Atty. Renato Lazaro Bondal (respondent) stands charged in a complaint
[1] filed by Jayne Y. Yu (complainant) for gross negligence and violation of Canon 16 [2] and Rule 16.03 [3] of the Code of Professional Responsibility arising from his alleged failure to attend to the five cases she referred to him and to return, despite demand, the amount of P51,716.54 she has paid him. In the Retainer Agreement [5] dated March 30, 2000, complainant agreed to pay respondent the amount of P200,000.00 as Acceptance Fee for the five cases, with an Appearance Fee of P1,500.00 pesos per hearing; and in the event that damages are recovered, she would pay respondent 10% thereof as success fee. Complainant later issued two checks in the amount of P30,000.00 and P21,716.54, respectively. Despite receipt of above-said amounts, respondent failed to file a case against Swire Realty and Development Corp; [7] due to respondents negligence, the case for estafa against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon was dismissed; [8] respondent negligently failed to inform complainant, before she left for abroad, to leave the necessary documents for purposes of the preliminary investigation of the case filed against Julie Teh which case was eventually dismissed; [9] and respondent compelled her to settle the two cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against Mona Lisa San Juan and Elizabeth Chan Ong under unfair and unreasonable terms. [10]
Complainant thus demanded from respondent, by letter [11] of June 14, 2001, for the return of all the records she had entrusted him bearing on the subject cases. Respondent did return but only the records bearing on the estafa case against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon and the B.P. Blg. 22 case against Mona Lisa San Juan. Complainant also demanded the refund of the amounts covered by the above-said two BPI Family Bank Checks amounting to P51,716.54 As respondent failed and continues to refuse to comply with complainants valid demands in evident bad faith and to her prejudice, she filed the present complaint charging him with flagrant violation of Canon 16 and Canon 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Issue : Whether or not respondent should return the money paid by the complainant.
Held: the only payment given to complainant by respondent is the amount of P51,716.54, then complainant still owes respondent more, as respondent rendered his legal services in 4 out of the 5 cases. An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer to get paid for his efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation. That complainant was dissatisfied with the outcome of the four cases does not render void the above retainer agreement for respondent appears to have represented the interest of complainant. Litigants need to be reminded that lawyers are not demi-gods or magicians who can always win their cases for their clients no matter the utter lack of merit of the same or how passionate the litigants may feel about their cause. [37] WHEREFORE, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent is, however, hereby directed to RETURN all the records in his possession relative to the cases he handled for complainant.
Artiaga vs. Villanueva
Before the Court for resolution is respondent Atty. Enrique C. Villanuevas Motion for Leave of Court for Respondent to File Motion for Clarification dated January 9, 2002 of the Resolution of the Court dated July 7, 1989, and said Motion for Clarification. Despite the pendency before the Court of the complaint for disbarment filed against respondent, he was appointed on February 9, 1987 as the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna. On August 11, 1988, respondent received a telegraphic transfer from the Secretary of Justice advising him to go on leave pending the outcome of the administrative complaint. Respondent complied with the directive of the Secretary of Justice and went on leave. On July 29, 1988, the Court rendered judgment against the respondent ordering his indefinite suspension from the practice of law from date of notice thereof until such time that he can demonstrate to the court that he has rehabilitated himself and deserved to resume the practice of law. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court and on July 7,1989, the Court issued a Resolution granting the motion of respondent and lifting respondents indefinite suspension from the practice of law. Respondent forthwith resumed the performance of his duties as Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna.
upon his retirement from the service, respondent was not paid his basic salaries during the period of his leave from August 11, 1988 to July 1989. On November 22, 2001, respondent sent a letter to the court Administrator requesting for a clarification as to whether or not, under the Resolution of the Court dated July 11, 1989, he was exonerated from the charges filed against him. On December 4, 2001, the Court Administrator replied to the letter of respondent that he had no jurisdiction to interpret or render an opinion on decisions or resolutions of the Court. Issue: whether or not under the Resolution of the Court dated July 11, 1989, he was exonerated from the charges lodged against him so as to entitle him to his back salaries and other emoluments during the period of his forced leave.
Held: the Court hereby declares that its Resolution dated July 7, 1989 granting the respondents motion for reconsideration and lifting respondents indefinite suspension from the practice of law did not exonerate him from the charges of engaging in unethical acts in the practice of his profession, but merely shortened the penalty of suspension meted on him under the Decision of the Court dated July 29, 1988. Accordingly, respondent is not entitled to back salaries and other emoluments corresponding to the period of his suspension.
Martelino vs. alejandro
This case presents another aspect of the court-martial proceedings against the petitioner, Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul Latif Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the officers and men under him, for violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor.
It appears that at the hearing on August 12, 1969 the petitioner Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the general court-martial, following the latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. The petitioner contended that the case had received such an amount of publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was being exploited for political purposes in connection with the presidential election on November 11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the challenge.
Issue: Whether or not the trial conducted was partial.
Held: the spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. even granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the suspension of the court-martial proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned.
In re Sycip
FACTS:
This is a consolidated petition. The first one filed by the surviving partners of atty. Alexander Sycip and the otherfiled by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ovaepa. They pray that they be allowed to continue using thenames of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners based their petitions on the following arguments:
Art. 1840 of the Civil Code,
in regulating other professions, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without anyrestriction as to the use of the name of a deceased partner,
the Canons of Professional Ethics allows the continued use of a deceased partner when permissible bylocal custom.
ISSUE:
W/N law firms may continue to use the names o deceased partners in their firm names
HELD:
NO!
Art. 1840 primarily deals with the exception of liability on cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individualproperty of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person who continues the business using thepartnership name. what the law contemplates is a hold over situation preparatory to formal reorganization. Art.1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than a professional partnershipwhose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members.
A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or forbusiness. a partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is not a partnership formed for thenpurpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property. Thus, assumed or trade name in law practice isimproper. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege orfranchise.
It must be considered that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceasedpartners name. Therefore, the cited provision on Canons of Professional Ethics is not applicable.
Perma-Line Corporation of America v. Sign Pictorial and Display Union, Local 230, International Brotherhood Ofpainters and Allied Trades, Afl-Cio, 639 F.2d 890, 2d Cir. (1981)