei opeia and theie is at most one Wagnei opeia, and I
have alieady shown howto expiess the two paits of that claim: x Px says
that theie is at least one such opeia, and the second pait, beginning with
at most, has (8.,) as its foimalisation. So Teie is exactly one Wagnei
opeia can be foimalised by the following L
=
-sentence:
x Px x y (Px Py x = y} (8.,)
Tis can also be expiessed by the following logically equivalent foimula:
x(Px y(Py x = y}} (8.o)
Tis sentence says that theie is a Wagnei opeia and it is the only one, that
is, any Wagnei opeia is identical to it. A still moie concise veision is the
sentence x y(Py x = y}.
:
Similaily, one can expiess in L
=
that theie aie exactly two Wagnei
opeias by combining (8.:) with (8.):
x y (Px Py x = y}x y z (Px Py Pz x = y y=z x =z}
By this method one can expiess, in the language L
=
, that theie aie
exactly :, Wagnei opeias, although this L
=
-sentence will be painfully long.
: Te equivalence to (8.,) follows fiom Exeicise 8.,.
One might think that the claim that theie aie :, Wagnei opeias involves
also a claimabout a mathematical object, namely the numbei :,. Howevei,
the claim can be foimalised without using a piedicate lettei oi constant
foi numbeis. Teiefoie, one can dispense with numbeis when claiming,
foi instance, that theie aie exactly :, Wagnei opeias. Some philosopheis
have tiied to dispense with numbeis and othei mathematical objects
completely, and the examples of this section show that identity can be
used to expiess ceitain claims without iefeience to numbeis, even if these
claims seem to be about numbeis at fist glance.
With these tiicks at ones disposal one can tackle a pioblem with the
foimalisation of designatois such as the king of Fiance, Claudias gaiden,
the tallest tutoi of New College who can speak Latin but does not own a
cai, oi the cai owned by Tim. Designatois of this kind aie called defnite
desciiptions. Defnite desciiptions cannot be adequately foimalised as
constants. Te following aigument is logically valid:
(T) Te cai owned by Tim is ied. Teiefoie theie is a ied cai.
Foimalising the defnite desciiption by a constant yields Pa foi the pie-
miss and x(Px Qx} foi the conclusion, with the obvious dictionaiy:
a: the cai owned by Tim
P: . . . is ied
Q: . . . is a cai
Cleaily, the aigument in L
2
coiiesponding to the English aigument (T)
is not valid, that is, Pa x(Px Qx}.
:
By foimalising a defnite de-
sciiption as a constant one loses all the infoimation contained in the
defnite desciiption. As the examples above show, a defnite desciiption
can contain a lot of infoimation, and condensing the tallest tutoi of New
College who can speak Latin but does not own a cai into a single constant
is bound to be inadequate.
: See Exeicise ,.:(i).
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :,o
If Tim did not own a cai at all, the piemiss Te cai owned by Tim is
ied would not be tiue; if Tim owned two oi moie cais the piemiss would
also be not tiue, as theie would not be any cai that is the cai owned by
Tim would not exist. Te piemiss implies that Tim owns exactly one cai.
In fact, the piemiss can be iephiased as follows:
,
Tim owns exactly one cai and it is ied.
Fiom the above it is cleai how to expiess the claim that theie is exactly
one cai owned by Tim. So the sentence can be iephiased in the following
way:
Teie is a cai owned by Tim, and its his only cai (that is,
eveiy cai Tim owns is identical to it), and it is ied.
Following the pattein of (8.o), the piemiss of (T) is foimalised as follows:
x {(Qx Rbx} y(Qy Rby x = y} Px) (8.,)
Foi this foimalisation the dictionaiy needs to be extended to covei b
and R:
b: Tim
R: . . . owns . . .
When the defnite desciiption the cai owned by Tim was foimalised
as a constant, the validity of (T) could not be captuied by the validity of
its foimalisation. Tis was the motive foi seeking a moie iefned analysis
of the defnite desciiption. I still have to show that the new, moie detailed
analysis actually allows me to show the validity of (T) by establishing
the validity of its tianslation. Te piemiss now is foimalised as (8.,) and
the conclusion as befoie by x(Px Qx}. With this foimalisation the
aigument is valid in piedicate logic with identity:
, Te following is Russells (:o,) theoiy of defnite desciiptions. Foi a ciiticismof Russells
theoiy see (Stiawson, :,o).
ix:mvii 8.8.
x{(Qx Rbx} y(Qy Rby x = y} Px) x(Px Qx}
Te pioof is on the next page.
In some cases it may not be so easy to see that a sentence contains
a defnite desciiption. Especially identity statements involving defnite
desciiptions may be confusing. Considei the following two sentences:
(i) Jane is a classicist.
(ii) Jane is the classicist.
In the fist sentence is expiesses piedication. Sentence (ii), howevei, is
an identity statement: Jane is a piopei name, while the classicist is a
defnite desciiption. If . . . is a classicist is tianslated as Q
I
and Jane as
c
I
, sentence (i) becomes Q
I
c
I
, while (ii) becomes the following foimula,
when foimalised in the style of 8.,:
x(Q
I
x y(Q
I
y y=x} c
I
=x}
Tis sentence is logically equivalent to
Q
I
c
I
y(Q
I
y y=c
I
},
which says that Jane and only Jane is a classicist.
Te following example of a sentence containing a defnite desciiption

is due to Russell (:o,):
Te king of Fiance is bald.
By the king of Fiance I mean the piesent king of Fiance. Tus, this
defnite desciiption does not iefei to any object because Fiance is a ie-
public, not a monaichy. Applying the stiategy above, one can iephiase
this sentence as follows:
Someone might could ietoit that (i) can be analysed as an identity statement as well,
because it says that Jane is identical to some classicist. See Exeicise 8., foi this analysis.
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :,8
x
(
(
Q
x
R
b
x
}
y
(
Q
y
R
b
y
x
=
y
}
P
x
}
|
(
(
Q
c
R
b
c
}
y
(
Q
y
R
b
y
c
=
y
}
}
P
c
|
P
c
|
(
(
Q
c
R
b
c
}
y
(
Q
y
R
b
y
c
=
y
}
}
P
c
|
(
Q
c
R
b
c
}
y
(
Q
y
R
b
y
c
=
y
}
Q
c
R
b
c
Q
c
P
c
Q
c
I
n
t
i
o
x
(
P
x
Q
x
}
E
l
i
m
x
(
P
x
Q
x
}
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :,
Teie is exactly one king of Fiance, and he is bald.
Tis English sentence can be foimalised as a sentence expiessing that
theie is a king of Fiance, he is the only king of Fiance, and he is bald:
x(Rxc y(Ryc y=x} Px}
R: . . . is the king of . . .
c: Fiance
P: . . . is bald
Since Fiance is a iepublic, the sentence Te king of Fiance is bald is
false. Howevei, the sentence
Te king of Fiance is not bald (8.8)
is also false undei at least one ieading: it seems to say that theie is exactly
one king of Fiance and that he is not bald, which is also not tiue since
theie is no king of Fiance.
Te following sentence, in contiast, is tiue:
It is not the case (foi whatevei ieason) that the king of Fiance is bald.
(8.)
Heie the claim that the king of Fiance is bald is iejected: it leaves open
whethei theie is a king of Fiance who is not bald oi whethei theie is no
king of Fiance at all, oi, peihaps, whethei theie is moie than one king, so
that theie is nothing that is the king of Fiance.
Sentence (8.8) is most natuially foimalised by the following sentence:
x(Rxc y(Ryc y=x} Px} (8.:o)
Tis says that theie is a king of Fiance, that he is the only king of Fiance,
and that he is not bald. So only the baldness is denied, not that theie is
exactly one king of Fiance.
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :8o
Wheieas in 8.:o the negation symbol diiectly piecedes Px, in the
foimalisation of (8.) it is at the beginning:
x(Rxc y(Ryc y=x} Px} (8.::)
Tis expiesses that it is not the case (foi whatevei ieason) that theie is a
king of Fiance, who is the only one, and who is bald.
If these foimalisations aie coiiect, then (8.8) and (8.) have difeient
meanings. But especially the foimalisation of (8.8) is not uncontiovei-
sial, and theie may be anothei ieading of (8.8) that iesults in a difeient
foimalisation. Te following claim is a valid aigument only if (8.8) is
undeistood as expiessing the same as (8.):
Te king of Fiance is not bald; foi theie is no king of Fiance.
Te fist sentence is the conclusion, the second sentence is the piemiss of
the aigument. It can be foimalised as a valid aigument in L
2
only if (8.8)
is foimalised like (8.) as (8.::). Tus, depending on the ieading, theie
aie two foimalisations of (8.8) in L
=
that aie not logically equivalent,
namely (8.:o) and (8.::). If an English sentence has two non-equivalent
foimalisations, it is ambiguous. By compaiing (8.:o) and (8.::), one can
see that this is a case of a scope ambiguity again. In foimalisation (8.:o)
the occuiience of has a naiiow scope; its scope is only Px. In foi-
malisation (8.::) the negation symbol has a wide scope: its scope is the
entiie sentence. Which foimalisation is bettei has to be decided fiom
case to case, depending on the context.
Te analysis of defnite desciiptions just sketched allows one to tieat
the expiession the king of Fiance as an expiession that does not iefei to
an object in any case. Tis is an advantage, compaied to a foimalisation
of the king of Fiance as a constant: a constant has exactly one object as
it semantic value in any given L
2
-stiuctuie; a constant iefeis to an object
in any L
2
-stiuctuie. If a constant is used, the following aigument comes
out as valid in L
=
:
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :8:
It is not the case that the king of Fiance is bald. Teiefoie
something is not bald.
Let the constant a stand foi the king of Fiance. Ten Pa x Px
can be established by a single application of the iule Intio. Howevei, the
English aigument cleaily is not valid. Te foimalisation is valid, while the
English aigument is not, because the semantics of constants in L
2
and of
defnite desciiptions in English aie difeient: in L
2
constants always iefei
to some object, while in English defnite desciiptions such as the king of
Fiance may fail to iefei to an object.
If the piemiss It is not the case that the king of Fiance is bald is
foimalised as (8.::)
x(Rxc y(Ryc y=x} Px},
in accoidance with the above pioposed analysis of defnite desciiptions,
then its foimalisation coiiectly comes out as not valid. Tis example
shows that, at least in some cases, the pioposed theoiy of defnite de-
sciiptions can be used to handle English designatois that do not denote
anything.
So fai I have foimalised piopei names as constants. In the light of
what has just been said, one may doubt the univeisal adequacy of this
foimalisation of piopei names: a piopei name such as Pegasus does not
seem to iefei to an object (existing now oi in the past). One pioposal foi
dealing with this pioblem is to foimalise piopei names in the same way
as defnite desciiptions. But doing so iequiies a piedicate that singles
out Pegasus, such that Pegasus, if he existed, would be the one and only
object satisfying this piedicate. Logicians have also played with alteinative
semantics, wheie constants may fail to iefei to an object. All of these
pioposals aie beyond the scope of this text.
Tis discussion of defnite desciiptions shows that the identity symbol
of L
=
is used foi moie than just foimalising oveit identity statements
in English. Many moie sentences and aiguments can be analysed using
identity. So foimalisations in L
=
captuie moie details than foimalisations
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :8:
in L
2
. Consequently, theie aie English aiguments that can be shown to
be valid in piedicate logic with identity but not in piedicate logic without
identity. Te aigument (T) above is such an aigument.
Of couise, stiictly speaking I still have to explain what I mean by
validity of anaigument inpiedicate logic withidentity, but the explanation
should be obvious:
Validity of English arguments (and logical truth etc) in predicate logic
with identity is defned analogously to validity of arguments in proposi-
tional and predicate logic in Defnitions .o, ,.8, ., and ,.,.
8. o iui1i1v :s : iocic:i cos1:1
Piima facie identity seems to be meiely anothei binaiy piedicate in Eng-
lish. In the semantics of L
=
, howevei, the identity symbol is always in-
teipieted as numeiical identity, while othei binaiy piedicate letteis can
be inteipieted as aibitiaiy binaiy ielations. Why does identity ieceive
this special tieatment: Why is theie not a piedicate logic with special
tieatment foi othei binaiy piedicates such as is smallei than oi loves:
One could come up with a special symbol foi any of those binaiy piedi-
cates and invent a semantics in which they aie always inteipieted in the
same way. Why is identity singled out as a logical piedicate, while otheis
aie not: I shall illustiate the difeient tieatment of identity and othei
ielations by consideiing two examples.
In piedicate logic with identity the following aigument is valid:
Te moining stai is the evening stai. Te moining stai is a
planet. Hence the evening stai is a planet.
In L
=
the piemisses can be foimalised as a=b and Pa and the conclusion
as Pb. Te claim a =b, Pa Pb can easily be established by a pioof in
Natuial Deduction.
In piedicate logic without identity, the best possible foimalisation
of the piemisses is Rab, Pa and of the conclusion Pb, with an entiy in
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :8,
the dictionaiy foi Rxy as . . . is identical to . . . . But, by specifying an
L
2
-stiuctuie in which Rab and Pa aie tiue, and Pb is not, Rab, Pa Pb
can easily be iefuted. Tus, the above aigument is valid in piedicate logic
with identity but not in piedicate logic without identity. Te ieason is
that in L
=
the inteipietation of = is fxed, while in L
2
the binaiy piedicate
lettei R may be inteipieted as any aibitiaiy binaiy ielation.
Te aigument can be compaied with the following aigument:
Te evening stai is smallei than Uianus. Uianus is smallei
than Satuin. Teiefoie the evening stai is smallei than Sat-
uin.
Tis aigument is not valid in piedicate without identity oi in piedicate
logic with identity. If the inteipietation of smallei than weie fxed in the
way the inteipietation of identity is fxed in L
=
, that is, if the piedicate
lettei foi . . . is smallei than . . . weie always inteipieted as the smallei-
than ielation, the aigument would come out as valid. Geneially, fxing the
inteipietation of fuithei piedicates, such as is smallei than, will make
moie aiguments valid and moie sentences logically tiue, but it is doubtful
whethei such notions of validity still captuie logical validity and logical
tiuth.
In Chaiacteiisation :., of valid aiguments in Section :., I stipulated
that an aigument is valid if and only if theie is no inteipietation undei
which the piemisses aie all tiue and the conclusion is false. In inteipieta-
tions, only the vocabulaiy that is non-logical can be ieinteipieted. Logical
vocabulaiy has been chaiacteiised as not subject-specifc. Te piedicate
expiession is smallei than is aiguably subject-specifc because it can
only be sensibly applied to objects with spatial extension (and peihaps to
numbeis); at least it is not so cleai whethei it can be applied to objects
such as thoughts, piopeities, laws, oi functions. Identity, in contiast, is
not specifc to any subject. Tus, it cannot be ieinteipieted. Logicians say
that identity is a logical constant. Tis way of distinguishing logical fiom
non-logical vocabulaiy is fai fiom being cleai and piecise, and the dis-
8 Identity and Defnite Descriptions :8
tinction and the possibility of such a distinction aie contioveisial issues
in the philosophy of logic.
Of couise theie could still be expiessions in English that, while not
contained as logical symbols in L
=
, aie yet logical expiessions. In fact,
many logicians believe that the language L
=
ought to be extended so as to
include additional logical symbols expiessing, foi instance, it is necessaiy
that . . . Consequently, they think that theie aie validaiguments inEnglish
that aie not valid in piedicate logic with identity. Othei philosopheis
think that any valid aigument of English can be foimalised as a valid
aigument in L
=
, so long as ceitain foimalisation tiicks aie allowed. Tese
contioveisies aie not only ciucial foi the philosophy of logic and language,
they also impinge on ontology and othei coie disciplines of philosophy.
At any iate, L
2
and L
=
aie veiy poweiful languages. Many logicians,
mathematicians, and philosopheis believe that L
=
is sumcient foi foimal-
ising veiy compiehensive paits, if not all, of mathematical and scientifc
discouise. If the language of mathematics and science can indeed be
handled in the language of piedicate logic with identity, theie is hope that
it can even captuie laige paits of philosophy.
Natuial Deduction Rules
vvovosi1io:i iocic
Intro

Elim:

Elim:
||
Intro

Elim
Intro:

Intro:

||
||
Elim

âtural Deduction rules :8o
||
||
Intro
||
||
Elim

Intro

Elim:

Elim:

vviuic:1i iocic
|t]v|
Intro
v
occui in oi in any undischaiged
assumption in the pioof of |t]v|.
v
Elim
|t]v|
|t]v|
Intro
v
v
||t]v||
Elim

occui in v , oi in , oi in any
undischaiged assumption othei
than |t]v| in the pioof of .
iui1i1v
|t = t|
|s]v|

s = t
=Elim
|t]v|
|s]v|

t = s
=Elim
|t]v|
Bibliogiaphy
Cappelen, Heiman and Einest LePoie (Spiing :oo,), Quotation, in
E. N.Zalta, ed., Te Stanfoid Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
URL: http.//plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr:oo,/entries/quotation/
Chuich, Alonzo (:,o), A note on the Entscheidungspioblem, journal of
Symbolic Logic :, o:.
De Moigan, Augustus (:8,), Formal Logic, Tayloi & Walton, London.
Devlin, Keith (:,), Fundamentals of Contemporary Set Teory, second
edn, Spiingei-Veilag, New Yoik.
Foibes, Giaeme (:), Modern Logic, Oxfoid Univeisity Piess, Oxfoid.
Geach, Petei (:o:), Reference and Generality, Coinell Univeisity Piess,
Ithaca.
Gentzen, Geihaid (:,,), Unteisuchungen bei das natiliche Schlieen,
Mathematische Zeitschrif ,, :,o::o, o,,o,.
Guttenplan, Samuel (:,), Te Languages of Logic, second edn, Blackwell,
Malden.
Halmos, Paul R. (:oo), âive Set Teory, D. Van Nostiand Company,
Piinceton. Repiinted, Spiingei-Veilag, New Yoik, NY, :,.
Hodges, Wilfiid (:oo:), Logic. An Introduction to Elementary Logic, sec-
ond edn, Penguin Books, London.
Index :88
Jakowski, Stanislaw (:,), On the iules of supposition in foimal
logic, âkadem Seminarium Filozofcznego Vydzialu Matematyczno-
Przyrodniczego Uniwersytetu Varszawskiego .
Lewis, David (:,,), Counterfactuals, Haivaid Univeisity Piess, Cam-
biidge MA. ieissued in :oo: by Blackwell, London.
Moiiis, Chailes (:,8), Foundations of the Teory of Signs, Univeisity of
Chicago Piess, Chicago.
Moschovakis, Yiannis (:), ôtes on Set Teory, Undeigiaduate texts
in mathematics, second edn, Spiingei, New Yoik.
Quine, Willaid O. V. (:o), Mathematical Logic, Noiton, New Yoik.
Neuaufage :,: von Haivaid Univeisity Piess (Cambiidge, M.A.).
Russell, Beitiand (:o,), On denoting, Mind :, ,,.
Sainsbuiy, Maik (:oo:), Logical Forms, second edn, Blackwell, Oxfoid.
Smith, Petei (:oo,), An Introduction to Formal Logic, Cambiidge Univei-
sity Piess, Cambiidge.
Stiawson, Petei F. (:,o), On iefeiiing, Mind ,, ,:o,.
Taiski, Alfied (:,o), Dei Wahiheitsbegiif in den foimalisieiten
Spiachen, Studia Philosophica Commentarii Societatis Philosophicae
Polonorum :.
Tennant, Neil (:o), âtural Logic, :nd edn, Edinbuigh Univeisity Piess,
Edinbuigh.
Tioelstia, Aine S. and Helmut Schwichtenbeig (:o), Basic Proof Teory,
numbei , in Cambiidge Tiacts in Teoietical Computei Science,
Cambiidge Univeisity Piess, Cambiidge.
Index
adequacy, :,, :,,
foi piedicate logic, :,
foi piopositional logic, ::8
ambiguity, o,o,, :8
lexical, :8
of scope, :8:
antisymmetiic, :o
aigument, :,, ::,
of a function, :,
aiity, 8,
aiity-index, ,o, 88
assignment, 8::
assumption, ::o
asymmetiic, :o
atomic foimulae, :oo
of L
2
, 8,
binaiy ielation, , :o
bound occuiience of a vaiiable,
8,
Compactness Teoiem of piopo-
sitional logic, :
completeness, ::,, ::, :,
conclusion, :,
conditionals
counteifactual, ,
indicative, ,
subjunctive, ,
conjunction
of sentences, ,o
connectives, ,, ,:,o
in L
I
, ,:
in L
I
, ,
in English, ,:
main, ,,
consistency, o8
in piedicate logic, :,,
semantic, :,,
semantic in L
2
, :o8
in English, :,
semantic, :, :,
semantic in L
I
, :
syntactic, :, :,
constants, ,o, 8,, ,, o
context, :,
contiadiction, :, o, o8, :o8, :,,
contiadictoiy, o
counteiexamples
in L
=
, :o
in piedicate logic, :o::
in piopositional logic, :
counteifactual
conditionals, ,
cut iule, :::
Index :o
declaiative sentence, :,
deductive validity, :o
defnite desciiptions, :,o
designatois, ,, ,o, :,, :,:, :,
dictionaiy, o:
disjunction, :::
of sentences, ,o
domain
of a function, :,
domains
of discouise, o
double aiiow, ::o
double negation elimination, ::,
empty set, ,
equivalence
logical, :, o, o8, :o8
equivalence ielation, :o
ex falso quodlibet, ,:, ::8
extensional, :,:
extensionality, :,:
extensions, ,, :,:
falsity
logical, :
foimal validity, :
foimulae
atomic, :oo, :o,
of L
=
, :o8
of L
2
, 8
fiee occuiience of a vaiiable, 8,
function, :
geneialisation, 8o
heait, o
identity
numeiical, :oo:o,
qualitative, :oo:o,
if, :o
inconsistency
semantic in L
I
, :
syntactic, :
indicative conditionals, ,
induction, :oo
inductive validity, :o
intuitionistic logic, ::,
kidney, o
languages
extensional, :,:
letteis
piopositional, :
piedicate, ,o, 8,
logical equivalence, :, o, o8,
:o8
logical falsity, :
logical foim, :,
piopositional logic, ,o
logical teims, :
logical tiuth, :
logical validity, :, :, ,
logically tiue, :o8, ::o
main column, ,, o
main columns, :
main connective, ,,
Index ::
metalinguistic vaiiable, :8
metavaiiables, :,:
Natuial Deduction, ::o
negation
of sentences, ,o
oideied paii,
paii
oideied,
paitial foimalisation, :,
piagmatics, :o
piedicate letteis, ,o, 8,, ,, o
piedicate logic, :,
piemiss, :,
pioof, ::, ::,
piopei names, o
piopeity, o
piopositional consistency, o8
piopositional contiadiction, o8
piopositional logic, :,
piopositionally valid, ,o, ,
piovable, :::
quadiuple, :o
quotation, :,:
iange
of a function, :,
ieductio ad absuidum, ::
iefexive, :o
ielation,
binaiy, ,
ioot, ::,
satisfaction, :oo
scope
of a quantifei, :,:
of a connective, o
scope ambiguity, o, :,:, :8:
semantic inconsistency
in L
I
, :
semantic consistency, :, :,
in L
I
, :
in L
2
, :o8
semantic values, ,
semantics, :,, :,
sentence letteis, :, ,, ,8, ,, o
sentences
of L
2
, 8o
of L
I
, :, ,o
of L
=
, :o8
sentential logic, :,
sets, o8
soundness, ::,, ::, :,
stiuctuies, :, :,
in L
I
, ,,
in L
=
, :o8
in L
2
, ,::
subjunctive conditionals, ,
syllogistics, :oo
symmetiic, :o
symmetiy, ::
syntactic consistency, :, :,
syntactic inconsistency, :
syntax, :,, :,
Index ::
tautology, o, o8
teinaiy, ,o
teinaiy ielation, :o
tiansitive, :o
tiiple, :o
tiuth
in an L
I
-stiuctuie, ,o
in an L
2
-stiuctuie, :o,
logical, :
tiuth, logical, :o8, ::o
tiuth-functional, ,,
tiuth-functional completeness, ,o
tiuth-values, ,,, ,, 8
univeisal quantifei, 8, :,:
valid, :,,
valid aigument, ,:
validity, :
deductive, :o
inductive, :o
logical, :, ,
of an aigument, ::
piopositional, ::
value
of a function, :,
values
semantic, ,
vaiiable assignment, 8::
vaiiables
in L
2
, 8,
metalinguistic, :8

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THE LOGIC MANUAL

foi Intioduction to Logic

Tis ielation contains all paiis with objects d and e

Te aiiow fiom Fiance to Italy coiiesponds to the paii Fiance,

Te ielation is symmetiic, but not asymmetiic oi antisymmetiic. It is

has n components. An n-tuple d

aie identical if and only if d

(i) If is a sentence letter, ||

Afei Defnition :.8 I aigued that an aigument is valid if and only if

Use diperent sentence let-

Tis use of the teim satisfes is motivated by its

In the fist pioof of only assumptions of aie dischaiged; one must

I will demonstiate the use of the iule with an example:

Heie is an example showing how the negation elimination iule can be

piovided the constant t does not

To motivate the elimination iule I will look at the following infoi-

Te following example of a sentence containing a defnite desciiption

Volker Halbach :oo8/:oo

piovided the constant t does not

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