LABREL | CASE DIGEST | ART 284

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ARTICLE 284
9. VICENTE SY, TRINIDAD PAULINO, 6BS TRUCKING
CORPORATION, and SBT TRUCKING CORPORATION vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and JAIME SAHOT
KEYWORDS: trucking business, painful thigh, illegally dismissed, no
medical certificate
PONENTE: QUISUMBING, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination- An employer may
terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be
suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is
prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as the health of
his co-employees.
However, in order to validly terminate employment on this ground,
Book VI, Rule I, Section 8 of the Omnibus Implementing Rules of the
Labor Code requires:
Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal- Where the employee
suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by
law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees,
the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a
certification by competent public health authority that the disease is of
such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period
of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease
or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not
terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave.
The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position
immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.
FACTS:
Private respondent Jaime Sahot has continuously served as truck
driver (initially a truck helper) for 36 years in the trucking business of
petitioners. In April 1994, Sahot was already 59 years old and had
been incurring absences as he was suffering from various ailments.
Particularly causing him pain was his left thigh, which greatly affected
the performance of his task as a driver. He inquired about his medical
and retirement benefits with the Social Security System (SSS) on
April 25, 1994, but discovered that his premium payments had not
been remitted by his employer. Sahot had filed a week-long leave
sometime in May 1994, and was subsequently medically examined
and treated for EOR, presleyopia, hypertensive retinopathy, UTI,
Osteoarthritis and heart enlargement.
.
On said grounds, Belen
Paulino of the SBT Trucking Service management told him to file a
formal request for extension of his leave. At the end of his week-long
absence, Sahot applied for extension of his leave for the whole month
of June, 1994. It was at this time when petitioners allegedly
threatened to terminate his employment should he refuse to go back
to work. At this point, Sahot found himself in a dilemmafacing
dismissal if he refused to work, then the inability to retire on pension
since petitioners never paid his correct SSS premiums. However,
effective June 30, 1994, petitioners dismissed him from work. Sahot
complained for illegal dismissal before the labor arbiter, praying for
the recovery of separation pay and attorneys fees against petitioners.
Petitioners Contention: Petitioners contend that private respondent
was not illegally dismissed as a driver because he was in fact
petitioners industrial partner. They further claimed that sometime
prior to June 1, 1994, Sahot went on leave and was not able to report
for work for almost seven days. On June 1, 1994, Sahot asked
permission to extend his leave of absence until June 30, 1994 but
never reported back to work nor did he file an extension of his leave.
Instead, he filed the complaint for illegal dismissal against the
trucking company and its owners. Petitioners added that due to
Sahots refusal to work after the expiration of his authorized leave of
absence, he should be deemed to have voluntarily resigned from
his work. They contended that Sahot had all the time to extend his
leave or at least inform petitioners of his health condition.
Respondents Contention: He denied ever being an industrial
partner of petitioners. There was no written agreement, no proof that
he received a share in petitioners profits, nor was there anything to
show he had any participation with respect to the running of the
business.
LA: Ther was no illegal dismissal in Sahots case since private
respondent had failed to report to work. Moreover, petitioners and
private respondent were industrial partners. It ordered petitioners to
pay "financial assistance to Sahot.
NLRC: Declared that private respondent was an employee, not an
industrial partner, since the start. Private respondent Sahot did not
abandon his job but his employment was terminated on account of
his illness, pursuant to Article 284
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of the Labor Code.
CA: It held that private respondent was indeed an employee of
petitioners since 1958. It also increased the amount of separation pay
awarded to private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid dismissal of private
respondent.
RULING OF THE SC:
NO. It is worthy to note that respondent is engaged in the trucking
business where physical strength is of utmost requirement.
Complainant started working with respondent as truck helper at age
twenty-three (23), then as truck driver since 1965. Complainant was
already fifty-nine (59) when the complaint was filed and suffering from
various illness triggered by his work and age. In termination cases,
the burden is upon the employer to show by substantial evidence that
the termination was for lawful cause and validly made. Article 277(b)
of the Labor Code puts the burden of proving that the dismissal of an
employee was for a valid or authorized cause on the employer,
without distinction whether the employer admits or does not admit the
dismissal. For an employees dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal
must be for a valid cause and (b) the employee must be afforded due
process.
Article 284 of the Labor Code authorizes an employer to terminate an
employee on the ground of disease, viz:
Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination- An
employer may terminate the services of an employee who
has been found to be suffering from any disease and
whose continued employment is prohibited by law or
prejudicial to his health as well as the health of his co-
employees.
However, in order to validly terminate employment on this ground,
Book VI, Rule I, Section 8 of the Omnibus Implementing Rules of the
Labor Code requires:
Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal- Where the
employee suffers from a disease and his continued
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his
health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer
shall not terminate his employment unless there is a
certification by competent public health authority that the
disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot
be cured within a period of six (6) months even with
proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be
cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate
the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave.
The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former
position immediately upon the restoration of his normal
health.
As this Court stated in Triple Eight integrated Services, Inc. vs.
NLRC, the requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of
the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would
sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of
the gravity or extent of the employees illness and thus defeat the
LABREL | CASE DIGEST | ART 284
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public policy in the protection of labor. In the case at bar, the
employer clearly did not comply with the medical certificate
requirement before Sahots dismissal was effected. In the absence of
the required certification by a competent public health authority, this
Court has repeatedly ruled against the validity of the employees
dismissal.
In addition, we must likewise determine if the procedural aspect of
due process had been complied with by the employer. From the
records, it clearly appears that procedural due process was not
observed in the separation of private respondent by the management
of the trucking company. The employer is required to furnish an
employee with two written notices before the latter is dismissed: (1)
the notice to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is sought, which is the equivalent of a charge;
and (2) the notice informing the employee of his dismissal, to be
issued after the employee has been given reasonable opportunity to
answer and to be heard on his defense. These, the petitioners
failed to do, even only for record purposes. What management did
was to threaten the employee with dismissal, then actually implement
the threat when the occasion presented itself because of private
respondents painful left thigh.
All told, both the substantive and procedural aspects of due process
were violated. Clearly, therefore, Sahots dismissal is tainted with
invalidity. #MAQUILING
UNION MOTOR CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and ALEJANDRO A. ETIS
[G.R. No. 159738. December 9, 2004]

FACTS:
On October 23, 1993, the respondent was hired by the petitioner as
an automotive mechanic at the service department in the latters
Paco Branch. In 1994, he was transferred to the Caloocan City
Branch, where his latest monthly salary was P6,330.00. During his
employment, he was awarded the Top Technician for the month of
May in 1995 and Technician of the Year (1995). He also became a
member of the Exclusive P40,000.00 Club and received the Model
Employee Award in the same year.

On September 22, 1997, the respondent made a phone call to Rosita
dela Cruz, the company nurse, and informed her that he had to take a
sick leave as he had a painful and unbearable toothache. The next
day, he again phoned Dela Cruz and told her that he could not report
for work because he still had to consult a doctor. Finding that the
respondents ailment was due to a tooth inflammation, the doctor
referred him to a dentist for further management.[2] Dr. Rodolfo
Pamor, a dentist, then scheduled the respondents tooth extraction on
September 27, 1997, hoping that, by that time, the inflammation
would have subsided. Upon instructions from the management, Mr.
Dumagan, a company security guard, visited the respondent in his
house on September 24, 1997 and confirmed that the latter was ill.

On September 27, 1997, Dr. Pamor rescheduled the respondents
tooth extraction on October 4, 1997 because the inflammation had
not yet subsided and recommended that he rest. Thus, the
respondent was not able to report for work due to the painful and
unbearable toothache.

On October 2, 1997, the petitioner issued an Inter Office
Memorandum[3] through Angelo B. Nicolas, the manager of its
Human Resources Department, terminating the services of the
respondent for having incurred more than five (5) consecutive
absences without proper notification. The petitioner considered the
consecutive absences of the respondent as abandonment of office
under Section 6.1.1, Article III of the Company Rules.

On October 4, 1997, Dr. Pamor successfully extracted the
respondents tooth. As soon as he had recovered, the respondent
reported for work, but was denied entry into the companys
premises. He was also informed that his employment had already
been terminated. The respondent sought help from the union which,
in turn, included his grievance in the arbitration before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Pending the resolution
thereof, the respondent wrote to the petitioner asking for the
reconsideration of his dismissal,[4] which was denied. Sometime
thereafter, the unions complaints were dismissed by the NCMB.

Left with no other recourse, the respondent filed, on May 18, 1999, a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the arbitration branch of the
NLRC against the petitioner and/or Benito Cua.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that the respondents failure to report for work
for ten (10) days without an approved leave of absence was
equivalent to gross neglect of duty, and that his claim that he had
been absent due to severe toothache leading to a tooth extraction
was unsubstantiated. The Labor Arbiter stressed that unnotarized
medical certificates were self-serving and had no probative weight.

The NLRC upheld the claim of the respondent that his successive
absences due to severe toothache were known to management. It
ruled that the medical certificates issued by the doctor and dentist
who attended to the respondent substantiated the latters medical
problem. It also declared that the lack of notarization of the said
certificates was not a valid justification for their rejection as
evidence. The NLRC declared that the respondents absence for ten
(10) consecutive days could not be classified as gross and habitual
neglect of duty under Article 282 of the Labor Code.

The CA concluded that since the respondents absences were
substantiated, the petitioners termination of his employment was
without legal and factual basis. The CA similarly pointed out that even
if the ten-day absence of the respondent was unauthorized, the same
was not equivalent to gross and habitual neglect of duty. The CA
took into consideration the respondents unblemished service, from
1993 up to the time of his dismissal, and the latters proven
dedication to his job evidenced by no less than the following awards:
Top Technician of the Year (1995), Member of the Exclusive
P40,000.00 Club, and Model Employee of the Year (1995).


ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the ca committed a reversible error in giving much
evidentiary weight to the medical certificates submitted by the private
respondent;
2) Whether or not the LA committed a reversible error in ruling that
private respondent was illegally dismissed

RULING:
The contention of the petitioner has no merit.

We note that the company rules do not require that the notice of an
employees absence and the reasons therefor be in writing and for
such notice to be given to any specific office and/or employee of the
petitioner. Hence, the notice may be verbal; it is enough then that an
officer or employee of the petitioner, competent and responsible
enough to receive such notice for and in behalf of the petitioner, was
informed of such absence and the corresponding reason.

The evidence on record shows that the respondent informed the
petitioner of his illness through the company nurse. The security
guard who was dispatched by the petitioner to verify the information
received by the company nurse, confirmed the respondents
illness. We find and so hold that the respondent complied with the
requisite of giving notice of his illness and the reason for his
absences to the petitioner.
Regrettably, the Labor Arbiter a quo clearly failed to appreciate
complainants pieces of evidence. Nowhere in our jurisprudence
requires that all medical certificates be notarized to be accepted as a
valid evidence. In this case, there is [neither] difficulty nor an
obstacle to claim that the medical certificates presented by
complainant are genuine and authentic. Indeed, the physician and the
dentist who examined the complainant, aside from their respective
letterheads, had written their respective license numbers below their
names and signatures. These facts have not been impugned nor
rebutted by respondent-appellee throughout the proceedings of his
case. Common sense dictates that an ordinary worker does not need
to have these medical certificates to be notarized for proper
presentation to his company to prove his ailment; hence, the Labor
Arbiter a quo, in cognizance with the liberality and the appreciation on
the rules on evidence, must not negate the acceptance of these
medical certificates as valid pieces of evidence.

Dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an
employee. Thus, it must be based on just cause and must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence.[22] To effect a valid
dismissal, the law requires not only that there be just and valid cause
LABREL | CASE DIGEST | ART 284
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for termination; it, likewise, enjoins the employer to afford the
employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.[23]
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for the
termination of employment by the employer:

ART. 282.
TERMINATION BY
EMPLOYER

An employer may
terminate an
employment for any of
the following causes:

(a) Serious
misconduct or willful
disobedience by the
employee of the lawful
orders of his employer
or representative in
connection with his
work;

(b) Gross and
habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties.

To warrant removal from service, the negligence should not merely
be gross but also habitual. Gross negligence implies a want or
absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire
absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exerting any effort to avoid them. The petitioner has not
sufficiently shown that the respondent had willfully disobeyed the
company rules and regulation. The petitioner also failed to prove that
the respondent abandoned his job. The bare fact that the respondent
incurred excusable and unavoidable absences does not amount to an
abandonment of his employment.

The petitioners claim of gross and habitual neglect of duty pales in
comparison to the respondents unblemished record. The respondent
did not incur any intermittent absences. His only recorded absence
was the consecutive ten-day unauthorized absence, albeit due to
painful and unbearable toothache. The petitioners claim that the
respondent had manifested poor work attitude was belied by its own
recognition of the respondents dedication to his job as evidenced by
the latters awards: Top Technician of the Year (1995), Member of the
Exclusive P40,000.00 Club, and Model Employee of the Year (1995).