The Specter of Seeession

Responding to Claims for Ethnic Self-Determination

Hurst Hannum
The first rush of posiHIIold War secessions shattering ofthe Soviet Union, Yugoslavia,
may be over, but conflicts within states Czechoslovakia, and Ethiopia within the
often triggered by ethnic or cultural past decade is a precedent not lost on many
differenceswill continue to proliferate, "nations" that would be states.
Ethfiicconflict has replaced the Cold Neither sovereignty nor self-determina-
War as the priniiDry interest of political tion is an absolute right. Each is limited by
and military theorists, and even conflicts other rights and international obligations,
that may be primarily political or economic Sovereignty is limited not only by the rights
in nature are frequently given an ethnic of other states and the innumerable political
cast. Such conflicts pose substantial threats and economic ties that bind them, but
to international peace and human life, and also by a legitimate international interest
the United States, other governments, and in human rights, the environment, and
intemational organizations are increasingly other issues formerly considered the sole
being called upon to influence, intervene jurisdiction ofthe state. Outside ofthe
in, or broker solutions to them. classic context of European decolonization.
Ethnic wars of secession highlight the free exercise of self-determination
the inherent tension between "self-deter- has been constrained historically by great-
mination" and "sovereignty" or "territorial power rivalry, questions about the potential
integrity." One-probleiQJn developing economic and political viability of new
coherant-respAnses to such conflicts has states, and the overarching goal of
been^the-vagugness of these terms. In the maintaining order and stability by pre-
context of decolonization, self-determina- serving existing territorial arrangements
tion meant immediate independence, but wherever possible,
there has been continuing disagreement Despite continued claims to a "right"
over its applicability to noncolonial situa- of secession by groups in Asia, Africa,
tions. Lip service is also routinely paid to Europe, and the former Soviet Union, no
the prindple of territorial integrity, but the such right has yet been recognized by the
HURST HANNUM is Professor of International Law at Tufts University's
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the author of Autonomy, Sovereignty,
and Self-Determination: Tbe Accommodation of Conflicting Rights.
Hurst Hannum
international community. International silence would be politically impossible
law does not prohibit secession, whether and, in some cases, morally objectionable,
voluntary or violent, but it has neither We are left, then, with the task of defining
recognized a right to secede nor identified the appropriate degree of foreign interest
even tentatively the conditions that might in the face of an almost infinite variety of
give rise to such a right in the fijture. demands for self-determination.
Military force can establish control over Two historically consistent and morally
a particular territory, but it cannot create justifiable purposes can be served by
international legitimacy. For example, contemporary self-determination and
Turkish forces have controUed the north- are therefore deserving of international
ern part of Cyprus for much longer than support: protecting individual and group
a unified Cypriot state has existed, yet no identity and facilitating effective participa-
statewith the exception of self-interested tion in government. The former purpose
Turkeyrecognizes the Turkish Republic is today reflected largely by the human
of Northern Cyprus as independent. rights norms that have developed since
Similarly, most countries reject Israel's 1945. The latter, sometimes referred to by
annexation of East Jerusalem and the Woodrow Wilson and others as "internal"
Golan Heights, Morocco's claims to the self-determination, implies finding appro-
Western Sahara, and Indonesia's pur- priate levels of democratic self-government
ported incorporation of East Timor. to guarantee effective participation by
all in the economic and political life of
PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST the Country.
If the international community feels These purposes may often be realized
compelled to insert itself into the extra- within less-than-independent political en-
ordinarUy difficult process through which tities. Strong national cultures can continue
people accept or reject national identity, it to survive even without their own states,
must agree on criteria for intervention that such as the Catalans, Scots, Welsh, Indian
go beyond a simple political preference for Tamils, Quebecois, Tibetans, and many
one side or the other. Leaving aside for the indigenous peoplesso long as the human
moment the issue of purely humanitarian rights of their members are protected,
intervention^which should have nothing This last point is reflected in the rela-
to do with competing claims over identity tively recent development of minimum
or territorythe only legitimate goal norms designed to protect the rights of
consistent with the present international both majorities and minorities. The United
order is ensuring that separation or unity Nations, the Organization for Security and
occurs without disturbing international Cooperation in Europe, and many indiivid-
peace. In any other situation, military ual states are increasingly willing to criticize
intervention in civil wars remains an un- efforts by central governments to ignore
justifiable and unwise interference in a regional or ethnic differences and denounce
state's domestic affairs. substate self-determination movements as
But if territorial claims cannot justify merely "terrorists" or "rebels." Indeed,
foreign intervention, should claims to self- diplomats and nongovernmental organiza-
determination be totally ignored? Such tions frequently urge states with ethnically
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The Specter of Secession
diverse populations to adopt more flexible acts that were considered legitimate and
constitutional arrangements in order to lawful at the time they were committed,
accommodate desires for local self-govern- (One might note that those who daim a
ment and cultural protection and to de- right to independence based on historical
crease the likelihood of violent conflict. arguments tend to choose the historical
This new interest in internal consti- period that would give them the
tutional arrangements raises difficult greatest amount of territorythat is,
questions about which issues fall within the period in which they themselves
a state's domestic jurisdiction and which were successfial conquerors.)
are the legitimate concem ofthe intema-
tional community. At the same time, how- THEFOREMOSTGOAL
ever, the need to translate international The international community in general
norms into domestic reality highlights and the United States in particular will
the essential role of democracy and the continue to be called upon to take sides in
rule of law in protecting minority rights, internal ethnic conflicts purportedly
as well as their more traditional role of based on demands for self-determination,
safeguarding individual liberties. Guidelines for decision-making must be
Those who claim to speak on behalf clearly articulated so that responses can
of their nation should be able to demon- be based on more than perceived short-
strate their mandate through free and fair term advantage and defended against
elections or referendums. This requires a charges of selectivity and hypocrisy,
political system open enough to allow When responding to claims of self-
such representatives to emerge, but it also, determination, protecting basic human
requires that would-be "ethnic entrepre- rights should be policymakers' foremost
neurs" demonstrate that they do in fact goal. Human rights norms are widely
speak for the people they claim to repre- accepted and give legitimacy to U.S. and
sent. Merely creating a "national libera- U.N. actions. Not only are such ideals
tion movement" is insufficient evidence broadly supported and understood by
that there exists a widespread desire for the American public, but U.S. law requires
secession or other major constitutional them to be a primary concern of U.S.
change within a statealthough it may foreign policy. Thus, a basic factor in for-
be the only option if repression prohibits mulating responses to self-determination
the free expression of minority views. claims should be whether or not a partic-
Self-determination should be concerned ular action is likely to promote the rights
primarily vsdth people, not territory. It of aU ofthe people concerned. Cultural,
should not be used to defend abstract linguistic, and religious rights must be
notions of sovereignty, to buttress fictitious respected, and neither minority nor
claims of national destiny, or to resolve majority should seek to impose its values
centuries-old territorial disputes. Nearly on the other. In many instances, this MOII
every state in the world was founded require only the guarantee of what some
directly or indirectly on conquest. "Self- term "individual" rights to free expres-
determination" cannot provide a meaning- sion, assembly, association, and religion,
fill standard against which to overturn In other cases, innovative solutions
FOREIGN AFFA\RS March/April 1998 [15]
Hurst Hannum
aflirmative action, govemment representa-
tion, devolution of powers, or support for
cultural activitieswiW. be needed to make
equality in fact match equality in law.
At the same time, however, it is im-
portant to reject the notions that every
ethnically or culturally distinct people,
nation, or group has an automatic right
to its own state or that ethnically homo-
geneous states are inherently desirable.
Even in an environment where human
rights are respected, a global system of
states based primarily on ethnicity or
historical claims is clearly unachievable.
Except in the smallest or most isolated
environments, there will always be
"trapped" minorities, no matter how
carefully boundaries are drawn. Ethni-
cally based states almost inevitably lead
to claims of ethnic superiority on the
part ofthe new majority and to a cul-
tural rigidity that creates problems for
new minorities. At their worst, newly
created ethnic states may tolerate or
encourage the killings and ethnic cleans-
ing that scarred the dissolution ofthe
former Yugoslavia.
This does not mean that the majority
in a new state need ignore its own culture
or the requirements of a modern state.
Some "state-building" (for example, with
respect to language or a common legal
system) may be necessary to develop the
administrative and economic ties that
bind communities together. Thus cultural
or ethnic minorities in a particular territory
must accept that status and not expect
their beliefs and customs to be reflected at
the national level to the same extent as
those ofthe majority population. This
does not mean, however, that a minority
need submit to a majority that seeks not
merely to mandate conformity to statewide
standards but rather to destroy cultures
that deviate from the dominant model.
In general, policymakers should con-
tinue to reject the notion that there is a
legal right of secession. This principle
wiU properly force nationalists to aban-
don their claim that "we are a nation and
therefore have a right to a state." On the
other hand, central governments should
no longer be allowed to hide behind the
fa9ade of national unity without explain-
ing how minority rights are genuinely
being protected.
There are two instances in which sec-
ession should be supported by the inter-
national community. The first occurs
when massive, discriminatory human
rights violations, approaching the scale of
genocide, are being perpetrated. If there
is no likelihood of a change in the attitude
ofthe central government, or if the ma-
jority population supports the repression,
secession may be the only effective rem-
edy for the besieged group. Although
support for secession raises serious issues
regarding possible outside intervention, it
is justifiable if the underlying abuses are
sufficiently grave. Such circumstances wall
probably be uncommon, although the
atrocities against, for example, Tibetans
in China or Kurds in Iraq might qualify.
It is important to remember, however,
that such exceptions are based primarily
on the need to alleviate human suffering,
not on acceptance ofthe impossible
equation of one nation to one state.
A second possible exception might
find a right of secession if reasonable
demands for local self-government or
minority rights have been arbitrarily
rejected by a central governmenteven
without accompanying large-scale violence.
This exception, however, would come
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The Specter of Secession
into play only when minimal demands To ensure equity, minorities in a new
are rejected; it does not mean that the state founded to preserve ethnic or cul-
United States or the United Nations tural homogeneity should be granted the
should substitute its judgment of what is same rights of self-determination that
fair or politically reasonable for that of were asserted by the seceding population,
the parties involved. The 1992 U.N. Legitimate self-determination can only
General Assembly declaration on minor- be exercised on the basis ofthe consent
ity rights only calls on states to "protect of all involved parties, not just those who
the existence" of minorities, granting the wish to separate. If neither international
latter the right "to participate effectively law nor politics offers a mechanism
in cultural, religious, social, economic through which minorities trapped wdthin
and public life." It neither mandates the a new ethnic state may rejoin their former
scope of that participation nor grants mi- state or, at least, create an autonomous
norities a veto over all actions that might region within their new home, rejection
affect them. of the new borders by force may be seen
as the only alternative.
WHEN RIGHTS CLASH Put simply, redressing historical griev-
The United States and others should gen- ances or responding to contemporary dissat-
erally encourage resolution of self-determi- isfactions cannot justify the dispossession
nation claims by means short of secession,
except when the parties agree to the division
of a state. Statehood is not necessary to
guarantee the legitimate human rights of
groups and individuals to protect and
promote their culture, language, and tradi-
tions. The fijMUment of other goals, such forced to choose between emigrating or
as increased political and economic power, remaining under "alien" domination and
is more legitimately sought through the which other groups should be rewarded
normal democratic process. At the same
time, however, the United States should
recognize that minimum human rights
and minority rights standards are expand-
ing beyond the purely individualistic focus
of America's own traditions, incorporating
the areas of language, culture, and educa-
tion. Potential mediators and advisers wiU
need to become familiar with comparative
arrangements for power-sharing, devolu-
tion, federalism, confederation, territorial
of members of ethnic minorities who now
live in the territory in question and whose
ancestors may have lived there for genera-
tions. No group can claim exclusive control
over a territory forever. It is morally impos-
sible to decide which individuals should be
and functional autonomy, self-govemment,
special participation rights for minorities
or regional groups, proportional represen-
tation, and similar arrangements.
with ethnically based political power in
the form of a new state.
If our concern is with peoples rather
than territories, there is no reason to re-
gard existing administrative or "republic"
boundaries within states as sacrosanct. In
most cases, the best way of determining
the wishes of those within a new state
would be through a series of plebiscites
to redraw what were formerly internal
boundaries. Such plebiscites could be
subject to various limitations to ensure
that they would not be used in haste or
to create enclaves that are not viable.
Accepting the possibility of altering borders
FOREIGN AFFAIRS- March/April 1998
Hurst Hannum
peacefiiUy might be a usefiil precondition
for recognition of a new state whenever a
significant proportion ofthe population
appears not to support the new borders.
Finally, when armed conflict occurs,
responsibility for war crimes and crimes
against humanity must be distinguished
from the underlying political agendas of
all sides. The United States and others
should continue to support international
accountability for such criminals, even if
the problems of such prosecutions are only
too evident from the halting work ofthe
U.N. tribunals on Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, prosecution of
war criminals should not be linked to
the merits of self-determination claims.
A principled response to self-determina-
tion claims asserted prior to the outbreak
of armed conflict cannot depend on
whether war crimes are committed after
the conflict begins.
The approach outlined above v^dU not
necessarily deter highly motivated groups
or power-hungry individuals from seek-
ing independence, whether for honest
motives or ulterior ones. But the present
lack of both normative and moral clarity
may be responsible for at least some of
the increased separatist violence ofthe
post-Cold War years. Emboldened by
the international community's acceptance
ofthe dissolution of Yugoslavia (and not
attuned to the fine distinctions drawn by
European diplomats and lawyers between
"dissolution" and "secession"), dissatisfied
groups in all parts ofthe world have decided
that wars of national liberation are more
likely to obtain meaningfiil outside support
than lower-keyed appeals for minority
rights or autonomy.
A more clearly formulated set of inter-
national norms, such as those suggested
here, may discourage at least some ques-
tionable claims and the ready resort to
violence that often accompanies them.
Such an approach wiU not satisfy partisans
who extol either the virtues of yesterday's
"national" identity or the needs of today's
modern state. Even so, recognizing and
accommodating conflicting rights is the
only way in which the world can respond
to diametrically opposed demands in a
politically and morally principled manner.
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume77No.2