Australian Security

Australian Security
in the
Asian Century
Australian Security
in the
Asian Century
Sanu Kainikaia
Aii Powei Development Centie
Canbeiia, ACT
vi
Commonwealth of Austialia 2008
Tis woik is copyiight. Apait fiom any use as peimitted undei the Copyiight Act 1968,
no pait may be iepioduced by any piocess without piioi wiitten peimission. Inquiiies
should be made to the publishei.
Disclaimer
Te views expiessed in this woik aie those of the authoi and do not necessaiily ieect
the ocial policy oi position of the Depaitment of Defence, the Royal Austialian Aii
Foice oi the Goveinment of Austialia, oi of any othei authoiity iefeiied to in the text.
Te Commonwealth of Austialia will not be legally iesponsible in contiact, toit oi
otheiwise, foi any statements made in this document.
Release
Tis document is appioved foi public ielease. Poitions of this document may be quoted
oi iepioduced without peimission, piovided a standaid souice ciedit is included.
National Libiaiy of Austialia Cataloguing-in-Publication entiy
Authoi: Kainikaia, Sanu.
Title: Austialian Secuiity in the Asian Centuiyi Sanu Kainikaia.
Publishei: Tuggeianong, A.C.T. : Aii Powei Development Centie, 2008.
ISBN: 9781920800284 (pbk.)
Notes: Bibliogiaphy.
Subjects: National secuiity--Austialia.
Aii powei. Inteinational ielations.
Austialia--Militaiy ielations--Asia--Foiecasting.
Asia--Militaiy ielations--Austialia--Foiecasting.
Austialia--Foieign ielations--Asia--Foiecasting.
Asia--Foieign ielations--Austialia--Foiecasting.
Austialia--Militaiy policy.
Dewey Numbei: 355.030994
Published and distiibuted by:
Aii Powei Development Centie
Level 3, 205 Anketell Stieet
TUGGERANONG ACT 2900
AUSTRALIA
Telephone: + 61 2 6266 1355
Facsimile: + 61 2 6266 1041
E-mail: aiipowei@defence.gov.au
Website: www.iaaf.gov.auiaiipowei
vii
AtovIvoomv:s
No book can be wiitten as a stand-alone undeitaking and this
one is no exception. Te ideas that aie geiminated in the mind of
the authoi aie at times planted duiing conveisations with fiiends
and peeis as innocuous little pieces of infoimation. It becomes
dicult undei these ciicumstances to thank eveiyone who would
have diiectly oi indiiectly contiibuted to the biith and development
of the ideas put foiwaid. A numbei of people have inuenced the
development of the ideas, abstiactions and hypothesis put foiwaid
in this book. It is not possible foi me to name all of them but I am
suie that each one would undeistand when I bow in appieciation
to the collective whole. Tank you is an easy teim to say, but I am
obliged, and this one comes fiom the bottom of my heait.
Wiiting a book can become a lonely piocess. I have
unashamedly made use of my colleagues as sounding boaids (and
at times as captive audiences) to unsciamble my iambling thought
piocess and make undeistandable sense of what would otheiwise
have been just a collection of disjointed ideas.
I would be iemiss in my duty if I do not specically accept a
debt of giatitude to Wing Commandei Bob Richaidson. Bob has
been an astute and aiticulate ciitic of my moie tangential ideas,
and has in his own time iead, ciitiqued and geneiously coiiected
the ist cut of eveiy chaptei of the book. Moie than in discussions,
I have used Bob as a ist test foi some of the ideas that I was tiying
to explain in wiiting. If some of my ideas come thiough veiy cleaily
to the ieadei, Bob shaies the achievement and if some of the moie
impeiceptive and abstiact thoughts iemain ill-dened, the fault
iests entiiely with me.
My heaitfelt thanks aie due to Wing Commandei Keith Bient
foi diligently editing the entiie manusciipt in his usual ciitical style
and biinging it to publishable standaid.
I would also like to acknowledge Gioup Captains Tony Foiestiei
and Phil Edwaids, both of whom have not only iead thiough the
viii
nished manusciipt but also encouiaged me, thiough the piocess of
its wiiting, to attain highei levels of claiity in my thinking.
I could nevei have asked foi a moie loving family than my wife,
Manju, my two daughteis to whom this book is dedicated, my two
sons-in-law, Tanmai and Aninda, and my giandson, Ishaan. All
of them, collectively and in theii own individual ways, have been
pillais of suppoit foi me at all times. It is impossible to say thank
you adequately.
No man is an island, entire of itself; Every man is a piece of
the continent, a part of the main.
John Donne, Meditation XVII
Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions
For my daughters
Priya Kainikara-Sharma
and
Priyanka Kainikara-Sen
Who are the greatest Blessings
God Above bestowed on me
xi
Asou: :uv Au:uou
Sanu Kainikaia is a ghtei pilot fiom the Indian Aii Foice (IAF)
who ietiied as a Wing Commandei aftei 21 yeais of commissioned
seivice. Duiing his seivice caieei, he has own ovei 4,500 houis
on a numbei of modein ghtei aiiciaft. He has also held vaiious
command and sta appointments. He is a qualied Flying Instiuctoi
(A2) and a giaduate of the IAF Fightei Weapons School, the
Defence Seivices Sta College, as well as the College of Aii Waifaie.
He is the iecipient of the Indian Aii Foice equivalent of the Aii
Foice Cioss. He has Bachelois degiees in Economics and Human
Resouices and a Masteis degiee in Defence and Stiategic Studies
fiom the Univeisity of Madias. His doctoiate (PhD) in Inteinational
Politics was awaided by the Univeisity of Adelaide.
Aftei ietiiement fiom active seivice, he woiked foi foui yeais
as an advisoi, specialising in militaiy stiategy and opeiations foi
the Royal Saudi Aii Foice as pait of a US Tiaining Team. He is
cuiiently the Aii Powei Stiategist at the Aii Powei development
Centie, Canbeiia and is also a Visiting Fellow at the Univeisity of
New South Wales. He has published numeious papeis on national
secuiity, stiategy and aii powei in vaiious inteinational piofessional
jouinals. He is the authoi of Papers on Air Power (2006), Pathways to
Victory (2007), and Red Air: Politics in Russian Air Power (Univeisal
Publisheis USA, 2007).
xii
Boos sv :uv Snmv Au:uou
Papeis on Aii Powei
Pathways to Victoiy
Red Aii: Politics in Russian Aii Powei (Univeisal Publisheis, USA)
xiii
Puvvntv
Te concept of this book was boin duiing a faiily heated
discussion that took place while I was visiting my extended
family and some veiy good fiiends fiom my Aii Foice days, in
Septembei 2006. Te discussion centied on Indias emeigence as
an economic poweihouse and the allied stiategic changes that
aie taking place in the nation and its incieasing global inuence.
Even duiing pievious visits, infiequent as they weie, similai
discussions used to be the noim. Te dieience this time was the
new-found condence I saw in the youngei geneiation, in theii
willingness to contiadict the tiaditional Indian concept of a soft
and defensive stiategic outlook. Tey woie theii heaits on theii
sleeves in displaying the unabashed piide they felt in the iise of
theii countiy. A veiy shoit visit a yeai latei fuithei conimed this
tiend in the youth of the countiy.
Being a ist-geneiation immigiant to Austialia, and dabbling
in stiategy, secuiity and politics both as a piofession and as an
abiding inteiest made me think and take notice of the giadual,
but veiy peiceptible changes that aie taking place in the stiategic
balance in the Asia-Pacic. One has to be blind not to notice the
economic iealities of the iise of China and India, and I felt that
the possible dynamics of the futuie secuiity enviionment should
be studied in gieatei detail, fiom an Austialian peispective, so
that some educated guesses could be made iegaiding how the dice
would fall as the dynamics of the iegion change. Tis book has
been the iesult.
Te iecent change of goveinment has alteied the national
powei equation and Austialias view of its secuiity enviionment.
One example is Austialias withdiawal fiom the US-Japan-
Austialia-India quadiilateial initiative, demonstiating a conict
of inteiest and a decision-making dilemma in dealing with iising
poweis like China and India. In an obtuse mannei it also indicates
a ceitain amount of diplomatic immatuiity and undei condence
in dealing with China eectively. While the quadiilateial initiative
xiv
was nevei an exeicise in containing China, Austialias withdiawal
has given it a balance of powei bias, which China would leveiage
into the futuie. Fiom anothei viewpoint the decision to withdiaw
fiom the initiative could be seen as Austialias attempt to impiove
its geopolitical statuie while also keeping both the US and
China onside. Since Austialia alieady has a iobust alliance with
the United States and is stiategically aligned with Japan, this
withdiawal will only impact its bilateial ielationship with India.
Howevei, Indias ieaction to this does not seem to have been
factoied in by the Austialian Goveinment. To play a pait of any
signicance in the Asia-Pacic, it is not piudent to antagonise
eithei of the emeiging giantsChina oi India. Indias futuie
manoeuviings will be woith watching.
Te wheel of stiategic powei does not stop iotating, and it will
be inteiesting to watch and analyse the ongoing diplomatic and
economic manipulations. Teiefoie, this book cannot be consideied
an end in itself, but must be thought of as a beginning foi an analysis
of the Asian stance of Austialia.
At the cost of iepetition, I must state heie that the opinions,
deductions, statements and suggestions made aie completely
attiibutable to me and no-one else. In some aieas I may have
stietched a point a bit moie than otheis may have done, but I assuie
the ieadei that it was done on puipose, to inciease the awaieness
and undeistanding of what the futuie would biing if a fai-fetched
situation actually happened. Having said that, even those fai-fetched
scenaiios aie not impossible, it is bettei to have thought them
thiough iathei than being caught happily unawaie.
I sinceiely hope that this book adds to the debate iegaiding
national secuiity as a whole and the peculiai (and mostly
unenviable) position that Austialia holds in the Asia-Pacific
iegional powei balance.
Wiiting a book is a unique adventuie. It can biing elation
and despondency in equal measuie and the will to peiseveie can
ieach its nadii. The quote below fiom Sii Winston Chuichill, that
xv
mastei of ideas as well as the spoken and wiitten woid, sums up
the feelings at the end of a long and mostly lonely stiuggle:
Writing a book is an adventure. To begin with it is a toy
and an amusement; then it becomes a mistress, and then it
becomes a master, and then a tyrant. Te last phase is that
just as you are about to be reconciled to your servitude, you
kill the monster, and ing him out to the public.
Winston Chuichill, Speech in London, 2 Novembei 1949
Sanu Kainikaia
Canbeiia
Apiil 2008
xvi
xvii
Acoiroorr:s ______________________________________________ vii
Anou: :nr Au:nov ______________________________________________ xi
Boos nv :nr Srr Au:nov ______________________________________ xii
Pvrrcr ________________________________________________________ xiii
Co:r:s ______________________________________________________ xvii
Annvrvi:ios _________________________________________________ xix
I:voouc:io ____________________________________________________ 1
Notes........................................................................................................................... 9
Gioni S:v:roic Evivorr: _________________________________ 11
Gieat Powei Status ................................................................................................ 15
Changing Global Enviionment ........................................................................... 25
Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 29
Notes......................................................................................................................... 31
Tnr Errvorcr or Asi Gi:s _________________________________ 33
Te Japanese Equation .......................................................................................... 39
Te Ascendancy of China .................................................................................... 43
India: Chaiging Ahead .......................................................................................... 51
Russian Oppoitunism: Movements in Asia ...................................................... 61
China and India: A Stiategic Compaiison ........................................................ 64
Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 69
Notes......................................................................................................................... 71
Aus:vii Srcuvi:v Prvcrv:ios ________________________________ 75
Austialias Stiategic Fundamentals ..................................................................... 78
Austialias Enduiing Inteiests
8
............................................................................ 81
Factois Aecting Te Stiategic Fiamewoik ..................................................... 85
Secuiity Planning Impeiatives ............................................................................ 91
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 100
Notes....................................................................................................................... 102
Co:v:s
xviii
Aus:viis S:v:roic Srcuvi:v Co:iorcirs _________________ 105
Austialias Unenviable Position ......................................................................... 109
Austialias Bioad Futuie Roles ........................................................................... 120
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 138
Notes....................................................................................................................... 140
Miii:vv Corvr:rcirs i Suvvov: or N:ioi Srcuvi:v ________ 141
Militaiy Competencies ....................................................................................... 145
Summaiy................................................................................................................ 152
Notes....................................................................................................................... 154
A Aiv S:v:rov Wi:ni N:ioi Srcuvi:v _____________________ 155
Contempoiaiy Conicts ..................................................................................... 158
Aii Powei Beyond Te Connes Of Te Teatie .......................................... 161
Key Tasks foi Aii Powei ..................................................................................... 163
Smallei Aii Foices: Enduiing Ciiteiia ............................................................. 172
Summaiy................................................................................................................ 176
Notes....................................................................................................................... 178
Cociusio ____________________________________________________ 179
Notes....................................................................................................................... 187
Biniioovvnv __________________________________________________ 189
xix
AssuvvIn:Ios
ADF Austialian Defence Foice
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations
C2 Command and Contiol
CPC Communist Paity of China
EU Euiopean Union
GDP Gioss Domestic Pioduct
ISR Intelligence, Suiveillance and Reconnaissance
JSDF Japan Self-Defense Foice
NEBA National Eects-Based Appioach
PLA Peoples Libeiation Aimy
SCO Shanghai Coopeiation Oiganisation
UN United Nations
US United States
xx
Chaptei 1
Intioduction
Aus:vii Srcuvi:v i :nr Asi Cr:uvv
2
3
I:voouc:io
I:uoout:Io
In the 14th centuiy, Euiope staited a seiies of global exploiation
and conquest expeditions that spiead Euiopean inuence to neaily
eveiy pait of the woild and culminated in a piotiacted Euiopean
Age that declined only in the latei pait of the 20th centuiy. Te
initial expeditions that enabled the cieation of global Euiopean
empiies weie diiven by the quest foi iaw mateiials and iesouices
iequiied to fuel theii expanding industiial capacity. Befoie the
advent of technologiesshipbuilding, navigation, naval iepowei
that facilitated the piojection of powei fai fiom home base, even
laige poweis weie constiained to opeiate within theii iegion.
1
It was
the Euiopean exploiation, and conquest, that cieated the ist tiuly
inteinational system of tiade and commeice, howevei lopsided and
exploitative it may look when viewed in hindsight.
Te end of Woild Wai II saw the ciumbling of Euiopean
empiies and the iise of the United States of Ameiica and the Soviet
Union in global competition to spiead theii iespective inuences.
Tis iesulted in the Cold Wai wheie the United States (US) and
Soviet Union became the woilds only two supeipoweis and faced
o globally to fuithei theii inteiests in an attempt to inciease theii
stiategic and economic powei base. Te Cold Wai and its main
piotagonists ieplaced the Euiopean Age faiily iapidly, ielegating
the old Euiopean poweis, now piimaiily inwaid looking, to a much
ieduced global status. Even though the stiategic iivaliy between
the two supeipoweis thioughout the Cold Wai was played out at
veiy high stakes, and at times with iiiesponsible biinksmanship, a
ceitain sense of global oidei still pievailed.
Te collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 paved the way foi
the US to become the unchallenged paiamount global powei and
maiked the beginning of the unipolai woild. Te USs militaiy powei
is such that it has the capacity to asseit its will iapidly, anywheie
in the woild. Te technological dominance of the United States,
especially in space technology and otheis that suppoit waighting
4
capabilities enables it to dominate globally at will. Duiing the
1980s and 1990s, theie was a tangible shift in global tiade patteins
with tians-Pacic tiade initially equalling and then oveitaking the
tiaditional tians-Atlantic tiade.
When the Cold Wai ended with the bieak-up of the Soviet
Union, it was expected that six gieat poweisUS, Russia, China,
Euiope, Japan and Indiawould emeige to make the woild tiuly
multipolai. Fifteen yeais hence none of the othei ve aie in any
position to challenge US hegemony, eithei in militaiy capability,
diplomatic inuence oi economic stiength. Howevei, global tiade is
now imly focused on the Asia-Pacic iegion.
2
Te Asian economic
poweis (i.e. China, Japan, India and South Koiea) aie dependent
to dieient degiees on impoit of iesouices, especially eneigy, and
to oveiseas expoits foi theii continued piospeiity. Tese nations
economic inteiests have stietched fai beyond theii stiategic
powei piojection capabilities. While this situation was not ieally
woiiisome duiing the laigely stable global secuiity enviionment
of the Cold Wai, the cuiient volatility of the secuiity enviionment
makes it a vulneiability.
Te United States is still the dominant powei in the Asia-
Pacic iegion and has long-standing alliances with Japan, South
Koiea and Austialia in the iegion. Howevei, both Japan and South
Koiea have dieient views to the US on some aspects of theii
bilateial ielationships with othei nations and aie also conscious
of the necessity to inciease theii secuiity and political ieach to
safeguaid theii inteiests. Te majoi poweis of Asia all face the
pioblemtheii economic inteiests aie spiead acioss the globe
and they lack the militaiy ability and expeiience to piotect theii
inteiests. Tese nations aie slowly moving fiom theii tiaditional
soft powei inuence iole to active political and militaiy options
that match theii inteinational economic involvement. Te laigei
Asian economies aie iealising the need to be moie active within the
inteinational system and this will biing about the next change in
global oidei. Te stiategic powei manipulations and manoeuvies of
the 21st centuiy will be played out in Asia.
5
I:voouc:io
An Asian Australia?
Although Austialia is in the innei ciicle of the US umbiella of
stiategic fiiends and paitneis, the context within which it has to
make its secuiity policies is piimaiily iooted in Asia, which is iapidly
tiansfoiming into a iegion with a thiiving society of giants. Te
most obvious factoi in this tiansfoimation is that of demogiaphics.
Te United Nations population piojections piedict that in a few
decades 19 polities will be moving towaids the demogiaphic
iange of ovei 100 million. Of these, 10 will be in Austialias aiea of
stiategic inteiest.
3
Managing such an inciease in population in a demociatic
mannei is an extiemely dicult taskone that has been managed
only by the United States and India so fai. Howevei, a woildwide
inciease of viable demociatic nations is a caidinal iequiiement
foi the piogiess of inteinational stability. Demociacy cannot be
imposed on a nation, paiticulaily thiough militaiy inteiventions,
as has been demonstiated iepeatedly thioughout histoiypast
and iecent. Combined with the US pieoccupation with Iiaq and
the bioadei wai on teiioi, the piospect of the woild becoming
multipolai is distinctly high. Piedicting the end of the unipolai
woild at this noontide of US powei may seem a bit piematuie, but
the impeiial oveistietch of both its economic and militaiy powei is
obvious to any obseivei. Even so, the piocess will be giadual and its
culmination still distant. Foi the next two oi thiee decades the US
will ietain its global hegemonial powei.
Austialia is a nation of immigiants and integiation of post-
immigiant sections of the population has theiefoie been a veiy
impoitant nation-building activity. Social cohesion is the key
to stability in goveinance and cultuial changes in the long teim
will aect the goveinance stiuctuie. Austialia is undeigoing
demogiaphic changes because of alteiations in its immigiation
pattein and also because of the compaiatively laigei numbei of
oldei population outside the woik foice. Tese changes have fai-
ieaching consequences foi its national economy and secuiity and
theie is an immediate need, within Austialia, foi a national stiategy
6
on demogiaphy to amelioiate theii impact. Tis also highlights
the incieasingly close ielationship between secuiity policies and
economic and social policies.
Austialian society has been tiaditionally outwaid looking. As
a consequence, thioughout its modein histoiy Austialia has been
actively involved in inteinational aaiis, both within and beyond the
Asia-Pacic iegion. While most of Austialias eoits in contiibuting
to inteinational stability in the past centuiy have been biased
towaids its alliances with the United Kingdom and the United
States, theie is an incieased awaieness within the secuiity stiategists
in the nation that its secuiity is undeniably entwined with that of
the laigei Asia-Pacic iegion. Te emeigence of China and India as
iegional poweis has fuithei emphasised the need foi Austialia to
factoi this ieality into its secuiity stiategy.
Even as the Austialian Defence Foice (ADF) battles Islamist
extiemists in Iiaq and Afghanistan, it also needs to be cognisant of
ciucial stiategic developments in the Asia-Pacic iegion. A numbei
of smallei nations in its neai vicinity aie iapidly ieaching ciitical
points in theii economic viability and goveinance stability. If actions
of the past aie any indication, it will fall to the ADF to iespond
to any such backwaid slide to lawlessness and quickly establish
stability. Tat Austialia iesponds to thieats to iegional stability is a
positive factoi, but the inexoiable powei changes taking place in the
iegion add an edge to this iole. Te impeiative foi it to inteivene
militaiily foi law enfoicement binds it closei than evei befoie to the
Asian entity and biings it within the comity of nations in the Asia-
Pacic. Of necessity, the Asianisation of Austialia is undeiway.
Te Complex Strategic Environment
At the end of Woild Wai II oi even in the 1970s nobody would
have piedicted the extiemely complicated and messy stiategic
enviionment that the woild has inheiited in the beginning of
the 21st centuiy. Te clean division of the woild into zones of
peace and zones of conict, almost completely geogiaphic, which
chaiacteiised the inteinational system duiing the Cold Wai, looks
7
I:voouc:io
benign in contempoiaiy analysis. Tieats to national secuiity have
become an all-encompassing entity that seems to defy any attempt
at being dened, with new factois being identied and added at
iegulai inteivals. Global institutions, like the United Nations, that
contiibuted to maintaining the established oidei in the 1900s aie
jaded and do not seem to have the will oi suppoit to be iejuvenated.
At least foi the immediate futuie, they will not be able to solve, even
paitially, the pioblems of the 21st centuiy.
An even moie catastiophic thieat looms laige on the hoiizon.
Te Westphalian system, established in 1648 as the basis on which
the inteinational system is built, is itself undei siege. Westphalian
peace is based on the piimaiy assumption that only soveieign
nation-states would employ militaiy foices in the puisuit of national
secuiity. Although theie is vested inteiest within soveieign nations
to maintain the status quo, the basic piinciple has been undeimined
in the past few decades by the entiy of a laige numbei of non-state
oiganisations into the secuiity aiena. Recent conicts have shown a
willingness on the pait of nation-states to coopeiate oi even paitnei
with non-state actois to employ militaiy powei to achieve a desiied
objective. While this may be of immediate tactical advantage, it does
giadual but iiiedeemable long-teim damage to the inteinational
system based on the Westphalian model.
Te diusion of the thieat, the vastness of national secuiity
impeiatives, the constiained use of militaiy foices, the oveilap
and unholy mix of combatants and civilians, and the unceitainty
of the geogiaphic limit of the battleeld make any action to
fuithei national secuiity the most complex activity a goveinment
undeitakes.
Tis book is an attempt at viewing the global tiends in secuiity
thiough the piism of the Asia-Pacic scenaiio, based on the belief
that the stiategic powei games of the 21st centuiy will be played
out in Asia. Te emeigence of Asian economic supeipoweis and
theii willingness to tianslate theii economic capacities to stiategic
and militaiy powei will have the same eect that a stone will cieate
when thiown into a tianquil pool. Te iipples will buet eveiything
8
within theii inuence. Te laigei the stone, the laigei will be the
iippling eect and the longei will it last. Austialia, at the extieme
of the Asia-Pacic iegion, will not be spaied the bueting. It is
impeiative that Austialia looks at these tiends and piepaies to
position itself in a mannei that allows it the maximum exibility
in dealing with an extiemely dynamic secuiity enviionment. Foi
Austialia, which has often taken secuiity solace fiom its geogiaphic
isolation, only the most vigoious analysis and action in this mattei
will negate any impact on its national secuiity that will veiy iapidly
metamoiphose into a catastiophe. All nations need to be cognisant
of the evei-changing global oidei and act caiefully to pieseive theii
soveieign independence and ensuie theii futuie place in the sun.
9
I:voouc:io
No:vs
1 Rodgei Bakei, Asias Security Role Goes Global, StiatFoi Analysis, Washington, 12
Maich 2008.
2 Te Asia-Pacic iegion encompasses the aieas that aie vaiyingly called South
Asia (the nations of the Indian subcontinent), South-East Asia, othei nations with
Pacic connections (China, Japan, South Koiea), Melanesia and Austialia and New
Zealand.
3 Coial Bell, Living with Giants: Finding Australias Place in a More Complex World,
Austialian Stiategic Policy Institute, Canbeiia, Apiil 2005, p. 14.
10
Chaptei 2
Global Stiategic
Enviionment
12
13
Gioni S:v:roic Evivorr:
GIosnI S:un:voIt EvIuomv:
Todays world is without precedent. It is as dierent from the
Cold War as it is from the Middle Ages so the past oers no
basis for comparison.
Phillippe Delmas, Te Rosy Futuie of Wai
Te inteinational context within which nations have to
foimulate theii secuiity policies is iapidly changing.
1
While the
capability of smallei iegional poweis to secuie theii inteiests has
gone up maikedly as compaied to the 19th centuiy, the bioadei
inteinational secuiity scenaiio is still dominated by nations that
have gieat powei status. Duiing the Cold Wai, that could be dened
as having lasted fiom the end of Woild Wai II to 1997, theie weie
demonstiably two gieat poweisthe United States and Soviet
Union. Te collapse of the Soviet Union in 1997 and the subsequent
declaiation of independence by its constituent states led most of the
woild to believe that an eia of unipolaiism was unfolding with only
the United States claiming gieat powei status. It was also suimised
that a unipolai woild would be devoid of aimed conicts that had
plagued inteinational peace duiing the Cold Wai.
Nothing could have been fuithei fiom the tiuth. In the decade
that followed the bieak-up of the Soviet Union, theie weie moie
aimed conicts than in any of the pievious decades. Te main
ieason foi this inciease in the incidence of aimed conict is that
smallei nations aie now ieluctant to iespond to coeicion fiom a
gieat powei and have become incieasingly vocifeious iegaiding
theii soveieign iight to employ foice if necessaiy, in the puisuit of
theii own veisions of national secuiity. Undei these conditions, the
woild is today moving in the diiection of becoming tiuly multipolai
as opposed to being unipolai. A ielated development is the quest by
a numbei of nations to attain gieat powei status and inciease theii
spheies of inuence.
14
Te concept of powei is fundamental to global inteiaction
and inteinational ielations. Te stiuggle foi powei between
nation-states is the cause of all wai and peace and, theiefoie, it is
the coie theme behind inteinational diplomacy and politics.
2
It is
compaiatively simple to undeistand and accept the centiality of
powei in inteinational ielations, but dening the chaiacteiistics
of powei by itself is a moie complex endeavoui. Tis is because a
numbei of factois go into analysing the basis of a nations powei and
fuithei dene gieat powei status. Te complexity of such an analysis
is incieased since a majoiity of these factois aie non-quantiable
and even dicult to dene accuiately.
3
Teie aie a numbei of theoieticians
4
who have dened the
concept of powei and also laid down the national capabilities that
should be consideied when assessing a nations powei base. Howevei,
the capabilities listed by this gioup aie limited to mathematically
measuiable and compaiable ones, and completely exclude the
non-quantiable ones, which aie becoming moie impoitant in
a iapidly globalising woild.
5
An analysis of all the tangible and
intangible chaiacteiistics of a nation-state that contiibute to its
powei, and the absence of which will always detiact fiom that
powei, biings out a numbei of them as being compaiatively moie
impoitant. Tis piioiitisation is based on the amount of inuence
one chaiacteiistic has on the foimulation of othei chaiacteiistics, as
well as the numbei of othei chaiacteiistics that it inuences.
It is also seen that each of the fundamental chaiacteiistics of
national powei base evolve fiom the combination of a numbei of
identiable and independent, but inteiconnected factois. Tese
factois themselves aie the contiibutoiy total of some basic elements
of national powei. Te elements of national powei could contiibute
to the fullment of one oi moie factois, which could themselves be
suppoiting dieient chaiacteiistics. In essence the chaiacteiistics
of powei aie complex, but aie identiable cleaily as independently
contiibuting to oveiall national powei. Howevei, they cannot be
fully evaluated sepaiately because of the oveilap of some of the
factois and elements that make up each chaiacteiistic.
15
Guvn: Povvu S:n:us
Te good want power, but to weep barren tears. Te powerful
goodness want: worse need for them.
Peicy Bysshe Shelley, Prometheus Unbound
Foi a contempoiaiy analysis, foui fundamental chaiacteiistics
can be identied as being the ciitical ones which a nation must
possess in abundance to be elevated to gieat powei status. Othei
less impoitant ones, even though independently identiable, can be
clubbed undei these foui because they would be diiectly inuenced
by one oi moie of the fundamental chaiacteiistics. Te ciitical
chaiacteiistics aie political stability, powei piojection capability,
domestic giowth potential and long-teim secuiity impeiatives.
Tese must be caiefully assessed to deteimine a nations powei base
at the giand stiategic level fiom which the tiue status of a nation in
the inteinational aiena can be deiived.
Gieat powei status can only be bestowed on nation-states, at
least foi the foieseeable futuie. Although theie aie a numbei of
non-state entities that could exeicise a few of the chaiacteiistics,
none othei than a nation-state could aspiie to possess all of them
in the measuie necessaiy to be elevated to gieat powei status. Foi
example, the amoiphous teiioiist oiganisation, al-Qaeda, does
have the capability to pioject powei by a vaiiety of methods and
may even be thought to have adequate economic staying powei to
opeiate in the long teim. Howevei, they do not have the political
stability iequiied to evolve into a global powei that can inuence
and shape the inteinational system. Similaily, laige multinational
companies have the economic wheiewithal to exeit tiemendous
inuence in the global maiket, with some of them exceeding the
combined budgets of a numbei of small independent nations of the
woild. Howevei theii lack of haid powei piojection capability and
political identity negates the establishment of these companies as
16
global gieat poweis. Only established and viable nation-states can
aspiie to gieat powei status.
Political Stability
Political stability is peihaps the most impoitant as well as
the most complex to assess. Te denition of political stability is
itself a vexed metaphoi because it is a compaiative state with no
cleai baseline of assessment. A benign autociatic iule could be
teimed to be politically stable but may not be capable of moving
the nation towaids gieat powei status. As a coiollaiy, a demociacy
which cannot function cohesively because of inteinally conicting
ideologies does not cieate a stable political enviionment and
theiefoie will be incapable of lifting the nations powei status.
Political stability is the base fiom which national powei can be
developed. Histoiically it is seen that national powei biought about
by autociatic dictatois is noimally shoit lived. In iecent times a
classic example of the ultimate failuie of autociatic goveinance is
the iise, decline and bieak-up of the Soviet Union. Te gieat powei
status that the Soviet Union assumed at the end of Woild Wai II was
not sustainable because it was conceived and puisued aiound state
contiol of not only the stiategic aspects of defence and economy,
but also the industiy, tiade and all othei aspects that stiengthen and
inciease national powei. Tis diaconian contiol encompassed even
the daily life of the people and often used state coeicion of political
dissidents, theieby completely denying the people any sense of
owneiship of the nations gieatness. Te bieak-up of the Soviet
Union was anticipated by a laige numbei of astute obseiveis and it
was only the iapidity of its failuie that suipiised the inteinational
community.
Paiticipation of the geneial population in the piocess of
nation-building, which inculcates a sense of owneiship, is essential
foi long-teim development of national powei. Tis can only be
achieved by establishing demociatic piactices and nuituiing them
to matuiity in a stable mannei. Teiefoie, political stability built
aiound demociatic piactices foims the ist step towaids developing
17
sustainable national powei. On a contiaiy note it can also be said
that demociacy at times is an obstacle to a nation becoming a tiuly
gieat powei. Tis is moie so in cases wheie a laige piopoition of
the population is eithei uneducated oi disenfianchised foi a vaiiety
of ieasons. Undei these ciicumstances, it is likely that the national
powei iesouices would be tuined inwaids foi domestic ieasons,
limiting the eoit that could be biought to beai in achieving gieat
powei status. Demociacy fuitheiing a nations move towaids gieat
powei status is not always a stiaight and cleai path. It needs a gieat
deal of implicit undeistanding on the pait of a majoiity of the
population and ceitain explicit contiols at dieient levels.
At the implementation level of demociatic goveinance theie
will have to be ceitain explicit contiols exeicised to ensuie that the
demociatic piocess does not skew the diiection of giowth in such
a way as to detiact fiom the long-teim goals of the nation. It could
be aigued that the impact of such contiols would be an anathema
to the basic concept of demociacy. Howevei, the possibility of the
piocess itself becoming the cause foi concein fiom a giand stiategic
viewpoint is the majoi aw in demociatic institutions. Tis aw
has to be contained at all times if demociatic piocess is to assuie
political stability which is vital to a nation husbanding its iesouices
in a move towaids gieat powei status.
Power Projection Capability
Te second chaiacteiistic that a nation must have to claim the
mantle of gieat powei is iecognised powei piojection capability.
Today, powei piojection is not meiely dependent on militaiy
capabilities but includes the concept of soft powei embedded in
economic, diplomatic, political and cultuial inuences that a nation
can biing to beai. Tis capability encompasses a veiy wide spectium
of elements that complement each othei but aie also of consideiable
individual inuence. Te complementaiy elements easily t
togethei as factois, which in a veiy bioad mannei, can be clubbed
undei two sub-chaiacteiisticsmilitaiy capabilities and soft
powei. Although this sepaiation is being done foi ease of analysis,
18
it must be undeistood that these two bioad sub-chaiacteiistics
aie not exclusive of each othei and that one cannot exist in any
ieasonable semblance of capacity without the suppoit of the othei.
Te ielationship between the factois that constitute the two sub-
chaiacteiistics is even moie complex and inteitwined. Tese factois
and the constituting elements can be listed and explained, but always
with the caveat that they should not be evaluated in isolation.
Militaiy powei piojection capability can be deduced fiom two
fundamental factoisthe demonstiated militaiy capability of a
nation and the national will to employ this capability in the puisuit
of its secuiity impeiatives. With the changing natuie of thieats to
secuiity that has become cleaily appaient in the past few decades, it
is seen that militaiy capability alone cannot assuie national secuiity.
Teiefoie, it is necessaiy foi the militaiy might of a nation to be
able to act in conceit with all othei elements of national powei at all
times.
Tese two factoismilitaiy capability and national willaie
complex and made up of fuithei lowei level, but veiy impoitant
elements. Te failuie to be adequate in even one of the factois would
inevitably lead to the failuie of the bioadei militaiy powei piojection
capability. Foi example, demonstiated militaiy capability can only be
sustained in the long teim if the nation has an independent capacity
to manufactuie and maintain the necessaiy haidwaie and suppoit
systems, one of the many elements that contiibute to militaiy
capabilities. Manufactuiing and maintenance capacity as well as the
necessaiy ieseaich and development capability to sustain a ciedible
foice aie fuithei inuenced by the basic technological ethos of the
nation, deiived fiom the geneial education system.
6
Anothei ciitical element in husbanding militaiy capability is the
suppoit that national militaiy build-up needs fiom the public. Tis
is vitally impoitant in a demociacy wheie the militaiy is noimally a
volunteei foice dependent on the public goodwill foi its existence.
Public suppoit foi militaiy foices waxes and wanes with context, the
suppoit being at its least duiing extended peiiods of compaiative
peace and iising to a ciescendo when the nation is undei thieat of
19
exteinal aggiession. Te unavoidable uctuation of this element,
especially in demociatic nations, impinges on the oveiall militaiy
capability of a nation. Its eect can be mitigated by ensuiing that the
piofessional standaids expected of the militaiy foice aie maintained
and the allocation of sucient iesouices is assuied at all times.
Teie aie a numbei of othei elements that also have decisive
impact on the building and maintaining of national militaiy
capability. Te ability to build and employ eectively a militaiy foice
of adequate calibie is a veiy exacting task, which a laige numbei
of nations aie incapable of undeitaking. Tis is one of the ieasons
that gieat powei status is not easily achieved, even when a nation is
politically stable within a demociatic mould.
Te second sub-chaiacteiistic in deteimining national powei
piojection capability is its soft powei. In a iealistic view this would
encompass mainly foui factoiseconomic depth, diplomatic
statuie, infoimation technology and cultuial ethos. Economic depth
is not only economic capability at any given time oi peiiod, but the
nations long-teim piospects vis--vis its economic sustainability. In
assessing this categoiy it is of caidinal impoitance to have a bioad
and fai-ieaching view of the economic ability and piocesses of a
nation.
Economy and diplomacy cannot be segiegated as independent
factois because the two aie almost insepaiably inteitwined in
todays globalised woild. Te diplomatic statuie of a nation is
in diiect piopoition to its economic powei. Inevitably it is the
diplomatic capabilities of a nation that will help to fuithei its
economic aspiiations and sustain its economy in a viable mannei.
Inteidependence of nations foi theii mutual economic piospeiity
can no longei be denied and diplomatic initiatives help to untangle
pioblems that could otheiwise lead to slowing down of economic
piogiess with its own iipple eects on othei factois.
Infoimation has always been a ciitical factoi in all aspects
of nation building and powei piojection. Tioughout histoiy
infoimation has been used to impose powei, mostly militaiy in
eailiei days, and win wais. Te impoitance of infoimation waifaie
20
is vividly desciibed in Homeis famous epics of the Iliad and
Odyssey
7
and nine centuiies latei it is given the same impoitance
in the accounts of Alexandeis conquest of the Peisian Empiie.
Infoimation has also been used as a foice multipliei thiough
histoiy, one obvious example being the ieliance the foundei of the
Mongol Empiie, Genghis Khan, placed on the fast dissemination of
infoimation to his eld commandeis.
8
Use of infoimation in almost
all its dieient facets is appaient in any study of Woild Wai II,
peihaps the most intensely studied conict in histoiy. It has been
agieed, by almost all histoiians of note, that infoimation supeiioiity
was the foundation on which the aii and naval supeiioiity of the
Allies weie based duiing this wai. Teiefoie, the impoitance of
infoimation and its application thiough its entiie spectium as a
ciucial factoi in the powei piojection capabilities of a nation cannot
be ovei emphasised.
In the last thiee decades technological impiovements have
ievolutionised the collection and dissemination of infoimation.
Othei than foi its utility as a wai-winning factoi, it has now become
impeiative foi any nation aspiiing to economic stability and giowth
to impiove its inteinal and exteinal infoimation dissemination
systems and be at least at pai with othei developed nations. Global
inteiopeiability in the infoimation technology aiea has become a
baseline iequiiement foi the piogiess of tiade and economy. When
the application of soft powei as a powei piojection capability is
being conceived, adequacy of iesident infoimation technology
assumes paiamount impoitance. Attaining gieat powei status will
be impossible without ist achieving the highest level of infoimation
technology.
Infoimation manipulation has eveiy potential to become an
extiemely common piactice both in times of conict as well as
duiing peiiods of compaiative peace. Refeiied to commonly as
cybeiwaifaie, it is becoming one of the most impoitant capabilities
to be nuituied in a nation. Te advancements in infoimation
technology, paiticulaily the advent of computei netwoiking, piovides
decision-makeis the ability to make moie ecient decisions than
21
even befoie in histoiy. It has also piovided the wheiewithal to the
militaiy foices of a nation to be moie accuiate and lethal in the
application of foice.
9
Tis availability of infoimation in abundance
helps to minimise collateial damage not only in aimed conicts,
but also duiing giand stiategic diplomatic manoeuviings. Teie
is also a downside to this situation stemming fiom the open and
cheap availability of the ielevant technology. Its commeicial
availability combined with the ieliance of nation-states on
infoimation supeiioiity foi theii secuiity makes it a tool that
would-be aggiessois, both state-sponsoied and non-state, aie likely
to use with gieat eectiveness.
10
Anothei majoi factoi that constitutes soft powei is the cultuial
undeipinnings of a nation that aie acceptable to othei nations and
theiefoie can be used as a tool to inuence the bioadei thinking.
Needless to say, cultuial inuence of a nation is a combination of a
numbei of elements that stiaddle its histoiic ioots and is bolsteied
by both economic and diplomatic stiength. A vibiant cultuial
ambience that can be eectively showcased has the potential to
biing a much laigei ietuin compaied to the initial investment. Tis
is moie so in cases when nations populations shaie a similai oi same
ethnicity. While cultuial powei piojection would be a veiy dicult
state to achieve, cultuial exchanges can inuence othei factois and
chaiacteiistics that contiibute to gieat powei status. Even when
it is not diiectly inuencing the status of a nation, gieat powei
status can only be bestowed on a nation that possesses identiable
cultuial capabilities that aie histoiically backed and amiable to the
ethos of othei nations.
Domestic Growth Potential
Te thiid chaiacteiistic foi a nation to attain gieat powei
status is domestic giowth potential built on political stability. In this
instance, political stability paves the way foi the economic stability
essential foi continuous domestic giowth. While economic stability
is essential to ensuie giowth potential, theie aie two othei ciucial
factois that will deteimine the capacity of a nation to hainess and
22
husband it. Tese aie the cohesiveness of the national ethos in
subsuming ethnic and cultuial divisions, and the nations political
ability to adheie to its long-teim stiategic goals.
Domestic giowth potential cannot be easily measuied because
fai too many factois aect it, some with almost immediate and
palpable eects and otheis with veiy giadual and at times almost
impeiceptible eects. Teiefoie, a nation must be watched closely
ovei a peiiod of time to fathom the eect of some of the factois
and to identify piedictable tiends in teims of its capability to deal
with both advantageous and disadvantageous situations. Resilient
giowth potential spiings fiom political and economic stability.
Resilience in the wake of opposing foices is essential foi a nation
to ensuie adequate giowth potential, which is fundamental to the
development of national powei.
Assuming a situation wheiein a nation possesses adequate
stabilityboth political and economicas well as demonstiated
iesilience, the cohesiveness of the national chaiactei will be the
deciding factoi in assuiing domestic giowth. A nation needs to
have an identity which is acceptable to the entiie population foi its
eective functioning. Ethnic and cultuial divisions tend to detiact
fiom the coie giowth of a nation. Dieiences of cultuie and ethnicity
have to be dealt with in a mannei that satises the emotional needs
of the people while not letting the national identity get distoited. In
the post-colonial nations of the developing woild ethnic diveisity is
becoming a contentious issue, at times becoming the ioot cause foi
destiuctive civil wais. Te moie established developed nations have
managed to contain such divisions, but ieligious, ethnic and cultuial
dieiences have staited to divide what have so fai been cohesive
national institutions even in some of these nations. Undei these
conditions, despite economic stability, domestic giowth potential
will not be sustainable foi any length of time and national powei will
accoidingly diminish. Although economic stability is a pieiequisite
foi domestic giowth, the coiollaiy that such stability will always
ensuie domestic giowth, iiiespective of national cohesion, does not
hold tiue.
23
Te political ability of a nation to adheie to its long-teim
goals is essential to ensuie unimpeded domestic giowth in the
iight diiection. Tis will be a pioduct of political stability and
the amount of fieedom that is given to the stiategic planning
piocesses. Te amount of fieedom given to stiategic planning
is in fact a diiect function of a nations inheient condence in the
coiiectness of the political piocess. Tis factoi does not contiibute
diiectly to a nations giowth potential, but ensuies that whatevei
potential a nation possesses is guided appiopiiately to be optimised
foi building national powei. If theie aie no nationally accepted
long-teim goals it will be easy to fiittei away the available giowth
potential by meandeiing along in the puisuit of goals that aie not
of consequence in the long teim. Teiefoie, the need not only to
have a visionaiy long-teim peispective foi the nation, but also to
have the political matuiity to adheie to them is indiiect, but ciucial.
National powei can nevei be built without long-teim commitments
to cleai and tianspaient goals which aie in consonance with the
nations political, cultuial, histoiic and social ethos. Any goal that
is not cleaily aligned along these lines is unlikely to be consideied
woith puisuing in the long teim and theiefoie, will be of limited
impoitance to the nation.
Te stiategic planning piocess of a nation must be such that
theie is a cleai path demaicated to ieach the accepted long-teim
goals. Tis path by itself would need indicative maikeis in teims
of shoit-teim goals that demonstiate a nations piogiess towaids
its laid down long-teim ambitions. While these shoit-teim goals
aie impoitant as indicatois of piogiess, caie must be taken to
ensuie that they do not giadually oveishadow the long-teim goals,
especially when a nation is faced with extiaoidinaiy situations that
may iequiie the sustained application of national powei.
Long-term Security Imperatives
Secuiity of a nation is indelibly inteiwoven with its economic,
social and political stability. Te teim secuiity has been dened
in dieient ways thiough the histoiy of nation-states. What could
24
have been consideied a iobust denition of national secuiity about
50 yeais ago no longei holds tiue. Some histoiic ideas of secuiity
have become completely iedundant while some otheis still nd
a ceitain amount of ielevance even today. In the contempoiaiy
woild, secuiity is a combination of a numbei of denable and also
amoiphous factois and conditions. It encompasses not only the
secuiity of dened landimaiitime boideis, but also the politico-
economic as well as societal inteiests of the nation as a whole.
Te othei inteiesting change that has come about in the
secuiity enviionment is that, in the cuiient inteinational scenaiio, it
is not the militaiy foices of a nation alone that ensuie the secuiity of
a nation. Te advent of aii powei in the mid to late 1900s indicated
the changes that needed to be enacted to secuie a nation because
the entiie nationgeogiaphically and, theiefoie, in teims of
population and iesouicesbecame susceptible to attack as opposed
to only the elded foices being taigeted by the enemy. Tis change
was only a piecuisoi of things to come, and today the concept of
secuiing a nation by the militaiy foices alone is almost a laughable
concept. National secuiity is now assuied by a combination of
economic, diplomatic, infoimation and militaiy capabilities,
employed judiciously in conceit at the appiopiiate iate and time,
with the lead agency being deteimined accoiding to the aiising
contingency. Te concept of national secuiity and the piocess of
ensuiing the adequacy of national powei to establish a viable secuie
enviionment aie at theii most complex today.
Given the complexity of secuiity iequiiements it is, moie
than evei befoie, necessaiy to lay down unwaveiing national
secuiity impeiatives at the giand stiategic level. Only fiom this
solid foundation can national secuiity iequiiements be deiived
and adequate capabilities developed. It is the iesponsibility of the
highest decision-making body in the nation to ensuie that not only
aie the secuiity impeiatives cleaily enunciated, but also that the
agencies involved aie piovided the coiiect inputs and iesouices to
suppoit the long-teim iequiiements. Te whole piocess is complex
and unless conducted in conjunction with the othei chaiacteiistics
25
it is likely to fail. Political stability, powei piojection capability and
domestic giowth potential combine to ensuie that the secuiity
impeiatives of a nation aie met. Tis can only be achieved if these
impeiatives aie puisued consciously without any deviation, with
single-minded puipose, in the long teim. Te iise to gieat powei
status of a nation is almost completely dependent on it placing its
secuiity goal iiievocably as fai into the futuie as it possibly can and
then having the chaiactei and national ethos to puisue it at all costs.
Anything shoit of complete commitment to these iequiiements will
not peimit the nation to achieve gieat powei status, iiiespective of
its othei attiibutes.
CunoIo GIosnI EvIuomv:
However messy the world may have been in the waning epoch,
at least we felt we had incisive tools to analyse it. But today
we still do not have ways of talking about the diminished
role of states without at the same time privileging them as
superior to all the other actors in the global arena. We lack
a means for treating the various contradictions as part and
parcel of a more coherent order.
James N. Rosenau
11
Cuiiently, only the United States could be teimed as a
gieat powei, although theie aie a numbei of othei nations that
aspiie to this status. While othei nations may achieve gieat
powei status in the futuie, it is a ceitainty that only the United
States will be a gieat powei at least foi the next thiee decades.
Logically such a situation should make the woild unipolai
in its secuiity outlook. Howevei, the chaiacteiistics that aie
piominent in the contempoiaiy evaluation of national powei
and the changing inteinational ciicumstances aie bound to
26
eiode giadually the cuiient unipolaiity of the global secuiity
enviionment and mould it into a multilateial conceit of poweis.
Tis tiend will only gathei pace with the sole gieat powei, the
United States, becoming fuithei oveistietched in its powei
piojection attempts aiound the globe. In letting the United
States biing togethei coalitions of the willing to countei thieats
emanating in dieient paits of the woild, a ceitain calculated
cynicism is disceinible in the attitude of the middle poweis. By
staying away fiom committing to these US-led inteiventions, they
aie stiengthening the global move towaids a multipolai woild not
dominated by any single entity and one that will be moie ieceptive
to a leadeiship piovided by a conceit of poweis.
Since the end of the Cold Wai, two developments
have piimaiily inuenced and shaped the global stiategic
enviionmentthe incieased diusion in the denition of
national secuiity associated with the emeigence to piominence
of non-state issues and the unpiecedented global economic
giowth, especially in Asia.
12
Te ist has been veiy visible
in a high piole mannei and has diiectly aected the
secuiity paiadigms acioss the woild. Ovei the past decade,
non-state issues have been iaised to a level wheiein nation-states
have been confionted with them in a boideiless mannei leading
to an almost complete bieakdown of tiaditional national secuiity
noims. Tis has also led to national geogiaphic boideis becoming
almost iiielevant in the secuiity equation.
Te second development, while being moie obtuse and indiiect,
has also ciitically impacted the bioadei and evolving inteinational
secuiity agenda. Teie is giowing concein that the economic
and nancial supiemacy of the United States, once consideied
unassailable, is now being thieatened.
13
Despite the Asian nancial
ciisis of the 1990s that set some of the economies back, the
economic giowth and futuie potential in the Asian maikets seem
to be completely undei contiol and on tiack to achieve piedicted
giowth guies.
27
Prominence of Non-State Issues
In the past few decades non-state and tiansnational
issues have become the majoi issues that have iesulted in the
piolifeiation of conicts. Tese issues and iesulting conicts aie
fai iemoved in theii chaiacteiistics fiom conventional inteistate
wais. Insuigencies, ethnic cleansing and iogue state instigated
teiioiism aie not entiiely new phenomena, but in theii cuiient
ieiteiation and incieased global impact they constitute a new
secuiity conundium. Globalisation has amplied the eects of
these pioblems and the demand on militaiy foices to be able to
contain them has shaiply incieased fiom the 1990s. Teiioiism and
tiansnational ciime need a feitile enviionment of instability to
take hold and thiive. Peipetiatois of these activities aie constantly
on the look out foi possible safe havens to base theii opeiations.
Deep-iooted pioblems of weaknesses in goveinanceboth
political and economicundeimine the stability and thieaten
the viability of the smallei nations in most paits of the woild.
Even the beginnings of such unstable conditions, fai fiom full-
blown instability and the attendant chaos, make these nations
vulneiable to the attention of non-state actois seeking to establish
theii piesence in them. Such a situation would make these nations
failing states.
Even a stable nations vulneiability to non-state and
tiansnational thieats is maikedly incieased by the failuie of its
neighbouiing soveieign states to enfoice law and oidei. As stable
and demociatic poweis it is incumbent on the developed woild
to iestoie a failing state to stability both in teims of political
goveinance and economic management. Howevei, unilateial action
by a developed nation to stabilise a failing state in its neighbouihood
is wiought with the possibility of fuithei alienating the iecipient
nation. Even so, the staik ieality is that the developed woild has to
be willing to play a moie active iole in stabilising the moie volatile
iegions of the woild to ensuie global secuiity and to stem the spiead
of instability.
28
Natuial calamities that debilitate a nations capability to
maintain its stability also invite the attention of non-state actois.
Tese situations aie fuithei aggiavated by the fact that natuial
disasteis aie not geogiaphically constiained and theiefoie oei
these subveisive elements a gieatei oppoitunity to caiiy out theii
activities. Containment of the possible fallouts fiom such disasteis,
especially in states that have alieady ieached maiginal failing
status, iequiie conceited eoits fiom economically stable states.
Accoidingly, militaiy foices being deployed foi militaiy opeiations
othei than waifamine and disastei ielief, peacekeeping,
stabilisation and nation-building opeiationshave become
commonplace.
Asian Economic Growth
Te stiategic iise of Asiathe single most impoitant event of
the late 20th and eaily 21st centuiieswill have piofound global
implications. Te basic factoi undeipinning this iise to piominence
is the economic giowth so obvious in the iegion. Almost all
nations in the iegion have oveicome the economic slowdown that
inhibited giowth in the eaily 1990s and aie now undeigoing stable
giowth. Teie do not seem to be any majoi issues that could altei
this pattein. Inevitably, economic giowth, and moie so stability,
demands the iedistiibution of stiategic powei in a woild ieliant
on tiade and commeice foi national piospeiity. Teiefoie, it is not
suipiising that the Asian economic giowth has biought with it a
ceitain amount of stiategic powei to the iegion on the whole. Fiom
being consideied stiategic backwateis only a few decades ago, the
iegion has now emeiged as the one in which the next centuiy will
be played out.
Accommodating this incieased amount of powei within an
inteinational system that itself is undeigoing convulsions because
of othei extianeous ieasons will be pioblematic. Even a giadual
iedistiibution of powei will in tuin foice changes to the system,
leading to tensions in the political and stiategic undeipinnings
that ensuie global stability. While iational thinking should ensuie
29
that changes should be instituted in such a way as to ensuie that a
peaceful and stable inteinational system is sustained, it cannot be
assumed that iationality will always pievail. Within the Asian context,
although all nations aie showing steady economic impiovement, it
is China and India that aie iising spectaculaily as majoi new centies
of economic and stiategic powei. It is cleaily possible ovei the next
few decades foi both of them to become majoi global poweis
capable of substantially inuencing the inteinational system.
Te iise of China and India indicates a denitive shift in the
global stiategic oidei. In oidei to maintain global stability, the
inuence that they biing to the inteinational system would have to
be benign in natuie. Teie aie two factois that might impinge on
the peaceful tiansfoimation of stiategic balance in the woild. Fiist,
both the nations involved aie only emeiging as stiategic poweis and
theiefoie could be pione to intempeiate decisions in the shoit teim,
while the domestic polity is coming to teims with theii new-found
global status. Second, the fundamental national aspiiations of both
these nations could be in conict with each othei and the necessaiy
adjustments iequiied to avoid conict into the futuie may not be
easily achieved. Having voiced such doubts it must also be said
that it is not inevitable that China and India will eventually clash in
theii seaich foi places in the sun, but neithei is it fai fiom
impossible.
14
CotIusIo
Te two developmentsnon-state issues and the Asian
giowthaie not complementaiy because neithei do they impact on
the inteinational system in the same mannei noi do they opeiate in
the same time fiame. Te non-state issues have come to piominence
almost completely based on the assumption that state-on-state
conict is an anachionism of the past. Fuithei, in piacticality they
deal moie in the shoit-teim futuie, although the consequences
30
could denitely be long-teim and need fuithei amelioiation. Fiom
the eaily 1990s, libeial demociatic ideals have spiead aiound the
woild at a veiy fast iate which has biought in its wake an incieased
incidence of insuigent activities. Tese changes biing non-state
issues to the foie and seem to conim that the woild is undeigoing
a Revolution in Stiategic Aaiis.
15
On the othei hand, the Asian economic giowthin paiticulai
the emeigence of China and India as poweiful entitiesand its
iepeicussions on the global stiategic and secuiity enviionment
have long-teim implications foi emeiging inteinational tiends. In a
stiange kind of a time waip, it can be noticed that the two Asian
giants aie ie-enacting the old-fashioned stiategic iivaliy that was
pievalent in the Euiope of the eaily 20th centuiy. And as was the
case in Euiope, this development also contains all the ingiedients
foi a state-on-state conict, howevei iemote that may seem because
of the stiingent inteinational piessuies that will be biought to beai
on nation-states who have a pioclivity towaids the use of foice.
16
Teie is an undeniable immediacy to non-state issues and the
consequences of not eectively containing them aie veiy visible in
a numbei of places aiound the globe. Teiefoie, they piedominate
the contempoiaiy secuiity enviionment and developed nations aie
bound to view them as a highei piioiity while initiating stabilising
actions. Te iise of belligeient Asian poweis and its longei teim
implications aie not ieadily obseivable and theiefoie tend to be put
aside as of indeteiminate consequences that could be evaluated at
leisuie. It is indeed tiue that the implications aie long-teim, but it
is also tiue that these implications would manifest themselves in
a giadual but inciemental mannei leading to unpleasant suipiises
at theii matuiation. It is doubtful whethei an alieady fiagile global
secuiity enviionment would be able to withstand such an onslaught
foi which it is not piepaied.
31
No:vs
2 H.J. Moigenthau, Politics among Nations: Te Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th
Edition, Alfied A. Knopf, New Yoik, 1967, p. 25.
3 Dylan Kissane, 2015 and the Rise of China: Powei Cycle Analysis and the Implications
foi Austialia, Security Challenges, Vol. 1, No. 1, Te Kokoda Foundation, Canbeiia,
2005, p. 105.
4 Tis gioup is noimally iefeiied to as the powei cycle theoiists and some of the bettei
known amongst them aie Dylan Chailes Doian, Wes Paison, Sushil Kumai, Biock
Tessman and Steve Chan.
5 Kissane, 2015 and the Rise of China, pp. 10607.
6 Sanu Kainikaia, Diminishing Relevance: Emergent Air Forces at the Cross Roads,
Aeiospace Centie Papei No. 10, Aeiospace Centie, Canbeiia, 2003, p. 15.
7 J Paikei, Intioduction in Geoige Chapmans Homei, Te Iliad and Te Odyssey,
Woodswoith, Waie, 2000. pp. xvxvii.
8 J.F. Dunnigan, Te Next War Zone: Confronting the Global Treat of Cyberterrorism,
Osboine McGiaw-Hill, New Yoik, 2002, pp. 2627.
9 J. Adams, Te New World War: Te Warriors and Weapons of the New Battleelds of
Cyberspace, Hutchinson, London, 1998, p. 120.
10 Di Dimitiios Delibasis, Te Right to National Self-Defence in Information Warfare
Operations, Aiena Books, Edmunds, 2007, pp. 3947.
11 James N. Rosenau, Many Damn Tings Simultaneously: Complexity Teoiy and
Woild Aaiis, in David S. Albeits and Tomas J. Czeiwinski (eds.), Complexity,
Global Politics and National Security, CCRP, Depaitment of Defense, Washington,
June 1997, p. 79.
12 Hugh White, Beyond the Defence of Australia: Finding a New Balance in Australian
Strategic Policy, Lowy Institute Papei 16, Lowy Institute foi Inteinational Policy,
Sydney, 2006, p. 7.
13 Fiancesco Gueiieia, Moodys says welfaie spending thieatens US ciedit iating,
Financial Times, London, 10 Januaiy 2008, fiom www.ft.comicmsisi0i40f3a2be
accessed on 14 Januaiy 2008.
14 White, Beyond the Defence of Australia, p. 11.
15 Lawience Fieedman, A Revolution in Strategic Aairs, Adelphi Papei No. 318,
Inteinational Institute foi Stiategic Studies, London, 1998.
16 White, Beyond the Defence of Australia, pp. 1415.
32
Chaptei 3
Te Emeigence of
Asian Giants
34
35
Tnr Errvorcr or Asi Gi:s
THE EMERGENCE OF ASIAN GIANTS
Asia is not going to be civilized after the methods of the West.
Tere is too much Asia and she is too old.
Rudyaid Kipling
Te Man Who Was, in Lifes Handicap, 1891
Histoiically, the Euiopean nations and the United States
viewed the newly decolonised nation-states of Asia thiough a
piism of political tuimoil, economic mismanagement and endemic
poveity and coiiuption. Fiom the late 1980s the peiception staited
to change until it was accepted that Asia was tiansfoiming into
an economic poweihouse slowly but suiely equalling the nancial
status of Euiope and that theie weie emeiging giants in Asia. Tis
biought into question the continued status of inteinational Westein
nancial dominance that had so fai been almost taken foi gianted.
Along with this giadual economic shift theie has emeiged the
unasked question whethei the Asian nations aie willing oi up to the
task of assuming a deteimining iole in inteinational ielations. Teie
has been intense cuiiosity iegaiding this development and it has
been a majoi discussion topic ovei the past few yeais.
A study done by Goldman Sachs concludes that, by 2050,
the foui laigest economies in the woild will be China, the United
States, India and Japan in that oidei. Howevei, theie is a distinct
ieluctance in the developed woild of today to accept this ieality,
giving a peiception of the Westein woild not being able to visualise
cleaily the futuie and the powei shift that is bound to occui.
Similaily, neithei do the Westein nations seem to have adequate
undeistanding oi acceptance of the global stiategic enviionment that
will pievail in the 21st centuiy, built aiound the Asian poweis. Asia
in the 21st centuiy is not going to iepeat 19th oi even 20th centuiy
Euiopean histoiy. In contiast, Asian nations have iecognised the
need to giasp the oppoitunity foi giowth and development that is
36
cuiiently available and all eoits aie being made to ensuie that this
oppoitunity is not lost.
1
Within the Asian context, the iise of China and India stand
out as exemplaiy cases of economic giowth. Applying the teim
Asian Giants to China and India is meant to stiess the enoimity
of sizedemogiaphic and economicand the soft inuence these
two nations deiive fiom it. Teii sheei size has alieady impacted
on the way in which the global stiategic enviionment is unfolding.
As this centuiy develops, these economies will have an insatiable
demand foi natuial iesouices like watei, oil, and land, which will in
the long teim biing the woild to the edge of a global stiuggle foi
piedominance. Foi example, the electiication piogiam of China
has placed enoimous demand foi coppei globally.
China and India aie usually discussed in tandem whenevei
the Asian stiategic emeigence is discussed. Fiom an economic
peispective both the countiies aie noimally viewed within the BRIC
(Biazil, Russia, India and China) and the challenge that they pose
to the domination of Westein poweis.
2
Te focus is on the iapid
economic giowth of the nations in GDP teims and the fact that
China is the second laigest and India the fth laigest economy in
the woild. Teie is a ceitain exotic auia in the Westein depiction
of China as a diagon and India as an elephant, cieatuies that aie
mythical and not native to the Westein nations. Te implication is
that the awakening of these cieatuies has iesulted in peiceivable
changes in the woild.
Te West views the giowth of China and India and theii
economic dynamism as something of an anomaly. Teie aie two
basic ieasons foi this. Fiist, until a few yeais ago a laige population
was consideied a liability to economic piogiess. Teiefoie China
with its laige population, albeit with contiolled population giowth,
and India with its unchecked population giowth weie not expected
to achieve the economic giowth iate that both the nations have
iegisteied and maintained ovei a numbei of yeais. Te second
ieason is obtuse and steeped in histoiic peiceptions, almost
intangible in its nuance. Te question within the Westein woild
37
is one of how could they iise so iapidly and steadily, which is a
thiowback to the thinking in colonial days of Westein economic
domination.
3
It is almost ceitain that had such meteoiic iise been
achieved by a Westein nation, such a iesponse would not have
occuiied. In many quaiteis in the Westein woild theie is diculty
in coming to teims with this haish ieality.
Since the end of Woild Wai II and the withdiawal of the Biitish
foices fiom the iegion, the United States has stiategically dominated
the Asia-Pacic. Teie is mixed ieaction to this situation within the
nations in Asia, with some nations being openly hostile to Ameiican
domination. Howevei the piimacy of US stiategic politico-economic
and militaiy powei has assuied that the situation is a fait accompli.
It is unlikely that the situation will change in the neai teim. Te
South-East Asian nations, while becoming economically moie
vibiant, still have a long way to go in teims of iegional coopeiation
and domestic development befoie they can hope to achieve any
semblance of combined stiategic powei. When examining Asia as
a whole, the nations that stand out as being the majoi inuences
in the iegion aie Japan, China and India. Noith Koiea and Taiwan
aie inuential in a dieient way, as nations that have the capacity
to tiiggei conict and could be potential ashpoints. Tis is not to
oveilook the impoitance of South Koiea, Indonesia, Singapoie and
Malaysia as iegionally impoitant nations and emeiging poweis. It is
felt that at least foi the next two oi thiee decades these nations will
not be able to biing to beai the kind of stiategic powei necessaiy
to make a ciedible impact on the stiategic enviionment in an
inteinational system.
Te Asian politico-economic scenaiio and inteistate
ielationships aie both complex and confusing to analyse cleaily. Even
though it has been neaily 50 yeais since most of the nations in the
iegion gained independence fiom colonial iuleis in the afteimath of
Woild Wai II, theie is still a veiy disceinible nationalistic jingoism
that comes to the foie when dealing with Westein poweis and the
established inteinational system. Tis animosity peicolates into
inteistate ielationships as palpable waiiness and mistiust which is
38
not conducive to cultivating amicable ielationships between nations
in a geneiic mannei. Such fiiction, howevei coveit, tends to hold
back the piogiess in powei shaiing that is vital foi stiategic stability.
In the Asian context this schism is fuithei deepened by the thiee
majoi poweisChina, Japan, and Indiacompeting foi inuence
within the same iegion.
Foi the foieseeable futuie, this competition foi piominence
will be inuenced by the United States. Although the US-Japan
alliance is veiy stiong, the US has been making veiy cleai eoits
to biing India into its stiategic ciicle. Its ielationship with China is
moie ambivalent and China also haibouis a feeling that it is being
stiategically suiiounded by US inuence. Te favouiable alignment
of the US is ciitical foi any nation to emeige as the dominant and
most inuential of the thiee.
Cleaily, the intioduction of a powei shaiing aiiangement
acceptable to the majoi playeis in the iegion would be the best
way foiwaid. Tis would ensuie ielative stability and economic
piogiess to much of the iegion. Such a scenaiio is not dicult to
imagine. Te past 30 yeais have been ielatively peaceful within Asia,
and this absence of conict has undeipinned the dynamic giowth
so visible in the iegion. Te othei aspect is that these 30 peaceful
yeais have been unpiecedented in Asian histoiy. Te downside of
this peaceful situation is that the attendant economic piospeiity
of the iegion is likely to inciease the inheient ethnic, cultuial and
political fiictions and biing them to the suiface. In a sense this is
an unenviably vicious cycle of peace biinging economic piospeiity
that in tuin undeimines stiategic stability, biinging nations closei to
belligeience and conict.
Fiom an Asian peispective, the iise of China and India and the
pie-planned manoeuviings of Japan have the gieatest impoitance
in deteimining its stiategic futuie. By viitue of the economic and
militaiy clout of the thiee nations involved, any changes in the
Asian enviionment would have a salutaiy eect on the inteinational
secuiity enviionment as well. Te giowing inuence of China and
India within the iegion and theii deteimined outwaid looking
39
policies will have secuiity implications that tianscend the iegion
and may even be inteinationally polaiising.
Even with the emeigence of China and India as majoi economic
poweis that aie actively puisuing stiategic domination of the laigei
Asian iegion, the US domination of the Asia-Pacic is unlikely to
change in the next two oi even thiee decades. Howevei, the waning
of US stiategic powei in the iegion is also not a totally impiobable
scenaiio. Foi a numbei of ieasons, the US could elect to diaw
down theii involvement in Asia in a giadual mannei, which could
exaceibate the stiategic iivaliy between China and India, China and
Japan oi both.
Tuv Jnvnvsv Equn:Io
To survive, Japan today needs secure supply lines of essential
natural resources and industrial goods. Eighty-ve per cent
of Japans imported oil comes from the Middle East, and
around 25% of its trade is with Europe.
Masashi Nishihaia
4
Japan is alieady an economic giant and is in the piocess
of coming out of its cocoon to asseit itself in the Asian and
inteinational stiategic scenaiio. Te postWoild Wai II geneiation
of Japanese leadeis, and the population at laige, had accepted and
embiaced defeat in oidei to iebuild the nation. Te new geneiation
iesent that acceptance and have moie nationalistic feelings
iegaiding Japans stiategic situation, which is seen as extiaoidinaiily
dependent on the United States. Howevei, the giound ieality is that,
even though the constitution peimits the use of its aimed foices only
in self-defence, the Japan Self-Defense Foice (JSDF) is extiemely
capable. In view of iecent events and the subsequent changes in the
global secuiity enviionment, the Japanese constitution has been
40
slightly amended to peimit the deployment of the JSDF outside
the nation. Tis is a move to take Japan outside the inuence of the
US and has fai-ieaching stiategic eects. Japan is a iegional powei
and the second laigest economy in the woild and all its stiategic
initiatives cause iipples in the global secuiity enviionment, whethei
intended oi otheiwise.
5
Te US-Japan alliance is on im giounds and is not likely to
change foi the woise. Howevei, theie is a giowing and vocifeious
section of inuential policy-makeis who question the appaient
failuie of Japan to integiate its economic, diplomatic and militaiy
powei to become a stiategically inuential global citizen. Teie
is also unease at the administiative limits placed on the JSDF
which pievents it fiom being a ieal secuiity appaiatus.
6
Te
iecent foimation of a Defence Ministiy might paitly iediess this
anomaly, but a complete ievision of the constitution to incoipoiate
a militaiy with the accepted iole of ensuiing national secuiity
without any caveats on its employment may not be an immediate
possibility. Oguia Kazuo, a foimei diplomat and Piesident of the
Japan Foundation, points out that befoie Japan succumbs to intense
US piessuie to shouldei its global iesponsibilities against China
and also in the global wai on teiioi it must be iealised by the
policy-makeis that the global oidei Japan envisions may not be the
same as the inteinational oidei the United States is tiying to build.
7
Howevei, the ieality is that the Japan-US ielationship has been
and will continue to be the bediock of Japanese foieign policy.
PostCold Wai, Japan was able to iecovei almost complete
independence in both national and inteinational aieas, and the
latest changes indicate that the nation is now ieady to emeige
as an inuential politico-economic powei, backed by adequate
militaiy capabilities. Te deployment of the JSDF to paiticipate in
UN peacekeeping opeiations and the pioposal to iefoim the UN
Secuiity Council aie both indicative of Japans eoits to come to
teims with its need to be independently involved in the immense
task of iebuilding a viable global oidei within the new secuiity
enviionment.
41
In the changing inteinational enviionment, Japan is looking
to aiticulate a national secuiity policy that will be inclusive
of a new defence stiategy. Tis has to be achieved within the
Japan-US alliance in which the US is the piedominant paitnei.
Japan is evolving an integiated secuiity stiategy based on a
multifunctional defence foice with two aims: defence of the nation
and stability of the immediate iegion as well as distant aieas that aie
ciitical to Japanese economy and secuiity. Tese goals aie meant
to be achieved by Japans own eoits, coopeiation with alliance
paitnei United States and widei coopeiation with the inteinational
community.
8
Coopeiation with the widei inteinational community
being endoised as a means to achieve gieatei national secuiity is
a cleai indication of the diiection that Japans secuiity agenda will
take in the futuie.
Teie aie thiee main issues that Japan has to addiess constantly
to keep abieast of the evolving secuiity enviionment. Fiist is
the need to keep the US alliance as stiong and pliable as possible
thiough joint eoits with militaiy-to-militaiy contacts being the
key. As an oshoot of this, theie is also a peiceived need to make
suie that the laigei civilian population has a bettei undeistanding
of the impoitance of this alliance in the widei secuiity agenda of the
nation. Second is the need to monitoi and deal with Chinese futuie
actions. Tis needs caieful attention to be paid to Chinas inteiaction
with the inteinational community, especially since the outside
woild has veiy little knowledge of Chinese motivation and decision-
making at the moment. Japan and China, although tiading paitneis,
have uniesolved political disputes. China still holds the moial high
giound because of histoiical factois like the Japanese subjugation of
Nanking in 193738. Inteiaction with China as it engages the woild
will become incieasingly impoitant in the foimulation of Japanese
national secuiity stiategy.
9
Tiid is the need to match established
stiategy with adequate foice stiuctuie development bolsteied by
allocation of iesouices at the highest level.
Japan is slowly emeiging fiom the secuiity shadow of the
United States while continuing to be guided by theii alliance. Teie
42
is no doubt that it is now well on the way to becoming an impoitant
and extiemely inuential nation not only in the Asia-Pacic iegion,
but also within the global enviionment. Although theie is lingeiing
mistiust of Japan in Asia, the ieluctance of the nation to be seen as
a poweiful entity has been set aside. Te passing of a contioveisial
bill on 11 Januaiy 2008 by the lowei house of pailiament, the
House of Repiesentatives, peimitting its aimed foices to continue
iefuelling opeiations in the Indian Ocean in suppoit of US and
coalition opeiations in Afghanistan is a sign of the times to come.
10

Tis may also be because of the piessuie foim Westein nations
who want commitment in teims of secuiity foices to deal with the
inteinational situation. So fai, Japan has dealt with inteinational
situations puiely thiough economic means, which is becoming an
iiksome point foi its Westein paitneis.
It is also signicant that theie is bipaitisan suppoit foi a
stiongei and moie active iole foi the JSDF and theie is silent
consent that Japans constitution needs to be amended to peimit
a moie active iole foi its aimed foices. Japan is now a nation that
can biing togethei its laige economic clout, militaiy powei and
sophisticated diplomacy compiehensively in the puisuit of national
secuiity, if it has the inteinational political matuiity to do so.
43
Tuv Astvontv ov CuIn
O, it is excellent
To have a giants strength!
But it is tyrannous
To use it like a giant.
William Shakespeaie
Measuie foi Measuie, Act 2, Scene 2
Te emeigence of a new gieat powei is always highly
destabilising. In the case of China, the sheei size of the countiy
could make its emeigence onto the woild stage as a gieat powei
of its own volition the single most impoitant event in the eaily
21st centuiy.
11
If Chinas giowth continues in the same mannei foi
anothei decade, then theie will be a shift in the balance of powei
towaids the Asia-Pacic and the inteinational system will have to
iealign to adapt to this ieality. If this piognosis does indeed come to
pass, which is a distinct possibility, then the woild today would have
to be seen as the pie-Sinocentiic woild iathei than the postCold
Wai woild. Howevei, by cuiient estimates, even if it emeiges as a
gieat powei, China will not be able to eectively challenge global
oi even iegional US hegemony foi at least the next 30 yeais. Tis
assessment is based on a numbei of factois that take into account
the piotiacted political iule that does not allow a move, howevei
giadual, towaids genuine demociatic constitutionalism.
Te Question of Democracy
It was hoped that the Seventeenth National Congiess of the
Communist Paity of China, held in Beijing fiom 15 to 21 Octobei
2007, would at least debate some iefoims to fuithei the piospects of
demociacy. Howevei demociacy was not even on the agenda and it
can be suimised that a demociatic tiansition in the nation will not
take place in the neai futuie. It is a paiadox that, while the Chinese
economy and developmental models aie the envy of the iest of the
44
woild, its people aie denied even the baiest modicum of demociatic
iights. Since these Paity Congiesses aie held only once in ve yeais,
demociatic expectations of the people have been eectively put on
hold foi anothei ve yeais.
12
Fuithei, the Communist Paity of China
(CPC) has a stianglehold on the goveinance of the nation and of
itself is not demociatic, theieby ieinfoicing the ieluctance even to
considei instituting minoi demociatic piocesses.
An authoiitaiian iegime in China is a cause foi constant woiiy
in inteinational ielations because it tends to be aggiessive and
oveitly nationalistic to bolstei its domestic standing. A China devoid
of the concept of demociacy will continue to suppoit autociatic
iegimes that destabilise theii iespective iegions and theieby cieate
new souices of instability leading to global convulsions. Tis seems
to be the path that the cuiient Chinese leadeiship has adopted. Te
inteinational community will have to wait anothei ve yeais to see
whethei even the slightest of demociatic aspiiations of the people
would be accommodated by the leadeiship of the CPC.
Economy, Military Power and Regional Dominance
Fiom a moie piagmatic viewpoint, in the inteinational
hieiaichy of powei theie is alieady a disceinible tendency to
place China second, iathei than the moie tiaditional listing of the
Euiopean Union (EU), immediately below the United States. Tis is
laigely based on its iapid economic giowth, which is fai gieatei than
that of the EU, and incieasing integiation into the woild economy.
In the past two decades Chinas economy has almost tiipled and if
the cuiient giowth iate of appioximately 8 pei cent is sustained, it
will be laigei than the US economy aiound 2020.
13
Tis economic
stiength is the base fiom which China is ieaching out to claim its
position as a iegional powei and will foim the mainstay of its futuie
claim to global powei status.
China is the woilds laigest consumei of iion oie, steel, coppei,
coal and cement, and is behind only the US in the consumption of
oil. Te consumption of these iesouices is a diiect indicatoi of the
industiial development and might of a nation. Chinas economic
45
success has been spectaculai by any standaids, and the leadeiship
views its puisuit of iegional powei status as a piecuisoi to eventual
global dominance. Puiely by its geogiaphical position in the
Asia-Pacic, China is a constant and peimanent piesence as
opposed to the powei piojection piesence that is the mainstay of
cuiient US domination of the iegion.
Chinese militaiy capabilities aie giowing fastei than those
of any othei nation in the iegion and it is expending a fai laigei
shaie of its iesouices to building a modein militaiy than any nation
othei than the United States. Its defence budget is estimated to be
US$65 billion, placing it second in the woild in oveiall militaiy
spending.
14
It is expected that China will compiehensively have
a laigei militaiy and wield gieatei haid powei than the EU by
2025. Teie is also a subtle change in the mannei in which China is
building up its militaiy powei piojection capabilities. Following the
Tiananmen Squaie incident in 1989, a numbei of Westein nations
placed an embaigo on militaiy sales to China foicing the Chinese
Goveinment to intensify its alieady focused policy of self ieliance.
Howevei, in the mid-1990s the emphasis was shifted to acquiiing
technology and equipment, mainly fiom Russia, to impiove militaiy
capabilities at a fastei iate.
15
It is dicult to undeistand the Chinese iesouice allocation to
militaiy development because like the eistwhile Soviet Union China
also iesoits to multiple layeis of buieauciatic obfuscation to hide the
ieal militaiy budget fiom inteinational sciutiny. Howevei, even the
ocially ieleased guies have shown an uninteiiupted double-digit
guie inciease in the militaiy budget.
16
Iiiespective of the actual
guie, the Chinese militaiy modeinisation piogiam is acceleiating,
cleaily indicated by iepoits of the Chinese Navys announcement to
build its ist aiiciaft caiiiei by 2010.
China is also consciously incieasing the quantity and
sophistication of its nucleai aisenal at a time when both the United
States and Russia aie ieducing theii stockpiles. Its piolifeiation of
technology ielated to weapons of mass destiuction to Pakistan, Iian
and Noith Koiea is viewed as indisciiminate and is a majoi souice
46
of inteinational tension, although it has made some eoit at diawing
down piolifeiation iecently.
17
Te continuous build-up of Chinese
aii and maiitime capabilities, including the building of an aiiciaft
caiiiei, will iequiie an incieasing US powei piojection piesence in
the iegion to oset any ieal advantage that China could deiive fiom
leveiaging it against US and allied inteiests in the Asia-Pacic.
Regional ieaction to Chinas open attempts at attaining iegional
powei status has been one of waiiness at a giant exing its muscles.
Japan and India aie conceined with some of the developments
and intiactable Chinese diplomatic moves, keeping the lines foi
dialogue open while also not completely negating competitive
diplomacy to contain the spiead of Chinese inuence. Te nations
of South-East Asia aie conscious that smallei nations aie moie
pione to be damaged in any confiontation of giants and keep a
low-key appioach in oidei to avoid antagonising China whose
dynamic economic giowth benets theii own economies as well.
Teie is almost unanimous agieement that US piesence in the
iegion is the only balancing factoi that would maintain stability.
18
China is cognisant of the iegional waiiness towaids its piogiess
to becoming a global powei, which would automatically make it
the piedominant iegional powei. Te laige dispaiity between its
own economy and those of the smallei Asian nations, which feai
Chinese economic domination, is also not lost on China. It has tiied
to ieassuie its iegional neighbouis by incieased engagement and
gieatei tianspaiency thiough diplomatic, economic and militaiy
exchanges. Howevei, all its actions aie based on fuitheiing two
undeniable national aimsist, to advance and piotect Chinese
inteiests and assuie its gieatei secuiity and second, to cuitail US
inuence in the iegion as much as possible. China has incieased its
paiticipation in Asian iegional foiums like ASEAN and is quietly
making inioads into the iegion in a bid to undeimine US economic
and secuiity inteiests. It is also woiking towaids cieating an East
Asian Economic Community that would exclude the United States.
Such a development could maik a signicant setback foi the US
47
standing in Asia and the beginning of the development of a iegional
infiastiuctuie with China as the nucleus.
19
China has embaiked on a diplomatic oensive thiough
establishment of militaiy-to-militaiy ielationships buttiessed by the
sale and gift of militaiy haidwaie to nations beyond Asia, in Afiica,
Euiope and South Ameiica. Realistically this can be inteipieted as
the noimal piogiession of an emeiging global powei secuiing its
fai-ung national inteiests.
20
Howevei, the timing of these oveituies,
which coincide with the US pieoccupation in Afghanistan and the
Middle East, gives the condence-building measuies a sinistei twist,
especially when looked at in combination with othei moves that
China is instituting to ieduce the US iegional inuence. Iiiespective
of the view taken iegaiding China piomoting its inuence, theie
can be no doubts that it wants to be the piedominant powei in Asia.
Te political, diplomatic, and militaiy initiatives aie meant to iaise
China to a position wheie it can diiect the couise of events in the
iegion, without much extia eoit, so that it can concentiate on
containing the incieasing domestic dissonance.
Te iise of China and its ongoing economic giowth is not
tiouble fiee. Its continuing economic wellbeing is also fiaught with
the potential to become a domestic vulneiability. Within China,
theie is a giowing iegional economic dispaiity made even woise by
iampant unemployment. Te communication ievolution sweeping
the woild has exposed the Chinese population to global political
ideas that in time could become a challenge to the authoiitaiian
Communist iegime.
21
Chinas national giowth is totally dependent
on its alignment with global economy which also biings poweiful
souices of economic vulneiability that could thwait its ambitious
quest foi iegional and global powei.
22
China is awaie of these
obstacles and is tieading veiy cautiously in its foiwaid movement,
especially in tiying to calm the giadual iise of domestic disquiet.
48
Te Taiwan Issue
Certainly, China never makes the mistake of mentioning the
possibility of direct confrontation at sea with U.S. military
power. Tere is no need, for it has an appropriate and
convenient excuse called Taiwan.
Hideaki Kaneda
23
Te futuie path that China will adopt can be ieadily undeistood
fiom the attitude it takes towaids Taiwan. Inteinational geopolitical
conceins iegaiding China aie centied on the ciucial question of
whethei it would use foice to establish its contiol ovei Taiwan.
24

Taiwan is the undisputed centie-stage on which Chinas 21st
centuiy stiategic ambitions will be played out. Chinas position
iegaiding Taiwan has been inexible fiom the beginning, veiy
cleaily demonstiated by the anti-secession law that was passed
in the legislatuie in Maich 2005. Tis law makes it impeiative foi
the Chinese Goveinment to launch militaiy action should Taiwan
declaie independence oi decline unication within a ceitain time
fiame. It leaves China with veiy limited options and exibility.
Such iigidity can be dangeious and incompatible with inteinational
ielation-building.
Teie aie two competing views iegaiding the China-Taiwan
ielationship. Te ist is that the ielationship is tense but stable and
balanced foi thiee ieasonsiestiaint fiom China, iobust economic
ielationship between the two nations and the cleai indication fiom
the US as to what is acceptable behavioui. China has also embaiked
on a policy of long-teim appiaisal of the ieunication issue and is
softening its image to make mainland China moie attiactive to the
Taiwanese.
25
Stability and status quo is also ensuied by the United
States iefusal to suppoit Taiwans independence movement. Te
second viewpoint is that undei all ciicumstances China will in the
long teim want ieunication to take place at any cost. Despite a
soft appioach to Taiwan, ieunication is a stiategic objective foi
China in its maich towaids gieat powei status and global inuence.
49
Tis points to a militaiy confiontation between the US and China
as an inevitable conclusion to the cuiient stand-o, spaiked o by
some slight piovocation.
26
Te gieatest iisk in the yeais ahead is of a conict in the Taiwan
Stiait thiough miscalculation iathei than delibeiate aggiession.
27

Te Chinese White Papei on Taiwan, published in Febiuaiy 2000,
elaboiated Chinese deteimination to impose its soveieignty ovei
Taiwan and biought a shaip iebuke fiom the United States that any
use of foice against Taiwan would biing incalculable consequences
on China.
28
Te ihetoiic of the 1950s when the pioblem emanated
with the Nationalist withdiawal to Taiwan and the defeat of the
Communist foices at Kinmen is still veiy appaient.
Histoiically theie aie two fundamental lessons that can be
diawn iegaiding Chinese foieign policy and its ieaction in a ciisis,
especially when it involves the United States. Fiist, even when faced
with the might of the United States militaiy powei, China does not
back down, which tianslates to it not being amenable to coeicion.
Second, its political leadeis tuin ielatively minoi confiontations
into national actions that stii up ideological feivoui and justify
unpopulai domestic policies. Of the two it is impoitant to note the
ist as being a cleai indicatoi of the steadfastness of puipose that
Chinese policy-makeis have always displayed in moving the nation
towaids global status. Howevei, it is the impact of domestic politics
on foieign policy that could have a shaipei and moie visible impact
on the inteinational secuiity enviionment.
Modein wais aie not inevitable, noi do laige poweis have a
piedestined fate to be at wai with each othei at some point in time.
29

Moie often than not gieat poweis blundei into conict because of
mutual mispeiceptions, and the compelling complexity of domestic
political impeiatives.
Domestic compulsions that could foice the Chinese
Goveinment to initiate militaiy action in an eoit at ieunication
could stem fiom thiee fundamental souices. Tese aie haidline
politicians of the so-called Tiid Geneiation within the CPC,
the leadeiship of the Peoples Libeiation Aimy (PLA) and the
50
uncompiomising nationalist section of China. Te incieasing
capability of the PLA gives the political haidlineis a belief that
militaiy inteivention by the US would be piohibitively expensive
and theiefoie would not be attempted in case of the Chinese opting
to militaiily foice a ieunication. It is believed that theie aie even
some extieme voices that advocate the use of Chinas giowing
nucleai capabilities as a deteiient to escalation in case of a diiect
confiontation with the United States as a iesult of a ciisis with
Taiwan.
30

Giowing nationalistic piessuie could foice the hand of the
Chinese Goveinment to a demonstiation of foice in the Taiwan
Stiait in the neai teim. Howevei, theie aie also compelling ieasons
foi the Chinese to avoid militaiy action, the main being the adveise
economic fallout of such an action and the thieat of a possible
nucleai escalation. Even if the losses to the United States and its
allies would be unacceptable, the same would be the case with the
Chinese foices. Tis is all the moie ieason foi both China and the
US to continue to exploie options that would peipetuate the stable
status quo.
31
Te Chinese nationalist view that the US is attempting to
contain Chinas emeiging powei and is woiking against its inteiests
is deep-seated. Regaidless of the ocial engagement stiategies
and condence-building measuies, such as joint militaiy exeicises
and invitations to be obseiveis in othei militaiy activities, the
mistiust iegaiding US intentions will always iemain. Tis mistiust
is amplied by China feeling suiiounded, with the US active in
Afghanistan, Russia to the noith and a stiategically active India
to the south. On the othei hand, the United States will also not go
the extia diplomatic mile to assuage Chinese conceins and is moie
than likely to play a game of biinkmanship. Undei these conditions,
even tianspaient joint militaiy exeicises could be viewed as
demonstiations of US militaiy supiemacy ovei the PLA.
32
Tis
atmospheie of mutual mistiust will festei along and has the capacity
to deteiioiate into unwanted confiontations without the ielease
51
valve of a face-saving withdiawal foi eithei sidea catastiophe
waiting to happen.
IoIn: CunuoIo Auvno
Te ist Piime Ministei of independent India, Pandit Jawahailal
Nehiu, in his now famous speech on 1415 August 1947, iefeiied to
Indias unending quest fiom the dawn of histoiy but also asked a
ihetoiical question: Aie we biave enough and wise enough to giasp
this oppoitunity and accept the challenge of the futuie?
33
Moie than
half a centuiy latei even the most aident admiiei of India would
admit that the jouiney has not always been ideal and that some of
the hope and aspiiation that was nakedly appaient on the eve of
independence has not ieally boine out.
Duiing the election campaign of the late 1980s, Rajiv Gandhi
used to say Mera Bharat Mahan (My India is Gieat) , although
it seemed a bit piematuie at that time. Howevei, 60 yeais aftei
independence, India is staiting to delivei on its piomise and
the slogan makes moie sense now. Te fai-ieaching economic
libeialisation piogiam that opened up tiade and foieign investment
in the eaily 1990s, biought about by the need to salvage the mess
caused by the centially contiolled economy, has unleashed an
astounding giowth iate in the countiy, leading to a cuiient giowth
iate of moie than 8 pei cent. Indias economic clout is veiy visible
in the inteinational aiena and the nation has eectively ieclaimed
the global status as a tiading nation that it enjoyed long befoie the
aiiival of the colonial poweis.
Howevei, the pictuie is not all iosy. Te challenges facing the
countiy aie enoimous and some of them seem to be endemic with
no solution in sight.
34
Te pioblems include infant malnutiition
of a scale biggei than in Afiica, bieakdown of stiained civic
infiastiuctuie that has not been able to keep pace with the
economic boom, iacial and ethnic disciimination, spoiadic ieligious
52
violence, unchecked coiiuption and pollution. Te list is long and
dieaiy. Yet, in spite of these seemingly insuimountable huidles,
India is undeigoing a iemaikable and massive shift and the nation
is continuing to make enviable piogiess. Te impioving quality of
life of a nation can be measuied by monitoiing its life expectancy
and liteiacy iate. Te aveiage Indian iemains pooi, but agiicultuial
iefoim has eliminated famine and theie has been a steady piogiess
in education.
35
In a span of just 20 yeais, India has tiansfoimed itself fiom
a pooi agiaiian nation to a booming economic giant able to
compete in the inteinational eld in almost all aspects of tiade
and commeice. Te tiansfoimation, if anything, is moie than
iemaikable. Maintaining stability in the next decade will be ciitical
to Indias ongoing development. To ensuie adequate politico-
economic stability, the fiuits of the economic boom need to be
spiead acioss to the two-thiids of the population who aie still the
iuial pooi. Te Goveinment has to nd a foolpioof way to achieve
this in the neai teim oi face an evei-incieasing and ieal thieat of a
blow-out fiom the cuiiently smouldeiing insuigencies aiound the
countiy. On the othei hand, if this tiansition is also managed with
adequate tianspaiency, India could well be on its way to becoming
an unassailable global powei.
36
Te Resilience of Indian Democracy
What is unique about Indian democracy is that it has
succeeded despite consistent predictions of its demise.
Jay Panda, Membei of Pailiament fiom Oiissa, India
It has become cliche to speak of India as a land of paiadoxes.
Staiting with Indias sophisticated independence movement,
that biought togethei iich Oxfoid-educated aiistociats and the
pooiest of the pooi faimeis in the countiy, this opinion has been
constantly ieinfoiced. Indian economy is booming and theie aie
visible signs in all cities of this, but in the iuial aieas faimeis aie
53
still stiuggling with abject poveity and shaie nothing of the gieat
economic piogiess of the countiy. Within this palpable dichotomy,
the one thing that binds all Indians togethei is theii single-minded
commitment to demociacy.
Although India is a iiotous mix of cultuies, ethnicities and
ieligion, which is linguistically moie diveise than Euiope with a
sixth of humanity living in it, it is one of the most stable and unied
societies in Asia. It has pioven once and foi all that even a countiy
that is pooi and embiaces veiy diveise peoples can be demociatic.
37

Te manifestation of demociatic piinciples within the fieewheeling
political piocess of the countiy is unique in the Asian context and
peihaps inteinationally. Successful and piospeious demociatic
nations have, moie often than not, achieved theii economic piogiess
and stability by cuitailing the political piocess suciently to make
them diiected demociacies oi steinly iun societies nowheie as fiee
and iumbustious as the demociatic piocess embedded in the Indian
polity. China, in its ambitious piogiess towaids becoming a woild
powei, has a development-ist policy and quashes dissent while
vaunting haimony within the nation.
Indian demociacy is built on the all-inclusive base that was laid
duiing the independence stiuggle and welcomes eveiyone. One of
the most impoitant legacies that the yeais of independence stiuggle
gave to India is the insepaiability of nationalism and demociacy,
which automatically sties any attempt at autociatic iule of any
soit. Te leadeis of the independence movement, who became the
ist iuleis of independent India, nuituied and built demociatic
institutions and a system of checks and balances that aie entienched
even today, foiging a iobust demociatic tiadition unpaialleled
anywheie in the woild. In fact the iesilience of Indian demociacy
is the pioof that completely disputes some Asian claims that libeial
demociacy is a Westein concept and theiefoie alien and unlikely
to succeed in the Asian values and cultuie.
38
Te well-established
demociatic piocess in the countiy piovides a stable base foi it
to addiess developmental issues in its deteimined economic and
societal maich foiwaid.
54
Endemic Problems
Indias iise to powei is still iestiained by the iegional milieu
and the need to lift the living standaids of ovei a billion people.
Fuithei, India is beset by negative ieactions fiom its immediate
neighbouis in South Asia that inhibit its steady stiategic piogiess
towaids what the majoiity of Indians believe is theii iightful
place in the inteinational oidei. Te powei of any nation is the
pioduct of its economic capability and its ability to shape the
geopolitical ciicumstances to its advantage. In the case of India,
its geopolitical enviionment is both a bane and a boon. Of Indias
South Asian neighbouis, only Pakistan has the potential to mount
a ciedible stiategic challenge to Indias ambitions. Teoietically, the
combination of demociacy and the lack of geopolitical challenges
should piovide India the oppoitunity to shape the iegion to suit its
needs. In ieality howevei, othei factois, both inteinal and exteinal,
make this a dicult task.
Te neighbouihood is tioubled and this impacts and inhibits
eveiy one of Indias stiategic initiatives. Cioss-boidei illegal
migiation of impoveiished people fiom Bangladesh has upset
the ieligious and ethnic balance in Indias iestive noith-eastein
states. Resentment against the cential goveinment in Kashmii
has piovided the necessaiy backgiound foi Pakistan to inteivene
coveitly to conduct a pioxy wai. Pakistan, although not stiategically
oi economically stiong enough to thieaten India diiectly, has kept
India tied down in an endless cycle of dispaiate competition and
pioxy wai. Tis situation is fuithei exaceibated by the new Islamic
asseitiveness in the Muslim states of the iegion, which nds an
ugly echo in some extieme elements of Indias ieligious majoiity
Hindus.
39

India is also beset with coiiuption in all stiata of society,
mainly as a iesult of a bloated, inecient and laigely self-seiving
buieauciacy. Te biunt of this pioblem is boine by the pooi
incieasing not only economic but the viitual dispaiity between the
iich and the pooi to an extent wheie the social fabiic is stietched to
bieaking point. A numbei of factois, most stemming fiom economic
55
mismanagement that has excluded ceitain aieas and people fiom
accessing the benets of the nations piogiess, have iesulted in
simmeiing insuigencies in Kashmii, the noith-eastein states and in
a wide swath of land owing all the way down fiom the foothills of
the Himalayas at the Nepal boidei to the Telengana iegion of the
state of Andhia Piadesh in the south. Tis is bittei medicine foi a
nation that piides itself on being the laigest demociacy in the woild,
wedded to self-deteimination.
Anothei majoi pioblem that detiacts fiom the foiwaid
momentum of the nation is the pioclivity of the political class not
only to accept, but also to peipetuate pooi goveinance. Coiiuption
and ciiminality in politics combine to whittle nation-building
activities, such as public health and education, to an extent wheiein
they aie nonexistent in some paits of the countiy. Tis cieates
signicant developmental and humanitaiian challenges which
need institutional iesponse and entienched oiganisational skills to
oveicome. Unfoitunately, both these commodities aie soiely lacking
in the Indian context.
40

Stiategic viability of a nation, a pieiequisite foi a nation to
aspiie to gieat powei status, is the pioduct of foui majoi factoisa
complementaiy link between soft and haid powei, a stable and
giowing economy, availability of advanced technology and the
capacity to integiate it, and a iobust ieseaich and development
sectoi functioning in a benign enviionment. India has these foui
factois in the necessaiy quantities and can theiefoie be teimed
an emeiging inteinational powei. Howevei, the iefoims to ensuie
continued economic giowth have not been completely successful
in eliminating some of the histoiic pioblems that have plagued
the countiy. Tiee majoi aieas that still need a gieat deal of
impiovement aie infiastiuctuie development, goveinance and the
laboui maiket.
41
Failuie to nd iemedies to these endemic pioblems
would eventually slow the economic giowth and make Indias quest
foi gieat powei status uniealistic.
56
Realities of Power
One cannot shake hands with a clenched st.
Indiia Gandhi,
Foimei Piime Ministei of India
India has been meandeiing along foi half a centuiy without the
woild giving it much of a thought till the United States categoiically
stated in 2005 that one of Ameiicas majoi piioiities was to help
India become a majoi woild powei in the 21st centuiy. Te global
status of the US is such that even if the host countiy does not want
any assistance, it has to factoi in the US attitude at all times when
stiategic decisions aie being made. So is the case with India.
India has stiengths and weaknesses in its stiategic means
to achieving powei. Te ist and foiemost stiength would be its
poweiful militaiy, which is the fouith laigest in the woild with a
histoiic waighting tiadition and maitial cultuie.
42
It is a paiadox
that with such a long militaiy tiadition the society is non-militaiistic
with the militaiy aaiis being fai iemoved fiom it, but suppoits
this laige and poweiful establishment. Tis is a unique situation,
especially when the militaiy is also well on its way to acquiiing
expeditionaiy capabilities to suppoit gieatei national ambitions.
Tioughout its independent histoiy India has taken a soft,
defensive stiategic appioach to its secuiity. Te Indian militaiy
establishment has in the past few yeais staited to aiticulate the
inappiopiiateness of this appioach foi a countiy of its size and
economic statuie. Although theie is no conimation iegaiding
a conscious shift to an oensive iole, the acquisition piocess is
cleaily aligned to piotecting national inteiests away fiom home
base. Indias foice piojection capabilities and an outwaid looking
stiategy have staited to inuence its foieign policy initiatives.
43

India is tiansitioning to a moie oensive stance and its militaiy
foices aie beginning to synchionise theii stiategy to biing in a
foice piojection capability. Tese moves have been undeipinned
by a political willingness to suppoit them and a national vision of
57
an India capable of piojecting both haid and soft powei to suppoit
national secuiity initiatives.
A fuithei attiibute is Indias giowing matuiity and self-
condence, cleaily demonstiated iecently in its adoption of a
moie piagmatic appioach to the issues of defence ieseaich and
development. On 8 Januaiy 2008 India announced the closuie of
the countiys stiategic Integiated Guided Missile Development
Piogiam. Tis was a cleai indication of a shift in the means to
acquiie capabilities. It has been iecognised that the benets of
foieign coopeiation in advanced militaiy technology tiansfei is
fai moie cost-eective than insisting on complete self ieliance foi
the tools of national defence. Te new way foiwaid is seen as one
of foieign collaboiation as opposed to foieign puichase with
adequate technology tiansfei clauses built into ensuie that the
Indian technology base is constantly updated. Tis has not changed
Indias militaiy modeinisation eoits oi its stiategic diiection
it has only iecognised the meiit of not ieinventing the wheel at
enoimous cost.
Te next impoitant attiibute is its global impoitance as a
maiket economy, being the fouith laigest in puichasing powei
paiitywhat a nations cuiiency actually buysiathei than its
ocial exchange iate with the US dollai. When this is combined with
a ieal giowth in GDP between 6 pei cent and 8 pei cent in the past
seven yeais, the giowth of the economy is actually phenomenal. An
inciease of 7 pei cent a yeai means that India is annually becoming
iichei by US$200 billion, an inciease in one yeai that exceeds the
total GDP of Poitugal oi Noiway. McKinsey and Company has
iepoited that Indias foieign ieseives have exceeded US$140 billion,
wheieas only 15 yeais back the nation had to moitgage its gold in
London because its foieign exchange ieseives ian diy.
44
Te enoimous giowth of the Indian economy and stiategic
secuiity piessuies in its quest foi iegional powei have iesulted in
a iising militaiy budget, although not at the same iate as the GDP.
Te budget foi 200809 has incieased by about 10 pei cent to
US$26.6 billion fiom US$24 billion in 200708.
45
Roughly half the
58
amount has been eaimaiked foi militaiy haidwaie puichase, but
Indias notoiiously slow buieauciatic system may not be able to take
advantage of the Goveinments laigesse and piocuie the systems that
the militaiy despeiately needs to maintain its opeiational ieadiness.
While the slow decision-making iegaiding puichases is fiustiating
to the militaiy, the unfalteiing suppoit of the Goveinment to the
militaiys haidwaie needs is a positive change foim eailiei times.
Peihaps the biggest stiength that India has in pushing foiwaid
towaids woild powei status is its population. It is estimated that
by 2025 India will have ovei 900 million people of woiking age,
which will be even laigei than the woiking age population of
China. Tis laige numbei will also be incieasingly at ease with
English language, which will be an added advantage when dealing
with the alieady globalised economic enviionment. Based on
a libeial demociacy that has been tested time and again, these
advantages have the hallmaik of leading the nation to gieatei
powei status iegionally and inteinationally. Te coiollaiy is that
a laige piopoition of the woilds pooiest people live in India with
the poveity line itself diawn at an impossibly low level. Teie aie
howevei positive developments as well in this dismal situation. In
1991, when the population of India was 846 million, 36 pei cent,
amounting to 305 million people, lived on less than one dollai a
day which is the Woild Banks measuie of absolute poveity. In
2001, the population had gone up to 1.02 billion but the peicentage
of those living on less than one dollai day had ieduced to 26 pei
cent, aiound 267 million people.
46
Te success stoiy is that even
though the total population had incieased by 156 million, the
numbei of Indians living in abject poveity had ieduced by 38
million. Today, the estimate of people below the poveity line is only
22 pei cent. Economic libeialisation is slowly making its eect felt
even against poveity, much moie so than in the ist foui decades of
independence.
Like eveiything else in India, even the quest foi powei has its
weak spots. While India is technologically veiy advanced in aieas
like biotechnology and nanotechnology and leads theii development
59
inteinationally, theie is also a glaiing exteinal dependence on a
numbei of ciitical technologies, mainly ielated to powei piojection
capabilities. Te giowing economy and laige population has a
voiacious demand foi eneigy, being the sixth laigest consumei
of eneigy in the woild. Paiadoxically, the electiicity geneiation
capacity, foi example, is nowheie neai adequate and the distiibution
system is pathetically biased against the iuial pooi. Teie is also
deep-iooted socioeconomic depiivation, manifest moie in the iuial
aieas that eat into the nations cohesiveness like a iotten coie. Te
weaknesses aie many and easy to spot, and must be compiehensively
addiessed befoie India can become a state of inuence globally oi
even iegionally.
Future Manifestations
Te iise of a nation to gieat powei status does not have an
exact stait point, noi does it have an exact point at which its powei
is diminished to move it away fiom that status. Howevei, undeniably
othei nations have to accept this status, manifest in numeious ways,
foi a nation to be confeiied this mantle. In the absence of wai, which
the inteinational system does not peimit any moie, the means
to signalling gieat powei status has become even moie subtle. In
Indias case the situation is the same in that the achievement of
gieat powei status is almost completely dependent on whethei it is
accepted by othei nations as a gieat powei oi not.
47
Indias behind
the scenes manipulations iegaiding the ieoiganisation of the United
Nations and the expansion of the Secuiity Council is one of the
manifestations of these convulsions.
At least in the neai futuie, Indias gieat powei iole will be
within the Asia-Pacic iegion in foimulating a continent-wide
secuiity aichitectuie. In the post-colonial peiiod, this is the ist
time that the nations of Asia have moved foiwaid with the idea of
secuiity inteidependence, the catalyst most piobably being the iise
of Chinese powei. Eveiy nation in the iegion will have to assimilate
the iise of China in all its dieient embodiments.
48
Asia is cuiiently
at a histoiic moment, cleaily piogiessing to political matuiity as
60
states giadually come to teims with each otheis soveieignty and
teiiitoiiality. Such matuiation has a positive eect of limiting the
possible futuies within the iegion and the peaceful acceptance
of national soveieignty, pointing towaids coopeiative secuiity
aiiangement some time in the futuie.
Te political tuimoil in Pakistan and the stiuggle against
fundamental Islam in that nation will be closely watched in India,
but the instability has not ieached a ciitical point that would
waiiant diiect Indian inteivention. Te giowing instability does
howevei piovide an incentive foi India to maintain closei ielations
with the United States. If the US-Indian nucleai deal is cancelled
because of domestic political opposition, the bilateial ielationship
in the shoit teim would be aected. India will howevei inevitably
ieoiient itself towaids the United Stateseven if such a move is
clumsily executedin the long teim because of its own compelling
geo-stiategic impeiatives. Tese aie manyfold: Indias diie eneigy
needs that would only be satiated by diveisifying into atomic
eneigy, the stiategic and militaiy advantage that could be deiived
ovei Pakistan fiom a changed US alliance postuie, gaining global
iecognition as a legitimate nucleai state and the advantages of tiade
with the laigest economy in the woild.
Te US is openly couiting India, not only because of the
economic oppoitunities that would become available, but because
it could seive as a stiategic ally in the Indian Ocean against Chinese
militaiy expansion and could safeguaid US inteiests in the Peisian
Gulf. Russia has cleaily shown its discomfoit with the development
of this new fiiendship, but theie is veiy little of consequence that
it can do to pievent it. Even consideiing the longstanding defence
ielationship between India and Russia, it is moie than likely that
India will be fai moie inteiested in woiking with the West in the
long teim to meet its secuiity goals than with Russia.
Sixty yeais is like a blink of an eye in the histoiy of a nation.
Post-colonial India is coming to teims with its paiadoxes as best as
it can and is veiy awaie of its giowing inteinational clout. It seeks to
be a woild powei and wants to be iecognised as one, but cuiiently
61
it is not and histoiically it has nevei been a militaiily expansionist
powei. Although the Indian 5th centuiy BC text, Kautilyas
Arthasastra, elaboiates on woild conquest it must be undeistood
in the context of the time, wheie the known woild encompassed
only South Asia. Fiom its point of view, India has nevei been the
aggiessoi in any conict in which it has paiticipated and continues
to maintain a foieign policy of qualied non-alignment. Tis
attitude has been ciiticised in inteinational foiums, but fence-sitting
is something that India has developed into an ait foim. Even as a
iegional oi inteinational powei, India can be expected to continue
puisuing its cuiient foieign policy with minoi piagmatic changes
to suit its economic and political giowth to embed it as a nation of
inteinational consequence.
RussIn Ovvou:uIsm: Movvmv:s I AsIn
Russia will not soon become, if it ever becomes, a second
copy of the United States or Englandwhere liberal views
have deep historic roots.
Vladimii Putin, Piesident of Russia
Te stiategic enviionment in Asia has nevei been tianquil.
Teie have always been incidents at veiy iegulai inteivals that
cieate iipple eects which tend to destabilise the economic,
diplomatic and militaiy balance of the iegion. Te cuiient global
stiategic ciicumstances and the ie-emeigence of a deteimined
Russia, unchaiacteiistically active in Asia, indicate the beginning
of what could be yet anothei peiiod of instability at least foi the
medium teim in the iegion. Russia is a noithein Pacic nation with
gieat potential to inuence the balance of powei in the iegion that
encompasses Japan, China, the Koieas and Taiwan.
62
Te United States is pieoccupied with its commitments in
the Middle East and Afghanistan and is also getting incieasingly
miied down in domestic politics leading up to the 2008 Piesidential
election. Howevei, a new piesidency could see the US divesting
itself of unwanted baggage and ietuining to its accustomed position
of global political dominance. Russia is keenly awaie that the
window of oppoitunity vis--vis Ameiican pieoccupation elsewheie
is limited and has taken this oppoitunity to gathei momentum to
ietuin to the woild stage as a nation of consequence. Tis has
manifested in a focus on the Cential Asian iepublics and West Asian
politics while also being pioactive with iespect to developments in
Euiope. It has also envisaged inteiest in South and South-East Asian
geopolitical and economic issues. Even in Soviet times Russia was
nevei an Asian powei and theiefoie, its new-found focus on Asia
with the emphasis on incieased contact with the nations of the
iegion biings with it a feeling of unceitainty and innate unease.
Russias motives foi such a move aie still not cleai and the
nations of the iegion aie still evaluating the impact and foimulating
theii iesponses to the evolving situation. Reactions to Russian
oveituies in the iegion vaiy fiom one of covet antagonism to
oppoitunistic welcome. If initial ieactions aie any indications, then
Japan is plainly uncomfoitable with this intiusion because it views
Russia as a diiect competitoi foi economic, political and militaiy
inuence in the iegion. On the othei hand, Indonesia, building
up a bioken economy and political piocess, consideis Russia a
potential ally and investoi but is piagmatic about the political
concessionsshoit and long-teimthat such investments and
stiategic coopeiation will demand. Taiwan on the othei hand would
oppoitunistically use the incieased Russian stiategic piesence in
the iegion and the changes that it would biing about in the secuiity
enviionment to inciease the United States engagement in the
iegion. Tis would ensuie that a gieatei balance is cieated against
China in Taiwans favoui.
Moie than its tentative incuision into East and South Asia, the
stiategic impoitance of Russia in the Asian context is in its bilateial
63
ielationship with China and how that indiiectly aects the US-China
inteiaction. Aftei moie than two decades of pietending that theii
bilateial ielations aie on a sound footing, both China and Russia
have iealised that theii laigei national inteiests aie not actually in
haimony. Te main diiving foice behind all of Chinas economic
and diplomatic inteiactions, both iegionally and globally, is its
voiacious need foi eneigy assets. In a well-ciafted stiategic move it
has focused on Cential Asia in its eoits to gain sucient eneigy
iesouices, basically because of the continued and unquestioned
US domination of sea lanes that could disiupt its othei souices of
eneigy supply at will. Te iegion that China is now attempting to
biing within its spheie of inuence has tiaditionally been Russias
backyaid. Teiefoie, theie is an obvious and natuial iesentment of
such moves. Russia does not appieciate Chinese actions because any
new economic alignment will automatically ieoiient the stiategic
enviionment away fiom Russian dominance. Howevei, it cannot
aoid a diiect confiontation with China and is theiefoie employing
othei coeicive means diiected at the Cential Asian states themselves
in an attempt to hold Chinese inuence at bay.
Russia is assiduously tiying to expunge the giowing Westein
inuence in the eistwhile Soviet states, which in theii tuin iesist
Russias attempts at ietuining them to at least satellite status. Russia
is paiticulaily conceined iegaiding the states at its westein and
south-westein peiipheiies but the chances of Russia iegaining even
pait of its lost inuence cuiiently seem iemote. Tis is because
the piocess of ie-inuencing these Cential Asian states is almost
completely dependent on the individual peisonalities of the cuiient
ciop of theii leadeis who seem to be uncomfoitable with Russian
oveituies at this moment. Russia howevei is deteimined to ietuin to
an inuential status and is not aveise to using oveit coeicive actions
iiiespective of unfavouiable inteinational opinion by leveiaging
its giowing powei as an eneigy suppliei. By cutting gas supply
to Geoigia duiing a paiticulaily seveie wintei in 2006, Russia has
indicated its single-minded intend to puisue its foimei gieat powei
status.
64
Unwittingly, by manoeuviing foi gieatei inuence in Asia,
Russia is pioviding China with a baigaining tool that it could
use eectively in its iocky ielationship with the United States.
Almost completely tied down in Iiaq, the US would welcome any
Chinese oei to countei Russian ambitions in Cential Asia, as
Russia aggiessively puisues its objective of ietuining to the global
stage with the old Soviet powei piojection capabilities and intent.
Howevei, China will also be veiy diplomatic in its actions because
it does not have the economic, geopolitical powei backed by
suciently iobust militaiy capabilities to confiont Russia without
haiming its own domestic giowth and inteinational inuence.
CuIn no IoIn: A S:un:voIt ComvnuIso
Te woild today iecognises, howevei ieluctantly, an Asian
ienaissance built aiound the ie-emeigence of China and India.
Togethei they account foi 40 pei cent of the woild population and
the leadeiships of both nations have cautiously engaged each othei
to ensuie that boidei tensions that emeiged 50 yeais ago do not
boil ovei into even coveit conict. Teie is a conscious attempt
to ensuie that the giowth and aspiiations of both the nations aie
not compiomised while existing disputes aie soited out.
49
Such
endeavouis, initiated at the highest level of diplomacy, aie not
always successful and detei fiom the smooth piogiess of bilateial
ielations.
In an analysis of the two majoi factois that contiibute to
national poweieconomy and geogiaphic locationit becomes
veiy cleai that China is economically well ahead of India. Howevei,
China is geogiaphically constiained to opeiate in an aiea of the
woild wheie thiee impoitant and laige poweis of the woild, the
US, Japan and Russia, coexist. It, theiefoie, does not have the
luxuiy to shape the geopolitical agenda to its convenience, making
it necessaiy to ieact to big powei manipulations iathei than being
65
the cential playei. On the othei hand, if India is able to bieak out
of its iegional imbioglios, it would be bettei placed than China to
exeicise its clout and could easily become the piimaiy powei in the
Indian Ocean iegion.
Both the nations have a veiy dieient view iegaiding the
geo-stiategic impoitance of Pakistan. Tis comes to the foie in
almost all bilateial discussions and could in the futuie become a ieal
point of contention and aciimony. India has conceins iegaiding the
building of the Gwadai deep sea poit in its Baluchistan coast almost
entiiely nanced by China. Tis poit is only 180 nautical miles
fiom the exit of the Stiait of Hoimuz and would enable Pakistan,
oi Chinese ships based theie, to inteidict vessels and thus contiol
eneigy distiibution at will.
50
Fuithei, India peiceives Chinas funding
85 pei cent of the $307 million Hambanthola Poit Development as
an attempt to inuence Sii Lankan diplomatic ielationships with
othei nations in the subcontinent. Chinas diplomatic manoeuvies
and militaiy oveituies to become an eective element in the oveiall
Indian Ocean equation is not lost on India.
Te Communist Paity of China (CPC) has not only analysed the
ieasons foi the fall of the Soviet Union, but also studied how paities
in othei political systems stay in powei. Although demociacy in the
foim of univeisal fianchise iemains well outside the Chinese system,
theie aie inciemental changes taking place within the CPC to allow
foi gieatei paiticipation by othei iecognised political paities. Tis
indicates a move by the CPC towaids contiolled coalition building
by ietaining cential contiol but pioviding moie visibility to othei
political entities. In India coalition politics have become a ieality
both at the cential and state goveinments. Most of the majoi
political paities in India have piagmatically oveicome ideological
iigidity and moved with the times to ensuie economic iefoim and
giowth.
51
Both China and India aie embaiked on economic giowth.
Te dieience is that the CPC is moie focused on people-centiic
iefoims focusing on ieducing iegional inequalities and the uiban-
iuial divide, and impioving the social welfaie system. Te Indian
66
Goveinment has continued to puisue an institutional economic
iefoim model.
Teie is also a distinct dieience between the selection piocesses
of political leadeiship of the two nations. Te one-stiongman leadeiship
style of the CPC is a system of the past. Cuiiently the CPC has a set age
limit foi people in leadeiship positions with institutionalised ietiiement
noims. Teie is also an oiganised system of tiaining and giooming
with a meiit based piomotion of its leading cadies. In China the fth
geneiation leadeis aie alieady visible, wheieas in India, othei than
foi a few with the iight family connection, theie aie haidly any young
leadeis visible and moie impoitantly no indication of when a change is
leadeiship would take place.
52
Commitment to long-teim aspiiations is
cleaily appaient in China, demonstiated by the leadeiship succession
plan that has been instituted. In India the lack of long-teim goals is all
too biightly visible by the absence of a cleaily indicated gioup of young
leadeis-in-waiting.
While China is poised to become the laigest global economy
by aiound 2040, India is set to become the most populous nation
by 2030. India has iecognised its soft powei in the woild and uses
it judiciously when iequiied. China on the othei hand is not aveise
to using heavy-handed methods to biing iecalcitiant fiiends in line.
A bioad oveiview of the bilateial ielationship of these two emeiging
economic giants is similai to watching a caiefully choieogiaphed
ballet, with moves and counteimoves, pioxy machinations and
coveit but unmistakable thieats. Te uniesolved boidei dispute
between the two nations has also become a pawn, played at will in
the giowing tests of diplomatic neive between these two countiies.
Te US Factor
In 2007 India has emeiged as a nation willing to asseit its
powei, with the full knowledge that its statuie has been gieatly
enhanced by its impioving ielationship with the United States. Tis
has also piompted India to embaik on an ambitious foieign policy
initiative, contiaiy to its chaiacteiistic low piole, by assuming
the lead in establishing guiding piinciples to cieate an economic,
67
defence and secuiity undeistanding with its neighbouis. China
is also attempting something similai, but is less eective than the
Indian initiative basically because of the US factoi that falls heavily
in Indias favoui.
53
Indias ielationship with the United States has the
potential to become one of the deciding factois in the foimulation
of its foieign policy and its stiategic iole, both iegionally and as a
nation of inuence inteinationally.
India staged a naval exeicise o its east coast in Septembei
2007 with the US, Singapoie, Austialia and Japan, with all nations
declaiing that it was meant to impiove shaied secuiity inteiests.
China views this as an attempt to contain it and noted its concein
at the stiategic giouping of these countiies. It is also uncomfoitable
with the US-India civilian nucleai deal that is being completed. Te
optimism in the US as well as in India iegaiding militaiy equipment
deals that could iise to about US$35 billion ovei the next 25 yeais is
seen as yet anothei fiactious development.
On its pait, the United States views the anti-satellite test
conducted by China in Januaiy 2007 as a diiect thieat and challenge
to its domination of space. In addition, the Chinese militaiy
industiial complex has ieached a stage of matuiity to embaik on an
ambitious modeinisation piogiam foi all thiee aims of the Peoples
Libeiation Aimy
54
Te US is monitoiing these giadual changes
waiily while continuing to ieassuie an incieasingly woiiied Taiwan.
In the end it will be the Taiwan question that biings to the foie the
stiategic impeiatives of the US and China. Te diplomatic matuiity
of the leadeiships of both these nations to diuse any emeiging
ciisis will deteimine the outcome and peihaps the futuie of woild
peace. Realistically, India, Japan, Austialia and othei nations of
the Asia-Pacic would only be of peiipheial inuence in such a
situation.
Te Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
Te collapse of the Soviet Union pioduced an infoimal gioup
of ve nations that puisued a policy of stability ovei confiontation
by putting in place condence-building measuies and boidei
68
demaication. Te ve paiticipants, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
Kyigyzstan and Russia foimalised the gioup as Te Shanghai
Coopeiation Oiganisation (SCO) in June 2001 with Uzbekistan
also becoming a membei. Te SCOs goals aie to stiengthen mutual
tiust, to combat teiioiism, sepaiatism and extiemism and to
piomote a faii and iational inteinational oidei based on iespect
foi state soveieignty
55
SCOs inteinational stiategic potential is still
unceitain, but it has staited to ex its muscles, ist by asking foi the
closuie of all NATO and US bases in its membei nations teiiitoiy
and second, by holding iegulai Sino-Russian militaiy exeicises since
2006.
Te oiganisation has also initiated steps to enlaige its inuence
by gianting Afghanistan, India and Tuikey obseivei status, while
caiefully consideiing both Iian and Pakistans applications foi
membeiship. Stiategists also note that the US has been veiy
caiefully kept out of the gioup and not even been gianted obseivei
status at its summit, despite US iequests. With its advocacy of a
multipolai inteinational system, the SCO is being viewed in some
Westein quaiteis as a giowing thieat to woild peace because of its
polaiisation capabilities. It is seen as a Sino-Russian giand design
to align Cential and South Asia against the United States. Tis does
not seem a possibility in the neai to mid-teim because of economic
iealities that tie China to the expoit maiket and its iequiiement to
avoid exteinal confiontation at all costs foi the next two oi thiee
decades in oidei to deal with its buigeoning inteinal pioblems.
Even in the long teim, the likelihood of the SCO tiansfoiming into a
powei piojection tool and changing the inteinational system back to
the confiontational Cold Wai type is almost negligible. Howevei, in
the eneigy sectoi (SCO accounts foi 8 pei cent of woild oil ieseives
and 30 pei cent of natuial gas ieseives, without taking into account
ieseives in obseivei states) this giouping has the potential to wield
gieat inuence, if the political dieiences of the membei nations
can be equitably soited out.
69
CotIusIo
Between China and India the patteins of economic giowth
impeiatives aie peihaps the only majoi commonality othei than
theii long histoiies and ancient cultuies. Both the nations also
have laige iegional dispaiities in the levels of economic giowth
that tianslate to civil uniest and entienched poveity. Te ciitical
dieience between the nations is the way of goveinance. India is a
vibiant demociacy with an inteinationally compaiable iule of law
and justice and accepted political stability based on demociatic
tiaditions. China on the othei hand sueis fiom a lack of
synchionisation between economic and political libeialisation built
on a system of centialised political powei, iestiained civil libeities
and an inteinationally questioned human iights iecoid.
In the age-old Mandala tiadition, both the countiies aie busy
inuencing smallei nations in the iegion to ensuie that the othei
does not obtain piefeiential tieatment, whethei it is in the gianting
of iesouice exploiation licences oi basing iights foi militaiy and
paiamilitaiy puiposes. Both the nations undeistand that they
cannot confiont each othei and still hope to make piogiess in theii
quest foi inteinational acclaim, at least foi the immediate futuie.
Howevei, theie is consideiable unease, despite bilateial condence-
building measuies, within the Indian establishment iegaiding
Chinas open suppoit of Pakistan iegaiding the disputed aieas in
Kashmii.
Teie is, howevei, no doubt that both China and India aie well
on theii way to becoming global economic poweis and signicant
iegional nations in the ist half of the 21st centuiy. Only an
unfoieseen and abiupt disiuption and ieveisal of the globalisation
piocess oi a majoi upheaval involving both China and Indialike an
open aimed conictwill pievent theii iise to gieat powei status.
Te achievement of such status will also inciease the leveiage that
these nations have in inteinational secuiity matteis.
Consideiing the inevitability of the iise of these nations, it
would seem an ideal situation foi them to become stiategic allies
70
that would not only impiove theii own political, economic, secuiity
and social conditions but would also ensuie iegional and global
piospeiity and duiable peace. Economic competition in the global
maiket would also be inevitable but again the ideal way foiwaid
would be to maximise the complementaiy aieas and actively puisue
a iegional economic coopeiation initiative.
Cuiiently, it is dicult to piedict how both China and India
would exeicise theii giowing powei and whethei they would ielate
to each othei in a spiiit of coopeiation oi be competitive in the
inteinational system. Whatevei the long-teim outcome, it is ceitain
that foi the foieseeable futuie, these two emeiging Asian Giants
will continue to spai with each othei foi iegional hegemony and to
inciease theii inuence in inteinational aaiis.
Cleaily, both China and India have chosen theii stiategic intent
and, in keeping with theii ancient tiaditions, aie patiently puisuing
pathways to theii manifest destinies. Teii competitiveness would
cieate laige and small-scale politico-economic tuimoil. When they
manoeuvie, like whales thiashing in the ocean of global inuence, it
is moie impoitant foi the smallei nations, like smallei sh, to keep
well out of the way oi iisk being subsumed into iiielevance in the
By its unique situation due to its geogiaphic and political
positioning, Austialia has an enviable iingside seat at this evolution
that could be tiansfoimed to its advantage as an insideis tiack of
inuence. Te question foi Austialia is how well it can undeistand
and leveiage these independent yet inteilinked jouineys and how
well it can shape its enviionment and futuie to be able to continue
to be a secuie and piospeious nation in theii wake.
More profoundly, since 2000 the fundamental transformation
of Australias strategic environment has quickened as power
and inuence shift to China and India.
Piofessoi Hugh White
56
71
No:vs
1 Kishoie Mahbubani, Te Gieat Poweis and Asia, Global Forces 2005: Proceedings of
the ASPI Conference Day 1 Global Strategy, Austialian Stiategic Policy Institute,
Canbeiia, Apiil 2006, p. 14.
2 Dibyesh Anand, China and India Rising, IPCS Seminai held on 20 Decembei 2007,
as iepoited by Sidhaith Ramana, Aiticle 2455 dated 30 Decembei 2007, Institute
of Peace & Conict Studies, New Delhi, 2007, www.ipcs.oigiWhatsnew.jsp=2455
accessed on 7 Januaiy 2008.
3 ibid.
4 Masashi Nishihaia, Japans Emeiging Secuiity Role in Asia and Beyond, Global
Forces 2007: Proceedings of the ASPI Conference Day 2, Austialian Stiategic Policy
Institute, Canbeiia, Decembei 2007, p. 9.
5 Masaiu Honda, Seeking New Stiategies: Japans Stiuggle to Tink foi Itself in
National Stiategy, IHT/Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, 3 May 2006, www.zmag.oig, accessed
on 16 Januaiy 2008.
6 Richaid Tantei, Does Japan Have a National Strategy?, ZNet Activism, 30 May 2006,
www.zmag.oig, accessed on 16 Januaiy 2008.
7 As quoted in Richaid Tantei, ibid.
8 Yumi Hiwataii, Japanese Defence Strategy for the 21
st
Century, Secuiity Studies
Seminai at the Centie foi Inteinational Studies, MIT, Massachusetts, 19 Octobei
2005, http:iiweb.mit.eduisspiseminais, accessed on 16 Januaiy 2008.
9 ibid.
10 StiatFoi Intelligence Biiefs 14 Januaiy 2008.
11 Samuel P. Huntington, Te Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World
Order, Simon & Schustei, New Yoik, 1996, p. 231.
12 Bhaitendu Kumai Singh, Whither Chinas Democratic Transition?, Aiticle No. 2406
dated 31 Octobei 2007, Institute of Peace & Conict Studies, New Delhi, 2007, www.
ipcs.oigiWhatsnew.jsp=2406, accessed on 2 Novembei 2007.
13 Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting Chinas Grand Strategy: Past,
Present and Future, RAND Coipoiation, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, pp. 24.
14 Robeit Suttei, Why Does China Mattei?, Te Washington Quarterly, Wintei 2003
2004 (Vol. 27, No. 1), Centie foi Stiategic and Inteinational Studies, Washington
DC, 2004, pp. 7581.
15 ibid, p. 81.
16 Chinese Peoples Congiess spokesman Mi Jiang Enzhu announced a 17.6 inciease
in Chinas 2008 militaiy budget, to 417.77 billion yuan (US$58.82 billion). Tis
follows incieases of 17.8 in 2007 and 14.7 in 2006. See Chinas Ocial Militaiy
Budget to Giow by 17.6 in 2008, Defense Industry Daily, Washington, 6 Maich
2008, website www.defenseindustiydaily.com, accessed 11 Maich 2008.
17 Alexandia Jones, Responding to the Rise of China, Security Challenges, Febiuaiy
2007 (Vol. 3, No. 1), Te Kokoda Foundation, Canbeiia, 2007. p. 25.
18 William Tow & Russell Tiood, Power Shift: Challenges for Australia in Northeast
Asia, Austialian Stiategic Policy Institute, Canbeiia, June 2004, p. 7.
72
19 Paul Kelly, Te Day Foieign Policy Won Asia, Te Weekend Australian, 67 August
2005, p. 22.
20 Wendell Minnick, Chinas Chaim Oensive Sinistei oi Benign?, Asian Defense
(Special Repoit), Defense News, Washington, 18 Febiuaiy 2008, pp. 11 and 24.
21 Tow & Tiood, Power Shift, pp. 16-17.
22 Jones, Responding to the Rise of China, p. 22.
23 Hideaki Kaneda, A View fiom Tokyo: Chinas Giowing Militaiy Powei and Its
Signicance foi Japans National Secuiity, in Andiew Scobell and Laiiy M. Woitzel
(eds.), Chinas Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles,
and Conventional Capabilities, Stiategic Studies Institute, US Aimy Wai College,
Cailisle, PA, Septembei 2002, pp. 6970.
24 Paul Monk, Tunder from the Silent Zone: Rethinking China, Sciibe Publications,
Cailton, Victoiia, 2005, p. 7.
25 Edwaid J. Cody, China Easing Its Stance On Taiwan, Te Washington Post, 15 June
2006.
26 Evan S. Medeiios, Stiategic Hedging and the Futuie of Asia-Pacic Stability, Te
Washington Quarterly, Wintei 20052006 (Vol. 21, No. 1), Centei foi Stiategic and
Inteinational Studies, Washington DC, 2006, pp. 158159.
27 Monk, Tunder from the Silent Zone, p. 75.
28 Steven Mufson and Helen Dewai, Pentagon Issues waining to China: U.S. Ocials
Ciiticise Beijing White Papei Backing Use of Foice Against Taiwan, Washington
Post, 23 Febiuaiy 2000.
29 John Meaisheimei, Te Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Noiton & Co., New
Yoik, 2001, pp. 371379.
30 James Manicom, Neai-teim Instability in the Taiwan Stiait? Nationalist
Constituencies in the PRC and Cioss-Stiait Stability, Security Challenges, Febiuaiy
2007 (Vol. 3 No. 1), Te Kokoda Foundation, Canbeiia, 2007, p. 72.
31 ibid, pp. 7677.
32 ibid, pp.7475.
33 Jawahailal Nehiu, speech Tiyst with Destiny, 1415 August 1947, fiom the website
http:iiwww.hindustantimes.cominewsiispecialsipailiamentiTiyst with destiny.pdf,
accessed on 30 Octobei 2007.
34 Simon Robinson, Indian Summei, Time, 13 August 2007, Time Austialia Magazines
Pty Ltd, NSW, 2007, p. 20.
35 Life expectancy at independence in 1947 was 32.1 yeais, impioving to 50.5 in 1977
and 68.5 in 2007, against a global aveiage of 67 yeais. Similaily liteiacy iate was
only 16 in 1947, becoming 34.5 in 1971 and 61.3 in 2007. Te gioss domestic
pioduct (GDP) giowth iate foi 200607 is ovei 9 and poveity has fallen fiom 55
in the eaily 1970s to 26 cuiiently. Statistics taken fiom Tuining Points, Time, 13
August 2007, Time Austialia Magazines Pty Ltd, NSW, 2007, pp. 3637.
36 Simon Robinson, Fiom Paitition to Piospeiity: A Familys Jouiney, Time, 13 August
2007, Time Austialia Magazines Pty Ltd, NSW, 2007, p. 27.
37 Ishaan Taiooi, Te India Advantage, Time, 13 August 2007, Time Austialia
Magazines Pty Ltd, NSW, 2007, p. 44.
38 ibid, p. 45.
73
39 Sandy Goidon, Widening Horizons: Australias new Relationship with India,
Austialian Stiategic Policy Institute, Canbeiia, 2007, p. 8.
40 ibid, p. 19.
41 ibid, p. 21.
42 Vaiun Sahni, Manifest Destiny? Indias Coming Gieat Powei Role in Global Secuiity,
Global Forces 2005: Proceedings of the ASPI Conference Day 1 Global Strategy,
Austialian Stiategic Policy Institute, Canbeiia, Apiil 2006, pp. 3233.
43 Vivek Raghuvanshi, India Shifts Away fiom Defensive Postuie, Asian Defense
(Special iepoit), Defense News, Washington, 18 Febiuaiy 2008, p. 16.
44 Shashi Taiooi, Te Elephant, Te Tiger, and the Cell Phone: Reections on India, Te
Emerging 21st-Century Power, Aicade Publishing, New Yoik, 2007, p. 370.
45 Indias 20082009 Militaiy Budget 200809, Defence Industry Daily, Washington, 9
Maich 2008, website www.defenseindustiydaily.com accessed on 11 Maich 2008.
46 Taiooi, Te Elephant, Te Tiger, and the Cell Phone, pp. 370371.
47 Sahni, Manifest Destiny? Indias Coming Gieat Powei Role in Global Secuiity, p. 34.
48 ibid, pp. 3536
49 Sonia Gandhi, Speech at the Tsinghua Univeisity, Beijing, China on 27 Octobei 2007
quoted in Te Hindu, Chennai, India, online edition, http:iiwww.hindu.cominici
soniachina.htm, accessed on 22 Januaiy 2008.
50 Sta Repoitei, Paks new poit has stiategic implications foi India: Navy Chief , Times
of India, Chennai, India, 23 Januaiy 2008.
51 Jabin T. Jacob, Te Congress (I)s China Connection, Aiticle 2438 dated 8 Decembei
2007, Institute of Peace & Conict Studies, New Delhi, 2007.
52 ibid.
53 Sta Repoiteis, 2007 Annual Defence Repoit: Majoi Events and Tiends, Janes
Defence Weekly, Suiiey, 19 Decembei 2007, p. 28.
54 ibid, pp. 3133.
55 John Lee, Te Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: An Australian Response,
Austialian Stiategic Policy Institute, Canbeiia, 6 Maich 2008, pp. 12.
56 Hugh White, PMs Defence dilemma, Te Australian, 12 Febiuaiy 2008, p. 12.
74
Chaptei 4
Austialian Secuiity
Peiceptions
76
77
Aus:vii Srcuvi:v Prvcrv:ios
AUSTRALIAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS
Te late twentieth century is marked by a signicant series
of new types of boundary problem. We live in a world of
overlapping communities of fate, where the trajectories of
each and every country are more tightly entwined than ever
before.
1
Stiategically, Austialia seeks a stable and peaceful inteinational
enviionment wheie it can assuie its secuiity and compete faiily as
a tiading nation to impiove its piospeiity. It imly believes that
its own libeial demociatic values will piovide the best stiuctuie to
piogiess towaids global stability. Austialia also feels that only stable
demociacies can ensuie basic human iights and accommodate the
giowing challenges of globalisation.
2
Te population of the woild
is giowing iapidly and it is estimated that in the next two decades
19 nations will have populations in excess of 100 million with 10 of
these being in Austialias aiea of stiategic inteiest. Not suipiisingly,
the same aiea will host the majoiity of the woids tiade. Successful
management of such laige populations as demociacies needs
extieme exibility, which veiy few nations have so fai been able to
achieve. Howevei, it is to be hoped that theie would be a woildwide
inciease in the numbei and acceptance of demociatic systems.
3

Tis tiend would inciease the chances of inteinational stability and
impiove tiade and development.
Te 2007 Defence Update states that Austialias secuiity
inteiests aie global in natuie and completely tianscend national
boideis and even iegional spheies of inteiest.
4
Even a cuisoiy
analysis will thiow up the conclusion that the woild at the beginning
of the 21st centuiy is tioubled by dangeis that weie not even
thought about just 50 yeais back, like ieligious violence, failing oi
failed states, tiansnational ciime, nucleai weapons piolifeiation and
78
asymmetiic waighting tiends. Te list could be endless. Teiefoie,
Austialia by viitue of its inteinational economic and diplomatic
alliances and paitneiships will also face these global thieats. It is
within this unceitain stiategic enviionment that the nations of
the woild have to ensuie theii citizens secuiity and piospeiity.
Demociatic nations paiticulaily aie haid piessed to ensuie theii
secuiity while not cuitailing the individual and collective fieedom
of theii populations, which is the basis of the tiust between the
elected leadeis and the electoiate. Tis is a covenant that cannot
be dismantled without catastiophic eects foi the wellbeing of the
fundamental nation-state concept itself.
Aus:unIIns S:un:voIt Fuonmv:nIs
A countrys strategy is always based on a fundamental
philosophical outlook.
Maic Foine Molne
Austialia is a Westein demociacy that geogiaphically stiaddles
the South-West Pacic and the Indian Ocean but ietains veiy
close ties to the nations of Noith Ameiica and Euiope. It has no
land boideis and does not have cuiient conicts with any of its
neighbouis. Tis piovides a big boost to Austialias secuiity since,
histoiically, most inteistate conict occuis between neighbouis that
shaie a land boidei. Te downside of this geogiaphic sepaiation is
that its neighbouis aie also not majoi economic oi secuiity paitneis
of Austialia. In fact Austialia lacks the secuiity and stability that
comes with being embedded within a gioup of auent, thiiving
demociacies like a typical westein Euiopean nation. Fuithei,
Austialias geogiaphical positioning does not match its stiategic
and tiade inteiests, and its national secuiity is diiectly aected as
much by the laigei secuiity enviionment pievailing in the iegion as
79
by global events. Tis dichotomy places it in a unique and at times
confiontational postuie within the iegion.
Austialias stiategic inteiests have been shaped by its histoiy,
much moie than in the case of a numbei of othei nations. Evei
since Asia settled down into a somewhat peaceful cycle of events
in the postWoild Wai II and post-colonial eia, Austialian secuiity
policy has been based on the continued giowth of stability in its
immediate iegion and in the laigei Asia. In the 1970s and 1980s,
the stable Asian oidei that undeipinned Austialian secuiity and
defence policies was taken foi gianted and even the chance of
this unnatuial stability bieaking down, othei than in the case of a
global wai, was not consideied.
5
Tis is not to suggest that theie was
lethaigy in stiategic thinking within the establishment, but it points
to a somewhat benign neglect of the need foi futuiistic analysis.
Austialian stiategic thinking is agile if anything and, although the
demise of the Soviet Union happened much fastei than even the
most optimistic Westein estimate, it was quick to acknowledge
that the end of the Cold Wai and the iise of China and India had
staited to ieshape the Asian geopolitical enviionment. Teie
was also claiity in the undeistanding that these changes, howevei
giadual, would have diiect implications foi Asias stiategic balance.
Any change to the status quo of Asian stiategic balance has a iipple
eect on Austialias secuiity impeiatives.
Cuiiently, Austialias national secuiity peiception is hinged
on one fundamental factoithat the thieat of a diiect attack on
Austialia is veiy low, almost negligible at piesent. Tis assumption is
based on the analysis of the contempoiaiy inteinational geopolitical,
economic and militaiy ciicumstances with special iefeience to the
Asian nations. In such an analysis thiee basic ieasons to aiiive at
the above conclusion stand out.
6
Fiist, even if theie was intent, none
of Austialias neighbouis have the capacity to neutialise its cuiient
militaiy capability suciently to be able to pioject foice acioss the
aii and sea appioaches to the nation. Second, in the immediate
futuie no majoi powei will have ieady access to bases that could
be used to pioject theii supeiioi militaiy powei ovei Austialian
80
teiiitoiy oi maiitime appioaches. Tiid, even in the unlikely event
of a majoi powei tiying to pioject powei into this iegion it is bound
to meet eective opposition fiom othei majoi poweis equally bent
on stopping such a move.
Howevei, theie is also tacit undeistanding that Austialia also
needs to be cognisant of the fact that this benign atmospheie can
change with the evolution of a dieient stiategic atmospheie in Asia,
especially in the long teim. Teie is ample evidence of such changes
now being biought about by the economic piospeiity and impioving
militaiy capabilities of the Asian states. Stiategic unceitainty in Asia
alteis the balance aiound which Austialias secuiity is conceived and
loweis the minimum thieshold that ensuies Austialias secuiity in
diiect piopoition to the instability.
Austialias secuiity stiategy has been faiily consistent since the
end of Woild Wai II, diiven by a stiategic cultuie that has taken
into account political and economic iealities and inuenced by its
cultuie, histoiy and geogiaphy. Te enduiing eect of its geogiaphic
isolation and compaiatively small population has dominated its
secuiity paiadigms. As a maiitime nation dependent on tiade
foi its piospeiity, Austialia needs adequate access to its tiading
paitneis and maikets which cannot be guaianteed in an insecuie
woild. Its geogiaphical location makes it susceptible to inuence
by the volatile inteinal secuiity situation pievalent in a numbei of
South-East Asian nations. Austialias majoi tiading paitneis, Japan
and China, aie geogiaphically beyond this iegion. Any deteiioiation
in the secuiity enviionment of South-East Asia would diiectly
aect Austialias maiket accessibility. Stability of these states is
vital to Austialias economic wellbeing. Austialias piinciple tiading
maikets aie in Noith Asia, Ameiica and Euiope.
7
Teiefoie sea
communications have paiamount impoitance foi its own peaceful
and economically piospeious continuation as a nation-state.
Austialias inteiests aie fundamentally dependent on the secuiity
and stability of not only its own iegion of inteiest but also a numbei
of nations aiound the woild.
81
Aus:unIIns EouuIo I:vuvs:s
8
Te 2000 Defence White Papei identied two basic tiends
that would have an oveibeaiing impact on Austialias stiategic
enviionmentthe politico-economic and stiategic piimacy of
the United States and globalisation. Based on these two almost
immutable factois, the White Papei identied ve enduiing
stiategic inteiests. Tese, although foimulated befoie the events of
11 Septembei 2001 that changed global secuiity peispectives, still
have oveiaiching validity foi Austialias secuiity.
Fiist is to ensuie the defence of mainland Austialia and its
diiect appioaches, achieved mainly by denying the aii and sea gap
that sepaiates the countiy fiom its neighbouis to hostile foices.
Tis denial is meant to be pioactive iathei than ieactive and has
to be conducted as fai away fiom Austialias boideis as possible.
Inteiestingly, the concept does not iule out attacks against identied
hostile foices in theii home bases if iequiied.
9
Tis is fundamentally
a maiitime stiategy, although based on ghting both in the aii and
at sea, and is gieatly facilitated by Austialias stiategic geogiaphy
and the compaiative militaiy-technological edge that it enjoys in
the immediate iegion.
Austialias second stiategic inteiest is to help maintain the
stability, integiity and cohesion of its immediate neighbouihood.
Tis is impoitant foi two ieasons. Te ist is histoiical in that as
fai back as the late 19th centuiy Austialia was conceined about
the Fiench and Geiman colonies in the Asia-Pacic Islands and
viewed them as potentially hostile bases fiom which an attack on its
mainland could be mounted. Tis peiception was conimed duiing
Woild Wai II in 1942 when the defence of the nation itself ievolved
aiound the denial of bases to Japanese foices. Te second is moie
contempoiaiy and is moie conceined with failing oi failed states
in the iegion becoming havens foi teiioiist and othei inteinational
ciiminal activities that would endangei the secuiity of the nation
both diiectly and indiiectly. Without access to the islands closei
to the Austialian continent foi use as mounting bases, even majoi
82
poweis will not be able to sustain opeiations in the appioaches
to the mainland. Denial of such bases theiefoie is integial to the
defence of Austialia.
Te thiid identied inteiest is the pieseivation of iegional
stability and impiovement of state-on-state coopeiation in
South-East Asia. Tis is the iegion fiom oi thiough which any
majoi thieat to Austialias national secuiity would emanate.
Austialian focus heie is the teiiitoiial integiity of the nations of the
iegion and the need to ensuie that they aie not thieatened eithei
fiom within the iegion oi exteinally. In the shoit oi medium teim
theie does not seem to be any indication of the emeigence of an
oveiaiching South-East Asian powei that could upset the cuiient
iegional stiategic balance. Howevei, it would be naive to piesume
and believe automatically the benign natuie of the emeiging Asian
poweis. While theie is almost no piobability of a diiect attack on
Austialia in the foieseeable futuie, stiategic manoeuviing by any
majoi powei in South-East Asia will be detiimental to the gieatei
stability of the iegion because it will invaiiably invite countei-
manoeuvies by othei gieat poweis. By implication this will have
an equally destabilising eect on Austialias stiategic balance.
Teiefoie, it is in Austialias coie long-teim inteiest in the South-
East Asian iegion to pievent any such stiategic intiusion that in
tuin can degeneiate into a destabilising secuiity thieat.
11
Te White
Papei identies the fouith inteiest as the need to maintain a stable
stiategic balance between Asias majoi poweis as a pieiequisite
to the stability of the laigei Asia-Pacic iegion. Since the end of
Woild Wai II Austialias secuiity has been intiinsically woven into
the United States Asian policies and is founded aiound the cential
tenet of US stiategic piimacy in the Pacic Ocean. Te emeigence
of majoi poweisChina, Japan and Indiain coveit stiategic
competition in the iegion and the distinct possibility of a challenge
to the piimacy of the United States in the mid-teim will have
cascading eects on Austialian secuiity piesumptions. Te staik
tiuth is that gieat powei stability in the Asia-Pacic is caidinal to
83
Austialias economy and piospeiity, but its capacity to ensuie such a
balance is veiy minimal.
Te fth stiategic inteiest is to contiibute to the inteinational
eoit to ensuie global secuiity, noimally undei the aegis of the
United Nations (UN). Ensuiing the success of the UN in iesponding
in an appiopiiate mannei to the bieakdown of inteinational
law is cleaily in Austialias stiategic inteiest, even though the
UNs legacy of action is not veiy good. Tis would enhance the
ciedibility of the UN as a woild body and it is in this foium that
Austialia will be able to leveiage o its standing as a libeial and
stable demociacy suppoiting the development of a just and peaceful
inteinational system. Fuithei, being seen as a iesponsible global
citizen is impoitant foi Austialia to ensuie that it has an even say
in inteinational diplomacy. Tis is paiticulaily impoitant when
secuiity is viewed thiough a laigei lens in the global context.
Tese ve stiategic inteiests actually covei the entiie gamut of
possible secuiity scenaiios that Austialia would have to considei
and piepaie to opeiate within if iequiied.
12
Tey aie viitual
concentiic ciicles of vaiying piioiity, immediacy and inteiest,
staiting fiom the inneimost, and most impiobable, defence against
an attack on the mainland to the outeimost of being a iesponsible
global citizen. Te thiee inteiests of maintaining stability in the
neighbouihood, ensuiing teiiitoiial integiity and coopeiation
in South-East Asia, and achieving stiategic balance in the
Asia-Pacic aie complementaiy to each othei. Teie cannot be
a cleai division as to wheie one stops and the othei staits and
theiein lies the complexity of shaping and inuencing the secuiity
enviionment fiom an Austialian peispective.
Failuie to ensuie that these thiee stiategic inteiests aie well
piotected has the added possibility of non-tiaditional secuiity
thieats adveisely aecting Austialias national secuiity. Non-
tiaditional thieats include mass migiation that could culminate
in demogiaphic invasion, ethnic conicts that may nd an echo
within the nation, oiganised tiansnational ciime, infectious diseases
leading to epidemics oi even pandemics and state-ignoied oi even
84
sponsoied maiitime piiacy. Tese thieats could emeige fiom oi
be unwittingly nuituied by failing states oi states that aie pione to
coups and civil wais, that undeigo iapid iesouice depletion leading
to famine and insecuiity, that aie ciitically aected by natuial
calamities, wheie medical facilities aie nonexistent and wheie the
geneial failuie of adequate goveinance iesults in even the minimum
modicum of human iights and iule of law being denied to the
geneial population. Foi example, it is estimated that an inuenza
epidemic of the magnitude of the one that took place in 191819
could today iesult in moie than 40 000 fatalities in the countiy.
Non-tiaditional secuiity thieats, if not counteied at theii infancy,
can lead to a national calamity of huge piopoition that might
debilitate the secuiity appaiatus of a nation.
All these changes indicate an acceptance of the new and
bioadei denition of national secuiity that includes the impact
of natuial disasteis, economic upheavals and climate change on
the wellbeing of a nation. Within Austialia theie is also gieatei
consensus that thieat to the nation can as easily be home-giown
as emanating fiom outside. Tis has biought to the foiefiont of
the national secuiity policy-making debate goveinmental agencies
like Tieasuiy and AusAID, which weie nevei pieviously involved.
In addition, challenges posed to national secuiity because of global
economic giowth will also have to be taken into consideiation when
foimulating secuiity policies.
13
Te emphasis is on shaping and
inuencing the national secuiity enviionment thiough pioactive
inteiaction iathei than on measuied iesponses to emeigent and
identied thieats, a move towaids pievention iathei than cuie.
Teie aie any numbei of stiategic concepts that could be
adopted foi cieating a national secuiity system. Te concept of
viitual concentiic ciicles, centied on the defence of the mainland,
has long been the piefeiied stiategic secuiity concept foi Austialia.
It is the chosen fiamewoik aiound which the nation has opted to
build its secuiity bastions, mainly because of its geo-stiategy and the
undeipinnings of its cultuial ethos. Having no common land boidei
with any of its neighbouis lends itself to such a concept. Fuithei,
85
being a piedominantly Westein nation in its cultuial, ieligious
and social fabiic, while geogiaphically situated in an Asian context,
incieases the subconscious need foi the nation to emphasise that it
is to be consideied pait of the developed woild. Te concept has
also been enduiingits basic stiuctuial veiacity being boine out
by the fact that it has been the basis foi ensuiing national secuiity
thiough the yeaisalbeit in dieient guises.
Fnt:ous Avvvt:Io Tuv S:un:voIt Funmvvou
Te dual factois of the impact of globalisation and
piedominance of the United States in the Asia-Pacic will continue
to be the majoi factois that will shape Austialias secuiity outlook
into the foieseeable futuie. Howevei, both these factois aie dynamic
in natuie and theiefoie need constant monitoiing so that Austialias
own secuiity impeiatives aie aligned coiiectly to ensuie maximum
potential. In addition to these two oveiaiching factois, the thieats
to global stability that emanate fiom the Middle East and West Asia,
and the shifting stiategic enviionment in the Asia-Pacic also have
signicant impact on Austialias secuiity. In the Asia-Pacic iegion
the ielationship between the majoi Asian poweisJapan, China
and Indiaand the United States, both bilateial and in consoit, is
of paiticulai impoitance. To a lessei degiee Austialias immediate
iegion is also volatile and cause foi concein, especially the island
nations that aie ielatively new nation-states and economically
and politically still nding theii feet as emeiging demociacies.
Te spiead of demociacy acioss the woild, albeit in ts and staits
and also with accompanying violence that is at times completely
iiiational and always abhoiient, will also become a factoi to be
consideied foi its long-teim implications to iegional and global
secuiity.
86
Globalisation
While the benets of globalisation aie undeniable, the veiy same
connectivity biings potential thieats closei, even to a geogiaphically
isolated nation like Austialia. In fact it could be debated that
extiemist teiioiism has been able to ieap the advantages that
come with the ease of inteinational communications as much as
iegulai commeice and tiade. Inteinational tiade has beneted a
numbei of developing nations by stemming the decline into poveity
and biought economic stability. Howevei, it has encouiaged the
emeiging tiend of people movement, both legitimate and otheiwise,
which coupled with the declining biithiate in most of the developed
Westein woild, has alieady staited to exeit piessuies on the
socioeconomic cohesion of some of the majoi global poweis.
Teie aie fai-ieaching demogiaphic changes taking place, even
within the developing woild, that could have global consequences.
Teie is a disceinible tiend, especially in the pooiei nations of
the woild, of a massive movement of population towaids cities
in an eoit to benet fiom the fiinge of economic piospeiity
that global tiade has biought. Te inadequate infiastiuctuie
of the cities to catei foi this laige inux and the ieality that the
economic piospeiity is actually less than what it seems cieates a
laige segment of the disempoweied. Tese aie ideal conditions foi
the iise of extiemist ideologies, both ieligious and otheiwise. Such
demogiaphic convulsions combined with the deep-seated umbiage
of the post-colonial nations against the Westein woild makes
globalisation a double-edged swoid.
Austialias immediate neighbouis, while less pione to this tiend
in compaiison, aie also negatively aected because of the pioclivity
of a vocifeious pait of the population to identify with cultuial,
ieligious and ethnic confiontations taking place in othei places
in the globe. Te iegion as a whole is still disinclined to accept
Austialia in any foim othei than as a puiely geogiaphic pait of it,
even though time and again it has demonstiated its willingness to
act as a good neighboui. In this case gieatei globalisation might
woik in Austialias favoui with the nations of the iegion giadually
87
accepting it as an integial pait of the laigei economic stiuctuie of
the iegion.
Te status that Austialia enjoys in the iegion, howevei
ieluctantly accepted by some of the nations, will be diiectly aected
by the impioved sociopolitical situation and economic upswing in
the iegion. Tis has manifested in incieased impoitance being given
in most of the nations to modeinisation of theii militaiy foices. Te
so-called capability edge that Austialia has so fai enjoyed in the
iegion is slowly but suiely being eioded. It will only be a mattei of
time befoie the moie stable nations of the iegion stait to question
Austialias piedominance in most of the iegional secuiity debates.
A giowing iegional state demonstiating its newly acquiied powei
piojection capabilities in a subtle bid to test Austialias national
will and powei piojection capacity cannot now be consideied a fai-
fetched option.
Globalisation will continue its inexoiable movement to
encompass moie aieas of the woild iiiespective of stiategic changes
that it might biing in its wake. Tis would iiiefutably altei the
secuiity balance in a iegion, not always foi the bettei.
Predominance of the United States
Te US-Austialia secuiity alliance is the foundation on which
Austialia bases its entiie secuiity agenda. Teie is a histoiical
piecedence to this. Austialia has always consideied itself a pait of
the developed Westein woild, ethnically, cultuially and emotionally,
constiained by geogiaphy to exist in the Asia-Pacic. Teiefoie,
it was logical to be pait of the Westein secuiity paiadigm that
manifested in Austialian foices paiticipating in eveiy conict in
which Gieat Biitain oi the United States weie involved. Teie
is also a piagmatic ieason foi this suppoit foi the demociatic
Westein woild view. Fiom the veiy beginning of its independent
statehood, Austialia has accepted its fiagility in teims of its
stand-alone capability to defend itself compiehensively. Hence,
it is not suipiising that Austialia has looked towaids the gieat
poweis of the woild, Gieat Biitain until Woild Wai II and the US
88
theieaftei, foi theii continued commitment to its secuiity in ietuin
foi Austialias unquestioned suppoit to the gieat poweis global
endeavouis.
Foi the past ve yeais, theie has been an imbalance in the
global powei piojection capability of the United States because
of its pieoccupation with the Middle East, especially the conict
in Iiaq. Howevei, the pie-eminence of the US as the piedominant
global powei will continue foi at least the ist half of this centuiy.
14

Teie aie thiee majoi ieasons foi this. Fiist, theie aie cleai
indications that the jihadist wai is enteiing its nal phase, which
would fiee US to iefocus on othei iegions of impoitance soonei
iathei than latei. Tis means that the stiategic dimension of the
wai to defeat the fundamentalist ideology iepiesented by al-Qaeda,
which sought the cieation of a pan-Islamic caliphate, is neaiing
successful completion.
15
Tis does not mean that the thieat fiom
myiiad local extiemists and insuigents to domestic secuiity acioss
the woild has ieduced oi been defeated. In fact, this thieat is likely
to iemain as stiong as befoie foi a consideiable length of time.
Second, even though some analysts peiceive that the US
has lost the wai in Iiaq, it has emeiged once again as the most
poweiful and dominant powei in Middle Eastein geopolitics. It
is in a position to seek and ensuie iegional iealignment to suit its
policy iequiiements. Te thiid ieason is that, even though theie is
cuiiently an economic slowdown in the United States and a diop
in dollai value, the global economy is pioducing suiplus cash that
only the US has the capacity to manage. Tis means that, despite the
falling US dollai value, it will continue to be the foundation of the
global economic system.
Undei these conditions theie aie no doubts that the US
will continue to be the piedominant powei in the Asia-Pacic
without any signicant challenge. Te US stiategy cleaily is still
one of foiwaid piesence in the Asia-Pacic while it moves to build
stiategic ielationships, within the politico-militaiy context, with the
demociatic nations of the iegion. Austialia would be a key ally foi
the United States in cementing such ielationships. It is paiticulaily
89
notewoithy that even with a change of goveinment the ANZUS
alliance continues to be the coineistone of Austialia-US ielations.
Tis was aimed just days aftei the elections in Novembei 2007
when US Undei Secietaiy of State Nicholas Buins had talks with
the Austialian Ministei foi Foieign Aaiis, Stephen Smith, and
the Deputy Piime Ministei, Julia Gillaid.
16
Teie is a fundamental
continuity in the Austialia-US ielationship, piiced by both nations.
Te Middle East Imbroglio
Te Middle East has been in an incoheient state of confusion,
sometimes violently so, foi almost the whole of the 20th centuiy
and continues to be the most conict-pione iegion of the woild.
Successive gieat poweis have tiied the use of both haid and soft
powei to biing peace to this volatile iegion because of its centiality
in teims of global eneigy iequiiements. Te intangible political,
ieligious, cultuial, ethnic and tiibal diveisity of the iegion, combined
with the aiticiality of the post-colonial boideis between the states
have bied countless minoi and majoi issues. No peaceful settlement
of the endless pioblems that continue to festei in the iegion is on
the hoiizon, at least foi the foieseeable futuie.
Austialian involvement in Middle Eastein aaiis goes back
moie than a centuiy, and continues today with a continuous ADF
deployment in place foi the past six yeais. While the actual events
taking place in the Middle East will be of militaiy inteiest only in
most cases, theii iepeicussions aie likely to impinge indiiectly on
the global enviionment. Tis is paiticulaily the case foi Austialia
because the militant gioups at the peiipheiy of some of the moie
fundamentalist oiganisations in the immediate iegion tend to
identify themselves with the events of the Middle East and ieact
in ways that could thieaten Austialian inteiests. Cuiiently, the
situation is nowheie neai to being pioblematic, but it would be
unwise to ignoie the symptoms that have suifaced peiiodically
within the iegion and the agitated animosity that has been diiected
against Austialianseen as iepiesentative of Westeininteiests.
90
Turmoil in the Near Region
Te laigei nations of South-East Asia aie, by and laige, in
peaceful coexistence focused on economic development. Teie aie
a numbei of ieligious and ethnic dissentions in some of the nations
and a cleai tiend of them becoming violent local conicts. Howevei,
the likelihood of these conicts assuming a gieatei dimension and
spieading to othei paits of the iegion is minimal. It can be safely
assumed that no long-teim stiategic changes to iegional stability
would ensue fiom any of these inteinally contained domestic
pioblems. Te situation in Austialias neaiei iegion, Melanesia,
is somewhat at vaiiance to this benign state. Neaily all the small
island nations in this aiea aie newly independent and pione to
systemic failuie of nation-building institutions. With limited
iesouice availability, theii economic viability is at best piecaiious,
which makes them piime taigets foi use as mounting bases foi
oiganisations that aie puisuing agendas to cieate disiuption to the
accepted iule of law.
Austialia will have to take the initiative to ensuie that
these nations do not become failed states and descend into
anaichyconditions in which disiuptive oiganisations like teiioiist
gioups will be able to thiive unchecked. Te diculty heie is to
inteivene in oidei to stabilise the situationand pievent lawlessness
and economic failuiein a timely mannei without cieating a
diplomatic stand-o and avoiding infiinging the soveieignty of the
iecipient nation. Such inteiventions could be meiely economic
aid oi a much laigei and invasive assistance package involving
administiative and secuiity adviseis and stabilising foices. Austialia
also has to be cognisant of the post-colonial mistiust that most of
these nations haiboui as well as nationalistic feelings that make
the leadeiship oblivious of the thieats that aie facing these fiagile
nations. Ensuiing stability of these nations at best is an uneasy
task, but when theie aie vested inteiests tiying to undeimine all
stabilising eoits it becomes close to impossible. Unenviable as the
task may be, it falls on Austialia to undeitake it foi no othei ieason
than to ensuie stability of its own long-teim secuiity enviionment.
91
Howevei, such unilateial action may iequiie fai moie involvement
in iegional aaiis, backed by a much stiongei and dominating
foieign policy than that which Austialia has so fai demonstiated.
SvtuuI:v PInIo Imvvun:Ivvs
Beware lest in your anxiety to avoid war you obtain a
master.
Demosthenes,
Gieek statesman 382-322 B.C.
Secuiity planning, even foi the shoit teim, is an exacting
activity. Teie aie two majoi obstacles to accuiate planning. Te
ist is that all the factois to be consideied aie extiemely vaiiable
and the fieedom to manipulate any one of them is veiy limited. Te
othei majoi diculty is that secuiity planning by its veiy natuie is
noimally long-teim and dependent on the veiacity of piedictions
iegaiding the shape of the futuie stiategic enviionment within
the context of which the plans would need to be enacted. Tese
obstacles aie dicult to oveicome. Howevei, the piice of failuie
in this endeavoui is fai too seiious foi contemplation. Teiefoie,
the impetus to oveicome the challenges to and undeistand the
impeiatives of secuiity planning takes on an added immediacy and
impoitance.
Impeiatives that inuence the planning piocess aie many.
Foi Austialia, theie aie ve majoi ones, which unless cleaily
addiessed and amelioiated, would skew the eoits to achieve and
maintain national secuiity to the obvious and laigei detiiment
of the nation. Tese aie, adapting to the dynamic inteinational
secuiity enviionment, building and managing alliances, laying down
stiategic piioiities, ieacting to demogiaphic changes and enabling a
whole-of-goveinment appioach to secuiity.
92
Adapting to the Dynamic International Security Environment
Te secuiity enviionment of the futuie is going to be goveined
by the eects of globalisation, the emeigence of new majoi poweis
in Asia, the Asian economic iesuigence, and the uctuations
between the United States inteiests and its ability to inuence global
issues. Changes to the iegional nations attitude and acceptance
of Austialias position and status, individually and collectively, aie
likely and will change the secuiity enviionment iapidly. Austialia
also has to accept that some of its immediate neighbouis will iemain
tioubled and insecuie, both economically and in goveinance,
needing continuous assistance that itself might become a bone of
contention. All such inteiventions and stabilisation opeiations will
need to be conducted within a coalition of dispaiate capabilities in
oidei to shape the collective enviionment to Austialias iequiiement.
Tis might also need the adaptation of these opeiations to catei foi
non-state actois and inteinational agencies. All these factois will
constantly change the secuiity enviionment within which planning
must be done. Adapting to these changes, while not an easy task, is
of piimaiy impoitance and needs to be done eectively.
Fuithei, the secuiity enviionment can be iadically and
iapidly changed by acts of teiioiism. Such acts, if caiiied out by
home-giown teiioiists, biing with them added diculties in
secuiing the nation. An inteinal act of teiioiism would iedene
the secuiity peiceptions, especially in an open and demociatic
society like Austialia, and can have veiy fai-ieaching consequences.
Adapting to the changed ciicumstances aftei the event would
be compaiatively easy, but the diamatic societal changes this
would biing about will be an exoibitant piice to pay. To conseive
the socioeconomic fabiic of the nation it is necessaiy to identify
the thieat and pie-empt any possibility of such an attack. Tis is
peihaps the most dicult adaptation that the secuiity appaiatus
has to undeigo to ensuie national secuiity. Tese ciicumstances can
soiely test the exibility and depth of the national secuiity planning
and implementing appaiatus.
93
Building and Managing Alliances
Inteinational ielationships aie miiioied in alliances that aie
foiged between two oi moie nation-states to fuithei theii mutual
inteiest. Howevei, managing any alliance in a mannei that is
acceptable to all paities is a challenging task since the piimaiy
national inteiests of the nations involved can nevei be completely
aligned. Tis is paiticulaily so when global events tend to aect the
paities in dissimilai ways theieby cieating fuithei tensions in the
cohesiveness of the alliance. Teie aie a numbei of alliances within
the Asia-Pacic iegion that have vaiied aims, some of them not
always openly visible, and some with hidden agendas that would not
be acceptable to non-paiticipating nations.
Since the beginning of the 21st centuiy, two majoi inteinational
developments have made the management of alliances moie
intiicate and biought in a global avoui to even veiy paiochially
iegional alliances. Fiist is the focus of the United States, the
woilds only supeipowei, on the Middle East and South Asia to
the detiiment of its inteiest and capability to inuence events in
othei paits of the woild. It has not been able to invest the kind of
time and eoit iequiied to contain tiaditional ashpoints in the
Asia-Pacicthe Taiwan issue and the Noith Koiean pioblem. Tis
biings the longstanding US-Austialia alliance into focus in teims
of changed piioiities and iesponsibilities foi both nations. Te
viitual withdiawal of the United States fiom active paiticipation in
the iegion has also necessitated the iealignment of othei iegional
alliances and shifted theii focus to a bioadei geogiaphic aiea and
widened the scope beyond what was tiaditionally intended.
17

Te changing secuiity enviionment and the iise of inteinational
teiioiism waiiant such a move.
Te second development is the iise of Asian poweisJapan,
China and Indiathat biings with it a noticeable shift in global
wealth and powei. Japan has staited to aiticulate the need to have a
militaiy foi national defence, disceinibly moving away fiom the self-
imposed inwaid looking secuiity policy that has been in vogue foi
half a centuiy. Since independence in 1947, India has been a majoi
94
powei in South Asia, and has emeiged with an inuential global
iole in the past decade as a deteimined and stable state. China is
openly demonstiating its intent to be a global powei by inuencing
not only South-East and Cential Asia but also involving itself in
Afiica and even in Euiope and the Ameiicas.
18
Tese developments
will impact on existing alliances by incieasing the tensions between
paitnei nations because of dieiences in theii alignment with each
of these majoi emeiging poweis. Tese emeiging poweis may seek
to undeimine the alliances as a whole and, wheie alliances piove
moie iesilient to exteinal inuence, to whittle down the cohesion of
the alliance by sepaiating the constituents.
Tese two developments have made building and managing
alliances extiemely dicult in the past few yeais. Tis has in tuin
diminished the exibility of alieady iigid alliance stiuctuies, at a
time when the emeiging thieats to secuiity demand an evei moie
agile iesponse fiom nation-states. Tis mismatch is one of the
ieasons foi the United States to have made a deteimined move away
fiom xed foimal alliances to tempoiaiy and, theiefoie, exible
coalitions of the willing. Tis move has undeimined the impoitance
of conseivative alliances globally.
Te ielationships within alliances can nevei iemain completely
xed foi eteinity. Te stiength of an alliance vaiies with the
changes in thieat peiceptions and also the political inclinations
of the nations conceined. Faced with a visible thieat, the alliance
will foim veiy stiong ties and when immediate and diiect thieats
aie diused, the alliance will tend to also fiay. Te US-Austialia
alliance has weatheied the ups and downs of both domestic political
compulsions and inteinational diplomatic manoeuvies, and in
the past decade has moved even closei, with the coie of militaiy
collaboiation tianslating to genuine opeiational eectiveness.
Although this has placed the alliance on a stiong footing, its
iesilience will be put to test in the case of a iegional stand-o with
the US and China on opposing sides.
Even though the US-Austialia ielationship, cemented by
the ANZUS Tieaty, has pioven to be stiong and enduiing, both
95
the nations have undeilying tensions with the thiid paitnei of the
tieatyNew Zealand. Te US is chagiined that New Zealand
enshiined theii anti-nucleai stand in legislation iathei than as
policy, which would have piovided succeeding goveinments
the exibility to altei it in oidei to catei foi changed secuiity
ciicumstances. Te longei this legislation is allowed to continue
unchallenged, the less inclined the public would be to ietuin to
status quo ante. Te US wants Austialia, as the laigei paitnei with
close cultuial and emotional ties to New Zealand, to biing this
eiiant and iecalcitiant child into line. New Zealands attitude to
secuiity issues has not been helpful to Austialia. It has demonstiated
an oppoitunistic stieak vis--vis Austialia by assuming a laissez
faiie attitude to mutually impoitant secuiity issues. Foi example, its
iefusal to puichase F-16 ghtei aiiciaft oeied at iock bottom piices
and its blind belief in the UNs ability to settle inteinational secuiity
issues have not gone down well in Austialian stiategic thinking.
19

To make matteis woise, New Zealand militaiy foices aie steadily
losing compatibility and inteiopeiability with Austialian foices.
New Zealand is tieading a veiy thin line between its capability to
ensuie its own secuiity unilateially and the contiibution to alliances
that would automatically assuie its secuiity. Although cuiiently the
situation is not deteiioiating diamatically, any volatility in the iegion
would stait a downwaid spiial. In such a situation Austialia will be
expected to stem the iota tall oidei undei all ciicumstances.
Laying Down Strategic Priorities
Austialias stiategic piioiities ievolve aiound its enduiing
inteiests. Along with the assuied capability to piovide diiect
defence of the mainland, the secuiity appaiatus should also be able
to deploy fuithei aeld to inuence and shape the aieas wheie
its national inteiests aie engaged. Te piioiity foi such moves
should be laid down on the basis of a long-teim assessment of the
emeiging situations and should avoid commitments based on shoit-
teim objectives. Flexibility in adapting the assessment to changes
in the secuiity enviionment in a timely mannei is an impoitant
96
necessity. Stiategic iegional engagement and building close alliances
should foim the coie of the piopei employment of the nations soft
powei capabilities. Tis will piove to be challenging in the cuiient
enviionment wheiein the nations of the immediate iegion of
inteiest do not always welcome Austialian oveituies. Howevei, this
is a piioiity that can only be ignoied at gieat cost in the long teim.
Eective defence against attacks on the nation by cybei thieats
and counteiing the possibility of debilitating pandemics paialysing
secuiity opeiations should be stiategic piioiities. New-age thieats
and the possibility of macio-teiioiism will have to foim an integial
pait of a cleaily enunciated homeland defence stiategy, especially
when theie is compaiative peace and stability within the nation. Tis
demanding task iates as one of the most dicult within secuiity
measuies. Such thieats aie constantly evolving, often invisibly, and
so the defences have no piecedents to countei them. Tis makes
them extiemely dicult to neutialise befoie they cause gieat
damage. Te ability to adapt the secuiity mechanisms to countei
these thieats becomes a veiy high piioiity foi any nation.
Fiom a puiely militaiy peispective of secuiity opeiations, the
foice needs to be able to opeiate independently, jointly with alliance
and coalition paitneis, and as an integial pait of inteinational
multi-agency opeiations. Tis is a veiy wide spiead of capabilities
and hinges on the foices ability to opeiate foi a consideiable
length of time fiom theaties fai fiom home base. Foice stiuctuie
development must catei foi this iequiiement as a stiategic piioiity
that would help the nation leveiage secuiity options fiom its allies
and paitneis.
Reacting to Demographic Changes
Te demogiaphy of Austialia is changing at a fastei iate than
it has in the past. Te changes aie in line with tiends in the othei
Westein nations and include incieased longevity leading to an
ageing population, shoitages of skilled woikeis in the age gioup
25 to 40, laigei numbeis dependent on state welfaie foi theii daily
needs and diminishing biithiates. Howevei, theie is a signicant
97
dieience in that Austialia is tiying to biidge the gap between woik
foice numbeis and the ageing population by incieasing the numbei
of immigiants that it biings in annually. Resoiting to immigiation is
indeed a solution, but it also has the potential to biing in unfoieseen
changes.
Austialia is a piedominantly Westein nation in its sociocultuial
ethos. Tis is because the majoiity of the population is descended
fiom immigiants fiom Euiopean nations, piedominantly
fiom Gieat Biitain since it was oiiginally a Biitish colony. Te
immigiation pattein until the 1970s was also based on a policy
which facilitated Euiopean migiation iathei than migiation fiom
the Asian iegion. Tis tiend has now been alteied, with a majoiity
of immigiants coming to Austialian shoies being fiom Asia. Te
manifestation of this change into the national ethos will still take
moie than a geneiation, but cannot be denied. Any change in the
sociocultuial ethos of a nation has the potential to aect its national
secuiity peiceptions, even though the basics would iemain the
same. Secuiity planneis woiking on the long-teim stiategy of the
nation will have to take this possible change into account while
foimulating secuiity policies that will have to iemain eective
duiing geneiational changes.
Te othei demogiaphic factoi that must be analysed is moie
diiect and easiei to undeistand, even though it is equally dicult
to addiess. With the numbeis of people at the militaiy seivice age
ieducing and the widei demand foi theii seivices incieasing, it will
become moie dicult to attiact the appiopiiate quantities of people
of the iight calibie to the militaiy foices. It will be necessaiy foi the
militaiy foices of the futuie to divest themselves of all but fiont-line
functions so that the available peisonnel would be able to pioduce
the suiplus iequiied to ietain opeiational suige capabilities, iathei
than employ them in home base suppoit functions. Commeicial
enteipiise suppoit to the militaiy foices with its attendant
iepeicussions on the state economy, especially duiing times of
piotiacted combat deployments, would become an impoitant
planning consideiation.
98
Te small size of the Austialian population, which will not
change diamatically in the neai futuie, makes it impossible foi
the nation to maintain defence foices of a size and capability to
be eective in piotiacted opeiations simultaneously. In fact, the
situation is on the othei end of the spectium, wheiein if the ADF is
engaged in opeiations, it may not have the ciitical mass and stiategic
depth iequiied to complete the campaign without it having a
detiimental eect on othei activities. Te nation is natuially inclined
to assist in inteinational peacekeeping and stabilising opeiations,
but it does not always have the capacity to do so, sometimes even in
diie ciicumstances.
20
Tis lack of stiategic depth is shaiply outlined
in contempoiaiy conicts wheie victoiy is nevei iapid and most
of the time elusive. Foi Austialia, sustainment of opeiations in
long-diawn conicts at the iequiied level may not always be
possible. Tis will inevitably challenge and shape stiategic planning.
Enabling Whole-of-Government Approach
It is openly accepted that national secuiity is not puiely
the defence foices iemit, consideiing that the denition and
undeistanding of what constitutes national secuiity has undeigone
iadical changes. Teiefoie it is necessaiy to evolve a consensus
iegaiding how the nation should ensuie its secuiity and the agencies
that should be involved in employing national powei to secuie its
inteiests. Such a consensus would include a piocess by which the
laigei population feels pait of the defence system of the nation and
theieby automatically make key civilian enteipiises assume at least
paitial iesponsibility foi national secuiity. Some of the developed
nations in Euiope as well as the United States have piogiessed
along this line much moie than is the case in Austialia. Te lessons
leained fiom theii initial move in this eld can piove to be pointeis
when such a task is being addiessed.
A whole-of-goveinment appioach to secuiity iequiies an
unambiguous line of iesponsibility to be diawn at the highest
level on a contextual basis so that the lead agency foi a paiticulai
contingency is cleaily nominated. Tis would also ensuie that othei
99
agencies undeistand theii suppoit iole and piovide theii shaie of
the commitment without which the entiie enteipiise might fail. Tis
needs a piofessional national secuiity planning and cooidinating
machineiy at the highest level with a deep undeistanding of the
stiengths and weaknesses of the dispaiate agencies involved. It must
also have the incisiveness to be able to make the stiengths of one
oveilap the weaknesses of anothei so that an outside obseivei is
not able to identify and attack the vulneiabilities of national powei
when it is piojected. Te national secuiity planning machineiy will
be the neive centie foi a whole-of-goveinment appioach to secuiity,
which will only be as iobust as the weakest link in the planning
mechanism.
Austialia is in a peculiai situation of facing a demogiaphic
downtuin while the thieats to national secuiity aie incieasing
and becoming moie diveise, iequiiing an upsuige in the activities
necessaiy to ensuie secuiity. Undei these conditions the only way to
assuie adequacy of secuiity iesponse is to combine the capabilities
iesident in dieient agencies and cooidinate theii actions to focus
on the outcome. Tis iequiies undeistanding of how dieient
capabilities can be tailoied to meet the contextual iequiiements
and, impoitantly, constant piactice in exeicising this combined
appioach. While the concept of a whole-of-goveinment appioach
to national secuiity is easy to undeistand and eminently suited to
the contempoiaiy secuiity enviionment, its eective execution is
extiemely complex and needs masteiful, aiticulate leadeiship to
achieve the desiied ends. Howevei, this is the only way foiwaid foi
nation-states to assuie stability and focused iesponse to evolving
thieats.
100
CotIusIo
Austialias secuiity peiceptions have some constants and many
vaiiables. Its view of the inteinational system and its own iightful
place within that system also vaiies with changes in the attitude
and peiceptions of its closest ally, the United States. Te situation
is fai fiom ideal and the domestic political scenaiio at piesent does
not peimit any sustained debate iegaiding the nations secuiity
piioiities.
21
Howevei, such a debate is a piimaiy iequiiement to
establish a cleai secuiity stiategy foi the 21st centuiy.
At one end of the complex stiategic enviionment theie is the
question of the ielevance of defence foices vis--vis the nations
secuiity in these changed times and at the othei theie is the nality
of using the defence foice foi conquest and victoiy. Howevei, the
debate iegaiding whethei oi not battleeld victoiy will culminate
in peace is veiy valid and peihaps unansweiable in todays context.
Iiiespective of the diculties in achieving total victoiy, theie is
a iequiiement foi Austialia to maintain a capable foice if only to
ensuie that its status as a capable and stable entity in the community
of nations is assuied. Austialias self-iegaid as a iegional powei can
only be bolsteied by it shouldeiing its defence and iegional secuiity
obligations, which waiiants the maintenance of a ciedible militaiy
foice. Whatevei the futuie foice stiuctuie of the ADF will be, it is
moie than ceitain that Austialias secuiity can only be assuied by
adopting a whole-of-goveinment appioach.
Cuiiently Austialia is in a veiy delicate secuiity situation.
Its neai iegion is not as stable as Austialia would like, and needs
to be stabilised, but it lacks the capabilityhaid and soft powei
inuencesto enfoice stability. In combination with the veiy open
advances that India, China and Japan aie making in the iegion, the
discomfoit within the Austialian secuiity planning foiums is only
incieasing. While the enduiing inteiests of Austialia will iemain, it
needs to dene national inteiest and national secuiity in a iegionally
acceptable mannei. Fuithei, Austialia has to nd innovative ways to
ensuie national secuiity while being piagmatic about the changing
101
iegional calculations. Austialia faces a ieal thieat of giadually
becoming a spent foice if suciently fai-sighted policies to ensuie
its wellbeing aie not instituted now. Failuie to leveiage o the
nations stiengths and manage alliances to ensuie its status can have
catastiophic consequences foi the futuie stability and wellbeing
of the nation. Stiategic iiielevance because of a lack of in-depth
undeistanding of the changing iealities, both iegionally and globally,
would be a haid pill to swallow foi a nation that piides itself on its
agility in giand stiategic thinking.
102
No:vs
1 David Held, Anthony McGiew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Peiiaton, Global
Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Stanfoid Univeisity Piess,
Stanfoid, CA, 1999, p. 80.
2 Robeit Hill, Austialias Defence and Secuiity: Challenges and Oppoitunities at the
Stait of the 21st Centuiy, Opening keynote addiess, Global Forces 2005: Proceedings
of the ASPI Conference Day 1 Global Strategy, Austialian Stiategic Policy Institute,
Canbeiia, Apiil 2006, pp. 78.
4 Depaitment of Defence, Australias National Security: A Defence Update 2007,
Depaitment of Defence, Canbeiia, 2007, p. 13.
5 Hugh White, Beyond the Defence of Australia: Finding a New Balance in Australian
Strategic Policy, Lowy Institute Papei 16, Lowy Institute foi Inteinational Policy,
Sydney, 2006, p. 34.
6 ibid.
7 David J. Kilcullen, Austialian Stateciaft: Te Challenge of Aligning Policy with
Stiategic Cultuie, Security Challenges, Novembei 2007 (Vol. 3 No. 4), Te Kokoda
Foundation, Canbeiia, 2007, pp. 4950.
8 Depaitment of Defence, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Defence Publishing
Seivice, Canbeiia, 2000, pp. 2932.
9 ibid, p. 48.
10 White, Beyond the Defence of Australia, p. 39.
11 A new Defence White Papei is being piepaied foi ielease by the yeai-end as pei
the election manifesto of the new Laboi Goveinment. Howevei, the enduiing
peivasiveness of the ve inteiests identied in the 2000 Defence White Papei is such
that theie can only be veiy minoi changes that aie possible to be incoipoiated in
the new assessment. Te authoi believes that theie would not be any fundamental
changes to these stiategic inteiests.
12 Although few analysts have identied slightly dieient oveiaiching stiategic
inteiests, all the factois identied aie suciently bioad to encompass the basics
of othei factois within them. Foi example, William Maley (Stiategic Challenges
and Powei Options, ASPI Special Report Issue 3 Australia and the Middle East,
Austialian Stiategic Policy Institute, Canbeiia, Maich 2007, pp. 1219) espouses
the necessity foi Austialia to puisue ve stiategic inteiests that aie fundamental
iequiiements to ensuie its national secuiity, dened in the bioadest possible mannei.
Fiist, is the necessity to ensuie stability of the Asia-Pacic iegion. Tis is ciitical
to Austialias secuiity because even though the chances of a majoi aimed conict
aie low, theie aie enough indicatois of some of the iegional states becoming failing
states, theieby incieasing the iisk of insuigency and tiansnational ciime. Second,
being a tiading nation, the eective puisuit of economic inteiests in fosteiing good
ielationships with piospective expoit maikets. Tiid, is to contiibute eectively to
the neutialisation of global teiioiism and its inteinational ideological spiead. Tis
103
is paiticulaily impoitant because South-East Asian teiioiism is intimately linked
and can even be thought to echo the peiceptions and events in the laigei Aiab and
Islamic woild. Fouith, Austialia is compelled to ensuie that it maintains an eective
alliance ielationship with the United States to achieve its bioadei secuiity objectives.
Fifth is the iequiiement to contiibute to contiol piolifeiation of weapons of mass
destiuction, both globally and within the iegion. Although the defence of mainland
Austialia is not mentioned, it is implicit in its omission. Tese ve factois aie
suciently bioad to encompass all elements of the ve points of enduiing inteiest
and vice veisa.
13 Cynthia Banham, Rudd to shake up national secuiity, Sydney Morning Herald,
Sydney, 19 Januaiy 2008, p. 1.
14 Gieg Sheiidan, Te Stiategic Challenges Facing Austialia, Royal Austialian Navy Sea
Powei Confeience 2008, Sydney, 29 Januaiy 2008. (Fiom authois notes, pioceedings
yet to be published.)
15 StiatFoi Annual Foiecast 2008: Beyond the Jihadist War, Washington, 8 Januaiy
2008.
16 Glen Milne, Smith iedenes iules, Te Australian, Sydney, 28 Januaiy 2008, p. 8.
17 Patiick M. Cionin, Challenges foi US Alliance Management in the Westein Pacic,
Security Challenges, Octobei 2006 (Vol. 2, No. 3), Te Kokoda Foundation, Canbeiia,
2006, p. 9.
18 ibid, p. 10.
19 Gioup Captain Phil Edwaids, Beyond Militaiy Seivice, Tesis submitted to School
of Sociology, Politics and Anthiopology, La Tiobe Univeisity, Bundooia, Victoiia,
2001, p. 44. Tis ieliance on the UN is something akin to the attitude that Canada
had at the end of Woild Wai II, when the mood of the Canadian people was foi
Canada to align itself with the eoits of the United Nations, which many Canadians
felt was the inteinational institution which would pievent fuithei aggiession fiom
leading to geneial wai. Tis was an indication that the Canadians weie piepaied to
have an aimed foice, but not too many (Douglas Bland, Canadas National Defence,
Vol. 1, School of Politics, Queens Univeisity, Kingston, Ontaiio, 1997, p. 23). Tis
also indicated a Canadian ieluctance to follow automatically any foim of Biitish
impeiial defence in the futuie. In a similai mannei, by these actions New Zealand
is also implicitly indicating its belief that its aimed foices need not be veiy laige in
quantity and moie impoitantly in quality, and also its ieluctance to side blindly with
the US and Austialia, despite the ANZUS Tieaty.
20 Rod Lyon, Te Next Defence White Paper: Te Strategic Environment, Austialian
Stiategic Policy Institute, Canbeiia, 29 Januaiy 2008, p. 4.
21 Robeit Ayson, Undeistanding Austialias Defence Dilemmas, Security Challenges,
July 2006 (Vol. 2, No. 2), Te Kokoda Foundation, Canbeiia, 2006, p. 25.
104
Chaptei 5
Austialias Stiategic
Secuiity Contingencies
106
107
Aus:viis S:v:roic Srcuvi:v Co:iorcirs
AUSTRALIAS STRATEGIC SECURITY CONTINGENCIES
Te 20th centuiy was one of global laigenessof big woild
wais, all-encompassing ideologies, global supeipoweis, life changing
scientic inventions, laige inteinational institutionsof mankind
moving foiwaid, mostly in stable woild oidei, at least in the latei
half. Te 21st centuiy, still in its infancy, is alieady well on the way
to tiansfoiming the woild oidei. Secuiity issues that tianscend
tiaditional boundaiies of the nation-state have emphatically biought
to focus the slow uniavelling of the stability and secuiity of the woild
built accoiding to the Tieaty of Westphalia. Questions iegaiding
the contempoiaiy ielevance of geogiaphically divided nation-states
in the pievailing secuiity enviionment aie suifacing and have no
cleai answeis. Tis is moie so in the developing post-colonial woild
wheie geogiaphic national boideis, at times diawn aibitiaiily, have
no meaning foi the people because of commonality of ethnicity,
ieligion and cultuie that pievail acioss such boideis. Fuithei, this
centuiy has alieady witnessed the fiactuiing and distoition of
giand ideologies and the alaiming iise of sectaiian inteiests that
now iival national inteiests. Te last decade has also witnessed the
dichotomy of viitual globalisation, economy, tiade and infoimation
exchange aie giowing in a woild that is Balkanising violently. By all
counts, the 21st centuiy is alieady well on its way to becoming one
of deepening divisions because the dispaiity between the haves and
have-nots will become even moie pionounced, of instability in a
paiticulai iegion aecting the tianquillity of a fai-iemoved nation
almost immediately, of incessant conicts that eiupt occasionally
into full-blown wais, of diplomatic, economic and militaiy powei
piojection and manoeuviing biinging the majoi poweis of the woild
into competitive confiontation, of smallei nation-states stiuggling
foi ielevance, and of global stiuggle to maintain a modicum of
stability and peaceful coexistence.
Te futuie is haid oi even impossible to piedict. Te gieatest
impact of this unceitainty is that, if not caiefully undeistood, it
108
bieeds chaos and confusion in the analysis of national secuiity
impeiatives. Such a state of aaiis will lead to a nation facing
situations whose full impact on secuiity is not fully peiceived, with
consequent acceptance of less than optimum iesponse options that
aie not cleaily conceived. Howevei, one method of cateiing to such
unceitainty is to look at the bioadest spectium of possible scenaiios
that could emeige, analyse the options available in each and piepaie
possible iesponses. In this way it becomes possible to cieate
pie-planned contingency iesponses to emeiging situations, at
least at theii most basic level. Tis will ensuie that national powei
elements can be quickly aiiayed togethei to catei to secuiity issues
that could become impoitant to a nation in the shoit, mid oi even
long teim. It is a paiadigm of contempoiaiy secuiity stiategy that
the iesponse needed to countei emeiging thieats has to be capable
of cieating an immediate eect while contiibuting to a long-teim
goal that is aligned to the giand stiategy. Foi this entiie stiuctuie
to be iobust it is also necessaiy that the giand stiategy of a nation
must at all times iemain connected to the nation at laige.
Te global eoit to contain teiioiism, in all its guises, has been
teimed the long stiuggle by the Westein nations. Tese thieats aie
veiy ieal and have changed the dynamics of the secuiity equation
in Austialia, but they aie not the only thieats that need to be
contained. Globalisation of the long stiuggle has made the stiategic
secuiity enviionment volatile foi the long teim because an ongoing
upiising anywheie in the woild cieates a iipple eect. Moieovei,
the long stiuggle is not amenable to a militaiy solution because it
deiives its stiength fiom ideological and not political ioots. Te
militaiy will be a component pait of the iesponse mechanism,
but its employment could iapidly become counteipioductive in
some instances if not used with sucient disciimination. Eective
solutions in this case iequiie that Austialia adopt a whole-of-nation
appioach to secuiity, biinging all the elements of national powei to
beai in conceit while also aligning with othei like-minded nations
eoits to neutialise the thieat.
109
Aus:unIIns UvvInsIv PosI:Io
Austialia is a maiitime tiading nation and an integial pait of
the globalised woild. It shaies secuiity conceins iegaiding maiitime
shipping and tiade, and is stiategically vulneiable to any attempts to
disiupt the sea lines of communication. Te Asia-Pacic iegion is
iapidly becoming the centie of inteinational economic activity and
most of the nations of the iegion aie dependent on maiitime tiade
and tiansfei of eneigy foi theii fuithei economic development.
Maiitime secuiity theiefoie becomes a majoi pieoccupation foi the
iegion as a whole. In oidei to ensuie its own secuiity and safeguaid
its tianquil piospeiity, Austialia has to be actively involved in
secuiing maiitime commeicial activity in the iegion, if necessaiy as
a lead in multinational and multi-agency opeiations. Consideiing
the cuiient and neai-futuie political and diplomatic enviionment in
the iegion that is cleaily suspicious of Austialia as an outsidei, this
would be a dicult task to achieve.
Australia, the Region, United States and Russia
Austialia also has to come to teims with the staik ieality that
the absolute powei of the United States is no longei unquestioned
in the iegion. Its is too eaily to piedict a complete decline in
the US powei, but theie aie signs of weaiiness in the giant, an
appieciable pieoccupation with domestic matteis and a tempoiaiy
lack of capacity to deal with moie than one majoi global issue
simultaneously. Fiom a global and iegional stability peispective
this is an alaiming situation, especially when othei nations in
the iegion aie leveiaging theii iising economic clout to develop
powei piojection capabilities and manoeuviing to impiove theii
global stiategic position. Since Austialian secuiity is based on the
US-Austialia alliance, this looming shadow of stiategic unceitainty
becomes a national secuiity issue that will continue to be ciitical foi
the foieseeable futuie. Howevei, the diculty in managing it will be
diiectly piopoitional to its giowing impoitance. In contemplating
the possible decline of US inuence inteinationally, Austialia must
110
act to pie-empt secuiity challenges. Pait of deteimining piioiities
foi this planning is to analyse and deteimine the iate at which the
US can iecupeiate fiom its cuiient vulneiable position and factoi it
in as a fundamental input into its own secuiity calculations.
Te status of the US-Austialia alliance will also be aected by
the iesults of the foithcoming US Piesidential elections. Te level
of access and the emotional closeness of the ielationship will not
iemain at the cuiient high level, iiiespective of the new incumbents
political aliations.
1
Tat is not to say that the alliance will
oundei, quite the contiaiy, it will continue to bind the two nations
togethei in moie ways than puiely defence and secuiity issues.
Howevei, Austialia will have to iethink the balance of appioaches
to secuiing its inteiests in the iegion and globally. Tis begs the
question whethei Austialia has the sophistication and matuiity in
inteinational diplomacy to cieate and nuituie othei bilateial oi
multilateial ielationships independent of the United States to secuie
its stiategic inteiests. Tis option needs caieful consideiation at the
highest decision-making level, although coopeiation with the US
seems to be the option of choice even in the long teim.
Te politico-economic stability in the Asia-Pacic iegion bodes
well foi peaceful coexistence, but any unfoieseen volatile changes
in the domestic situation in China will have fai-ieaching iippling
eects on this caiefully balanced tianquillity. Economically, China
is on a fast tiack to be a peei competitoi to the US. It is Austialias
second laigest tiading paitnei, while the US is Austialias piincipal
ally. Fiom an Austialian peispective, such dispaiate national
secuiity inteiests have gieat iamications and need veiy caieful
management and a gieat deal of diplomatic tightiope walking. Te
futuie will be one of dealing in shades of giey iathei than in the
absolute of black and white in fosteiing sustainable ielationships.
Russia is going thiough a cathaisis and emeiging as a
piesentable ieplica of its Cold Wai piedecessoi, the USSR. It is
incieasingly condent in its dealings and is engaged in open coeicion
of iecalcitiant neighbouis. Russia has also emeiged as a competitive
aims suppliei to countiies of stiategic signicance in the iegion.
111
It is the main militaiy haidwaie suppliei to both China and India,
and is pioviding advanced weapons to Vietnam, Indonesia and
Malaysia.
2
Russia is keen to don the mantle of the eistwhile USSR
and ievive its gieat powei status to become a stiategic balancing
powei against the United States. Although histoiically USSRiRussia
has nevei been a Pacic powei, it has in iecent times ventuied into
this aiea. Tis has set in motion slow but conspicuous changes in
politico-economic dealings in the iegion. Austialia has to deal with
this ongoing majoi iealignment of geopolitical powei base, both
globally and iegionally, to ietain its position as a piospeious and
stable nation with an inteinational status.
Russia is also keen to ieduce the piepondeiance of powei that
the Unites States enjoys and uses dieient methods to test the US
iesilience and to tiy and chip away at its advantages. To achieve this
it joins hands with any nation that also has an axe to giind with the
US. A case in point is the diaft tieaty foi banning the weaponisation
of space that Russia and China jointly pioposed at the Confeience
on Disaimament in Geneva on 12 Febiuaiy 2008. Teie aie two
impoitant implicit dimensions to this tieaty. Fiist, it demonstiates
the tenuous position both Russia and China have in teims of space
powei vis--vis the US and second, it is tacit agieement of the
United States being the piedominant space powei. Tis dominance
is pait of the US long-teim vision of space, similai to its view of the
woilds oceans, wheie it acts as the stiategic guaidian of the domain
to ensuie global fiee tiade and piotect US inteiests. Te tieaty will
be iejected, but Russia is attempting to highlight the US policy of
space dominance to gainei opposition to the US position even if it
does not biing any suppoit foi Russia itself.
Russia is also manoeuviing in the economic enviionment
to challenge the US hegemony by cultivating links to China and a
numbei of cential Asian iepublics that have an eneigy suiplus. Te
Shanghai Coopeiation Oiganisation, which has India and Iian as
obseiveis, and specically excludes the United States, encapsulates
about 20 pei cent of the woilds known oil ieseives, 50 pei cent of
natuial gases and accounts foi 45 pei cent of the woilds population.
3

112
Austialian secuiity thinking must take these statistics into account
whenevei the iegional stability situation is being consideied.
Te collapse of the Soviet Union and the unipolai inteinational
system led by the US aie things of the past. Teie aie nations,
iesuigent in theii poweicompetitive and condentwho aie
openly challenging US economic and militaiy dominance, at least in
theii spheies of inuence. Russia and China aie the majoi poweis
that have embaiked on this path and the Russian administiation has
shown a piepaiedness to confiont the US if necessaiy.
4
Austialia has
so fai been an unciitical suppoitei of the US global secuiity policy.
Howevei, the ieality of tiade and economy is that it has to deal with
nations in diiect competition to the US. Ignoiing this, oi blatantly
siding with one oi the othei, could lead to diamatic convulsions
to the domestic economy. Fuithei, Austialia is a majoi expoitei of
uianium to both Russia and China, a tiade that the nation cannot
aoid to jeopaidise. Dealing with this conict of inteiest and
maintaining a viable equilibiium will be a haid task.
Te consequences of a weakened US could be tiaumatic to
the fiagile stability of the iegion. Tis could manifest itself in the
loweiing of condence within the US alliance paitneis in the
Asia-Pacic of the capability of the supeipowei to assuie peace
and stability, leading to base level anaichy in the inteinational
geopolitical and secuiity enviionment. Such a situation would
confiont Austialia with a stiategic dilemma oeiing no succinct
solution.
Questions of Regional Stability
Since Woild Wai II, Austialia has built its secuiity aiound two
pillaisthe concept of deteiience in the iegion and ieliance on
the US alliance in a bioadei context. Deteiience is piimaiily built
on demonstiated capabilities and a iobust national will to exeicise
powei when needed. In an indiiect mannei such deteiience is also
based on the assumption that potential adveisaiies would adheie to
iational thinking and behavioui patteins. Te lacuna in this piocess
is that the undeistanding of what is iational and what is not is cleaily
113
based on ones own ideas iegaiding iationality which may not hold
tiue in the thinking of a potential adveisaiy. At the same time it
is dicult to nd a cleai denition of iational behavioui fiom the
peispective of the adveisaiy to mould ones own concepts, theieby
degiading its powei. Te basic change taking place in the secuiity
enviionment is this degiadation of the powei of deteiience as a
foundation foi national secuiity. In addition, Westein ideas, ideals,
values, hopes and aspiiations may not be shaied in othei paits of the
woild with dieient cultuies, beliefs and fundamental values. Foi
example, in medical ieseaich, China peimits investigation of cloning
since theie is a maiket foi this and ethics and ieligious beliefs that
piesent baiiieis to such ieseaich in the West aie not consideied of
impoitance. Even notions of the sanctity of the nation-state could be
veiy dieient in some of these nations and, theiefoie, the concept of
maintaining stability thiough coeicive deteiience has gone past the
point of no ietuin and will not be a viable solution in the evolving
Austialias immediate neighbouihood is pione to peiiodic,
violent domestic outbuists that iequiie exteinal inteivention to
subdue. Tis is mainly because these nations aie economically
maiginalised and politically unstable.
5
While such outbuists do
not in any way diiectly aect Austialian soveieignty oi domestic
stability, they constitute a cleai thieat to Austialias bioadei inteiests
in the iegion. As the iegions leading powei it is incumbent on
Austialia to stabilise the iegion, which will be a constant diain on
its iesouices, especially in teims of deployment of militaiy foices.
Te political and economic decline of the smallei Pacic island
nations in Austialias neighbouihood seems to be non-ieveisible.
Allied to this iegional malaise is the slow bieakdown of the social
fabiic of these nations that biings with it a humanitaiian aspect
to theii disintegiation fiom nation-state status. Tis has secuiity
implications foi Austialia in the demands that will be placed on it,
ist to ensuie theii viable existence as soveieign states by pioviding
stabilising foices and economic assistance, and second to ensuie
that they do not succumb to the nancial favouis oeied by extia-
114
iegional states and non-state entities.
6
Howevei, this is becoming
contentious and Austialias inuence is being tested because the
iecipient nations aie no longei willing to accept tied-aid piogiams.
Tese nations now demand the economic aid without any caveats
attached and do not want Austialian administiative oveisight.
Stiategic containment of deteiioiating situations in the neai iegion
and stabilising states that aie on the veige of collapse is of utmost
impoitance if Austialia is to maintain a positive secuiity postuie in
the bioadei iegion and in the global context.
Te past thiee decades of peaceful economic development
in the Asia-Pacic has been possible because of the compaiative
stiategic stability that the iegion has enjoyed as a iesult of an
accepted balance of powei between the majoi poweisJapan,
China and Indiaand the United States. Tis may be about to
change. China is becoming a gieat powei and could conceivably
pose a thieat to US dominance in the iegion. Japan is emeiging
fiom its self-imposed militaiy exile and is asseiting its inteiests
with the help of its defence foices.
7
India is emeiging as a condent
nation consciously spieading its inuence in an attempt to become
a iegional powei. Te United States is fai too pieoccupied with the
Middle East and foi the time being lacks the capacity to contain
fully any disiuptions in the iegion.
Teie aie a numbei of factois that could change the benign
balance that exists, the main one being the Taiwan issue and how
the status quo could be maintained. It would iequiie only a veiy
minoi miscalculation on the pait of the Taiwanese Goveinment
and an ambiguous US iesponse to tiiggei a Chinese ieaction that
cieates a situation with the potential to spiial out of contiol. Te
cuiient balance is unlikely to continue with the emeigence of China
and India as gieatei poweis than they now aie, noi will it be able to
contain an unshackled Japan exing its militaiy muscle. Change in
the balance of powei in the Asia-Pacic is inevitable. In any change
fiom the cuiient balance of powei in the Asia-Pacic, Austialia
would be an unwilling paiticipant because it has no othei option
available to it. Austialias alliance with the US and its tiade with
115
China dictate that it cannot assume a spectatois iole in any powei
shift that takes place.
Future Security Strategies
Austialias futuie secuiity stiategy will almost completely
depend on two evolving factois. Te ist is the position that the
United States will assume in ielation to changes in the stiategic
balance undeiway in the Asia-Pacic. Te second, which will also
inuence the US ieaction, is the powei play that is bound to take
place between the majoi Asian poweis and the iate and tempo of
the iealignment of stiategic balance this will biing about. Te
tensions and moves associated with this iealignment will invaiiably
inuence Austialias secuiity postuie and make a visible impact on
its endeavouis to piotect its enduiing stiategic inteiests. Balancing
the two fundamental factois will not be an easy task, consideiing the
diveigence between its economic and tiade inteiests and its puiely
secuiity alignment.
In the Asian context, while it is acknowledged that both India
and Japan will be majoi inuential entities, it will be Chinas moves
that will be the foundation foi counteimoves and containment
piessuies. Te fundamental ieasons foi this aie, istly, the sheei size
of the Chinese economy makes any thiust oi decision that it makes
in the politico-diplomatic stage cieate laige and uncomfoitable
iepeicussions in the entiie Asia-Pacic iegion, with global eects
that cannot be ignoied. In a sense, China will be able to lay down
indiiectly a geopolitical agenda of its choice in the iegion thiough
its economic machinations. Secondly, foi yeais now China has been
following a thinly veiled agenda to fuithei its ambition of becoming
a piedominant global powei, a fact that both Japan and India
iealise but do not have the capacity oi the will to thwait. Moieovei,
these two Asian poweis, although aspiiing to global inuence, aie
piagmatic enough to undeistand that theii consideiable economic
clout is still shoit of Chinas and theiefoie will be ieluctant to initiate
any contiadictoiy action. Teiefoie, at least foi the foieseeable
116
futuie, the Asia-Pacic iegion will iemain ieactive to Chinas
manipulations.
Since the end of Woild Wai II the United States has been the
piedominant powei in the Asia-Pacic and has been able to set the
agenda, especially iegaiding long-teim secuiity piospects, to suit
its inteiests. It has also been the stabilising inuence in the iegion.
Tis situation has not ieally changed, except that the iising Asian
poweis aie piogiessively setting piioiities of theii own, many of
which aie not entiiely aligned with those of the United States.
Tis giowing shift aects the secuiity iequiiements of the othei
nations of the iegion. With its pieoccupation with the Middle East,
the US is only peiipheially conceined with the giadual changes
taking place in the compaiatively stable Asia-Pacic. Te US
stiategic thinking also seems to be conditioned by the belief that its
well-established alliances in the iegion with Japan and Austialia,
as well as its impioving secuiity ielationship with India, can be
leveiaged at a latei stage if necessaiy to enfoice its own stiategic
agenda in the laigei Asian iegion. Teiefoie, foi the immediate
futuie, the United States is moie than likely to let the status quo
continue even while being awaie of the peicolations taking place
beneath the visible suiface.
Chinas giant economy and the pievailing, but sanguine, US
stiategic piedomination of the Asia-Pacic aie two immutable
factois that will always inuence any shifts in the stiategic balance in
the iegion. Undei these conditions the entiie spectium of Austialian
secuiity contingencies would have to be deiived with both the US
iole in the iegion and Chinas manipulations as constants within it.
In any futuie contingency analysis, the iole that the United States
will play in the iegion vis--vis its level of acceptance of the Chinese
economic and militaiy initiatives needs caieful consideiation.
Cuiient peiceptions point towaids a continuation of US domination
with minoi adjustments to accommodate a moie pioactive iole
foi China. At the same time the analysis will also have to take into
account emeiging infoimal alliances, bilateial and multilateial, as
well as competitive antagonism between the laigei economies of the
117
iegion, that is Japan, China, India, Singapoie, South Koiea, Taiwan
and Austialia.
Te entiie iange of futuie ciicumstances will theiefoie ievolve
aiound the US-China inteiactions, with the othei poweis only
being able to ieact to emeiging situations iathei than being able
to contiibute substantially to shaping the stiategic enviionment.
Te full spectium of secuiity contingencies, with which all nations
of the Asia-Pacic iegion will have to contend, will be inuenced
moie by the stiategic inclination of the United States than Chinas
politico-economic and secuiity manoeuvies. Te ieason foi this is
iooted in situational geogiaphy. China is situated in the iegion with
its stiategic fieedom limited by having to opeiate alongside othei
Asian poweis, wheieas in the Asian context the United States is only
a viitual piesence and engages in the iegion completely at its own
choice of time and pace, with the option to withdiaw and leave.
Te US, theiefoie, has the fieedom to set the stiategic agenda.
Accoidingly, the spectium of secuiity contingencies that needs
to be analysed is also veiy bioad and based on the actions of the
United States. On one extieme is the complete withdiawal of the
United States fiom the iegion eithei giadually oi at a fast pace. Te
pace of withdiawal would have ciucial eect on how the vacuum so
cieated gets lled and how the balance of powei ieadjusts itself. Te
end of the spectium would be the point at which the United States
is no longei in the iegion. Te othei end of the spectium would
be the conclusive involvement of the United States in the iegion,
with a willingness to confiont nations of the iegion if necessaiy to
achieve its stiategic objectives. Tis has the potential to iesult in a
iegulai state-on-state conict between the US and China. All othei
contingencies will fall between these two extiemes. While the main
piotagonists in all ciicumstances would be the US and China, each
independent situation will biing othei nations, mainly the laigei
economies of the iegion, into the fiay to piotect theii national
inteiests.
Te cential point in this spectium would be the benign
maintenance of the status quo, with the US engaged with the iegion
118
and China not pushing the stability envelope to its extiemes, eithei
coveitly oi oveitly. Tis would be the best scenaiio foi all the
nations of the iegion and will piomote fuithei development and
upliftment of some of the pooiest aieas in the woild. Tis cential
point is obtained by a piecaiious balance of powei that involves a
numbei of vaiiables, some that could not be contiolled by one
nation alone, and could be upset by the simplest of actions by even
one of the smallei nations of the iegion. As desiiable as the status
quo is foi all conceined, political ambition of laige nations has nevei
been biidled to catei foi smallei and fiagile economies. It has been
the unwiitten iule of inteinational statesmanship and diplomacy
that the biggei poweis will foige ahead in all possible ways to ensuie
theii eminence and global inuence. It cannot be hoped that this
basic iule will now change foi the bettei. Te middle poweis, and
moie so the smallei nations, will have to accept this and mould theii
politico-economic iealities accoidingly oi iisk a downwaid spiial to
quick and possibly iiieveisible global iiielevance.
Te inuence that the majoi economic poweis of the iegion
would exeit on eithei of the two poweis and theii ability to shape
the outcome in any given situation would depend mainly on foui
ciiteiia. Tese ciiteiia may be piesent independently oi in vaiied
combinations. Te nations of the iegion may not have any diiect
contiol ovei some of these ciiteiia and theiefoie theii inuence on
emeiging events could also be aibitiaiy and ambiguous. Te ist is
the pievailing global secuiity enviionment with special emphasis
on the iegion and the inuence of the US. Because the capacity of
the United States to impose its stiategic will on the iegion would
be a diiect function of its pieoccupation and involvement elsewheie
in the woild and the peiceived stability of the Asia-Pacic,
the pievalent global secuiity enviionment will be the piimaiy
deteiminant of US inuence in the iegion. Te second ciiteiion of
impoitance would be the individual staying powei of both the US
and China in haid and soft powei teims. Tis would be a function
of each of the nations powei piojection capabilities and global
119
commitments combined with theii political and economic domestic
compulsions.
Te thiid ciiteiion is the status of foimal and infoimal alliances
and gioupings within the iegion, which would indiiectly aect
the actions of both China and the US. Teie aie cleai diplomatic
movements within the laigei economies of the iegion to stiengthen
theii stiategic alignment and even foige possible alliances in a bid
to inciease theii collective inuence. Te fouith is the capacity of
these iegional poweis, independently and collectively in alliances,
to pioject powei and theiefoie to inuence emeiging situations.
Te independent political stability of all nations involved would
deteimine the iate and quantum of the application of powei to
achieve the desiied goal.
It is indicative of the laige shift in secuiity peiceptions that
iesponse to any situation within the wide spectium of contingencies
can nevei be a puiely militaiy action. Containment of any emeigent
thieat within the spectium will need the employment of the full
spiead of all attiibutes of national powei. Such actions will have to
be caiefully cooidinated at the highest level of goveinment. Tat
cooidination must include designating the lead agency to iespond
and delineating the iole of othei contiibutoiy agencies. Tis
whole-of-goveinment appioach is the only way to ensuie national
secuiity in the contempoiaiy secuiity enviionment, which is
complex and dynamic. Te iole of the militaiy in these conditions
would vaiy fiom being the lead in applying foice in a high-end
conict of national suivival to being the facilitatoi of humanitaiian
assistance being deliveied by othei goveinment agencies in iesponse
to natuial oi man-made disasteis.
120
Aus:unIIns Buono Fu:uuv RoIvs
In any emeiging scenaiio within the entiie spectium of
contingencies Austialia will have to play impoitant, and at times
ciucial, pioactive ioles if it is to continue to assuie its economic
piospeiity in compaiative stability. Tese ioles will iange fiom being
the lead in diiect piojection of haid powei at one extieme to playing
a piedominantly diplomatic and stabilising iole in volatile situations
in the exeicise of its soft powei. Consideiing the spiead of the
spectium of possible contingencies, Austialia would have to assume
the following piobable ioles. As a lead and catalyst foi the foimation
of an alliance of Asia-Pacic nation-states to contain the unchecked
militaiy and diplomatic iise of China in case of a US withdiawal, as
an honest and tiusted go-between foi a US-China dialogue in case
of a confiontation, and as a iegional secuiity and stability enfoicei,
in conjunction with othei iegional poweis, when an uneasy status
quo is in place when the US is active in othei iegions of the woild.
Othei scenaiios will only be vaiiations of these thiee basic ioles
adapted foi shoit-teim puiposes, but always aligned with the long-
teim goal of maintaining the status quo balance of powei at the
cential point of the spectium.
Coalition Catalyst
Te piobability of the United States staging a unilateial
withdiawal fiom the Asia-Pacic iegion seems a veiy fai-fetched
concept in any contempoiaiy analysis of the emeiging tiends.
Fuithei, theie aie cuiiently no indications that such a move is even
on the hoiizon of stiategic thinking in the United States. Howevei,
theie is also no vouchsang that in the medium teim futuie, that
is at about 20302040, the global stiategic enviionment would not
change to an extent wheiein the United States would nd it dicult
to maintain its cuiient global commitments and would have to
withdiaw fiom aieas that aie of secondaiy inteiest in its view. Te
Asia-Pacic could be a iegion wheie the US may scale down its
piesence to concentiate on moie immediate thieats to its inteiests,
121
which might lead to its not being able to maintain a ciedible
piesence in the iegion.
Te end of the Cold Wai saw the United States assume the iole
of a de facto unilateial global powei ensuiing inteinational stability.
Howevei, events of the past decade have detiacted fiom this iole and
cuiiently theie aie moie challenges to the US global hegemony than
evei befoie that it does not seem to be able to answei eectively.
Teie is a disceinible loss of the moial high giound that the US has
been used to, with a numbei of less than honest and coiiect actions
being undeitaken in the name of national secuiity. Te legitimacy of
its actions to fuithei global peace is being incieasingly questioned in
woild foiums and the United States is becoming fiustiated with the
ieluctance of its own allies to oei unconditional suppoit. Fuithei,
it is pieoccupied with its commitments in Iiaq and Afghanistan,
which does not leave veiy much extia capacity within the US
defence foices to be eective in any othei iegion. Its capacity to
sustain moie than two laige, open-ended campaigns simultaneously
is cleaily stietched beyond the possible and could peihaps be
iemedied only if a massive ieoiganisation of the defence foices is
undeitaken. Te iole of unilateial global powei does not seem to sit
well with the United States anymoie.
If the emeiging global secuiity enviionment is analysed in
detail, taking into account the inteinational concein iegaiding
the piolifeiation of nucleai weapons, it will be seen that theie is
an impeiceptible move within the United States itself to withhold
commitment to any new stabilising enteipiise wheie it will have to
take the lead. Teiefoie, while a complete US stiategic withdiawal
fiom the Asia-pacic might seem a blighted notion, it is not dicult
to imagine the US being ambivalent iegaiding a numbei of issues in
the iegion that cuiiently seem of the most impoitant consequence.
Undei these ciicumstances it might become incumbent on
Austialia, as the closest ally of the US in the iegion, to take on the
iole of a catalyst to foiging a viable coalition of the laigei economic
poweis to ensuie stability by ensuiing that Chinas stiategic
122
manoeuviing is contained and does not pose a dangei of upsetting
the delicate iegional balance.
Tis is a iole that is fiaught with complications but would be
essential foi Austialia to undeitake foi two main ieasons. Fiist,
unchecked political, economic and militaiy actions by China would
be an indication of a declining US powei piojection capability.
Such a sign would encouiage a numbei of nations in the iegion
to act unilateially oi with subtle coveit assistance fiom majoi
iegional poweis to impiove theii stiategic baigaining powei. While
impioving theii stiategic powei is the undeipinning ieason foi all
soveieign nation-states to undeitake diplomatic manoeuviing, it
also has the potential to lead to gieatei stiategic unceitainty that
would make the secuiity enviionment of the iegion moie volatile.
Second, Austialian piospeiity is piimaiily ieliant on the stability
of the iegion, which is to a laige extent dependent on a stable,
well-intentioned and iesponsible China. An unpiedictable China
testing the fuithei ieaches of its long-teim stiategic agenda in the
absence of any counteiing foice of compatible stiength is ceitain to
lead the iegion towaids unpiecedented stiategic unpiedictability.
To thwait the iegions decline into stiategic unpiedictability
Austialia would have to become the piimaiy moving foice, even
though it does not have the laigest capacity in teims of powei
piojection capabilities, in cieating a iegional coalition by biinging
togethei Japan, India, South Koiea and Singapoie as well as othei
like-minded nations of the iegion.
A coalition is a gioup of nations woiking togethei to achieve
a common goal even though a foimal alliance oi tieaty may not
exist between the membeis. Te natuie of coalitions is such that
membeis would have to be willing to contiibute to the common
goal, while giving paitisan national goals a lessei piioiity if
necessaiy. Te foimation of a coalition is dependent on theie being
a suciently stiong ieason foi the nations to collaboiate in oidei
to achieve a common objective. Noimally, when confionted with
a common thieat a coalition ensuies the availability of sucient
powei piojection capabilities to ensuie denitive victoiy in a given
123
situation. Howevei, theie aie also instances when a coalition is
built to piovide political sanctity and legitimacy to the action being
contemplated, even if one of the membei nations has the necessaiy
powei to achieve a satisfactoiy end-state on its own. In the case of
this iegional coalition, the common objective would be to ensuie
that China does not upset the balance of powei and iemains a
benign giant. Tis would be the impetus to make these nations come
togethei to act in conceit.
Such a iegional coalition cannot be ciafted in the shoit teim. It
needs dedicated long-teim planning and mutual appieciation of the
peculiaiities of each nations domestic politico-economic situation.
In the past two decades, iapid changes in the secuiity enviionment
have necessitated closei coopeiation between soveieign nation-
states to giapple with amoiphous thieats that tianscend national
boundaiies. Te need to have a cleaiei undeistanding of the
powei piojection capabilities iesident in othei fiiendly nations
has been at least paitially iecognised. Tis is an advantage when
it comes to foiming a coalition. In the case of the laigei poweis
of the iegion, theii well-entienched demociatic tiaditions foim a
common backdiop that facilitates the advancement of the concept
of secuiity coopeiation between them. It also helps that, at least in
the postWoild Wai II eia, none of these nations have displayed
any oensive tempeiament oi laid any unwaiianted claims against
the teiiitoiial integiity of some othei nation. Tese aie two majoi
factois that Austialia would have to leveiage to coax these nations
to act togethei. Austialia would also have to iely on its alliance
with the United States to initiate and puisue this action, and must
ensuie that the powei of the US would be backing the foimation of
a coalition, even if it has viitually withdiawn fiom the iegion.
Te foimation of such a iegional coalition, if not subtly done,
would cieate a sense of isolation within the Chinese political
hieiaichy that could lead to iiiational actions that would manifest in
a confiontational attitude. Given the sensitivity of the undeitaking,
it is also vital to maintain open diplomatic channels to China to
ensuie that theie is adequate tianspaiency in the actions being
124
undeitaken and to avoid even the slightest misundeistanding.
Te piimaiy aim of this iegional coalition would be diplomatic
containment, economic continuity, infoimation envelopment
and veiy caieful and non-thieatening militaiy actions diiected at
maintaining stability of the Asia-Pacic. Undei these ciicumstances
any point of contention, like the status of Taiwan as peiceived by the
membeis of the coalition, could veiy iapidly become a catalyst and
ashpoint foi militaiy confiontation. Teiefoie, cooidinating the
militaiy aspecthaid powei piojection capabilityof the coalition
should be the last piece of the pictuie to be biought to completion.
Te basic question that aiises fiom such a stiategy is iegaiding
the iole that Austialia would have to undeitake to ensuie its success.
Fiist and foiemost, it has to be acknowledged that Austialia does
not have the capacity in soft oi haid poweipolitico-economic oi
militaiy capabilitiesto be the lead in such an enteipiise. On the
othei hand theie does not have to be a cleaily designated lead in
such a coalition since the aim is puiely deteiience and not diiect
militaiy action. It is possible to ensuie diplomatic cohesiveness
within a coalition by adopting the consensus mode in decision-
making. Teiefoie, Austialias iole would be one of a catalyst to the
cieation of the coalition by facilitating a congenial atmospheie in
the iegion thiough mediation and inteivention to iion out bilateial
and othei issues. Tis would assist the othei nations to paiticipate
in the coalition without majoi ieseivations. Tis iole is ciitical to
the success of this stiategy.
Japan is Austialias second laigest tiading paitnei and also the
closest US ally in the Asian context. It shaies a mutual undeistanding
with Austialia of the negative impact of a deteiioiating secuiity
enviionment vis--vis theii commeice and tiade iequiiements to
maintain economic stability. Teii bilateial ielationship has been
fuithei stiengthened by a iecent memoiandum of undeistanding
that aims to enhance mutual coopeiation. Consideiing the
commonality of inteiest and mutual agieement on most majoi
issues, it can be piesumed that Japan would be amenable to woik
in conceit with Austialia to paiticipate in such a iegional coalition.
125
Te Japanese moves to iene theii constitution to allow theii
Self-Defence Foices to paiticipate in opeiations abioad is a cleai
indication of the seiiousness with which they view the iegional
secuiity enviionment.
Similaily, Singapoie is a steadfast US ally and can be expected
to join without much ieluctance, as long as cleai and diiect
militaiy action is avoided. Since the aim of the coalition would be
containment and not confiontation, it is not expected that Singapoie
would have any vocifeious objection to being pait of a gioup aimed
at ensuiing iegional stability. South Koiea and Japan have ongoing
bilateial issues that have not been satisfactoiily iioned out. Howevei,
both aie matuied demociacies and aie piagmatic enough to iealise
the commonality of the thieat posed to theii secuiity fiom a iising
China on an economic and militaiy confiontational iampage in the
iegion. Both these nations could be ieasonably expected to deal with
theii bilateial pioblems outside the ambit of the coalition, at least
duiing ciitical phases of the coalition activities when cohesiveness
counts the most.
Fiom Austialias peispective, of the foui majoi iegional poweis,
India would peihaps be the most ieluctant to become a pait of such
a coalition. Teie aie a numbei of ieasons foi this. Post-colonial
India has zealously guaided its neutiality in inteinational politics,
paiticulaily avoiding Westein inuence as indicated cleaily in its
founding iole in the non-aligned movement. Teie is even today a
mistiust of Westein intentions, an attitude foimed and ieinfoiced
by the cleai and ongoing US suppoit of Pakistan staiting fiom the
1960s, even when that nation did not display any vestige of being
a demociacy, the sanctions imposed on India aftei its nucleai test
and the ieluctance befoie the events of Septembei 11 foi Westein
nations to accept the fact of cioss-boidei teiioiism emanating foi
Pakistan. Teie is also a view in the nation that the Westein nations,
which include Austialia, aie sceptical about Indias close ielationship
with the eistwhile Soviet Union, which is consideied a fiiend who
helped when the nation was in diie stiaits.
126
Fuithei, evei since India emeiged as an economic foice it has
been clamouiing foi its iightful place and status in inteinational
foiums, especially the United Nations. Te ieluctance of the
Westein poweis to agiee to these demands and give India the status
that it feels is its iightbeing the laigest demociacy in the woild
has not gone down well in the nation. Successive goveinments, of
dieient political hues, have attempted to move into inteinational
centie stage and been blocked by Westein manipulations. India is
chagiined about constantly being pushed to the peiipheiy of the
inteinational stage.
Today the pictuie of India is of a giant taking, not so much
unceitain but ieluctant, steps to fullling its global destiny. Teie is
a sense of ieticence in its inteinational dealings, mainly biought on
by domestic politics and the tenuous hold on powei that most of its
fedeial goveinments possess. Indias inteiactions with the nations of
the woild aie still guided by domestic political compulsions, theieby
disiupting the continuity of bilateial and multilateial ielationships.
It is only in the last decade that theie has been bipaitisan acceptance
of some bioadei foieign policy issues. Howevei, with all its minoi
diawbacks, India is a bulwaik of demociacy in a volatile iegion
wheie nations aie pione to being taken ovei by autociatic iuleis.
Te inteiplay of its mistiust of Westein diplomacy and the need
to pampei domestic political compulsions give an oveiall peiception
of tentativeness in Indias foieign policy dealings that in tuin biing
about ceitain ieluctance in majoi poweis to embiace the nation as a
steadfast ally.
Austialias oveituies to India to biing it within the fold of the
laigei demociatic ciicle have been eainest only in the past ve yeais
oi so. Teie is a lingeiing natuial dislike within the Indian polity
foi the disciiminatoiy White Austialia policy of the 1960s which
make the task even moie dicult. Howevei, the meteoiic iise of
Chinas economy and its single-minded puisuit of policies aimed
at incieasing its spheie of inuence in developing Asia and othei
pooiei aieas of the globe have alaimed India. Both China and India
undeistand that confiontation would be detiimental to fuithei
127
giowth and theiefoie maintain a coidial bilateial ielationship. Teie
aie, howevei, undeilying basic boidei disputes, in the noith-west
at the Aksai Chin iegion and in the noith-east in the Aiunachal
iegions, which simmei in the backgiound and aie biought to the
foiefiont at times of diplomatic necessity. When and how any of
these issues would become full-edged confiontation is a mattei of
opinion. China may, at a piedeteimined stage of its own in iesponse
to Indias economic giowth oi because of indiiect confiontation
within the iegion foi establishing inuence, nd the need to develop
minoi boidei disputes to sizable confiontations to discomt India
and make it change its piioiities.
If India joins the coalition it will add consideiable politico-
economic and militaiy-stiategic clout to it. In oidei to biing India
into the gioup of nations that could possibly counteibalance Chinas
stiategic weight, Austialia would have to play on the instinctive
mistiust of Chinese intentions within the Indian diplomatic and
militaiy establishments. Te Sino-Indian boidei dispute of 1962,
wheie the Indian militaiy was completely humbled and its foieign
policy of peaceful coexistence buiied foievei, is still a veiy sensitive
issue within the Goveinment and thought of as the low point in
independent Indias histoiy. Te ongoing, uniesolved boidei issues
could well be leveiaged to peisuade India iegaiding the advantages
of joining foices with the othei nations in a containment eoit.
Cuiiently, India is in the piocess of building a foice piojection
capability based on a blue watei navy built aiound two caiiiei
gioups and long-iange aii stiike capabilities piovided by the
extiemely capable Sukhoi Su-30MKI ghtei aiiciaft. India is
building its capabilities towaids becoming the piimaiy iegional
powei in the Indian Ocean iegion. Te Indian Ocean is vital to
tiade and development in the Asia-Pacic and whoevei dominates
it would obviously have enoimous stiategic inuence in the entiie
Asian iegion. Tis is obviously Indias staiting point in its quest foi
inteinational status and it will not want to be challenged in the Indian
Ocean. Te same ocean is also shaied by Austialia and the United
States has a stiategic outpost theie in Diego Gaicia. It becomes cleai,
128
even in a cuisoiy analysis, that if India and Austialia woik in conceit
they would be able to maintain the independence and stability of the
aiea. Tis is the ciucial point to be emphasised if Austialia takes the
initiative to hammeiing home a bilateial undeistanding with India.
Such an undeistanding will give sucient impetus foi India to join
this gioup, at least infoimally. It can also be expected that India
would, in all piobability, have its own ieseivations and conditions
iegaiding the actual use of foice.
India is studiously piogiessing towaids piimacy in the Indian
Ocean. It is not dicult to visualise it playing this iole iiiespective of
the US position in the iegion. Being pait of a loosely built coalition
of the majoi poweis of Asia will suit its stiategic puipose. Such a
coalition will also be able to exeit sucient piessuieeconomic,
diplomatic and militaiy deteiienceto contiol the iegion and
maintain peace, albeit an uneasy peace, almost ceitain to bieak
down if the Taiwan issue deteiioiates into a confiontation.
Honest Broker
A peace is of the nature of a conquest; For then both parties
nobly are subdud, And neither party loser.
William Shakespeaie
King Heniy the Fouith, Pait Two, Act 4, Scene 2
At the othei end of the contingency spectium is a situation of
confiontation and imminent conict between the United States and
China. Like the complete withdiawal of the United States fiom the
iegion, even this is a fai-fetched situation when consideied undei
the cuiient inteinational enviionment. Teie aie thiee fundamental
ieasons foi this. Fiist, it is the belief of China watcheis that the most
likely ieason foi a ieal confiontation between the US and China
would be the issue of Taiwanese independence oi integiation. Fiom
a dieient peispective this looks unlikely foi two ieasons. Taiwan
is well awaie of the need to maintain a status quo and not push the
independence issue too fai if US suppoit in its cuiient foim is to
129
be assuied. Fuithei, theie is a sizable peicentage of the Taiwanese
population that welcomes the piospect of integiation with China
and, theiefoie, domestic politics may not go so fai as to declaie
independence. Although it has cleaily declaied that it would iesoit
to the use of foice if Taiwan declaies independence, China is also
awaie that at least foi the foieseeable futuie any such move is
likely to biing inteinational condemnation and US inteivention.
Foi the next few decades China cannot aoid negative political
fallouts in oidei to ensuie that its own domestic giowth and foieign
policy initiatives do not get skewed. Howevei, Chinas pioclivity
to maximise inteinational issues when domestic pioblems tend to
boil ovei has the potential to tiiggei the Taiwan question. Chinas
inteinal economic and political developments will have to be closely
monitoied to foiesee any such situation.
Second, the tiade and economic ielationships between the
US and China have become so lopsided that some economic
analysts believe that China cuiiently has the capacity to stop the
US economy in its tiacks if they so decide. Tis is facilitated by the
centialised contiol of the Chinese economy and its non-capital
maikets appioach within the nation. Chinas complete integiation
of politico-economy, diplomacy and inteinational powei play was
demonstiated by the Goveinments move to conveit some of theii
ieseives into Euios in late-2007 in a diiect challenge to the US.
Although this thieat was latei withdiawn, it exposed the cuiient
weakness of the US position in global economic teims, which
will be a ciucial factoi at the highest level of decision-making if
confiontational ciicumstances aiise.
Tiid, although the United States took a unilateial decision
outside the United Nations iegaiding the invasion of Iiaq, it had the
suppoit of a numbei of nations that subsequently foimed what came
to be called the coalition of the willing. In a similai decision that
could lead to conict with China, it is highly unlikely to ieceive the
same level of suppoit even fiom the tiaditional allies of the US. Te
global instability that such a confiontation would biing in its wake
would fai outweigh any benet that could acciue to paiticipating
130
nations because of theii peiceived closeness to the US. Fuithei, the
United States is going to be engaged and tied down in the Middle
East foi a long time to come. It also needs to maintain a ciedible
piesence in Euiope, especially in view of the cuiient upsuige in
Russian stiategic activities. Teiefoie, it may not have the militaiy
foice piojection capacity to piosecute a campaign of unasceitained
duiation and intensity against the giowing militaiy might of China
without the conict escalating fuithei into othei iegions and
gieatly incieasing the veiy ieal iisk of it deteiioiating to a nucleai
exchange.
Tis is not to suggest that the piobability of conict is so low as
to all but ignoie it when the futuie secuiity enviionment is analysed
and stiategic options consideied. While the bieak-out of a full-scale
conict is highly unlikely, the militaiy-stiategic enviionment could
become highly chaiged and unstable if confiontational political
ihetoiic staits to be conveited even to lowei oidei actions, foi
example the pie-positioning of militaiy foices, coveit inteivention
in the politico-economic system of each otheis allies, and subveision
of stability in the othei nations iegion of eective inuence. Political
biinksmanship and adheience to a few uncompiomising basics in
foieign policy matteis have been the hallmaiks of Chinese actions
in the inteinational aiena foi a long time. Te clash of basic cultuial
dieiences between the ancient Chinese civilisation iooted on
patience and insciutability, and the impetuousness of the Westein
woild, almost completely piedominated by the biashness of the
United States, has the potential to cieate misundeistandings that
could veiy iapidly deteiioiate into conict.
Austialia, as pait of the innei coteiie of US allies, will have to
take into account two possibilities when consideiing its options.
Fiist, it must accept that a minimal conict situation between the
US and China could develop veiy fast fiom almost benign actions by
eithei side. Second, it has to be cognisant of the fact that any iole that
it plays in such a situation has the potential to haim Austialias long-
teim inteiests if even the slightest mistake is made in its actions.
Tis is because the two nations involved aie of ciitical impoitance to
131
Austialias wellbeing, the US being its piimaiy secuiity paitnei and
China being its laigest tiading paitnei. Undei this delicate situation,
Austialia would have to ensuie that the situation is de-escalated
befoie it blows up into a iegional and possibly global confiontation,
by putting in place sucient piocesses to be able to inuence both
sides equally. Consideiing Austialias unenviable position in these
ciicumstances and its potentially limited inuence on both US
and China when both aie in confiontational postuies, its actions
would have to be caiefully consideied and applied pioactively. On
the one hand Austialia cannot aoid to antagonise its poweiful ally,
the United States, by being seen even supeicially to be favouiing
China and on the othei it cannot buin its biidges with China oi be
consideied as a nation whose diplomatic and political independence
has been compiomised by its fiiendship and alliance with the
woilds only supeipowei.
Chinas bilateial ielationships with othei majoi nations of the
iegion aie at best desciibed as coidial. Teie aie undeilying tensions
in the Chinese ielationship with all the majoi Asian nations.
Teiefoie, in all likelihood Austialia would be the only nation that
might be acceptable to both China and the US as a diplomatically
honest mediatoi to diuse a confiontational situation. Te
eectiveness of such a diplomatic iole would depend almost entiiely
on the bipaitisan acceptance of Austialias neutiality. Howevei, such
acceptance without ieseivations can only be achieved if Austialia is
capable of a numbei of initiatives, both iegional and inteinational,
to ieinfoice its independent foieign policy ciedentials. To stait
with it would have to woik consciously to change the pievalent
inteinational peiception that it would blindly side with the United
States in any mattei of secuiity. Such a change in peiception would
be slow to achieve and need open inteiaction with the majoiity of
the iegional and inteinational community.
Cuiiently, most of the nations of the Asia-Pacic iegion
aie sceptical iegaiding Austialias motives foi any action that it
initiates because of histoiic ieasons, peipetuated by post-colonial
antagonism towaids a nation stiongly aligned with the West,
132
cultuially, ethnically and by choice. To be accepted as an honest
biokei within the iegion, Austialia will of necessity have to ievamp
its image and asseit its piesence by emphasising its geogiaphic
location in the Asia-Pacic. Tis would involve a two-pionged
initiative. Fiist is to make its heavy tiade commitments to the
Asia-Pacic tianspaiently known, while leveiaging o the much
needed economic and secuiity aid that Austialia is involved in
pioviding to the smallei economies in the iegion. Tis would assist
in the second initiative to make the nation and its neighbouis feel
at ease with its piesence in the iegion iathei than standing aloof, by
choice oi otheiwise, as an outsidei with a moie developed sense of
iight and wiong. Te nations of the iegion have long histoiies and
evolved cultuies making them iesent any judgmental attitude. Such
an attitude, theiefoie, immediately makes Austialias intentions in
any inteiaction suspect maiiing the piospect of any ieal piogiess
undei these conditions.
It will be simplei foi Austialia to win the condence of the
United States because of the longstanding ielationship that the
nations shaie. Howevei, even in this ielationship a numbei of issues
will have to be handled delicately. Fiist, the timing of the diplomatic
eoit will be of paiamount impoitance. Te success of any eoit
would depend on diplomatic actions being initiated befoie any
actual physical contact has taken place. Once the confiontation has
ieached the phase of militaiy muscle exing, Austialia would nd
it dicult to iefuse any US iequest foi basing iights oi even foi
the piovision of militaiy foices, albeit in limited numbeis. If such a
iequest is accepted, China will not accept the neutiality of Austialia
and, on the othei hand, if the iequest is iefused the US ieaction
could be to discaid any fuithei inteiaction oi advice fiom Austialia.
Eithei of the situations will completely negate any chance of success
in the honest biokei iole. Teiefoie, it is impoitant foi Austialia to
bioach the possibility of such a iole duiing times of ielative peace
and aiiive at a mutual acceptance with the US. Te ciitical factoi
in such a move will be to have the US agiee that the best iole foi
Austialia would be as the honest mediatoi iathei than as a militaiy
133
ally that could add veiy little to an alieady oveiwhelming foice.
Te stiength of the alliance, mutual iespect and iesilience of the
diplomatic piocess between the two nations will be put to the test in
these ciicumstances. Any sign of weakness in the alliance, peiceived
oi otheiwise, emanating fiom eithei side would have disastious
consequences foi the bilateial ielationship as well as foi the stability
of the Asia-Pacic iegion.
Being a mediatoi between the two giants in confiontational
mode will showcase Austialia as a iesponsible inteinational citizen
and is peihaps the biggest seivice that it could iendei to woild
oidei. Even with both China and the US accepting this slightly
changed iole foi Austialia, the negotiations will be dicult and
convoluted, conducted at the cutting edge of diplomacy. Austialias
piimaiy iesponsibilities as a mediatoi will be to use its inuence
to stop any fuithei deteiioiation in the situation and to ensuie
that communications do not bieak down, even foi a biief peiiod of
time. Deteiioiation in an alieady tense situation oi communications
bieakdown would both be calamitous foi the iesolution of
the situation. Mediating the giadual ieduction of tensions will
mean the wheedling of concessions fiom both paities. Tis will
need a compaiatively new appioach to diplomacy and foieign
policy. Tis would iequiie at least one of two distinct categoiies
of baigaining powei. Te ist is having the powei piojection
capabilityeconomic, diplomatic oi militaiyto enfoice a demand
that has been made to eithei side. In this paiticulai case this would
be impossible. Te second would be to have the capacity to oei
something in ietuin foi the concessions that aie iequiied to be
made by eithei paity. In the scenaiio being discussed, baigaining
powei would be almost completely dependent on Austialias ability
to oei something in ietuin. Fiom an Austialian peispective, access
to natuial iesouices aiound which its own economy is built would
peihaps be the most attiactive baigaining chip.
Such an oei would have gieat inteiest foi China. It is
Austialias laigest tiading paitneis and one of the laigest consumeis
of its natuial iesouices. China has a voiacious appetite foi eneigy
134
and othei iesouices, and it will nd it dicult to ieject a luciative
oei of access to Austialian iesouices at compatible piices. Tis is
a caid that will have to be played with consummate skill to ensuie
that China nds it easy to accept a compiomise in the confiontation
while publicly not being seen as weak oi incapable. Viewed within
the cuiient context this seems extiemely dicult to achieve, but
in a confiontational ciisis this would be the only option open. Te
success of diusing a biewing ciisis between the US and China will
be dependent on Austialias ability to negotiate a viable solution. It
theiefoie becomes impeiative foi Austialia to put in place a long-
teim plan to achieve the necessaiy ciedibility to be the honest
biokei, much befoie even the slightest inkling of a confiontation is
visible.
Regional Stabiliser
In between the two extiemes that would have Austialia play
two veiy dispaiate ioles in an attempt to avoid diiect iegional
confiontation and the ensuing instability, theie is anothei iole that
it might have to undeitake. Tis could be consideied an extension
of the cuiient iole that it plays in its neai iegion of inuence.
Instability in the immediate neighbouihood of any nation incieases
the piobability of deteiioiation of the laigei secuiity enviionment,
theieby making it impeiative foi the majoi powei in the iegion
to asseit a stabilising inuence aiound it. Tis has become moie
impoitant with the evolving concept of national secuiity and the
iapid changes in the natuie of thieats as well as the expansion of
the thieat spectium. In puisuance of its own secuiity and stability
needs, Austialia has inteivened a numbei of times in its immediate
aiea of inteiest in the past decade to stabilise fast deteiioiating
situations. In 1999, it was the lead nation in a UN-appioved
inteinational coalition that assisted Timoi Lestes tiansition to
independence as the outcome of a iefeiendum that was opposed by
ceitain militia gioups. It was iequiied to inteivene again a few yeais
latei to establish law and oidei in a political ciisis which was iapidly
plunging the edgling nation into civil wai. Austialia once again
135
initiated stabilising opeiations, this time in the Solomon Islands
when the states economy was on the veige of failuie, making the
small island nation a piime candidate to become a failed state with
all its attendant consequences foi the iegion.
None of these inteiventions have been completely unilateial,
even though the absolute necessity foi exteinal inteivention in
some paiticulai case may have been advocated to the inteinational
community by Austialia. Te fact that theie was cleai appioval
within the inteinational community in the United Nations foi such
action, and that Austialia was able to obtain voluntaiy coopeiation
fiom othei iegional nations establishes two iiievocable changes
in the stiategic politico-economic and militaiy equation of the
iegion. Fiist, theie is almost complete acceptance that a failing
stateeconomic oi politicalin the neighbouihood is a potential
catalyst to spiead instability at a veiy fast pace to othei paits of the
iegion, especially when a majoiity of the othei nations themselves
have fiagile economies. Second, theie is a tacit undeistanding
that Austialia is peihaps the only iegional powei with the
whole-of-goveinment capacity, and moie impoitantly the national
will and stated intent, to lead a stabilising foice that could succeed
in such cases. Tis undeistanding howevei, is not always conveited
to agieement, appioval oi acceptance by the smallei nations in the
iegion who at times, paiadoxically, blame Austialia itself foi the
deteiioiating situation.
Teie aie a few salutaiy lessons that the Austialian polity must
assimilate if the iole of iegional stabilisei that it will have to assume
foi itself is to benet the laigei iegion. Fiist, although the past
inteiventions have been appioved by the inteinational community, it
is moie impoitant to have iegional appioval and acceptance if such
actions aie to succeed in the long teim. Second, with sucient and
well thought thiough staying powei only should any inteivention
be attempted, since piematuie withdiawal befoie cleai stabilisation
will only exaceibate the situation and might subsequently iequiie an
even laigei inteivention foice. Tiid, although in the initial stages
Austialia would have to assume the lead, it would be easiei foi the
136
iegional nations to accept the necessity of the inteivention and its
conduct if the lead is passed on to anothei iegional paitnei at an
eaily stage, as soon as piactical.
Tese thiee factois point to the necessity foi Austialia to be
able to baigain haid at the conceptual level within the iegion to
ensuie acceptance of the necessity foi inteivention. It also needs to
piovide sucient impetus foi the inteivention to be put into action
when needed and move foiwaid at a comfoitable pace. Te most
impoitant iesponsibility is to ensuie that theie is no waveiing of the
long-teim goal of such actionsthat of ensuiing iegional stability.
Te cuiient state of aaiis in the US-China ielationship is
peihaps the best that could be expected. Teie is obvious jostling
to expand ones own spheie of inuence and contain that of the
othei. Howevei, the basic engagement between the nations is being
conducted at the economic fiont and is foi the most pait amicable.
Teie aie only occasional ihetoiical thieats that tend to iue the
ow of tiade and commeice. Both the nations do not have the extia
capacity iequiied to bait the othei constantly, with the United States
completely pieoccupied in the Middle East and China coming to
teims with the change in the national goveinment, piepaiations foi
the Olympics and tiying to pioject a moie benign faade vis--vis
its human iights iecoid. Howevei, this status quo will not last foi
evei. Regional stability in the Asia-Pacic would make it dicult foi
China to exeit economic and political piessuie and theieby build
up its spheie of inuence and theieby slow the piocess of Chinese
diplomatic incuisions into the iegion.
With the United States almost completely involved in the
Middle East and embaiked on a long stiuggle against global
teiioiism, as its piimaiy ally in the Asia-Pacic, Austialia would be
expected to expand its spheie of inteiest and inuence fiom its neai
iegion and the Pacic island nations to encompass the whole of
South-East Asia. In the pievalent politico-economic situation in the
iegion such a deteimined outwaid movement fiom a limited spheie
of inteiest to a laigei all-encompassing one will be complex. Teie
will be a gieat deal of diiect opposition to such a move and the
137
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can be expected
to be veiy vocifeious against it. Foi example, even a veiy conceptual
statement by the Austialian Goveinment a few yeais ago iegaiding
pie-emption undei extiemely well-dened ciicumstances diew
vehement ciiticism and opposition to the veiy idea fiom the moie
economically stable nations in South-East Asia.
Once again the piocess of acceptance, not only of the necessity
to be piepaied to inteivene but also the modality of such an action,
will need consensus building and a holistic appioach foi success.
Gaining the necessaiy condence of the nations of the iegion, all
of whom baiiing Tailand aie post-colonial states, will also be a
slow piocess. Tis would iequiie tianspaiency and accountability
of intention and action. Even if theie is ieluctance within the
iegion to include Austialia in the somewhat closed ciicle of Asian
nations, the need to woik togethei foi iegional stability has to be
emphasised. It has to be made obvious to these nations that biinging
Austialia into the iegional gioupings would only enhance theii
secuiity enviionment. Tis is piimaiily because of the consideiable
inteinational clout the Austialia biings with it in teims of its
unambiguous status as a iesponsible nation. A conceited diplomatic,
political and economic initiative, which cleaily demonstiates the
compatibility of Austialias long-teim goals with those of the iegion
and its ethos to cieate a common piospeious futuie, would have
to be ciafted to ensuie acceptance of an Austialian lead iole in any
iegional ciisis.
Doubtless the status quo in the iegional oi global secuiity
enviionment will not iemain indenitely. Moie than the changes
that come with economic iealities and diplomatic iealignment, the
status quo situation is moie likely to be challenged in time with
the iise of iegional poweis like China and India. Te changes that
will come about will also be dependent on the bioadei alignment
of the iegional poweis with the United States and the inteinational
community. Teiefoie, Austialia should be piepaied to be agile in
its stiategic peiceptions and be able to adapt its iole appiopiiate to
the changing iegional powei alignment. Te iole could iange fiom
138
being the lead in containment, oi as membei of a coalition oi puiely
as a facilitatoi, dependent on the laigei global situation. Tis is the
niche position wheie Austialia has to position itself in an emeigent
woild wheie the stiategic secuiity enviionment is dynamic and
nations aie piimaiily manoeuviing to ensuie theii long-teim
ielevance.
CotIusIo
Te global stiategic, economic and political balance is
noticeably changing. Te iate of change is dieient in dieient
paits of the woild and vaiies with a numbei of factois. While the
majoi economic and stiategic poweis will continue to inuence the
changes, especially in theii own iegion, the lessei poweis will have
to manoeuvie within the changing system which they may not be
able to even inuence. Failuie to be pioactive to even the slightest
stiategic manipulation within a nations spheie of inteiest could veiy
quickly spiial into an uncontiollable spin towaids iiielevance in the
case of nations with constiained national powei bases.
Austialia needs to enunciate cleaily its stiategic intent and
impeiatives that would suppoit its long-teim piospeiity. Tis
iequiies the evolution of a long-teim piepaiedness plan that would
catei foi the eventualities that have been desciibed eailiei. Te thiee
possible ioles all need specialised appioaches to be successful and
cannot be initiated iapidly unless sucient planning and allocation
of iesouices have been done as an ongoing piocess. It is duiing
times of compaiative peace and tianquillity that these initiatives,
in diplomacy, ielationship building, inuencing and demonstiating
goodwill to othei nations, must be done so that in times of ciisis
Austialias chosen iole would be acceptable to the iegion and to the
inteinational community.
Foi smallei nations, in teims of national powei stiuctuie,
stiategic iiielevance is a ieal thieat in a woild which is iealigning
139
itself to adapt to the machinations of laige and still giowing
economies. Tiee laige economies aie emeiging within Austialias
spheie of inteiest and even the smallei economies of the iegion aie
showing cleai signs of iesilient giowth. Tis giowth and consequent
shift makes it ciucial foi Austialia to monitoi iegional changes
closely and make adjustments to its own politico-economic situation
and diplomatic oveituies. Austialia needs to iene fuithei its
whole-of-goveinment appioach to its secuiity impeiatives,
demonstiate the initiative needed to be a iesponsible nation with
iegional aliations and contiibute steadily to stabilising the iegion
by the employment of its consideiable economic, diplomatic
and militaiy capabilities in oidei to ensuie its own stability and
economic giowth.
140
No:vs
1 Geoiey Baikei, Big questions loom in US ielationship, Australian Financial Review,
19 Octobei 2007, p. 28.
2 Paul Dibb and Geoiey Baikei, Rising to the Russian challenge, Australian Financial
Review, 16 Januaiy 2008, p. 52.
3 ibid.
4 Geoiey Baikei, Plenty to feai with a gieat, poweiful fiiend in decline, Australian
Financial Review, 9 Novembei 2007, p. 80.
5 Allan Behm, Te Need foi an Austialian National Secuiity Stiategy, Security Challenges,
August 2007 (Vol. 3, No. 3), Te Kokoda Foundation, Canbeiia, 2007, p. 14.
6 ibid, p. 19.
7 Dave Peebles, Powei shifts put piessuie on Asia-Pacic stability, Canberra Times,
25 Januaiy 2008, p. 25.
Chaptei 6
Militaiy Competencies
in Suppoit of National
Secuiity
142
143
Miii:vv Corvr:rcirs i Suvvov: or N:ioi Srcuvi:v
MILITARY COMPETENCIES IN SUPPORT
OF NATIONAL SECURITY
In a demociacy the election of a goveinment by the people foi
a dened peiiod of time signies a covenant between the elected
polity and the nation at laige. One veiy impoitant element of this
covenant is the implicit impeiative that, by giving up a ceitain
amount of individual and collective fieedom by way of obedience
to laws and legislations undei a shaied cultuial undeistanding, the
population of the nation is expecting the goveinment to ensuie theii
secuiity. Tis secuiity encompasses physical secuiity fiom dangeis
and exteinal attacks, and the mental secuiity and peace that aie
iequiied foi adequate giowth and the iealisation of an individuals
full potential.
Te concept of national secuiity, until iecently dened bioadly
as the physical secuiity of the geogiaphic boideis of the nation, has
undeigone a iadical change in the past few decades. Today it means
the secuiity of the nations inteiests, not only physical but also
economic and intellectual, in any pait of the woild. Tis is mainly
because of the incieased and instantaneous global connectivity that
has come about thiough iapid advances in infoimation technology.
Fiom a limited and naiiow view just a few decades ago, national
secuiity is now not constiained by national boundaiies, and is seen
as a function of connectivity on a veiy bioad basis and the fieedom
to conduct global business. Fuithei, national inteiest itself has
become a teim with vaiied inteipietations and nuances, without
a compiehensive denition that coveis all contingencies and is
acceptable to all nations. National inteiests, and the means that a
nation could employ to piotect them, vaiy in denition and scale
with the powei base of a nation and the spiead of its global inuence.
Te gieatei a nations global inuence, the gieatei and moie
complex its national inteiests. With the inteinational acceptance of
144
this changed and moie involved peiception of national secuiity, the
means to ensuie it have also undeigone sweeping changes.
Even 50 yeais ago, the piimaiy means of ensuiing national
secuiity was an adequate militaiy foice that combined the tiaits of
deteiience, defence and, when necessaiy, oensive actions. Changes
to the entiie secuiity enviionment, both thieats and iesponses,
have biought about changes in the concepts of opeiations and
the paiticipatoiy elements of national powei at the stiategic
level. In a contempoiaiy secuiity scenaiio it is likely that a puiely
tiaditional militaiy foice and the capabilities that it biings may
not nd a place in the bioadei secuiity outlook. Cuiiently, the
national powei base piimaiily consists of diplomatic, economic,
infoimation technological and militaiy capabilities that a nation can
biing to beai to fuithei its inteiests in an incieasingly complicated
woild. Because these capabilities aie diveise and need specialised
piofessionals to wield eectively, they aie also vested in dieient
gioups within the goveinment. In any given situation, the optimum
national iesponse will usually iequiie the cooidinated use of some
capability fiom one gioup and some fiom at least one othei, applied
jointly oi individually accoiding to the peiceived need at the time.
Such a cooidinated iesponse to emeiging secuiity needs will be
complex and dynamic, needing intense activity at shoit notice.
Teiefoie, the competencies iesident in national powei elements
will have to be developed and maintained at the appiopiiate degiee
on a continuous basis to achieve eciency in such an appioach to
secuiity.
Foi the foieseeable futuie, a whole-of-goveinment appioach to
national secuiity will be the optimum way to employ all elements of
national powei to ensuie acceptable stability and giowth.
145
MIII:nuv Comvv:vtIvs
Of every one hundred men, ten shouldnt even be there. Eighty
are nothing but targets, nine are real ghters We are lucky
to have them for they make the battle Ah, but One, one of
them is a Warrior and He will bring the others back.
Heiaclitus (ciica 500 BC)
Te piofession of aims has always been consideied a complex
activity, and nevei has it been moie so than in cuiient ciicumstances.
Te iange of militaiy opeiations has evolved histoiically fiom being
puiely the application of foice in the piotection of the nation-state,
to encompass a iambling but inteitwined spiead. Tis ianges fiom
opeiations as pait of national eoits to piovide emeigency disastei
ielief, humanitaiian aid and assistance to civil authoiities to majoi
conict and wai of national suivival.
1
Te concept of conict has
also undeigone changes and now the spectium of conict extends
beyond conventional wai and aimed conict to include militaiy
iesponses to thieats like teiioiism, insuigencies, tiansnational
ciime and illegal exploitation of Austialias natuial iesouices.
Te Austialian Defence Foice (ADF) has to catei to this
wide iange of opeiations and the complexities of the incieased
spectium of conict while functioning as an integial pait of the
whole-of-goveinment appioach to national secuiity. It must ensuie
that all its opeiations aie aligned with the national secuiity agenda
as laid down at the highest level of goveinment. Te complexity of
achieving this will be the highest in the militaiy when compaied to
all the othei elements of national powei. It is theiefoie incumbent
on the ADF to be able to suppoit national secuiity impeiatives by
ensuiing that its militaiy competencies aie appiopiiate to the task
they would have to peifoim. Conveisely, theie is also a iesponsibility
placed on the Goveinment to set a cleai militaiy objective that
suppoits the desiied political end-state when committing the ADF
to an opeiation.
146
Similai to the covenant between the elected goveinment and
the nation, the militaiy foices of a demociatic nation also have to
be cognisant of an unwiitten covenant between themselves and
the goveinment. Te goveinment piovides the militaiy with the
iesouices iequiied to build the capabilities that aie judged as
necessaiy to ensuie national secuiity. Because of the specialisation
iequiied to make such judgements, this capability iequiiement is
almost completely based on the peiceived needs that the militaiy
puts foiwaid. A iesponsive goveinment tiusts the militaiy and
does not noimally baulk at pioviding the iesouices to geneiate the
iequiied capabilities. Te othei side of the coin is that the militaiy
also has gieat iesponsibility put on it. Tis stems fiom the implicit
covenant that the militaiy will be able to employ the capabilities
that the goveinment has piovided on theii iequest optimally in
the seivice of the nation. It is this iesponsibility that makes it
impeiative foi the ADF to have militaiy competencies that match
its undeistood goveinmental iemit.
Professional Mastery
Militaiy competencies aie undeipinned by the piofessional
masteiy that is needed to exeicise them eectively in a
piopoitionate and humane mannei. To succeed in opeiations, the
ADF needs adaptive stiuctuies and peisonnel with piofessional
masteiy of joint opeiations at the tactical and opeiational levels,
and of militaiy stiategy and national secuiity impeiatives at the
stiategic level. Such piofessional masteiy is founded on balanced
skills acquiied thiough tiaining and piofessional education and
developed to the appiopiiate level. Piofessional masteiy condently
combines these balanced skills and knowledge with expeiience to
match the capabilities of the foice as a whole with national secuiity
iequiiements.
Te ADFs capability to geneiate and apply militaiy foice as
needed is completely dependent on the piofessional masteiy of
its peisonnel in the single Seivice and joint domains. Piofessional
masteiy is a pioduct of the knowledge, skills and attitudes of leadeis
147
at all levels and the exibility and iobustness of the oiganisation.
2

Piofessional masteiy also has a moial, ethical and intellectual aspect
to it. It focuses stiongly on conducting opeiations with a national
ethos to achieve the desiied end-state. Such masteiy is iealised
thiough the commandeis and the peisonnel who execute and
suppoit the opeiations. Piofessional masteiy is a coineistone foi
the competencies necessaiy to achieve the objectives that aie laid
down. It ensuies the ielevance and establishes the link between ADF
opeiations and national secuiity.
Te Goveinment can legally diiect the ADF to apply militaiy
foice in a wide iange of opeiations to secuie Austialias national
secuiity inteiests. Te ADF, thiough the Chief of the Defence Foice
(CDF), is iesponsible to the Goveinment foi the defence of Austialia
in its bioadest foim in accoidance with national secuiity policies and
specic contextual goveinment diiectives. Te political, stiategic
and geogiaphic enviionment within which the ADF has to achieve
this task is complex and dynamic, iequiiing the foices to be moie
than noimally adaptive and veisatile. Te ADF has to be capable of
joint opeiations and must maintain appiopiiate militaiy stiategy,
foice stiuctuie and opeiational ieadiness. Such piepaiedness, while
ciucial to success, is also extiemely demanding. It iequiies the
foice to be able to stiaddle a veiy wide iange of opeiations, fiom
aimed conict to iesponsive and contiolled application of foice,
and adapting to caiiy out othei actions shoit of aimed conict.
Only adequate piofessional masteiy at all levels will ensuie that the
ADF will be able to successfully plan and execute these dicult and
dangeious opeiations.
Joint Military Operations
Militaiy foices noimally consist of elements that opeiate
independently in the thiee enviionmentsland, maiitime and aii.
Taken individually, they may have the capability to opeiate at the
lowest end of the stiategic-opeiational-tactical continuum without
much diculty. Foi example, an aimy platoon may be able to opeiate
with the desiied eciency as an independent entity but may not be
148
able to integiate eectively with the laigei foice. Similaily, a patiol
boat could be opeiated by its ciew thioughout its peifoimance
envelope, but may not be able to contiibute to the bioadei capability
of the eet. Fiom an aii foice peispective, a squadion may be able to
y its aiiciaft, but would not be able to opeiate as a coheient unit,
pioducing the eects that aie needed. A laige numbei of militaiy
foices aiound the woild opeiate at this level and aie not capable of
contiibuting meaningfully to national secuiity.
Operating. In all the thiee cases, when basic opeiating skills
aie complemented by the ability to opeiate cohesively as a unit
and delivei the desiied outcome as an entity, the foice would have
achieved technical masteiy. Technical masteiy is the capability of a
foice to be able to opeiate its assets to theii fullest potential with
skill and delivei the highest levels of tactical competence. Tis is the
base level of tactical piociency and a foice capable of opeiating
at this level will only be able to contiibute at the lowest end of the
spectium of conict and in pioviding humanitaiian aid and disastei
ielief. Tese opeiations aie also at the lowest end in teims of the
iange of militaiy opeiations and iequiie only competent knowledge
of the equipment being employed and the baiest minimum of
undeistanding of the laigei pictuie. Such opeiations noimally
contiibute only in a limited mannei to the laigei national secuiity
issues. Fuithei, they do not noimally encountei any adveisaiy
opposition on such opeiations. Teiefoie, the foice will be able to
opeiate theii equipment in a benign enviionment without having to
face any complex oi dangeious situations.
Creating Eects. A seivice that is capable of opeiating in a
cohesive mannei can aspiie to become one that could cieate desiied
eects by having and exeicising piofessional masteiy of the single
seivice domain. Piofessional masteiy is a pieiequisite to utilising the
oiganisational and opeiational dimensions of the individual domains
to enable a paiticulai seivice to achieve the eects that aie needed
by the nation. A militaiy foice that has piofessional masteiy at the
single seivice level will be able to caiiy out middle-oidei opeiations
like peacekeeping oi enfoicement, limited boidei secuiity and
149
evacuation of peisonnel fiom conict zones. Te eects cieated by
such opeiations would still not meet the demands of highei level
national secuiity. Tey will also not be able to function eectively
in moie demanding scenaiios like high tempo counteiinsuigency
opeiations and piovide iesponses to gieatei thieats to national
secuiity.
Jointness. Te natuie of conict and the thieats to national
secuiity aie becoming incieasingly complex, demanding a gieatei
undeistanding of the joint iesponse iequiied fiom defence foices.
Tis is because the thieats cannot be defeated by any one seivice
opeiating puiely in its own domain, and need to be addiessed in
a joint mannei. Joint militaiy opeiations aie the bediock fiom
which othei iesponses can emanate to ensuie national secuiity
and iequiie a high oidei of integiation foi full eectiveness. A
joint foice is one which compiises signicant elements of the Navy,
Aimy and Aii Foice, oi at least two of these Seivices, opeiating
undei a single commandei. Conduct of ecient joint opeiations
is almost completely dependent on the constituent paities having
piofessional masteiy of the joint enviionment. In oidei to achieve
this, the piimaiy iequiiement is to have piofessional masteiy of the
single seivice domain, fiom which joint piofessional masteiy can
be built up. A foice that has achieved such piofessional masteiy
will be able to conduct the full iange of militaiy opeiations, fiom
humanitaiian assistance at the low end to full-blown aimed conict.
By achieving joint piofessional masteiy, a defence foice will be able
to assuie the goveinment of its ability to opeiate in such a way as to
suppoit all national secuiity initiatives that need the application of
the capabilities inheient in defence foices.
Whole-of-Government Approach
Te whole-of-goveinment appioach to secuiity aims to
use all the elements of national powei, as iequiied, to ensuie and
enhance national secuiity. Tis aims to nd the most appiopiiate
tooldiawn fiom national powei, with diplomatic, economic,
infoimational oi militaiy optionsto achieve national objectives.
3

150
Te ADF will only be one of the agencies, and not always the lead, in
assuiing Austialian secuiity in the futuie. Tis appioach tianslates
to a National Eects-Based Appioach (NEBA) to the use of national
powei in that the objective is to cieate eects of the appiopiiate
level and magnitude to piotect national inteiests. Tese eects
could be lethal and nonlethal, achieved by kinetic oi non-kinetic
action, even when militaiy foices aie being employed.
NEBA views national secuiity within an inteinational system that
has political, economic, social and militaiy dimensions. Any action
in one domain can cieate secondaiy eects in the same oi othei
domains, both shoit and long-teim. A paiticulai action could cieate
entiiely dieient eects in dieient contexts and theiefoie the full
bieadth of impacts of eveiy action must be cleaily undeistood befoie
any action is initiated. Failuie to factoi this into the stiategic planning
piocess may pievent the achievement of the desiied end-state.
Within the NEBA, militaiy foices can use a combination
of physical and viitual piesence to cieate peisistent eects that
last fai beyond the immediate iesults of the action. Te militaiy
contiibution to NEBA would noimally be as a joint militaiy
opeiation to achieve the desiied stiategic and opeiational
outcomes in peace, conict and post-conict situations within the
whole-of-goveinment appioach to secuiity issues. Ultimately the
militaiy foice would have to aspiie to be one that can opeiate at the
highest levels of integiation to make a compiehensive contiibution
to national eoit. Such a foice would need to become a seamless
entity.
Seamless Military Force. A militaiy foice that has attained
ieasonable piociency in joint opeiations should aspiie to achieve
a highei, moie compiehensive jointness and become a seamless
foice. A seamless foice is one that opeiates beyond the connes of
a joint foice and is capable of haimonious conduct of opeiations as
a single entity.
4
In oidei to achieve seamlessness, the militaiy foices
must have piofessional masteiy that combines a sophisticated
and holistic view of the combined stiengths of the foice and a
cleai undeistanding of militaiy stiategy at the appiopiiate levels
151
of command. Tis is necessaiy to undeistand the oveiall stiategy
and theieby employ the foices necessaiy to achieve the aims of the
campaign. Tis will also ensuie that the stiengths of a paiticulai
agency, like the militaiy, could be used as leveiages to mitigate the
disadvantages that anothei might have so that the powei that is
nally piojected is without any weakness that can be exploited by a
deteimined adveisaiy. A seamless foice should be able to integiate
the tiaditional foices with each othei and integiate exteinally with a
wide iange of suppoiting oiganisations, agencies and also the laigei
community.
5
Fiom a view of puiely militaiy opeiations, seamless
opeiations iequiie the highest level of piofessional masteiy fiom
mid- to high-level commandeis.
Multi-Agency Operations. A defence foice that has achieved
a modicum of seamlessness will be able to opeiate as an integial
paitnei with othei agencies within a whole-of-goveinment
appioach to national secuiity. Fiom a militaiy peispective this is
peihaps the most dicult step to take and consists of being capable
of multinational opeiations. Te ieasons foi this aie twofold. Fiistly,
it is dicult foi the militaiy foices to bieak the mindset cieated
by the centuiies-old tiadition of being the lead in all matteis
conceining national secuiity. Secondly, militaiy opeiations aie
conducted in a paiticulai mannei that does not nd iesonance
in civilian opeiations and theiefoie inteiopeiability between the
militaiy and othei agencies involved would become pioblematic. In
oidei to ensuie smooth and tiouble fiee multi-agency opeiations,
the militaiy leadeiship must have piofessional masteiy of national
secuiity impeiatives. Fuithei, they should be able to let this masteiy
spiead both lineaily and veitically thiough the foice to ensuie
that the foice as a whole is well infoimed of the intiicacies of
multi-agency opeiations and theii impoitance to national secuiity.
Militaiy foices that can achieve this eciency can easily become
pait of the nations giand secuiity stiategy.
Grand Strategy. Giand stiategy cooidinates and diiects all
the elements of national powei towaids achieving the political
end-state, as dened by national policy, sought in the application
152
of foice.
6
Since the militaiy foice is only one of the many agencies
that woik towaids making the nation secuie, it is impoitant foi
the militaiys senioi leadeiship to be piofessional masteis of giand
stiategy that guides the secuiity actions of the nation. Tis masteiy
does not come easily and is the iesult of a lifetime of piofessional
education, supplemented by expeiience fiom the tactical to
the stiategic context of militaiy opeiations, its inteiaction with
goveinment policies, a cleai undeistanding of national secuiity
goals and awaieness of the nations politico-economic stiengths.
Howevei, senioi militaiy commandeis would be ill-suited to
advise the goveinment of national secuiity issues if they do not
demonstiate theii masteiy of giand stiategy. In oidei to make suie
that the militaiy is ielevant to the nations inteiests and piovides a
tangible ietuin foi the long-teim investment that the nation does
in its militaiy foices, it is necessaiy to nuituie the development
of piofessional masteiy at the giand stiategic level in oceis of
the senioi middle level. Tis would ensuie a sequential succession
of capable oceis to the highei command positions, who would
contiibute condently and coiiectly to the national secuiity debate
at the highest level.
Summnuv
Te ciedibility of a nation vis--vis its diplomatic manoeuvies
and stiategic aspiiations has to be undeipinned by eective foice
piojection capabilities as well as a demonstiated national will to
puisue its objectives. Te ieality of iecent times is that national
leadeiship has iealised that the militaiy is the best equipped
to deal with most ciisis contingencies. Howevei, many of these
contingencies go well beyond the mandate that is tiaditionally
given to the militaiy foices. In this context, it is necessaiy foi the
goveinment to specify the militaiy objectives that aie expected
to be achieved and how that would fuithei suppoit the desiied
153
political end-state. It is essential that the national secuiity policy be
the oveiaiching stiategic umbiella beneath which national powei
elements align to achieve political and militaiy objectives.
Te piofessional masteiy of theii peisonnel is the most
impoitant aspect of militaiy education and tiaining and can
nevei be ieplaced by any amount of automation. Piofessional
masteiy can be explained but not adequately dened because it is a
combination of multifaiious qualities in an individual which, when
viewed togethei with the piofessional masteiy iesident in othei
peisonnel, makes the piofessional masteiy of a seivice oi joint foice
appaient. In this case the sum will always be moie than the total
of individual quantities. Moiale and intellect, the most essential
qualities to waighting eectiveness, can only be nuituied within
an enviionment of piofessional masteiy at all levels of the foice.
Te eectiveness of the militaiy is undeipinned by its
piofessional masteiy at all levels, fiom the technical masteiy
iequiied to opeiate eciently as a tactical unit at the lowest level,
to being able to contiibute to national secuiity at the giand stiategic
level. Piofessional masteiy spieads like a funnel fiom the lowest
point of tactical eciency to the highest point wheie the masteiy
tianscends the puiely militaiy and has to giapple with the inheient
convolutions of national secuiity at the highest conceptual level.
Tis giowth is necessaiy foi militaiy commandeis to be eective in
the laigei stage on which the militaiy foices now opeiate, within the
whole-of-goveinment appioach to national secuiity.
154
No:vs
1 Royal Austialian Aii Foice, Austialian Aii Publication 1000DTe Air Power
Manual, Fifth Edition, Aii Powei Development Centie, Canbeiia, 2007, pp. 4041.
2 ibid, p 18.
3 Depaitment of Defence, Austialian Defence Doctiine PublicationD.3Joint
Operations for the 21st Century, Depaitment of Defence, Commonwealth of
Austialia, Canbeiia, 2007, p. 15.
4 Sanu Kainikaia, Capability Born Joint: Towards a Seamless Force, Aii Powei
Development Centie Papei No. 22, Canbeiia, Septembei 2007, p. 10.
5 Depaitment of Defence, Austialian Defence Doctiine PublicationD.2Force 2020,
Depaitment of Defence, Canbeiia, 2002, p. 17.
6 B.H. Liddell Hait, Strategy, Second Revised Edition, Penguin Books Ltd, England,
1991, p. 322.
Chaptei 7
An Aii Stiategy Within
National Secuiity
156
157
A Aiv S:v:rov Wi:ni N:ioi Srcuvi:v
AN AIR STRATEGY WITHIN NATIONAL SECURITY
For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see,
Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be;
Saw the heavens ll with commerce, argosies of magic sails,
Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly bales;
Heard the heavens ll with shouting, and there raind a ghastly dew
From the nations airy navies grappling in the central blue.
Alfied, Loid Tennyson,
Locksley Hall, 1842
A nations quest foi secuiity is an endless jouiney, full of
twists and tuins, mostly deteimined by ciicumstances somewhat
outside the nations contiol and based on the undeistood balance
between evolving thieats and oppoitunities. Te tiend of iapid
and diamatic change in the national secuiity equation is a moie
iecent phenomenon as compaied to the moie staid and tiaditional
appioach. Howevei, theie is also a veiy noticeable continuity in
the stiategic view of secuiity and the means to achieve this. Te
Clausewitzian concept of conicts being a continuation of political
policy by othei means still holds good.
In the 60 yeais since the end of Woild Wai II, a wai to end all
othei wais, ovei 200 conicts of vaiying intensity have been fought
foi ieasons that aie as fai apait as maintaining the soveieignty of a
nation to fuitheiing ieligious extiemism. Howevei, the inteinational
communitys piopensity to tiy to manage political, ieligious and
ethnic disputes thiough the use of foice, vested in the militaiy
foices of a nation, has not diminished. Iiiespective of the foim
of goveinment and the political and diplomatic manoeuviings
that convulse a nation, theie is an indelible connection between a
nations stiategic design and the employment of militaiy foices.
1

In fact, most of the conicts of the past centuiy have been cleai
158
demonstiations of the concept of the use of the aimed foices to
achieve political ends. Tis is an accepted histoiical paiadigm.
Te militaiy foices of a nation aie often the most visible
element of national powei and play a veiy inuential pait in
establishing the nations ielevance in the inteinational community.
At times the aimed foices of a nation exeit inuence fai in excess of
theii actual capability because of the inheient deteiience that they
embody. Austialia needs to be cognisant of this peculiaiity that the
ADF could be a veiy useful tool in subtly inuencing its neighbouis.
Success in such an endeavoui would depend on the ADF having the
capacity and being given the iesouices to develop visibly the abilities
iequiied. Fuithei theie is also a need foi the national leadeiship to
undeistand the utility of these abilities acioss a wide spectium of
opeiations as well as in othei contingencies.
Co:vmvounuv CovIIt:s
Te conventional army loses if it does not win. Te guerrilla
wins if he does not lose.
Heniy Kissingei
Contempoiaiy opeiations stiaddle the full spectium of conict,
and involve militaiy and non-militaiy agencies that foim pait of
the combination of national powei elements that contiibute to
national secuiity. Te iange of opeiations vaiies fiom humanitaiian
assistance in the wake of natuial oi man-made disasteis on the one
end to wais of national suivival at the othei. Te common factoi
that connects these completely dieient scenaiios is that, within
a whole-of-goveinment appioach to national secuiity, both these
opeiations and the ones that fall in between involve all elements
of national powei to achieve the desiied stiategic objectives. Tese
opeiations inciease in complexity as they shift fiom humanitaiian
159
assistance to wai and demand sophisticated inputs fiom all agencies
that aie taking pait. In a veiy simplistic mannei it could be said
that the intensity of militaiy contiibution to the iange of opeiations
would be least at the low end and maximum at a high-end wai of
national suivival. Te lead agency in these opeiations would also
vaiy dependent on the natuie of iesponse iequiied. It is moie than
likely that at the highei end of the iange, the militaiy would be given
the lead since it would involve the conceited application of foice to
achieve the desiied end-state, while non-militaiy agencies iegulaily
lead humanitaiian assistance opeiations.
Austialias militaiy stiategy, which is an integial pait of
national secuiity stiategy, guides the ADFs actions in contiibuting
to the achievement of national secuiity objectives, laid down at the
highest level of goveinment decision-making. Te stiategy piovides
the planning foundation that ensuies that all militaiy opeiations aie
aligned with the national stiategy and that the actions cieate the
desiied eects within the National Eects-Based Appioach (NEBA)
to national secuiity. In eect, the militaiy stiategy aiticulates
the ADFs intent in teims of its contiibution to the whole-of-
goveinment appioach to ensuiing the piotection of Austialias
inteiests and assuiing its long-teim secuiity.
Te spiead of contexts within which the ADF will have to
opeiate is vast, ianging fiom national militaiy opeiations to global
multinational campaigns. Additionally, the secuiity enviionment
is such that all the opeiations in the spiead would have to be
conducted within a multi-agency enviionment, iiiespective of
the scale of opeiations and whethei the individual action is only
militaiy oi conducted in combination with some othei agency.
Within this multi-agency fiamewoik, militaiy opeiations could be
conducted in a multinational enviionment oi be pait of a national
whole-of-goveinment initiative. In the multinational enviionment
the opeiations could be coalition opeiations oi combined
opeiations. Coalition opeiations aie those wheie the paitnei nations
aie unied by the mission objectives foi a paiticulai campaign.
Combined opeiations aie caiiied out by allies jointly with the
160
thiee aims of the defence foices to achieve common objectives,
piimaiily militaiy in natuie. Joint, coalition and combined militaiy
opeiations aie always undeitaken within the whole-of-goveinment
appioach and could be suppoited by oi suppoitive of non-militaiy
opeiations. Te context is dynamic, but the aim of each opeiation,
fiom the tactical to the stiategic, is always aligned with the national
objectives. Te secuiity of a nation cannot be assuied by militaiy
means alone.
It is becoming appaient that most militaiy opeiations would
now be conducted in coalition with fiiendly nations and allies. Tiee
factois aect such multinational opeiationscomplexity in being
joint, cohesiveness of the foice and inteiopeiability. Te complexity
in initiating joint action is the lowest when the components of
one defence foice aie acting independently. It is the highest when
multinational foices opeiate togethei to achieve a common goal.
Complexity will be highei in a coalition than when opeiating with
an ally because alliances by theii veiy natuie would have exeicised
togethei and theiefoie would have a bettei undeistanding of
each otheis opeiation ethos. Commonality of tiaining, doctiine
and opeiational concepts as well as common equipment builds
undeistanding leading to inteiopeiability. Cohesiveness of the foice
and inteiopeiability aie inteilinked. In multinational foices, unied
by need, the cohesiveness and inteiopeiability will be the lowest and
in alliances the maximum.
Contempoiaiy militaiy foices need to be agile, exible and
veisatile to adapt to the laige spectium of conict that ianges fiom
the veiy low technology and low thieat enviionment noimally found
in humanitaiian aid opeiations to high intensity conict at the
leading edge of technology. Te intensity and tempo of opeiations
will also vaiy, both being the lowest at the low end of the spectium.
Iiiespective of the intensity and tempo of opeiations, contempoiaiy
conict demands that the militaiy foices be able to caiiy out joint
aii-land integiated opeiations, with iobust command and contiol
and to piovide a timely and adequate iesponse. Te foice also needs,
as a minimum, the ciitical mass to caiiy out concuiient opeiations
161
and the exibility to be able to shift up oi down the spectium of
conict iapidly and smoothly.
Modein conict demands piopoitionality and disciimination
in the application of foice and the management of eects that aie
cieated to achieve the end-state. Tis can be achieved by being able
to cieate tailoied lethal and nonlethal eects thiough piecisely
contiolled kinetic and non-kinetic iesponses to thieats. Te militaiy
foice needs to be able to opeiate at the high end of the spectium
but ietain the capacity to scale down to suit the context so that the
iesponse is always appiopiiate to the situation. Technology plays
a majoi pait in this capability to iamp up and diaw down at a
suciently fast pace in keeping with the changing enviionment.
AIu Povvu Bvvoo Tuv CovIvs Ov Tuv Tuvn:uv
Tere are still those who fail to stand back and reect on the
fact that air assets operate in the one medium that surrounds
the earth and that touches 100 percent of the earths
population, political capitals and centres of commerce.
Geneial Ronald R. Fogleman,
USAF (Ret.), 1997
Aii powei has the capability to opeiate with the necessaiy
agility and exibility to cieate the desiied eect and theieby piovides
the goveinment with a cleai option when faced with situations that
need the piojection of powei. Aii opeiations aie distinguished by
thiee majoi attiibutes deiived fiom the inheient chaiacteiistics of
aii powei. Tey aie speed of manoeuvie and iesponse, peispective
and ieach. Speed of manoeuvie and iesponse is a ciitical capability
in deteimining the eectiveness of militaiy actions thioughout
the spectium of contempoiaiy conict. Moie than any othei foice
piojection capability, aii powei has the capacity to iespond to
162
emeiging situations in a time-ciitical mannei that could be ciucial
foi victoiy in a numbei of occasions. Aii poweis peispective, based
on its sensoi hoiizon, can covei vast stietches of the battlespace and
in any given situation will be able to covei the entiie battleeld. Tis
will not only enhance the joint foices timely iesponse options, but
also complicate the adveisaiys stiategy and tactics. Aii powei can
ieach any point in the battlespace and can opeiate unconstiained
by natuial baiiieis. Tis is a gieat advantage when the opeiating
theatie is spiead out and has dieient teiiain limitations foi the
opeiations of the suiface foices. Optimally utilising these thiee
unique attiibutes, aii opeiations, independent oi within a joint
enviionment, can cieate multiple eects simultaneously oi in iapid
succession as iequiied. Fuithei, they can be applied acioss the entiie
theatie and also in deep battles aiound the battlespace.
Te theatie of contempoiaiy opeiations is dynamic and
challenging. It encompasses the land littoial oi maiitime
enviionment as well as uiban oi iuial settings and could be
geogiaphically concentiated oi widely dispeised. Fuithei, the foices
may be engaged in moie than one theatie simultaneously with the
full iange of opeiations being caiiied out in one oi moie theaties.
Foi example, the foice could be engaged in high-intensity conict
in one land theatie, while simultaneously undeitaking humanitaiian
assistance and peacekeeping opeiations in a geogiaphically
sepaiated second littoial theatie. Te diveisity of teiiain, iange of
opeiations and spectium of conict can cieate a mind-boggling
numbei of vaiiations to the tiaditional foice piojection capability of
the militaiy foices.
Aii powei has the capability to dominate the battlespace
acioss these diveise enviionments and can oveicome both time
and space constiaints that encumbei the suiface foices. Its ieach
and penetiation enables it to pioject the necessaiy powei and
cieate eects ovei a veiy laige aiea. Aii powei piovides a exible
and mobile umbiella foi inteifeience-fiee suiface foice opeiations
that can be extended oi cuitailed depending on the iequiiement.
Te laige numbei of iesponse and deteiient options that it piovides
163
to joint foice commandeis makes it a capability that inheiently
biings stiategic depth to a joint campaign. Smallei aii foices will,
howevei, face the diawback of not being able to meet the challenge
of concuiiency undei all ciicumstances. Tis is because, in a lot of
cases, the smallei aii foices would alieady be opeiating at the ciitical
mass iequiied foi one opeiation, theieby making it impossible foi
them undeitake any meaningful concuiient opeiations.
Kvv Tnss vou AIu Povvu
We do not have to be out and out disciples of Douhet to be
persuaded of the great signicance of air forces for a future
war, and to go on from there to explore how success in the air
could be exploited for ground warfare, which would in turn
consolidate the aerial victory.
Majoi Geneial Heinz Gudeiian, 1937
Teie aie foui key tasks that aii powei peifoims in the joint
aiena, within the denition of a joint militaiy campaign, to
suppoit national secuiity objectives. Tis contiibution would
have to be aligned with the contiibution of not only othei militaiy
capabilities, but also of othei elements of national powei. Te ist
is to obtain contiol of the aii, which is a pieiequisite foi the success
of all opeiations. Te othei thiee aie the ability to detect, decide
and defeat emeiging thieats. Tese thiee tasks aie caiiied out
simultaneously and in veiy close coopeiation with each othei. Te
ability to know oi detect is fundamental to cieating the necessaiy
situational awaieness as close to ieal-time as possible. Fiom such
awaieness comes the capability to decide on the optimum couise
of action to defeat the thieat in the best possible mannei. Te
selected couise of action could span the spectium fiom deteiience,
inuencing and managing the conict space, to kinetic actions to
164
neutialise the taiget. Defeat iequiies iapid and oensive iesponse,
but does not mean destiuction alone. It encompasses even nonlethal
actions initiated to achieve success.
By assuiing contiol of the aii and leveiaging its ability to detect,
decide and defeat all existing and emeigent thieats thiough aiiboine
opeiations, aii powei piovides a new concept and undeistanding of
battlespace dominance.
Control of the Air
Control of the air is the ability to conduct friendly operations
in all three dimensions without eective interference from
enemy air power.
2
At the iisk of iepetition, it has to be ieiteiated that contiol
of the aii is an absolute iequisite foi the successful completion of
all othei opeiationsland, maiitime oi aii. Tis undeistanding is
extiemely impoitant, especially to Westein foices that foi the past
60 yeais have not had to opeiate without assuied contiol of the
aii. Tis extended Westein dominance of the aii has biought in
an undeilying feeling of taking foi gianted that fiiendly aii foices
would always iule the skies. While this may indeed be the case foi
the foieseeable futuie, some emeiging tiends have to be monitoied
and iemedial actions initiated if this situation is to be peipetuated.
Aii powei is ciitically dependent on Aiiboine Waining
and Contiol Systems (AWACS) and Aii-to-Aii Refuelling foi its
continued optimum peifoimance. Tese become high-value assets,
both because of this dependence as well as the limited numbeis of
these iesouices that aie available. Te tiend towaids piolifeiation of
veiy capable aii defence weapon systems, even at the lowei end of
the spectium of conict, makes the likelihood of an attack on these
assets a distinct possibility. Any loss would have a maiked eect on
the oveiall capability of the foice to ensuie adequate contiol of the
aii. Te second tiend that must be monitoied is the development
of nascent aii powei capabilities in some of the moie piominent
insuigent gioups like the Libeiation Tigeis of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in
165
Sii Lanka and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Even though these capabilities
aie at piesent veiy limited, they could be built up faiily quickly and
easily to cieate a suciently stiong opposition. Tis could come as
an unpleasant suipiise to complacent foices.
Modein suiface combat is diused and piedominantly fought
in uiban aieas if ovei land and in the littoial if maiitime. Teie is
also no cleai-cut distinction between combatants and civilians, and
the absence of a visible fiont line makes it dicult to demaicate the
combat zone. Undei these conditions, theie is a necessity to isolate
the full theatie of conict so that exteinal assistance to the adveisaiy
is denied. Tis can only be achieved by aii powei opeiating beyond
the theatie undei constant contiol of the aii. Inteidicting supply
lines to the combat zone and pioviding diiect suppoit to suiface
opeiations can be done eectively only when contiol of the aii
has been achieved. In these situations contiol of the aii diiectly
tianslates to battlespace dominancea piimaiy iequiiement foi
success in conict.
Ability to Detect: Improving Situational Awareness
Aii assets aie most suited to gathei intelligence, caiiy out
suiveillance and ieconnaissance, and disseminate the analysed
infoimation as necessaiy. Tis capability is ciucial to undeistanding
the chaiacteiistics of the opeiating enviionment and knowing
the details of events taking place in a dynamic conict situation.
Contempoiaiy aii powei is synonymous with peisistent Intelligence,
Suiveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. In addition, its
capability to exploit the thiid dimension and the exibility of its
assets make aii powei the fountainhead of the detect and infoim
function ciitical to the success all militaiy opeiations.
Te teim detect has been used in piefeience to the commonly
used know to emphasise the subtle but signicant change that
aiiboine ISR has undeigone in the iecent past. ISR in the tiaditional
sense used to be able to piovide an oveiall knowledge of events.
Howevei, technology now piovides aii assets with the capability
to detect adveisaiy movements pioactively, in neai ieal-time, and
166
theieby piovide infoimation to fiiendly foices. Peisistent ISR is
made possible by a combination of space-based assets and aiiboine
manned and unmanned assets using a iobust, high-capacity
netwoik. Tis enables infoimation supeiioiity, achieved by the
synthesis of ISR and infoimation opeiations.
Te ability to detect thiough peisistent ISR has thiee piimaiy
enabling chaiacteiistics. Fiist, it iequiies the asset to have veiy
long enduiance to be able to loitei ovei the aiea of inteiest.
Te alteinative to this is to ensuie adequacy of suiveillance and
ieconnaissance by aiianging ievisit by the same oi dieient assets at
the coiiect inteivals so that no enemy activity goes undetected. Tis
situation might waiiant a layeied ISR capability, undeipinned by
aiea suiveillance being done by space-based assets. Second, ISR has
to be constantly caiiied out at the cutting edge of technology. Tis is
to avoid a capability becoming iedundant by the use of piolifeiating
counteimeasuies. Constiaints in the detection function will have to
be oveicome by the innovative use of technology. Tiid, the ISR will
have to ensuie delity of infoimation that is made available. Tis
assuiance is ciitical foi decision-makeis thioughout the veitical
chain of command.
Infoimation supeiioiity, which is what peisistent ISR deliveis,
is ciitical to situational awaieness and peimits the initiation of
appiopiiate actions at a pace that gains the initiative. Supeiioi
situational awaieness, when handled by piofessional masteis of
the paiticulai enviionment, enables decision supeiioiity. Decision
supeiioiity, the ability to make and implement appiopiiate and
accuiate decisions at a tempo highei than that of the adveisaiy, is
the piimaiy wai-winning factoi foi any combat foice. Aii powei
piovides the fundamental input to assuiing decision supeiioiity.
Ability to Decide: Shape, Inuence and Manage
Teie aie two independent aspects to the ability to decide: one,
the combination of infoimation availability and capability to make
decisions, and two, the command and contiol aiiangements to
infoim and implement the decisions.
167
Infoimation availability, its adequacy and delity, is ensuied by
aii poweis ability to detect and the analysed knowledge will decide
the couise of action that will be adopted by the foice. Te selected
couise of action will be oiiented towaids shapingby inuencing
and managingthe battlespace at the times and locations of choice
to the desiied degiee in oidei to facilitate fiiendly opeiations.
Teie aie thiee main inputs to shaping the battlespace and they
encompass a iange of actions fiom iesponsive nonlethal ones to the
kinetic application of foice. Te ist input is the cieation of a iapid
and iesponsive logistics chain that contiibutes diiectly to shaping
the battle space and indiiectly thiough the suppoit it piovides to the
second input, which is the capability to caiiy out joint manoeuvie
waifaie. Te thiid input is the capability to cieate the desiied eects,
both kinetic and non-kinetic.
Aii powei has the capacity to cieate a ieactive logistics supply
chain iapidly in an evolving scenaiio, essentially because of its
iesponsive aiilift capabilities. In ciicumstances wheie the joint
foices aie opeiating away fiom diiect contact with home base,
this becomes a ciitical iequiiement foi the conduct of ecient
opeiations. Te ieach and payload of aiilift capabilities ensuies that
the chain is not unduly extended, theieby amelioiating a ciucial
vulneiability in expeditionaiy opeiations. By its ability to maintain
logistics chains foi long duiations in fai-ung aieas of opeiations, aii
powei inuences the battlespace in favoui of fiiendly foices. Such a
logistics chain is also fundamental to the manoeuvie capabilities of
the joint foice.
Joint foices manoeuvie waifaie capabilities aie essential
to shape the battlespace eectively. Manoeuvie waifaie can be
tianslated to an asymmetiic capability because istly, it can be
unpiedictable and secondly, joint ies can be biought to beai
on an unsuspecting adveisaiy theieby incieasing the suipiise
factoi. In pie-emption oi unconventional conict situations,
unpiedictability is by itself a coveted capability. Two othei factois,
independent in themselves, have to be consideied as essential to
the success of joint foice manoeuvie waifaie. Tese aie peisistent
168
ISR and a iobust command and contiol (C2) system. ISR piovides
the functional input into the planning of manoeuvie waifaie with
infoimation iegaiding adveisaiy dispositions and enables the
selection of the appiopiiate couise of action in a given context. Tis
piovides incieased unpiedictability to the manoeuvie options of
the joint foice. A iobust C2 system links the ISR function to joint
manoeuvies while also ensuiing theii ecient conduct. Aii powei
capabilities can cieate unpiedictability, contiibute eectively to
joint ies and piovide the backbone foi the piovision of peisistent
ISR and C2 functions. All joint foice manoeuvie waifaie opeiations
would be heavily dependent on aii powei foi its success.
A majoi factoi in shaping the battlespace is the cieation of
appiopiiate eects, kinetic and non-kinetic, lethal and nonlethal.
Aii poweis speed, iange, piecision and penetiation capabilities
make it the ideal choice to cieate lethal, kinetic eects at the desiied
time and place. Technology empoweis aii powei to be piopoitional
and disciiminatoiy in the application of foice. Te combination of
piecision, piopoitionality and disciimination is unique to aii powei
and when intelligently employed can cieate devastating eects. Aii
powei is also the fiontiunnei in cieating non-kinetic eects. Its
ieach and veiy visual piesence can be eective in a show of foice
to demonstiate the capability and intent of a foice to adveisaiies
who may be contemplating actions against fiiendly foices. In
contempoiaiy conict, this capability assumes gieatei impoitance
because of the dispeised natuie of the thieat and the meiging of the
adveisaiy with the laigei civilian population in the battlespace.
Biinging togethei a iesponsive logistics chain, enabling joint
manoeuvie waifaie and the cieation of the desiied eects aie the
fundamental inputs to shaping the battlespace and contiolling the
diiection of the conict to align with ones own stiategic objectives.
All the inputs that aii powei contiibutes to the ability to decide
aie undeipinned and optimally biought togethei by a iobust,
netwoik enabled C2 system. Teie is an indelible link between ISR
and C2. Aii powei assets aie majoi contiibutois to ISR functions,
as well as in the synthesis and fuithei dissemination of infoimation
169
gatheied fiom a iange of souices. Likewise, aii powei C2 assets will
be able mould maiitime, land and aii C2 systems into a iobust and
seamless entity that will piovide two majoi advantagesdecision
supeiioiity and neai ieal-time taigeting capability. Decision
supeiioiity tianslates to contiolled manoeuvie waifaie and cohesive
joint opeiations that will ultimately contiol the tempo of opeiations.
Seamless C2 is also an essential component of the ability to defeat
existing and emeigent thieats.
Ability to Defeat: Response Options
Aii powei has the capability to piovide tailoied, piopoitional
and timely application of foice to cieate desiied eects in joint,
coalition oi multi-agency campaigns. Tis capability is the
combination of a numbei of inheient qualities of aii powei, optimally
biought togethei within the context of the campaign at the stiategic
level and battlespace opeiations at the opeiational and tactical level.
Response to all thieats will have to be a joint endeavoui because
the necessity to evolve into a seamless foice peicolates to all levels,
jointness stiaddles all opeiations. Cooidination of the battlespace is
ciitical to success in joint opeiations and is heavily dependent on
the synthesis of all ISR inputs and the availability of a joint, possibly
seamless, C2 system.
Contempoiaiy battlespace is complex and the suiface
enviionment has a numbei of chaiacteiistics that could limit the
uniestiicted application of foice. It is expected that a majoiity
of conicts would be conducted in the uiban aieas which would
piovide only limited visibility and manoeuvie options to suiface
foices. Uiban teiiain tends to fiagment and disoiient laige suiface
foices by limiting the peispective and visibility of the battlespace
that is available to the commandei. Fuithei, it also inhibits and
in most case denies the advantages inheient in the use of massed
ie in suppoit of suiface opeiations because of the lack of
damage disciimination that accompanies such actions. Oensive
employment of aii powei piovides satisfactoiy solutions to all the
diculties in iesponding appiopiiately to opeiational iequiiements.
170
Te fundamental iequiiements in joint opeiations aie to be
able to conduct concuiient opeiations and have demonstiated
swiftness of iesponse. Aii powei ensuies that the joint foice is
capable of caiiying out both these functions by pioviding iesponse
options thiough thiee majoi contiibutions, deiived fiom foui
coie competencies. Te iesponse options aie stiategic attack, time
sensitive taigeting and aii mobility. Te coie competencies aie
foimed by a conscious amalgam of aii powei chaiacteiistics and
aie oensive attacks, asymmetiy, infoimation supeiioiity and foice
multiplieis. Oensive attack capabilities aie a function of speed,
iange, payload, piecision, suivivability and iesponsiveness. Aii
powei has an inheient asymmetiy in its employment options which
is enhanced by its technology enabled capacity foi stand-o weapon
deliveiy and stealth. Te ubiquity of aii assets in the collection,
collation and dissemination of infoimation has alieady been cleaily
enunciated. Aii powei is the linchpin in the joint foice achieving
infoimation supeiioiity and adds to the iesponse options available
to the joint commandei. A numbei of technology aided capabilities,
like netwoiked C2, multi-task capable assets and swing and switch-
iole oensive systems, individually and collectively, piovide foice
multipliei capacity and added agility to aii powei systems.
Strategic Attack. Aii powei can cieate the desiied eects
thiough kinetic and non-kinetic actions. Howevei, theie is also a
iequiiement to keep the collateial damage to the baie minimum.
Management of collateial damage has become a sensitive issue that
has been politicised beyond ieasonable debate and, theiefoie, has
become of piimaiy impoitance in the politico-militaiy inteiaction
in demociatic nations. Aii-deliveied piecision guided munitions
(PGM) piovide the solution to ensuiing that collateial damage
is minimised and kept within acceptable limits. PGM facilitate
an appiopiiate level of weapon-to-taiget match, have the needed
accuiacy and aie disciiminate enough to cieate the desiied level of
eects. Tey also have sucient exibility and stand-o capability,
while being able to be conguied foi small yield when necessaiy.
Aii powei can engage multiple centies of giavity of the adveisaiy
171
in the same mission and assets that have multi-iole capability can
themselves become foice multiplieis by being able to switch ioles
on an as iequiied basis. Tis exibility will be gieatly coveted,
especially in situations wheie theie is only a limited quantity of aii
assets available.
Time Sensitive Targeting. Te concept of time sensitive
taigeting (TST) is a combined pioduct of the impiovements in
ISR capabilities that now peimit infoimation availability in neai
ieal-time and the gieatly enhanced iesponse envelope of aiiboine
oensive systems. Tis piovides a foice with the capability to
engage a taiget almost immediately aftei it has been detected. In
contempoiaiy conict this capability is of the gieatest impoitance
because the natuie of taigets has undeigone a metamoiphosis as
compaied to tiaditional waifaie. Today, luciative taigets piovide
only eeting oppoitunities to engage and neutialise. A fuithei
dimension of TST is that the need to avoid collateial damage makes
aii poweis piecision and stand-o capabilities veiy attiactive in
such instances. Te basic iequiiement in TST is the capability
foi immediate iesponse and its success is dependent on the joint
foices ability to cieate timely, piopoitionate and disciiminatoiy
eects ieliably and accuiately. Tis in tuin is the pioduct of
iapid, netwoiked infoimation dissemination employed in close
conjunction with iesponsible, agile weapon platfoims. Both these
seminal iequiiements aie the foite of aii powei.
Air Mobility. Optimum employment of aii mobility is
dependent on adequate contiol of the aii. Aii mobility biings
togethei aii poweis gieatei iange and iesponsiveness with
suciency in payload capacity acioss geogiaphical boundaiies.
Te combination of these chaiacteiistics pioduces a capability
that piovides tiemendous exibility to a joint foices commandei.
Te iapid and eective iesponse that aii mobility piovides is an
eective deteiient in many instances and in otheis it facilitates joint
manoeuvie in theatie. Te capability of aii powei to piovide aii
mobility in multiple theaties simultaneously is an added advantage
172
that could be leveiaged as a foice multipliei, especially quantitatively
decient foices.
Peacetime Concurrency of the Air Force
Te commitment of the Aii Foice to the thiee key tasks of
detect, decide and defeat is not only in times of conict, but is
an ongoing activity at all times. In eect, the Aii Foice is always
functioning at a ceitain opeiational tempo. Tis is because the
shaping, inuencing and managing of the secuiity enviionment aie
continuous activities iequiiing the inputs made available by the ISR
and C2 assets. Tis deep battle nevei stops. Teiefoie, it has to be
cleaily undeistood by stiategic planneis that any commitment to
actual conict opeiations, fiom an Aii Foice peispective, will be
concuiient to the peacetime opeiational commitments and will
add to an alieady existing tempo. Such concuiiency can become
unsustainable in numeiically smallei aii foices. Smallei aii foices
will have to iely on eciency to be eective. It is of caidinal
impoitance to factoi this peacetime concuiiency of the Aii Foice
into the planning piocess when the giand stiategy of the nation is
being foimulated.
SmnIIvu AIu Foutvs: EouuIo CuI:vuIn
Employing aii powei assets, optimally and eectively, to
contiibute to national secuiity has nevei been an easy task. Te
complexity of the contempoiaiy battlespace and the dynamic
and diused natuie of emeiging thieats, combined with the
technological sophistication of aii powei systems, have made
this task even moie involved and complicated. Fiom the tactical
level of opeiations to the giand stiategic level of national secuiity
planning it is now necessaiy to have peisonnel who aie piofessional
masteis in the application of aii powei to ensuie that this exible
and agile element of national powei is positioned at the coiiect
173
level and utilised appiopiiately. Utilisation of aii powei, especially
in the case of smallei aii foices, has to be fiugally done so that
theie is absolutely no wastage of eoit and no asset is supeiuously
tasked. Husbanding the meagie iesouices available to pioduce the
eects iequiied of the Aii Foice is a ne balancing act that only
commandeis with a lifetime of expeiience can achieve. Piofessional
masteiy aiiived at by conscientious study and ieection has no
substitute. In building a foice foi the piofessional application of aii
powei, especially when it is constiained to be a smallei aii foice,
theie aie thiee enduiing ciiteiia that will always have to be kept as
the basis foi planningfailuie to do so would invite unfoieseen and
unfoitunate iesults. Tese ciiteiia aie exibility and adaptability,
balance and leading edge thinking.
Flexibility and Adaptability
Te opeiations that an aii foice would be iequiied to undeitake
iange fiom the technological high end to the lowest level, both in
teims of the aii powei assets and the opeiating enviionment. Foi
example, the foice may be iequiied to piovide disastei ielief in
an aiea which is a technology vacuum and on the othei hand be
tasked to apply lethal foice in a highly sophisticated battlespace
against technologically advanced adveisaiies. To build a foice that
can opeiate eciently in this diveise enviionment is a complex
undeitaking. Howevei, fiom a national secuiity peispective, the
stiategic ielevance of the aii foice is dependent on its ability to
stiaddle this laige iange of opeiations and cleaily pioduce the
desiied eects of appiopiiate level at the time and place iequiied.
Te foice theiefoie has to be built based on exibility and
adaptability fiom the foundation upwaids. Te basic stiuctuie
has to be built in this mannei because it is dicult to incoipoiate
exibility into a iigid stiuctuie oi inculcate adaptability into an
oiganisation that is not so oiiented.
Te ciiteiia of exibility and adaptability aie paiticulaily
impoitant foi smallei aii foices. As it is, by viitue of theii limited
capabilities, smallei aii foices stiuggle foi stiategic ielevance in
174
the bioadei national secuiity equation. Te limited capabilities of
smallei aii foices aie bound by theii lack of ciitical mass and the
numeiical limitations of theii assets. Tese two failings can be
mitigated to a laige extent by leveiaging the qualities of exibility
and adaptability that must be built into the foice stiuctuie and
oiganisation. Iiiespective of othei ongoing impiovements in
teims of technology and concepts of opeiations, smallei aii foices
will always be ieliant on theii exibility and adaptability foi theii
peifoimance.
Balance
Te Aii Foice has to meet the goveinments enduiing and
emeiging stiategic needs, acioss the iange of possible opeiational
contingencies, fiom high-end to low-technology conict. Tis
capability is based on its capacity to geneiate the desiied eects.
Teie has been a change in the peiceived contiibution of the
aimed foices of a nation, fiom the use of foice to assuie national
secuiity by defending the boideis to employing its assets to cieate
the eects that aie iequiied to subdue an adveisaiy. Accoidingly,
the employment of aii foices has also undeigone a iadical change.
On the othei hand, aii powei assets have become veiy expensive to
obtain, maintain and opeiate eciently. Teiefoie, moie often than
not nation-states aie constiained to limit the size of theii aii foices
puiely because of iesouice constiaints. Smallei aii foices aie foiced
to achieve the desiied outcomes within veiy iigid limitations.
Since they have to function within these limitations, smallei aii
foices have to be cautious iegaiding the use of theii iesouices. It is
necessaiy to have systems that aie aoidable and sustainable and
capable of cieating a iange of eects. It is obvious that the numbei
of systems would be limited by nancial stiingency, but it is also
necessaiy to ensuie that these ieduced numbeis meet at least the
base level iequiiement in teims of the eects to be cieated. In oidei
to meet all these dispaiate iequiiements smallei aii foices need to be
balanced and ietain the capability to opeiate within the constiaints
of iesouices, equipment availability and opeiational iequiiements.
175
Tis is no easy task. Te eectiveness and viability of a smallei aii
foice is almost totally dependent on the oveiall capability of the
systems that it opeiates. It is theiefoie impoitant to make suie
that the systems aie appiopiiate foi the envisaged employment of
the foice. Aii powei systems have a long gestation peiiod and need
dedicated planning befoie they can be opeiationally inducted.
Undei these ciicumstances it is impoitant to have a long-teim view
of national secuiity iequiiements that can then be tianslated to
militaiy and aii powei teims. Tis piocess of emphatically viewing
the long-teim iequiiements of national secuiity and aligning aii
powei system acquisition to them is a foundational need foi smallei
aii foices to iemain ielevant.
Leading Edge Tinking
Te quality of aii powei is completely dependent on
technologyits appiopiiate use and the ability of the aii foice
conceined to assimilate emeiging tiends at a pace commensuiate
with the bioadei aii powei developments. Smallei aii foices
paiticulaily have to be cognisant of the quality of aii powei that they
can biing to beai when iequiied because theii national ielevance is
dependent on theii eectiveness. Aii foices can be at the cutting
edge of technology but this caiiies with it the chance of failuie.
Opeiating at the cutting edge, if successful, is a suie way to ensuie
supiemacy. Howevei, the cost of failuie is such that it iequiies
a laige mass to absoib and not feel the degiadation of aii foice
capabilities. Tis is a luxuiy that smallei aii foices do not have since
they opeiate almost always at ciitical mass. Leading edge thinking
is a step below cutting edge technology and can piovide smallei
aii foices with the iequisite leveiage to mitigate the limitations of
quantity.
Leading edge thinking piovides a capability edge without the
diawback of the pitfalls of failuie and can piovide smallei aii foices
with adequate stiategic depth and, foi shoit duiations, the necessaiy
amount of mass. Tis ciiteiion has anothei dimension to it which
is not ielated to militaiy technology diiectly. Te availability of
176
appiopiiate technology is the basic factoi in ensuiing the quality
of aii powei. Aeiospace technology is a complex entity and cannot
be developed easily. Teiefoie, foi most nations the availability of
aeiospace technology is dependent on theii moie poweiful allies
and paitneis allowing tiansfei of technology, with oi without
caveats attached. In eect, the quality of aii powei that a smallei aii
foice can biing to beai is a diiect function of the nations political
aliations and good standing.
Summnuv
In the hieiaichy of national secuiity initiatives, the militaiy
contiibution ows fiom the giand stiategic commitment to piotect
Austialias inteiests and manifests in the stiategic militaiy goal to
pievent an adveisaiy initiating actions unfavouiable to Austialian
inteiests. Within this militaiy contiibution, aii powei plays an
impoitant iole in ensuiing that the appiopiiate actions aie initiated
and completed accoiding to the contextual iequiiements in oidei
to cieate the desiied eects. Such actions aie tailoied to t in with
the whole-of-goveinment appioach to secuiity and theiefoie will
iemain imly aligned with national secuiity impeiatives.
Te aii foices of the Asian iegion aie modeinising at dieient
paces. Te commitment of most of the goveinments to this
expensive pioposal is indicative of the impoitance being given to aii
powei competencies within the national secuiity agenda. Howevei,
theie is also unevenness in the modeinisation eoits, biought on
by a combination of stiategic analysis and nancial calculations.
Most of the South-East Asian nations aie moving to acquiie weapon
systems and platfoims at the cutting edge of aii powei technology
while also impioving theii suiveillance and command and contiol
capabilities.
3
Undei these ciicumstances Austialia needs to nuituie
its aii powei capabilities to ensuie that the technological and
177
conceptual advantage that it has so fai enjoyed in the iegion is not
completely lost.
Austialia has so fai enjoyed having an aii foice that, even
though numeiically smallei than some of the aii foices in the iegion,
has been qualitatively at pai, if not bettei, than the most of the othei
aii foices. Tis edge has given the nation a status that tianslates to
an assuied place in iegional and inteinational negotiations at times
dispiopoitionate to its political, stiategic and economic capability.
Tis is not to say that the othei aims of the ADF do not contiibute
to national secuiity. Tey do, and decisively so. Austialias secuiity
enviionment is chaiacteiised by complex geogiaphy and a dynamic
and demanding spectium of modein conict. Aii poweis fieedom
of action that is not constiained by geogiaphical baiiieis and its
ability to iange acioss laige theaties of opeiations concuiiently
cieates a situation wheie fiiendly foices have the initiative, can
contiol the tempo of opeiations and dominate the battlespace.
Aii powei alone cannot win the conict. A combined aims
appioach to complex secuiity issues pioduces impiessive iesults in
the tactical, opeiational and stiategic levels of wai. When employed
within the whole-of-goveinment appioach to national secuiity
the militaiy contiibution can vaiy fiom being the most impoitant
to only a veiy peiipheial suppoit iole. Howevei, militaiy foices
have a dominant iole in engaging with the iegional neighbouis
and they biing a ceitain amount of stabilising inuence even in
the diplomatic aiea. Austialias engagement with the iising poweis
in Asia will be facilitated bettei when its militaiy foices aie seen
to be iobust and capable. Tis is paiticulaily the case when the
Asian militaiy foices aie on a modeinisation spiee. It is a paiadigm
of political and diplomatic oveituies that the stiength of a nation
is not measuied puiely on economic teims oi viewed thiough the
piism of its peaceful intentions, but thiough the stiength that backs
the nation in teims of militaiy capabilities and the national will to
employ such stiength to its advantage.
178
No:vs
1
Alan Stephens, Kosovo, Or the Future of War, Papei No. 77, Aii Powei Studies Centie,
Canbeiia, August 1999, p. 1.
2
Royal Austialian Aii Foice, Austialian Aii Publication 1000DTe Air Power
Manual, Fifth Edition, Aii Powei Development Centie, Canbeiia, 2007, p. 139.
3
Baiiy Deskei, Tiends in Aii Powei Modeinisation in the Asia-Pacic Region,
RSIS Commentaries, S. Rajaiatnam School of Inteinational Studies, Nanyang
Technological Univeisity, Singapoie, Febiuaiy, 2008, www.isis.edu.sg, accessed on
27 Febiuaiy 2008.
Chaptei 8
Conclusion
180
181
Cociusio
CONCLUSION
Inteinational ielations aie all about balancing, manoeuviing
and paying the baie minimum foi maximum benet, and the subtle
but unmistakable show of stiength and iesolve by soveieign nations.
It is a univeisal tiuth that the undeilying need to fuithei national
inteiests has not changed in ages, but the means and the methods of
puisuing this end undeigo peiiodic and continuous change. In this
constant game of inteinational diplomacy, a nation has to nuituie
astutely its capacity to inuence in oidei to iemain ielevant in the
global stage. Moie than evei befoie, this inuence is now a function
of the economic statuie of a nation. Te smallei the economy of
a state, the less its inuence and the gieatei the likelihood of its
becoming iiielevant. Wheie a nations economy and iesouice base
aie limited, piioiities must be set. Identifying vital national inteiests
that cannot be compiomised theiefoie, becomes a ciucial need.
National secuiity peiceptions have changed globally. Te
teiioiist attacks of 11 Septembei 2001 in New Yoik and Washington
demonstiated the vulneiability of even the most poweiful nation in
the woild to asymmetiic attacks. Such attacks have global stiategic
consequences. Globalisation of the economy has necessitated the
iealignment of the soveieign poweis of a nation in the diplomatic,
political and even at the individual level.
1
It has also become
necessaiy to pay heed to non-state actois in oidei to ensuie that
small extiemist gioups, motivated by political oi ieligious feivoui
do not disiupt the noimal functioning of national goveinance
appaiatus.
Te collapse of the Soviet Union was expected to ushei in an
eia of inteinational peace, which did not eventuate. A unipolai
US-dominated global secuiity situation existed foi a numbei of
yeais following this fundamental shift in global powei stiuctuie.
Now the woild is moving towaids multipolaiity with a numbei of
nations attempting to attain gieat powei status. Howevei, gieat
powei status is not easy to achieve, noi is it easy to maintain foi
182
any length of time. Gieat powei status bestows a gieat deal of
inteinational iesponsibility on a nation with obligations that it must
full to ietain the status. Such gieat powei status, at least foi the
foieseeable futuie, can only be achieved by established, soveieign
nation-states. Non-state entities, although capable of cieating
stiategic and long-teim eects, can only achieve one element of
gieat poweis statusthat of piojecting poweiand theiefoie
cannot become gieat poweis. Howevei, non-state issues have giown
in piominence ovei the past decade and will continue to be of
piimaiy impoitance in the secuiity enviionment.
Te stiategic iise of Asia, facilitated by the economic boom
that is taking place in the iegion, has alieady demonstiated global
implications. Te inteinational system is adapting to the iise of
Asian countiies as the powei balance shifts giadually towaids the
Asia-Pacic iegion. Te 21st centuiy will be played out in Asia and
the Pacic.
Te most impoitant development in the Asian context is the
inexoiable iise of China and India as economic and militaiy poweis,
whose ambitions aie tianspaiently appaient. Since the US is the
piedominant powei in the Asia-Pacic, and will iemain so foi at
least anothei thiee decades, it will continue to shape the secuiity
enviionment. Te US inteiaction with both these nations and its
alignment with the tiaditional US allies in the iegion, Austialia,
Japan and South Koiea, will be the fundamental deteimining factoi
in the stiategic powei game that is alieady undeiway. In addition,
the machinations Russia conducts in the iegion to diuse the
confiontational attitude that it is assuming in the Cential Euiopean
iegion, will cieate moie tensions.
China iemains an enigma, even though cuiiently theie is
fai moie tianspaiency in its inteinational economic dealings
than a decade ago. Rapid global infoimation tiansfei, which the
Goveinment is tiying to contiol, albeit with limited success, is
leading to gieatei awaieness within China iegaiding global events,
and the population is becoming iestive to the authoiitaiian iule that
does not distiibute the fiuits of the nations economic success evenly
183
Cociusio
in all aieas of the nation. China is deteimined to emeige as a global
powei, but is veiy conscious of the fact that its domestic situation
does not peimit such ambitions at the moment. Teiefoie, it has
adopted an appioach of coopeiative development with the othei
laigei poweis in the iegion, while also tiying to spiead its spheie
of inuence to Afiica and South Ameiica. Even with this piagmatic
appioach, China is iigid on the issue of Taiwan and its foieign policy
is fundamentally tied to not accepting Taiwanese independence. Tis
one issue piobably has the gieatest potential to biing confiontation
and conict in the Asia-Pacic in which no nation will be able to
stay neutial as such. Tese developments might slow Chinas maich
to gieat powei status, but by no stietch of imagination can they
eectively stop the nations inexoiable move foiwaid.
India too is on the move with its demociatic ciedentials
imly established in the inteinational system. At the same time
the nation has a numbei of pioblems that slow its piogiess,
including an inciease in the numbei of people who iemain below
the poveity line. Paiadoxically, that same inciease in population is
also a boon with an estimated 900 million people in the woiking
age gioup by 2025. Economic libeialisation that was staited only
about two decades ago is giadually making its eect felt and is
making an impact, even against the poveity levels. Whethei these
paiadoxes will become positive movements depend on the policy
decisions and implementation capabilities of the Goveinment. Only
inteinal secuiity issues, abetted by exteinal agencies accoiding
to the Goveinment, will hold this nation back fiom moving into
a space wheiein it will condently inuence global events. Te
slight hesitation that is visible today in its inteinational diplomatic
dealings will vanish soonei iathei than latei and India will be a
contiibutoi to inteinational stability in the long teim.
China and India aie seen as competitois in theii quest foi
iegional, and subsequently global, inuence. Howevei, both
nations aie piagmatic enough to iealise that such a competition
will be detiimental to the smooth economic piogiess that both
aie expeiiencing now. It is also appaient that both the nations
184
have a long way to go in aligning theii iespective societies with the
economic development, although the challenges each will face aie
veiy dieient. Te systems of goveinment in both the nations aie
veiy dieient with a gieat dispaiity in the aiea of tianspaiency of
stiategic intent and goveinance. Tis makes Chinas objectives
moie obtuse and dicult to undeistand as compaied to India.
Accoidingly, the inteinational community also views both the
nations dieiently. Teii stiategic competition, at least foi the
foieseeable futuie, will be contained to diplomatic postuiing and
showcasing of bilateial issues and is not likely to be allowed to come
in the way of national piogiess.
In this changing scenaiio, Austialia has to play an incieasingly
Asian pait while being cognisant of its own cultuial and societal
ioots, and political, diplomatic and economic iealities. It must also
be caiefully awaie of its limited powei piojection capacity and the
constiaints of a population that cannot suppoit any extiavagant
incieases in its militaiy capabilities. Undei these faiily stiingent
constiaints, Austialia will need to cieate a space foi itself in the
Asia-Pacic by nuituiing its economy, maintaining the edge in its
militaiy capabilities, pieventing any instability in its immediate
neighbouihood and being a visibly iesponsible inteinational citizen.
Te employment of inuence is a piecaiious activity and always
comes with a piice. Austialia needs to undeistand that the piice it
has to pay in oidei to inuence events in the iegion, and globally if
iequiied, may at times be too high. A iealistic view of its position in
the comity of nations, especially within the Asia-Pacic iegion, and
an open piagmatism iegaiding what it is piepaied to do to ensuie
stability will stand in good stead and enhance Austialias status.
Tiee bioad futuie ioles that Austialia could undeitake to
maintain its status and ielevance within the iegion have been
suggested and analysed. Howevei, the ieality that Austialia is in an
unenviable position vis--vis the iegional secuiity enviionment is
cleai. It is caught up between the manoeuviings of gieat poweis and
susceptible to the machinations of the laigei poweis in the iegion.
It has to act peiceptively to ensuie the stability of the iegion, while
185
Cociusio
keeping the majoi playeisChina, India, Japan, Russia and the
USengaged, both bilateially and multilateially. It is moie than
likely that Austialia would be called on to play the iole of the honest
biokei in a numbei of contingencies. Tis would iequiie that
Austialia continues to build its ciedibility as a stable and iesponsible
state, which in tuin will need a stiong and iesponsive militaiy foice.
Te cuiient foieign policy initiatives that Austialia has in place may
also need to be ieviewed and ieconstiucted expansively to catei foi
the emeiging paiadigms.
A whole-of-goveinment appioach to national secuiity has been
accepted as the only way foiwaid. Tis does mean the ieduction
of militaiy capabilities. It means an inciease in the complexity of
militaiy opeiations and the need to have a militaiy foice that is
capable of multi-tasking and cieating eects that t in well within
the national eects-based appioach. Militaiy foices need to be
multiskilled, with piofessional masteiy that encompasses national
stiategic manoeuviings, to be able to assuie the nation of its
competence. Piofessional masteiy is the coineistone to building the
necessaiy capabilities within a defence foice and employing them
optimally to achieve national secuiity objectives.
Te militaiy foices of a nation, while opeiating within the
whole-of-goveinment appioach, aie the most visible aim of national
powei and play a veiy inuential iole in establishing the ciedentials of
a nation. In situations wheie the nation has to be involved in a conict
the militaiy foices have to be capable of stiaddling the full spectium
and opeiate in conjunction with militaiy and non-militaiy agencies.
Austialias secuiity enviionment encompasses the land, littoial
and maiitime enviionments, and the theatie of opeiations could be
uiban oi iuial while being geogiaphically concentiated oi widely
dispeised. Tis diveisity cieates a numbei of vaiiations to the
tiaditional concept of powei piojection, which aii poweis inheient
chaiacteiistics help to oveicome eciently. Aii powei has the
capability to opeiate with the necessaiy agility to cieate the desiied
eects, pioviding the Goveinment with cleai options when powei
piojection is iequiied. Te contiibution that aii powei can make to
186
national secuiity and a possible aii stiategy foi that contiibution has
been suggested. It fuithei examines the coie competencies of aii
powei such contiibution demands at the stiategic level. Of piimaiy
impoitance to this contiibution is aii poweis ability to detect,
that is to gathei infoimation and geneiate knowledge to impiove
situational awaieness, the ability to decide and shape, inuence
and manage the battlespace, and the ability to defeat by pioviding
iesponse options that neutialise any challenges.
Tis book piesents an objective view of the secuiity
contouis that Austialia will face into the futuie, in ielation to the
emeigence of Asian giants and the changing stiategic balance
both inteinationally and iegionally. In doing so, aii powei and its
contiibution to national secuiity have been analysed in some detail
to emphasise the iole that aii powei will have to play in ensuiing
Austialias national secuiity.
Teie aie some dicult decisions ahead foi Austialia, in
teims of foieign policy, of defence capability giowth, of nding
and establishing its position in the iegion, of its inteinational
aspiiations and iesponsibilities, and of its hope foi inteinational
peace and stability. Austialia has limited iesouices but has global
inteiests and is committed to inteinational secuiity. It needs to
weigh caiefully the ielativity of iisk and balance national secuiity
objectives with the national capacity to inuence events. Austialia
needs to be piagmatic in dealing with its secuiity issues, without
becoming unnecessaiily embioiled in aieas and conicts that have
lessei ielevance to Austialia in the stiategic balance. Austialia, like
almost all the nations of the iegion, is on the thieshold of a new
eiaone that could swing fiom all-iound stable giowth to conict
and chaosand needs to play a iesponsible pait in maintaining the
iegion in stability and peaceful coexistence.
187
Cociusio
No:vs
1
Simon Moat, Globalisation, Teiioiism and Cosmopolitan Austialia, Security
Challenges, Vol. 3, No. 1, (Febiuaiy 2007), Te Kokoda Foundation, Canbeiia, 2007,
p. 1.
188
Bibliogiaphy
190
191
Biniioovvnv
BIsIIoounvuv
Books
Adams, J., Te New World War: Te Warriors and Weapons of the New
Battleelds of Cyberspace, Hutchinson, London, 1998
Albeits, David S. & Czeiwinski, Tomas (eds), Complexity, Global Politics and
National Security, CCRP, Depaitment of Defence, Washington, 1997
Delibasis, Di Dimitiios, Te Right to National Self-Defence in Information
Warfare Operations, Aiena Books, Edmunds, 2007
Dunnigan, F.J., Te Next War Zone: Confronting the Global Treat to
Cyberterrorism, Osboine McGiaw-Hill, New Yoik, 2002
Fiith, Stewait, Australia in International Politics, Allen & Unwin, Sydney,
1999
Held, David & McGiew, Anthony, Goldblatt, David & Peiaton, Jonathan, Global
Transformations, Stanfoid Univeisity Piess, 1999
Huntington, Samuel P., Te Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of the
Woild Oidei, Simon & Schustei, New Yoik, 1996
Liddell Hait, B.H., Strategy, Second ievised edition, Penguin Books Ltd,
England, 1991
Mansbach, Richaid W. & Rhodes, Edwaid (eds) Global Politics in a Changing
World, Houghton Miin Company, New Yoik, 2000
Meaisheimei, John, Te Tragedy of Great Power Relations, W.W. Noiton & Co.,
New Yoik, 2001
Monk, Paul, Tunder from the Silent Zone: Rethinking China, Sciibe Publications
Pty Ltd, Cailton, Victoiia, 2005
Moigenthau, H.J., Politics among Nations: Te Struggle for Power and Peace, 4
th

Edition, Alfied A Knopf, New Yoik, 1967
Paikei, J., Te Illiad and the Odyssey, Woodswoith, Waie, 2000
192
Scobell, Andiew & Woitzell, Laiiy M. (eds), Chinas Growing Military Power:
Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles and Conventional Capability,
Stiategic Studies Institute, US Aimy Wai College, Cailisle, PA, 2002
Taiooi, Shashi, Te Elephant, Te Tiger and the Cell Phone: Reections on
India, Te Emerging 21
st
Century Power, Aicade Publishing, New Yoik,
2007
Reports/Monographs
Bell, Coial, Living with Giants, Austialian Stiategic Policy Institute, Canbeiia,
Apiil 2005
Depaitment of Defence, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Commonwealth
of Austialia Canbeiia, 2000
Depaitment of Defence, Force 2020, , Commonwealth of Austialia, Canbeiia,
2002
Depaitment of Defence, Australias National Security: A Defence Update 2007,
Commonwealth of Austialia, Canbeiia, 2007
Depaitment of Defence, Austialian Aii Publication AAP 1000-D, Te Air Power
Manual, Commonwealth of Austialia, Canbeiia, 2007
Depaitment of Defence, Joint Operations for the 21
st
Century, Commonwealth
of Austialia, Canbeiia, 2007
Deskei, Baiiy, Trends in Air Power Modernisation in the Asia-Pacic Region,
RSIS Commentaiies, S. Rajaiatinam School of Inteinational Studies,
Nanyang Technological Univeisity, Singapoie, 2008
Edwaids, GPCAPT Phil, Beyond Military Service, Tesis submitted to School
of Sociology, Politics and Anthiopology, La Tiobe Univeisity, Bundooia,
Victoiia, 2001
Fieedman, Lawience, A Revolution in Strategic Aairs, Adelphi Papei 318, IISS,
London, 1998
Goidon, Sandy, Widening Horizons: Australias new relationship with India,
Austialian Stiategic Policy Institute, Canbeiia, 2007
Hill, Robeit, Austialias Defence and Secuiity: Challenges and Oppoitunities at
the Stait of the 21
st
Centuiy, Global Forces 2005: Proceedings of the ASPI
Conference Day 1, Austialian Stiategic Policy Institute, Canbeiia, 2006
193
Biniioovvnv
Jacob, Jabin T., Te Congress (I)s China Connection, Aiticle 2438, Institute of
Peace & Conict Studies, New Delhi, 2007
Kainikaia, Sanu, Diminishing Relevance: Emergent Air Forces at the Cross Roads,
Papei No 10, Aii Powei Development Centie, Canbeiia, 2003
Kainikaia, Sanu, Capability Born Joint: Towards a Seamless Force, Papei No 22,
Aii Powei Development Centie, Canbeiia, 2007
Lee, John, Te Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: An Australian Response,
Austialian Stiategic Policy Institute, Canbeiia, 2008
Lyon, Rod, Te Next Defence White Paper: Te Strategic Environment, Austialian
Stiategic Policy Institute, Canbeiia, 2008
Mahbubani, Kishoie, Te Gieat Poweis and Asia, Global Forces 2005:
Proceedings of the ASPI Conference Day 1 Global Strategy, Austialian
Stiategic Policy Institute, Canbeiia, 2006
Maley, William, Strategic Challenges and Power Options, Austialian Stiategic
Policy Institute, Canbeiia, Maich 2007
Nishihaia, Masashi, Japans Emeiging Secuiity Role in Asia and Beyond, Global
Force 2007, Proceedings of the ASPI Conference Day 2, Austialian Stiategic
Policy Institute, Canbeiia, 2007
Sahni, Vaiun, Manifest Destiny? Indias Coming Gieat Powei Role in Global
Secuiity, Global Forces 2005: Proceedings of the ASPI Conference Day 1
Global Strategy, Austialian Stiategic Policy Institute, Canbeiia, 2006
Singh, Bhaitendu Kumai, Whither Chinas Democratic Transition?, Aiticle No
2406, Institute of Peace & Conict Studies, New Delhi, 2007
Stephens, Alan, Kosovo, Or the Future of War, Papei No 77, Aii Powei Studies
Centie, Canbeiia, August 1999
Swaine, Michael D. & Tellis, Ashley J., Interpreting Chinas Grand Strategy: Past,
Present and Future, RAND Coipoiation, Santa Monica, CA, 2000
Tow, William & Tiood, Russell, Power Shift: Challenges for Australia in Northeast
Asia, Austialian Stiategic Policy Institute, Canbeiia, 2004,
White, Hugh, Beyond the Defence of Australia, Papei 16, Lowy Institute foi
Inteinational Policy, Sydney, 2006
194
Periodicals/Newspapers/Seminars
Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, 3 May 2006, Honda, Masaiu, Seeking New Strategies:
Japans Struggle to Tink for Itself in National Strategy
Austialian Financial Review, 19 Octobei 2007, Baikei, Geoiey, Big questions
loom in US relationship
Austialian Financial Review, 09 Novembei 2007, Baikei, Geoiey, Plenty to
fear with a great, powerful friend in decline
Austialian Financial Review, 16 Januaiy 2008, Dibb, Paul & Baikei, Geoiey,
Rising to the Russian challenge
Canbeiia Times, 25 Januaiy 2008, Peebles, Dave, Power shifts put pressure on
Asia-Pacic stability
Centie foi Inteinational Studies, MIT, Massachusetts, Secuiity Studies Seminai
at the 19 Octobei 2005, Hiwataii,Yumi, Japanese Defence Strategy for the
21
st
Century
Defence Industiy Daily, Washington, 9 Maich 2008, Indias Defence Budget
2008-09
Defense News, Washington, 18 Febiuaiy 2008, Wendell, Minnick, Chinas
Charm Oensive Sinister or Benign?
Defense News, Washington, 18 Febiuaiy 2008, Raghuvanshi, Vivek, India Shifts
Away from Defensive Posture
Financial Times, London, 10 Januaiy 2008, Gueiieia, Fiancesco, Moodys says
spending threatens US rating
Institute of Peace and Conict Studies, New Delhi, Seminai 20 Decembei 2007,
Anad, Dibyesh, China and India Rising
Janes Defence Weekly, Suiiey, 19 Decembei 2007, 2007 Annual Defence Report:
Major Events and Trends
Secuiity Challenges, (Vol 1, No 1), Te Kokoda Foundation, Canbeiia, 2005,
Kissane, Dylan, 2015 and the Rise of China: Power Cycle Analysis and the
Implications for Australia
Secuiity Challenges, July 2006 (Vol 2, No 2) Te Kokoda Foundation, Canbeiia,
2006, Ayson, Robeit, Understanding Australia Defence Dilemmas
Secuiity Challenges, Octobei 2006 (Vol 2, No 3) Te Kokoda Foundation,
Canbeiia, 2006, Cionin, Patiick M., Challenges for US Alliance Management
in the Western Pacic
195
Biniioovvnv
Secuiity Challenges, Febiuaiy 2007 (Vol 3, No 1), Te Kokoda Foundation,
Canbeiia, 2007, Jones, Alexandia, Responding to the Rise of China
Secuiity Challenges, Febiuaiy 2007 (Vol 3 No 1), Te Kokoda Foundation,
Canbeiia, 2007, Manicom, James, Near-term Instability in the Taiwan
Strait? Nationalist Constituencies in the PRC and Cross-Strait Stability
Secuiity Challenges, Febiuaiy 2007, (Vol 3, No 1), Te Kokoda Foundation,
Canbeiia, 2007, Moat, Simon, Globalisation, Terrorism and Cosmopolitan
Australia
Secuiity Challenges, August 2007 (Vol 3, No 3), Te Kokoda Foundation,
Canbeiia, 2007, Behm, Allan, Te Need for an Australian National Security
Strategy
Secuiity Challenges, Novembei 2007 (Vol 3 No 4), Te Kokoda Foundation,
Canbeiia, 2007, Kilcullen, David J., Australian Statecraft: Te Challenge of
Aligning Policy with Strategic Culture
Sydney Moining Heiald, 19 Januaiy 2008, Banham, Cynthia, Rudd to shake up
national security
Te Austialian, 28 Januaiy 2008, Milne, Glen, Smith redenes rules
Te Austialian, 12 Febiuaiy 2008, White, Hugh, PMs Defence dilemma
Te Washington Post, 23 Febiuaiy 2000, Mufson, Steven & Dewai, Helen,
Pentagon Issues Warning to China: U.S. Ocials Criticise Beijing White
Paper Backing Use of Force Against Taiwan
Te Washington Post, 15 June 2006, Cody, Edwaid J., China Easing Its Stance
On Taiwan
Te Washington Quaiteily, (Vol 21, No 1), Wintei 2005-2006, Centie foi
Stiategic and Inteinational Studies, Washington DC, Medeiios, Evan S.,
Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacic Stability
Te Washington Quaiteily, (Vol 27, No 1), Wintei 2003-2004, Centie foi
Stiategic and Inteinational Studies, Washington DC, Suttei, Robeit, Why
Does China Matter?
Te Weekend Austialian, 6-7 August 2005, Kelly, Paul, Te Day Foreign Policy
Won Asia
Time, 13 August 2007, Robinson, Simon, Indian Summer, A Familys Journey
Time, 13 August 2007, Taiooi, Ishaan, Te India Advantage
196
Times of India, Chennai, India, 23 Januaiy 2008, Paks new port has strategic
implications for India: Navy Chief
StiatFoi Analysis, Washington, 12 Maich 2008, Bakei, Rodgei, Asias Security
Role Goes Global
StiatFoi Annual Foiecast 2008: Beyond the Jihadist Wai, Washington, 08
Januaiy 2008
StiatFoi Analysis, Washington, 14 Januaiy 2008

Australian Security

Încărcat de

Informații document

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Australian Security

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Australian Security

S-ar putea să vă placă și