Chapter 8.

Theories of Humor
A. Introduction.
Humor is a genuine mystery. (Robert Latta 1999:3)
Laughter is one of the unsolved problems of philosophy. (Monro 1963:13)
We are still without an adequate general theory of laughter (Morreall 1987:128)
Philosophical literature on humor is both minimal and entrenched in a logical sp
ace and language inadequate to the scope and complexities of the subject. (Rucki
1993)
Humor is a pervasive feature of human life...yet its nature is elusive. It has g
enerated little theoretical interest. (LaFollett & Shanks 1993)
These quotations suggest that theories of humor are problematic. As stated in th
e Preface: There are special reasons why humor research has been inadequate. 1.
Researchers have been captivated by a single model (paradigm or metaphor). They
have seen it only from the perspective of one theory or discipline, e.g. a socio
logical or psychological analysis of humor, as being only based on, e.g. aggress
ion, or an incongruity. Michael Gelven (2000) wrote, "The philosophers are ironi
cally the most inept in their attempt to understand its [humor's] nature." 2. Re
searchers fail or are unable to define humor. (See Chapter 3 on definition.) Def
inition also requires an analysis of definition itself. This is virtually never
done. Without first defining humor, experiments concerning humor are unscientifi
c and statements about humor are empty. We cannot say what causes humor, what it
does, or if humor is beneficial if we do not first clearly know what humor is.
Thus, much of humor research is invalidated. 3. Once humor is defined we still h
ave the problem that it is defined in terms which are vague, thereby committing
the fallacy of abstractionism (essentialism or Platonism). For example, if humor
is incongruity, we must concretely and by paradigm define incongruity. We see t
hat "incongruity" means different things to different theorists. 4. If humor is
an emotion, we must also have a valid and well-founded theory of emotion.
On humor research we find the following comments:
"Of all the phenomena which come under the investigation of empirical and philos
ophical psychology, humor is easily one of the least understood." (Morreall 1987
:212)
"Neither incongruity ...nor other criteria that have been advanced to define hum
or are capable of doing so." (G. E. Ferro-Luzzi in Latta 1999:5)
"The subject matter is more in its early stages than at maturity." (Lefcourt 200
1:165)
"There is still no standard of theoretical framework upon which researchers gene
rally agree." (R. Martin in Ruch 1998:57)
"There is very little research on the sense of humor as a concept." (V. Raskin i
n Ruch 1998:95)
"One of the most striking and enduring traits of personality is the sense of hum
or. Yet despite its distinctiveness, the sense of humor remains a neglected area
of research." (Levine & Rakusin 1959:183)
"All these factors...have resulted in a flawed, rather pathetic body of research
on the psychology of humor." (Mary Crawford in Barreca 1992:25)
The following is a brief look at humor theory. The very word "theory" suggests s
omething strange. Does one arise in the morning in hopes of creating theories? I
s "theory" the sort of word which contains its own unacceptability? Perhaps this
is because theories are usually abstract and obscure. And they are often mistak
en. But one of the most common faults of theories is the assumption that any one
theory is correct, and that the other theories are false. It is like asking for
the absolute truth, the only single definition of a term, regardless of context
, which will apply to the past, present, and future. It makes no sense to ask fo
r the theory, which will uniquely explain all. Rather, theories are merely model
s, perspectives, or metaphors.
The fallacy of thinking that only one theory is true is the fallacy of taking ou
r models or metaphors literally. It is "taking things literally humor." Thus, we
need not think that one theory will explain all aspects of humor, or be the tru
e theory. However, theorists have erroneously claimed just that-that their theor
y is the correct one. Berlyne (1954:806-807) wrote: "Most of the philosophical t
heorists erred in singling out one or two as the critical prerequisites for laug
hter, so that their theories fitted certain instances of humor very well, but ac
counted for other instances less convincingly."
Generally speaking, theories of humor are based on a writer's more general theor
ies. A Freudian gives a Freudian view of humor, a gestaltist gives a Gestalt the
ory; a linguist gives a discourse analysis, structuralist, speech act or script
theory, and so on. We each have our all-permeating metaphors with which we model
"reality"-and which arise out of an attempt to understand "reality." Each theor
y and philosophy may be thought of as an expanded metaphor. The trick is not to
become captivated by our metaphors-become caught in our own web.
We have approached an analysis of humor with the following models: a) Humor is a
n emotion and may be clarified by means of an assessment theory of emotion. Humo
r may be seen as an aesthetic emotion or form of beauty. The aesthetic as an emo
tion and the way in which art expresses emotions has been analyzed in the book,
Emotion in Aesthetics (Shibles 1995b). Aesthetic humor may similarly be analyzed
. Just as we may speak of humanistic art, we may speak of humanistic, aesthetic
humor. b) Humor involves thought, action, feeling, and context. The knowledge an
d classification of thought and behavior, generally, may be used to clarify and
classify humor. c) The assessments involved in humor are based on mistake, illog
ic, deviations, errors, etc. d) The types of metaphor humor and metaphor were se
en to be a useful way of classifying the types of humor. Both humor and metaphor
involve similar thought patterns. Both involve saved falsity and deviation. e)
A theory of humor rests on a theory of language. We have already discussed these
theories in detail and by example. Humor was seen to be usefully regarded as a
subjective assessment that there is a mistake, but one which is not harmful or f
ear inducing. It may be pointed out that the fact that humor must not be taken a
s fearful, or harmful, has been suggested or hinted at by other theorists.
Darwin suggests that one must be in a happy frame of mind. Eastman (1972) says o
ne must be in a playful mood. August Wilhelm von Schlegel (Stewart 1967:102-108)
stated that humor involves a cheerful acceptance and adaptation, based on flexi
ble intelligence. Oring (1992:3) speaks of "appropriate incongruity." The psycho
logist, M. Rothbart (1976/7) argued that humor is incongruity in a safe context.
A number of writers saw that an event must be taken as nonthreatening, as one c
ondition for producing humor. Also, theorists tend to present only a few categor
ies and ignore the rest. Or a category would be presented solely from the perspe
ctive of a single metaphysics or philosophy. Some of the more extensive classifi
cations of humor which have been given are as follows. The classifications they
give will be related (in brackets) to those given in this book.
D. H. Monro (1963) gives one of the more adequate classifications. For him, humo
r is: 1) any breach of the usual order of events (deviation), 2) importing into
one situation what belongs to another (context deviation, metaphor), 3) anything
masquerading as something it is not (hypocrisy, pretense, trick, etc.), 4) word
play, puns (ambiguity, grammatical deviation, etc.), 5) nonsense, 6) forbidden
breach (value deviation, deviation from rule, etc.), 7) novelty, freshness, unex
pectedness, escape (deviation from usual, defeated expectation, surprise, escape
).
James Sully (1902) gave the following classifications: 1) novelty and oddity (de
viation), 2) deformity (deviation, value deviation), 3) moral deformity and vice
(value deviation), 4) breach of order or rule (deviation from rule), 5) small m
isfortune (practical joke, ridicule), 6) indecency (value deviation), 7) affecti
ons and pretenses (hypocrisy, pretense), 8) lack of knowledge or skill (ignoranc
e humor, mistake), 9) incongruity, 10) absurd (nonsense), 11) nonsense, 12) verb
al play, witticism (ambiguity, grammatical deviation, etc.), 13) merry mood (thi
s may rather be regarded as a feeling or state of well-being, not as humor), 14)
humor of being victor over the vanquished (this is superiority humor which is n
ot treated here as humor, but as ridicule, practical joke, or escape humor). He
presents no theory of his own.
Cicero (Stewart 1967:32ff.) spoke of jokes of language versus jokes of thought.
The distinction between them would have to be clearly made out. At the beginning
of this book epistemological primacy of language was argued for. Thought basica
lly reduced to language-use. Morreall (1987:204-205) also expressed an emphasis
on language: "Language is especially important for creating humor." Cicero in De
Oratore (II, lviii-lxii) gives as types of jokes of thought: 1) deceiving expec
tation (defeated expectation), 2) satirize tempers of others (satire), 3) playin
g humorously on one's own tempers (self-deprecation humor), 4) compare a thing w
ith something worse (sinking), 5) dissembling (hypocrisy, pretense, trick), 6) u
tter apparent absurdities (nonsense), 7) reprove folly (value deviation, blatant
vice, satire, etc.), 8) surprise (defeated expectation), 9) deceit (trick, etc.
), 10) verbal distortion (many categories, e.g. ambiguity, fallacy of accent).
As a brief overview, we may present the following theoretical and historical app
roaches to humor:
1) Claims that all humor is due to a single factor. This view was criticized ear
lier.
2) Humor as based on unconscious or subconscious activity. This is largely the F
reudian approach. The unconscious is today a highly suspect and pseudopsychologi
cal notion. This view is therefore found indefensible in its usual forms.
3) Energy release. This also is usually Freudian and is another piece of unsuppo
rtable, pseudopsychology. Humor is described by Freud as "saved energy." Spencer
& Lunacharsky (1993:50-51) and Tsur (1989:247) also have that view. "Energy" is
a metaphysical term and is not an entity in itself. There is no "energy" as suc
h. Titze & Eschenrder (2000:39ff) also argue that psychic energy is pseudoscienti
fic. Dziemidok (1993:63) also criticizes the notion of excess mental energy. The
word must, for intelligibility, be reduced to a concrete paradigm or operationa
l definition. Any theory of energy release, whether Freudian or not, will run in
to this difficulty. For further analysis, see the account under "Escape or Relea
se Humor." Theodor Lipps (1922) regards humor as superfluous energy release as j
oy caused by resolution of "mental congestion" due to deviation from wants and v
alues. Spencer (1892) also thinks of humor as excess mental energy. The built up
emotions are inappropriate so we laugh. (cf. ambivalence theory)
On Definitions
A distinction is here made between the following types of definition: (1) descri
ptive, (2) stipulative. (3) recommended; (4) value or persuasive; (5) metaphoric
al, e.g. the creative construction of new definitions; (6) circular definitions,
e.g. "Humor is comedy," or "Humor is what is funny." (7) normative, or what the
word is commonly thought to mean; (8) dictionary and encyclopedia definition; (
9) over abstract or unintelligible definition; (10) essentialistic or absolute d
efinition. (#6, 9, and 10 are rejected because they are fallacies.), 11) constru
ctivist definitions-definitions which do not claim to realism, 12. operational d
efinitions. (cf. Nobel prize winning physicist, P. Bridgemans, notion of "operati
onal definition.")
In conformity with contextualist and ordinary-language views of language [e.g. J
ohn Dewey and Wittgenstein (1968)], essentialistic definitions are not to be had
. To seek to give a literal definition is to commit the "metaphor-to-myth" falla
cy. It is akin to saying, for example, that my religion is the only truth, there
by generating a pervasive fiction.
Definitions may be rather regarded as perspectival seeings-as. To define noncirc
ularly is to relate different things. To define is to take a model or metaphor.
"Humor is an emotion," or "The world is absurd," are metaphors. We will not, the
refore, be able to conclude that the real definition of "humor" is such and such
. Because absolutistic, it is not acceptable to say, "Humor is just aggression,"
"Humor is really catharsis," "Humor is essentially nonsense." Other types of de
finition are possible. When one type of definition is mistaken for another, equi
vocation or category-mistake results. It is, for example, a mistake to take a re
commended definition as a descriptive definition.
B. Theories of Humor by Theory.
The psychologist, Eysenck (1947, 1942) mentions four approaches to the study of
humor:
1) Cognitive Theory. This deals with the apprehension of mistakes, incongruity,
etc. Our approach in this text is largely cognitive, but includes all of human e
xperience. For Apte (1985) the cognitive is shaped by culture and humor is cultu
rally appropriate incongruity. (262) Humor smooths social action.
2) Conative Theory. Here the stress is on motivation. Psychologists, in an attem
pt to reduce thought to behavior, tend to interpret emotions behaviorally, for e
xample, "hate" as "going away," and love as "coming toward." This has often yiel
ded a simplistic account. Here the conative approach is said to stress a satisfa
ction of a desire for superiority. It reduces to a superiority view. On my analy
sis, the superiority view falls under ridicule or defense mechanisms and does no
t qualify as a type of humor.
3) Affective Theory. Such theories stress emotional components. In our earlier d
iscussion emotions were said to involve a) thought (cognitive), b) action (conat
ive), c) feeling (affective), and d) situation. That is, all four are involved i
n an analysis of humor. Also, it was seen to be inadequate to treat affect as se
parate from the cognitive, because emotion is largely constituted by the cogniti
ve (thought). Bergson believes that strong emotion and sympathy are incompatible
with humor. Rather, detachment is needed. The ambivalence, contradiction, incon
gruity and other theories may all involve a comingling and struggle between oppo
sing emotions, e.g. love-hate. Hffding (1930) holds that humor is a contrast of t
wo ideas wherein the emotion of one destroys the other. The defective in contras
t with the superior turns to its opposite.
4) Instinct Theory. Some of those holding such theories are Eastman (1936), McDo
ugall (1923), Greig (1923), Koestler (1964), Darwin (1904), etc. But "instinct"
explains little. To say we laugh at a contradiction joke out of instinct has lit
tle explanatory value. To say we laugh out of instinct is to say only that we la
ugh because we laugh. "Instinct" is a confusing and misleading term. It may mean
any of the following: a) unlearned behavior, b) unalterable behavior, c) heredi
tary behavior, d) behavior not involving reason, e) behavior attempting to remov
e tension, f) unconscious behavior. These are discussed below.
a) Instinct as unlearned behavior. All this says is that we laugh because we wer
e born that way. It is not an explanation. But what we laugh at and our ability
to create humor is certainly learned, and differs from individual to individual.
Even if humor were somehow instinctive, the important thing is that we can radi
cally change and develop it. The most crucial thing to know about humor, as oppo
sed to merely smiling, is not explained by saying that it is instinctive.
b) Instinct as unalterable behavior. On the contrary, humor is greatly alterable
.
c) Instinct as hereditary behavior. We have not yet adequately traced humor, or
language ability, through the genes. We have not the slightest idea of the genet
ic structure which brings about the pun. (If we had, there would certainly be th
ose who would wish to destroy such genetic traits.) We do not see articles on "T
he Genetic Structure of Shaggy Dog Stories."
d) Instinct as behavior not involving reason. It has been clearly shown that hum
or does involve reason or cognition.
e) Instinct as behavior attempting to remove tension. This would reduce to the r
elease and escape theory. A clarification of the mechanisms at work would need t
o be clarified. See "Escape or Release Humor."
f) Instinct as unconscious behavior. Same arguments apply as mentioned above und
er "unconscious theories."
5. Humor as Based on Emotion. These are often called "ambivalence" theories. Hum
or is said to be caused by a conflict of emotions. It is like taking Beardsley's
, or Kant's, logical absurdity theory, and applying it to emotions. We might cal
l it the "emotional absurdity theory." An emotion is supposedly confronted with
a contradictory emotion thereby somehow resulting in humor. For example, joy plu
s hate leads to laughter. In the incongruity theory of humor we have two incompa
tible ideas. Here we supposedly have two incompatible emotions at once. With emo
tions, it is called "ambivalent" instead of "incompatible." It is supposedly an
action toward and away (conation views) at the same time. Then it is just a matt
er of listing the contradictory emotions. Ambivalent emotions or conditions typi
cally listed are: superior and inferior, mania and depression, playful chaos and
seriousness, sympathy and animosity, drive and block of drive, playful and fear
ful, joy and hate.
Some writers who hold such theories are Menon (1931), Greig (1923), Freud (1960)
, and Koestler (1964). One of the major difficulties with such theories is that
they rest on an inadequate account of emotion, or no theory of emotion is even d
iscussed. Supposedly the combination of love and hate yield humor. What sense mi
ght be made of this? Perhaps, if each is regarded merely as a feeling it would m
ake sense. But as a type of contradictory assessment it can serve as a basis of
humor. It is the bad seeming to be good, or love being presented as hate. People
often pretend to dislike someone to overcompensate for their actual attraction.
Koestler (1964) has a version of the ambivalence theory. It is, basically, that
the emotions cannot keep up with a rapidly shifting intellect. Thought changes t
oo quickly for emotions, thereby causing laughter. Emotion is supposedly deserte
d by thought. Emotion and reason seem to be personified here and treated atomist
ically. Koestler (1964:56) wrote: "Laughter is aggression (or apprehension) robb
ed of its logical raison d'tre; the puffing away of emotion discarded by thought.
" (56) Humor is such that "the sudden bisociation of a mental event with two hab
itually incompatible matrices results in an abrupt transfer of the train of thou
ght from one associative context to another. The emotive charge which the narrat
ive carried cannot be so transferred owing to its greater inertia and persistenc
e; discarded by reason, the tension finds its outlet in laughter." (Ibid. 59) To
say that the emotions cannot keep up with the intellect is vague and even perso
nification. Again, a clear view of thought and emotion is lacking. Koestler, unf
ortunately, compounds his problems by basing his theory also on energy release.
6. Humor as Based on Physiology. Against this view, Buytendijk (1950:127) wrote,
"Behavior can never be reduced to physiological processes and explained as a re
sult of the integration of reflexes." And B.F. Skinner (1953:161) wrote, "In spi
te of extensive research it has not been possible to show that each emotion is d
istinguished by a particular pattern of responses of glands and smooth muscles..
..and in any case, such responses are not said to be the emotion....As long as w
e conceive of the problem of emotion as one of inner states, we are not likely t
o advance a practical technology."
The medieval view of emotion was based on a balance of the four humors:
black bile (melancholy), yellow bile (choleric), phlegm (phlegmatic) and blood (
temper, lust). Each eccentricity was supposedly due to an excess, lack, or imbal
ance of these humors. Ben Johnson (1910/2001) wrote a satire on this view in Eve
ryman in His Humor. We are reminded of the current attempt to explain humor by m
eans of adrenaline release. The attempt to reduce humor and emotion to physiolog
y is, however, a useful perspective. The physiological approach is always intere
sting, but as yet does little to explain or clarify humor. The relation between
thought and physiology has yet to be made out, and there are seemingly some insu
rmountable difficulties. How can such different kinds of things as thoughts, be
reduced to electrical impulses or cellular activity? Is humor electrical? Quite
new principles seem to be required. A revolution in our thinking about the psych
ophysical seems inevitable.
Magda Arnold (1970) has done valuable work on investigating the physiological ba
sis of the assessment theory of emotion. Hundreds of other investigators could a
lso be cited. W. F. Fry (1957, 1975), in a series of books and articles, has wor
ked especially on the physiological aspect of humor. Schachter (1962ab, 1964, 19
71) and Berlyne (1954, 1960, 1971) have also worked in this area on the "activat
ion" theory and their work will be discussed later.
The pathophysiology of laughing is explored by Stearns (1972). Some of the infor
mation he presents is as follows. Pseudo-bulbar palsy involves seemingly uncause
d explosive laughter. The laughter seems inappropriate and the individual seems
to be unable to stop laughing. The person may laugh inappropriately such as on r
eceiving unpleasant news. It is stated that the explanation for this phenomenon
is unknown. Also, in general, no laughing center in the brain was found. Laughin
g fits are sometimes a sign of thalamic disorder with cortical involvement. Wils
on's disease (due to copper poisoning) and convulsive disorders involve involunt
ary laughter. Hysterical laughter is sometimes found after trauma, shock, prefro
ntal lobotomy, in Alzheimer's disease ("intellect deterioration"), Pick's diseas
e, Kuru Syndrome (of New Guinea only). The Kuru syndrome affects sixty percent o
f the people there and involves a late symptom of excessive laughter. Some suspe
ct virus as a cause. Writers sometimes erroneously report the Kuru syndrome as d
eath caused by laughter. Regarding his search for physiological correlates R. Sc
hwab wrote, "No organized electrical activity of the cerebral cortex, but only l
ow voltage random activity of the delta wave type, can be detected in the awake
newborn infant." (Stearns 1972:50) It is obvious that a bilateral, persistent EE
G pattern is established between the second and fourth month of life (at the tim
e when the first smiling and then laughing is observed). But again, humor need n
ot involve laughter and laughter need not involve humor.
Pygmies when affected with pressure on the brain are said to fall down in paroxy
smal laughter. There is a decrease in muscle tone leading to the fall. Vacant, c
ompulsive laughter appears sometimes with dementia praecox. The hebephrenic has
abnormal and constant laughter and smiles. One may mention also laughter due to
drugs such as LSD, nitrous oxide, ethyl alcohol, liquor, etc. Between 1962 and 1
964 it is reported that 1000 people in Tanganyika and Uganda (especially girls i
n Catholic convent schools) died in a group laughing epidemic. The report, it wo
uld seem, would need detailed checking.
7. Arousal Theories of Humor. In her summary of psychological approaches to humo
r, Mary Rothbart (1977) wrote, "The approach followed by most recent theories of
laughter and humor is based on the concept of arousal." The following is an acc
ount and critique of Schachter's arousal-label theory: Stanley Schachter (1962ab
, 1964, 1971) presents a view of emotions which combines a traditional physiolog
ical arousal theory with a cognitive-emotive theory. In an experiment, students
were injected with adrenaline and asked to report their experiences. Seventy-one
percent reported having certain physical sensations, the rest described "as if"
emotions, for example, "I feel as if I were afraid." In the first case, then, t
here is physical arousal. But if Schachter is attempting to determine what an em
otion is and what causes emotion, it is unsatisfactory to inject subjects with a
drenaline and then claim that that is or causes emotion. The procedure is questi
on-begging. It would be more adequate and significant to try to find out how emo
tions arise in the first place, rather than injecting adrenaline and assuming, o
r then advocating, a physiological arousal theory or activation theory of emotio
n.
In an article coauthored with Jerome Singer (1962b:398) Schachter says that emot
ions do seem to be partially equated with a physiological state: "Emotional stat
es may be considered a function of a state of physiological arousal and of a cog
nition appropriate to this state of arousal." Schachter's assumption is that "a
general pattern of sympathetic [nerve] discharge is characteristic of emotional
states." However, the injection of adrenaline could not result in an adequate re
production of the physical changes involved in all or any particular emotion. We
may, however, assume that this was not their task, but that they were rather co
ncerned with the relation between certain artificially induced states of physica
l arousal and cognition. With these limitations the theory is interesting.
It was found that what determines which emotion is experienced, is the cognition
one has and the kind of linguistic labeling one does. There is supposedly a gen
eral state of arousal and the cognitive assessment, perception of the situation,
and activity involved determine what specific emotion is felt. Subjects who wer
e aware that the cause of their arousal was adrenaline reported no emotions. The
conclusion is reached that "cognitive factors may be major determinants of emot
ional states." (139) Schachter represents the case as follows: "Given such a sta
te of arousal it is suggested that one labels, interprets, and identifies this s
tate in terms of the characteristics of the precipitating situation and one's ap
perceptive mass....it is the cognition that determines whether the state of phys
iological arousal will be labeled 'anger,' 'joy,' or whatever." (139)
On this view, a physiological state or visceral activity alone cannot induce an
emotion. Cognition is also necessary. This is not, in one sense, unlike the Jame
s-Lange theory of emotion according to which emotion is the perception of our bo
dily state. James played down cognitive function and stressed physiological arou
sal. Schachter regards his own views as a modified James-Lange view. (Ibid. 160)
On Schachter's view, a perception of a situation can cause a physiological arou
sal. What arousal it is, is determined by the way the situation is seen and asse
ssed. Cognition does not cause, but only correlates with physiological arousal.
Cognition only "steers" arousal. One of the difficulties with this view, as with
the James Lange Theory, is that it is not seen that the "perception" of a situa
tion is rather the cognition of a situation. Emotion and physiological states, t
hen, follow cognition. R. Lazarus (1968:260) offers the following criticism: "Th
is injection procedure limits the conclusions that can be drawn about emotion in
the normal life situation...The individual perceives and appraises a situation
relevant to his welfare, and this appraisal is a crucial antecedent to the emoti
onal reaction...The activation follows, it does not [usually] precede, the cogni
tion about the situation."
Nevertheless, Schachter offers the important insight that emotions are partly li
nguistically determined by means of labeling and assessment. Emotion, then, is p
artly a description of context and situation, and includes resulting feelings. E
motion does not merely name an internal physiological state. Schachter & Singer
(1962b:398) state, "Given a state of physiological arousal for which an individu
al has no immediate explanation, he will label this state and describe his feeli
ngs in terms of the cognitions available to him."
This theory, although it does not adequately account for emotions in which cogni
tion precedes feeling, may nevertheless account for cases such as fatigue, hango
ver, etc., in which feeling does in fact precede cognition. Such states may, how
ever, be perceptions of sensations rather than emotions. Also, one reason why ar
ousal may be thought to be needed is that often it is only in such a state that
one can overcome taboo or guilt to permit sexual feelings. The mistaken view is
sometimes held that lovers must be angry in order to love.
Walster & Walster (1978) use Schachter's theory to try to explain romantic love.
Such love supposedly requires physiological arousal and requires that the arous
al be labeled in a certain way. Romantic love is often based on frustration and
obstacles, to make it work. The lovers are separated by distance, opposed by the
ir families, etc. The love is not based on simple reinforcement. On their view,
the negative frustrations produce the arousal needed, the positive assessment or
label attached to the arousal determines it as being love. If the label "hate"
were attached to the arousal one would experience hate. Objections to this view
of love are the same as those against Schachter's view above. Walster & Walster
offer the qualification, "Unfortunately, experimental evidence does not yet exis
t to support the contention that almost any form of high arousal, if properly la
beled, will deepen passion." (Ibid. 85-99)
Berlyne (1954, 1960, 1971) applies the arousal theory specifically to the emotio
n of humor. Some factors raise arousal, others lower it. The factors which arous
e are not merely adrenaline increase, but are assessments of various sorts, for
example, novelty, surprise, incongruity, strangeness, complexity, ambiguity, puz
zlement, apparent contradiction, relieved frustration, etc. He calls these "coll
ative variables." These variables return the arousal theory to a stress on cogni
tive assessments as in the assessment theory of emotion. Incongruity is stressed
(1967) but it is admitted that it could not be defined.
James Jones (1970:85) in his doctoral dissertation, "Cognitive Factors in the Ap
preciation of Humor," stresses cognition. He states: "Most traditional theories
have assumed that the positive humor response (laughter, smiling, etc.) is indic
ative of positive affect, and have sought to explain what process produces this
reinforcing state of affairs. The present paper, on the other hand, has attempte
d to fill in the intervening cognitive processes." The cognitive mediation invol
ves such notions as distortion, incongruity, bisociation (Koestler), explanation
, implications, attributions, and perception. There is reinforcement involved su
ch as, superiority, relief, safety, freedom, cognitive mastery, etc. Jones' anal
ysis could fit Beardsley's logical absurdity theory of metaphor, or Kant's theor
y of humor. It is basically an incongruity-resolution theory and so goes beyond
an arousal theory.
8. The Configuration or Gestalt Theory. This view is held by such psychologists
as Maier (1932), and P. Schiller (1938). According to this approach there is a s
udden figure-ground shift, or a context deviation. The shift may be from embarra
ssment to relieved understanding. (cf. Bateson 1953) The previous unrelated part
unexpectedly falls into place in a whole, almost like a crossword puzzle experi
ence. Both the part and the whole become redefined. In philosophy, the shift may
be referred to as "seeing-as." (Shibles 1974c:450-455) One basic model or metap
hor of Gestalt thought is to base thinking on certain patterned, visual phenomen
a. It is an expansion of a metaphor. For Maier we must have emotional distance f
or humor. For Bateson getting the point of a joke requires an unexpected figure-
background reversal.
9. Humor as Based on the Irrational. These theories are in adequate supply. Most
of such theories are based on the fallacy of argument from ignorance. That is,
whenever we do not know how something works, someone fills up the gap in knowled
ge with a mystical or unfounded entity such as instinct, energy, god, an invisib
le fluid, mental entity, the unconscious, or something irrational. Bergson's vie
w is based on an irrational leap of intuition. He opposes the concrete and mecha
nical. On the other hand, he gave a somewhat rational explanation of humor in sp
ite of it.
10. Circular Theories of Humor. (See earlier section, "Circular Definiti
ons of Humor." Chapter 3.)
Many views of humor are based merely on circular statements. For example: Humor
is based on the will to laugh. Humor is based on what is funny. We laugh at what
is funny. Humor is based on the ludicrous. We laugh at the absurd. Marie Swabey
(1961:26) gives the following circular definitions: a. "Often we use the term c
omic as referring simply to a quality of nature or art that provokes merriment o
r laughter." (26) b. "To be truly comical a state of affairs must be seen to be
funny, droll, exciting some ludicrous reflection." (26) c. She quotes Meredith's
statement, '"The test of true comedy is that it shall awaken thoughtful laughte
r.'" (27) On the other hand, Swabey gives a definition which could fit well with
the theory of humor presented in this book, namely, that humor is an assessment
of a mistake which is not taken seriously. She states: "The most adequate gener
ic definition of the comic is: the presence of an incongruity, contradiction, or
absurdity that is humanly relevant without being oppressively grave or momentou
s." (28) Kotthoff (1998) says that humor is the nonserious. (Humor wird als Nich
t-Ernstes definiert.) Robert Solomon ("Racist Humor" 2001) defines humor, follow
ing De Sousa (1987), as "finding things funny." It is as circular to say that th
e humorous is the humorous. The section on analytic contradiction humor also giv
es numerous examples of contradiction humor about humor. Roger Scruton (1983) th
inks humor is the enjoyment of the object for its own sake. This is also a plato
nistic, abstractionist fallacy. "Humor is cognitive experience in a "mirthful st
ate of mind." (Apte 1985:14) Wells (1997:4): "Humor is what is funny." She, howe
ver, realizes this is circular. "'Humor' will be used...to cover anything funny"
; "We call something 'humorous' if it is apt to amuse." (Mike Martin in Morreall
1987:173) "Humor is amusement." (Michael Clark, Michael Martin in Latta 1999:13
) "The comical does not exist for someone lacking a sense of humour." Yuri Borev
in Dziemidok 1993:27) Humor is an "elusive feeling of funniness." (Vogel (1989:
1) Humor is when "two people enjoy a text together." (Vogel (1989:35) "Humor is
a device used...to have fun with other people." (Vogel (1989:1)
11. Stimulus-Response or Learning Theories of Humor. Cause-effect, and stimulus-
response are such vague terms that they are not of much help in presenting a the
ory. Behaviorists often seem to think something important is being asserted when
they say, "behavior is learned" or is fully analyzable in terms of stimulus-res
ponse, reinforcement, extinction, reward, punishment, etc. Again, these terms ar
e only vague assertions that everything happens in terms of cause and effect. An
d certainly in this they are right. But they are right only because they themsel
ves impose this vague model on reality. If we want to see things in terms of cau
se and effect or stimulus-response, we can. It is only up to us. There is no cau
se and effect as such in nature. These terms are human interpretations. It is on
ly that we see reality "that" way. We could also see reality differently, e.g. a
s noncausal, and this is exactly how one does see it when cause is reduced to me
re correlation (cf. Shibles "Free Will." 1972a" 65-69)
The stress on learning shows that one can develop desirable patterns of behavior
and extinguish undesirable ones. It is not a fatalism. Some behaviorists, such
as John Watson (1930), believe that there are some emotions we are born with and
that others are learned. Miller & Siegel (1972) believe that love is learned. T
his, then, allows us to acquire it, if we have not, and to improve it. On the ot
her hand, by saying it is learned is not sufficient to explain what it is or how
it is learned. To say it is learned by stimulus-response methods is again too t
heoretical and vague. Thus, stimulus is a partial description of an event. Thus,
for each stimulus-response situation to be adequate a great number of stimuli a
nd responses would have to be reported. Instead of S-R we would need Sl, S2, S3.
..- Rl, R2, R3,...
Too often the behaviorist presents a simplistic or overrestrictive account of be
havior by failing to include many of the relevant factors. The most central area
of inadequacy is that the behaviorist often fails to include language, self-tal
k, and assessment in their S-R model. They state, for example, that money is a s
timulus making one respond in a certain way, e.g. to work hard. But what is left
out of the account is that it is not the money itself which is the main stimulu
s, but rather the assessment of the money. Some people will never do certain thi
ngs for money. But to find that out we must know of their assessments.
Also, assessments themselves serve as stimuli. One may condition oneself, as in
the case of a critical philosopher. Humor for example, can be created, chosen an
d developed by people and they can selectively and deliberately respond with hum
or to serious people and situations. Our assessments serve to guide our behavior
more than simple reactions to our environment. A behaviorism which, as in the c
ase of humans, excludes language and assessment would be inadequate. And this is
one of the main errors of assuming that animal studies are sufficient to give i
nsight into human behavior. (cf. "personification humor.") Animals so not speak
English (or any other human language). Thus, the experimental behaviorist's anal
yses are often found inadequate. On the other hand, if behaviorism were to inclu
de linguistic assessment and imagery, a more satisfactory analysis could be give
n. This, then, is not an attack on behaviorism so much as to support it by an at
tempt to make it more clear and adequate.
Instead of speaking of stimuli it would be more helpful to speak of linguistic d
escriptions. Behaviorists often think that they are just correlating one object
with another. They are rather correlating one description with another, and the
behaviorist is thinking by means of language. "Behavior," "observation," and "pe
rception" are words in our language and, as such, have epistemological primacy a
s language. Perception and behavior are seen only through our language. Observat
ion is not an acceptable primary criterion, because it presupposes language. Thi
nking is language-use plus some images. Then, to speak of stimuli or behavior is
derivative from linguistic assessments of events. To speak of a stimulus it is
not sufficient to just point to an object. There is a difference of assessment b
etween being mauled and embraced, though the physical event looks the same. Too
much concentration on rewards or objects rather than language assessments as sti
muli, results in an inadequate and harmful analysis. Because of such assessments
a stimulus is not a single physical event, but rather a complex event involving
the individuals studied as well as the researcher.
In summary, firstly the basic words of the behaviorist are vague and result in s
implistic analyses. Behaviorists fail to see that linguistic assessment is what
is significant in analyzing humor behavior. They fail to see that their scientif
ic method should begin not with observation and behavior, but with language (act
ually a most important kind of behavior). However, the behaviorist program could
be modified so as to be useful. The first step is to reduce abstract terms to c
oncrete language-games or specific examples. The use of quantification and stati
stics is often especially unacceptable as a way of clarifying or understanding h
uman assessments. Wittgenstein (1968:232) stated it in this way, "In psychology
there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion."
Secondly, their method must be made adequate by accounting for linguistic assess
ments as regards human behavior. The above objections were to their methods used
and lack of adequacy. With these qualifications and modifications, behaviorism
may become critical philosophy and the philosophy of science, and I know of no b
etter method of problem solving in a concrete nonmetaphysical way.
12. Theories For or Against Humor. There are theories according to which one sho
uld never use either humor or metaphor. On these views, one should always be ser
ious and speak only literally. There is also the exact opposite view.
A. Anti Humor.
WHAT WOULD THE WORLD BE LIKE IF THERE WERE NO HUMOR IN IT?
A few adherents of the view condemning humor are: Ecclesiastes XXI, 20: "A fool
lifteth up his voice with laughter, but a wise man doth scarce smile a little."
Shelly was anti-humor. Laughter does not seem to be a sin, but it leads to sin."
(St. John Chrysostom ca. 345-407) "Laughing has always been considered by theol
ogians as a crime." (Robert Ingersoll) Can one imagine Christ laughing? The inte
rnet site, anti-humor.com, is a group of christians who are "proudly fighting on
God's side against humor." [Hyers (1969), however, has attempted to deal more p
ositively with the place of humor in religion. See also Appendix on religious hu
mor.] "Good taste and humor are a contradiction in terms." (Malcolm Muggeridge T
ime Sept. 24, 1953) Anti-Patriarchal (Radical) Feminists and Women's Studies tea
chers are said to lack humor. (cf. Shibles 1991a; Chapter 9 on feminist humor) "
True wit or good sense never excited a laugh...A man of parts and fashion is the
refore only seen to smile, but never heard to laugh"; "Nobody has ever heard me
laugh." Humor is ill-manners, folly, irrational and silly. (Letter to His Son. L
etter 144) (Lord Chesterfield) "The sense of the Ridiculous...has an intimate co
nnection with the highest and noblest principles. In the education of youth, not
hing requires more serious attention, than its proper regulation." (Stewart 1976
:161)
Ludovici (1932) said that humor is a cause of decadence, Plato regarded it as ev
il perhaps partly because he regarded humor as being based on malice and envy (P
hilebus) (cf. Attardo 1994:19-20); Aristotle regarded it as a kind of abuse. (Ni
comachean Ethics, Book iv, ch. 8) Chafe (1987) said that humor shows us our mist
akes and disables us so that we cannot act. The psychologist, William McDougall
(1922), said that happy people do not laugh because they do not need to. In gene
ral, those who are witty, playful, and humorous are often regarded, erroneously
apparently, as immature or childish. This is largely because the authors take an
y deviation from the serious as wrong. But, as was argued, humor is useful in ga
ining insight, motivation, saying things which could not other wise be communica
ted, etc. Humor is pleasurable and serves humanity, as opposed to humanity servi
ng seriousness.
B. Pro Humor. The following are some views which, on the other hand, app
reciate the use of humor: "Humor [is] tied to greater intelligence." (Kenderdine
1931:22) "Humor goes together with emotional maturity." (Grotjahn 1957:81) "The
man of greatest humor is he who has the most curious, observant and reflecting
mind, who has a mind richly stored with experiences, whose mind is capable of al
ertness of movement, springing from point to point" (Menon 1931, in Monro 1963:2
25) "Those who would not say anything funny themselves, and who are annoyed at t
hose who do, seem to be savage and austere." (Aristotle, Ethics)
13. Aristotle's Theories of Humor. Perhaps the best known of Aristotle's theorie
s is contained in the following quotation: "Comedy is an imitation of men worse
than the average; worse...[in the sense of] the ridiculous, which is a species o
f the ugly. The ridiculous may be defined as a mistake or deformity not producti
ve of pain or harm to others." This view has been interpreted in a variety of wa
ys, but on one interpretation it coheres with the assessment theory of humor pre
sented in this book. By "Imitation" is partially meant that it is "created." He
further agrees that ridicule, being open censure, is not humor. Humor is not abu
se but only gives unpressured harmless innuendo. (Cooper 1922:225) The defect or
ugliness must not be painful or destructive. We can now, with the assessment th
eory of emotion, make more sense than previously of Aristotle's theory.
Imitation is a form of pretense humor. Also, that the laughter is at those who h
ave human faults is a type of value deviation, just as is the ugly. It deviates
from our desires or from the ideal. To this view, Aristotle adds in the Tractatu
s Coislinianus (In Cooper 1922:225): "Comedy is an imitation of action that is l
udicrous and imperfect...directly presented by persons acting, and not in the fo
rm of narrative; through pleasure and laughter effecting the purgation of the li
ke emotions." This extends humor, or comedy, to anything which is imperfect. It
is acted out in the case of comedy. And this results in catharsis or release fro
m tension. This brings his view in line with the now rejected release, or escape
views of humor. But if we laugh at others for faults in others, which we fear o
r will not readily admit in ourselves, then this can lead to superiority views o
f humor.
We need not here further speculate on all the possible meanings of "imitation, p
urgation, ugly," etc. This has been extensively done by numerous scholars. Howev
er, it is important to point out that Aristotle's theory of humor includes much
more than these few statements about comedy. Humor is said to be due to self-dep
recation, vanity, excessive flattery, vice, a catharsis, unintentional contradic
tion, reversals, exaggeration, irony, etc. Accounts given of Aristotle's view of
humor usually, if not always, leave out the following. In the Tractatus Coislin
ianus, Aristotle says that humor comes from a) diction (rhetoric), and b) from t
hings done. The sources of laughter are:
a) Humor from Diction (rhetoric, "embellishments of language"): 1. Ambiguities (
e.g. homonyms). Greek uses the same word for both "God" and "wealth." (Cooper 19
22:229) 2. Synonyms (cf. circularity humor). 3. Garrulity (excessive repetition,
bombast, triviality, nonsense, childishness, pompousness, overindulgence, etc.)
4. Paronyms (adding to or taking away from a word. Use a word where it does not
belong. Neologism). 5. Diminutives, e.g. "Dear little Socrates" (Swiss and Bava
rian are noted for their excessive use of diminutives). 6. Perversion of intenti
on or meaning. 7. Distortion of grammar or syntax.
b) Humor from Things, Persons or Actions: It is correctly noted that this classi
fication of humor is somewhat arbitrary because things, people and actions canno
t be separated from language. (Cooper 1922:239) 1. Assimilation of what is bette
r to what is worse or the reverse (sinking, value deviation, e.g. people are ass
imilated to birds or frogs). 2. Deception, lie. 3. The impossible, irrational, u
nintelligible, violation of laws of cause and effect. 4. Irrelevance and the inc
onsequential. The possible comes to nothing. 5. Unexpectedness or surprise. This
is regarded as the main source of laughter. It is spoken of also as the "marvel
ous." Surprise alone, however, would be insufficient to cause humor. (cf. Dziemi
dok 1993:63) 6. Debase character. The character is only acceptably and harmlessl
y debased, not so much as to constitute abuse or ridicule. For example, the char
acter may be shown to have positive qualities and habits as well. 7. Clownish pa
ntomime. 8. Disjointed story without proper sequence.
Aristotelians took one or another aspect of these views to stress. It is said th
at Aristotelians in the Renaissance added surprise to baseness. As was seen, Ari
stotle already discussed surprise. In 1550, V. Maggi wrote, "In all ridiculous t
hings ugliness [I would say deviation] or baseness are necessarily joined with w
onder. The comic is deformed or illogical." Aristotle's model or metaphor of hum
or was expanded in many ways. It was taken literally as well. Many thought of hu
mor as a mental deformity.
Caesar (Stewart 1967:32ff.) extended Aristotle in asserting that the laughable i
s due to presenting the ugly in a way that is not ugly. Quintilian (Stewart 1967
:33ff.) asserted that laughter is always associated with something low or humble
. We have seen, however, that many types of humor present neither the ugly, nor
the low or humble. Hegel (Stewart 1967:109ff.) speaks of humor as the breakdown
of beauty and the spiritual, to yield the ugly or trivial.
14. Freudian Theory of Humor. Freud's (1960) work on humor is, Jokes and Their R
elation to the Unconscious. In the first place, as discussed earlier, the intell
igibility and status of the so called "unconscious" is today in question. It is
regarded by those more familiar with the critical literature as a mentalistic an
d pseudopsychological notion. Freud, himself, said about it that the unconscious
is something which we really do not know, but which we are obliged by compellin
g inferences to supply. But the "unconscious" or even the "mind" is not an assum
ption we must make. Wittgenstein (1966:25) wrote: "The picture of people having
subconscious thoughts has a charm. The idea of an underworld, a secret cellar. S
omething hidden, uncanny. cf. Keller's two children putting a live fly in the he
ad of a doll, burying the doll and then running away. (Why do we do this sort of
thing? This is the sort of thing we do do.) A lot of things one is ready to bel
ieve because they are uncanny."
Freud (1960) presents a release type theory. It is also a type of "energy releas
e" theory which was criticized earlier. Such "energy" is a mystical notion. Freu
d's view, put concisely, is that humor is pain changed to pleasure. Supposedly,
in childhood we have few blocks or restrictions to direct expression of pleasure
. We develop painful blocks which must be overcome to achieve such pleasure. A r
eturn to childhood pleasure is required. Freud (1960:170) wrote, "The infantile
is the source of the unconscious and the unconscious thought-processes are none
other than those...produced in early childhood."
When conquered, the "energy" for overcoming the block or repression is supposedl
y "saved," and released in the form of laughter. For Freud, "Laughter arises whe
n the sum total of psychic energy, formerly used for the occupation of certain p
sychic channels, has become unutilizable, so that it can experience absolute dis
charge." (Cooper 1922:77) Put differently, humor involves slipping around and de
ceiving the "superego." It is a bitter pill sugarcoated. Perhaps it is similar t
o the pleasure derived from cessation of great exertion. Freud takes this tidy p
aradigm or metaphorical model of "economy of psychic energy" and applies it as f
ollows: The pleasure of "wit" is the economy of energy expenditure in inhibition
. The pleasure of "humor" is the economy of energy expenditure in feeling. The p
leasure of the "comic" is the economy of energy expenditure in thought.
In comedy, we supposedly observe the superfluous energy of others and we save it
as empathetic observers. We save the clown's excessive expense of energy. Sinki
ng and defeated expectation are given as several other sources of energy release
. The purpose of harmless jokes is to produce pleasure. But otherwise, two purpo
ses given are: a) to relieve aggressiveness, as defense (the hostile joke), and
b) to expose, as with the obscene joke. It is thought that the enjoyment (releas
e) of aggressive humor decreases aggressive tendencies. Since Freud, psychologis
ts have shown that any kind of humor decreases aggression. (e.g. Grotjahn 1970)
The above is a description of "tendency wit." This is wit which gratifies sexual
, aggressive, and other repressed "tendencies." It is like taboo, or value devia
tion humor. Other than "tendency wit" there is "harmless wit," or humor for its
own sake, such as pleasure in nonsense. As with traditional rhetoric, he divides
wit into: a) thought wit and b) word wit. Cicero had made the same distinction.
Freud gives the following techniques of wit:
a) condensation. Examples are Millionarr [German, Millionr plus Narr (fool)]; alc
oholidays; familionr (familir plus Millionr). (Ibid. 19) Two words are brought toge
ther in a concise way. They supposedly tend to show what one really wants to say
, instead of merely what is socially acceptable to say. It is a form of blatant
honesty. This tendency to combine one's actual, though unacceptable thoughts, wo
rks like dream work. In dream work there are fantastic combinations revealing, y
et tending to hide or symbolize one's real fears and desires. Condensation is of
ten regarded as the principle of metaphor. Metaphor is frequently thought of as
"condensed" simile. For Freud, condensation may be more like a "Freudian slip."
Thus far, Freud's view seems to be that humor is an expression of frustration or
a laugh of well-being or relief. But these types of laughter seem to have littl
e to do with humor.
b) word division. Example, "homme roux (red) et sot (fool)" are derived from "Ro
usseau," c) pun, d) ambiguity, e) nonsense which makes sense, f) faulty thinking
, g) automatic errors of thought (cf. stereotype), h) say reverse of what we mea
n (cf. irony), i) omission, j) representation through trifles (cf. sinking), k)
comparison (cf. simile), l) etc.
Menon's (1931) ambivalence theory is an expansion of Freud's model. He maintains
that laughter is a release of surplus energy such as after a fight. It is a con
flict of two impulses and an attitude change thereby releasing energy. Greig, a
neo-Freudian, (1923) also presents an ambivalence theory. He states that if love
behavior is interrupted, energy is brought against the interruption which, if w
eakened or suddenly removed, escapes as laughter. He extends Freud's extravagant
metaphors. He says that smiling is rudimentary sucking; that man chasing a hat
is funny because a hat is an erotic symbol. He sees the hump of Punch, in Punch
and Judy, as a sexual symbol. As typically Freudian, he sees erotic symbols in a
lmost anything.
These conceits, or farfetched metaphors may, however, be translated into more co
ncrete observations about humor. We may leave aside the notions of energy, uncon
scious, id, ego, and superego as entities. But humor may be interpreted as a cha
nge in ambivalence or from expectation, a sudden shift of understanding, or the
shift involved in a practical joke. An outdated and historical Freudianism may b
e translated, in some ways, into some of the types of humor and mechanisms prese
nted in this book. This includes the defense mechanisms. There is some truth and
sense even in these most extravagant metaphors. The problem arises if the Freud
ian theory is taken too literally. (cf. Attardo 1994:187-189) When Greig (1923)
speaks of love behavior, we may relate this to the notion of acceptance which is
a necessary aspect of humor. Thomas Carlyle and Thackeray both (in Douglas 1915
:980, 979) said that the sense of humor is love. In all such metaphors there may
be some degree of insight.
Ziv (1988:129-130) sees Israeli humor as being aggressive and basically a defens
e mechanism. He has an incongruity-relief theory. (1984:96) He gives the followi
ng schema of the functions of humor: 1. aggressive function (superiority), socia
lly acceptable anger/aggression; 2. social function: communication, acceptance,
interaction; 3. sexual: allows one to express repressed desires for sex; 4. defe
nse mechanism: against what is negative (black humor), use of self-deprecation h
umor; 5. intellectual function: escapism, creativity, problem solving.
15. Linguistic Theories of Humor.
Hardly anything in linguistics is important.If the same thing
happens in marine toxicology, we eat poisoned fish. (Pullum 1991:137)
Linguistics, like symbolic logic, has not been able to adequately analyze either
poetry, metaphor or humor. In Graeme Ritchie's web article, "Describing Verball
y Expressed Humour," he supports the linguistic approach, but concludes that the
linguistic and computational general theory approach "is still vague speculatio
n." Some recent articles on the pragmatics of humor are to be found in the bibli
ography. The following reviews by the author exemplify some of the issues in the
linguistic approach to humor.
A. Review of Salvatore Attardo, Linguistic Theories of Humor. (1994) [(S
hibles 1996a)
The book, Linguistic Theories of Humor (Attardo 1994) is actually a survey of va
rious linguistic theories of humor up to 1993. Its strength lies in the scope of
its coverage of linguistic theories, as it includes many publications available
only in foreign languages. It is also important for its extensive bibliography
relevant to linguistic approaches of humor. Although it is not an interdisciplin
ary or in-depth analysis, some critical discussion is presented. The text is cen
tered around the "Semantic Script Theory of Humor" (SSTH) which has already been
presented in various works by Raskin, especially in Semantic Mechanisms of Humo
r (1985). Raskin presented a linguistic incongruity theory of verbal humor which
stresses the switching of context rather than the sentence. He makes the claim
to be able "to account for the meaning of every sentence in every context." (198
5:67) It is also a mentalistic theory in which he speaks of "mental mechanisms."
(p. 49) Humor is said to occur if the following obtains: 1. The text is compati
ble, fully or in part, with two different scripts and 2. The two scripts with wh
ich the text is compatible are opposite in a special sense. (1985:99) Attardo cl
arifies and unifies the various changing versions of Raskin's script theory, and
presents the views of some of its critics.
For the above reasons alone, to read the book is as Attardo might say, a "necess
ary and sufficient condition" for anyone wishing to have a general survey of hum
or from the perspective of linguistics. The book is highly recommended in this r
egard. The author has to this extent clearly enhanced our access to a variety of
linguistic literature on humor. Although a great task was performed in bringing
together the work of many linguistic views of humor, most of them are of dubiou
s value as the author himself shows.
It is important also to mention what the book is not and what it does not do. Th
e following analysis is from the perspective of 1) the methods and conceptual cl
arifications in the philosophy of science, 2) the analysis, adequacy and usefuln
ess of the approaches of the various linguists themselves, 3) techniques of humo
r which may be used as powerful tools of criticism, 4) an adequate, holistic and
interdisciplinary analysis of humor. Theories of humor are often presented with
out humor even though they consist, as Wittgenstein would say, of "disguised jok
es." It will be shown here that much of what is said in the book by and about th
e linguistic approach does not conform to careful scientific analysis and so can
be easily "reduced to absurdity," and is also subject to many of the other form
s of critical insight humor and satire.
This latter task will be performed by showing as well as telling of the techniqu
es involved in humor. In the critique, the following working definition of humor
will be assumed: Humor is produced by the thought that there is a mistake or de
viation, but one which is not perceived as being bad or harmful. This then typic
ally produces laughter and/or good bodily feelings which together constitute the
emotion, humor. And the types of humor may be extensively analyzed and classifi
ed as types of metaphor, including the various types of rhetoric, informal logic
al fallacies and defense mechanisms. The typology of humor therefore includes, f
or example: reduction to absurdity, circularity, satire, taking metaphors litera
lly, irony, metaphor, ambiguity (puns), connotation; analytic and synthetic cont
radiction; incongruity, escape, superiority (defense mechanism), rationalization
; deviation from: desires, familiar, ideal, grammar, pronunciation, style, expec
tation; insight, abstractness (essentialism) fallacy, substitution, synecdoche,
value deviation, etc. These techniques of humor will then be used to analyze the
theories of humor which are presented in Attardo's book. It may be noted that C
icero in De Oratore II (lxi 250-285) also classified humor in terms of the forms
of rhetoric, metaphor and illogic as follows: absurd (farce), allegory, ambigui
ty, antithetical expressions, assumed simplicity, caricature, comparison (resemb
lance), contradiction (opposition), defeated expectation, deviation from spellin
g, equivocation, irony, metaphor, mimicry, narrative, fables, proverbs, mild rid
icule, surprise, understatement, value deviation, words taken literally.
The purpose of the analysis is to provide a positive critique toward putting the
text on a more scientific footing as well as to attempt to show some of the pow
er of analysis which critical insight humor can have. In this regard, Quintilian
stated, "All forms of argument afford equal opportunity for jests." (Institutio
Oratoria VI.iii.65) The humor used here is in no way intended to undermine Atta
rdo's work, but on the contrary to engage the reader in the work, in human dialo
gue and offer criticisms of the various issues so diligently offered up to us by
the various authors mentioned. Ridicule is here regarded as a dysfunctional neg
ative emotion, so that is clearly not intended. Perhaps one of the most notoriou
s examples of a linguist who used humor to critique linguistics is Pullum (1991)
in The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax, and Other Irreverent Essays on the Study o
f Language. But ridicule and insult seem not to be excluded from his account.
1. Deviation from Proper Language Humor. The definition given above of humor as
the thought that there is a mistake but one which is not harmful may be illustra
ted by noting some of the typographical mistakes in Attardo's book: "indetail"*
(1), "occurr"* (75), first word in a sentence begins with a lower case (110), se
ntence ends with ",." (131), "problemsconfronting"* (194), "registe"* for "regis
ter" (238), "is" in place of "in" (314). The author or publisher may not find th
ese mistakes to be humorous (or numerous), but to the reader it may be, as long
as one does not regard them as being bad. And they are okay. A few mistakes of t
his sort are inevitable and need in no way detract from the value of the work it
self. It is amusing to see a sentence end with ",." for a change.
2. Meaningless Meaning. a) "Meaning" is used throughout the text often curiously
disguised in linguistic jargon such as "semantic script" (semantic = meaning);
sme, smeme, lexeme, bundles of semes, classeme, isotopy. These are just words for
units of meaning (64, 65, 74, 81). Greimas states that jokes are "isotopic varia
tions" merely means "variations in meaning." (81) Yet it is ironical that nowher
e do we find "meaning" defined, because Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigat
ions (PI 1968) and others have argued that there are no meanings as such, and th
at they are pseudopsychological notions. It is a form of blatant vice humor to u
se "meaning" or its synonyms now as if they make sense. For example, do words ha
ve meanings, like a person has a suitcase? Can we put meaning in a word like we
put water in a glass-pour it in? The picture of meaning given in the book in thi
s sense becomes humorous.
3. Humor Produced by Mistakes Regarding Ethical Terms. Because humor is an emoti
on involving value terms, one needs to have a clear analysis and definition of v
alue terms before one can give a clear analysis of humor. None is given. In Shib
les (1978, 1994-95) it is argued that, in fact, ethical terms are in themselves
meaningless terms and operate like the function x in algebra or like a blank che
ck. There is, then, no such thing as humor which is good in itself or bad in its
elf. We have first to give an intelligible substitution for these open-context t
erms. Furthermore, humor has to be acceptable and a positive value or it becomes
anger, ridicule, sarcasm and nor humor. It is therefore curious to find Haiman
holding that humor and sarcasm are much alike (236). It is as amusing to argue t
hat love is really hate, or truth is really falsity. (I realize that Nietzsche s
aid "Truth is falsity," but that was done deliberately as an example of oxymoron
insight humor.)
Reduction to absurdity humor is indicated by the following assertions:
a) "For Raskin there is no difference between punning and non-punning humor." (2
17)
b) For Raskin: "All jokes are essentially the same since they are all based on o
ppositions between scripts." (220)
c) "Raskin (1985) takes the argument further by claiming that not only does ling
uistics not account for the differences between good and bad jokes, but that it
cannot in principle do so." (Also blatant vice humor.) And without an analysis o
f ethical terms, we cannot know if linguistics can or cannot deal with it.
4. Metaphor-to-Myth Fallacy Humor. This is also called the fallacy of taking on
e's metaphor literally, or as being the only model. Blatant vice humor often acc
ompanies it. The book is entitled Linguistic Theories of Humor, but, in fact, it
has another agenda-that of showing that the Semantic Script Theory of Humor (SS
TH) is the best linguistic theory of humor. The book could have had this title.
It means that other theories are evaluated from this special perspective. Exampl
es follow:
a) "SSTHis the first (and only) formal, full-fledged application of a coherent th
eory of semantics to humor." (207) Compare to this a statement such as "The Bibl
e is the only truth." SSTH certainly has some insights to offer, and it also has
many shortcomings as well: undefined terms, mentalism, inadequate analysis of e
thical terms, is admittedly not a full-fledged system but merely one linguistics
model, etc. Attardo himself brought the theory into question.
b) Exaggeration (incl. absolutism) humor. Examples: 1) "SSTH is clearly to be pr
eferred." It is the "benchmark for humor research." (332) 2) "Linguistic humor c
an be understood exhaustively only by a general linguistic account of humor." In
a review article, Attardo (1994a:292) had put it even more clearly: "We know we
are good, but we need to show it to others."
c) Expansion of metaphor humor, category-mistake and reductionism. "Script" is r
educed by Raskin to physical science terms like "node." (246) He reduces script
language to a geometrical model of circles within circles and then speaks of scr
ipts in terms of the "distance between circles" and the "topology" relation betw
een scripts. (248, 249) Language and humor become reduced to geometry. It is sta
ted, "The script for GOOD and the script for BAD is 1 unit," and that there are
"long-distance links between scripts." (248) This is also reduction to absurdity
, depersonalization and category-mistake humor.
d) Captivation by a model. It is stated that SSHT is a formal abstract theory wi
th a set of primitives and rules (like a mathematical system)-a rigid, fixed mod
el. It is ironic that one would still use this absolutistic model when, for exam
ple, Wittgenstein rejected early formalistic work on symbolic logic (in his Trac
tatus) in favor of an ordinary-language approach (Philosophical Investigations).
(cf. John Dewey and pragmatists critique of formal theories.)
e) Captivation by a single paradigm: incongruity. (Though it is pointed out that
Raskin who has an incongruity theory, would rather be classified in terms of sc
ript theory.) (49) The typology of humor, all of the various kinds of behavior,
is reduced to a single one: incongruity. In one sense, the term is not really cl
arified or detailed. About this Susan Vogel (1989:19) states, "The overlapping o
f scripts or the incongruous clash...is not sufficient to explain funniness." In
another sense, detailed scripts are given and analyzed. If the types of humor w
ere instead reduced to the kinds of metaphor, all of the traditional and useful
types and devices of rhetoric would be available for classification in terms of
the way language is actually used. The view of "strange making" (from Russian Fo
rmalism) as metaphor, metonymy, decontextualization, parallels, and deformation
are, however, mentioned in passing under the discussion of Italian semiotic theo
ries. (177) The view presented that metaphor involves compatible interpretations
(189) is false in one sense at least. Metaphor is often rather thought to be "l
ogically absurd." It is often a combining of unlike things which may never be co
mpatible, especially for tension metaphors or oxymora, and for humor which is ba
sed on these types.
5. Circular Insight Humor. The following are examples of unintended humor produc
ed by presenting statements which seem to say something, but are actually in a f
undamental way circular. (Admittedly they may have some noncircular meanings as
well.) Humor may be produced by the surprise of finding out that nothing is real
ly being said. Eco points out that "comic" and "humor" are used as separate term
s, but are in fact synonyms. (5) Examples:
a) "Getting the point" of a joke is referred to as "disjunction" (= final soluti
on) (86), "the disambiguation process" which operates in a "linear fashion" on a
"chronological axis" (94), "paralogical logic" (148), "local logic" (148), "pal
eologic" (148), "paretelic logic" (148), "disjunctor" (95), "indicateur" (95), "
script switch trigger." (Raskin) (95)
b) "Linguistic humor can be understood exhaustively only by a general linguistic
account of humor." (334, my underlines)
c) "'What is the essence of a red ball?''Ballness.'" (242) (This is Platonism and
abstractionism fallacy humor.)
d) "A register is identifiable insofar as it opposes itself to another kind of r
egister." (238) Compare: "The leprechaun is identifiable insofar as it opposes i
tself to another kind of leprechaun."
e) "Competence" basically means "having the ability to do something." Thus, to s
ay that we are able to create humor because we have the competence to do so," is
circular. It does not have explanatory value. But Chomsky and Raskin (1, 13, 19
6) use "competence" as if it were a causal explanation. Besides its circularity,
it involves humor based on the genetic fallacy, false cause, argument from igno
rance, irrelevance, fallacy of mentalism, and being simplistic.
Among linguists, "competence" is a controversial term, so it is amusing to read
Attardo's statement: "The reader may safely skip this introductory chapter altog
ether, provided he/she is willing to take this writer's word on a working defini
tion of humor as 'competence.'" (p. 1) (Blatant vice humor) In any case, satisfa
ctory evidence to support the notion of "competence" was not provided in the cha
pter.
Competence is incompetent. It is defined as "something speakers know how to do,
without knowing how and what they know." (p. 1) This definition also applies to
negligence and insanity. This is equivocation (ambiguity) humor regarding "know,
" and is also, in one sense, untrue. Speakers do not have the competence to crea
te many or even most of the types of humor, e.g. circularity humor, oxymora, met
aphor humor, etc., nor are they usually skilled at the types they do use.
Attardo is quite right in not identifying humor with laughter. Thus, "Humor is w
hen you laugh" is not a circular statement. On the other hand, he does define hu
mor in terms of the even more controversial and circular concept, "competence."
f) The joke process is defined as follows: "The text begins by setting a context
, which will be the background of the jokeAn element (disjunctor) then occurs in
the text which can cause a passage from the sense reconstructed thus far in the
joke to a second opposite sense. This element occurs at the end of the text, a p
osition which is the location of the rheme of the last sentence of the text." (1
07)
In one sense, this says little more than that the joke has a beginning, middle a
nd end. That is, to tell a joke, one must begin at the beginning, proceed to the
middle and finish at the end. That is all there is to it. That it is said to in
volve sense opposition is not circular, but then it is not necessarily true eith
er.
g) "Either an object passes a test or it fails." (242) (This is also an either-o
r fallacy.) Presumably, this is unlike Alice in Wonderland where "Everybody has
won, and all must have prizes."
6. Fallacious Definitions of Humor.
a) In discussing Script-based theories, one of the most amusing definitions is:
"A script is an organized chunk of information about something." (198) Seeming t
o say something this statement says practically nothing and, in addition, uses t
he humorous colloquial style of the value term "chunk" in a formal context. It s
eems like a child's request to the Library of Congress: "Please send me anything
about anything."
Although it should be obvious that humor is produced by more than oppositions an
d incongruity, gradually the "necessary and sufficient essentialistic" definitio
n of these terms has been expanded to include more and more concepts such as act
ual-nonactual, normal-abnormal, etc. (204 ff.) "Opposition" is not a scientific
term unless further clarified. There is typically a limited perspective and redu
ctionism with binary operations. This was Nietzsche's point about "Truth is fals
ity."
b) Essentialist fallacy. (Dogmatism and abstractionism.) "Platonism" refers to t
he view that words just have abstract essentialistic meanings in themselves, tha
t there are really such things out there (reification) as Number in itself, Trut
h in itself, Meaning in itself, Ideas in themselves, Mind in itself, and even Wo
rd in itself. Most philosophers, but especially John Dewey and Wittgenstein, hav
e at least theoretically (but curiously often not in practice) rejected such ess
entialism as being unacceptable and unscientific. One form essentialism takes is
the quest for absolute certainty, for literal definitions which have absolute n
ecessary and sufficient conditions. On the ordinary language view, to the contra
ry, to define is to take a model or metaphor (perspective, hypothesis, paradigm,
prototype, diagram, etc.) Accordingly, it is unacceptable to say as Escarpet do
es, that humor is indefinable. (30) There are no essential, fixed definitions. S
o it is amusing to find Attardo actually claiming to be an essentialist and to r
equire necessary and sufficient conditions for definitions and humor. It is espe
cially curious because he even cites Wittgenstein's opposition to such essential
ism, but does not seem to see that it applies to his own position. (243):
1) Essence means necessary and sufficient conditions. (2, 49, 242)
2) "The theory must promote the necessary and sufficient conditions that a text
must meet for the text to be funny." (198)
3) Having trouble defining "polythetic contexts," as anyone would, he speaks of
such humorous possibilities as "motherese" (241), but reduces it to absurdity by
noting that we do not also speak of "Uncle-ese." (241)
4) "At least one common feature exists in all object members of a class." (244)
Compare this with a sentence like: "Glue and people are members of the same clas
s because they are things, or because they contain water."
5) Essentialism reduced to absurdity: "It is pointed out [on the basis of resear
ch] that penguins are regarded as the worst examples of birds." That is, Attardo
is not sure if we can therefore really consider penguins as birds because he is
in search of absolute essentialistic classes-Birdness in itself.
6) "Humor is caused by incongruity due toregister." But the meaning of "register"
is found to be so vague and controversial as to be empty. "Register" seems to m
erely mean "context." Attardo himself says that "register" is an elusive concept
. (236) Some linguists, then, first raise the dust and then claim they cannot se
e. The statement may only mean "incongruity in a context." What would incongruit
y without a context be? An especially amusing definition by Halliday is quoted:
"A register is a cluster of associated features having a greater than randomtende
ncy to co-occur; and like a dialect, it can be identified at any delicacy of foc
us." Who said linguistics do not have poetic flares? For a scientist the last ph
rase, "delicacy of focus," would be especially curious (cf. metaphor humor).
Comparable to that of the word "being," the range of different meanings of "regi
ster" is vast: domain, province, role, social situation, activity, formality, la
nguage of instructions, recipes, subject matter, technical language, range of ap
propriateness, journalese, sports registry, language of one's social role, etc.
(237-238) Thus, Attardo calls the definition of "register" "fuzzy" (241) thereby
creating value deviation humor, the "fuzzy register."
7) Abstractionism humor. Such simple notions as "topic" or "a common thread of d
iscourse" becomes for the linguist, for example: The repetition of semes which d
o not have to be lexematized on the surface and the hearer will use for his/her
knowledge of the world and all available implicatures and presuppositions from t
he text to determine isotopy! (81, 86)
8) In a discussion of Greimas' structuralist approach to humor, "isotopy" is def
ined as: linear, narrative, function, disjunction, and semantic interpretation o
f the text. (60 ff.) Then it is stated, "Almost immediately after the publicatio
n of Smantique structurale, Greimas and his associates began presenting different
definitions of the notion of isotopy." (76) (Deviation from ideal, defeated exp
ectation, hopeless, irony, mistake, reversal, self-deprecation humor)
The definition of "isotopy" got more and more vague until it meant merely an "in
teraction of linguistic elements," which exemplifies reduction to absurdity humo
r. Eco calls "isotopy" an "umbrella term." (86)
9) Morin is said to introduce "narrative function" without defining it. (85)
7. A War: Phonology vs. Phonetics? As perhaps most linguists are phonemicists or
phonologists, if not something else, they would be very happy to keep it a deep
secret that there is actually a bloody semi-intellectual battle going on betwee
n phonemicists/phonologsts and the following: some non-phonemicists, phonetician
s, foreign language teachers and ESL teachers. In the book, phonetics and phonol
ogy are presented as if there were no controversy and no problem at all with the
concept of the phoneme. It is sweep it under the rug. The phoneme is typically
defined mentalistically as "a minimal meaningful bundle of sound features." But
it is no more clear than the notion of meaning itself-another controversial term
in linguistics. We need an acceptable definition of both "meaning" and "phoneme
," and basically none is given here. Phonemes are classes of sounds not symbols
for specific sounds as are the IPA phonetic symbols. Phonemes are rather ideal,
theoretical, abstractions. The humorous result is that phonemes cannot even be p
ronounced. Phonemics concerns itself with universal, abstract laws and principle
s, whereas phonetics is about the actual sounds themselves. It is ironic that to
learn the pronunciation of a language one should not look at a book on phonemic
s or phonology of a language. We would have to find one on the phonetics of the
language-although one will find very few. Thus, for example, the statement that
a homophone is two phonemes with the same pronunciation (11) is incorrect. Phone
mes cannot be pronounced. As the typical linguist is probably by this time givin
g a negative evaluation of these statements which seem to attack his/her very li
fe work, thereby not being amused, perhaps a few quotes, not mentioned by Attard
o, are in order (they may then be immediately dismissed upon reading): a) Foley
(1977:3) states, "Transformational phonetics [phonemics] is vitiated by philosop
hical errorsThe philosophy of scienceis fundamentally erroneous." b) "The phoneme
theory seems to us to have nothing interesting to offer. Indeed it has done a lo
t more harm than good." (Kelly & Local 1989:6) They claim that phonemics dispara
ges phonetics. (Ibid. p. 1) c) "Phonemes do not actually exist: They are theoret
ical constructs." (Standwell 1991:139) d) "Phonology isuseless as a tool for lang
uage pedagogy." (Hammerly 1991:173; cf. Shibles "The Phonetics vs. Phonemics Con
troversy," and Phonetics of the World's Languages: A Reference Guide, forthcomin
g)
The lack of concern for phonetics often shown by linguists is exemplifie
d by the incorrect phonetics given (by Pepicello & Green) in the book: "a wafer"
is given as [weyfr] (131), whereas the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) phone
tics would be [ei.wei.f]. "Twenty-three" Attardo gives as [twentiTri] (151), inst
ead of [twEn.ti.Ti]. In a review article of Sobkowiak's book on metaphonology, Att
ardo (1994a:297) is quite correct in stating that IPA symbols were not but shoul
d have been used. The use of schwa here is also questionable. (cf. Shibles "The
Phantom Schwa: A Pseudo Symbol" 1994d.)
As a result of the linguist's concern for universals and abstraction, few exampl
es of either phonetics or humor are given (excepting, of course, quantitative st
atistical analyses). In a book of 426 pages only about 118 examples of humor are
given. When jokes are given, they are not original and some seem to be less hum
orous than the text itself. For example, Q. "How many surrealists does it take t
o screw in a light bulb?" A. "Fish." (272) It is used to illustrate nonsense, bu
t surrealism is, after all, not nonsense, but at best a genuine and profound met
aphorical insight-giving perspective not to be demeaned. I would therefore have
preferred a reply such as "As many as wished to climb in?"
Attardo points out that Greimas gives examples, but that the latter claims no va
lidity for them! (blatant vice and contradiction humor)
8. Adequacy or Holism vs. "Trivial Details." Attardo wrote, "Redfern and Nashare
very pleasant readingUnfortunately, they lack a theoretical approach and their ge
neralizations are weak, noncommittal, and often miss the significant issues and
pursue trivial details." (192, my underlines) An interesting comment, "Interesti
ng, but trivial." I am reminded of the similar statement, "Interesting, but not
very informative." I hope no one says this about Attardo's book. But this does r
aise an interesting question about adequacy.
Attardo's own view is a limited perspective, and not interdisciplinary or holist
ic as he sometimes suggests that it is. He admits however: "The linguistic and s
emiotic program are reductionistic and essentialistic." (Also blatant vice and t
ake metaphor literally humor.) Something so relevant and significant as emotion,
which also constitutes to a large extent what is meant by style (cf. 231), is n
ot defined or accounted for by the authors presented. Linguists have not been ab
le to account for emotion or metaphor. Do they even exist? (Ambiguity of referen
t humor) The author notes that linguists have largely confined their research to
(deal only with) puns or incongruity, a phonemic or similar analysis, or a curr
ent fashionable theory which is limited in scope. Suprasegmentals are usually ig
nored. The only poetry allowed is the prose of the linguist which is, thought to
be literal.
On the other hand, some linguists are beginning to break out of the emotionless
quantitative mathematics-like model of language toward a more holistic account b
y their increased consideration of larger contexts (Ch. 10), pragmatics, convers
ational implicatures; script theory which is concerned with structures larger th
an that of the sentence; etc. (180)
Clearly, just to state that "Any humorous text will contain an element of incong
ruity and an element of resolution" (144) will not generate an adequate typology
of humor. But Attardo does mention some who present more holistic positions suc
h as that of Lakoff. He might have also included the book by Lakoff & Turner (19
89) with its holistic title, More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Meta
phor. The subtitle, of course, makes it sound respectably scientific.
Also, Dorfles is mentioned in passing as one who speaks of the "strange-making"
function of language (176). This would apply to humor, by the way, as well as to
metaphor. Attardo might have also cited Dorfles' work on metaphor, e.g. L' este
tica del mito da Vico a Wittgenstein (1967), according to which metaphor is part
ially cognitive and emotive constituting our life and world. Humor would not be
merely "strange-making" for Dorfles. Until linguists and the rest of us can deal
more holistically with language and humor, it will remain strange.
In summary, yet uncertain if this is or is not a punch line or "script switch,"
Attardo's Linguistic Theories of Humor is not only a welcome contribution to lin
guistic humor research, but in the ways mentioned, amusing as well. And another
book by him is on the way. It will be entitled, "A General Theory of Humor."
B. Review of Neal Norrick, Conversational Joking. (1993) (Shibles 1996b)
Neal Norrick, a professor of English linguistics, who counts as his interests pr
agmatics and semantics, has previously written on intertextuality, frame theory
and "bisociation," presumably from the work of Koestler (The Act of Creation 196
1). He presents here an account of joking from the perspective of contemporary d
iscourse analysis, and more specifically on the model of conversation analysis.
The terms, definitions and methods used to describe conversations are thus used
to describe joking. "An account of joking will be a fundamental part of any comp
lete description of conversation" (1). A critique of his book is then a critique
of both conversation terminology as well as joking.
1. The Conversation Model: Levels and Stereotypy
If "conversation" is to be the fundamental model of interpretation, an adequate
definition of "conversation" would be expected, but none is forthcoming. It is n
ot clear what "conversation" is to include or exclude. We could approach it from
the viewpoint of the various disciplines: psychology, philosophy, anthropology,
linguistics, semantics, pragmatics, phonetics, literary theory, etc. This book
does not take these various points of view or the view of a critical philosophic
al analysis. Norrick opts for a sociological viewpoint (2) while seeming to pres
ent an interdisciplinary analysis. His conclusions must then be limited to the m
ore restricted domain mentioned here.
The meaning and scope of a sociological analysis are assumed and its methods and
theories are not actually employed. Thus, the basic term "conversation" in not
clearly circumscribed and cannot as such serve as a scientific concept upon whic
h to base an analysis.
The fundamental approach is to put language into a context-though which context
is not so clear. Whereas a more full contextual analysis of humor might be antic
ipated, only the context of conversation is given. This involves noting the role
of joking regarding 1) language games: turn taking, intruding, parting, greetin
g, closing, questioning, bridging uncomfortable gaps, "winding down the conversa
tion" (27), encouragement, warning, politeness, etc.; 2) intentions of the speak
er, e.g. to relieve embarrassment, save face; 3) theoretical commentary: strateg
y, interactional aggression, overstatement, functions of conversation, social co
ntrol function, metalinguistics (jokes regarding the language itself), joke tell
ing technique, audience reception, etc.
The author often confuses these levels. For example, the technique of questionin
g is not the same as intending to question, or having wonder, or questioning as
a scientist questions a strategy. When one asks a question one may have no inten
t or knowledge of using questioning as a strategy. One may, for example, use it
because of prior learning or habit, and even do it when it would be bad strategy
. Similarly, one may joke without being aware that it is a joke, just tell the j
oke, tell a joke to fulfill a certain purpose. We cannot simply say that the pur
pose of a joke is to accomplish a set purpose without knowing the actual intenti
on of the speaker. Nor, similarly, can we claim that the speaker intends to acco
mplish a certain conversational purpose unless we know that it was so intended.
On the third level, we may describe what we think the intention of the joke is a
nd what conversational function it may have even if neither were intended by the
speaker. These levels are often run together by the author. That is, if I make
a joke, I am not thereby necessarily "engaging in conversational strategy."
The juxtaposition of such levels can create humor as in the following: Question:
"Why did you ask about Wittgenstein's notion of meaning being mentalistic?" Ans
wer: "To keep the conversation going." Or one could have answered, "Because I li
ke your accent." Norrick states, "The whole interchange thrives on attempts to m
ake others laugh." (28) How do we know the precise intent of each speaker? Would
anyone have the intent of merely making someone else have laughter-any kind of
laughter? Would laughing gas do as well?
To ascribe fictive intentions in this way is to stereotype, and such conversatio
nal terms can thereby create a false stereotypic typology. A joke may rather hav
e an unlimited number of possible uses, and for each person we must have evidenc
e as to which use was selected. This is an intentional fallacy. This calls into
question the main point of the book that "Joking fulfills many 'serious' functio
ns in conversation." This is from the theoretical level #3, but may not be inten
ded (level #2). The language game played (level #1) must also be assessed. We ma
y find that a greeting is really an intrusion or insult.
"Joking ushers in a play frame." (133) What is this? Does one need a frame when
one plays? Does this mean that when I joke I open it up or wish to open it up fo
r others to joke as well, as the author asserts? Perhaps one only intends to mon
opolize the conversation. "The uttering of any joke makes any other joke topical
ly relevant" (42), is not necessarily true and is an all statement fallacy.
The number of possible uses, intentions and purposes a joke may have is endless,
just as each word uttered may have unlimited meanings depending upon its intona
tion. The number of uses narrows down when we find the actual intent and use of
the joke. To avoid the use of conversational model terms stereotypically, descri
ption of actual motivation and self-talk is needed. We need to know what people
actually intend when joking.
"Laughterserves as a move toward closure." (40) There are numerous statements lik
e this which are or border on being teleological fallacies. That is, it is like
saying that the purpose of laughter is to move toward closure (or to conform to
the terms of the conversational model). It may, but need not be so. He says, for
example, that banter aims at entertainment, not topical talk. (29)
In addition to the many possible intonations and uses there seems to be an infin
ite number of language game descriptions. The author himself rightly states that
humor has multiple functions (43). Thus, the uses and games can extend to every
possible verb and description available in the language. No map is given here t
o help delimit these possible uses and language games. The same action can be em
barrassing, mauling, showing affection, being polite, engaging in local customs,
etc. We cannot say that just one of these games is being played, unless we can
establish the case. Certainly there are vast contexts available other than, or e
ven instead of the conversational ones. What would be preferred in analyzing the
function of jokes is a careful, critical interdisciplinary analysis. A conversa
tional analysis is acceptable if it is seen to be only a perspectival model or m
etaphor, not the actual description. Such statements then as "Joking does x in c
onversation," or "Joking has the function x," are unacceptable. We cannot say wh
at the conversational joke really does.
One would not, therefore, make such statements as: a) "Conversationalists use jo
king to negotiate the introduction of a new arrival" (29), or b) "A joke calls f
or laughter immediately upon its completion." (43)
For the above reasons and reasons given later, the following claims are also sus
pect: "This investigationrevealedwordplay interaction not previously treated in re
search on humor" (80), and "No one has ever illustrated any of the relevant proc
esses until now." (129)
As a result of the above, the typology and pragmatics lacks adequate basis. The
author, however, having an interest and some expertise in poetics, might have sh
own how rhetoric and metaphor can be used to form a classification of humor. "Al
l forms of argument [and tropes] afford equal opportunity for jests." (Quintilia
n Institute Oratoria VI.iii.65)
2. Theories of Emotion and Humor
Theories of humor and humor as an emotion, are not presented, but nevertheless m
ust of necessity be implied. "Joking" is used in the title and mainly throughout
the book, instead of "humor," presumably to keep the issue focused on the "conv
ersational" level. In this sense, the book is technically not about humor at all
. Without having a theory of emotion and humor, problems inevitably arise, such
as the following:
1) joking (humor?) is often falsely identified with laughter: "Conversationalist
s may place laughter in certain positions so as to arrange their talk." (41) (Do
we tell a joke to arrange our conversation?) "Laughterindicates genuine amusemen
t." (42) "Laughterserves as a move toward closure." (40) "Joking and laughter are
linked as two parts of an adjacency pair." (23)
2) On the rational-emotive or cognitive theory of emotion, emotions are due to c
ognitive value assessments which then cause bodily feelings. This opposes the th
eory that emotions are just released-like steam. The author, however, appears to
opt for the steam theory in holding a covert catharsis-release view. "It may he
lp us let off steam and relieve tension which might find less salubrious express
ion otherwise." (133)
3) Due to the lack of a theory of humor-ridicule, sarcasm and mocking are treate
d throughout the book as forms of humor. They are not. Humor may be defined as t
he assessment of a mistake or deviation which is accepted as not being harmful.
For there to be humor there must be acceptance and positive emotion. (cf. Shible
s Humor 1978) He states, "Puns rank quite high on the scale of aggression." (60,
cf. 25-37, 42, 44, 73-81, 132-135) On his view, joking has the social control f
unction of keeping people in line (130)-presumably possibly involving nagging, r
idicule, intimidation, mocking, etc. He himself calls some comments "facetious"
(29), and notes that joking involves "laughing at" those who do not speak like w
e do, e.g. dialect or foreign language speakers (130). This is not humor, but ri
dicule which does not conform to the definition of humor which I have proposed.
One should not be ridiculed for speaking a dialect or a foreign language. Most a
ll speakers of English around the world have an accent or speak a dialect. On th
e other hand, the author senses that something is not quite right with treating
ridicule as humor, for he says, "Jokes hardly count as real aggression" (133), t
hough he does not state why. It may be suggested here that if the ridicule (incl
uding sarcasm, mocking, etc.) is treated as being nonserious and accepted, it ma
y be regarded as humor. Sarcasm as sarcasm, and ridicule as ridicule, can never
be humor as a matter of definition. On this view, of course, virtually anything
even horror and tragedy can be humorous if it is regarded as being nonserious (o
r distanced) as in tragicomedy. As humor, tragedies are not tragic, horror stori
es are not horrible, and battles are not belligerent.
4) Puns are treated as forms of aggression and as being the lowest form of jokin
g:
"Puns count as frivolous and superficial." (60)
"Wordplaycarries little or no weight as personal experience." (59)
"Punningtypes are aggressive." (80)
"Punning disrupts." (23) [It may rather enhance. He even cites such a case (31).
]
Without a theory of humor it is understandable that one cannot develop a theory
of good or bad humor and cannot determine if puns can be important or not. Puns
can, however, give insight and there can be excellent puns. James Joyce's Finneg
an's Wake consists of innumerable puns. Consider, for example, the lines of the
poet Dylan Thomas: "The poles are kissing as they cross." The poles of the cruci
fix are meeting and crossing at the same time. This gives the insight that the c
ross is a kind of double-cross of religion and life, a cruel situation for peopl
e to be in. Religion may also be spoken of as the "loophole" of rationality, pla
ying on the notion of "tax loophole" which typically favors religion.
Puns can give insight and be important. It is enlightening to note that the aest
hetician, Scruton, holds that art is inscrutable, and that John Dewey's pragmati
sm stresses doing. Sherzer is cited here for his view that puns are aggressive (
24, 105. etc.), and in German Scherz means "joke, tease, wisecrack." Hanslick, a
n Austrian writer on the aesthetics of music plays with language in: "Die Musik
ist ein Spiel aber keine Spielerei. "[Music is a play (playing, game, game of ch
ance, performance, involvement, interchange, playing of music), but no playing a
round (pastime, hobby, fiddling around).] (Vom Musikalisch-Schnen: Aufstze Musikkr
itiken. 1982:144) The ambiguity is used to try to support his arguments for obje
ctive formalism.
Pun is a form of ambiguity humor. What seems true is taken as false. On this vie
w, the reader cannot overlook the dedication of the book: "For Corinna because s
he never had one before." This could refer to a number of things ambiguously: A
dedication? That one did not have a dedication before is no special reason for o
ne to have one now. If it were a flattering dedication, one would not stress tha
t it is only one's first. One looks for something more, perhaps a peak sexual ex
perience, impressive enough to warrant the dedication of a book. Perhaps it mean
s a "sense of humor" which she never had before-though which this book does not
deal with. One may also try to imagine who Corinna might be. But we can close th
e possibly endless analysis of the ambiguity here-perhaps the author is just try
ing to keep the conversation coming.
3. Conversational Phonetics
Norrick does not use IPA phonetic symbols, preferring standard orthograp
hy and contractions such as "hafta," which he also negatively evaluates as "care
less speech." (11) He redefines the usual symbols as follows: (.) = falling into
nation, (,) = level, (?) = final rise, italics = stress, [ ] = simultaneous spee
ch, double quotes = a nonregular production of speech such as parody. (11-12) Pa
uses are noted in seconds, e.g. (2.0) = two seconds pause, e.g. "Hello (2.0), Ji
m!" There is no mention of theories of intonation or related problems of symboli
sm. His system may be confusion-producing and inadequate, but the symbols for in
tonation on the 1993 IPA chart are also awkward and rather unusable-I have never
seen them in use. Intonation is admittedly a notoriously difficult thing to rec
ord. My own system uses numeral superscripts, e.g. low-high-low = [232] abbrevia
ted as [ $] with bold numerals being used for tone languages.
Because IPA sound symbols are not used , one would never know how a single word
the author presents is to be pronounced. Given the importance of intonation for
meaning, this is a significant shortcoming in the description of conversations.
Thus, the dialogues given look and "sound" like the following one which is recor
ded by Norrick (29):
"Vera: He He.
Andy: Huh huh huh.
Vera: Yea [he he]
Teddy: [Ha ha] ha heh heh.
Vera: He ha ha ha ha ha ha
Teddy: Huh he he"
This may be compared with the following conversation given by Merkle (Ba
irische Grammatik, 1975:194), but Merkle gives the meaning of each utterance. As
with Norrick's example the phonetics should have been given in IPA symbolism. F
or example, "m-m" might be IPA [/m./m].

Bavarian Meaning in Standard German
Max: Fahsd mid? Fhrst du mit?
Marie: M-m. O nein.
Max: H? Wie bitte?
Marie: N)) Nein.
Max: Ach fahr doch mit!
Marie: - Nein nein.
Max: Gh! Sei doch nicht so.
4. Summary
The author has shown some of the uses of joking from the perspective of discours
e analysis terms used to describe conversations. It is concluded that "Joking wo
rks to present a personality, to test for shared attitudes, to identify a common
code for our interaction, and generally to keep the conversation moving along."
(129) His limited approach does not allow him to analyze humor, determine what
the difference is between good and bad humor, or to develop humanistic or insigh
t humor. He deals with conversational joking as he sees it rather than as how it
might be understood or improved. The major positive attributes of the book are
that it deals with ordinary language and that it emphasizes the context aspect o
f the joke. He states, "Joking fulfills many 'serious' functions in conversation
." (128)
16. Theories of Humor exemplified by Type:
In the following, several of the types of humor are presented along with one or
more theories of humor which mention that type:
Abstractionism Humor. Schopenhauer states that humor is to wrongly subsume under
the abstract. (cf. Stewart 1967:11ff.) "The cause of laughter in every case is
simply the sudden perception of the incongruity between concept and the real [or
perceived] objects." (1958:Book I, 13) The sensuous and particular is seen as in
congruous with abstract knowledge. Humor is said to arise from the unexpected re
lief of intellectual strain, or victory of sense perception over abstract, obscu
re thinking. Humor is the escape from the too intellectual.
Acceptance. A fundamental distinction may be given between theories which are ba
sed on humor as acceptance versus those based on aggression. I have argued that
the latter do not generate humor. The required acceptance aspect has been referr
ed to in various ways from love (Carlyle) to an attitude of mirth, or play. Berg
er (1997:4), for example, states that humor needs a "Play frame." A number of ot
her such views were mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Seward (1930) sa
ys that for humor there must be incongruity plus playfulness, a "happy sense of
irresponsibility." (32) Thurber's definition of humor as chaos remembered in tra
nquility is based on the acceptance which comes from time, distance and calmness
.
Aesthetic Humor. (See aesthetic humor section and introduction above.) As stated
above, We have approached an analysis of humor as an emotion which may be clari
fied by means of an assessment theory of emotion. Humor may be seen as an aesthe
tic emotion or form of beauty. D. H. Monro (1967) wrote that humor is "a special
kind of aesthetic emotion." The aesthetic as an emotion and how art expresses e
motions has been analyzed in the book, Emotion in Aesthetics. (Shibles1995b) Aes
thetic humor may similarly be analyzed. Just as we may speak of humanistic art,
we may speak of humanistic, aesthetic humor. Wells (1997:56) on Japanese humor s
peaks of omoshiroi which refers to the aesthetic quality of humor and ingenuity.
Roger Scruton (in Morreall 1987:156-171) thinks humor is the enjoyment of the o
bject for its own sake, an aesthetic enjoyment rather than to reveal knowledge o
r discover. That it is "for its own sake" an abstractionist fallacy. There is no
meaning to such a phrase. Furthermore, others, e.g. Raskin (in Ruch 1998:95-108
) think that there is a deep truth in all humor.
Category Mistake. Bergson's theory of stereotypes is also a theory of category m
istakes. This theory overlaps with contradiction, incongruity and other types of
humor. Berger (1997) says humor is based on mixing styles. He also mentions: al
lusion to indiscretion, the inept wins, inflated language, sinking, eccentricity
, exposed privacy, naming (e.g. John Butterfingers).
Circularity Humor. Basically never mentioned.
Conceit Humor. Mentioned as incongruity or exaggeration, but not usually taken n
otice of in connection with humor. (See John Locke below) Gracin (1642) and Tesau
ro (1968/1654) in work on the conceit mentioned its use as humor.
Connotation Humor. Rarely or not mentioned at all. John Locke spoke of associati
ons of ideas even on a slight basis of resemblance. Humor is based partly on une
xpected resemblance.
Context Deviation Humor. Koestler (1964) sees humor as combining things from two
incompatible contexts. Monro (1963) argued that all humor involves a mixing of
different universes of discourse. One thing is regarded as another (cf. metaphor
). The incongruity gives us delight in the new and an escape, just as does metap
hor. Context deviation may also be thought of as category-mistake. The latter is
a fallacy discussed extensively in the philosophical criticisms by Gilbert Ryle
(1949) and Wittgenstein (1968). For Schopenhauer humor is based on the subsumpt
ion of a phenomenon under a heterogeneous concept: "The cause of laughter in eve
ry case is simply the sudden perception of incongruity between a concept and the
real objects which have been thought through it." (1819:I, 76) For Bergson (191
1), humor results from stereotyped and inelastic behavior in an inappropriate co
ntext.
Contradiction and Incongruity Humor.
Wherever there is contradiction, the comical is present. (Kierkegaard in Morreal
l 1987:83)
Wit is the clash and reconcilement of incongruities, the meeting of extremes rou
nd a corner.
(Leigh Hunt, Table Talk 1851, in Stevenson 1948:2543)
Schopenhauer mentions the incongruity between the sensuous and the abstract. Koe
stler says humor relates incompatible contexts. Jean Paul Richter (1813, cf. Ste
wart 1967:102) regards humor as the relation of seemingly unlike things. There i
s supposedly a deception which is then resolved. Hazlitt (cf. Stewart 1967:139;
Morreall 1987:68) wrote: "The essence of the laughable, then, is the incongruous
, the disconnecting one idea from the other, or the jostling of one feeling agai
nst another." Humor is a sudden, unexpected "painless contradiction" between the
way things are and the way they ought to be. Baudelaire speaks of a contradicto
ry collision of infinite misery with infinite grandeur. This view may be combine
d with his view of metaphor according to which everything corresponds to everyth
ing else. (1923-1952, MB:40) Edgeworth (1803) said that "Irish Bull humor" is a
sudden apparent congruity in real incongruity. The Irish Bull as it is commonly
used seems in fact to include other types of humor as well. Among others who men
tion incongruity are Bergson, George Campbell, Carlyle, Michael Clark (1987), Co
leridge, Darwin, Eastman, Emerson, Goethe, David Hartley, Hunt, Schaeffer (1981)
, and Schlegel.
In more recent research, Morreall (1983:58, cf. 1983ab, 1985, 1987) states, "Lau
ghter is an expression of pleasure at a psychological shift." Perhaps recognizin
g that laughter is not the same as humor he later revised this definition to: "H
umor always involves the enjoyment of a perceptual or imagined incongruity." (19
87:135, cf. Ziv & Diem 1987) It is based on surprise or incongruity, and may be
an affective shift. Whereas "emotion" is almost always assumed and undefined by
philosophers and others, Morreall refers to the theory of emotion used: Jerome S
haffer's (1983) definition of emotion which is a version of the cognitive-emotiv
e theory. For Morreall, incongruity is said to be involved in all humor. (1983:1
9) His view is also like that presented in this book to the extent that humor is
an assessment which is not taken seriously. He states, "The situationis not dist
urbing to us.We enjoy the incongruity." (1987:195) Kierkegaard regarded humor as
painless contradiction. (Lippitt 2000) The comic is incongruity which then leads
us to a new way of seeing, a new religious existence, supposedly. The serious a
nd speculative philosophers are seen as comic in comparison with one's actual ex
perience. "The more completely one exists, the more he will discover the comic."
(Lippitt 2000:46) The religious person "is one who has found the comic on the g
reatest scale." It is humor which brings hope. Christianity was thus thought to
be the most humorous view of life in world history. (cf. Ch. 10, Humor about Rel
igion)
For Hegel, comedy is the triumph over one's contradictions. One rises superior t
o one's own contradictions. Hegel's philosophical model is to synthesize thesis
and antithesis. (Stewart 1967:109ff.) The model applied to humor becomes: "An in
finite geniality and confidence capable of rising superior to its own contradict
ion, and experiencing therein no taint of bitterness or sense of misfortune what
ever." It is "an expression of self-satisfied shrewdness." (1920:iv:302) We triu
mph over contradiction and ruined purpose. The contradictory contrasts are maste
red and resolved. Horvay Barnes (1978) holds a similar dialectic theory that the
humorous assertion is first seen as a thesis, then in terms of an antithesis (o
r contradiction as in the literal falsity of metaphor), and then there is a reso
lution into a synthesis. This seems to be also the way metaphor works. Beardsley
's (1958, 1962) logical absurdity theory of metaphor, discussed earlier, could b
e similarly used to develop a logical absurdity theory of humor. Lippitt (2000:7
) does suggest this when he writes of "humour that depends upon incongruity oper
ating in the same way as metaphor." Adam Schaff (Dziemidok 1033;33) sees humor a
s a struggle of oppositions and of mutually exclusive emotions such as altruism
vs. egoism. It is a Marxist view.
Leacock (1938) stressed the positive assessment needed for incongruity humor to
work. Humor is regarded as the essence of human kindness: "the kindly contemplat
ion of the incongruities of life and the artistic expression thereof." (3) Humor
can develop and progress so as to refine our character. (18)
Pirandello (1960) regards humor as the feeling of the opposite. It is a dismantl
ing, disruptive tool by means of which to unmask society, but cautions against b
eing indignant. (31, 134, 145)
Linguistic script theories are largely based on incongruity and opposition. By "
shift" is meant, for example, between actual-nonactual, impossible-possible, goo
d-bad, high value-low value, joke mode-truth mode, life-death, etc. A switch is
triggered from one incongruous script to another. Raskin advances over logicians
by opposing the reduction of statements to mere truth values (T/F). He realizes
ordinary language cannot be reduced to logic and that truth is not even essenti
al to meaning. (1998:100-103) Mulkay (1988) similarly regards humor as a sudden
shift of two incongruous frames. Jokes first create a reality, then undermine it
.
Plessner (1970), adopting a European phenomenological approach, states,"Only tho
se boundary conditions excite laughter which, without being threatening, are nev
ertheless unanswerable, so that the person is prevented from becoming their mast
er and doing anything with them." (111) This deviates from the theories which re
quire resolution. For Plessner, a contrariety confuses us and because we cannot
resolve it, our body takes over and we laugh. In this sense, "he himself doesn't
laugh; there is laughter in him." (116) [Es lacht in ihm.]
One type of congruity is Beardsley's (1962) logical absurdity theory.
Defeated Expectation Humor. "The most common kind of joke is that in which we ex
pect one thing and another is said." (Cicero "On the Orator" 1942, Book I, Ch. 6
3) Eastman (1936) speaks of "practical humor" as a snatching away of meaning. Da
rwin mentions exciting surprise. Hazlitt (1819) wrote that humor is due to the e
xperience of surprise or contrast arising before one can reconcile the discrepan
cy between appearance and reality. Perhaps the most significant adherent of the
defeated expectation theory is (Kant !990:190; 1951:177) who wrote: "Laughter is
an affection arising from the sudden transformation of a strained expectation i
nto nothing" [Das Lachen ist ein Affekt aus der pltzlichen Verwandlung einer gesp
annten Erwartung in nichts.] (cf. Monro 1963:Ch. 3, Morreall 1987:45ff.) Dziemid
ok (1993:17) rightly points out that such can happen without producing humor, e.
g. when one expects a high grade, but gets a low one. Furthermore this cannot ac
count for all humor. Pascal also has a defeated expectation theory.
Deviation from the Ideal Humor. Plato's philosophy consists of contrasting an id
eal world with the imperfect everyday world that we know. The deviation from the
ideal may serve as a source of humor. Humor is based on ignorance of oneself (i
gnorance humor), seeing others as they fail to see themselves (dramatic irony),
revealing faults where there are pretended virtues (hypocrisy). Plato also has a
superiority theory of humor. Moses Mendelsohn (Stewart 1967:Ch. 2) similarly st
ates that laughter originates in a contrast between perfection and imperfection.
The work, Don Quixote, by Cervantes relates romantic idealism to realism, the i
deal world of the outdated codes of chivalry to the real world. The reduction of
the ideal to the real also produces sinking humor. Feibleman (1972), a neoplato
nist, regards all humor as being based on deviation from the ideal. All humor is
satire as it criticizes the deviation from the ideal. Thus, there is a contrast
between: ideal vs. real (cf. Jean Paul), actual vs. possible, complete vs. inco
mplete, perfect vs. imperfect, world as it ought to be vs. world as it is, macro
cosm vs. microcosm, universal vs. concrete.
Lessing (1959) said that the ridiculous requires a contrast between perfections
and imperfections. Schopenhauer (1958) spoke of humor as the incongruity between
the norm and the imperfect. Hazlitt (1819) wrote, "Man is the only animal that
is struck with the difference between what things are, and what they ought to be
."
Deviation from Purpose Humor. Hegel mentions that comedy derives from the triump
h over the defeat of one's purposes.
Escape or Release Humor. "Something offensive in an inoffensive manner." (Cicero
On the Orator 1942, Book I, Ch. 58) Freud's mentalistic and metaphorical versio
n of release humor was discussed earlier. Schopenhauer's version is that humor r
esults from the escape from oppressive reason. There is a vital, sudden joy of p
leasure derived from release from the constraints of reason. McDougall believes
there is an instinctual mechanism which converts pain into pleasure. It is a kin
d of release. Laughter helps avoid pain. It seems to be a kind of defense mechan
ism. Similarly, Eastman (1936:41) treats humor as an unpleasantness or frustrati
on taken pleasantly. He wrote: "A jokeis composed of unpleasant experiences playf
ully enjoyed." This is like Kant's view of humor as strained expectation come to
nothing. This is also similar to and possibly based on Plato's view, according
to which the ludicrous is a mixture of pain of malice with the pleasure of super
iority at observing a harmless ignorance in others (Philebus). Fry (1957) and Mi
ndess (1971) also have release theories. Mindess regards humor as a freedom or e
scape from conformity, morality, inhibitions, reason, language, naivete, serious
ness, etc. Thus, to laugh is to be liberated from such things. He stresses the u
se of humor as a way of gaining insight. D. Berlyne, Viktor Frankl (1963:68-69)
see humor as necessary detachment in order to allow for survival. We can thereby
rise above the otherwise intolerable situation. The escape from the self also l
eads to altruism. Another form of release theory is relief theory. Gregory (1924
:200) holds that humor is a sudden and surprising interruption by the release of
effort regarding a negative event. It is incongruous relief. It turns the negat
ive into the positive and so humanizes and develops sympathy.
On Latta's theory (1999) we go from an aroused state to a cognitive shift of int
erpretation to a new state which nullifies the first stage, thereby causing rapi
d pleasurable, relaxation through laughter. An example is given: one prepares to
jump a brook, recognizes failure, then laughs at landing in the water. But this
could produce anger instead of humor. The theory does not account for the accep
tance needed. Secondly, laughter is not the same as humor. Thirdly, the kinds of
shift are not accounted for. Fourthly, relaxation is not necessary for humor-of
ten just the reverse. Fifthly, his definitions are circular: "The mark by which
a humorous context is identified as such is the laughter of humor," and ""Someth
ing is funny...only if one finds oneself or others laughing...in that...way whic
h is characteristic of humor." (59) It is a shifty theory. Nevertheless, one may
agree with his statements that neither one or all of the following are necessar
y for humor: aggression, the unexpected, surprise, superiority.
Illogic Humor. Kant's (1951:181) view is that the logic in seeming illogic produ
ces a defeated expectation giving rise to laughter. His logical absurdity theory
is: '"Humor', in the good sense, means the talent for being able voluntarily to
put oneself into a certain mental disposition, in which everything is judged qu
ite differently from the ordinary method (reversed, in fact), and yet in accorda
nce with certain rational principles in such a frame of mind." The psychologist,
Jerry Suls (1972) presents a similar view in his two stage model for the apprec
iation of jokes. Stage 1 is defeated expectation (or incongruity). Stage 2 is th
e resolution of the incongruous parts. A needed explanation or resolution of the
punch line is required for there to be humor. This is the sort of view Beardsle
y presented in his explanation of metaphor. It appears to derive from Kant's ana
lysis of humor.
Incongruity. See contradiction and incongruity above.
Insight Humor. "Humor is superior to religion...in its hospitality toward the co
ntinual arrivals of truth. It is a more congenial companion of science. Humor is
the most philosophic of all the emotion." (Eastman (1936:25)
Take Literally Humor. Bergson states that we erroneously fix our attention on th
e physical aspects of metaphor. This is similar to asserting that humor is produ
ced by taking metaphors literally. Clark (1970) holds that every object of humor
is incongruous.
Metaphor Humor. Discussed extensively earlier. Several additional views are as f
ollows. Metaphor is mentioned and central in Freudian theory. Samuel Johnson (19
25, in MB:149) defines wit in the way that metaphor has often been defined. He w
rote, "Wit may be considered a combination of dissimilar images, or discovery of
occult resemblances in things apparently unlike." Eastman (1972) spoke of "poet
ic humor" which is picture humor, comic sight, or any joke which vividly arouses
the imagination. Hobbes (1840) notes the intellectual pleasure of metaphor and
striking juxtapositions.
Mixed Theories. Most theories are mixed theories. The classifications are given
here on the basis of where the greater emphasis is. Freud, for example, stresses
aggression, but actually has a mixed theory. . Berger (1997), says humor is bas
ed on various things: mixing styles, allusion to indiscretion, the inept wins, i
nflated language, sinking, eccentricity, exposed privacy, naming, etc.
Nonsense or Absurdity Humor. See logical absurdity theory under illogic humor. E
astman believes that pointless humor is best. He calls it "pure humor."
Paradox Humor. Schopenhauer (1958:Book I, 13) states, "All laughter is occasioned
by a paradox."
Perceptual Humor. The perceptual aspect of metaphor is imagery. John Locke (1690
:Book ii, Ch. 11, 2) wrote, "Wit lying mostly in the assemblage of ideas, and put
ting them together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resembla
nce or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in
the fancy." What Eastman called "poetic humor" is also imagistic or perceptual h
umor.
Reversal. Apter (1987, 2001) has what he calls a Reversal Theory. It seems to be
rather an arousal, contradiction theory. The reversal only involves going from
one opposite to another. The reversal is bringing together (synergy) a nongoal d
irected state (paratelic, good) with a goal directed, serious state (telic). Hum
or, then, like metaphor, is an identity of opposites. The unexpected synergy, go
ing from A to not-A, the escape from logic causes humor. Opposites are: sacred-p
rofane, superior-inferior, poor-rich, intellectual-unintellectual (clown), human
s-animals (machines, depersonalization), man-woman, adult-child.
Ridicule and Superiority. "Laughter always arises from the gaiety of disposition
, absolutely incompatible with contempt and indignation." (Voltaire) Ridicule is
not regarded here as genuine humor although Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics Book
IV) said, "A joke is a kind of abuse, and Wit is cultured insolence." (Book ii,
Ch. 12, 16) Plato's view that humor deviates from the ideal is more a creation of
ridicule than humor. Bergson's theory and superiority theories also seem to str
ess a nonacceptance, and so are not humor. The Japanese usually reject ridicule
as humor. (Wells 1997) For Freud, humor is basically an expression of hostility.
In one form or another a number of writers, including Plato and Hobbes, hold th
e superiority theory. The theory stresses ridicule of others, or laughing at oth
ers. In a sense, it is a moral theory asserting, in effect, "I'm better than you
are." Baudelaire held a superiority theory but he defined superior as the delig
ht of humans over such things as the ideal/nature, the grotesque, fallen humanit
y, ignorance, and misery. In a sense this is like saying humor is due to a mista
ke or deviation. Rapp (1951) combines aggression, ridicule and superiority in hi
s theory. Humor is a kind of ridicule plus love.
Superiority can refer to a number of things: the sublime feeling of metaphor, su
dden self-esteem due to seeing another's inferiority, superior to false logic, f
eelings of security, satisfaction of having solved a problem, feeling of well-be
ing after a narrow escape, etc. In any case, the superiority theory only account
s for certain feelings of well-being, not humor as we have earlier defined it. H
obbes wrote that laughter is: "nothing else but sudden glory arising from a sudd
en conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of
others, or with our own formerly." He says that the laughter is at the defects
of others. His claim that laughter is "nothing else but sudden glory" is certain
ly untrue. And it is not clear that superiority alone will produce humor--it may
produce conceit. Dziemidok (1993:10) points out that superiority does not have
anything to do with the comical. It fails to account for the other types of humo
r and seems to largely describe the laughter of ridicule and not humor at all. C
riticizing the superiority theory, Huizinga (1970) says, "The genuine seeker aft
er truth sets little store by triumphing over a rival." Stendahl follows Hobbes,
but adds that no strong emotions can be present. (Dziemidok (1993:12) We may su
ggest that this may be interpreted to mean that no negative emotions are present
. Groos (in Dziemidok 1993:41-43) has a superiority theory combined with deviati
on from the norm. Humor always involves an absurdity (Verkehrtheit), a victim an
d a resulting emotion of superiority. Dziemidok (1993:42) objects that no notion
of superiority is needed to account for humor here.
Self-Deprecation. Deconstructionism is a special form of this. Lvi Strauss holds
that humor is a sudden short-circuiting of the connection between two semantic f
ields. Symbolic activity reconstructs it. This could almost serve also a definit
ion of metaphor. By so doing the self, society, the self-righteous, etc. are dis
mantled. We deconstruct ourselves and our society.
Sinking Humor. Spencer (1892) says we expect something important, but something
minor happens instead. When we realize fear is inappropriate, we laugh. It combi
nes with a release theory. Alexander Bain (1865) speaks of degradation of the su
blime to the low, the serious to the unserious, but without strong emotions (i.e
. presumably without negative emotions). Bergson also mentions the reduction of
the solemn to the familiar.
Stereotype Humor. Bergson's theory (1900) is based on compulsive, rigid, and ina
ppropriate, stereotype humor. Objects of laughter for him are also clumsiness, a
bsentmindedness, puns, automatism, vices. Of special concern is that people be v
ital human beings, yet they ludicrously act as machines or automatons (le mchaniq
ue vs. le vivant). Basically it is to treat a person as a thing. Thus, humor mai
nly involves clumsiness, rigid behavior, automaticism, vices and compulsions. It
is a tragicomedy to watch soldiers marching robot-like in a straight line. The
incongruity results in laughter. Bergson's stereotype humor becomes personificat
ion or dehumanization humor. Basically, his theory of humor is merely an extensi
on of his philosophical metaphor of vitalism and intuition as opposed to reason.
It also seems closer to ridicule than to humor. Whatever does not cohere with h
is philosophical vitalism is ridiculed. Bergson also gives five classes of word
humor: fixedly saying you will do something you do not intend to do, divert atte
ntion from the moral (or metaphor) to the physical (or literal), invert words or
reversal, pun, sinking.
Value Deviation. Alfred Stern (1949), a Bergsonian, speaks of humor as a degrada
tion of or deviation from values. Roger Scruton (1983) thinks humor devalues the
object in the subject's eyes and creates an "attentive demolition."






Return to Table of Contents
or continue to Chapter 9 on
Feminist and Wonen's Theories of Humor.