253. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. EVELYN P.

CAYOBIT
Facts: Since 1982, respondent has been employed with the National Housing Authority (NHA). On March 29, 1990,
she was appointed as Livelihood Specialist in its Dagat-dagatan Development Project. The position was co-terminus
with the project and did not require any eligibility. Even then, she submitted her original certificate of eligibility
showing a rating of 81.20%, the grade she obtained in a civil service examination held on July 30, 1989 in Manila.
On June 5, 1990, petitioner approved her appointment, which was given retroactive effect from July 1, 1989.
Another appointment was extended to respondent in September 1993 as Senior Livelihood Officer. This position
required civil service eligibility owing to its permanent status. On September 29, 1993, Carmelita Bernardino,
Senior Specialist at petitioners field office in NHA, came across her appointment papers, which included her
original certificate of eligibility. In the course of processing said papers, Bernardino found out that her eligibility
was not entered in the service card on file with the field office. To verify, Bernardino went to petitioners National
Capital Region office on October 18, 1993. Bernardino discovered that respondent was not in the passing list on
file. The matter was referred by Bernardino to her superior, Director Imelda Abueng, who verified respondents
eligibility with petitioners central office. She found out that based on the masterlist of eligibles kept at the central
office, respondent obtained a failing mark of 40.96%. Respondents appointment was disapproved. On October 25,
1993, petitioner charged respondent with dishonesty and grave misconduct. After hearing, respondent was held
guilty of the charges against her. In fine, there was no substantial evidence to prove that petitioner committed the
offenses leveled against her.
Issue: WON there is substantial evidence to hold that respondent procured and used a fake or spurious certificate
of eligibility.
Ruling: The masterlist of eligibles shows that respondent obtained a failing grade in the examination given on July
30, 1989. Contrary to what is stated in her certificate of eligibility that she passed it with an 81.20% rating,
respondents actual score was only 40.96%. As we have ruled that the masterlist is the primary record of eligibles,
the entry therein must prevail. Well to emphasize, the masterlist of eligibles is an official record. It is formally
prepared and kept by petitioner pursuant to both its constitutional and statutory mandates to conduct and
safeguard civil service examinations and to maintain a register of eligibles. As such, every entry made therein is
presumed genuine and accurate unless proven otherwise. espondent failed to explain the discrepancy in her
grades appearing in the masterlist and her certificate of eligibility. She was not able to offer proof that the score
indicated in her certificate was due to the error or mistake of petitioners own personnel. In fact, she did not even
get a certification from petitioner that her certificate was issued by it.
The bare testimony of respondent that she has nothing to do with forging the certificate as she actually just
received it by mail in her residential address deserves scant belief. We cannot accept her simplistic claim that she
used the certificate under the false impression that it was genuine. The three witnesses
[17]
and the various
documents she presented cannot exculpate her. The witnesses, in essence, merely testified that they received the
certificate of eligibility in question from respondent. Their belief that she was eligible was based on their reliance
on the certificate. n fine, we hold that the evidence presented by petitioner is substantial to support a finding that
respondent is guilty of the offense charged against her. The established facts lead us to accept the conclusion that
she indeed procured and used a fake or spurious certificate of eligibility and, in accordance with CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 15, Series of 1991, committed dishonesty and grave misconduct. It bears stressing that in
administrative proceedings, the quantum of evidence required is only substantial.
[19]
It is such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might
conceivably opine otherwise.
[20]
The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where there is reasonable ground
to believe that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct,
[21]
even if the evidence might not be
overwhelming.
[22]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
254. Office of Ombudsman vs Santos
Facts: The case arose from a complaint filed by Estrelita L. Gumabon, Teacher III, Lagro Elementary School, against
the school Principal, respondent Florentina A. Santos, before the Office of the Ombudsman on September 29,
1997. The complaint alleged that respondent falsified her daily time record as her entries therein did not match
the entries of the schools security guard in their logbook. Answering the charges, respondent explained that it was
her daily routine upon arrival at the school to inspect its outer premises before entering the school grounds, to see
if the school fence is clean and garbage-free. The security guard only logs in the time of respondents entry into the
school grounds as her arrival time. Hearings were conducted before Graft Investigation Officer Joselito P. Fangon
at the Administrative Adjudication Bureau, Office of the Ombudsman. On July 23, 2001, the Office of the
Ombudsman rendered a decision finding respondent guilty of dishonesty, violation of Sec. 4 (c) of R.A. 6713 and
grave misconduct. It imposed upon respondent the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of benefits
equivalent to twelve (12) months salary and temporary disqualification for re-employment in the government for
one (1) year from the finality of said decision. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed and set aside the decision
of the Ombudsman and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. It held that the findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman were not supported by substantial evidence.
Issue: WON there is substantial evidence
Ruling: Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." A finding of guilt in an
administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the
respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.A reading of the decision
of the Office of the Ombudsman and a thorough examination of the records of this case show sufficient evidence
to prove respondents administrative liability. In its decision, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Graft
Investigation Officer Joselito P. Fangon, cites the pieces of evidence that support its ruling. It discussed its findings
thus: Respondent FLORENTINA A. SANTOS stands administratively charged with, among others, the falsification of
her Form 48; of being one of the Owners/Incorporators of a private school; of having oppressed and harassed
school teachers and employees; and of theft of school property. We affirm all the other findings of the Office of
the Ombudsman. The testimonial and documentary evidence contained in the records constitutes substantial
evidence to prove the administrative liability of respondent, as discussed by the Ombudsman.
255. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB
Brief Fact Summary. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted enforcement of an order directing
Universal Camera Corporation (Petitioner) to reinstate an employee with back pay who was discharged because he
gave testimony under the Wagner Act (Act), and cease and desist from discriminating against any employee who
files charges or gives testimony under the Act. The views of that court conflicted with those of the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, and clash of opinions required settlement by the United States Supreme Court.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The substantial evidence test was the standard of review under all three statutes.


Facts. The Wagner Act was one of the principle New Deal statutes, and heavily regulated the collective bargaining
process and, in many cases, required employers to deal with the unions. That Taft-Hartley Act was enacted in 1947
to amend some features of the Wagner Act that were deemed to tilt the balance too far against employers. The
lower courts were reaching different conclusions about the application of the Act, so settlement was required by
the Supreme Court. The Petitioner claimed that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was barred from
taking into account the report of the examiner on questions of fact insofar as that report was rejected by the
board.

Issue. What was the effect of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act on the duty of the Court of
Appeals when called upon to review orders of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)? Was the Court of
Appeals bound by the Boards rejection of an examiners findings?
Held. Remanded to the Court of Appeals to accord the findings of the trial examiner the relevance they reasonably
command in answering the comprehensive question whether the evidence supporting the Boards order was
substantiated. The APA and Taft-Hartley Act direct that courts assume more responsibility for the reasonableness
and fairness of Labor Board decisions than in the past. The Boards findings are entitled to respect; but they must
still be set aside when a record before the Court of Appeals clearly precludes the decision from being justified by a
fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of the witnesses, its informed judgment on the matters, or both. The
substantial evidence test applies. The responsibility placed on the Board by the Labor Management Relations Act
does not make its decision unreviewable. Nothing in the statutes suggest that the Board should not be influenced
by the examiners opportunity to observe the witnesses he hears and sees and the Board does not. Nothing
suggests that courts should not give an examiners report such probative force as it commands. The substantial
evidence test is not modified in any way when the examiner and the Board disagree. Dissent. None. Concurrence.
None printed.
256. Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company vs PSC
Facts: What is sought in this petition for mandamus and contempt with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining
order by petitioner Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, "the holder of several certificates of public
convenience for the operation of bus service" in several southern Luzon provinces extending to Manila,
1
is to
compel respondent Land Transportation Commission to act on its letters of January 24, February 2 and February 8,
1968,
2
wherein it sought deferment of action on any request of respondent Eastern Tayabas Bus Company, Inc. for
the issuance of plates covering units involved in its lease agreement with petitioner, such request being premised
on the alleged nullity of an order of respondent Commissioner Cadiao of the Public Service Commission, dated
November 2, 1967, granting the petition of respondent Eastern Tayabas Bus Company, Inc. to "be allowed to
acquire and register units for the operation of the certificates on the ground that its contract of lease of its
certificates with the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company will terminate on March 6, 1968, . . ." with the proviso
"that it should not operate the same earlier than March 6, 1968, which is the expiration date of the contract of
lease." It was also expressly set forth in this order of respondent Cadiao that it "is without prejudice to the
resolution of applicant's contention that under the lease contract it has the right to terminate the lease contract
after a 60-day period notice to the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. which is now pending before the regular
courts. Petitioner contends that this order of November 2, 1967 is beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent Public
Service Commission, acting through respondent Commissioner Cadiao, on the ground that the matter therein
involved is pending resolution in an arbitration proceeding by virtue of a decision of this Court on August 31, 1966,
the dispositive portion of which declared that the Public Service Commission was without jurisdiction to continue
with cases between then petitioner Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and then respondent Eastern Tayabas
Bus Company, Inc. "until final judgment or order is rendered by the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Civil Case
No. SP-600, and, until such time, the restraining order herein issue shall remain effective.
Issue: WON there is due process
Ruling: It has already been a settled doctrine that a plea of denial of procedural due process does not lie where a
defect consisting of an absence of notice of hearing was thereafter cured by the alleged aggrieved party having
had the opportunity to be heard on a motion for reconsideration. "What the law prohibits is not the absence
of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard."

There is then no
occasion to impute deprivation of property without due process where the adverse party was heard on a motion
for reconsideration constituting as it does "sufficient opportunity" for him to inform the Tribunal concerned of his
side of the controversy.
15
As was stated in a recent decision,
16
what "due process contemplates is freedom from
arbitrariness and what it requires is fairness or justice, the substance rather than the form being paramount," the
conclusion being that the hearing on a motion for reconsideration meets the strict requirement of the process.
This is all then that this petition presents. Clearly it should be dismissed for it is bereft of any support in law. A
word more however is required in view of the conspicuous failure of petitioner's counsel to exhibit the candor
required of an officer of the Court. The petition, as shown in the motion to dismiss and in the course of the oral
argument, left out many facts within the knowledge of the petitioner with the evident purpose of imparting a
semblance of plausibility to a petition otherwise clearly lacking merit. While counsel is expected to exhibit the
utmost zeal on behalf of a client it is likewise imperative if the rule of law were to be truly meaningful that the
orders of this Court be based on a full and candid disclosure of relevant matters so that whatever action may
thereafter be taken be warranted by the events as they did transpire. Members of the Bar would then be remiss in
their duty towards a court of justice if in their undoubtedly earnest efforts to serve their client's cause, there is, as
in this case, a failure to live up to their exacting responsibility to exert the utmost diligence that their pleadings
submitted reflect the facts with truth and accuracy.
257. Manila Trading vs Zulueta
Facts: The Secretary of Labor apprised the Court of Industrial Relations of a labor dispute existing between the
petitioner company and its employees who were members of the Philippine Labor Union which was forthwith
docketed as case No. 49 and entitled, "Philippine Labor Union vs. Manila Trading and Supply Co." A preliminary
hearing was held after which, on August 6, 1938 the respondent court entered an order requiring the
company, inter alia not to dismiss any of its employees and laborers except for good cause and with its permission.
Subsequently, on June 30, 1939, one of the gatekeepers of the petitioners, Filomeno Ramollo, was suspended for a
breach of duty. The breach consisted in that as gatekeeper of the petitioner he permitted, contrary to instructions,
one of the customers to pass thru the exit gate without paying for the work done on the car. Before this, i t is also
alleged that he refused to work in the setting up department of the company when ordered by his superior. The
Philippine Labor Union submitted a petition in case No. 49 requesting the reinstatement of the suspended laborer,
to which an answer was filed by the company. In its order of July 28, 1939, the respondent court found that the
laborer was guilty of the breach imputated to him, but, deciding that his suspension from June 30 to July 28, 1939
was a sufficient punishment, ordered his immediate reinstatement. The petitioner moved for reconsiderations, but
the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, sitting in banc, denied the motion. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue: WON CIR may readmit laborer who, it is admitted, had been found derelict in the performance of his duties
towards his employer.
Ruling: We concede that the right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employees, is subject to
regulation by the State basically as we should expend beyond economic orthodoxy, we hold that an employer
cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of
misfeasance or malfeasance who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance towards his employer, and whose
continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interest. The law, in protecting the rights of the
laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. There may, of course, be cases where
the suspension or dismissal of an employee is whimsical or unjustified or otherwise illegal scrutinized carefully and
the proper authorities will go to the core of the controversy and not close their eyes to the real situation. This is
not however the case here.
The writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted, and the order of the Court of Industrial Relations appealed
from, reverse without pronouncement regarding costs.