Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
2009, Unit 6,
RST 28.1 (2009) 63–94 Religious Studies and
doi:10.1558/rsth.v28i1.63 Religious Studies and
Surveillance in New Religious Movements: Scientology as a
Case Study
SUSAN RAINE
University of Alberta
Contemporary discourse on surveillance tends not to account for the types of
surveillance and security measures that both traditional and alternative reli-
gions adopt. Certainly, many religions have for centuries recorded, and thus,
monitored, the lives of their followers. English parish records noting lives, bap-
tisms, deaths and so forth is one such example originating in the sixteenth
century. When one thinks of contemporary surveillance, however, more so-
phisticated strategies involving new technologies typically comes to mind.
article o
lance techniques of one particular new religious movement—Scientology.
movement employs a variety of stratagems in order to preserve a high level
of secrecy regarding both its central doctrines and some of its activities.
article suggests that Scientology’s surveillance methods are driven not only by
the group’s desire to protect its interests, but also by the quest for control (and
hence, for power) that the group’s founder, L. Ron Hubbard, sought through-
out his life and left as an institutional legacy after his death.
Key Words: surveillance, new religious movements, Scientology.
Introduction
Recent years have seen an increase in academic research on the many
manifestations of surveillance in society. A range of literature explores
the materialization, development, roles and consequences of surveil-
lance systems in government, military, corporate, consumer, medi-
cal, legal and criminal justice institutions—to name just a few.
ubiquitous and multifarious nature of these surveillance technologies
has contributed to what David Lyon has termed “surveillance society”
(Lyon 1994).
the available technology: increasingly, computer dependent technolo-
64 Surveillance in New Religious Movements
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gies dominate surveillance systems. Moreover, in the wake of the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, surveillance measures have grown a
great deal especially in terms of monitoring individuals’ movements
across national and international borders. Attendant technologies are
of a high-tech nature: increasingly, biometric data are an integral part
of surveillance strategies (Lyon 2003). Increasingly evident also is the
amalgamation of previously separate surveillance systems into what
Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson term the “surveillant assemblage”
(Haggerty and Ericson 2000).
Definitions of what constitutes surveillance are not always precise.
Gary T. Marx (2002) discusses the problem of traditional dictionary
definitions of surveillance that typically refer to the observation of a
“suspicious person.” Dated definitions tend also to focus on the visual
aspects of surveillance despite the multitude of ways in which we can
monitor persons, objects and space. Such definitions, he argues, are
therefore obsolete given the comprehensive nature of contemporary
surveillance (Marx 2002, 10–11). Marx identifies that surveillance
can be physical, psychological, visible, invisible, human, electronic
and so forth. Furthermore, he distinguishes between “traditional”
and “new” surveillance techniques—the latter referring to the shift to
computed based surveillance/data collection systems (see Marx 1988).
He proposes that a constructive and more wide-ranging definition of
new surveillance includes reference to “the use of technical means to
extract or create personal data.” It is di
nition that encompasses all forms of surveillance (Marx 2002, 12).
Lyon defines surveillance as, “any collection and processing of personal
data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or
managing those whose data has been garnered” (Lyon 2001, 2). More
recently, Lyon has reiterated and added to his definition; additionally,
he stresses, “it is crucial to remember that surveillance is always hinged
to some specific purposes” (Lyon 2007, 15). Lyon’s critique of sur-
veillance debates (mostly) the negative and problematic outcomes of
surveillance regimes and technologies especially within the context of
government, the military, bureaucracies and policing (e.g. Lyon 1994,
2001, 2007), although he does acknowledge that information gather-
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© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2009
ing does not always lead to undesirable ends (Lyon 2007, 15).
Current surveillance theorizing1 has been influenced greatly by the
work of Michel Foucault (1977) whose analysis of Jeremy Bentham’s
prison design, the Panopticon, has been instrumental in establishing
the emergence of surveillance studies in academic research (Lyon 1994,
66). Critically, despite his focus on penal and medical systems, Foucault
argued that all social institutions are able to adopt and normalize sur-
veillance measures. Moreover, he identifies that our society in general
has become one in which surveillance occupies a central role (Foucault
1977). Academic discussion and theorizing acknowledges a debt of
inspiration not only to theorists such as Foucault, but also to the
authors of fictional accounts of surveillance societies—most notably
George Orwell’s Nineteen-Eighty-Four. Other past and contemporary fic-
tional accounts also have permeated surveillance research: Aldous Huxley,
Philip K. Dick, Margaret Atwood and other authors too, have been influ-
ential, although necessarily, recent theoretical frameworks and concepts
have moved well beyond these sites of inspiration. As well, recent films
including Gattaca, Code 46 and Children of Men (based on the novel
by P.D. James) provide a new wave of cinematic representations of sur-
veillance societies—depictions that have found their way into academic
discourse as new discussions and ideas reflect concerns with current and
future surveillance technologies and their (mis)use. (For discussions of
fictional representations of surveillance societies see Haggerty and Eric-
son [2000, 606-607]; Lyon [2007, 142–145]; and Marks, [2005].)
Despite the burgeoning surveillance research that addresses the myr-
iad of surveillance technologies and their applications, little discussion
exists about the ways that religions, sects and other religious collec-
tivities monitor both their members and their social environments.
Arguably, all religions do engage in some form of monitoring of their
adherents—this process may involve traditional modes of surveillance
such as records of births, deaths, marriages, baptisms and so forth.
Marx comments that religious surveillance from the fifteenth century
on was especially rigorous.
as well as a more general monitoring of the population’s moral lives
prevailed. Church parishes were the first to keep systematic records
66 Surveillance in New Religious Movements
© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2009
on individuals (Marx 2002, 17). Catholicism established elaborate
monitoring practices in order to collect information on populations,
and, the Catholic practice of confession still, as it always has, also con-
stitutes a form of surveillance of church members (Lyon 2007, 76).
Historically, this form of monitoring, however, was not a consistent
process. For example, prior to the Reformation in England, the proc-
ess of confession functioned as a form of “social discipline” in which
priests could “interrogate” individuals in order to expose criminal acts
and enforce “religious morality.”
elimination of confession and hence, individuals would only attend
confession three times a year or less (
ingly, when Catholic confession had been commonplace, an individual
attending confession frequently professed not only their own sins but
also those of their neighbours (
held knowledge pertaining to many persons in the local population.
One might argue that religious surveillance varies, depending
upon—among other factors—the size of the religious organization
and its degree of tension with mainstream society. Generally speak-
ing, one might consider that smaller religious communities tend to
use more intense levels of surveillance on their members, largely in
an e
via attendant punishments for perceived infractions) and to prevent
defection.2 Also, self-monitoring of one’s conduct and of that of other
members helps to ensure group cohesion and thus reduce the likeli-
hood of adherents questioning the groups’ practices or leaving alto-
gether. Many new religious movements, especially the more restrictive
and controversial ones sometimes labelled “cults,” operate under highly
controlled environments in which religious leaders closely follow the
day-to-day lives of their followers. Larger, more established religious
traditions probably use less encompassing surveillance measures—in
part because their followers number in the tens-of-thousands or even
millions, and also because they are more likely to live in society at large
rather than within restrictive religious environments. (Some highly
devout members, however, may choose to live within more carefully
monitored environments which gives them high status within their
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© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2009
respective faiths—for example, Catholic or Buddhist monks and nuns
living in monasteries.)
they contain.
possess power, and, consequently can e
on file (Lyon 2007, 83). “Ethics” ensured that Hubbard maintained
complete power over the outcomes of individual decisions made by
member Scientologists. His surveillance system, therefore, also acted
to maintain Hubbard’s control and power over his organization and
its members, and it continues that function to this day. Not only does
Scientology’s monitoring system address its own adherents, but also
it directs its attention to the beliefs and actions of other individuals
and organizations.
scrutiny—sometimes in well publicized ways.
Surveillance of alternative viewpoints: Entheta
the Internet as the movement’s surveillance has extended into the realms
of cyberspace. In response to the World Wide Web, Scientology issues
its members with software for their computers that blocks access to In-
ternet web sites that contain information that o
even just quizzical about, those of Scientology and its leaders. Dubbed
the “ScienoSitter” (Ross 1998) by Scientology’s critics, Scientology
disseminates the software to members via a program that encourages
them to design their own “I am a Scientologist” web page. Scientology
web co-ordinators review member website outlines, then they install
the web page along with the Scientology filter system (Brown, 1998).
“ScienoSitter” blocks over one thousand Internet sites including those
of critics, ex-members, universities, newspapers, newsgroups, lawyers
and authors (Operation Clambake 2003).9
the group uses the very technology that it finds threatening to monitor
and limit the cyber behaviours of its members.
Scientology designs its surveillance of cyberspace to keep its mem-
bers ignorant of the current controversies surrounding the group, but
arguably, the most important function of “ScienoSitter” is the pro-
tection of Scientology’s financial interests. An abundance of websites
exist that detail not only Scientology’s practices, but also its secret doc-
trines. One of the most important of these doctrines is O.T. III, which
appears in a course that is central to Scientology because it reveals
Hubbard’s controversial beliefs about the emergence and nature of
human existence. Nearly two decades ago, reporter Richard Behar
(1991) indicated that the cost of O.T. III alone was $17,010. (
did not include the costs incurred for prerequisite courses.) To obtain
O.T. VIII, the accumulated costs ranged from $200,000 to $400,000.
Furthermore, Scientology teaches its members that to view—even un-
intentionally—doctrine intended for disclosure only at a level higher
than one’s current status, is dangerous to one’s well-being. As a result,
the stratified revelation process operates as another method of member
control (Wallis 1977, 125).
using several private detectives and more than ten lawyers to monitor
his activities and unearth his personal details including all his finan-
cial and government records (Behar 1991, 39). Scientology sued Time
magazine for $416 million, but a court dismissed the suit in 1996.
tology’s “Sea Org.” According to Hubbard, the purpose of the Sea Org,
“is to get ethics in on the planet and eventually the universe” (Hub-
bard 1975, 375).
regulatory level of Scientology. It consists of the most dedicated of
Scientology’s members, and of these, the most elite at one time lived
aboard Hubbard’s ship, Apollo. (Hubbard established a small fleet of
ships under his military-style command in order to spread Scientology
on a global level [Whitehead 1987, 36].) Today the Sea Org is based
at the Flag Land Base in Clearwater, Florida.
now the organization’s only seafaring vessel. Former Scientologist and
public relations o
many aspects of his twenty-two years as a high-ranking Scientologist to
the experiences of Party members in 1984. Young asserted that Hub-
bard considered individual privacy suspect in Scientology’s Sea Org.
Consequently, spending time alone, away from Scientology duties is
“unethical, selfish and probably a sign of criminality” (Young 1997b).
In the Scientology world, such “counter intentions” are undesirable.
Sea Org inspectors keep constant watch over members to ensure that
they possess no unapproved reading material, letters or written notes.
Sea Org members are subject to routine and unannounced inspection
regardless of whether it is day or night, or if the member is awake,
asleep, in the bedroom or the bathroom (Young 1997b).
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© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2009
structure.
guilty of deviation from Sea Org norms (Kent 1999c, 2000, 2001).
A weekly “Ethics Condition” detects such deviations, since it involves
a procedure that Hubbard designed to monitor members’ individual
achievements.
couches performance in terms of “stats,” and punishes even a small
downward trend (Atack 1990, 172). According to former members,
punishment has taken the form of both forced manual labour and in-
tensive re-programming in Sea Org conduct, placing the members un-
der considerable psychological and physical duress (Kent 1999c, 7–8;
Kent 2000, 21–42; Kent 2001, 356). Ex-members have described the
lack of sleep, lack of basic hygiene, lack of adequate food, the demands
of forced physical exercise, and the required auditing at the end of each
day that they had to endure. Furthermore, most accounts included
reference to surveillance by guards who were positioned to ensure that
members remained at their duties (Kent 2000).
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———. 1979. “United States of America vs. Mary Sue Hubbard et. al. Stipulation
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Wallis, Roy. 1973 “Religious Sects and the Fear of Publicity.” New Society. 7 June:
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Whitehead, Harriet. 1987. Renunciation and Reformulation: A Study of Conversion in
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