1AC

Diplomacy
Scenario 1 is Mexico Relations
Status quo prohibitions on marijuana decimate relations with Mexico
Duke 13 (Steven, Professor of Law @ Yale Law School, The Future of Marijuana in the United States,
OREGON LAW REVIEW, Vol. 91, 1301, AB)
Prohibited drugs are typically produced in different countries than they are consumed. The consumer countries
blame the producer country and often bully or bribe the producer to enforce its drug laws more effectively.
The United States takes such a position with Mexico, whose cartels supply a large portion of the
marijuana and other illicit drugs that Americans consume. Mexico, on the other hand, attributes its internal
violence to the U.S. appetite for Mexicos drugs. The United States repeatedly pressures other countries
to more aggressively punish producers of drugs for export . Indeed, the United States customarily intervenes
and objects when any country, even one as small as Jamaica, considers liberalizing its prohibition laws.68 Not
only would the creation of legal drug markets throughout the world allow for enormous drug
prohibition resources to be spent productively on something else and would reduce international
crime, it would also greatly diminish the international blame game and help rid the United States of
its reputation as an international bully. 69
Its the largest internal link and overcomes barriers to cooperation with Mexico
Hakim 14 (Peter, Professor @ MIT and Columbia and president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-
based think tank on Western Hemisphere affairs, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3496, Why the U.S. should
legalize marijuana, January 26
th
, AB)
Legalizing cannabis , a step most Americans now favor, is the only way out of this jumble, particularly after President
Obama made clear that he would not enforce a federal ban on marijuana use in those states where it was now lawful. We have
other fish to fry, he said. In another interview, he said marijuana is no more harmful than alcohol. Legalization should also contribute to
easier relations with Mexico and other neighbors to the south on issues of public security. To be sure, legal
marijuana comes with costs and risks. The American Medical Association considers cannabis a dangerous drug while the American Psychiatric Association asserts
that its use impedes neurological development in adolescents and can cause the onset of psychiatric disorders. Some studies suggest it interferes with learning
and motivation. It should be anticipated that legalization will lead to greater use, at all ages, as marijuana becomes more accessible and less expensive, and the
cultural and social stigmas surrounding its consumption literally go up in smoke. Abuse and addiction including among juveniles will rise as well. But
keeping marijuana illegal also carries a high price tag. Particularly devastating are the human costs of
arresting and jailing thousands upon thousands of young Americans each year. Roughly one-third of all U.S. citizens are
arrested by age 23. Racial and ethnic minorities are most vulnerable. African-American marijuana users are over three times more likely to be arrested and
imprisoned than whites, even though the two groups consume the drug at virtually the same levels. With cannabis accounting for roughly half of total drug arrests,
legalization would sharply reduce this egregious disparity. It would also save money by reducing the U.S. prison population. A half a million people were
incarcerated for drug offenses in 2011, a ten-fold jump since 1980 at an average annual cost per prisoner of more than $20,000 in a minimum-security federal
facility. Cannabis legalization would also help to lift an unneeded burden from U.S. foreign policy in Latin
America, where Washingtons drug war has long strained diplomatic relations . Most governments in the
hemisphere have concluded that U.S. anti-drug policies are just not working and, in many places, are actually
contributing to mounting levels of crime, violence and corruption. Colombia has been a notable exception. With U.S. support of nearly
$10 billion, the country has become far more secure in the past dozen years. Yet Juan Manuel Santos, Colombias president and arguably Washingtons closest ally
in the region, is now a leading advocate of alternative drug strategies. In an exhaustive report last year, prompted by President Santos, the Organization of American
States analyzed a range of alternative policy approaches, including cannabis legalization. Few Latin American countries are actively
contemplating legalization a la uruguaya. But many have stopped arrests for use and possession of marijuana, and virtually all are keeping a close
watch on developments in Uruguay. Nowhere is there much enthusiasm for cooperating with the United States in
its continuing efforts to eradicate drug crops and interrupt drug flows. A decision by the U.S. government
to legalize marijuana would be a bold step toward breaking todays bureaucratic and political inertia
and opening the way for a genuine hemisphere-wide search for alternative strategies.
US-Mexico relations spill over to border biodiversity communication
Bonner and Rozental 9 (Robert C., Former Commissioner U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Former Administrator Drug
Enforcement Administration, and Andrs, Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico; Former President and Founder Mexican Council on
Foreign Relations, Managing the United States-Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Problems, Pacific Council on International
Policy, http://www.pacificcouncil.org/admin/document.doc?id=31)
The 1,952-mile Mexico-U.S. border is unique. Only nine international land boundaries are longer, and only the longest of these (Canadas border
with the United States) can claim the same flow of legal commerce and travel almost $300 billion in trade each year. Millions of people legally
cross the frontier annually; because many of them do so several times a week, the total number of crossings into the United
States from Mexico exceeds 200 million per year. No other major national boundary sees anything like this volume of
traffic. The pacific nature of relations between the United States and Mexico also sets the border apart
from most other long land boundaries. It has been nearly a century since the last hostile action (U.S. raids in search of Pancho Villa after his
attacks on Columbus, New Mexico during the Mexican Revolution), decades more since the last major rectification of the frontier (the Gadsden Purchase of 1853-4)
and 161 years since a forcible seizure of territory (at the conclusion of the U.S.-Mexican War in 1848). The border is policed and where the boundary is not a river,
often fenced but it remains demilitarized. Interdependence is an abiding feature of the U.S.-Mexico relationship, and
this interdependence is particularly pronounced along the border itself, where most communities are twin cities. In the case of Nogales, the towns on each side of
the border share the same name; in the case of Calexico and Mexicali, they are simply different combinations of the same words (Mexico and California). Hundreds
of thousands of people from these communities commute across the border for work, shopping, and visits with friends or relatives. Interdependence
raises the stakes for both countries. Because trade flows are so immense, misguided policies can
impose tens of billions of dollars of costs each year on consumers. Poor security coordination along the frontier could prove
deadly and even, in the case of a serious terrorist threat, disastrous. Sound joint management of
shared resources can lead to sustained and ecologically sustainable development in the border region,
whereas mismanagement of these same resources by either government will produce scarcity and
environmental degradation. Finally, federal policies in both countries that ignore interdependence or reflexively promote sovereignty over other
considerations split border communities. In this report, we urge both governments to confront the challenges of border
management directly and immediately. We identify the policies they should adopt now to secure the border,
expedite legitimate crossings, manage shared resources, and foster economic development. We also articulate the ultimate
goal to which they should aspire, offering a conception of border management that can guide them as they adopt specific policies. Full Report 9 We envision a
system of border management that moves people and goods between the United States and Mexico far more quickly and efficiently than the present arrangement
but that also makes both nations more secure. This new system would expedite trade, encourage the emergence of regional economic
clusters, promote wise stewardship of shared natural resources, enhance efforts to preserve ecosystems that cross the national boundary, and invite
communities that dot and span the frontier to exploit opportunities for mutual benefit. Ultimately, the border should be as thin as technologically and politically
possible for those engaged in legitimate travel or commerce while remaining difficult to penetrate for those engaged in criminal activity or unauthorized transit.
Management of this shared boundary should serve as a model for binational collaboration in
confronting shared challenges. Few policymakers, legislators and opinion leaders fully understand the border. Indeed, misperception
and misunderstanding of the situation at the border create a major public relations challenge. Those seeking to
improve management of this shared boundary and the region around it must inform policymakers by describing the situation on the ground before their
recommendations will make sense. In the next section of this report, therefore, we offer our diagnosis of the situation on the ground today. We emphasize not only
the deficiencies in border management but also the bright spots along the frontier where cooperation has been exemplary. Significant cooperation
between Mexico and the United States already exists along the border, but it is incomplete, uneven,
and unsystematic.
Sustaining the border regions environment is key to overall biodiversity
BGC 9 (Border Governors Conference, Strategic Guidelines for the Competitive and Sustainable
Development of the U.S.-Mexico Transborder Region, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, September, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/strategic-guidelines-for-the-
competitive-and-sustainable-development-the-us-mexico)
Due to its vastness the U.S.-Mexico border region encompasses an important wealth of natural resources and diverse
ecosystems. Freshwater, marine, and wetland ecosystems, deserts, rangelands, and several forest
types constitute sensitive and invaluable natural features . For example, the Chihuahuan Desert supports 350 of the 1 500
known species of cacti in the world. Many of these species are found only in single valleys. In the western region, the Sonoran Desert
has the greatest diversity of vegetation of any desert in the world. A prominent feature of the Chihuahuan and
Sonoran deserts is the occurrence of mountain ranges separated by extended valleys. These ranges provide habitats not present in the
valleys and host species that contribute to the biodiversity of the border territory. Urban settlements, along with
agriculture and cattle ranches, generally occupy the valleys. Big waterways, like the Rio Grande or the Colorado River, traverse the
international border and support millions of people in large cities and rural towns. The Rio Grande or Ro Bravo, as it is
known in Mexico, ows through ve Mexican states and three U.S. states, and a dozen Native American nations. All rely on it for
irrigation. From the headwaters in the Rocky Mountains, through the semi-arid Colorado Plateau and the arid Chihuahuan Desert, to its
nal subtropical ending in the Gulf of Mexico, the Rio Grande sustains a diversity of critical ecosystems and is
crucial for wildlife , including animals as diverse as beavers, bears, kangaroo rats, and migratory birds. The Colorado River also sustains
a very biodiverse region encompassing six U.S. states and two Mexican states. The ecosystems along the Colorado are facing unprecedented
pressure from economic activities. The ecosystems water needs are rarely considered as agricultural production, industry, and a rapidly
growing urban population use all but a trickle of the rivers water. The Gulf of Mexico supports productive sheries, which
are largely dependent on the estuaries, lagoons, wetlands and freshwater inows from the Rio Grande. The coastal habitats at the
mouth of the Rio Grande are particularly important as breeding grounds and maturation areas for
commercial sheries in the Gulf of Mexico. In the Pacic coastal area, a saltwater lagoon and slough mark the seaward end of
the Tijuana River within the Tijuana River National Estuarine Research Reserve (TRNERR). Established in 1982 to restore and preserve the
integrity of the estuary as a functioning ecosystem supporting a diversity of sh and wildlife resources, this protected area encompasses 2 500
acres of beach, dune, mudat, saltmarsh, riparian, coastal sage, and upland habitats. The reserve is home to eight threatened
and endangered species, including the light-footed clapper rail and the California least tern among others.
Biodiversity in specific hotspots checks extinction. Key to ag, medicine, and
ecosystems
Mittermeier 11
(et al, Dr. Russell Alan Mittermeier is a primatologist, herpetologist and biological anthropologist. He holds Ph.D. from Harvard in Biological
Anthropology and serves as an Adjunct Professor at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. He has conducted fieldwork for over 30
years on three continents and in more than 20 countries in mainly tropical locations. He is the President of Conservation International and he is
considered an expert on biological diversity. Mittermeier has formally discovered several monkey species. From Chapter One of the book
Biodiversity Hotspots F.E. Zachos and J.C. Habel (eds.), DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-20992-5_1, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011. This
evidence also internally references Norman Myers, a very famous British environmentalist specialising in biodiversity. available at:
http://www.academia.edu/1536096/Global_biodiversity_conservation_the_critical_role_of_hotspots)

Extinction is the gravest consequence of the biodiversity crisis, since it is irreversible. Human
activities haveelevatedtherate of species extinctions to a thousand or more times the natural
background rate (Pimm et al. 1995). What are the consequences of this loss? Most obvious among them may be the lost opportunity for
future resource use. Scientists have discovered a mere fraction of Earths species (perhaps fewer than 10%, or even 1%) and understood the
biology of even fewer (Novotny et al. 2002). As species vanish, so too does the health security of everyhuman.
Earths speciesare a vast genetic storehouse that may harbor a cure for cancer, malaria, or the next new pathogen cures
waiting to be discovered. Compounds initially derived from wild species account for more than half of all commercial medicines even more
in developing nations (Chivian and Bernstein 2008). Natural forms, processes, and ecosystems provide blueprints and inspiration for a
growing array of new materials, energy sources, hi-tech devices, and other innovations (Benyus 2009). The current loss of species has been
compared to burning down the worlds libraries without knowing the content of 90% or more of the books. With loss of species, we
lose the ultimate source ofour crops and the genes we use to improve agricultural resilience, the inspiration
for manufactured products, and the basis of the structure and function of the ecosystems that support humans and all
life on Earth (McNeely et al. 2009). Above and beyond material welfare and livelihoods, biodiversity contributes to security, resiliency,
and freedom of choices and actions (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Less tangible, but no less important, are the cultural, spiritual,
and moral costs inflicted by species extinctions. All societies value species for their own sake, and wild plants and animals are integral to the
fabric of all the worlds cultures (Wilson 1984). The road to extinction is made even more perilous to people by the loss of the broader
ecosystems that underpin our livelihoods, communities, and economies(McNeely et al.2009). The loss of coastal wetlands and mangrove
forests, for example, greatly exacerbates both human mortality and economic damage from tropical cyclones (Costanza et al.2008; Das and
Vincent2009), while disease outbreaks such as the 2003 emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in East Asia have been directly
connected to trade in wildlife for human consumption(Guan et al.2003). Other consequences of biodiversity loss, more subtle but equally
damaging, include the deterioration of Earths natural capital. Loss of biodiversity on land in the past decade alone is estimated to be costing
the global economy $500 billion annually (TEEB2009). Reduced diversity may also reduce resilience of ecosystems and the human communities
that depend on them. For example, more diverse coral reef communities have been found to suffer less from the diseases that plague degraded
reefs elsewhere (Raymundo et al.2009). As Earths climate changes, the roles of species and ecosystems will only increase in their importance
to humanity (Turner et al.2009). In many respects, conservation is local. People generally care more about the biodiversity in the place in
which they live. They also depend upon these ecosystems the most and, broadly speaking, it is these areas over which they have the most
control. Furthermore, we believe that all biodiversity is important and that every nation, every region, and every community should do
everything possible to conserve their living resources. So, what is the importance of setting global priorities?Extinction is a global
phenomenon, with impacts far beyond nearby administrative borders. More practically, biodiversity, the threats to
it, and the ability of countries to pay for its conservation vary around the world. The vast majority of the global conservation budget perhaps
90% originates in and is spent in economically wealthy countries (James et al.1999). It is thus critical that those globally exible funds
available in the hundreds of millions annually be guided by systematic priorities if we are to move deliberately toward a global goal of
reducing biodiversity loss. The establishment of priorities for biodiversity conservation is complex, but can be framed as a single question.
Given the choice, where should action toward reducing the loss of biodiversity be implemented rst ?The eld of
conservation planning addresses this question and revolves around a framework of vulnerability and irreplaceability
(Margules and Pressey2000). Vulnerability measures the risk to the species present in a region if the species and ecosystems that are highly
threatened are not protected now, we will not get another chance in the future. Irreplaceability measures the extent to which spatial
substitutes exist for securing biodiversity. The number of species alone is an inadequate indication of conserva-tion priority because several
areas can share the same species. In contrast, areas with high levels of endemism are irreplaceable. We must conserve these places because
the unique species they contain cannot be saved elsewhere. Put another way, biodiversity is not evenly distributed on our planet. It is heavily
concentrated in certain areas, these areas have exceptionally high concentrations of endemic species found nowhere else, and many (but not
all) of these areas are the areas at greatest risk of disappearing because of heavy human impact. Myers seminal paper (Myers1988) was the
rst application of the principles of irreplaceability and vulnerability to guide conservation planning on a global scale. Myers described
ten tropical forest hotspots on the basis of extraordinary plant endemism and high levels of habitat loss, albeit
without quantitative criteria for the designation of hotspot status. A subsequent analysis added eight additional hotspots, including four from
Mediterranean-type ecosystems (Myers1990).After adopting hotspots as an institutional blueprint in 1989, Conservation Interna-tional worked
with Myers in a rst systematic update of the hotspots. It introduced two strict quantitative criteria: to qualify as a hotspot, a region had to
contain at least 1,500 vascular plants as endemics (> 0.5% of the worlds total), and it had to have 30% or less of its original vegetation (extent
of historical habitat cover)remaining. These efforts culminated in an extensive global review (Mittermeier et al.1999) and scientic
publication (Myers et al.2000) that introduced seven new hotspots on the basis of both the better-dened criteria and new
data. A second systematic update (Mittermeier et al.2004) did not change the criteria, but revisited the set of hotspots based on new data on
the distribution of species and threats, as well as genuine changes in the threat status of these regions. That update redened several hotspots,
such as the Eastern Afromontane region, and added several others that were suspected hotspots but for which sufcient data either did not
exist or were not accessible to conservation scientists outside of those regions. Sadly, it uncovered another region the East Melanesian Islands
which rapid habitat destruction had in a short period of time transformed from a biodiverse region that failed to meet the less than 30% of
original vegetation remaining criterion to a genuine hotspot.
Scenario 2 is OAS
The United States unilateral hardline approach to the war on drugs has devastated
OAS credibility
Isacson 12 (Adam, director of the Regional Security Policy Program at the Washington Office on Latin America, May 22, Conflict
Resolution in the Americas: The Decline of the OAS, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11979/conflict-resolution-in-the-americas-
the-decline-of-the-oas, AB)
"The [Organization of American States] is an enemy of the U.S. and an enemy to the interests of freedom
and security," said Rep. David Rivera, a Republican congressman from Florida, in July 2011 as he joined the House Foreign Affairs Committee's
GOP majority in voting to cut off U.S. funding for the OAS. Riveras low regard for the organization was matched by Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez, who in
urging the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean to form a new regional bloc excluding the United States said, "You cant expect much from
the OAS. Its like a corpse that must be buried." The Organization of American States troubles go
beyond being attacked from both extremes of the ideological spectrum. The April 2012 Summit of the Americas
showed many of the region's presidents disagreeing, at times sharply, with the United States on key issues
like drug policy and diplomacy toward Cuba; several said they saw little reason to continue with the series of periodic meetings that began in
1995. Latin American governments, meanwhile, have formed a handful of parallel organizations that
explicitly exclude the United States . What is going on here? The OAS, the world's oldest regional
organization, has never been a diplomatic powerhouse. Since the Pan-American Union's founding in 1910, it has rarely been the
center of gravity for the Western Hemisphere's politics or diplomacy. It has helped to resolve only a small fraction of the region's armed conflicts or crises that
threatened to deteriorate into conflicts. Instead, the OAS has functioned as a multilateral sounding board, a place to
build consensus around broad policies , from anti-communism to counternarcotics to
counterterrorism. The ability to discuss issues at regular general assemblies and special sessions has
reduced friction among its members. And some OAS components -- the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, electoral observer missions
and efforts to verify postconflict demobilizations -- have made important contributions to regional peace, security and
democracy. But the OAS has been hampered by its design, which keeps it deliberately weak. The
organization operates on a consensus model, in which a determined minority can prevent action. Its
one country, one vote system means that a tiny state like St. Lucia has as much voice as a large state
like Brazil. The OAS has no analogue to the U.N. Security Council and no dispute-resolution or peace-enforcement mechanism to deal with breaches of the
peace like that contemplated in Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter. The OAS is also hampered by a perception, reinforced during the
Cold War, that the Washington-based body is dominated by the United States . This is perhaps inevitable given the
asymmetry of wealth and power between the United States and its regional neighbors. Still, the perception of an uneven playing field
has damaged the organization's "honest broker" status and made Latin American states reluctant to
take decisions that might require them to cede sovereignty to the OAS, even for the benefit of a
greater good. As a result, the OAS has not been viewed as a forum for debating drug policy. Instead, the
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), which is largely funded by the United States, has reinforced Washingtons hard-
line approach emphasizing supply reduction. Nor has the OAS been a leading voice on regional security issues; little of note has emerged from its Secretariat
for Multidimensional Security since it was established in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. The organization's security guarantees exist mostly on paper: The 1947
Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, which commits all countries to view an attack against one as an attack against all, has not been meaningfully invoked in
decades, and Mexico dropped out of it entirely in the 2002 run-up to the Iraq War. By contrast, the OAS has become a more active voice in
favor of strengthening the region's 30-year-old transition from dictatorship to democracy. However, its 2001 Democratic Charter, which
in theory automatically suspends nondemocratic members and calls for diplomatic measures to deal with interruptions in democracy, has not been employed
successfully. It failed key tests in Venezuela in 2002 and Honduras in 2009, as well as in more recent cases of democratic erosion in several countries. Cases of
interstate conflict are rare in Latin America, but when they do occur they can be explosive. The OAS has played a
role at times in defusing them, usually by quickly convening regional heads of state and exerting
united international pressure. From the 1950s to the 1970s, for instance, frequent flare-ups along a disputed border between Nicaragua and
army-less Costa Rica were taken to the OAS. In one of the organization's greatest achievements, it helped broker an end to a brief 1995 border war between Peru
and Ecuador, which included the deployment of a postconflict observer mission. Many other 20th century border conflicts, though, were settled by other
international actors. The Vatican, for instance, mediated a 1978 dispute between Argentina and Chile, and the International Court of Justice is currently considering
a maritime dispute between Peru and Chile. Far more common in Latin America have been internal conflicts: civil wars,
insurgencies, coups d'tat and mass outbreaks of violent crime. Here, it is far harder for an international actor to resolve the
conflict, because it means obligating a state or an insurgency to change its behavior within its own borders.
EVEN IF legalization is ineffective, the gesture is enough to resolve the lack of internal
communication in the OAS -- independently solves
Padgett 13 (Tim is WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America, OAS
to White House and Hemisphere: Its High Time to Consider Legalizing Pot,
http://world.time.com/2013/05/22/key-regional-organization-pushes-white-house-to-debate-legalizing-
pot/, AB)
On the Latin American street, the Organization of American States has always borne a reputation, often undeserved,
as Washingtons lackey. But the OAS, based in Washington, just sent the western hemisphere a message the
White House would rather not hear: Its time to seriously discuss legalizing marijuana as one means of
reducing harrowing drug violence. That conclusion, from a study presented last Friday in Bogot, Colombia, by OAS
Secretary-General Jos Miguel Insulza, is one that a growing number of Latin American governments including
Uruguay, which might legalize marijuana this year are urging the Obama Administration to accept .
Having the motion seconded by Washingtons lackey makes it harder to ignore. But even as Insulza and
Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos were hailing the OAS report last week, something else was brewing in Bogot that could further
undermine resistance to pot legalization. The Colombian capital is about to start a program that uses marijuana to wean junkies off bazuco, a
cheap but fiercely addictive cocaine paste. It will mark one of the largest experiments to determine if marijuana
which legalization opponents still insist is a gateway to harder drugs like cocaine and heroin is in reality an exit drug. If so, it
will only serve to reinforce the argument, mentioned by the OAS study, that marijuana is a relatively
benign drug, far more comparable to alcohol than it is, say, to crystal meth. (MORE: Legalizing Marijuana and Other Ways the U.S. and
Mexico Can Win the Drug War) As Miami Herald South America correspondent Jim Wyss recently wrote from Bogot, For the most desperate
[bazuco] users, the cannabis cure may be the only way out. Or as one social worker told Wyss, We want people to quit a substance that is
very, very dama0ging and transition to something less dangerous and which will allow them to function in society. Critics say the effort will just
turn bazuco zombies into potheads. But for years now, similar projects in countries like Brazil, Jamaica and most recently Canada have indicated
that marijuana is in fact an effective exit drug. In British Columbia last fall, a team of U.S. and Canadian addiction researchers determined that
clinical trials on cannabis substitution for problematic substance abuse appear justified. That doesnt mean we should all start smoking herb
like Harold and Kumar. The fact that a glass of hot bourbon can relieve common cold symptoms doesnt mean we should all start drinking
Manhattans, either. But affirming marijuana as an exit drug would lead us to reconsider one of modern societys most glaring double standards:
booze good, pot bad. It would reinforce the notion that moderate marijuana use is not more perilous than moderate alcohol consumption.
According to studies, in fact, pot smoking in some cases can be a preferable alternative to drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco. (MORE: The
Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect) So why do we waste so many resources (almost $10 billion each year in
the U.S. alone) as well as lives hunting down marijuana users and sellers? The OASs $2 million report The Drug Problem in the Americas
seems to ask the same thing. It is not an outright call for marijuana legalization. It is, as Insulza said in Bogot, the beginning of a long-awaited
discussion about more realistic *drug war+ policies. Most Latin American leaders whose countries suffer the
bloody brunt of the largely failed U.S.-led drug war already made it clear to President Obama at last
years Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, that its high time to ask whether marijuana
legalization might help reduce drug cartel revenues and therefore drug cartel mayhem. (Studies indicate it
could rob Mexicos narco-mafias of a third of the estimated $30 billion they rake in each year.) Insulza
acknowledged the current disposition throughout the Americas to deal with the legalization issue, and
he called for greater flexibility on the part of nations like the U.S. The 400-page OAS study itself concludes
that trends in the hemisphere lean toward decriminalization or legalization of the production, sale
and use of marijuana. Sooner or later, decisions in this area will need to be taken. Santos, who is widely considered
Washingtons closest ally in Latin America today, has not yet endorsed legalization, but he said the report should help drug-war battered
countries like his seek better solutions than the conventional interdiction strategy Washington still pushes. Former presidents of
three of Latin Americas largest economies Brazil, Mexico and Colombia have jointly called for marijuana
legalization. In the U.S., the states of Washington and Colorado last fall voted to legalize pot. Now that the OAS has joined
that chorus, both the White House and the U.S. Congress need to join the discussion with more open
ears.
Border disputes are coming and escalatethe OAS solves hemispheric confidence-
building
Herz April 08 (Monica, Director, Institute of International Relations, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Author of Ecuador vs. Peru,
Development Studies Institute, DOES THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES MATTER?,
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CC4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fs
erviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F57413%2Fipublicationdocument_singledocument%2Fdf9c52a2-2dc9-4ca6-9a4e-
05fa2a399a31%2Fen%2FWP34.2.pdf&ei=q1IaUujIAavy2gX5yYCQAQ&usg=AFQjCNHJfVZsoHNpbVFXZrs_-_5MVpD-
kA&sig2=QzMXH1oWhtsczkMOq4OosA)
Nevertheless, one must remember that boundary disputes exist today and were sources of conflict in the past. The
territorial disputes in the hemisphere at present are: Peru-Chile- Bolivia (Chile and Bolivia do not have diplomatic relations); Nicaragua and
Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Colombia; Colombia and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela; and Venezuela and Guiana (ABIN 2007). Moreover,
guerrilla warfare was present from the late 1950s onward, and the war in Colombia is the most vivid example of this reality today. Intra-state
wars (as defined by the Correlates of War Project) occurred in twelve countries since the 1950s.7 Currently drug traffic and
transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals
alike, and the social and economic problems that characterise the region could give rise to international
conflicts over resources and migration. The domestic political and social situation in many Latin
American countries could generate internal conflicts. The fragility of domestic mechanisms for conflict
resolution and the state apparatus in general has generated political crises throughout the history of the southern
part of the Americas. Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent
crisis is a possibility in the medium term. The OAS and the Management of Security From the brief overview presented above it
is apparent that the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks:
Among these institutions, the OAS is the most universal , including all countries in the hemisphere and
geared towards the multidimensional problems in place. The OAS, IATRA and the Pact of Bogota (Treaty on Pacific
Settlement of Disputes) are supposed to be the pillars of the hemispheric security system. The Pact has never been applied, however. The
OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework. As we have seen, either the
Permanent Council or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers serves as the Organ of Consultation for both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty and
makes decisions aimed at addressing security threats perceived by the member states. Other institutions are also part of the group of regional
mechanisms for the management of international security, although only the OAS congregates all hemispheric sovereign countries: ad hoc
regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group,8 the Guarantors of the Peru- Ecuador Treaty;9 the Summit Meetings;10 and the Meeting of
Defence Ministers11. Two specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions: the Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear
Accounting Agency; and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Institutions such as the
Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Andean Group, Mercosul and the Union of South American Countries, geared toward
economic, cultural and social integration, also play a part in the creation of a common security agenda. The relations between the
OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant for the purposes of this article since the Summit process has
provided guidance beyond the Charter and the Rio Treaty for action in the sphere of security. Regarding the other forms
of cooperation, the levels of coordination do not have any significant results. Initially the Summit process was to develop an autonomous
agenda, but the OAS has increasingly taken the Summits orientation as a guide for action. In the context of the Third Summit of the Americas
held in Quebec City in 2001, the OAS was officially designated as the Secretariat of the Summit of the Americas Process. At the Miami Summit in
1994, the Heads of State and Government assigned mandates to the OAS in several areas such as drugs, corruption, terrorism, hemispheric
security, sustainable development and the environment. The OAS incorporated these mandates into its agenda on a priority basis. The OAS
security structure was designed for collective security operations and for dispute settlement through
diplomatic consultation. Chapter VI of the Charter endorses the principle of collective security an attack on one is
considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on
peaceful means for the settlement of disputes. Chapter V outlines the procedures to promote this. The legalist
tradition, profoundly rooted in Latin American international culture and also relevant in inter-American relations more generally, is firmly
associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it. When a security threat is detected,
either the Charter of the OAS or the Rio Treaty may be invoked. There is no established norm regarding which treaty is invoked and in some
cases both documents have been used.12 The political process in each case will determine the selection. The difference in tone between Article
60 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty may determine the choice of one or the other. The Rio Treaty indicates that stricter sanctions
could be applied. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets and determines whether the request is justified and whether to convene the Organ
of Consultation. Frequently an investigating committee is formed and reports back to the Organ of Consultation. Finally, resolutions may be
voted for. Several options are available: sending an observation committee, sanctions or even the use of armed force. At any point the
organisation may consider the crisis solved or may simply choose to withdraw from the case. The Special Representatives and Envoys of the
Secretary-General are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the hemispheres trouble spots and/or appointed to head OAS
electoral observation missions. The OAS has had some success in reducing regional tensions and preventing
conflicts from escalating (Shaw 2004: 96). This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and
Nicaragua between 1948 and 1979, and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969. It has
functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict since its creation.
Investigative commissions were created in a number of cases to offer assessments and sometimes indicate solutions
to situations of conflict or controversy. It has also been a major forum for the process of generating
regional norms on security, regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between
democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality.
The use of military capabilities is extremely rare. The only Inter-American Peace Force was created in 1965 and sent to the
Dominican Republic after its civil war and US military intervention. During the Cold War, the containment of the ideological threat of
communism was the main pillar of the concept of security in the Western Hemisphere and at the OAS. The IATRA and the doctrines of national
security developed in most Latin American countries reflected this logic. The definition of threat was framed in Cold War terms for the first time
at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, in 1954. A resolution was issued defining a government under communist control as a threat
to the hemisphere.13 The treatment of the Dominican Republic political crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Revolution within the same framework
followed. The Declaration of San Jos, issued during the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers in August 1960, explicitly makes use of Cold War
discourse, mentioning the threat of extra continental intervention by the Soviet Union and China and that the inter- American system is
incompatible with any form of totalitarianism (OAS 1960). The 1960s can be characterised as the period when the OAS was most clearly used
as an instrument of US foreign policy partly because many countries in the region accepted the bipolar ideological view of international
relations sponsored by the US. During this period the OAS mediation of the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in 1969, was the
clearest expression of the organisations capacity to be effective beyond the Cold War confrontation. During a World Cup soccer tournament in
July of that year, border incidents between El Salvador and Honduras occurred. The large migration of Salvadorians to Honduras (around
300,000) generated social pressure, and riots against the migrant population took place in Honduras. As a result, El Salvador invaded Honduras.
The day after the fighting began, the OAS met in an urgent session and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of El Salvadors forces
from Honduras. The OAS negotiated the dispute, put pressure on El Salvador to withdraw and a ceasefire was reached. The threat of OAS
economic sanctions against El Salvador and the dispatch of OAS observers to Honduras to oversee the security of Salvadoranians remaining in
that country were fundamental for the temporary resolution of the dispute. This was a clear case of preventive diplomacy, more specifically
pre-emptive engagement, according to Lunds terminology. Violence had begun, with 2,000 dead and thousands displaced, but was not
widespread and the OAS acted successfully to create channels of communication, turning the norm of peaceful resolution of disputes into a
reality while also using inducements and pressure. After only four days of fighting a ceasefire was reached. Thereafter, the OAS engaged in
conflict resolution, allowing the disputes between the two countries to end peacefully. In other cases the OAS was also able to avoid violence
that faced the region during the period. The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational
sense, supporting the return to stability or status quo in many instances, and as a forum for conflict
resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution. The
following are the cases in which the Charter or the Rio Treaty was invoked to deal with a security threat in the region, in the period up to 1990
(those in which conflict prevention was successful in stabilising the situation are in italics): [Chart omitted] During the 1970s and 1980s the
OAS became less active in the security sphere. The disagreements between the US and most Latin American countries tended to widen. Latin
American countries supported moves towards greater engagement of the OAS in social and economic issues. The Protocol of Buenos Aires,
which took effect in 1970, addressed some of the concerns of Latin American countries by creating the Inter-American Economic and Social
Council. There was no consensus on the use of the OAS as part of the Cold War foreign policy of the US. In fact in 1975, the majority of Latin
American states reversed the embargo on Cuba as they did not consider Cuba to be a threat.14 The OASs inaction during the 1980s conflicts in
Central America,15 the marginal role it played in the Falklands/Malvinas War and the US unilateral decisions to intervene in Grenada in 1983
and Panama in 1989 led to greater emphasis on ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group, the Summit Meetings, the Meeting of
Defence Ministers or the Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty. The OAS After the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, an attempt to
redefine the role played by the OAS has been made, prompted by a wide sense of failure, the new consensus on democracy in the region, the
admission of Canada in 1990, different interests of regional actors and the wider debate on the redefinition of the concept of security. The
OAS has become active in fostering confidence-building measures and land-mine clearing, and has continued
its work on the dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict. The range of activities in which the
organisation has been involved has grown notably and new capabilities have been generated. Several institutional changes took place and new
agencies were created such as the Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the Inter- American Drug
Abuse Control Committee and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. The Secretary General acquired new responsibilities. He or she
is now authorised to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council matters which might threaten the peace, security
or development of member states. The Education for Peace Programme was also created.16 The effort to reshape the organisation also
should be understood in the context of the generation of the idea that peace is a regional asset. The vision of a peaceful and stable region, in
contrast to other parts of the world, is perceived by national elites of several countries as an advantage in the context of the current dispute
over international investment flows. At the same time, policy makers and academics undertook a debate on the new role of the OAS as the
literature quoted earlier testifies. In this new context does the OAS matter? Two different paths are taken in the remaining part of this article
to answer this question. First, I point out that the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading
role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating
the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation
to have an active role in preventing intra-state conflicts . In addition, the OAS remains an important pillar
of the norm of peaceful solution of disputes, which is an historical legacy of previous periods. Insofar as the states participate
in norm construction and behaviour is changed, one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy
mechanisms . Secondly, I will show that the OAS prevented a number of international and domestic disputes
from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises. In the sphere of security, in
particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were
passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate on the redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the
Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to review the
hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS
and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards greater transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small
states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The Committees
working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on
recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its subsidiaries, on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with
technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and
institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate
established by the Permanent Council: disarmament and non-proliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-
American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Zone;
confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty;
follow-up to the Special Conference on Security; the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs;
the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of the small island states; the implementation of
Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American
Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. The redefinition of the concept of security involved the incorporation of
an expanded concept and the shift from collective security to co-operative security (Tickner 1995; Buzan 1991; Matthews 1991). The
expanded concept of security allows for the perception of the interdependence between economic,
social, political and environment issues and threats and use of violence. The perception that so-called new threats to
security such as drug traffic, illegal traffic of arms, intra-state violence and institutional failure of states could be tackled by the organisation
became acceptable. At the Special Conference on Security, held in 2003 in Mexico, member states defined security in multidimensional terms.
Thus efforts to deal with drug traffic, democratic stability, terrorism and mine clearing acquired new legitimacy. A new normative framework
was generated and institutional mechanisms were produced. Some of the norms and mechanisms in question are part of the preventive
diplomacy practice discussed at the beginning of this article. The emphasis on confidence- and security-building
measures, which guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information,
replaced the stress on deterrence in the concept of collective security or collective defence (i.e. the idea that aggressors would have to face the combined force of a coalition) (Carter et al. 1992; OAS 1993; Dominguez 1993; Griffith 1998), The idea of arms control is not explicitly present inthe Charter, but slowly entered the inter- American security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1974, eight
Latin American governments issued the Ayacuchu Declaration,19 affirming their support for the idea of arms control, and the Hemispheric Security Committee has taken on this subject. The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Production and Traffic of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and related Materials of 1997 expresses the link between the arms control agenda and the new prominence of the concept of cooperative security. On June 7, 1999, the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala adopted a landmark Inter-American Convention on Transparency in
Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. By June 2003, the Convention was signed by twenty OAS member states all major hemispheric conventional weapons importers and exporters. The Contadora group mentioned earlier, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBMagenda, launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to Latin America (Rodrigues 1999; Rojas 1996). The 1995 war between Peru and
Ecuador reminded Latin American leaders that the pending territorial disputes in the region, a legacy of the nineteenth century demarcation process, could be ignited into an actual exchange of fire. The US government, moving in the 1990s towards a more multilateral approach in the region, and the democratisation of Latin American countries permitted the introduction of the confidence-building agenda. In addition, the concern with the nature of civil-military relations in Latin America, given the regions history of military intervention in public administration, and the
search for new roles and identities for the military led local elites to acquire greater interest in the subject. In the 1990s the states in the hemisphere turned to the OAS as a catalyst for confidence building. The OAS has organised and sponsored conferences on confidence- and security- building measures, designed to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to modernise their defence forces without triggering suspicions fromneighbours or leading to an arms
race. In 1994, a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defence policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San
Salvador expanded this agenda, dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalisation of discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure defence expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina
and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentinas Defence White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering and analysis. ECLACs common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBMthat contributes to disarmament and the l owering of military expenditures. A meeting of experts took place in
Miami in 2003, issuing two final documents that are nowa reference for the debate on the subject (US Department of State, 2003). The countries of the region have also adhered to CSBMs on a global level, the OAS having approved the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999. This initiative provides a framework for the advance notification of acquisitions of weapon systems covered by the UN Register. The data available on the participation of American states in different aspects of the confidence and security agenda
attest to the wide involvement of countries in the hemisphere. Among the OAS countries, 26 have presented reports on the themes required. Moreover bilateral arrangements complement this trend, such as the joint operations and training between Brazilian and Argentine forces in particular. The experience of Latin American armies in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. As part of the transformation process, the IADB has acquired new and different roles. Its current programmes include mine clearing in Central America, reporting on
confidence- and security-building measures, and developing educational programmes on regional security. The analysis of the military security- and confidence-building measures was initiated at the headquarters of the Inter-American Defence Board in 1995. Resolution 650 (1031/95) of the OAS Permanent Council tasked the IADB with the preparation of an inventory of the military security- and confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere. The Board provides a senior- level academic programme in security studies for military, national police and civilian leaders at
the Inter-American Defence College (IADC). On March 15, 2006, the 32nd Special Session of the General Assembly formalised the IADB status as an OAS agency. Thus it is clear that a long process involving hemispheric states, and more particularly the military establishments in the region, has generated a norm regarding knowledge sharing and the diffusion of rules regarding military activities and arms procurements. This is a changein social interaction that prevents conflict by generating confidence. The second normthat the OAS had a central role in generating was the
association between democracy and security, allowing for a role of the regional multilateral institutions in protecting democratic institutions where they were fragile or collapsing thus avoiding conflict. The newweight given by the OAS to the defence of democracy marked the international landscape in the region in the 1990s (Cooper and Legler 2001 & 2006; Massote 2007). In this case one should also notice the presence of other regional institutions playing an important role: the Rio Group, the Andean Group, the Caribbean Common Market and MERCOSUR. The
theme was always present in declaratory terms in the OASs agenda, having been associated with the Cold War dispute. Some attempts to foster formal democratic institut ions can be understood both as part of the US Cold War strategy and as the movement towards a regional regime for the protection of human rights and democracy. The Declaration of Santiago (OAS 1959: 4-6) issued by the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, explicitly mentions the importance of free elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights and effective judicial procedures.
During that meeting the American Commission for Human Rights was created. Nevertheless only in 1979 did the OAS begin its road towards a legitimising and supporting role in the consolidation and improvement of democracy in the Americas. At that moment a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was passed. The 1985 Cartagena Protocol states the commitment to the promotion and the strengthening of representative democracy. The 1991 Declaration on the Col lective Defence of Democracy, often referred to as the
Santiago Declaration, called for prompt reaction of the regions democracies in the event of a threat to democracy in a member state. Resolution 1080, passed by the General Assembly in June 1991 in Santiago, determines that the OAS Permanent Council should be summoned in case of the suspension of the democratic process in any member state, and thereafter a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be summoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions may be imposed. The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas set the tone for a growing responsibility regarding
the maintenance of democratic regimes in the Americas. In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter took place through the ratificati on of the 1992 Protocol of Washington. The agreement strengthens representative democracy by giving the OAS the right to suspend a member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force. A new collective identity was fostered, led by the US, and made possible by the transition of most Latin America countries to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, the OAS relaxed its commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the
process of constructing a regime for the preservation of democracy. Finally, in 2001 the Inter- American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalising the democratic paradigm (OAS 2001). This new Charter creates procedures for cases of formal disruption to democracy and for situations when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a coup detat was attempted against President Hugo Chaves of Venezuela in 2002. In this context, the OAS Unit for the Promoti on of Democracy (UPD), nowthe Department for the Promotion of Democracy, was
established in 1991. It provided assistance for the development of democratic institutions and for conflict resolution. During the first years of its activities, the UPD concent rated on the area of electoral observations. Following the First Summit of the Americas in 1994, it got involved in programmes for the support of peace processes on the continent. The UPD took part in several electoral observation missions on national and municipal levels, supporting training, educational, research and information programmes (Thrien and Gosselin 1997). Since 1990 the OAS has set
up 92 electoral observation missions in 20 different countries (OAS 2007b). The Inter-American Forumon Political Parties fosters debate and research on issues pertaining to the political system of states, such as campaign financing and confidence in the political system. The OAS has also promoted national dialogue in countries where political institutions may be facing a crisis such as Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname and Bolivia andgenerated training and educational programmes geared towards the generation of a democratic culture. These activities are
part of the conflict-prevention toolbox and the extent, and importance of the activities allow us to assert that the OAS plays a major part in guaranteeing democratic stability in the region. These activities can be categorised in a different manner, but from the point of view of conflict prevention, in a region where intra- state and inter-state violence has often been generated by domestic political instability, this is a fundamental contribution for the prevention of violent escalation of disputes. After the end of the Cold War we can also verify that the OAS played an
important role in conflict prevention dealing with situations that could have escalated into violent conflict. In the following instances the Charter, Resolution 1080 or the Inter American Democratic Charter were invoked: [Chart Omitted] The OAS has also been involved in conflict resolution and national reconciliation since the 1990s. It took part in post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua, Haiti and Guatemala. The International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV, Comison Internacional de Apoio y Verificacin) was the context in which the OAS, in
conjunction with the United Nations, dealt with the pacification of Nicaragua. Peace building in Nicaragua was a coordinated enterprise undertaken by the OAS and the UN(Seresere 1996). The OAS would receive returning combatants and their families inside Nicaragua. The Commission aided in the reintegration of approximately 120,000 combatants and their families into post-war Nicaraguan society, was able to include non-combatants in the programme and mediated local conflicts. The OAS also monitored the 1996 elections, which saw a successful transition from one
elected president to the next. CIAV ended operations in July 1997. The OAS was assisted the mine-clearing operations in Nicaragua, the General Secretary of the organisation having requested the IADBto plan the operations. Subsequently a wider project to remove mines from Central America was implemented. The mine-clearing programme was created in 1991 and was conducted under the general coordination of the UPD with the technical support of the IADB. The OAS also aided the process of pacification in Suriname, where its crucial role as mediator led to the
signing and fulfilment of the 1992 peace accord. The OAS mission helped collect and destroy weapons from armed groups that had operated throughout Surinames rural areas. In 1993 and 1994, the OAS monitored compliance with the peace accords and assisted in the removal of land mines. When a coup detat took place in Haiti i n September 1991, the OAS was the first international organisation to react, issuing a Permanent Council resolution condemning the coup, and demanding respect for the democratically elected government (Berenson 1996). An ad hoc
Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was called, pursuant to the mechanism established under Resolution 1080. The meeting called for full restoration of the rule of law and the reinstatement of President Aristide; and suspension of economic, financial and commercial ties with Haiti was recommended. In October, the creation of a Civilian Mission to re- establish and strengthen constitutional democracy was authorised by the meeting of Consultation. Secretary General Baena Soares sent OAS human rights observers to Port-au- Prince. After this initial OAS experience,
the UN General Assembly approved a plan for a joint OAS/UN mission. Only after the action of the multinational force, led by the US in September 1994, was it possible to effectively put in place the peacekeeping mission authorised by the Security Council and the OAS/UN civilian mission could start its work. The International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was the most advanced experience in cooperation between the OAS and the UN. In the context of the mission, collaboration took place in the areas of electoral observation, humanitarian aid, human rights
monitoring, political negotiations, refugees, fuel supply and the economic recovery programme. After the signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996, the OAS provided support for legislative and electoral reforms, aided the reintegration of ex-combatants and promoted the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict
resolution between states . In September 2005, Belize and Guatemala signed an agreement at the OAS establishing a framework for
negotiations and confidence-building measures, to help maintain good bilateral relations while they seek a permanent solution to their
longstanding territorial dispute. The OAS is supporting that effort through its Fund for Peace. In April 2006, El Salvador and Honduras reach an
agreement regarding their common border, the OAS having played an important role in support of negotiations. Conclusion I have argued in
this article that the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate, particularly after the 1990s, in a limited but
important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role in preventing the
escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts . I have pointed out that in 18
different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent,
or more violent, conflict. The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through
mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution. Three norms developed partly within the
organisation are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful
resolution of conflict; the norm of information sharing built into the confidence-building agenda; and the norm that
stresses democratic institutional stability, associating democracy and security and allowing a more active multilateral
interference in domestic political affairs. The pattern of behaviour observed in the pages above permits us to point out that institutions have
been built, are functioning and have changed matters on the ground in several countries, preventing violence. I would also like to
stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state
apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile. The examples mentioned in this article pertain to
information gathering, electoral assistance and other matters regarding political and judicial institutions. This assistances favours
acquiescence to international norms and accords.
Latin American Instability leads to multiple scenarios for draw in and asymmetric and
nuclear warfare
Fleishmann 13 <Luis, Ph.D. in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New York City, an M.A. degree from the New
School as well and a B.A. in Political Science and Labor Studies from Tel Aviv University. Dr. Fleischman has worked for more than two decades
for the Jewish Federations of Palm Beach County, Florida and Central New Jersey as executive director for community and political relations. In
that capacity, he has worked intensively on issues related to the Middle East and national security serving as a liaison between these
organizations and members of Congress, foreign consuls, the media and the local community at large. Dr. Fleischman has also worked as senior
advisor for the Menges Hemispheric Security Project at the Center for Security Policy. The focus of Dr. Fleischmans work at the CSP was on
monitoring Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his allies, their connections to radical groups, the expansion of Chavezs ideas across the
continent and the rise of anti-democratic forces in the region. Dr. Fleischman is also an Adjunct Professor of Sociology and Political Science at
Florida Atlantic University Honors College and FAU Lifelong Learning Society, Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the
United States, May 31, 2013, http://books.google.com/books?id=N7D6doBly7AC&lr=&source=gbs_navlinks_s>#SPS
The challenges that Latin America poses today are not all the direct result of the Bolivarian revolution. Indeed, outside pernicious forcesthe
drug cartelsexisted before the Bolivarian revolution, and they had been a major challenge in the region for two decades before Chavez's rise
to power in 1999. But the Bolivarian revolution has promoted the destruction of democracy and has set afoot
an authoritarian socialist movement throughout Latin America that despises the market economy,
liberal democracy, and U.S. political and cultural hegemony. It has inspired governments to follow its model and has
gained admirers among groups and movements through- out Latin America. Chavez has made alliances with all anti-U.S. elements in the region
and now around the globe. Indeed, the Bolivarian leader has deepened his relationship with the FARC guerrillas in
Colombia and has made alliances with Iran. His financial and material assistance has revitalized a
moribund FARC and incorporated it with the insurgent force of the Bolivarian revolution. He has
promoted Iran's presence in Latin America, including its most ominous aspectsasymmetric warfare and nuclear
cooperation. Further, the Bolivarian leadership expanded its relations with drug cartels and has facilitated their hunt for more territory,
giving them an outlet in the midst of the U.S. war on drugs and enabling them to continue destroying the social fabric Of society and State
authority in the region. The leadership expected that such lawlessness could precipitate the rise to power of other revolutionary leaders. These
partners of the Bolivarian revolution, however, still follow their own interests and objectives. All together, they create chaos in a region
that in the future will see the proliferation of nothing but more adverse conditions: authoritarianism,
further anarchy, insurgency, local and international terrorism, rogue states' involvement, and Other
negative elements such as an arms race and nuclear activity. The continent's current economic
prosperity, about which many Latin American leaders rejoice and brag, is not enough to counteract the detrimental
effects of the Bolivarian revolution in some countries. Further, attempts to counter the negative repercussions have met
with the indifference and impotence Of Other non-Bolivarian countries in the region. Being that the majority of these countries are left leaning,
where the push for social rights and appeals to the poor are stronger than that for liberal democracy, Chavez's actions did not disturb their
leaders. In fact, countries like Brazil rushed to view Chavez as a key to regional integration. More- over, many Of them joined Chavez in his anti-
American fervor. They did not embrace it with the same fury that Chavez and his allies did, but the moderate Left certainly still carries the anti-
American baggage of the past. Brazilian president Lula's foreign policy toward Iran is a case in point. As we have seen, many other countries of
the moderate Left also developed warmer relations With Iran. Argentina is moving toward conciliation with Iran despite the fact that its own
courts declared Iran responsible for the most lethal terrorist attacks on Argentinean soil. Iran therefore became a For those who look at the
facts with a technical perspectivefor example, a general in the armed forces whose specialty is conventional warfarethey might not
perceive the threat of the Bolivarian revolution and its actions as imminent. For those who seek hard evidence beyond reasonable doubt,
predicting what may happen in the future is impossible; however, the current situation provides enough Signs to require a serious look at the
rise of authoritarian governments in the region and their connections. For one, the breakdown Of democracy in the continent
is alarming, but it cannot be reduced to a crisis of democracy per se. Instead, it is the inevitable result
when a state's government fails to consolidate its powers, to include its citizens in policymaking and
represent their interests, and to strengthen the rule of law so that it can prevent external elements from
corrupting it. Simply, a weak democracy becomes a weak state. A weak state is vulnerable to corruption. Corruption leads to colonization
Of the State by powerful groups that have enough purchasing power. As noted throughout the book, the deterioration of
democracy to this extent has security implications insofar as external forces can penetrate it. The United
States has remained impotent in the face Of these developments because it took a defensive position. In addition, the war in Iraq hurt its image
in Latin America and exacerbated negative feelings toward the United States. Consequently, the United States could not confront Chavez and
his revolution directly, leading to its position of compliance with Latin American countries. Thus, the United States lost the ability
to pursue its agenda actively and ended up accepting a passive role in the continent. As stated in chapter 9,
however, the Bolivarian revolution will not die along with Chavez. It will endure and survive because of the
structures and practices he has left in place, not just in Venezuela but in the region as well. The United States should
not have any illusions about it: The challenge will continue. The effects Of authoritarianism, the
destruction Of the State, and the proliferation Of non-state actors and rogue States are likely to
continue their course if no one moves to counter them. As time goes by, these circumstances will further aggravate Latin
American relationships with the United States. U.S. foreign policy, therefore, cannot be guided by traumas of the past, appeasement, fear, or
guilt. Its security and foreign policy needs to serve the interests and goals of the region, as well as those of
the United States, particularly when a threat to national security is raised.



Afghanistan Adv.

Withdraw of NATO forces leaves Afghanistan vulnerable to collapse in the status quo
Jeong 8/7/14 <May, Financial Times, Talibans summer surge threatens Afghanistans stability,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5e9045b4-1e18-11e4-bb68-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3AxcM3T5A>#SPS
As politicians in Kabul wrangle over the result of Afghanistans contested presidential election, Taliban forces have used this
summers fighting season to make bold advances into previously government-held territory across the
country, according to eyewitnesses and local officials. Only a week ago, more than 1,000 insurgents stormed a district in Nangahar province,
a few hours drive from the capital Kabul. Similar attacks have been reported in recent weeks in Ghor, Faryab, Badghis, Nuristan, Kapisa, Kunar,
Faryab, Helmand and Kandahar spanning the north, east and south of the country. With rivals Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai
locked in arguments over who won the election to succeed President Hamid Karzai, the escalation in fighting raises fresh doubts
about the achievements of the 13-year war, the USs longest-ever military engagement, and whether Afghan
security forces can keep the Taliban at bay as foreign troops withdraw. Nowhere are such questions
more relevant than in the southern province of Helmand, where British forces had held responsibility for security in recent
years. Interviews with police commanders, local politicians and community elders reveal how Afghan forces are struggling to cope
with the departure by the end of the year of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force [Isaf], whose number
nationwide has halved to less than 50,000 in the past 18 months. Violence in the north of Helmand has increased, and the zones of control
around district administration centres across the province have diminished. According to the latest UN report, the increase in
civilian casualties by 24 per cent in the first half of 2014 was a result of increased fighting between the
government and insurgents. The report found the conflict was encroaching upon urban centres, leading
to more deaths in the civilian population.
Legalization stabilizes the Afghan marijuana industry constrains terrorist funding and
provides economic stability
Goodman 14 <H. A., author and journalist who studied International Relations at USC and worked for a brief stint at the U.S.
Department of State's Foreign Service Institute, Legalizing Marijuana Should Be a Top National Security Objective: Terrorism and Border
Instability Would Diminish, 7/14/14, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/h-a-goodman/legalizing-marijuana-shou_b_5583767.html>#SPS
First, Afghanistan according to CBS News is the world's largest supplier of cannabis and the plant is even more
profitable to Afghan farmers than opium poppy. Considering that the U.S. is the largest consumer of
marijuana in the world with 7.3 percent of Americans -- around 23 million citizens -- who regularly use marijuana, the Afghan
economy and people could benefit greatly from supplying a legal cannabis industry. American citizens spend
$40.6 billion a year on marijuana, so a federally recognized marijuana industry in the U.S. could provide people in
war-torn states like Afghanistan a needed source of legal income. This alone could mitigate instability,
but the fact that terror groups are using profits from Afghanistan's cannabis crop directly undermines
our national security objectives. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, "Drug trafficking, the critical link between supply
and demand, is fueling a global criminal enterprise valued in the hundreds of billions of dollars that poses a growing challenge to stability and
security." The report goes on to state that there are "more and more acts of violence, conflicts and terrorist activities fuelled by drug trafficking
and organized crime." Echoing this alarming fact, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated the Afghan illegal drug trade is funding
insurgency, international terrorism and wider destabilization." Therefore, Afghanistan's cannabis crop is
funding terror groups; a reality that directly undermines the White House's stated counterterrorism objectives. According to a 2010
Time article titled, Afghanistan's New Bumper Drug Crop: Cannabis, federally legalizing marijuana would drain cash from
insurgents in the ongoing Afghanistan War: "'Afghanistan is using some of its best land to grow
cannabis,' says Antonia Maria Costa, director of the UN drug office in Vienna. 'If they grew wheat instead, insurgents would not have money
to buy weapons and the international community would not have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on food aid.' ... 'Eradicating
marijuana and opium fields can breed resentment by people and be destabilizing,' says John Dempsey, a rule-of-law
adviser to U.S. and Afghan officials for the U.S. Institute of Peace. ... Groups of armed drug traffickers, meanwhile, travel through the
countryside, buying opium and cannabis at the farm gates for cash. For many farmers in the area, making a living and staying alive -- sadly -- go
hand in hand." Furthering the link between the illegal cannabis trade and terror, a Guardian article in 2012 explained that, "Officials in southern
Uruzgan province, which borders Kandahar and Helmand, largely stamped out farming of the drug because of worries it was financing the
Taliban." Legalizing a drug that 40 percent of high school students in the U.S. have tried in order to slash funding to the
Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations is far more feasible than introducing a democratic
system to tribes and Afghan farmers. As it stands, the U.S. is the world's largest consumer of cannabis
and Afghanistan is the largest producer, but neither Bush nor Obama has taken action to address this
glaring economic reality.
There is room for expansion of the market
Graham-Harrison 13 <Emma, The Guardian, UN report: Afghan insurgents use marijuana fields as hiding places, September 10, 2013,
http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/09/10/un-report-afghan-insurgents-use-marijuana-fields-as-hiding-places/>#SPS
The amount of Afghan farmland planted with cannabis fell by nearly a fifth last year after one province launched
a fierce eradication campaign, but a bumper crop meant that actual production rose compared with 2011, according to the UN. Officials in
southern Uruzgan province, which borders Kandahar and Helmand, largely stamped out farming of the
drug because of worries it was financing the Taliban. In 2011 there were over 1,000 hectares of the crop there, but
last year under 100 hectares were sown. According to reports from the field, the reduction was caused by a strictly enforced
ban by provincial authorities, which was imposed because cannabis fields seemed to have been used by insurgent groups as hiding places, the
UN Cannabis Survey Report said. Planting in most other areas remained largely steady, with just over half of commercial production
concentrated in the south of the country. The report does not include kitchen garden plots of the drug grown for personal use, but these
produce relatively small amounts. Overall Afghanistan produced 1,400 tonnes of commercial cannabis resin in 2012,
worth around $65 million, the report estimated. A slightly smaller crop in 2011, when prices were
higher, brought in nearly $100 million. Cannabis production in Afghanistan is dwarfed by opium farming, which last year took up
more than 10 times as much farmland and produced a crop worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Afghanistan produces around 90% of the
worlds opium supply. However many poppy farmers in the south plant a spring opium crop and, when it has been harvested, turn to cannabis
for the summer. It seems that cannabis and opium are more complementary crops than substitutes for each other, the report said.
Government efforts to stamp out poppy farming may even push up production of cannabis, the report
warned. Last year the UN said Afghanistans importance as a source of resin for world markets might be
growing as more farmers switched to the crop. With increasing pressure on poppy cultivation through eradication and
other measures, the possibility of the commercial production of cannabis gradually playing a much bigger
role in the illicit economy of Afghanistan is not beyond the realms of imagination, the report said. Cannabis
resin can be much more lucrative than opium for individual farmers. It brings in over $1,500 in extra earnings per
hectare, requires less weeding and is comparatively easy to harvest. However the plants need irrigation at a time when streams fed by snow
melt are drying up and a long summer growing season can stop subsistence farmers planting vital food crops on the land.
Nows key --- increased instability will cause full-scale civil war and great power
intervention
Ali Imran 3-2, Washington-based journalist, Pakistan Times, The high cost of Afghan uncertainty,
http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2014/03/02/comment/the-high-cost-of-afghan-uncertainty/
Afghanistan is yet again on the edge of uncertainty and its future fragile as ever . President Barack Obama has
ordered contingency planning for pullout of all American forces by the end of the year after months of frustrations over delay in conclusion of
bilateral security agreement. In Central and South Asia, nervous neighbours have stepped up diplomatic efforts though disparately to deal
with the post-2014 Afghan situation amidst an echoing sense of dj vu. Voicing Beijings concerns over possible Afghanistan collapse, Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Kabul last week and prescribed a broad-based political reconciliation as the way forward. Finance Minister
Ishaq Dar visited Kabul over the weekend and committed $ 500 million for development of the strife-stricken country. India and Iran have also
been engaging Kabul. New Delhi has indicated shifting gear from its soft power aid for Afghanistan to hard power involvement with military
supplies. Tehran has pledged its support for Kabul but also warned the Afghans against signing the BSA with Washington. Nearly 13 years after
the 9/11-sparked war, the stakes for Central and South Asia with regard to regional integration through
Afghanistan are far higher. A troubled Afghanistan will blunt the potential for multi-billion dollars trade,
energy and economic interconnectedness through projects like TAPI gas line and CASA-1000 electricity transmission projects.
Pakistans exports to Afghanistan, which have grown to 2.3 billion annually, could also be at stake. More vexingly, the Afghan
instability will send terrorism jitters across the regions, provoking external interference. The return of
Afghan civil war will test a whole lot of bilateral relations in the region and might draw the edgy
countries into a proxy-led or even direct broader conflict.
Multiple scenarios for escalation
Rubin, 11 (Joel, Director of Policy and Government Affairs, Ploughshares Fund, former congressional
aide and diplomat, fellow at the State Department in both Near Eastern Affairs and Political-Military
Affairs, Masters degree in Public Policy and Business Administration from Carnegie Mellon University
and a Bachelors degree in Politics from Brandeis University, Huffington Post, 77/2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joel-rubin/middle-east-nuclear-threat_b_891178.html)
The national security calculus of keeping U.S. forces in Afghanistan has shifted. Any gains that we made from keeping 100,000 American
soldiers in harm's way are now questionable, especially since al Qaeda has been dealt a significant blow with the killing of Osama bin
Laden. President Obama's decision to end the surge by late next year only reinforces this reality. Yet many of the underlying
sources of conflict and tension in South and Central Asia will remain after an American withdrawal. In a region
that has deep experience on nuclear matters -- with nuclear aspirant Iran bordering
Afghanistan on one side and nuclear-armed Pakistan and India on the other -- the United States
must take into account the potential for regional nuclear insecurity caused by a poorly executed drawdown in Afghanistan. As much as we
may like to, we can't just cut and run. So as the United States draws down its forces, we must take care to leave stable systems and
relationships in place; failure to do so could exacerbate historic regional tensions and potentially create new national security risks. It is
therefore essential that Washington policymakers create a comprehensive nuclear security strategy for the region as part of its Afghanistan
withdrawal plans that lays the groundwork for regional stability. We have only to look to our recent history in the region to understand the
importance of this approach. In the 1980s, the U.S. supported the Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union. When that conflict ended, we
withdrew, only to see the rise of al Qaeda -- and its resultant international terrorism -- in the 1990s because we didn't pull out responsibly
from Afghanistan. Our choices now in Afghanistan will determine the shape of our security challenges in
the region for the foreseeable future. And we can't afford for nuclear weapons to become to South and Central Asia
in the 21st century what al Qaeda was in the 1990s to Afghanistan. To avoid such an outcome, several key objectives must be included in
any Afghanistan withdrawal plan. First, current levels of regional insecurity -- which already are extremely high -- will continue to drive
tensions, and quite possibly conflict, amongst the regional powers. Therefore, we must ensure the implementation of a regional approach
to military withdrawal. These efforts must bring all relevant regional players to the table, particularly the nuclear and potentially nuclear
states. Iran and all the countries bordering Afghanistan must be part of this discussion. Second, the United States must be mindful to not
leave a governance vacuum inside Afghanistan. While it is clear that the current counter-insurgency policy being pursued in Afghanistan is
not working at a pace that meets either Western or Afghan aspirations, it is still essential that Afghanistan not be allowed to implode. We
do not need 100,000 troops to do this, and as the Afghanistan Study Group has recommended, credible political negotiations that
emphasize power-sharing and political reconciliation must take place to keep the country intact while the United States moves out. Third,
while the rationale for our presence in Afghanistan -- to defeat al Qaeda -- has dissipated, a major security concern
justifying our continued involvement in the region -- potential nuclear conflict between
India and Pakistan -- will remain and may actually rise in importance. It is crucial that we keep a
particularly close eye on these programs to ensure that all is done to prevent the illicit transfer or ill-use of nuclear weapons. Regardless of
American troop levels in Afghanistan, the U.S. must maximize its military and intelligence relationships with these countries to continue to
both understand their nuclear intentions and help prevent potential conflict. We must avoid a situation where any minor misunderstanding
or even terrorist act, as happened in Mumbai in 2008, does not set off escalating tensions that lead to a nuclear exchange. Ultimately, the
U.S. will one day leave Afghanistan -- and it may be sooner than anyone expects. The key here is to leave in a way that
promotes regional stability and cooperation, not a power vacuum that could foster proxy conflicts. To
ensure that our security interests are protected and that the region does not get sucked in to a new level of insecurity and tension, a
comprehensive strategy to enhance regional security, maintain a stable Afghanistan, and keep a watchful eye on Pakistan
and India is essential. Taking such steps will help us to depart Afghanistan in a responsible manner that protects our security interests,
while not exacerbating the deep strategic insecurities of a region that has the greatest risk of arms races and nuclear conflict in the world.
Legalization robs terrorists of funding necessary to carry out attacks
Pagan and Stroleny 11 <Christopher and Julian, Criminal defense Lawyers, LEGALIZING MARIJUANA WILL REDUCE TERRORISM
AND BORDER INSTABILITY, Note: Card is undated, 2011 is latest thing cited, http://www.pslaw.org/legalizing-marijuana-will-reduce-terrorism-
border-instability/ >#SPS
Legalizing marijuana should be a top national security objective that is, if the United States wants to minimize terrorism and border instability.
How do legalizing marijuana and maintaining national security relate to each other? Well, heres the breakdown! The United States has been
waging wars with Iraq and Afghanistan for the past two decades and has tried relentlessly to stabilize both Iraq and Afghanistan by attempting
to build some type of political and economic structure within each of those nations. Additionally, as the 2011 U.S. National Strategy for
Counterterrorism states, the Presidents top national security priority is ensuring the security of the citizens of the United States and the
interests of the United States from terrorists. With that in mind, Afghanistan is the largest provider of cannabis in the world and the United
States is the worlds largest consumer of cannabis. Citizens of the United States spend about $40.6 billion a year on cannabis. Therefore, if the
United States legalizes cannabis, Afghanistan and its people and economy could establish a source of
income by supplying the United States legal cannabis industry. This would create some sort of economic
stability in Afghanistan and even destabilize terror groups. This is because terrorist groups are the main
beneficiaries of the illegal drug trade in Afghanistan. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the
terrorist groups use profits from drug trafficking to fund acts of terrorism, violence and other conflicts.
The illegal drug trade in Afghanistan is supporting the ongoing influx of terror activities. Therefore, so long
as marijuana is still illegal in the United States, the terrorist groups will benefit from illegal drug
trafficking. However, if the United States would legalize marijuana, the illegal drug trade in Afghanistan
would disappear and terrorist groups would lack funds to carry out their terror activities.
Statistical data confirms drug profits correlate with terrorism- and legalization
removes the incentive for cooperation between cartels and terrorist organizations
Beauchamp, 2014
[Zack, (Editor of TP Ideas and a reporter for ThinkProgress.org), ThinkProgress.org, January 8
th
, 2014, What Everyone Should Know About Legal
Pot and Terrorism http://thinkprogress.org/security/2014/01/08/3122901/drugs-terrorism/]

So if illict drug profits are helping terrorist groups slaughter innocent people, and counter-narcotics enforcement has
eminently failed to solve the problem, what can we do? Well, the logic linking drugs and terrorism depends crucially on drugs being
illegal. If the drug trade didnt take place in the shadows, there would be no reason for farming to take
place in failed states or for drug sellers to partner with terrorists for distribution. Opium poppy, marijuana,
and even coca grow in a broad range of countries, not just those where production currently occurs, Harvard economist Jeffrey Miron writes.
If drugs were legal, production would be widely dispersed and have no particular overlap with
countries that harbor terrorists. Mirons simple argument is impossible to assess in the aggregate; each drug market has
different connections to terrorism, so the effect might be different depending on the substance. Instead, lets instead pare down and focus
solely on marijuana, the only drug whose legalization is possible in the United States in the near term. A 2010 RAND Corporation study found
that if legal American marijuana replaced Mexican imports, either through national legalization or a national grey
market birthed by state-level legalization, cartels would lose a full 20 percent of their drug income. A recent
revision of the RAND study by a Mexican think tank came to a slightly higher estimate, adding that losing marijuana
revenues could have a transformative impact on the Mexican drug trafficking industry, over and
beyond the direct potential reduction of marijuana export income. Afghanistan, not often discussed in marijuana
legalization debates, might also see real gains. A 2009 U.N. Office of Drug Control (UNODC) report found that Afghanistan produced a huge
percentage of the worlds cannabis and the largest percentage of hashish (cannabis resin). The Afghan marijuana trade, valued at $65 million in
2012, is taxed by those who control the territory, providing an additional source of revenue for insurgents, according to UNODC Executive
Director Antonio Maria Costa. There are some questions as to whether reducing drug revenue would actually reduce terrorist violence. The
RAND researchers, for instance, suggest Mexican cartel violence might actually increase in the short term as gangs struggled over scarcer
resources. However, the best historical analogy RAND could uncover the American mafia post-prohibition
suggests the long-term reduction in violence could be enormous. Like cartels, the mafia engaged in all sorts of
profitable illegal enterprises beyond the illegal intoxicant racket, the loss of alcohol revenue was seemingly devastating for the mafia.
Homicides declined rapidly after the repeal of prohibition; plausibly, RANDs researchers write, a large share of that decline was accounted
for by fewer killings in the bootlegging trade. Piazzas findings, published after RANDs paper, are also crucial here. His research
suggests a direct correlation between drug profits and terrorist violence; increases in the latter
directly follow increases in the former (a point he solidified in a follow-up study on opium in Afghanistan). That suggests each
dollar in drug profit at least marginally increases the ability of cartels and other terrorist organizations to do
their nasty violence; soldiers and car bombs dont pay for themselves. Even though cartels and the Taliban dont need marijuana profits to
be violent, theyll be somewhat more limited in their ability to conduct violence without them

Latin America terrorist funding ensures a nuclear attack
McCaul 12 JD @ St. Marys, former federal prosecutor
(Michael, A LINE IN THE SAND: COUNTERING CRIME, VIOLENCE AND TERROR AT THE SOUTHWEST
BORDER, UNITED STATES HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Lexis)
Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States. The Congressional Research Service reports
that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of
growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East
terrorist organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere,
to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected. This second edition emphasizes Americas
ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing presence in Latin America, and the
growing relationship with Mexican DTOs [Drug Trafficking Organizations] to exploit paths into the
United States. During the period of May 2009 through July 2011, federal law enforcement made 29 arrests for violent terrorist plots
against the United States, most with ties to terror networks or Muslim extremist groups in the Middle East. The vast majority of the suspects
had either connections to special interest countries, including those deemed as state sponsors of terrorism or were radicalized by terrorist
groups such as al Qaeda. American-born al Qaeda Imam Anwar al Awlaki, killed in 2011, was personally responsible for radicalizing scores of
Muslim extremists around the world. The list includes American-born U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan, the accused Fort Hood gunman;
underwear bomber Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab; and Barry Bujol of Hempstead, TX, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula. In several documented cases, al Awlaki moved his followers to commit jihad against the United States. These
instances, combined with recent events involving the Qods Forces, the terrorist arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hezbollah,
serve as a stark reminder the United States remains in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations and their
associates. In May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on Osama bin Ladens compound
indicated the worlds most wanted terrorist sought to use operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United
States to conduct terror operations.3 The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al Qaeda operatives blending in
with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who then attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law. Of equal
concern is the possibility to smuggle materials , including uranium, which can be safely assembled on
U.S. soil into a weapon of mass destruction.
Nuclear terrorism causes nuclear escalation due to miscalc its rapid and highly likely
Morgan 09
(Professor of Foreign Studies at Hankuk University, Dennis Ray, December, World on fire: two scenarios
of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race Futures, Vol 41 Issue
10, p 683-693, ScienceDirect)
In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question Is Nuclear War Inevitable?? In Section , Moore points out what most
terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, theyve figured
out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore
points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and
explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian dead hand system, where regional nuclear commanders would be given full
powers should Moscow be destroyed, it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters
have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the
suicidal Samson option against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks
on Russia and even anti-Semitic European cities In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against
Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more
powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for
years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or
else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could
last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what
many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident,
mistaken communication, false signal or lone wolf act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few
minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid
escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less
probable since each country would act under the use them or lose them strategy and psychology;
restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a
window of opportunity to win the war. In other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly,
as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of
people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation
states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites
needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long
as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors In other
words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the
escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used,
it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of
much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and
suffering in a nuclear winter. In Scenarios, Moore summarizes the various ways a nuclear war could begin: Such a war could start
through a reaction to terrorist attacks, or through the need to protect against overwhelming military opposition, or through the
use of small battle field tactical nuclear weapons meant to destroy hardened targets. It might quickly move on to the use of strategic nuclear
weapons delivered by short-range or inter-continental missiles or long-range bombers. These could deliver high altitude bursts whose
electromagnetic pulse knocks out electrical circuits for hundreds of square miles. Or they could deliver nuclear bombs to destroy nuclear and/or
non-nuclear military facilities, nuclear power plants, important industrial sites and cities. Or it could skip all those steps and start through the
accidental or reckless use of strategic weapons.

Plan

The United States should legalize nearly all marihuana in the United States.

Solvency
The state-by-state system is broken only federal legalization solves industry
uncertainty and taxation benefits
Blumenauer and Polis 13
Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-OR 3rd District) and Rep. Jared Polis (D-CO 2nd District), The Path Forward: Rethinking Federal Marijuana Policy,
2013, http://polis.house.gov/uploadedfiles/the_path_forward.pdf SJE

The current regulatory system for marijuana is broken. As more states move to legalize the substance, the problems will only get
worse. Due to this patchwork system, many operating in compliance with state law may find themselves
raided and their businesses ruined, while others that are actually breaking both federal and state laws
may never be caught. Many patients who need marijuana for legitimate medical purposes cant obtain it
legally. They are forced to the black market, risking their safety and paying exorbitant prices. Simultaneously, medical marijuana programs
have the potential to become safe havens for those looking to use the drug for relaxation or recreational purposes. Today, legitimate marijuana
businesses cant operate like other businesses, and state tax laws often arent consistent with their
marijuana laws. Federal prosecutors and local law enforcement in each state often handle the situation
differently, and the entire industry an industry that many Americans support remains clouded by uncertainty,
illegitimacy and fear. It is time to make a change. While individual states remain the laboratories of innovation, it is time for the federal
government to make sure that states, businesses, and individuals are able to act in an environment
that has coherent and consistent laws . Congress should pursue each of the following options: 1. Tax and Regulate
Marijuana Considering the growing number of jurisdictions that legalize medical marijuana and the two jurisdictions that legalize recreational use, it is time
that Congress end the federal prohibition on marijuana, removing it from the Controlled Substances Act and creating a
regulatory and taxation framework, similar to the frameworks in place for alcohol and tobacco. A
specific tax on marijuana grown for all purposes should be imposed to help fund substance abuse
dependency treatment, law enforcement, and help reduce the federal debt. Revenue estimates from taxing marijuana
vary due to uncertainties surrounding the existing marijuana market and how legalization and regulation would impact price and consumption habits. Assuming
increased legal consumption and reduction in prices, a $50 per ounce tax, for example, would raise estimated revenue of
$20 billion annually. 53 Any study of the fiscal impact should also include the savings generated by reduced expenditures on marijuana interdiction and
enforcement. This represents a unique opportunity to save ruined lives, wasted enforcement and prison
costs, while simultaneously creating a new industry, with new jobs and revenues that will improve the
federal budget outlook. Passing such legislation would represent a key part of a comprehensive approach to marijuana reform. However Congress
should also consider additional legislation that would ease problems during this transitional period, such as exempting medical marijuana specifically to ensure
patient access, and alleviating specific tax and business challenges.
States cant solve without the federal government
Chemerinsky et al. 5/19/14
[Erwin Chemerinsky , University of California, Irvine ~ School of Law ; Jolene Forman , American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California,
Criminal Justice and Drug Policy Fellow; Allen Hopper, American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California Criminal Justice and Drug Policy
Director; Sam Kamin, University of Denver ~ Sturm College of Law, Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights and Remedies Program.
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation. Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2014-25 ETB]
All eyes turned immediately to the DOJ to see what the federal response would be. After months of agonizing silence, the federal
government surprised many by announcing that it would forgo, for the time being, legal challenges to the
new laws and allow Colorado and Washington to implement their regulatory regimes unimpeded.49
This new memo emphasized eight priorities that drive federal marijuana enforcement policy and then
indicated that states that could demonstrate compliance with these priorities would largely be left to
their own devices.50 While this policy guidance constitutes a welcome step back from the federal governments previous
brinksmanship, it hardly solves the federalism problems caused by marijuanas dual legal status. As we
demonstrate more fully below, marijuanas continued status as a prohibited substance under federal law
significantly hampers the capacity of the states to effectively implement new state taxation and
regulatory policies . III. Problems Posed by Continuing Federal Prohibition As previous sections made clear, the threat of criminal
prosecution against those operating marijuana businesses under the aegis of state law is more remote now than it has been in recent years.
The federal government has announced a wait-and-see approach to state-level regulation,51 creating metrics for measuring whether states
are up to the task of taxing-and-regulating rather than prohibiting marijuana outright.52 But the threat of federal enforcement
is only one of the potential problems stemming from the continuing federal prohibition of marijuana.53
In this section, we point out the often dire consequences that continue to flow from marijuanas categorization as a Schedule I narcotic.
What we show is that even if the promise of federal non-enforcement were made permanent which
cannot happen by executive action alone because enforcement decisions are always made at the whim
of the executive federal prohibition operates to present substantial obstacles to businesses and
individuals seeking to implement and avail themselves of new state laws authorizing marijuana
distribution and use. A. Banking Perhaps the most profound, and most well-documented, consequence of
marijuanas prohibited status at the federal level is the unavailability of even the most rudimentary
banking services for those engaged in marijuana commerce.54 The threat often explicit of money
laundering prosecutions has made banks unwilling to engage in any transactions with marijuana
businesses. 55 As a result, marijuana in the states is largely a cash business, with all of the problems and
negative connotations associated with businesses forced to the periphery of legality.56 The lack of commercial banking is more
than a dignitary harm for those operating in the marijuana industry; for many it is a sincere safety concern. Marijuana businesses present an
easy target for thieves who are aware that these businesses often have no choice but to keep large quantities of cash on hand.57
Regulators in Colorado and Washington State grasped early on that resolution of this problem would
be one of the key concerns of the administrative process58 marijuana businesses are much more difficult to regulate and tax if they
are operating on a cash basis. However, lawmakers in both states also realized fairly quickly that, given the
predominantly federal nature of banking regulation, there was little that could be done at the state
level alone. Although the Obama administration announced in early 2014 that marijuana businesses should have
access to banking services59 and promulgated a pair of memos purporting to loosen banking
restrictions on the marijuana industry,60 there is little that the executive branch can do unitarily; the
core of the banking problem is the continuing illegality of marijuana at the federal level.61 For example,
even if the federal government were to promise never to pursue money laundering charges against
those banks doing business with the marijuana industry, it is not at all clear that banks would actually
begin to treat marijuana businesses the way they treat other businesses . The assets of a marijuana
business remain subject to forfeiture even in the face of a federal promise not to pursue such actions
and it is difficult to see how those assets could be seen by a bank as sufficiently secure against
government seizure to be worth the risk.62 It was for this reason that the reaction of the marijuana industry to the new
banking guidelines was decidedly tepid.63 B. Tax Law A little-known provision of federal tax law makes the
operation of a successful marijuana business even one operating in clear compliance with state law an incredibly
difficult proposition. Federal Tax Rule 280E64 requires those operating in violation of federal drug laws
and only federal drug laws65 to pay federal income tax and to do so on extremely disadvantageous terms.
Under 280E a marijuana retailer cannot deduct her expenses prior to calculating her taxable income;
other than the cost of obtaining the goods for sale, a marijuana business is required to pay taxes on its gross
receipts.66 All other usual business expenses retail rent, employee payroll, lights, heating and cooling, etc. cannot be
deducted as they can in any other business, either legitimate or illegal. Even if the federal
government does not seek to prosecute marijuana business for violating federal law, and even if it
does not seek to forfeit the assets of businesses in violation of that federal law, it is already applying
rule 280E against those businesses in ways that may prove nearly as crippl ing to the industry. For
example, in 2011 the IRS ruled that Harborside Health Center, Californias largest medical marijuana dispensary, owed millions in taxes
under the application of 280E. 67 Steve DeAngelo, Harborsides owner was quoted as saying that a literal interpretation of 280E
would [cripple] ruin not just him but the entire industry: " No business , including Harborside, could survive if
it's taxed on its gross revenue. All we want is to be treated like every other business in America."68 C. Access to Law and
Lawyers So long as marijuana remains illegal at the federal level, marijuana businesses will have
difficulty operating as full legal citizens. One of the biggest obstacles facing marijuana businesses, for
example, is finding attorneys willing to provide legal services. The Model Rules of Professional Responsibility and the ethics
rules of nearly every state prohibit an attorney from knowingly facilitating the criminal conduct of her
client.69 Because nearly all the actions of a marijuana professional remain violations of federal law, any
assistance that a lawyer gives to a business that she knows to be in violation of federal law could be
construed as an ethical violation. This is true not just when the lawyer helps a marijuana retailer purchase product from a
marijuana grow facility when she assists in the actual violations of federal law, in other words but also when the lawyer incorporates the
marijuana business, helps draft a lease, lobbies local government officials for a zoning exemption or negotiates an employment agreement.
Because all of these tasks help a marijuana business to break federal law, there is a plausible argument
that the lawyer subjects herself to discipline for knowingly doing so. State bar committees considering the
ethics of representing the marijuana industry have largely split on the issue. Most recently, the Ethics Committee of the Colorado Bar
Association concluded that, as it is currently drafted, lawyers put themselves at risk when they perform many legal tasks for marijuana
clients: A lawyer cannot comply with Colo.RPC 1.2(d) and, for example, draft or negotiate (1) contracts to facilitate the purchase and sale of
marijuana or (2) leases for properties or facilities, or contracts for resources or supplies, that clients intend to use to cultivate, manufacture,
distribute, or sell marijuana, even though such transactions comply with Colorado law, and even though the law or the transaction may be
so complex that a lawyers assistance would be useful, because the lawyer would be assisting the client in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal under federal law.70 The state of Arizona came to exactly the opposite conclusion, reasoning that the assistance of lawyers was
necessary to help the state achieve its goals of maintaining a regulated medical marijuana regime. [W]e decline to interpret and apply ER
1.2(d) in a manner that would prevent a lawyer who concludes that the clients proposed conduct is in clear and unambiguous compliance
with state law from assisting the client in connection with activities expressly authorized under state law, thereby depriving clients of the
very legal advice and assistance that is needed to engage in the conduct that the state law expressly permits. The maintenance of an
independent legal profession, and of its rights to advocate for the interests of clients, is a bulwark of our system of government.A state law
now expressly permits certain conduct. Legal services are necessary or desirable to implement and bring to fruition that conduct expressly
permitted under state law.71 Even if a state were to explicitly empower lawyers to assist marijuana clients,
those lawyers would have to tell those clients that they are in a state of profound legal uncertainty.
Take for example, the little known case of Hammer v. Todays Health Care II.72 In Hammer, a pair of Arizona citizens sued a
Colorado medical marijuana dispensary in Arizona state court to recover on a $500,000 loan on which the dispensary had stopped making
payments. The court sided with the defendant, holding that neither legal nor equitable relief was available
to the plaintiffs who had knowingly lent money to defendant for criminal purposes.73 The court
recognized the absurdity of this result excusing the defendants from repaying the loan because they
were, in the eyes of the law, drug dealers but was unwilling to give the plaintiffs the benefit of their
bargain where the conduct envisioned by the agreement remained illegal under federal law.74 An insurance
case from Hawaii produced an equally disquieting result. A homeowner whose 12 marijuana plants had been stolen from her home sued her
insurance company for failing to pay out on a policy insuring, among other things, loss to trees, shrubs, and other plants75 The court
rejected the claim, on the basis that state law did not purport to and could not authorize marijuana cultivation under federal law and that
enforcement of the insurance contract would thus be contrary to both federal law and policy.76 Together with restrictions on
the availability of lawyers, these cases make clear just how unsettled expectations are for those in the
marijuana industry. They cannot rely on the contracts they sign or the insurance they pay for. They
may or may not be able to secure legal representation to help them through the legal minefield
created by complex state regulatory apparatuses. Although they are required to pay their taxes, they
cannot deduct their expenses the way other businesses can. The reason in each case is the same in
the eyes of the law, they are engaging in criminal conduct.