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Yu vs Bondal

Atty. Renato Lazaro Bondal (respondent) stands charged in a complaint


[1]
filed by Jayne Y.
Yu (complainant) for gross negligence and violation of Canon 16
[2]
and Rule 16.03
[3]
of the Code
of Professional Responsibility arising from his alleged failure to attend to the five cases she
referred to him and to return, despite demand, the amount of P51,716.54 she has paid him. In
the Retainer Agreement
[5]
dated March 30, 2000, complainant agreed to pay respondent the
amount of P200,000.00 as Acceptance Fee for the five cases, with an Appearance Fee
of P1,500.00 pesos per hearing; and in the event that damages are recovered, she would pay
respondent 10% thereof as success fee. Complainant later issued two checks in the amount
of P30,000.00 and P21,716.54, respectively. Despite receipt of above-said amounts,
respondent failed to file a case against Swire Realty and Development Corp;
[7]
due to
respondents negligence, the case for estafa against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon was
dismissed;
[8]
respondent negligently failed to inform complainant, before she left for abroad, to
leave the necessary documents for purposes of the preliminary investigation of the case filed
against Julie Teh which case was eventually dismissed;
[9]
and respondent compelled her to
settle the two cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against Mona Lisa San Juan and Elizabeth
Chan Ong under unfair and unreasonable terms.
[10]

Complainant thus demanded from respondent, by letter
[11]
of June 14, 2001, for the return
of all the records she had entrusted him bearing on the subject cases.
Respondent did return but only the records bearing on the estafa case against Lourdes
Fresnoza Boon and the B.P. Blg. 22 case against Mona Lisa San Juan.
Complainant also demanded the refund of the amounts covered by the above-said two BPI
Family Bank Checks amounting to P51,716.54
As respondent failed and continues to refuse to comply with complainants valid demands in
evident bad faith and to her prejudice, she filed the present complaint charging him with flagrant
violation of Canon 16 and Canon 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Issue : Whether or not respondent should return the money paid by the complainant.

Held: the only payment given to complainant by respondent is the amount of P51,716.54,
then complainant still owes respondent more, as respondent rendered his legal services in 4 out
of the 5 cases. An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an absolute fee arrangement
which entitles a lawyer to get paid for his efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation. That
complainant was dissatisfied with the outcome of the four cases does not render void the above
retainer agreement for respondent appears to have represented the interest of complainant.
Litigants need to be reminded that lawyers are not demi-gods or magicians who can always
win their cases for their clients no matter the utter lack of merit of the same or how passionate
the litigants may feel about their cause.
[37]
WHEREFORE, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
Respondent is, however, hereby directed to RETURN all the records in his possession relative
to the cases he handled for complainant.




Artiaga vs. Villanueva

Before the Court for resolution is respondent Atty. Enrique C. Villanuevas Motion for Leave of
Court for Respondent to File Motion for Clarification dated January 9, 2002 of the Resolution of
the Court dated July 7, 1989, and said Motion for Clarification.
Despite the pendency before the Court of the complaint for disbarment filed against
respondent, he was appointed on February 9, 1987 as the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna.
On August 11, 1988, respondent received a telegraphic transfer from the Secretary of
Justice advising him to go on leave pending the outcome of the administrative complaint.
Respondent complied with the directive of the Secretary of Justice and went on leave.
On July 29, 1988, the Court rendered judgment against the respondent ordering his
indefinite suspension from the practice of law from date of notice thereof until such time that he
can demonstrate to the court that he has rehabilitated himself and deserved to resume the
practice of law.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court and on July
7,1989, the Court issued a Resolution granting the motion of respondent and lifting respondents
indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
Respondent forthwith resumed the performance of his duties as Provincial Prosecutor of
Laguna.

upon his retirement from the service, respondent was not paid his basic salaries during the
period of his leave from August 11, 1988 to July 1989. On November 22, 2001, respondent sent
a letter to the court Administrator requesting for a clarification as to whether or not, under the
Resolution of the Court dated July 11, 1989, he was exonerated from the charges filed against
him. On December 4, 2001, the Court Administrator replied to the letter of respondent that he
had no jurisdiction to interpret or render an opinion on decisions or resolutions of the Court.
Issue: whether or not under the Resolution of the Court dated July 11, 1989, he was exonerated
from the charges lodged against him so as to entitle him to his back salaries and other
emoluments during the period of his forced leave.

Held: the Court hereby declares that its Resolution dated July 7, 1989 granting the respondents
motion for reconsideration and lifting respondents indefinite suspension from the practice of law
did not exonerate him from the charges of engaging in unethical acts in the practice of his
profession, but merely shortened the penalty of suspension meted on him under the Decision of
the Court dated July 29, 1988. Accordingly, respondent is not entitled to back salaries and other
emoluments corresponding to the period of his suspension.

Martelino vs. alejandro

This case presents another aspect of the court-martial
proceedings against the petitioner, Major Eduardo Martelino,
alias Abdul Latif Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and the officers and men under him, for violation of
the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a result of the alleged
shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then
undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor.

It appears that at the hearing on August 12, 1969 the petitioner
Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the
general court-martial, following the latter's admission that he
read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. The
petitioner contended that the case had received such an
amount of publicity in the press and other news media and in
fact was being exploited for political purposes in connection
with the presidential election on November 11, 1969 as to
imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military
court denied the challenge.

Issue: Whether or not the trial conducted was partial.

Held: the spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus
on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of
the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of
Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it
was not of the petitioners but of the Government. even
granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity,
since the petitioners here do not contend that the respondents
have been unduly influenced but simply that they might be by
the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the suspension of the
court-martial proceedings has accomplished the purpose
sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by postponing
the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned.

In re Sycip

FACTS:

This is a consolidated petition. The first one filed by the surviving partners of atty. Alexander
Sycip and the otherfiled by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ovaepa. They pray that they
be allowed to continue using thenames of partners who had passed away.

Petitioners based their petitions on the following arguments:

Art. 1840 of the Civil Code,

in regulating other professions, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names
without anyrestriction as to the use of the name of a deceased partner,

the Canons of Professional Ethics allows the continued use of a deceased partner when
permissible bylocal custom.

ISSUE:

W/N law firms may continue to use the names o deceased partners in their firm names

HELD:

NO!

Art. 1840 primarily deals with the exception of liability on cases of a dissolved partnership, of the
individualproperty of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person who continues the
business using thepartnership name. what the law contemplates is a hold over situation
preparatory to formal reorganization. Art.1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a
good will to protect rather than a professional partnershipwhose reputation depends on the
personal qualifications of its individual members.

A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or forbusiness. a partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is not
a partnership formed for thenpurpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding
property. Thus, assumed or trade name in law practice isimproper. The right to practice law is
not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege orfranchise.

It must be considered that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued
use of a deceasedpartners name. Therefore, the cited provision on Canons of Professional
Ethics is not applicable.

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