Polcase

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL,
Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
Petitioner,

- versus -

THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO
ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL
ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE
MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON,
ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO
RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO,
JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI,
VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE
GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ,
AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO
SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL
ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B.
PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL
ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE
GUZMAN,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

FIDELITO DIZON,
Petitioner,

- versus -

Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

GERARDA H. VILLA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 151258

G.R. No. 154954

G.R. No. 155101

G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

- versus -

MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II,
MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS,
CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and
ANSELMO ADRIANO,
Respondents.

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
February 1, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J .:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa the victim in this
case on 10 February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.
1
Due in
large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were
organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This widespread condemnation
prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in 1995, that would
criminalize hazing.
2
The intent of the law was to discourage members from making
hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity, organization, or association.
3

Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the exculpatory implications of consent and
initial innocent act in the conduct of initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing
punishable or mala prohibita.
4

Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the
country.
5
Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged
those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of
San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis
Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito Mangga of the Philippine
Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in
Baguio City.
6

Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the

1
Sponsorship Speech of former Senator Joey Lina, Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 34 (08
October 1992) 9
th
Congress, 1
st
Regular Sess. at 21-22 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 34].
2
Id.
3
Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 47 (10 November 1992) 9
th
Congress, 1
st
Regular Sess. at
20-21, 24-27 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 47].
4
Id.; Senate Transcript of Session Proceedings No. 62 (14 December 1992) 9
th
Congress, 1
st
Regular Sess.
at 15 [hereinafter Senate TSP No. 62].
5
Senate TSP No. 34, supra note 1.
6
Id.
general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a
fundamental principle in our criminal justice system [N]o act constitutes a crime
unless it is made so by law.
7
Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is
viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered
a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are
called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and
to rule strictly based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258
(Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101
(Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
FACTS
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)
8
and the trial
court,
9
are as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam
Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo
Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the
Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded
to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael
Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the
initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that
they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days.
After their briefing, they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for
the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and
insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked
towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered
physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of
Aquilan initiation rites. These rites included the Indian Run, which required the

7
U.S. v. Taylor, 28 Phil 599 (1914). The Court declared, In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes
such as are known in the United States and England as common law crimes; id. at 604.
8
CA Decision (People v. Dizon, CA-G.R. CR No. 15520), pp. 1-5; rollo (G.R. No. 151258), pp. 62-66.
9
RTC Decision [People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 1-57; rollo (G.R. No. 151258),
pp. 109-167.
neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows
to the neophytes; the Bicol Express, which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor
with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked,
jumped, or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in which the neophytes were held at the
back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending
assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist
blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the Auxies
Privilege Round, in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical
pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the
fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made
to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to
memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give a
wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the
Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and
psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they
endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day
officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members
10
Fidelito Dizon
(Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head
of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of
Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members,
including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to paddling and to
additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which
was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining
of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings,
Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again,
the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner.
They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering
and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as

10
As explained in the Petition for Review of Villareal, resident brods are those fraternity
members who are currently students of the Ateneo Law School, while alumni brods are those
fraternity members who are graduates or former students of the law school; see Villareals
Petition for Review (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 5-7; rollo (G.R. No. 151258), pp.
17-19.

they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really
feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and
helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the
Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35
Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.
11

On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340
was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
12

On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide,
penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
13
A few weeks
after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340
against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.
14

On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)
15
set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal
liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by
then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero,
Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada,
Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.)
were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

11
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 2, supra note 9; rollo, p. 110.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 66-67; rollo, pp. 175-176.
14
CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC, CA-G.R. SP No. 89060), p. 4; rollo (G.R. No. 178057), p. 131.
15
Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and
Eliezer R. de los Santos (with Concurring Opinion).

2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio
Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the
crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They
were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of 30,000 as
indemnity.

3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of
prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of 50,000 and
to pay the additional amount of 1,000,000 by way of moral damages.

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge
against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.
16
Meanwhile,
on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions
to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
17
On 25 October 2006, the CA in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153
18
reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal
case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to
speedy trial.
19

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually
brought before this Court.

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

16
RTC Decision (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. 38340), p. 21; rollo (G.R. No. 178057), p. 1114.
17
CA Decision (Escalona v. RTC), pp. 12-14, supra note 14; rollo, pp. 139-141.
18
Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B.
Reyes, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
19
The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision
dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due process; and, second,
conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt.
20

While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a
Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died
on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by
petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CAs
Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.
21

Petitioner sets forth two main issues first, that he was denied due process when the CA
sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was
deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same ratio decidendi that served
as basis of acquittal of the other accused.
22

As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizons right to
present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier
date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial.
According to Dizon, his right should not have been considered as waived because he was
justified in asking for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the
hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to present

20
Villareals Petition for Review (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), p. 13; rollo, p. 25.
21
Dizons Petition for Review (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 1; rollo, p. 3.
22
Id. at 17; rollo, p. 19.
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been
acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and
were not tainted by evil motives.
23
He claims that the additional paddling session was part of the
official activity of the fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the
chairperson of the initiation rites decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation
so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling.
24
Further, petitioner echoes the argument of
the Solicitor General that the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have
resulted in Lennys death.
25
The Solicitor General purportedly averred that, on the contrary,
Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could not be considered fatal if taken
individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the victim.
26

Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims
that Lennys father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizons father, since the latter did
not have a car, and their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of
the parking space was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances
regarding a stolen parking space were only part of the psychological initiation. He then cites
the testimony of Lennys co-neophyte witness Marquez who admitted knowing it was not
true and that he was just making it up.
27

Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show
of concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the
neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to
switch places with Lenny to prevent the latters chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon,
together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair.
According to petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of
compassion and concern for the victims well-being.

23
24
25
26
Id. at 23-24; rollo, pp. 25-26.
27
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision dated
10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it
acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the
lesser crime of slight physical injuries.
28
According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in
holding that there could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity
initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been
upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny.
Since the injuries led to the victims death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are
criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code.
29
The said article provides: Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the
Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial courts finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal
liability of all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of
the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the
reversal of the CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-
G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.
30
The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge
filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to several pending incidents, the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused

28
Peoples Petition for Certiorari (People v. CA, G.R. No. 154954), p. 2; rollo, p. 13.
29
Id. at 167; rollo, p. 118.
30
Villas Petition for Review on Certiorari (Villa v. Escalona, G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080), p. 1; rollo, p. 84.
Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon
(Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in
Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court
found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. C-38340 involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For
various reasons, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost
12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9
accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to
assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the
prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence
were not at its disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.

ISSUES
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence constitutes denial of
due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the
liability of each accused according to individual participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.

DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this
Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal
penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for
pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term
personal penalties refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties,
31
while the term
pecuniary penalties (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,
32
including civil liability
predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).
33
However, civil
liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused
and is recoverable through a separate civil action.
34

Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for
both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict
complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him
deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence
for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8
th
, 15
th
, and 22
nd
of September; and the 5
th
and 12 of
October 1993.
35
The Order likewise stated that it will not entertain any postponement and that
all the accused who have not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times
down the line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence

31
Petralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81337, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 644.
32
People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA 122, citing J. Aquinos Concurring Opinion in
People v. Satorre, G.R. No. L-26282, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.
33
People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239; People v. Bunay, G.R. No. 171268, 14
September 2010, 630 SCRA 445.
34
People v. Bunay, supra, citing People v. Bayotas, supra.
35
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), p. 7, supra note 8; rollo, p. 68.
when required shall therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence.
36

However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that
his client Antonio General would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel
would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already testified.
37
Because
of this development and pursuant to the trial courts Order that the parties should be ready at all
times down the line, the trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date
25 August 1993 instead of his originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to
start two weeks later, or on 8 September 1993.
38
Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to
present evidence on the accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on
25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a previously scheduled case, and that he would
be ready to present evidence on the dates originally assigned to his clients.
39
The trial court
denied the Manifestation on the same date and treated the Constancia as a motion for
postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court.
40
Consequently,
the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a waiver of that
right.
41

Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when
the trial court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the
25 August 1993 hearing should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned
trial dates were not supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present
evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also
points out that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact
insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he
contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of evidence,
thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the

36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 7-8; rollo, pp. 68-69.
40
41
Id.
Constitution itself.
42
Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel
This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in ones defense,
43
as well as the
right to be present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.
44

In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,
45
the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defenses
presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled
due to lack of quorum in the regular membership of the Sandiganbayans Second Division and
upon the agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but
Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an
Order directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his
surety bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his right to present evidence because
of his nonappearance at yesterdays and todays scheduled hearings. In ruling against the
Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of
Court, Crisostomos non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was
merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such date only and not
for the succeeding trial dates

x x x x x x x x x

Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not
have been deemed as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While
constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be
coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not
voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to present
evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the
prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.

In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the
present case, the court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally
made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence.
In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences
of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first

42
People v. Banihit, 393 Phil. 465 (2000); People v. Hernandez, 328 Phil. 1123 (1996), citing People v. Dichoso, 96
SCRA 957 (1980); and People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).
43
People v. Hapa, 413 Phil. 679 (2001), citing People v. Diaz, 311 SCRA 585 (1999).
44
People v. Hapa, supra, citing Parada v. Veneracion, 336 Phil. 354, 360 (1997).
45
Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, 495 Phil. 718 (2005).
explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences
of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply
went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without even
allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.

Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case
involving a grave penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of
the accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the court could personally
conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.
46
(Emphasis supplied)

The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25
August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have
considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused
General had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding
trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the
trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to
impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set
for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates
constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right
to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal
case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.
47
In People v. Bodoso, we
ruled that where facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural
unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the
invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is
supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.
48

We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case
at bar. Neither can we see any procedural unfairness or irregularity that would substantially
prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the
arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to
decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law

46
Id.
47
People v. Bodoso, 446 Phil. 838 (2003).
48
Id.
to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the
hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that all actions of the petitioner were part of
the traditional rites, and that the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not outside the
official activity of the fraternity.
49
He even argues that Dizon did not request for the extension
and he participated only after the activity was sanctioned.
50

For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or
justice to another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the
case for the reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on
the parties. This case has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue.
Since the key facts necessary to decide the case have already been determined, we shall proceed
to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano
should not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a
reasonable period of time. She points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the
dormancy of the criminal case against them, and that they asserted their right only after the trial
court had dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes
that the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos,
and Adriano, because it found that the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the
movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it may require were not at its
disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals.
51

The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
52
This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious,
capricious or oppressive delays.
53
The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended
with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse

49
Dizons Petition for Review, supra note 21 at 20; rollo, p. 22.
50
51
Villas Petition for Review on Certiorari, supra note 30 at 19; rollo, p. 102.
52
People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372, 28 August 2006, 499 SCRA 688.
53
People v. Tampal, 314 Phil. 35 (1995), citing Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298 (1991); Acebedo v.
Sarmiento, 146 Phil. 820 (1970).
without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.
54
In determining the right of
the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.
55
The conduct of both the
prosecution and the defense must be weighed.
56
Also to be considered are factors such as the
length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the
defendant.
57

We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to
the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.
58
As a consequence, an appeal
or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double
jeopardy.
59
As we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is
capricious, certiorari lies.
60
The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition
challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.
61
Rather, grave
abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double
jeopardy from attaching.
62

We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial.
The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the
following factors contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case
below:

x x x x x x x x x

54
People v. Tampal, supra; Acebedo v. Sarmiento, supra.
55
People v. Tampal, supra.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
People v. Hernandez, supra note 52, citing People v. Tampal, supra; Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Bermoy,
471 SCRA 94, 107 (2005); People v. Bans, 239 SCRA 48 (1994); People v. Declaro, 170 SCRA 142 (1989); and
People v. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516 (1988).
59
See People v. Hernandez, supra note 52.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of
Appeals and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the
court a quo requiring them to secure certified true copies of the same.

x x x x x x x x x
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that
contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We
nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this
case x x x.

x x x x x x x x x
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the
records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the
prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring it
to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is
the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an
Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the
complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not
comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the
court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance
on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with.
It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still
not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of
the said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x
x x.

x x x x x x x x x
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5,
2002, or for a period of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the
part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution
and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by
petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court
did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time.
This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the
constitution frowns upon x x x.
63
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De

63
Vera.
64
On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.
65
Unfortunately, the initial trial of the
case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.
66

As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or
inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused
amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases a clear violation of the right of the
accused to a speedy disposition of cases.
67
Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in
the disposition of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court
found the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal
complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy
disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the
Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's
duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs.
Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in not quashing the information which was filed six years after the
initiatory complaint was filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to
a speedy disposition of the case. So it must be in the instant case, where the
reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade already.
68

(Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060
that accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the
records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez,
Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates
that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused the accused cannot again

64
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 985 (2001).
68
Id.
be charged with the same or an identical offense.
69
This principle is founded upon the law of
reason, justice and conscience.
70
It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in
the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.
71
It found
expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and in our own
Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen,
72
viz:
Article III Bill of Rights

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional
right, provides as follows:
73

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused
has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit
the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order
to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under
Rule 45 of the same Rules.
74
The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a)
there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the
defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case

69
Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 168982, 5 August 2009, 595 SCRA 438.
74
Id.; People v. Maquiling, 368 Phil. 169 (1999).
against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendants express
consent.
75

As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, [a] verdict of acquittal
is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate
courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine
has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as
an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated
trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from
successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents
the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a
greater penalty.
76
We further stressed that an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of
repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal.
77

This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts
acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following
recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute
and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process;
78
(2) where there is a finding of
mistrial;
79
or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.
80

The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
81
Here, the party

75
People v. Velasco, 394 Phil. 517 (2000), citing Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 117, Sec 7; Paulin v. Gimenez,
G. R. No. 103323, 21 January 1993, 217 SCRA 386; Comelec v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 108120, 26 January
1994, 229 SCRA 501; People v. Maquiling, supra note 74.
76
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, G.R. No. 159261, 21 February 2007, 516 SCRA 383, 397, citing People
v. Serrano, 315 SCRA 686, 689 (1999).
77
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra, citing People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207, 240 (2000).
78
Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil. 42 (1986), citing People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166 (1985); Combate v. San
Jose, 135 SCRA 693 (1985); People v. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389 (1971); and People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264
(1975).
79
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76 [citing People v. Tria-Tirona, 463 SCRA 462, 469-470
(2005); and People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207 (2000)]; People v. Court of Appeals and Francisco, 468 Phil. 1
(2004); Galman v. Sandiganbayan, supra, citing People v. Bocar, supra.
80
People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76, citing People v. Serrano, supra note 76 at 690; People v.
De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 550.
81
People v. Nazareno, supra note 73; De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 506.
asking for the review must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility;
82
or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to
deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice.
83
In such an event, the accused cannot be
considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.
84

The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of
(1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of
slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According
to the Petition, the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because
private complainant and petitioner were denied due process of law when the public respondent
completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x
and c) the petitioners Comment x x x.
85
Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when it adopted
the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court; and
failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
86
The Solicitor General also assails the
finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the
appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to hazing.
87

In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.
88
In People v. Maquiling, we held that
grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
misappreciated the facts and the evidence.
89
Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal
or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ

82
People v. Nazareno, supra note 73; De Vera v. De Vera, supra.
83
People v. De Grano, supra note 80, citing People v. Maquiling, supra note 74 at 704.
84
Id.
85
Peoples Petition for Certiorari, p. 8, supra note 28; rollo, p. 19.
86
Id. at 80-81; rollo, pp. 91-92.
87
Id. at 82-86; rollo, pp. 93-97.
88
See Francisco v. Desierto, G.R. No. 154117, 2 October 2009, 602 SCRA 50, citing First Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 171989, 4 July 2007, 526 SCRA 564, 578.
89
People v. Maquiling, supra note 74, citing Teknika Skills and Trade Services v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment, 273 SCRA 10 (1997).
of certiorari.
90
Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the
Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies
when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused.
91
We have also
recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear
demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive
it of its very power to dispense justice.
92
The present case is one of those instances of grave
abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug,
the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of
the fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries
sustained by the victim as a result of the physical punishment heaped on him
were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim, there
can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the
medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely
speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense and
the severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor,
the length of this period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in
much the same manner as the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No.
4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said period is absent, the crime
committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v. De los
Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this
Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson,
Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature.
93

(Emphasis supplied and citations included)

90
People v. Maquiling, supra note 74, citing Medina v. City Sheriff of Manila, 276 SCRA 133, (1997); Jamer v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 278 SCRA 632 (1997); and Azores v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
252 SCRA 387 (1996).
91
De Vera v. De Vera, supra note 81; People v. Dela Torre, 430 Phil. 420 (2002); People v. Leones, 418 Phil. 804
(2001); People v. Ruiz, 171 Phil. 400 (1978); People v. Pomeroy, 97 Phil. 927 (1955), citing People v. Ang Cho Kio,
95 Phil. 475 (1954).
92
See generally People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, supra note 76; and People v. Court of Appeals and
Francisco, supra note 79.
93
CA Decision (People v. Dizon), pp. 21-22, supra note 8; rollo, pp. 82-83.
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa
94
in finding that the four
accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of
the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the
incapacity or medical attendance required.
95
The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A
review of that case would reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical
injuries, because the victims injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical
attendance.
96
Furthermore, he did not die.
97
His injuries were not even serious.
98
Since Penesa
involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical injuries and not death, the ruling
cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact.
According to the court, the four accused were found to have inflicted more than the usual
punishment undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa.
99
It then adopted the
NBI medico-legal officers findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the
multiple traumatic injuries he suffered from the initiation rites.
100
Considering that the CA
found that the physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,
101
it
was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries,
which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is
found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical
injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal
framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to
discretion.

94
People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398 (1948).
95
96
People v. Penesa, supra note 94.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
100
101
Id.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries punished
under Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies is
therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable
penalty in case the victim dies should be based on the framework governing the destruction of
the life of a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365
for culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two
types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in that the accused
cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs.
102

Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof
that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered,
103
the
only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been
proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The
accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an
allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the Petition
in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime,
the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under
Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a
quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity
members were guilty of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted.
104

102
See footnote 1 of Corpus v. Paje, 139 Phil. 429 (1969).
103
104
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could
have been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented
to the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore,
were liable only for the consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused
Victorino et al. were acquitted; 4 of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical
injuries; and the remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly
commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or
to get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man
driven by his own desire to join a society of men pledged to go through physically and
psychologically strenuous admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order
to understand how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we
deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional
felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely known as
hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.
105
The classical
theory posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to
choose between good and evil.
106
It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable
for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.
107
The basic postulate of the classical
penal system is that humans are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with
reference to the principles of pleasure and pain.
108
They refrain from criminal acts if threatened
with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in committing the
crime.
109
Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame of the actor.
110

105
RAMON C. AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE VOLUME ONE 3 (1961); see People v. Estrada, 389
Phil. 216 (2000); People v. Sandiganbayan, 341 Phil. 503 (1997).
106
VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE: ANNOTATED AND COMMENTED BOOK
ONE 4 (3
rd
ed. 1958); see People v. Estrada, supra.
107
FRANCISCO, supra at 4; People v. Estrada, supra.
108
AQUINO, supra note 105 at 3.
109
Id.
110
GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, PENAL SCIENCES AND PHILIPPINE CRIMINAL LAW 6 (1974).
The identity of mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal
intent is the predominant consideration.
111
Thus, it is not enough to do what the law
prohibits.
112
In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed
by means of dolo or malice.
113

The term dolo or malice is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom,
intelligence, and intent.
114
The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and
with power to choose between two things.
115
The second element, intelligence, concerns the
ability to determine the morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a
licit and an illicit act.
116
The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a
certain act.
117

The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.
118
It refers to the purpose of the mind and the
resolve with which a person proceeds.
119
It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to
the act, while intent concerns the result of the act.
120
While motive is the moving power that
impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the purpose of using a particular means to
produce the result.
121
On the other hand, the term felonious means, inter alia, malicious,
villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.
122
With these elements taken
together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a
vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional
felony requires the existence of dolus malus that the act or omission be done willfully,
maliciously, with deliberate evil intent, and with malice aforethought.
123
The maxim is
actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person

111
People v. Sandiganbayan, 341 Phil. 503 (1997).
112
FRANCISCO, supra note 106 at 33.
113
Id. at 33-34.
114
MARIANO A. ALBERT, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (ACT NO. 3815) 21-24 (1946).
115
Id. at 21.
116
Id. at 21.
117
Guevarra v. Almodovar, 251 Phil. 427 (1989), citing 46 CJS Intent 1103.
118
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 670 (8
th
abr. ed. 2005); see People v. Regato, 212 Phil. 268 (1984).
119
Guevarra v. Almodovar, supra note 117.
120
ALBERT, supra note 114 at 23.
121
People v. Ballesteros, 349 Phil. 366 (1998); Bagajo v. Marave, 176 Phil. 20 (1978), citing People v. Molineux,
168 N.Y. 264, 297; 61 N.E. 286, 296; 62 L.R.A. 193.
122
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 118 at 520.
123
See FRANCISCO, supra note 106 at 34; ALBERT, supra note 114 at 23-25.
performing the act complained of is innocent.
124
As is required of the other elements of a felony,
the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
125

In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it
is to be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase
coming to an agreement connotes the existence of a prefaced intent to cause injury to
another, an element present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal
negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the
result of an act performed without malice or criminal design.
126
Here, a person performs an
initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill,
the deed results in a wrongful act.
127
Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a
requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.
128

The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.
129
Being mala in se, the
felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo
130
immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.
131
Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot
and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.
132

Furthermore, the victims death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or
suicide.
133
If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent but with

124
U.S. v. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504 (1911); U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910).
125
U.S. v. Barnes, 8 Phil. 59 (1907); Dado v. People, 440 Phil. 521 (2002), citing Mondragon v. People, 17 SCRA
476, 481 (1966); People v. Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488 (1928); U.S. v. Reyes, 30 Phil. 551 (1915); U.S. v. Mendoza, 38
Phil. 691 (1918); People v. Montes, 53 Phil. 323 (1929); People v. Pacusbas, 64 Phil. 614 (1937); and People v.
Penesa, supra note 94.
126
People v. Fallorina, 468 Phil. 816 (2004), citing People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943); FRANCISCO, supra note
106 at 51-52, citing People v. Sara, 55 Phil. 939 (1931).
127
See generally FRANCISCO, supra note 106 at 51.
128
Id. at 52; People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943), citing People v. Nanquil, 43 Phil. 232 (1922); People v. Bindoy,
56 Phil. 15 (1931).
129
Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 737, citing Rivera v. People, G.R. No.
166326, 25 January 2006, 480 SCRA 188, 196-197.
130
People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996).
131
Mahawan v. People, supra note 129, citing Rivera v. People, supra note 129.
132
Dado v. People, supra note 125.
133
People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 450 (2003), citing WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW VOL. 1, 473-474 (12
TH

ED., 1932).
lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence the act must be qualified as reckless or simple
negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.
134

Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.
135
It is said that,
throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations
ranging from military groups to indigenous tribes.
136
Some say that elements of hazing can be
traced back to the Middle Ages, during which new students who enrolled in European
universities worked as servants for upperclassmen.
137
It is believed that the concept of hazing is
rooted in ancient Greece,
138
where young men recruited into the military were tested with pain or
challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle.
139

Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these values of ancient Greek
civilization.
140
According to a scholar, this concept lends historical legitimacy to a tradition or
ritual whereby prospective members are asked to prove their worthiness and loyalty to the
organization in which they seek to attain membership through hazing.
141

Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to
join an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter.
142

134
See People v. Garcia, 467 Phil. 1102 (2004), citing People v. Carmen, G.R. No. 137268, 26 March 2001, 355
SCRA 267; U.S. v. Tayongtong, 21 Phil. 476 (1912); see generally U.S. v. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468 (1909).
135
A. Catherine Kendrick, Ex Parte Barran: In Search of Standard Legislation for Fraternity Hazing Liability, 24
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 407 (2000)
136
Id.
137
In re Khalil H., No. 08110, 2010 WL 4540458 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 9, 2010) (U.S.) [citing Kuzmich, Comment,
In Vino Mortuus: Fraternal Hazing and Alcohol-Related Deaths, 31 MCGEORGE L REV. 1087, 1088-1089
(2000); and SYMPOSIUM, THE WORKS OF PLATO (THE MODERN LIBRARY 1956)]; Gregory E. Rutledge,
Hell Night Hath No Fury Like a Pledge Scorned ... and Injured: Hazing Litigation in U.S. Colleges and Universities,
25 J.C. & U.L. 361, 368-9 (1998); Kendrick, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
138
In re Khalil H., supra; Rutledge, supra.
139
Jamie Ball, This Will Go Down on Your Permanent Record (But We'll Never Tell): How the Federal Educational
Rights and Privacy Act May Help Colleges and Universities Keep Hazing a Secret, 33 SW. U. L. REV. 477, 480
(2004), citing Rutledge, supra.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Kendrick, supra note 135, citing Scott Patrick McBride, Comment, Freedom of Association in the Public
The neophyte period is usually one to two semesters long.
143
During the program, neophytes
are required to interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter
history; to understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point
average; to participate in the organizations activities; and to show dignity and respect for their
fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni members.
144
Some chapters require
the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte stage.
145

Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as
prerequisite for admission to an organization.
146
In hazing, the recruit, pledge, neophyte,
initiate, applicant or any other term by which the organization may refer to such a person
is generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial,
silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or activities.
147
It encompasses different forms of conduct that
humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically endanger those who desire membership in the
organization.
148
These acts usually involve physical or psychological suffering or injury.
149

The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century
ago, our national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society named Kataastaasan
Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable
Association of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation).
150
The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a
small confraternity believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by
confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic Church.
151
The Katipunans ideology was
brought home to each member through the societys initiation ritual.
152
It is said that initiates
were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series of

University Setting: How Broad is the Right to Freely Participate in Greek Life?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 133, 147-
8 (1997).
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id., citing Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203 (Ala. 1998) (U.S.).
146
See generally Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing Law.
147
Id.
148
In re Khalil H., supra note 137, citing WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1041 (1986);
and People v. Lenti, 44 Misc.2d 118, 253 N.Y.S.2d 9 (N.Y. Nassau County Ct. 1964) (U.S.).
149
See generally Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), Sec. 1, otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing Law; Susan Lipkins,
Hazing: Defining and Understanding Psychological Damages, 2 ANN.2007 AAJ-CLE 2481 (2007).
150
REYNALDO C. ILETO, THE DIORAMA EXPERIENCE: A VISUAL HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINES 84
(2004).
151
Id.
152
Id.
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve.
153
They were made to go
through vigorous trials such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or [pagtalon] sa balon.
154
It would
seem that they were also made to withstand the blow of pangherong bakal sa pisngi and to
endure a matalas na punyal.
155
As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made
to sign membership papers with the his own blood.
156

It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the
Philippines in the late 19
th
century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of
hazing in the United States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on
Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do
exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or
drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves.
157
In 1901, General
Douglas MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy
during his second year at West Point.
158

In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was
injured during the shriners hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz
membership.
159
The ritual involved what was known as the mattress-rotating barrel trick.
160
It
required each candidate to slide down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected
mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the candidate was required to climb.
161
Members of

153
Id.; see Philippine Insurrection Records, Reel 31, Folder 514/10 Cartilla del Katipunan, quoted in LUIS
CAMARA DERY, ALAY SA INANG BAYAN: PANIBAGONG PAGBIBIGAY KAHULUGAN SA
KASAYSAYAN NG HIMAGSIKAN NG 1896, 16-24 (1999).
154
Philippine Insurrection Records, supra, quoted in DERY, supra at 17.
155
Philippine Insurrection Records, supra, quoted in DERY, supra at 18.
156
ILETO, supra note 150.
157
STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY: A HISTORY OF WEST POINT 222 (1999).
158
Id.
159
Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, 285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1985) (U.S.). (The South Carolina
Supreme Court held, inter alia, that (1) evidence supported the jury finding that the manner in which the association
carried out mattress-rotating barrel trick, a hazing event, was hazardous and constituted actionable negligence; and
(2) the candidate was not barred from recovery by the doctrine of assumption of risk. Id.)
160
Id.
161
Id.
Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route
to the barrel.
162

In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North
Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings
directly onto the neophyte paratroopers chests.
163
The victims were shown writhing and crying
out in pain as others pounded the spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the
victims.
164

In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of
Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.
165
The fraternity
members subjected the pledges to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes
at the nape, the chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the
back with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and
knees; various kicks and punches to the body; and body slamming, an activity in which active
members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to the ground.
166
The
fraternity members then put the pledges through a seven-station circle of physical abuse.
167

In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity
members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.
168
The hazing
included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with
water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being
pushed and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot

162
Id.
163
CNN U.S., Pentagon Brass Disgusted by Marine Hazing Ceremony, January 31, 1997, available
at<http://articles.cnn.com/1997-01-31/us/9701_31_hazing_1_hazing-incident-camp-lejeune-marines?_s=PM:US>
(visited 3 December 2010); see also Gregory E. Rutledge, Hell Night Hath No Fury Like a Pledge Scorned ... and
Injured: Hazing Litigation in U.S. Colleges and Universities, 25 J.C. & U.L. 361, 364 (1998).
164
CNN U.S., supra; see also Rutledge, supra.
165
State v. Allen, 905 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Mo. 1995) (U.S.). (One of the pledges Michael Davis blacked out and
never regained consciousness. He died the following afternoon. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial
courts conviction of hazing. Id.)
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Ex parte Barran, 730 So.2d 203 (Ala. 1998) (U.S.). (The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the (1) pledge knew
and appreciated the risks inherent in hazing; and (2) pledge voluntarily exposed himself to hazing, supporting the
fraternity's assumption of the risk defense. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil
Appeals and reinstated the ruling of the trial court, which entered the summary judgment in favor of the defendants
with respect to the victims negligence claims. The case was remanded as to the other matters. Id.)
sauce, butter, and yerks (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items);
(5) doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and
yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m.
meetings, during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7) running the
gauntlet, during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway and
descended down a flight of stairs.
169

In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim Sylvester Lloyd
was accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.
170
He
participated in initiation activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and torture,
psychological coercion and embarrassment.
171

In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered
injuries from hazing activities during the fraternitys initiation rites.
172
Kenner and the other
initiates went through psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the
buttocks for more than 200 times.
173

In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought initiation into
the campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.
174
The
pledges efforts to join the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four
nights. Jones, together with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on
his face and buttocks.
175
In these rituals described as preliminaries, which lasted for two

169
Id.
170
Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, No. 96-CV-348, 97-CV-565, 1999 WL 47153 (Dist. Ct., N.D. N.Y., 1999)
(U.S.). (The plaintiff filed a law suit against Cornell University for the latters liability resulting from the injuries the
former sustained during the alleged hazing by the fraternity. The New York district court granted defendant
Cornells motion to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint. Id.)
171
Id.
172
Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc., 808 A.2d 178 (Pa. Super.Ct. 2002). (The Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that: (1) the fraternity owed the duty to protect the initiate from harm; (2) breach of duty by fraternity
was not established; (3) individual fraternity members owed the duty to protect the initiate from harm; and (4) the
evidence raised the genuine issue of material fact as to whether the fraternity's chapter advisor breached the duty of
care to initiate. Id.)
173
Id.
174
Morton v. State, 988 So.2d 698 (Flo. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (U.S.). (The District Court of Appeal of Florida
reversed the conviction for felony hazing and remanded the case for a new trial because of erroneous jury
instruction. Id.)
175
Id.
evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.
176
During the last two days of
the hazing, the rituals intensified.
177
The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the
four-night initiation.
178
Jones and several other candidates passed out.
179

The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial birth by fire,
through which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth.
180

Some organizations even believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this
process enables the organization to establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and
ensures the future of the organization.
181
Alleged benefits of joining include leadership
opportunities; improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking
opportunities; and the esprit dcorp associated with close, almost filial, friendship and common
cause.
182

Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the
military.
183
The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that
Congress prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or not.
184
It was not until 1901 that
Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing conduct whereby any one sustains an

176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Rutledge, supra note 137.
181
Rutledge, supra note 137, citing Fraternity Hazing: Is that Anyway to Treat a Brother?, TRIAL, September
1991, at 63.
182
Rutledge, supra note 137, [citing Robert D. Bickel & Peter F. Lake, Reconceptualizing the University's Duty to
Provide A Safe Learning Environment: A Criticism of the Doctrine of In Loco Parentis and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 20 J.C. & U.L. 261 (1994); Jennifer L. Spaziano, It's All Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an
Eye: An Analysis of University Liability for Actions of Student Organizations, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 213 (1994);
Fraternity Hazing: Is that Anyway to Treat a Brother?, TRIAL, Sept. 1991, at 63; and Byron L. Leflore, Jr., Alcohol
and Hazing Risks in College Fraternities: Re-evaluating Vicarious and Custodial Liability of National Fraternities,
7 REV. LITIG. 191, 210 (1988)].
183
Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, The Criminalization of Fraternity, Non-Fraternity and Non-Collegiate Hazing, 61
MISS. L.J. 111, 117 (1991), citing Benjamin, The Trouble at the Naval Academy, 60 The Independent 154, 155
(1906). According to Lewis, the 1874 statute outlawing hazing was directed specifically at the United States Naval
Academy.
184
Gregory L. Acquaviva, Protecting Students from the Wrongs of Hazing Rites: A Proposal for Strengthening New
Jersey's Anti-Hazing Act, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 305, 311 (2008), citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 118.
injury to his [or her] person therefrom.
185

However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the
Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states
increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.
186
As of 2008, all
but six states had enacted criminal or civil statutes proscribing hazing.
187
Most anti-hazing laws
in the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even the
most severe situations.
188
Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in
case death or great bodily harm occurs.
189

Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in
death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.
190
In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of
imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and not more than three years.
191

Indiana criminal law provides that a person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally

185
Acquaviva, supra, citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 118-119.
186
Acquaviva, supra, citing Lewis, supra note 183 at 119.
187
Acquaviva, supra at 313.
188
Amie Pelletier, Note, Regulation of Rites: The Effect and Enforcement of Current Anti-Hazing Statutes, 28 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM.& CIV. CONFINEMENT 377, 377 (2002).
189
Id.
190
Id., citing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 120/10 (1992) (U.S.).
191
730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-1482 of the 2010 Sess.) (U.S.).
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal recklessness, a
Class D felony.
192

The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.
193
As
an element of a Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in serious bodily injury, death
falls under the category of serious bodily injury.
194
A person who commits a Class C felony is
imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence
being four (4) years.
195
Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the
act creates a substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it
becomes a Class C felony.
196
A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to exceed
seven years.
197

In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony.
198
An individual
adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not
more than two years or not less than 180 days.
199
Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious
bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony.
200
A person who has been convicted of
a third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years.
201

West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a felony, the
hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided therefor.
202
In Wisconsin, a
person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death of another.
203
A

192
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Ind. Code Ann. 35-42-2-2 (U.S.).
193
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Ind. Code Ann. 35-42-2-2 (U.S.).
194
Ind. Code Ann. 35-42-2-2 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.) (U.S.) citing State v. Lewis, 883 N.E.2d 847
(Ind. App. 2008) (U.S.).
195
Ind. Code Ann. 35-50-2-6 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.) (U.S.).
196
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Mo. Rev. Stat. 578.365 (2001) (U.S.).
197
Mo. Stat. Ann. 558.011 (West, Westlaw through 2010 First Extraordinary Gen. Ass. Sess.).
198
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Tex. Educ. Code Ann. 37.152 (Vernon 1996) (U.S.).
199
Tex. Stat. Code Ann., Penal Code 12.35 (Vernon, Westlaw through 2009 Legis. Sess.) (U.S.).
200
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Utah Code Ann. 76-5-107.5 (1999) (U.S.).
201
Utah Code Ann. 1953 76-3-203 (Westlaw through 2010 Gen. Sess.) (U.S.).
202
Pelletier, supra note 188, citing W. Va. Code 18-16-3 (1999) (U.S.).
203
See Pelletier, supra note 188, citing Wis. Stat. 948.51 (1996) (U.S.).
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or
both.
204

In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there
was no hazing statute.
205
This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General
Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballous family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since
there was no anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until 1994.
206

The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not
proven beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites does not
automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind whether or not there is
a contextual background or factual premise they are still criminally liable for intentional
felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that with the
exception of Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the
animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer
disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found
that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to
inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that
he had apparently been motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his
fathers parking space had been stolen by the victims father.
207
As to Villareal, the court said
that the accused suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had
a hand in the death of Villareals brother.
208
The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very

204
Wis. Stat. Ann. 939.50 (Westlaw through 2009 Act 406) (U.S.).
205
Pelletier, supra note 188 at 381.
206
Id.
207
208
Id.
clear that they acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is
unrebutted and so for the death of Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must
and should face the consequence of their acts, that is, to be held liable for the
crime of homicide.
209
(Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine
the existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed
utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness
Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room and we
were briefed as to what to expect during the next three days
and we were told the members of the fraternity and their batch
and we were also told about the fraternity song, sir.

x x x x x x x x x

Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house and we
were made to ride a van and we were brought to another place
in Kalookan City which I later found to be the place of
Mariano Almeda, sir.

x x x x x x x x x

Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to
link our arms and then the driver of the van and other members
of the Aquilans who were inside left us inside the van, sir.

x x x x x x x x x

Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect,
Villa akin ka, Asuncion Patay ka and the people
outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.

Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a
voice these remarks uttered upon your arrival?

Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of
excitement in their voices, sir.

209
Id.
x x x x x x x x x

Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through
and through, what were the voices or utterances that you
heard?

Witness Villa akin ka, Asuncion patay ka, Recinto patay ka sa
amin, etc., sir.

Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue
during the rocking of the van which lasted for 5 minutes?

x x x x x x x x x

Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing
voices, sir.

x x x x x x x x x

Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were
being inflicted, was there any utterances by anybody?

Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and
some were encouraging others who were pounding and
beating us, it was just like a fiesta atmosphere, actually
some of them enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir.

Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?

Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us
whether matigas pa yan, kayang-kaya pa niyan.

Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words
that you quote?

Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances
simultaneously, I could not really pin point who uttered those
words, sir.

x x x x x x x x x

Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of
this Bicol Express?

Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.

Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the
utterances that you remember?

Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on
my thigh, he would say that and I quote ito, yung pamilya
nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko, so that would in turn
sort of justifying him in inflicting more serious pain on me. So
instead of just walking, he would jump on my thighs and then
after on was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that
this guy, his father stole the parking space of my father,
sir. So, thats why he inflicted more pain on Villa and that went
on, sir.

Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?

Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.

Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of
having your family have his brother killed, what was your
response?

Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was
just making it up sir. So he said that I knew nothing of that
incident. However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express, he
kept on uttering those words/statements so that it would in turn
justify him and to give me harder blows, sir.

x x x x x x x x x

Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that
Lenny Villas father stole the parking space allotted for his
father, do you recall who were within hearing distance
when that utterance was made?

Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.

x x x x x x x x x

Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were
different people who heard from time to time, sir.

x x x x x x x x x

Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation
against Lenny Villas father was made?

Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came
near to us and when Lenny Villas turn, I heard him
uttered those statements, sir.

Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villas
father?

Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.

Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?

Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas thighs and
sometime he stand up and he kicked his thighs and sometimes
jumped at it, sir.

x x x x x x x x x

Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You
mentioned also that accusations made by Dizon you or your
family had his brother killed, can you inform this
Honorable Court what exactly were the accusations that
were charged against you while inflicting blows upon you in
particular?

Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in
particular if I knew that his family who had his brother killed,
and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that it
was just a story that he made up and I said that I knew
nothing about it and he continued inflicting blows on me,
sir. And another incident was when a talk was being given,
Dizon was on another part of the pelota court and I was sort of
looking and we saw that he was drinking beer, and he said and
I quote: Marquez, Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo
diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking
kapatid, yari ka sa akin, sir.

Atty. Tadiar What else?

Witness Thats all, sir.

Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or
a physician came around as promised to you earlier?

Witness No, sir.
210
(Emphasis supplied)

210
TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-72, 90-91, 100-102, 108-109, 127-134.
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have
you stated that there was a briefing that was conducted
immediately before your initiation as regards to what to expect
during the initiation, did I hear you right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?

Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.

Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to
expect during the initiation?

Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular
place, we would be mocked at, sir.

Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc.,
and the likes?

Witness Yes, sir.

Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical
contact?

Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.

x x x x x x x x x

Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go
back to school. All the bruises would be limited to our arms
and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular school uniforms like
long sleeves, it would be covered actually so we have no
thinking that our face would be slapped, sir.

Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have
bruises on your body but that will be covered?

Witness Yes, sir.

JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you
expect that would create bruises to your body?

Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a
paddling or paddle, sir.

x x x x x x x x x

Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation
procedures is psychological in nature?

Witness Combination, sir.
211
(Emphasis supplied)

x x x x x x x x x

Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of
physical initiation, meaning body contact, is that correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological
initiation, correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things
calculated to terrify you, scare you, correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation
intended to, I repeat, terrify you, frighten you, scare you
into perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct?

Witness Sometimes sir, yes.

Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he
said or he was supposed to have said according to you that your
family were responsible for the killing of his brother who was
an NPA, do you remember saying that?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by
Dizon that you did not believe him because that is not true,
correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

211
TSN, 26 May 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 29-32, 43.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps,
the purpose as I have mentioned before, terrifying you,
scaring you or frightening you into quitting the initiation,
this is correct?

Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why
he was saying those things was because he wanted to inflict
injury.

Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception,
correct?

Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to
Villareal, he was hitting me.

Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the
same forms of initiation by all the initiating masters? You said
that earlier, right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or
kicked you said something similar as was told to you by Mr.
Dizon?

Witness No, sir.

Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the
masters would run on your thighs, right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the
initiating masters not only on you but also on the other
neophytes?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of
initiation was administered by one master, was also
administered by one master on a neophyte, was also
administered by another master on the other neophyte, this
is correct?

Witness Yes, sir.
212
(Emphasis supplied)

212
TSN, 3 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 24-28.
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon
and Villareal were baseless,
213
since the statements of the accused were just part of the
psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes; that [t]here is no
element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered by
Petitioner and Villareal are part of tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity
members during their initiation rites.
214

We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial
proportion on the part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such
inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was the CAs primary basis for finding that
Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional
felony of homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as reproduced
above, it was Dizon who uttered both accusations against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no
participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It was Boyet Dizon [who]
stepped on [Marquezs] thigh; and who told witness Marquez, [I]to, yung pamilya nito ay
pinapatay yung kapatid ko. It was also Dizon who jumped on Villas thighs while saying,
[T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father. With the testimony clarified, we
find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire
factual milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the
testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be
subjected to psychological pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be
mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout, Patay ka, Recinto,
Yari ka, Recinto, Villa, akin ka, Asuncion, gulpi ka, Putang ina mo, Asuncion, Putang
ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin, or some other words to that effect.
215
While beating the neophytes,
Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed

213
Peoples Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 131; rollo, p. 626; Peoples Comment (Villareal v.
People, G.R. No. 151258), p. 120-3; rollo, pp. 727-730.
214
Peoples Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), pp. 130-131; rollo, pp. 625-626; Peoples Comment
(Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 120-123; rollo, pp. 727-730.
215
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], pp. 18-35, supra note 9; rollo, pp. 127-144.
Lenny Villas father for stealing the parking space of Dizons father. According to the Solicitor
General, these statements, including those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the
psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.
216

Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological pressure was
through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so
that he could justify giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation
and role playing. Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-
up.

The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact,
during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina
spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the
period of interpellations on why we included the phrase or psychological pain
and suffering.
x x x x x x x x x
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the
recruit but the recruit or neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I
already described yesterday, like playing the Russian roulette extensively to test
the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit to continue his
desire to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organization or
playing and putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the
recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing
outside, asking him to jump outside after making him turn around several times
but the reality is that he will be made to jump towards the inside portion of the
building these are the mental or psychological tests that are resorted to by
these organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who appeared during
the public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental aberration,
that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want to
prevent.
217
(Emphasis supplied)

216
Peoples Comment (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), pp. 130-131; rollo, pp. 625-626; Peoples Comment
(Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258), pp. 120-123; rollo, pp. 727-730.
217
Senate TSP No. 51 (17 November 1992) 9
th
Congress, 1
st
Regular Sess., pp. 12-13.
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be
automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it
must be taken within the context of the fraternitys psychological initiation. This Court points out
that it was not even established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity
with each other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of
Lennys co-neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he knew it
was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it up.
218
Even the trial court did not give
weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: [T]he cumulative acts of all the
accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of the
fraternity initiation rites x x x.
219
The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus
interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of
such intent.
220
Instead, we adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as
it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.
221

The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to
injure not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries
on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that
since all of the accused fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa
and death ensued, all of them should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1)
of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the
Revised Penal Code,
222
the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus.

218
TSN, 21 April 1992(People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-72, 90-91, 100-102, 108-109, 127-134;
see TSN, 26 May 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 29-32, 43; and TSN, 3 June 1992 (People v.
Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 24-28.
219
220
Dado v. People, supra note 125.
221
222
The aforementioned articles refer to the Revised Penal Code provisions on Physical Injuries. These are the
As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises
from the mental state of the wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no
criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of
physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or
malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to
incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely
satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of
the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.
223

Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances
224
that the mere infliction of physical
injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional
felony. In Bagajo v. People,
225
the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her
students behind her legs and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and
bruises from the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial courts finding of criminal liability
for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus: Independently of any civil or administrative
responsibility [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent
the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred
or any malevolent intent. Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that as a matter of
law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil. In People v.
Carmen,
226
the accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady
of Fatima under the guise of a ritual or treatment plunged the head of the victim into a
barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him
on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of nervous breakdown by expelling
through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused the
death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial courts finding

following: (a) Art. 262 Mutilation; (b) Art. 263 Serious Physical Injuries; (c) Art. 264 Administering Injurious
Substances or Beverages; (d) Art. 265 Less Serious Physical Injuries; and, (e) Art. 266 Slight Physical Injuries
and Maltreatment.
223
Cf. United States v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910); and Calimutan v. People, 517 Phil. 272 (2006).
224
Cf. Calimutan v. People, supra, citing People v. Carmen, 407 Phil. 564 (2001); People v. Nocum, 77 Phil. 1018
(1947); People v. Sara, 55 Phil 939 (1931); and People v. Ramirez, 48 Phil 204 (1925).
225
176 Phil. 20 (1978).
226
People v. Carmen, supra note 224.
of liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the
accused should be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under
Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of inflicting physical
pain on the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In
People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and
external acts of the accused.
227
What persons do is the best index of their intention.
228
We have
also ruled that the method employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on
which the injury was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.
229
The Court
shall thus examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the
commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would
be physical beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit
anytime. On their first night, they were subjected to traditional initiation rites, including the
Indian Run, Bicol Express, Rounds, and the Auxies Privilege Round. The beatings
were predominantly directed at the neophytes arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays
and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila
Fraternitys principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to traditional
initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and
Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another traditional ritual paddling by the
fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The
auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from
those who were designated to inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates.
230
It was

227
People v. Regato, supra note 118.
228
Id.
229
Cf. People v. Penesa, supra note 94.
230
their regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to pump their
legs in order that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical
activity or round; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them
whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent.
231
A few days before the rites, he
asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.
232
His father knew that Lenny
would go through an initiation process and would be gone for three days.
233
The CA found as
follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented
to undergo physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration
of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to become members of
the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were given briefings on
what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity,
the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made aware that
traditional methods such as mocking, psychological tests and physical
punishment would take place. They knew that the initiation would involve
beatings and other forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and
opportunity to quit at any time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness
Navera testified that accused Tecson told him that after a week, you can already
play basketball. Prosecution witness Marquez for his part, admitted that he
knew that the initiates would be hit in the arms and legs, that a wooden
paddle would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms
and legs. Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting
neophytes.
234
(Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny
continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear
malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in
this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting
physical pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements

231
232
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 38, supra note 9; rollo, p. 147; TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v.
Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), p. 108.
233
Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), p. 109.
234
of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of
criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven
was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional rounds on the second
night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially
reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members
still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which were performed pursuant to
tradition. Other than the paddle, no other weapon was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The
targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles,
including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending
assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the
presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the same
process of traditional initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or
given a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely
different from common crimes.
235
The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken into
consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted
may also be determined by Lennys continued participation in the initiation and consent to the
method used even after the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-
Hazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are already
punished under the Revised Penal Code.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it results in
death, the charge would be murder or homicide.


SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be
frustrated homicide or serious physical injuries.


235

SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse
does so it can be penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.


SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new
offense under this definition of the crime of hazing?

SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either
composing a sorority, fraternity or any association from making this requirement
of initiation that has already resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr.
President.

That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land
that no group or association can require the act of physical initiation before a
person can become a member without being held criminally liable.

x x x x x x x x x

SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that
imposition? Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a
mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club or
organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, et
cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.

The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage
hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or
more charges or offenses, because these very same acts are already punishable
under the Revised Penal Code.

That is my difficulty, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. x x x

Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference:
When a person or group of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for
gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit a wrong is not visible
or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President,
let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then
the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing
is the basis, what is important is the result from the act of hazing.

To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter
the sororities or fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called
hazing. Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even
consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness
are even committed initially, Mr. President.

So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That
is why there is need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang
fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong
makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o
pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong
neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng
murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa
mga kabataan na: Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at
kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo.

x x x x x x x x x

SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the
distinguished Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his statement that the
prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted in the death, that
resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of
lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of
the accused in proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a
novel situation where we create the special crime without having to go into
the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any crime.

If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to
initiate, then there is no offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits
that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a new society or
a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts
that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by
intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the
basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being
criminalized because in the context of what is happening in the sororities and
fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that their intention
is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting
physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred,
discouraged.

If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the
masters intended to kill or the masters intended to maim. What is important is the
result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the
physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, We did not have the
intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not
have any intention to kill or maim.

This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged
therefore with the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where
the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if they are
separate offenses.

x x x x x x x x x

SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that
initiated and a person died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill
if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not
anymore?

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x
x x

SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to
prove intent to kill or not?

SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if
that occurs, there is no need to prove intent to kill.

SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.

SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It
should be hazing, Mr. President.
236
(Emphasis supplied)

During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to
include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified
thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection
to the inclusion of sodomy as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as
necessary to be punished. However, the act of sodomy can be committed by two
persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of
sodomy forced into another individual by another individual. I move, Mr.
President, that sodomy be modified by the phrase without consent for purposes
of this section.

SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy

236
with the concept that it is only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done
without consent will change a lot of concepts here. Because the results from
hazing aggravate the offense with or without consent. In fact, when a person
joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with
or without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person joins a
sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the crime of hazing.

This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the
malpractices that attend initiation which may have been announced with or
without physical infliction of pain or injury, Mr. President. Regardless of
whether there is announcement that there will be physical hazing or whether
there is none, and therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is
of no moment. What is important is that there is an infliction of physical
pain.

The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from
himself if he joins a fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the
individual, or the parents of the victim can run after the perpetrators of the
crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on the part of the
victim.
x x x x x x x x x
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the
distinguished Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society
sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and practices.

In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of
some individuals when they do their acts in private as we do not take a peek into
the private rooms of couples. They can do their thing if they want to make love in
ways that are not considered acceptable by the mainstream of society. That is not
something that the State should prohibit.

But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that
the act may even be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The
infliction of pain may be done with the consent of the neophyte. I f the law is
passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because the
neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.

If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator
said, Well, he allowed it upon himself. He consented to it. So, if we allow
that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of the victim, then we
would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass
this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the
infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.

But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to
prohibit. That the defense of consent will not apply because the very act of
inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable act.
The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely aggravates
the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify
the criminal nature of the act.

So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the
offense if it is committed without consent of the victim, then the whole
foundation of this proposed law will collapse.

SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment?
(Silence.) The Chair hears none; the same is approved.
237

(Emphasis supplied)

Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove intent, Senator Lina,
the principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the
idea of intent or whether there it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a
radical amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.

If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a
special law on hazing. We will not include this anymore under the Revised
Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr.
President.
238
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core
principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact
an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of
mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing
unique as against typical crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as
an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lennys parents

237
Senate TSP No. 62, supra note 4 at 13-15.
238
would not have consented
239
to his participation in Aquila Fraternitys initiation rites if the
practice of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now
retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent history, the people have
spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously
considered harmless by custom, as criminal.
240
Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter
dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation
rites through physical and/or psychological suffering has not been traditionally criminalized.
Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not
clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of
criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against
the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being
no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries
or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of
his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also
punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof,
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from
which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an

239
Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 108-109.
240
Vedaa v. Valencia, 356 Phil. 317, 332 (1998).
inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.
241
In this
case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor.
242
In contrast, simple
imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or
material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill.
243
Here, the threatened
harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.
244

The test
245
for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as
follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous
results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.
246

As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the
degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved.
247
If,
on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the
individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in
order to prevent or avoid damage or injury.
248
In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is
required.
249
It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may
be required of an individual, from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort.
250
The
duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of
each particular case.
251

There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.

241
Caminos v. People, 587 SCRA 348 (2009) citing LUIS B. REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE: CRIMINAL
LAW BOOK ONE 995 (15
th
ed. 2001); People v. Vistan, 42 Phil 107 (1921), citing U.S. vs. Gomez, G.R. No.
14068, 17 January 1919 (unreported); U.S. v. Manabat, 28 Phil. 560 (1914).
242
People v. Vistan, supra, citing U.S. vs. Gomez, supra.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Gaid v. People, G.R. No. 171636, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 489; Gan v. Court of Appeals, 247-A Phil. 460
(1988).
246
Gaid v. People, supra; Gan v. Court of Appeals, supra.
247
Gaid v. People, supra; People v. Vistan, supra note 241, citing U.S. vs. Gomez, supra note 241.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
See Gaid v. People, supra note 245, at 503 (Velasco, J., dissenting).
251
Id.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to
multiple traumatic injuries.
252
The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the
heart to work as a pump and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood.
253
In the
present case, the victims heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was
deprived of its requisite blood and oxygen.
254
The deprivation was due to the channeling of the
blood supply from the entire circulatory system including the heart, arteries, veins, venules,
and capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the formation of multiple
hematomas or blood clots.
255
The multiple hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,
256
indicating
that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee
blows, paddles, or the like.
257
Repeated blows to those areas caused the blood to gradually ooze
out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became so markedly diminished as to produce
death.
258
The officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other
organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the
lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms.
259
It was concluded that there
was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim suffered from a previous cardiac
arrest or disease.
260

The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and thighs, resulting
from repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his
eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on
him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they
were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms,
legs, and thighs.
261
They were also paddled at the back of their thighs or legs;
262
and slapped

252
253
Id.
254
255
Id.; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 52-67.
256
257
Id.; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 68-69.
258
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 37, supra note 9; rollo, p. 146; TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v.
Dizon, Crim. Case No. C-38340), pp. 70-71.
259
260
TSN, 24 June 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), p. 50.
261
RTC Decision [Crim. Case No. C-38340(91)], p. 18-21, supra note 9; rollo, p. 127-130.
262
on their faces.
263
They were made to play rough basketball.
264
Witness Marquez testified on
Lenny, saying: [T]inamaan daw sya sa spine.
265
The NBI medico-legal officer explained that
the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries suffered by the latter.
266

The relevant portion of the testimony is as follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various
cross examinations of defense counsels that the injuries that
you have enumerated on the body of the deceased Lenny Villa
previously marked as Exhibit G-1 to G-14 individually by
themselves would not cause the death of the victim. The
question I am going to propound to you is what is the
cumulative effect of all of these injuries marked from Exhibit
G-1 to G-14?

Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the
victim. So, it is not fair for us to isolate such injuries here
because we are talking of the whole body. At the same manner
that as a car would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more
humane in human approach is to interpret all those injuries in
whole and not in part.
267

There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were
drinking during the initiation rites.
268

Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to
recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered
that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.
269

With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victims death was the cumulative
effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly
participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.

263
264
265
TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 175-176.
266
267
TSN, 16 July 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 92-93.
268
TSN, 21 April 1992 (People v. Dizon, Crim. Case No.C-38340), pp. 110-111.
269
Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, 291 S.C. 140, 352 S.E.2d 488 (S.C. App. 1986) (U.S.) citing Easler v.
Hejaz Temple of Greenville, 285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1985) (U.S.).
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at
least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon and Villareal restrained
themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in
the end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation
rites having in mind the concept of seniority in fraternities the implication of the presence
of alumni should be seen as a point of review in future legislation. We further note that some of
the fraternity members were intoxicated during Lennys initiation rites. In this light, the Court
submits to Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to
include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members
during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the misery of
hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to
establish kinship. A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to
avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips during bar examinations.
270
Another initiate
did not give up, because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he
did not have a choice.
271
Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila
Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances, they left their
fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were
entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-
Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been
convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).
272
Since
there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule
according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to
prove, beyond reasonable doubt,

270
271
272
Republic Act No. 8049 (1995), Sec. 4(1), otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing Law.
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny
Villa.
273
As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished by the fact of his
death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability
of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability
from slight physical injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only
with respect to accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of 50,000
as civil indemnity ex delicto and 1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid
by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of 30,000 as indemnity to be jointly
and severally paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the
victim.
274
In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,
275
we sustain the CAs award of
indemnity in the amount of 50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including
expenses incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by
tangible documents.
276
Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is prevented
from granting them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses
were incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not
interpose any claim for actual damages.
277

273
274
Brias v. People, 211 Phil. 37 (1983); see also People v. Yanson, G.R. No. 179195, 3 October 2011, citing
People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 189580, 9 February 2011.
275
People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 189847, 30 May 2011 [citing People v. Flores, G.R. No. 188315, 25 August 2010;
People v. Lindo, G.R. No. 189818, 9 August 2010; People v. Ogan, G.R. No. 186461, 5 July 2010; and People v.
Cadap, G.R. No. 190633, 5 July 2010].
276
Seguritan v. People, G.R. No. 172896, 19 April 2010, 618 SCRA 406.
277
Peoples Consolidated Memoranda (Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 155101), p. 144; rollo, p. 1709.
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of
the victims death.
278
This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which
provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased.
279
Thus, we hereby we affirm the CAs award of moral damages in the amount of
1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito
Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed
Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato
Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries is also
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda,
Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under
Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In
addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil
indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000,
plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this
Decision until satisfaction.
280
Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby
AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal
case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally,
pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby
dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and
TERMINATED.

278
Heirs of Ochoa v. G & S Transport Corporation, G.R. No. 170071, 9 March 2011, citing Victory Liner Inc. v.
Gammad, 486 Phil. 574, 592-593 (2004).
279
Id.
280
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, 17 July 1994, 234 SCRA 78.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law
to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members
during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the Opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

GR No. 151258

FACTS:
Seven Freshmen Law students of Ateneo de Manila University School of Law have been
initiated by the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity on February 1991. The initiation rites started when
the neophytes were met by some members of the mentioned fraternity at the lobby of the
Ateneo Law School. They were consequently brought to a house and briefed on what will be
happening during the days when they will be initiated. They were informed that there will be
physical beatings and that the neophytes can quit anytime they want. They were brought to
another house to commence their initiation.
The neophytes were insulted and threatened even before they got off the van.
Members of the fraternity delivered blows to the neophytes as they alighted from the van.
Several initiation rites were experienced by the neophytes like the Indian run, Bicol express and
rounds. They were asked to recite provisions and principles of the fraternity and were hit
everytime they made a mistake.
Accused fraternity members, Dizon and Villareal, asked the head of the initiation rites
(Victorino) to reopen the initiation. Fraternity members subjected neophytes to paddling and
additional hours of physical pain. After the last session of beatings, Lenny Villa could not walk.
Later that night, he was feeling cold and his condition worsened. He was brought to the
hospital but was declared dead on arrival.
Criminal case was filed against 26 fraternity members and was subsequently found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and penalized with reclusion
perpetua.
On January 10 2002, CA modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according
to individual participation. 19 of the the accused were acquitted, 4 of the appellants were
found guilty of slight physical injuries, and 2 of the accused-appellants (Dizon and Villareal)
were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
Accused Villareal petitioned for review on Certriori under Rue 45 on the grounds that
the CA made 2 reversible errors: first, denial of due process and second, conviction absent
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011 and
filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011.

ISSUE:
Whether or not criminal liability for personal penalties of the accused is extinguished by death
RULING:
Yes, criminal liability of the accused is extinguished by death. The Court took note of
counsel for petitioners Notice of Death when it has been received while the petition was
pending resolution. Personal penalties refer to the service of personal or imprisonment
penalties, while pecuniary penalties refer to fines, costs, civil liability. Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code states that the criminal liability of a convict for personal penalties is totally
extinguished by death of the convict. His pecuniary penalty has been extinguished since the
death of the accused happened before his final judgment. Therefore, the death of the
petitioner for both personal and pecuniary penalties including his civil liability has ended. His
petition has also been dismissed and the criminal case against him has been closed and
terminated.
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REP. VIRGILIO P. ROBLES VS. HON. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
and ROMEO L. SANTOS

G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
The petition seeks the review
1
of the Orders
2
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy
Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident
grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two
separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband
Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for
his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No.
82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A.
No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A.
No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC
proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail
and ordered his arrest.
4
Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after
his arrest.
5
Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the
motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit.
Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly
grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803
arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A.
No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but
this proved unavailing.
6

Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803
constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of
appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special
civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.
7

Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803.
Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed
twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal
Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner
submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his
penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting
petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent
Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight
physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with
grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to
separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from
Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion
not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal
party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing
to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative,
whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2)
the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing
him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of
the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule
124,
8
in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or
motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement,
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal"
contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-
arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and
jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance on People v. Esparas
9
undercuts the cogency of its
ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the
Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for
importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried
and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death
sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.
10

The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment
in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident
when one considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself
from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114
11
of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence merely renders his bondsman potentially
liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the
accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to
surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-
day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that
mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a
fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to
attend the scheduled proceeding"
12
at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before
the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803.
Following the MeTCs refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released
days after the MeTC ordered petitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His
motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense"
13
protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.
14
It is not disputed that petitioners
conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal
Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner
adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of
reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not."
15

We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under
the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit
any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light
felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage
to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an
amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any
person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if
done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion,
without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the
court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should
be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the
defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which
the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed
upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may
be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1)
the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence"
(paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses
(paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties
(paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence"
(paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible,"
16
unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act.
These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the
mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species
of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is
nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring
clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the
proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it x x x"
17
on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-
crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes
as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance
of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless
imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x
x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to
reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances
of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should
be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully.
For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for
the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty
for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if
the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the
latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can
be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual
willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.
18
(Emphasis
supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or property.
19

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a
case for "Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being
limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually
incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law
20
(the normative ancestry of our present day penal code)
and since repeatedly reiterated,
21
stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary
doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller
22
that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime
in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"
23
has long been abandoned when
the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court
decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Fallers conceptualization of quasi-crimes by
holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely
methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence
24

only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of
criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on
erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-
crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy
Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one
resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another
resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second
prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of
such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless
of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on
double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,
25
decided in
1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the
dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior
case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon
which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then,
whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior
conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the
Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga
26

(promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero
27

(promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas
28

(promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva
29

(promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay
30

(promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan
31

(promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v.
Court of Appeals
32
(promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and
People v. City Court of Manila
33
(promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova,
J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under
the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries
and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accuseds prior
acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges
grounded on the same act, the Court explained:
34

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act
of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.
For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same,
and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
35
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its
logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of
authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,
36

decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent
prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same
reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based.
Estiponas inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to
impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in
Buerano.
37
There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals conviction of an accused for
"damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and
less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon
which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We
reversed on the strength of Buan:
38

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war
case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of
People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J.
B. L. Reyes, held that
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act
of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.
For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same,
and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
x x x x
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now
Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident,
because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.
39
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance
in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Courts
attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated
December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not
sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision
dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of
damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs."
He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide
and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same
reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily,
the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with
any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."
40

(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to
extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A
more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioners case than People v. Silva,
41
a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision,
was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence."
Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter,
invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on
reconsideration, found merit in the accuseds claim and dismissed the second case. In
affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz
and its progeny People v. Belga:
42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed
the case, holding:
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy
enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga
were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two
automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint
having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were
filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for
damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the
owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers
injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only.
After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No.
88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple
physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured
passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief
of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after
trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence
filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to
the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the
preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of
First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless imprudence.
Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant
Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov.
Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following
language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by
the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical
injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused
was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of
the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a fast and reckless
manner ... thereby causing an accident. After the accused had pleaded not guilty the
case was dismissed in that court for failure of the Government to prosecute. But some
time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence.
The amount of the damage was alleged to be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the
accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling.
Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of
the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the
offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of
First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense
charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence
which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the
first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice
versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
x x x x
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the
prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of
Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecutions contention might be
true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge
of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first
prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not
now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the
inferior court.
43

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and
hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."
44
We declined
the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the
ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court
for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State,
thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the
ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was
anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon
certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find,
nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the
facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no
practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would
warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear.
On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the
identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.
45
(Emphasis
supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC
succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually
incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both
under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single
prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its
operation light felonies
46
); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu
of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most
serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but
"the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight x x x,"
47
a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences.
Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more
consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a
single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent
acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can
produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models that of a single criminal
negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with
varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing
prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted?
Should Article 48s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its
multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses
which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single
charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be
penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which
involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-
crime with its multiple consequences
48
unless one consequence amounts to a light
felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts
amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level
courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the
charge with the first level courts.
49
Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No.
7691,
50
the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious
penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of
acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less
grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The
issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense
and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article
48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately
from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of
all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their
number or severity,
51
penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v.
Jose,
52
we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging
"reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical
injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage
to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an
amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the
amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there
should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two;
one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.
53
(Emphasis
supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article
365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field
demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing"
of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for
light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under
Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat
the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined
under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of
Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution
of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize
each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes
as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy
adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the
power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between
quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to
the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-
offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave
felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is
why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor Generals argument that
double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined
with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument
was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to
first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser
offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the
defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the
Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation
places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.
54
(Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges
under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant
occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to
mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single
charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.
55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True,
they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under
Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the
certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as
here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded,
Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula
of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the
lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung
of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February
2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We
DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y
Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground
of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Ivler vs. San Pedro G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
Bill of Rights
Ivler vs. San Pedro
G.R. No. 172716November 17, 2010
FACTS:

charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce
and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded
guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking
this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him
in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal
case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.

Without acting on petitioners motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

I SSUES:

1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari
when the MTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and

2. Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the
death of respondent Ponces husband.

RULI NG:

The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not."

the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that
quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself
and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365.

These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are
thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but
any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for
quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed
under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient
schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability,
should cushion the effect of this ruling.

Petition granted.

G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR
vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO and EVANGELINE PONCE
Facts:

charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent
Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner
pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the
second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of
reckless imprudence.
The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in
criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioners motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner
soughtreconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.
Issues:

(1) Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari
when the MTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by
respondent; and
(2) Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband.
Ruling:
The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for
the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon a valid information.
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."
the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that
quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately
defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of
such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless
of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence
on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True,
they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under
Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the
certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as
here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded,
Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula
of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the
lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung
of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February
2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We
DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y
Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground
of double jeopardy.

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, G.R. No. 171513
Petitioner,

- versus -

HON. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-
DE CASTRO, HON. DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA and HON. EFREN N.
DE LA CRUZ, in their official capacities
as Presiding Justice and Associate Justices,
respectively, of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan, and NIERNA S. DOLLER,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------x

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 190963
Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

FIRST DIVISION OF THE Promulgated:
SANDIGANBAYAN and ARNOLD
JAMES M. YSIDORO,
Respondents. February 6, 2012
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions assailing the rulings of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 27963, entitled People of the Philippines v. Arnold James M. Ysidoro.

G.R. No. 171513 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (Rules) filed by petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro to annul the resolutions, dated July 6,
2005
281
and January 25, 2006,
282
of the Sandiganbayan granting the Motion to Suspend
Accused Pendente Lite.

G.R. No. 190963, on the other hand, is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by the
People of the Philippines through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (People) to annul and set
aside the decision,
283
dated October 1, 2009, and the resolution,
284
dated December 9, 2009, of
the Sandiganbayan which acquitted Ysidoro for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts), as amended.

The Antecedents

Ysidoro, as Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte, was charged before the Sandiganbayan,
with the following information:

That during the period from June 2001 to December 2001 or for
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Leyte, Province
of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the] Honorable Court,
above-named accused, ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, a public officer, being
the Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality
and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
withhold and fail to give to Nierna S. Doller, Municipal Social Welfare and
Development Officer (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, without any legal basis, her
RATA for the months of August, September, October, November and
December, all in the year 2001, in the total amount of TWENTY-TWO
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE PESOS (P22,125.00), Philippine
Currency, and her Productivity Pay in the year 2000, in the amount of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00), Philippine Currency, and despite demands
made upon accused to release and pay her the amount of P22,125.00 and
P2,000.00, accused failed to do so, thus accused in the course of the
performance of his official functions had deprived the complainant of her

281
Rollo, G.R. No. 171513, pp. 14-16.
282
Id. at 17-18.
283
Rollo, G.R. No. 190963, pp. 42-50.
284
Id. at 57-60.
RATA and Productivity Pay, to the damage and injury of Nierna S. Doller and
detriment of public service.
285

Ysidoro filed an omnibus motion to quash the information and, in the alternative, for
judicial determination of probable cause,
286
which were both denied by the Sandiganbayan. In
due course, Ysidoro was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty.

The Sandiganbayan Preventively Suspends Ysidoro

On motion of the prosecution,
287
the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Ysidoro for
ninety (90) days in accordance with Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, which states:

Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense and in
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office.

Ysidoro filed a motion for reconsideration, and questioned the necessity and the
duration of the preventive suspension. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for
reconsideration, ruling that -

Clearly, by well established jurisprudence, the provision of Section 13,
Republic Act 3019 make[s] it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend,
for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days, any public officer who has been
validly charged with a violation of Republic Act 3019, as amended or Title 7,

285
Rollo, G.R. No. 171513, p. 20.
286
Id. at 33-45.
287
Id. at 59-60.
Book II of the Revised Penal Code or any offense involving fraud upon
government of public funds or property.
288

Ysidoro assailed the validity of these Sandiganbayan rulings in his petition (G.R. No.
171513) before the Court. Meanwhile, trial on the merits in the principal case continued before
the Sandiganbayan. The prosecution and the defense presented their respective evidence.

The prosecution presented Nierna S. Doller as its sole witness. According to Doller, she
is the Municipal Social Welfare Development Officer of Leyte. She claimed that Ysidoro ordered
her name to be deleted in the payroll because her husband transferred his political affiliation
and sided with Ysidoros opponent. After her name was deleted from the payroll, Doller did not
receive her representation and transportation allowance (RATA) for the period of August 2001
to December 2001. Doller also related that she failed to receive her productivity bonus for the
year 2000 (notwithstanding her performance rating of VS) because Ysidoro failed to sign her
Performance Evaluation Report. Doller asserted that she made several attempts to claim her
RATA and productivity bonus, and made representations with Ysidoro, but he did not act on her
requests. Doller related that her family failed to meet their financial obligations as a result of
Ysidoros actions.

To corroborate Dollers testimony, the prosecution presented documentary evidence in
the form of disbursement vouchers, request for obligation of allotment, letters, excerpts from
the police blotter, memorandum, telegram, certification, order, resolution, and the decision of
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman absolving her of the charges.
289

On the other hand, the defense presented seven (7) witnesses,
290
including Ysidoro, and
documentary evidence. The defense showed that the withholding of Dollers RATA was due to
the investigation conducted by the Office of the Mayor on the anomalies allegedly committed
by Doller. For this reason, Ysidoro ordered the padlocking of Dollers office, and ordered Doller

288
Supra note 2, at 18.
289
Rollo, G.R. No. 190963, p. 43.
290
They are: (1) Lolita Retorbar, Welfare Aide assigned at the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, Leyte, Leyte; (2) Cristina Polinio, Youth Development Officer II, Municipal Social Welfare Office,
Leyte, Leyte; (3) Dennis Q. Abellar, Human Resource Management Officer IV, Leyte, Leyte; (4) Ethel G.
Mercolita, Municipal Accountant for the year 2000-2001, Leyte, Leyte; (5) Elsie M. Retorbar, Barangay Daycare
worker, Leyte, Leyte; and (6) Domingo M. Elises, former Municipal Budget Officer, Leyte, Leyte.
and her staff to hold office at the Office of the Mayor for the close monitoring and evaluation of
their functions. Doller was also prohibited from outside travel without Ysidoros approval.

The Sandiganbayan Acquits Ysidoro

In a decision dated October 1, 2009,
291
the Sandiganbayan acquitted Ysidoro and held
that the second element of the offense that there be malice, ill-motive or bad faith was not
present. The Sandiganbayan pronounced:

This Court acknowledges the fact that Doller was entitled to RATA.
However, the antecedent facts and circumstances did not show any indicia of
bad faith on the part of [Ysidoro+ in withholding the release of Dollers RATA.

In fact, this Court believes that [Ysidoro] acted in good faith and in
honest belief that Doller was not entitled to her RATA based on the opinion
of the COA resident Auditor and Section 317 of the Government Accounting
and Auditing Manual.

It may be an erroneous interpretation of the law, nonetheless,
*Ysidoros+ reliance to the same was a clear basis of good faith on his part in
withholding Dollers RATA.

With regard to the Productivity Incentive Bonus, Doller was aware
that the non-submission of the Performance Evaluation Form is a ground for
an employees non-eligibility to receive the Productivity Incentive Bonus:

a) Employees disqualification for performance-based
personnel actions which would require the rating for the
given period such as promotion, training or scholarship
grants, and productivity incentive bonus if the failure of the
submission of the report form is the fault of the employees.

291
Supra note 3.

Doller even admitted in her testimonies that she failed to submit her
Performance Evaluation Report to [Ysidoro] for signature.

There being no malice, ill-motive or taint of bad faith, [Ysidoro] had
the legal basis to withhold Dollers RATA and Productivity pay.
292
(italics
supplied)

In a resolution dated December 9, 2009,
293
the Sandiganbayan denied the prosecutions
motion for reconsideration, reasoning that -

It must be stressed that this Court acquitted [Ysidoro] for two
reasons: firstly, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of
proving that accused Ysidoro acted in bad faith as stated in paragraph
1 above; and secondly, the exculpatory proof of good faith xxx.

Needless to state, paragraph 1 alone would be enough ground
for the acquittal of accused Ysidoro. Hence, the COA Resident Auditor
need not be presented in court to prove that [Ysidoro] acted in good
faith. This is based on the legal precept that when the prosecution
fails to discharge its burden, an accused need not even offer evidence
in his behalf.
294
(italics supplied)

Supervening events occurred after the filing of Ysidoros petition which rendered the
issue in G.R. No. 171513 i.e., the propriety of his preventive suspension moot and
academic. First, Ysidoro is no longer the incumbent Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte as his term
of office expired in 2007. Second, the prosecution completed its presentation of evidence and
had rested its case before the Sandiganbayan. And third, the Sandiganbayan issued its decision
acquitting Ysidoro of the crime charged.

292
Id. at 47-48.
293
Supra note 4.
294
Id. at 58.

In light of these events, what is left to resolve is the petition for certiorari filed by the
People on the validity of the judgment acquitting Ysidoro of the criminal charge.

The Peoples Petition

The People posits that the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 have been duly
established by the evidence, in that:

First. [Ysidoro] was the Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte when he
ordered the deletion of private complainants name in the payroll for RATA
and productivity pay.

Second. He caused undue injury to [Doller] when he ordered the
withholding of her RATA and productivity pay. It is noteworthy that
complainant was the only official in the municipality who did not receive her
RATA and productivity pay even if the same were already included in the
budget for that year. x x x

Consequently, [Doller] testified that her family suffered actual and
moral damages due to the withholding of her benefits namely: a) the
disconnection of electricity in their residence; x x x b) demand letters from
their creditors; x x x c) her son was dropped from school because they were
not able to pay for his final exams; x x x d) [h]er children did not want to go
to school anymore because they were embarrassed that collectors were
running after them.

Third. Accused clearly acted in evident bad faith as he used his
position to deprive [Doller] of her RATA and productivity pay for the period
mentioned to harass her due to the transfer of political affiliation of her
husband.
295
(emphasis supplied)

The People argues
296
that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion, and
exceeded its, or acted without, jurisdiction in not finding Ysidoro in bad faith when he withheld
Dollers RATA and deprived her of her productivity bonus. The Sandiganbayan failed to take into
account that: first, the Commission on Audit (COA) resident auditor was never presented in
court; second, the documentary evidence showed that Doller continuously discharged the
functions of her office even if she had been prevented from outside travel by Ysidoro; third,
Ysidoro refused to release Dollers RATA and productivity bonus notwithstanding the dismissal
by the Ombudsman of the cases against her for alleged anomalies committed in office; and
fourth, Ysidoro caused Dollers name to be dropped from the payroll without justifiable cause,
and he refused to sign the disbursement vouchers and the request for obligation of allotment
so that Doller could claim her RATA and her productivity bonus.

In the same manner, the People asserts that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion when it ruled that Doller was not eligible to receive the productivity bonus for her
failure to submit her Performance Evaluation Report. The Sandiganbayan disregarded the
evidence showing the strained relationship and the maneuverings made by Ysidoro so that he
could deny her this incentive.

In his Comment,
297
Ysidoro prays for the dismissal of the petition for procedural and
substantive infirmities. First, he claims that the petition was filed out of time considering the
belated filing of the Peoples motion for reconsideration before the Sandiganbayan. He argues
that by reason of the late filing of the motion for reconsideration, the present petition was filed
beyond the 60-day reglementary period. Ysidoro also argues that the 60-day reglementary
period should have been counted from the Peoples receipt of the Sandiganbayans decision
since no motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed. Second, Ysidoro claims that the
Sandiganbayans ruling was in accord with the evidence and the prosecution was not denied
due process to properly avail of the remedy of a writ of certiorari. And third, Ysidoro insists that

295
Rollo, G.R. No. 190963, pp. 20-24,
296
Id. at 16-33
297
Id. at 78-85.
he can no longer be prosecuted for the same criminal charge without violating the rule against
double jeopardy.

The Issue Raised

The ultimate issue to be resolved is whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion and exceeded its, or acted without, jurisdiction when it acquitted Ysidoro of the
crime charged.

The Courts Ruling

We first resolve the preliminary issue raised by Ysidoro on the timeliness of the Peoples
petition for certiorari. The records show that the motion for reconsideration was filed by the
People before the Sandiganbayan on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to file the
motion which fell on October 16, 2009, a Friday. Although the date originally appearing in the
notice of hearing on the motion was September 22, 2009 (which later on was corrected to
October 22, 2009), the error in designating the month was unmistakably obvious considering
the date when the motion was filed. In any case, the error cannot detract from the
circumstance that the motion for reconsideration was filed within the 15-day reglementary
period. We consider, too, that Ysidoro was not deprived of due process and was given the
opportunity to be heard on the motion. Accordingly, the above error cannot be considered fatal
to the right of the People to file its motion for reconsideration. The counting of the 60-day
reglementary period within which to file the petition for certiorari will be reckoned from the
receipt of the People of the denial of its motion for reconsideration, or on December 10, 2009.
As the last day of the 60-day reglementary period fell on February 8, 2010, the petition
which was filed on February 5, 2010 was filed on time.

Nevertheless, we dismiss the petitions for being procedurally and substantially infirm.

A Review of a Judgment of Acquittal

Generally, the Rules provides three (3) procedural remedies in order for a party to
appeal a decision of a trial court in a criminal case before this Court. The first is by ordinary
appeal under Section 3, Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The second
is by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules. And the third is by filing a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Each procedural remedy is unique and provides
for a different mode of review. In addition, each procedural remedy may only be availed of
depending on the nature of the judgment sought to be reviewed.

A review by ordinary appeal resolves factual and legal issues. Issues which have not
been properly raised by the parties but are, nevertheless, material in the resolution of the case
are also resolved in this mode of review. In contrast, a review on certiorari under a Rule 45
petition is generally limited to the review of legal issues; the Court only resolves questions of
law which have been properly raised by the parties during the appeal and in the petition. Under
this mode, the Court determines whether a proper application of the law was made in a given
set of facts. A Rule 65 review, on the other hand, is strictly confined to the determination of the
propriety of the trial courts jurisdiction whether it has jurisdiction over the case and if so,
whether the exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been attended by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

While an assailed judgment elevated by way of ordinary appeal or a Rule 45 petition is
considered an intrinsically valid, albeit erroneous, judgment, a judgment assailed under Rule 65
is characterized as an invalid judgment because of defect in the trial courts authority to rule.
Also, an ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition tackle errors committed by the trial court in the
appreciation of the evidence and/or the application of law. In contrast, a Rule 65 petition
resolves jurisdictional errors committed in the proceedings in the principal case. In other words,
errors of judgment are the proper subjects of an ordinary appeal and in a Rule 45 petition;
errors of jurisdiction are addressed in a Rule 65 petition.

As applied to judgments rendered in criminal cases, unlike a review via a Rule 65
petition, only judgments of conviction can be reviewed in an ordinary appeal or a Rule 45
petition. As we explained in People v. Nazareno,
298
the constitutional right of the accused
against double jeopardy proscribes appeals of judgments of acquittal through the remedies of
ordinary appeal and a Rule 45 petition, thus:

The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy
and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a
second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the accused has been
confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an
appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the
government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the
criminal defendants culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a
final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the
constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The
reason is not only the defendants already established innocence at the first
trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same
untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a
government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the
State. Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government
would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the
defendants guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the
first trial, all in a process where the governments power and resources are
once again employed against the defendants individual means. That the
second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the effects any less
prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience.
299
(emphases
supplied)

However, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65
petition, predicated on two (2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of acquittal
rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the court; and where the prosecution had been
deprived of due process.
300
The rule against double jeopardy does not apply in these instances
because a Rule 65 petition does not involve a review of facts and law on the merits in the
manner done in an appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not examine and
assess the evidence of the parties nor weigh the probative value of the evidence.
301
It does not

298
G.R. No. 168982, August 5, 2009, 595 SCRA 438.
299
Id. at 450.
300
Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil. 42, 87 (1986).
301
People v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. No. 173396, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 128, 133,
citing First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 171989, July 4, 2007, 526
include an inquiry on the correctness of the evaluation of the evidence.
302
A review under Rule
65 only asks the question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not the
question of whether the decision is legally correct.
303
In other words, the focus of the review is
to determine whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds.
304

Applying these legal concepts to this case, we find that while the People was
procedurally correct in filing its petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petition does not raise
any jurisdictional error committed by the Sandiganbayan. On the contrary, what is clear is the
obvious attempt by the People to have the evidence in the case reviewed by the Court under
the guise of a Rule 65 petition. This much can be deduced by examining the petition itself which
does not allege any bias, partiality or bad faith committed by the Sandiganbayan in its
proceedings. The petition does not also raise any denial of the Peoples due process in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.

We observe, too, that the grounds relied in the petition relate to factual errors of
judgment which are more appropriate in an ordinary appeal rather than in a Rule 65 petition.
The grounds cited in the petition call for the Courts own appreciation of the factual findings of
the Sandiganbayan on the sufficiency of the Peoples evidence in proving the element of bad
faith, and the sufficiency of the evidence denying productivity bonus to Doller.

The Merits of the Case

Our consideration of the imputed errors fails to establish grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Sandiganbayan. As a rule,
misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on evidence do not, by
the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion.
305
That
an abuse itself must be grave must be amply demonstrated since the jurisdiction of the court,

SCRA 564.
302
Id. at 133.
303
People v. Nazareno, supra note 18, at 451
304
Ibid.
305
Id. at 452.
no less, will be affected.
306
We have previously held that the mere fact, too, that a court
erroneously decides a case does not necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction.
307

Jurisprudence has defined grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in this wise:

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
308

Under this definition, the People bears the burden of convincingly demonstrating that
the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in the appreciation of the evidence. We find
that the People failed in this regard.

We find no indication from the records that the Sandiganbayan acted arbitrarily,
capriciously and whimsically in arriving at its verdict of acquittal. The settled rule is that
conviction ensues only if every element of the crime was alleged and proved.
309
In this case,
Ysidoro was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan for two reasons: first, his bad faith (an element of
the crime charged) was not sufficiently proven by the prosecution evidence; and second, there
was exculpatory evidence of his good faith.

As bad faith is a state of mind, the prosecution must present evidence of the overt acts
or omissions committed by Ysidoro showing that he deliberately intended to do wrong or cause

306
Id. at 452-453.
307
Id. at 453.
308
Marcelo G. Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 170500 and 170510-11, June 1,
2011.
309
Aisporna v. CA, et al., 198 Phil. 838, 848 (1982).

damage to Doller by withholding her RATA. However, save from the testimony of Doller of the
strained relationship between her and Ysidoro, no other evidence was presented to support
Ysidoros bad faith against her. We note that Doller even disproved Ysidoros bad faith when
she admitted that several cases had been actually filed against her before the Office of the
Ombudsman. It bears stressing that these purported anomalies were allegedly committed in
office which Ysidoro cited to justify the withholding of Dollers RATA.

The records also show other acts that tend to negate Ysidoros bad faith under the
circumstances. First, the investigation of the alleged anomalies by Ysidoro was corroborated by
the physical transfer of Doller and her subordinates to the Office of the Mayor and the
prohibition against outside travel imposed on Doller. Second, the existence of the
Ombudsmans cases against Doller. And third, Ysidoros act of seeking an opinion from the COA
Auditor on the proper interpretation of Section 317 of the Government Accounting and
Auditing Manual before he withheld the RATA. This section provides:

An official/employee who was wrongly removed or prevented from
performing his duties is entitled to back salaries but not RATA. The rationale for
the grant of RATA is to provide the official concerned additional fund to meet
necessary expenses incidental to and connected with the exercise or the discharge
of the functions of an office. If he is out of office, [voluntarily] or involuntarily, it
necessarily follows that the functions of the office remain undischarged (COA,
Dec. 1602, October 23, 1990). And if the duties of the office are not discharged,
the official does not and is not supposed to incur expenses. There being no
expenses incurred[,] there is nothing to be reimbursed (COA, Dec. 2121 dated
June 28, 1979).
310

Although the above provision was erroneously interpreted by Ysidoro and the COA
Auditor, the totality of the evidence, to our mind, provides sufficient grounds to create
reasonable doubt on Ysidoros bad faith. As we have held before, bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence but imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong or a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent, or
ill-will to partake the nature of fraud.
311
An erroneous interpretation of a provision of law,

310
Rollo, G.R. No. 190963, p. 47.
311
Sampiano. v. Indar, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 597, 613.
absent any showing of some dishonest or wrongful purpose, does not constitute and does not
necessarily amount to bad faith.
312

Similarly, we find no inference of bad faith when Doller failed to receive the productivity
bonus. Doller does not dispute that the receipt of the productivity bonus was premised on the
submission by the employee of his/her Performance Evaluation Report. In this case, Doller
admitted that she did not submit her Performance Evaluation Report; hence, she could not
have reasonably expected to receive any productivity bonus. Further, we cannot agree with her
self-serving claim that it was Ysidoros refusal that led to her failure to receive her productivity
bonus given that no other hard evidence supported this claim. We certainly cannot rely on
Dollers assertion of the alleged statement made by one Leo Apacible (Ysidoros secretary) who
was not presented in court. The alleged statement made by Leo Apacible that the mayor will
get angry with him and he might be laid off,
313
in addition to being hearsay, did not even
establish the actual existence of an order from Ysidoro or of his alleged maneuverings to
deprive Doller of her RATA and productivity bonus.

In light of these considerations, we resolve to dismiss the Peoples petition. We cannot
review a verdict of acquittal which does not impute or show any jurisdictional error committed
by the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to:

1. DISMISS the petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 171513,
filed by Arnold James M. Ysidoro for being moot and academic.

2. DISMISS the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 190963, filed by the People
of the Philippines, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, for lack of merit.

312
Cabungcal, et al. v. Cordova, et al., 120 Phil. 567, 572-573, (1964) insofar as it applies mutatis
mutandis.
313
Rollo, G.R. No. 190963, p. 26.
SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL
TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN
CALILUNG, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the
Secretary of Justice, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J .:
This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon
Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship.
1
Petitioner
prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic
Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who
Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act
No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225
is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states,
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law."
Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003,
reads:
SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship
upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear
to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its
duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office:
Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country
where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines
shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office
in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those
who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the
country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned
officers in the armed forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is held
unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall
remain valid and effective.
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act No.
9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of
dual allegiance?
We shall discuss these issues jointly.
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers
that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual
citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or
naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without
losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law
allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by
simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.
2
The
Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national
interest.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a
state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the
oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former
Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The
fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of
the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to
the Republic.
3

In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress is
necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law.
During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow dual
allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative
deliberations reveals the following:
x x x x
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist -
- the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
this case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He
pointed out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public interest. He
thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual allegiance by reason of retention of
foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a
violation of the Constitution
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constitutional
injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed law
aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means. However,
he said that in one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the
taking of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual citizenship is transferred from
the Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath that will be taken by the
former Filipino is one of allegiance to the Philippines and not to the United States, as
the case may be. He added that this is a matter which the Philippine government will
have no concern and competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual
allegiance is involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of the
bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires this
oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign
country concerned, he explained.
x x x x
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce his
foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government, and at
the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there is now
a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the
person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a
matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he is not a member of a foreign
parliament but a Member of the House.
x x x x
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary to
national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said that the dual allegiance
problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the bill
which states that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is
recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country and
in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country
of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this
stage, he explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is required to take an
oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance to the country. He then said that the
problem of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of the Philippines but of the other
foreign country.
4
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the
legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 63
5
which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225
does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face,
it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3,
Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the
burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the
concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a
concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet passed
any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not be
justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends that while it
is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme Court, through
Mercado v. Manzano,
6
already had drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual
allegiance from dual citizenship.
7

For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual
allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to
entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.
8

To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it
is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual
allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned
with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
9
Congress was
given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really
constitutes dual allegiance.
10
Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since
the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance.
Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes
dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual
citizenship.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,
11
we said that the courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is
right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts
of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial
restraint and act with caution and forbearance.
12
The doctrine of separation of powers
demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what
constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of
determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, G.R. No. 182701
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Promulgated:
and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA,
Respondents. July 23, 2008

x -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

R E S O L U T I O N

REYES, R.T., J .:

A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the
Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the
time of filing the certificate of candidacy.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure assailing the (1) Resolution
314
and (2) Omnibus Order
315
of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Second Division, disqualifying petitioner from running as Barangay
Chairman.

Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of
Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007.

On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition
316
before the
Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of
petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any
public office. In his Answer,
317
petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the
same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
318
He returned to the Philippines and
resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for
Barangay Chairman.

After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the
winner.
319

314
SPA 07-198 (BGY), signed by Rene V. Sarmiento, as Presiding Commissioner, and Nicodemo T. Ferrer, as
Commissioner; rollo, pp. 16-20.
315
Signed by Jose A.R. Melo, as Chairman, and Romeo A. Brawner, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Nicodemo T. Ferrer,
as Commissioners.
316
Rollo, pp. 31-35.
317
Id. at 36-37.
318
Also known as the Dual Citizenship Law.
319
Rollo, pp. 6, 19.
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for
disqualification, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for
Disqualification is GRANTED and respondent Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez is
DISQUALIFIED from running as Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San
Dionisio, Iloilo.

SO ORDERED.
320

In ruling against petitioner, the COMELEC found that he was not able to regain his
Filipino citizenship in the manner provided by law. According to the poll body, to be able to
qualify as a candidate in the elections, petitioner should have made a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. This, petitioner failed to do.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to the present
petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying him
from running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.

We dismiss the petition.

320
Id. at 20.
Relying on Valles v. Commission on Elections,
321
petitioner argues that his filing of a
certificate of candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.

We note, however, that the operative facts that led to this Courts ruling in Valles are
substantially different from the present case. In Valles, the candidate, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez,
was a dual citizen by accident of birth on foreign soil.
322
Lopez was born of Filipino parents in
Australia, a country which follows the principle of jus soli. As a result, she acquired Australian
citizenship by operation of Australian law, but she was also considered a Filipino citizen under
Philippine law. She did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the
Philippines.

In contrast, petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American
citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-
acquiring Filipino citizenship.

More importantly, the Courts 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by the
enactment of R.A. No. 9225
323
in 2003. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions
before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines.
Section 5 of the said law states:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or
re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

321
G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000, 337 SCRA 543.
322
See Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999, 307 SCRA 630.
323
See note 5.

x x x x

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath. (Emphasis added)

Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly
provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath.

Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the
COMELEC observation on this point:

While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of
the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice
Consul of the Philippine Consulate Generals Office in Los Angeles, California, the
same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted
provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented
that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225.
Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Bagacay.

For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly
executed before an officer of law who is authorized to administer an oath. The
affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all
foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopezs
failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an
affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he
failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of respondent to
prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this Commission
holds him disqualified from running for an elective position in the Philippines.
324

(Emphasis added)

While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge
the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory can not cure the defect of his candidacy.
Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate
because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not
a matter of popularity.
325

In sum, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner
as candidate for Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

324
Rollo, p. 19.
325
See Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52699, May 15, 1980, 97 SCRA 500.

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000]
CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PURISIMA, J .:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998
and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No.
98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner,
Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May
1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen
and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In
1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at
the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously
participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as
well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor
of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr.,
in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground
therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof
that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on
Elections en banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the
impugned resolution shows that respondent was able to produce
documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father... and
consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the
Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the
contrary notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important
documents . . . no other evidence substantial in nature surfaced to
confirm the allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian
citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a
mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an
equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay
meager, to prove that respondent contemplated renunciation of her
Filipino citizenship.
326

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-
election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a
petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC,
First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was
likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in
EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue
when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998
elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles,
in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out with a
Resolution dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:
Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are
to dispose the instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above
table definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new
evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-
066. The present petition merely restates the same matters and
incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995
Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having
put forth any new evidence and matter substantial in nature, persuasive
in character or sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such
Resolutions, the dismissal of the present petition follows as a matter of
course.
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new
matters and issues tendered, We find no convincing reason or
impressive explanation to disturb and reverse the Resolutions
promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This
Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the

326
Rollo, p. 31.
present petition.
SO ORDERED.
327

Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
Resolution but to no avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in its en
banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition;
questioning the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public
office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by
virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987
Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her
also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3)
and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before
the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian
passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in
Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No.
92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified
to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an
Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate
of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3,
1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the
private respondent had renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in
her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of
residence, private respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a
citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine
citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had renounced
her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passport
cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy here
in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically restore the

327
Rollo, pp. 57-58.
status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the
private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the
mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the
election of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration of her
Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated.
Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private
respondent has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is
disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in
applying the principle of res judicata to the case under consideration; citing the
ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,
328
that:
xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand. xxx
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli
which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in
Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco,
a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez,
an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took
into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines
were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the
country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine
Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the
Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to
reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to
the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
(underscoring ours)

328
141 SCRA 292, 367.
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except
such others as have since become citizens of some other country:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship
by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands
who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of
the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.
(underscoring ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo
Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly
evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus,
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the
laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the
principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to
wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of
blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973
329
and 1987
330

Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is
a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being
born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If
Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can
also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private
respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine
citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondents
application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her
of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of
a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign
country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine
armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or
amnesty has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the
laws in force in her husbands country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation
must be express. Petitioners contention that the application of private

329
Article III, Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1.....Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
2.....Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
3.....Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred
and thirty-five.
4.....Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
330
Article IV, Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1.....Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
2.....Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
3.....Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
4.....Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is
bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC
331

and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.
332

In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent
Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not
mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien
certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that
respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April
22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of
Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination
of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a
holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are
not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate
against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in
the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.
333
As held by this court in the
aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration
does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of ones citizenship.
The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of
registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of
Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship
before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private
respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino
parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for
losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or
renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that respondent must go
through the process of repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private
respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of
Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;

331
185 SCRA 703.
332
G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999.
333
Commonwealth Act 63, Section 1.
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
Again, petitioners contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified dual
citizenship as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same
with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance.
334

Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any
act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different
countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual
citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The
Court succinctly pronounced:
xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and
in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification.
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not
automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was
ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.
335
The filing of a
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.
336
This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that
he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under
oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992,
such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private
respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship,
duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia
on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian
passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second
Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly
appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the
issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her
renunciation was effective, petitioners claim that private respondent must go
through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in
judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging

334
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
335
Mercado vs. Manzano, supra.
336
Ibid.
the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration.
337
He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed
out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the
principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue
of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,
338
an exception to
this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that
the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following
must be present:
1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where
said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof, and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the
case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated
that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings,
though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler.
339
Indeed, there
appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on
Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of
citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by
petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior cases.
Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a
reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue
notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC
Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA
No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to
run for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business.

337
41 SCRA 292, supra.
338
51 SCRA 248.
339
Moy Ya Lim Yao, supra, pp. 366-367.

G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner,
vs.
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
x-----------------------------x
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO
KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J .:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are
deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition,"
1
that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it
or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of
profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge
the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our
people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr.,
the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a
natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial
roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the
fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than
distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President
of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to
be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his
place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the
thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no
such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the
birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004,
petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of
the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish
by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and
concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit
aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a
certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office,
attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo
Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives
to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National
Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the
more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of
the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe
and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d)
Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No.
20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the
certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract
between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil
Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said
office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World
War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three
days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The
motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February
2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably
with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The
petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order,
a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or
execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No.
161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and
Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny
due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a
material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner
Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false"
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the
Omnibus Election Code -
"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In
addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution,
the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the
purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections" -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would
authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel
the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court per Rule 64
2
in an action for certiorari under Rule 65
3
of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by
law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power
is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law
which power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated
to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a
gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a
proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government
post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke
the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in
urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before
it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and
the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and
vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,
4

as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse
prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act
Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide
Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of
the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the
members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of
government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No.
1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the
present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario.
Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although
two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning
candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of
the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en
banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -
"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President of the Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or
Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or
for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the
Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.
5
In such context, the
election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest
number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-
election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs.
Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs.
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want
of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on
the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office.
6
Aristotle saw its significance if
only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being
composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-
sufficient existence.
7
The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be
governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be
expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand,
and with concomitant obligations, on the other.
8
In its ideal setting, a citizen was active
in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general
interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th
century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the
rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and
justice.
9
Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship,
which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power.
10
The 20th
century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid
emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.
11
The
idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed
in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the
rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.
12

The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects
of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."
13
In church records, the natives were called 'indios',
denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship
became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult
to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however,
were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by
Royal Decrees.
14

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion,
promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the
Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts;
15
however,
three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines -
the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,
16
the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868
specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,
17
and
finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made
applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.
18

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because
of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the
Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by special laws.
19

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December
1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish
citizens. -
"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside
of Spain,
"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy."
20

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of
decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an
upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law
dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws
then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the
United States.
21
Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the
native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by
its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over
which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty
may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either
event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of
such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry
on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect
thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in
the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by
making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held
to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in
which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress."
22

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States
Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish
subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased
to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to
be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine
Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and
then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto,
shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall
have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and
ninety eight."
23

Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of
the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11
th
day of April 1899. The term
"inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a
native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or
before 11 April 1899.
24

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899
to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines.
Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the
common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality,
operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine
Archipelago within that period.
25
More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to
the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide
by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of
the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein."
26

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had
for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first
Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his
slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also
known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902,
as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects
on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of
some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein
provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could
become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States,
if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a
citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April
1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of
some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a
mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link
with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as
being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the
Philippines -
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before
the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law
provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory
situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino
citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino
mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to
correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino
women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of
the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under
the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except
for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines
for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."
27

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship
- naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis
28
had been in vogue. Only two,
i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen of
the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs
29
(1912), did not last long.
With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor
30
(1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the
primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married
to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had
not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a
Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death
on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe,
showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a
mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an "uncertified"
copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate,
Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen,
and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The
birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F.
Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen,
twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries
on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents
would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84
years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a
natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley,
the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of
public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in
evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for
respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as
Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by
respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence
for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they
purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of
Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo
Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner,
who had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were
certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
"Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x x x x x x x
"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or
is recorded in a public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie
proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made
therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the
statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the
routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record
which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.
31

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954,
at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that
Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a
colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines
during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing
record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner,
however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the
same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be
San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be
sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the
time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if
the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of all
residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of
the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to
the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to
petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December
1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines
took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity.
Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory
acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent;
voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document.
32
Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry
Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and
sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the
father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or
reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such
father could be identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or
sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as
being an authoritative document of recognition.
33
In Mendoza vs. Mella,
34
the Court
ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the
question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which
is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as
sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such
reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the
names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original,
let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753.
For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them
who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say
that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document
wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made,
according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there
must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the
child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently
executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only
other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document." In
Pareja vs. Pareja,
35
this Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof
of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents,
those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their
office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means
by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in
any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers
and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural.
Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child
had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy
which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the
heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought
during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing,"
so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a
genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument
(one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private
writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article
175 provide:
"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the
child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding
the death of either or both of the parties.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article
172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent."
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code
reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws."
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,
36
the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child
should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a
natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was
born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950.
Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea
of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in
favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to
merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to
indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect
his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions
on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the
context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been]
defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the
relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a
family, and those which exist among members of a society for the
protection of private interests."
37

In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,
38
the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign
country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as
those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the
domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the
separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital
authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property,
legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it,
and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons
and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively
by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article
15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional
provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in
different parts of the Civil Code,
39
such as on successional rights and family relations.
40

In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive
parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction
extended only to define his rights under civil law
41
and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory
attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining
proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in
the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain,
the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines
and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil
Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became
the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and
should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the
domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status
should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that
prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of
filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien
to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should
govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being
applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The
word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead
or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must
be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made
before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and
the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie
Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove
the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living
together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house,
and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing
in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law
do hereby declare that:
"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe,
more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's
Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
"x x x x x x x x x
"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged
while they were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was
also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children,
Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with
our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.),
Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months
between 1943-1944.
"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4)
more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
"x x x x x x x x x
"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew,
Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate
child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January
2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would
be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body
cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be
resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of
Appeals,
42
this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of
the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory
has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2)
copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule
on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the
results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to
reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child.
According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5,
1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent
marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The
veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no
less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a
marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a
Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or
on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child.
Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his
mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court
in Morano vs. Vivo,
43
citing Chiongbian vs. de Leo
44
and Serra vs. Republic.
45

On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is
most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of
them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis
mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under
the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis
mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter
dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look
closely into these cases.
"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a
Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the
child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether
the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus
sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized
stepfather.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate
son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had
become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was
illegitimate here.
"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of
a Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino
because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing
there about invidious jus sanguinis.
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.
46
This is a more complicated case. The case was
about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan.
Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got
his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that
there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina
mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If
Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore
was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an
obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father,
were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was
illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter
dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs.
Vivo.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual
foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child,
and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the
illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established
long ago by People vs. Cayat.
47
I would grant that the distinction between
legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x
But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real
differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another
purpose.
"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public
service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an
illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the
child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness
of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child
from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion
of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is
neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction
transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court),
Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar
views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should
indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its
mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the
illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had
custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate
child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses
jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No.
161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003
which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running
for the position of President in the 10
th
May 2004 national elections on the
contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his
certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the
petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly
elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve
a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution.
Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only
after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion
has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the
matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which,
in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on
the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have
been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence
upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have
well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired,
would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ.
The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first
light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively
that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that
he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample
opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and
to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which,
as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,
48
must not only be
material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in
SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170603 January 29, 2007
EDISON SO, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80437 which reversed the Decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 8, in Naturalization Case No. 02-102984. Likewise assailed is
the appellate courts Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration of its Decision.
Antecedents
On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for
Naturalization
3
under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. He alleged the following in his petition:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in
No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an
average annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other
benefits; he is single, able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is
exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines
pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, as amended, because he
was born in the Philippines, and studied in a school recognized by the Government
where Philippine history, government and culture are taught; he is a person of good
moral character; he believes in the principles underlying the Philippine constitution; he
has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of
his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as
with the community in which he is living; he has mingled socially with the Filipinos and
has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of
the Filipino people; he has all the qualifications provided under Section 2 and none of
the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473, as amended; he is not opposed to
organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold
and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; he is not defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the
success or predominance of mens ideas; he is not a polygamist or a believer in the
practice of polygamy; he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;
he is not suffering from any incurable contagious diseases or from mental alienation; the
nation of which he is a citizen is not at war with the Philippines; it is his intention in good
faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and
particularly to China; and he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of
the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission as citizen of the Philippines. The
petition was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 02-102984.
Attached to the petition were the Joint Affidavit
4
of Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr. and Mark B.
Salcedo; and petitioners Certificate of Live Birth,
5
Alien Certificate of Registration,
6
and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence.
7

On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order
8
setting the petition for hearing at 8:30
a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were enjoined
to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The entire petition and its
annexes, including the order, were ordered published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general circulation
in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the petition and notice be
posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building.
9

Petitioner thus caused the publication of the above order, as well as the entire petition
and its annexes, in the Official Gazette on May 20, 2002
10
and May 27, 2002,
11
and in
Today, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila, on May 25, 2002 and
June 1, 2002.
No one opposed the petition. During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr.
who testified that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and adviser
of the So familys business. He would usually attend parties and other social functions
hosted by petitioners family. He knew petitioner to be obedient, hardworking, and
possessed of good moral character, including all the qualifications mandated by law.
Atty. Adasa, Jr. further testified that petitioner was gainfully employed and presently
resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila; petitioner had been practicing
Philippine tradition and those embodied in the Constitution; petitioner had been socially
active, mingled with some of his neighbors and had conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines; and petitioner and his
family observed Christmas and New Year and some occasions such as fiestas.
According to the witness, petitioner was not disqualified under C.A. No. 473 to become
a Filipino citizen: he is not opposed to organized government or believes in the use of
force; he is not a polygamist and has not been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude; neither is he suffering from any mental alienation or any incurable disease.
12

Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for
ten (10) years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were
classmates at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy.
Petitioner was a member of some school organizations and mingled well with friends.
13

Salcedo further testified that he saw petitioner twice a week, and during fiestas and
special occasions when he would go to petitioners house. He has known petitioner to
have resided in Manila since birth. Petitioner is intelligent, a person of good moral
character, and believes in the principles of the Philippine Constitution. Petitioner has a
gainful occupation, has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner and
has all the qualifications to become a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner also testified and attempted to prove that he has all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines.
At the conclusion of his testimonial evidence, petitioner offered in evidence the following
documents: (1) Certificate of Live Birth;
14
(2) Alien Certificate of Registration;
15
(3)
Immigrant Certificate of Residence;
16
(4) Elementary Pupils
17
and High School
Students
18
Permanent Record issued by Chang Kai Shek College; (5) Transcript of
Record issued by the University of Santo Tomas;
19
(6) Certification of Part-Time
Employment dated November 20, 2002;
20
(7) Income Tax Returns and Certificate of
Withholding Tax for the year 2001;
21
(8) Certification from Metrobank that petitioner is a
depositor;
22
(9) Clearances that he has not been charged or convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude;
23
and (10) Medical Certificates and Psychiatric Evaluation
issued by the Philippine General Hospital.
24
The RTC admitted all these in evidence.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.
25
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring that
petitioner EDISON SO has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to
become a Filipino citizen and he is hereby admitted as citizen of the Philippines, after
taking the necessary oath of allegiance, as soon as this decision becomes final, subject
to payment of cost of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
26

The trial court ruled that the witnesses for petitioner had known him for the period
required by law, and they had affirmed that petitioner had all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. Thus, the court concluded that
petitioner had satisfactorily supported his petition with evidence.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), appealed the decision to the CA on the following grounds:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) CHARACTER WITNESSES, NAMELY:
ARTEMIO ADASA, JR. AND MARK SALCEDO WERE NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER
WITNESSES.
II.
PETITIONER IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE ADMITTED AS CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
27

Respondent contended that based on the evidence on record, appellee failed to prove
that he possesses all the qualifications under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473. It insisted that his two (2) character witnesses did not
know him well enough to vouch for his fitness to become a Filipino citizen; they merely
made general statements without giving specific details about his character and moral
conduct.
28
The witnesses did not even reside in the same place as petitioner.
29

Respondent likewise argued that petitioner himself failed to prove that he is qualified to
become a Filipino citizen because he did not give any explanation or specific answers to
the questions propounded by his lawyer. He merely answered "yes" or "no" or gave
general statements in answer to his counsels questions. Thus, petitioner was unable to
prove that he had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law
to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.
30

On the other hand, petitioner averred that he graduated cum laude from the UST with
the degree of Bachelor of Science in Pharmacy. He is now on his second year as a
medical student at the UST Medicine and Surgery. He avers that the requirements for
naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended by LOI 270, in relation to Presidential
Decree Nos. 836 and 1379, had been relaxed after the Philippine government entered
into diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China; the requirements were
further relaxed when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 was signed into law.
31
Petitioner
pointed out that the petition, with all its annexes, was published in the official gazette
and a newspaper of general circulation; notices were likewise sent to the National
Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Department of Foreign Affairs, and the
OSG. But none from these offices came forward to oppose the petition before the lower
court.
32
Petitioner insisted that he has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become Filipino. This was clearly established by his witnesses.
In its Reply Brief, respondent alleged that R.A. No. 9139 applies to administrative
naturalization filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization. It insisted that even in
the absence of any opposition, a petition for naturalization may be dismissed.
In its Decision
33
dated August 4, 2005, the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and
dismissed the petition for naturalization without prejudice.
34
According to the CA,
petitioners two (2) witnesses were not credible because they failed to mention specific
details of petitioners life or character to show how well they knew him; they merely
"parroted" the provisions of the Naturalization Act without clearly explaining their
applicability to petitioners case.
35
The appellate court likewise ruled that petitioner failed
to comply with the requirement of the law that the applicant must not be less than 21
years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition; during the first hearing on
December 12, 2002, petitioner was only twenty (20) years, nine (9) months, and twenty
five (25) days old, falling short of the requirement.
36
The CA stated, however, that it was
not its intention to forever close the door to any future application for naturalization
which petitioner would file, and that it believes that he would make a good Filipino
citizen in due time, a decided asset to this country.
37

Petitioners motion for reconsideration
38
was denied in a Resolution
39
dated November
24, 2005; hence, the present petition grounded on the sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA.
40

In support of his petition, petitioner reiterates the arguments he set forth in the Brief filed
before the CA.
In its Comment
41
on the petition, respondent countered that R.A. No. 9139 (which took
effect on August 8, 2001 and where the applicants age requirement was lowered to
eighteen (18) years old), refers only to administrative naturalization filed with the Special
Committee on Naturalization; it does not apply to judicial naturalization before the court,
as in the present case.
42
Respondent, through the OSG, avers that its failure to oppose
the petition before the court a quo does not preclude it from appealing the decision of
the RTC to the CA; it is even authorized to question an already final decision by filing a
petition for cancellation of citizenship.
43
Lastly, respondent reiterates its argument that
petitioners character witnesses are not qualified to prove the formers qualifications.
In determining whether or not an applicant for naturalization is entitled to become a
Filipino citizen, it is necessary to resolve the following issues: (1) whether or not R.A.
No. 9139 applies to petitions for naturalization by judicial act; and (2) whether or not the
witnesses presented by petitioner are "credible" in accordance with the jurisprudence
and the definition and guidelines set forth in C.A. No. 473.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a
nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.
44
Under current and existing
laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a)
administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization
pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a
law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.
45

Petitioners contention that the qualifications an applicant for naturalization should
possess are those provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No. 473
is barren of merit. The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for
naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 2
46
and 4
47
of C.A. No. 473. On the
other hand, Sections 3
48
and 4
49
of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the qualifications and
disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative act.
Indeed, R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the
process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more
encouraging.
50
It likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of
lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus promoting "brain
gain" for the Philippines.
51
These however, do not justify petitioners contention that the
qualifications set forth in said law apply even to applications for naturalization by judicial
act.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws the former
covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived
here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along
thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the
Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.
52
To reiterate, the intention of the
legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine
citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative
rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a need
to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can
be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No.
9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of
acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only
implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or
administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and
disqualifications.
In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, though at the time
of the filing of his petition, administrative naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already
available. Consequently, his application should be governed by C.A. No. 473.
Second. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable
even to judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law would be broadened since it
would then apply even to aliens who are not native born. It must be stressed that R.A.
No. 9139 applies only to aliens who were born in the Philippines and have been residing
here.
Third. Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to
the intention of the legislature to liberalize the naturalization procedure in the country.
One of the qualifications set forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born in the
Philippines and should have been residing herein since birth. Thus, one who was born
here but left the country, though resided for more than ten (10) years from the filing of
the application is also disqualified. On the other hand, if we maintain the distinct
qualifications under each of the two laws, an alien who is not qualified under R.A. No.
9139 may still be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.
Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A. No. 473, the law stands and
the qualifications and disqualifications set forth therein are maintained.
In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented were competent
to vouch for his good moral character, and are themselves possessed of good moral
character. It must be stressed that character witnesses in naturalization proceedings
stand as insurers of the applicants conduct and character. Thus, they ought to testify on
specific facts and events justifying the inference that the applicant possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law.
53

Petitioners witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on his specific acts; they
did not elaborate on his traits. Their testimonies do not convince the Court that they
personally know petitioner well and are therefore in a position to vouch for his
qualifications. As correctly found by the CA, the witnesses testimonies consisted mainly
of general statements in answer to the leading questions propounded by his counsel.
What they conveniently did was to enumerate the qualifications as set forth in the law
without giving specific details. The pertinent portion of Atty. Adasas testimony follows:
q Do you know the petitioner Edison So?
a Yes, Sir.
q Will you please tell us how did you come to know him?
a Well I came to know him[,] the petitioner[,] when I was the legal consultant and
adviser of their family business and I used to ah (sic) me[e]t him during my visit to their
place way back in 1991 to 1992.
q From that day of 1991 up to the present, is your relationship with the petitioner more
or less contin[u]ous?
a Yes, sir, because aside from the usual professional visit that I did to their family some
social function was sponsored normally and I am (sic) invited and I used to attend.
q During the birthday party of the petitioner, did you usually attend petitioners birthday?
a On several occasions I attend the birthday.
q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides at present?
a At present the petitioner resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila.
q Do you know for how long the petitioner resides in the Philippines?
a As far as I personally known (sic) Your Honor is that since birth.
q During all the times that you have know[n] the petitioner, what is your impression of
his conduct?
a Well ah (sic) I have personally known him to be obedient and hard working individual
and ah (sic) he has a good moral character and he has been ah (sic) no adverse report
concerning the character of the petitioner.
q In your opinion does the petitioner has the qualifications necessary to become [a]
citizen of the Philippines?
a Yes.
q Can you tell us why do you say so?
a I would say Your Honor that petitioner has posses (sic) all the qualifications mandated
by law and presently he is more than 21 years old and he has resided in the Philippines
particularly in the City of Manila contin[u]ously for more than ten (10) years and that
since his birth; and that he has good moral character and I have observed that ah (sic)
he has been practicing Philippine traditions and ah (sic) those embodied in the
Philippine constitution and he has been socially active and meddle (sic) some of his
neighbors and ah (sic) I am sure he has desire to embrace and learn the customs and
ideas and traditions in the Philippine[s] and as I earlier mentioned that he conducted
himself in proper and approachable (sic) manner during his entire residence in our
country and he has a gainful occupation.
q Will you please tell us what are these customs which the petitioner embraced?
a Well I have observed that ah (sic) together with his family they used to ah observed
(sic) the usual Filipino celebration during Christmas and new year and some occasions
such as fiestas.
q And do you know whether petitioner is not disqualified under Commonwealth Act to
become Filipino citizen of the Philippines (sic)?
a Ah there has been no incident or occasion which I learned that would disqualify of
coming (sic) the citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. I have noticed that ah (sic) he
is qualified under Commonwealth Act 473 as amended because he is not opposed to ah
(sic) organized government. His family and himself does not believed (sic) in the use of
force in the success of his ideas and ah (sic) he is not a poligamist (sic) or believer in
the practice of illegal and he has not been convicted in any crime involving him in any
crime (sic). and he is not suffering from any mental alienation or any incurable
contidious (sic) disease. as provided for.
q Will you please tell us why you know all these stage?
a Because of ah (sic) the personal attachment with his family we have continuously
having ah (sic) the usual contact with his family.
54

It can thus be inferred that Atty. Adasa is close to petitioners family, but not specifically
to petitioner. Atty. Adasas statements refer to his observations on the familys practices
and not to petitioner in particular. Nothing in his testimony suggests that he was close to
petitioner and knew him well enough to vouch for his qualifications.
Salcedo, on the other hand, testified thus:
q Now do you know the petitioner in this case Edison So?
a Yes, Sir.
q Are you personally acquainted with him?
a Yes, Sir.
q How long have you known the petitioner?
a I have known him for about ten (10) years, Sir.
q Will you please inform the Honorable court under what circumstances did you come to
know the petitioner?
a I met him in a birthday party in 1991, Sir.
q And from 1991 up to the present is your relationship with the petitioner more or less
contin[u]ous?
a Yes, Sir.
q How often did you see the petitioner?
a I see him twice a week, Sir.
q And during this time that you met the petitioner, what did you usually do?
a We play some games, Sir. We play Patentero (sic).
q Do you go to church together?
a Yes, Sir.
q During fiestas in your place, did the petitioner go?
a Yes, Sir.
q How about during fiestas in the place where the petitioner reside[s], did you also go
during fiestas?
a Yes, Sir.
q During occasion in the house of the petitioner, are you invited?
a Yes, Sir.
q How many time[s] did you go to his (sic) residence of the petitioner?
a Twice a week, sir.
q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides?
a The petitioner resides at 528 Lavezares Street, Tondo, Manila, Sir.
q For how long does the petitioner reside in that address?
a Since birth, Sir.
q During all the times that you have known the petitioner, will you please tell us your
impression of his conduct?
a He is a person of good moral, sir, and he believed in the principles of the Philippines
(sic) Constitution.
q Will you please cite one or two of these principles underlined the principles (sic) of the
Philippines (sic) Constitution?
a Ah the Philippines is a Republican of the (sic) state, sovereignty preside (sic) over the
people and the government authority emanate from within; and the other one is the
civilian government is not supreme over the military.
q Now in your opinion does the petitioner have all the qualifications necessary to
become a citizen of the Philippines?
a Yes, Sir.
q What are these qualifications?
a He is at least 21 years old, he is a person of good moral and has been residing in the
Philippines since birth.
q What else?
a He must be a Filipino and ah must practice the traditions and customs, Sir.
q Do you know whether the petitioner conducted himself in a proper and appraochable
(sic) manner during the period of his residence in the Philippines?
a Yes, Sir.
q Do you know if the petitioner has a gainful occupation?
a Yes, Sir.
q What is the occupation of the petitioner?
a Ah (sic) he is the secretary in a wood factory in Commonwealth, Sir.
q And aside from being the secretary, what else did the petitioner do?
a He help (sic) in the factory cargo, Sir.
q Is the petitioner still a student?
a Yes, Sir.
q Where is he studying?
a In UST, Sir.
q Is he your classmate?
a Yes, Sir.
q What was his course?
a Pharmacy, Sir.
q So when you said he was the secretary he only works as part time secretary?
a Yes, Sir.
q You said the petitioner meddle (sic) socially with the Filipinos?
a Yes, Sir.
q Will you please name at least one of those Filipinos the petitioner meddle (sic) with?
a Samuel Falmera, Sir, Marlon Kahocom, Sir.
q Who else?
a Elmer Ramos, Sir.
q Who else?
a Sharmaine Santos, Sir.
q You said the petitioner is of good moral character?
a Yes, Sir.
q Why do you know that?
a As a classmate I can see him I go with him and ah (sic) I can see that he has ah
better approached (sic) with other people and I can see that he mixed very well with
friends.
q So during school days you see him everyday?
a Yes, Sir.
q When there are no classes during the vacation you see the petitioner twice a week?
a Yes, Sir.
q Does the petitioner (sic), do you think the petitioner is not disqualified to become the
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines?
a Yes, Sir, he is not disqualified, Sir.
q Why do you say that he is not disqualified?
a Because he abide [by] any law in the government, sir, ah (sic) he is not polygamus
and he is not convicted of any crime, Sir.
q Do you know ever the petitioner oppose to any organized government?
a No, Sir.
q Do you know whether he believe[s] in the use of force in any such ideas?
a No, Sir.
q Do you know if the petitioner is a believer in the practice of polygamy?
a No, Sir.
q Do you know whether the petitioner suffer[s] from mental alienation or incurable
disease illnesses?
a No, Sir.
q Why do you know?
a I know him personally, sir, I have been with him as my classmate, sir and ah (sic) he
is a very intelligent person, Sir.
q Is the petitioner a member also of any organization or association in your school?
a Yes, Sir.
q What organization?
a He is a member of Wishten and a member of starget, Sir.
q What does starget means?
a Starget is an organization of Chinese community in UST, Sir.
q How about the other one which you mentioned?
a Ah (sic) these are twisting, sir he represents the ah the (sic) school intercollegiate,
Sir.
55

Again, Salcedo did not give specific details on petitioners qualifications.
In sum, petitioners witnesses clearly did not personally know him well enough; their
testimonies do not satisfactorily establish that petitioner has all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications prescribed by law.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own
good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must
be credible persons.
56
Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is
not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a
police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose
affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not the declaration
made but the person making it. This implies that such person must have a good
standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed
to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a
good warranty of the applicants worthiness.
57

The records likewise do not show that the character witnesses of petitioner are persons
of good standing in the community; that they are honest and upright, or reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable. The most that was established was the educational attainment
of the witnesses; however, this cannot be equated with their credibility. In fine, petitioner
focused on presenting evidence tending to build his own good moral character and
neglected to establish the credibility and good moral character of his witnesses.
58

We do not agree with petitioners argument that respondent is precluded from
questioning the RTC decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A
naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision
rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be
cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the
court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a
certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the
granting of the certificate.
59
If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship,
with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period
despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court.
Thus, petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of
naturalization law. For this reason, we affirm the decision of the CA denying the petition
for naturalization without prejudice.
It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the
Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be
conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the
law.
60

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, G.R. No. 125793
Petitioner,

Present:

- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
and DEPORTATION and Promulgated:
WILSON SOLUREN,
Respondents. August 29, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Citizenship is a priceless possession. Former U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren fittingly
emphasized its crowning value when he wrote that it is mans basic right for it is nothing less
than to have rights.
340
When a person loses citizenship, therefore, the State sees to it that its
reacquisition may only be granted if the former citizen fully satisfies all conditions and complies
with the applicable law. Without doubt, repatriation is not to be granted simply based on the
vagaries of the former Filipino citizen.

The Case

The instant petition for review
341
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
contests the denial by the Court of Appeals (CA) of the Petition for Habeas Corpus interposed

by petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa from the Order of Summary Deportation issued by the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) for his return to the United States.

The Facts

The facts as culled by the CA from the records show that petitioner Joevanie Arellano
Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968,
342
when petitioner was seven
years old,
343
his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen
344
of the United States. By
derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds
citizenship by virtue of naturalization
345
), petitioner also acquired American citizenship.

Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a
balikbayan for one year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson

Soluren of the BID on May 23, 1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay,
Malay, Aklan; subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila.
346

Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law and
Investigation Division of the BID on May 28, 1996; and on the same day, Tabasa was accused of
violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a charge sheet
which alleged:

1. That on 3 August 1995, respondent (petitioner herein [Tabasa])
arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as a balikbayan;

2. That in a letter dated 16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert,
Consul General of [the] U.S. Embassy, informed the Bureau that
respondents Passport No. 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., had been revoked by the U.S. Department of
State;

3. Hence, respondent [petitioner Tabasa] is now an
undocumented and undesirable alien and may be summarily deported
pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by then
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation (Exhibit
3).
347

The pertinent portion of the Herbert letter is as follows:

The U.S. Department of State has revoked U.S. passport 053854189
issued on June 10, 1994 in San Francisco, California under the name of
Joevanie Arellano Tabasa, born on February 21, 1959 in the Philippines.
Mr. Tabasas passport has been revoked because he is the subject of an
outstanding federal warrant of arrest issued on January 25, 1996 by the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, for violation of
Section 1073, Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution, of Title 18 of the
United States Code. He is charged with one count of a felon in possession
of a firearm, in violation of California Penal Code, Section 12021(A)(1), and
one count of sexual battery, in violation of California Penal Code, Section
243.4 (D).
348

The BID ordered petitioners deportation to his country of origin, the United States, on
May 29, 1996, in the following summary deportation order:
Records show that on 16 April 1996, Mr. Kevin F. Herbert, Consul
General of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, filed a request with the Bureau to
apprehend and deport the abovenamed [sic] respondent [petitioner
Tabasa] on the ground that a standing warrant for several federal charges
has been issued against him, and that the respondents Passport No.
053854189 has been revoked.

By reason thereof, and on the strength of Mission Order No. LIV-96-
72, Intelligence operatives apprehended the respondent in Aklan on 23
May 1996.

In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 81461 [sic,
81461 should be 86461+, 30 May 1989), the Supreme Court ruled that if
a foreign embassy cancels the passport of an alien, or does not reissue a
valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country.
Further, under Office Memorandum Order No. 34 issued on 21 August
1989, summary deportation proceedings lie where the passport of the
alien has expired.

It is, thus, apparent that respondent has lost his privilege to remain in
the country.
349

Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order
350
on May 29, 1996, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
40771. Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest for
deportation may be issued by immigration authorities before a final order of deportation is
made; that no notice of the cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he
is entitled to admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant
because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines

prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of
his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.

At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old.
351

On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the person of the
petitioner on June 3, 1996 and show the cause of petitioners detention, and restrained the
Bureau from summarily deporting him. On June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before the
CA; and on June 6, 1996, the CA granted both parties ten (10) days within which to file their
memoranda, after which the case would be considered submitted for decision.
352
Meanwhile,
the Commissioner of Immigration granted the petitioners temporary release on bail on a PhP
20,000.00 cash bond.
353

However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had
acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA
8171), and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the
respondent Bureau.
354

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA, in its August 7, 1996 Decision,
355
denied Tabasas petition on the ground that he
had not legally and successfully acquiredby repatriationhis Filipino citizenship as provided
in RA 8171. The court said that although he became an American citizen by derivative
naturalization when his father was naturalized in 1968, there is no evidence to show that he
lost his Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, as explicitly
provided in Section 1, RA 8171the law governing the repatriation of natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship. The affidavit does not state that political or economic necessity
was the compelling reason for petitioners parents to give up their Filipino citizenship in 1968.
Moreover, the court a quo found that petitioner Tabasa did not dispute the truth of the April
16, 1996 letter of the United States Consul General Kevin F. Herbert or the various warrants
issued for his arrest by the United States court. The court a quo noted that after petitioner was
ordered deported by the BID on May 29, 1996, he successively executed an Affidavit of
Repatriation on June 6, 1996 and took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on June 13, 1996more than ten months after his arrival in the country on August 3, 1995. The
appellate court considered petitioners repatriation as a last ditch effort to avoid deportation
and prosecution in the United States. The appellate court concluded that his only reason to
want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is to avoid criminal prosecution in the United States of
America. The court a quo, therefore, ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now before us.

The Issue

The only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine
citizenship under RA 8171. If there is no valid repatriation, then he can be summarily deported
for his being an undocumented alien.

The Courts Ruling

The Court finds no merit in this petition.

RA 8171, An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their
Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos, was enacted on
October 23, 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons, viz:

Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of
political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship
through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is
not a:

(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any
association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing
organized government;

(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their
ideas;

(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or

(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases.
356
(Emphasis supplied.)

Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171?

He does not.

Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171

To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:

a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and

b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a
natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization
when he was still a minor.

Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available
only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a
parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons
later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor
children according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino
subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The
repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and
automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood
relationship:
357
the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born
Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at
the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does
not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a
political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply
for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while
he was still a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative
naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that
he is entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the
country due to political or economic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a
minor at the time of his repatriation on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171
belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for
repatriation.

Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or
economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to
political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic
or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parents and not

his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born
Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and
economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation.

In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171.
However, he can possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Where to file a petition for repatriation pursuant to RA 8171

Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he
failed to follow the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file his
petition for repatriation with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was
designated to process petitions for repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O.
No. 285) dated August 22, 1996, to wit:

SECTION 1. Composition.The composition of the Special Committee
on Naturalization, with the Solicitor General as Chairman, the
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the National
Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, shall remain as constituted.

SEC. 2. Procedure.Any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring
Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 8171 shall file a petition with the
Special Committee on Naturalization which shall process the same. If
their applications are approved[,] they shall take the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on
Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of
registration (emphasis supplied).

SEC. 3. Implementing Rules.The Special Committee is hereby
authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the
appropriate forms and the required fees for the processing of petitions.

SEC. 4. Effectivity.This Administrative Order shall take effect
immediately.

In the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171 issued by the SCN on
August 5, 1999, applicants for repatriation are required to submit documents in support of their
petition such as their birth certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino
citizenship.
358
These requirements were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications
of the applicant particularly in light of the reasons for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; then, executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he registered, together with the
certificate of live birth, with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office
subsequently issued him a certificate of such registration.
359
At that time, the SCN was already
in place and operational by virtue of the June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel
V. Ramos.
360
Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN to process petitions filed pursuant to

RA 8171 was issued only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance according to
the Court in Angat v. Republic.
361
Thus, petitioner should have instead filed a petition for
repatriation before the SCN.

Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171

Even if petitionernow of legal agecan still apply for repatriation under RA 8171, he
nevertheless failed to prove that his parents relinquished their Philippine citizenship on account
of political or economic necessity as provided for in the law. Nowhere in his affidavit of
repatriation did he mention that his parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic reasons. It is notable that under the Amended Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 8171, the SCN requires a petitioner for repatriation to set forth, among
others, the reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in
case of Filipino woman, or whether by political or economic necessity in case of [a] natural-born
Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such political or
economic necessity should be specified.
362

Petitioner Tabasa asserts, however, that the CA erred in ruling that the applicant for
repatriation must prove that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of political or

economic necessity. He theorizes that the reference to political or economic reasons is
merely descriptive, not restrictive, of the widely accepted reasons for naturalization in *a+
foreign country.
363

Petitioners argument has no leg to stand on.

A reading of Section 1 of RA 8171 shows the manifest intent of the legislature to limit
the benefit of repatriation only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity, in addition to Filipino women who lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens. The precursor of RA 8171, Presidential Decree No.
725 (P.D. 725),
364
which was enacted on June 5, 1975 amending Commonwealth Act No. 63,
also gives to the same groups of former Filipinos the opportunity to repatriate but without the
limiting phrase, on account of political or economic necessity in relation to natural-born
Filipinos. By adding the said phrase to RA 8171, the lawmakers clearly intended to limit the
application of the law only to political or economic migrants, aside from the Filipino women
who lost their citizenship by marriage to aliens. This intention is more evident in the following
sponsorship speech of Rep. Andrea B. Domingo on House Bill No. 1248, the origin of RA 8171,
to wit:

Ms. Domingo: x x x

From my experience as the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, I observed that there are only four types of
Filipinos who leave the country.

The first is what we call the economic refugees who go abroad to
work because there is no work to be found in the country. Then we have
the political refugees who leave the country for fear of their lives
because they are not in consonance with the prevailing policy of
government. The third type is those who have committed crimes and
would like to escape from the punishment of said crimes. Lastly, we have
those Filipinos who feel that they are not Filipinos, thereby seeking other
citizenship elsewhere.

Of these four types of Filipinos, Mr. Speaker, the first two have to
leave the country not of choice, but rather out of sacrifice to look for a
better life, as well as for a safer abode for themselves and their families. It
is for these two types of Filipinos that this measure is being proposed for
approval by this body. (Emphasis supplied.)

x x x x

x x x [I]f the body would recall, I mentioned in my short sponsorship
speech the four types of Filipinos who leave their country. And the two
typesthe economic and political refugeesare the ones being addressed
by this proposed law, and they are not really Filipino women who lost their
citizenship through marriage. We had a lot of problems with these people
who left the country because of political persecution or because of
pressing economic reasons, and after feeling that they should come back
to the country and get back their citizenship and participate as they should
in the affairs of the country, they find that it is extremely difficult to get
their citizenship back because they are treated no different from any other
class of alien.
365

From these two sources, namely, P.D. 725 and the sponsorship speech on House Bill No.
1248, it is incontrovertible that the intent of our legislators in crafting Section 1 of RA 8171, as it
is precisely worded out, is to exclude those Filipinos who have abandoned their country for
reasons other than political or economic necessity.

Petitioner contends it is not necessary to prove his political or economic reasons since
the act of renouncing allegiance to ones native country constitutes a necessary and
unavoidable shifting of his political allegiance, and his fathers loss of Philippine citizenship
through naturalization cannot therefore be said to be for any reason other than political or
economic necessity.
366

This argument has no merit.

While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to ones native country is necessarily a
political act, it does not follow that the act is inevitably politically or economically motivated as
alleged by petitioner. To reiterate, there are other reasons why Filipinos relinquish their
Philippine citizenship. The sponsorship speech of former Congresswoman Andrea B. Domingo
illustrates that aside from economic and political refugees, there are Filipinos who leave the
country because they have committed crimes and would like to escape from punishment, and
those who really feel that they are not Filipinos and that they deserve a better nationality, and
therefore seek citizenship elsewhere.

Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him
to prove to the satisfaction of the SCN that the reason for his loss of citizenship was the
decision of his parents to forfeit their Philippine citizenship for political or economic exigencies.
He failed to undertake this crucial step, and thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful.

Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is
mandated by the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides that citizenship
may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State has the power to prescribe
by law the qualifications, procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to
determine if an applicant for repatriation meets the requirements of the law for it is an
inherent power of the State to choose who will be its citizens, and who can reacquire
citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said
requirements, the State is justified in rejecting the petition for repatriation.

Petitioner: an undocumented alien subject to summary deportation

Petitioner claims that because of his repatriation, he has reacquired his Philippine
citizenship; therefore, he is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.

This theory is incorrect.
As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 for he
has not shown that his case falls within the coverage of the law.

Office Memorandum No. 34 dated August 21, 1989 of the BID is enlightening on
summary deportation:

2. The Board of Special Inquiry and the Hearing Board IV shall
observe summary deportation proceedings in cases where the charge against
the alien is overstaying, or the expiration or cancellation by his government
of his passport. In cases involving overstaying aliens, BSI and the Hearing
Board IV shall merely require the presentation of the aliens valid passport
and shall decide the case on the basis thereof.

3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien, or does
not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain
in the country, under the Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15
(Schonemann v. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 81461 *sic, should be 86461+, 30
May 1989). The automatic loss of the privilege obviates deportation
proceedings. In such instance, the Board of Commissioners may issue
summary judgment of deportation which shall be immediately
executory.
367

In addition, in the case of Schonemann v. Defensor Santiago, et al., this
Court held:

It is elementary that if an alien wants to stay in the Philippines,
he must possess the necessary documents. One of these documents is a
valid passport. There are, of course, exceptions where in the exercise of its
sovereign prerogatives the Philippines may grant refugee status, refuse to
extradite an alien, or otherwise allow him or her to stay here even if he [the
alien] has no valid passport or Philippine visa. Boat people seeking
residence elsewhere are examples. However, the grant of the privilege of
staying in the Philippines is discretionary on the part of the proper
authorities. There is no showing of any grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or whimsicality in the questioned summary judgment.

x x x
368

Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after his admission into
the country, became an undocumented alien who can be summarily deported. His
subsequent repatriation cannot bar such deportation especially considering that
he has no legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, this petition for review is DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996 Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs to the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
R E S O L U T I O N

KAPUNAN, J .:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the
age of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving
the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April
1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St.
Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations.
In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar
Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his
Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the
following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of
the Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified
public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,
Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La
Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B.
Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized
elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was
one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees
was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's
citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court,
dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the
same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a
comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing
his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate
child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a
Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he
elected Philippine citizenship"
1
in strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the
Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a
Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate
Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of
majority."
2
In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order
that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the
person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election
must be made upon reaching the age of majority."
3
The OSG then explains the
meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to
mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been
interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO,
supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940).
Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a
(sic) person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino (ibid.,
citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in
Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was
not made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine
citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time"
allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on
the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election
of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his
Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in
my school records and other official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for
Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to
vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me
before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to
(sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question
raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the
affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar
examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under
Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born
of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless,
upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
4
This right to
elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided
that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines.
5

Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
citizens.
6
It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions
on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative
effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935
Constitution.
7
If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old
charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
8

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid
election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of
Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a
statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said
party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within
which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only
provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age
of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years.
9
In the opinions of
the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine
citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this
Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper
period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of
the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election
should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority.
10
The
phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority.
11
However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice,
12
that the three (3)
year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period
after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has
ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which
period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.
13

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine
citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He
became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was
made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age,
or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear
that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority."
14

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five
(35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June
1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on
the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election
was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to
exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former
elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically
lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching
erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the
case of In re: Florencio Mallare,
15
the pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married
to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of
age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has
been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April
14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old),
Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning for
certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship.
16

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein
are very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First,
Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the
enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under
the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be
applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed
out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship
because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this
regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore
himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him
all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong
Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands,
42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs.
Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28,
1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a
non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully
entitled.
17

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal
of the House of Representatives,
18
where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an
informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held
that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In
the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of
age constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52:
emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be
excepted to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already
citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for
those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when
the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot
be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in
public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election
time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature
are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing
is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two
countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino
when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the
private respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also
have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine
citizenship?
19

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we
consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the
Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes
and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG.
Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span
of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he
finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority."
Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a
tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his
election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when
needed and suppressed when convenient.
20
One who is privileged to elect Philippine
citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the
right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped
away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's
application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Citing Cu vs. Republic of the Philippines, 89 Phil. 473, 476 (1951).
2 Citing CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., p. 359.
3 Citing Cuenco. vs. Secretary of Justice, 5 SCRA 108, 110 (1962).
4 Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of
foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office;
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines, and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship;
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law.

Perez v. Estrada
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC (June 29, 2001)
* Digest of this case is particularly longer because of the novelty of the issue. FACTS:
The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the SC to
allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases
filed against former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the
public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history."
The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the
Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo

HELD: Petition denied. In the case of Estes vs. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the television coverage of judicial proceedings is an inherent denial of due process
to the accused. The Court in this case also identified the following as being likely
prejudices: "1.The potential impact of television . . . is perhaps of the greatest
significance. . . . From the moment the trial judge announces that a case will be
televised it becomes a cause clbre. The whole community, . . . becomes interested in
all the morbid details surrounding it. The approaching trial immediately assumes an
important status in the public press and the accused is highly publicized along with the
offense with which he is charged. Every juror carries with him into the jury box these
solemn facts and thus increases the chance of prejudice that is present in every criminal
case. . . . "2.The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be impaired. The
impact upon a witness of the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is
simply incalculable. Some may be demoralized and frightened,...

Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases against
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 44 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
the Former President Joseph E. Estrada. Perez vs. Estrada [AM 01-4-03-SC, 29 June 2001]
En Banc, Vitug (J): 4 concur, 1 on leave, 2 file separate concurring opinions, 2 file separate
dissenting
opinion, 1 joins separate opinion of one concurring justice
Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association
representing
duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a
letter requesting
the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and
other criminal
cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to
assure the public
of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request
was seconded by
Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator
Renato
Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando
Perez formally
filed the petition.
Issue: Whether the press should be allowed to air Estradas trial to the public.
Held: The press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness, and it has become an
important
instrument in the quest for truth. Recent history exemplifies media's invigorating presence, and
its
contribution to society is quite impressive. The Court, just recently, has taken judicial notice of
the enormous
effect of media in stirring public sentience during the impeachment trial, a partly judicial and
partly political
exercise, indeed the most-watched program in the boob-tubes during those times, that would
soon culminate
in EDSA II. The propriety of granting or denying the petition involve the weighing out of the
constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and
the fundamental
rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to
control its
proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another,
the right of the
accused must be preferred to win. With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but
also the very
life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict
solely on the
basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the
presentation of credible
evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or
subtle, in
proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret
veritable facts free
from improper influence, and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by
running emotions
or passions. Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary
is proved in a
trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention and
where the
conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and
argument
given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. Thus, an accused
has a right to a
public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty
can be held
critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be
unjustly
condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public
trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those
who wish to
come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial
process. In the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the
public to
observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large
as to distract the
trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they
have observed
during the proceedings.

IN THE MATTER OF THE A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC
ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED
IN THE COLUMNS OF MR. Present:
AMADO P. MACASAET
PUBLISHED IN MALAYA PUNO, C.J.,
DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 19, QUISUMBING,
20 AND 21, 2007 YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 8, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

REYES, R.T., J .:

FREEDOM of the press and judicial independence (kalayaan ng pamamahayag at
kalayaang panghukuman) two constitutional values which unfortunately clash in this case for
indirect contempt of court have to be weighed and balanced against each other.

The Antecedents

The case stemmed from certain articles that appeared in the Business Circuit column of
Amado P. Macasaet in the Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation of which he is the
publisher. The articles, containing statements and innuendoes about an alleged bribery incident
in the Supreme Court, came out in four (4) issues of the newspaper onSeptember 18, 19, 20 and
21, 2007, reproduced as follows:

September 18, 2007

Bribery in the Court

A lady justice (I have not been told whether she is from the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals) did not report for a day last week.

Her secretary received a gift-wrapped box about the size of two dozen
milk cans.

Believing that the gift might be something perishable, she opened the
box. Indeed, it was a gift estimated at P10 million. Posthaste, the secretary
informed the magistrate about the gift. She thought she was doing her job. The
lady justice fired her instead.

She would not have anybody catch her accepting a bribe. But she
practically did.

The stupidity here is that the bribe-giver what else would we call him or
her did not check whether the lady justice was in the office or not. Better still
he or she could have the box full of money delivered to her home. But then her
family would get to know about and ask who was the kind soul that was so liberal
with money a boxful of it.

The Supreme Court cannot let this pass. A full investigation should be
conducted. The magistrate who was sent the bribe should be impeached.

The gift gives proof to the pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty. This
time, the lady justice is with a higher court.

The court is like a basket of apples. There a few which are rotten that
makes the whole basket rotten.

The names and reputation of highly-respected jurists must be saved from
suspicions they are thieves.

Heres the clue

The Court employee who was fired by the lady jurist is a niece of another
lady justice who earlier retired. The worker was inherited by the incumbent lady
justice.

My problem with this report is that while my source is definite about the
employee opening a gift-wrapped box that contained at least P10 million, he
wont confide to me the identity of the jurist.

Unless the employee who was fired talks against her boss and she should
as a matter of duty we will never know who this justice really is. The members
of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan are all called
justices.

The head of the Office of Government Corporate Counsel is also honored
by being addressed as such. So is the head of the Court of Tax Appeals.

Since the employee was fired for opening the box which she thought
contained perishable goods but turned out there was an estimated P10 million in
it, she should be loyal to her duty of telling the truth.

That way, she would have rendered a great service to the justice
system. Without her talking, every lady with the title of Justice is suspect. There
are more than a dozen of them in different courts but only one was caught red-
handed taking a bribe. Her name should be known so that the Supreme Court can
act swiftly on a clear case of bribery.

Otherwise, this case becomes one where the pot calls the kettle black. Or
is that the reason the employee would not talk, that her former boss could spill the
beans on her peers?

September 19, 2007

The Bribe Giver

I learned from some lawyers that the bribe money given to a lady justice
came from a Chinese-Filipino businessman who has been criminally charged.

It is funny that the delivery of five boxes of money (I said only one
earlier) coincided on the day the lady justice, obviously acting as ponente,
acquitted the prospect.

The secretary of the lady justice who took the bribe made five trips to the
guardhouse to pick up the boxes.

Incidentally, this secretary is a namesake of her aunt, a deceased associate
justice of the Supreme Court.

I dare say that if her name is Cecilia, it is entirely possible that the lady
justice is a member of the Supreme Court. The late justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma
is the only lady justice I know who retired and died at a ripe old age and left
behind a reputation of decency and integrity.

We are coming closer and closer to the truth. The lady justice shamed her
court. She should resign or be impeached.

That is the only way the soiled reputation of the Highest Court could be
restored.

September 20, 2007

Cecilia, please save the court

I have established the lady justices secretary who opened one of the five
milk boxes containing bribe money is a niece of the late, respected and honorable
Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma from Batangas.

The secretary is a niece of the late justice and a namesake.

Cecilia, you have a duty to honor the memory of your aunt, who, during
her stay in the court, was known for having balls.

More important than that, you have a duty to save the sagging reputation
of the Supreme Court.

Cecilia, you must tell the Court en banc everything you know about the
money that was sent in five boxes to your boss.

Not in retaliation for your dismissal, but for no other reason than as a duty
to your country and, I must again say, to honor the memory of your late illustrious
aunt, a legal luminary and staunch defender of the Constitution.

The other reason you must spill the beans is that if you do not, other lady
justices are suspects. That is not fair to them.

September 21, 2007

Wrong date, same facts

On verification, I discovered that the secretary of a lady justice of the
Supreme Court who was said to have accepted five milk boxes of money, was
fired as early as March. Not last week as I mistakenly reported.

It turns out that Cecilia Muoz-Delis from Bicol picked up the last five
boxes several times in March.

She never opened the first four boxes which she picked up from the
guardhouse of the Court.

She opened the last and saw the money because the lady justice was
absent on that day. Forthwith, she was fired. Cecilia, who is from Bicol, never
opened any of the first four boxes delivered on various dates (I have not been told
when). She picked up all of them from the Supreme Court guardhouse and left
them with the lady justice. She wouldnt dare open the first four because the lady
justice was in her office. She opened the fifth one because the lady justice did not
report for work on that day.

Cecilia thought that the gift-wrapped box contained some perishables like
food. What she found was money instead. She was fired.

Whenever a gift for lady justice comes, she would order Cecilia to pick it
up from the guardhouse. So the fifth she picked up was one of those errands.

Where is Cecilia?

I cannot get any information on the present whereabouts of
Cecilia. However, if the Supreme Court has intentions to investigate what I have
been saying, maybe the Chief Justice himself should find out where she could be
sent an invitation to appear before an investigation group in the Court.

Better still, as I said, yesterday, Cecilia should disclose everything she
knows regarding the box before the Court en banc.

Farthest thing from my mind is to embarrass the lady justice whose
identity I do not know up to now.

It is my conviction that the Court should investigate reports of wrongdoing
by any of its peers. Justice is served that way.

The Chief Justice and the rest of the justices should not have a problem
finding out who she is.

It is a simple job of asking a clerk to go to personnel department of the
Court and find out who Cecilia worked for.
[1]

The September 18, 2007 article, the first of the series of articles, caught the attention of
Assistant Court Administrator (ACA) Jose Midas P. Marquez, Chief of the Supreme Court
Public Information Office, in the course of his monitoring the daily news reports and columns in
major newspapers. However, since it was vague about which court was being referred to,
whether the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax
Appeals,
[2]
ACA Marquez opted to merely note it.
[3]

The succeeding two articles, however, gave an indication that the supposed bribery
happened in the Supreme Court. Respondent Macasaet, in his September 19, 2007article, wrote,
among others, that I dare say that if her name is Cecilia, it is entirely possible that the lady
justice is a member of the Supreme Court x x x. We are coming closer and closer to the
truth. The lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or be impeached. That is the only
way the soiled reputation of the Highest Court could be restored.

Similarly, in his September 20, 2007 article, respondent said that Cecilia had a duty to
save the sagging reputation of the Supreme Court.

Also on September 20, 2007, at around 6:00 p.m., Marites Daguilan-Vitug, Editor in
Chief of Newsbreak, faxed a letter to Supreme Court Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago asking for three things

1. In (sic) April 13, 2007, you concurred with a decision penned by Justice
Romeo Callejo, Sr. ruling that the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion by finding probable cause against Henry
Go. However, five months later (September 3, 2007), acting on Gos motion
for reconsideration, you reversed yourself and ordered the dismissal of the
graft case against Go. Please explain the circumstances that led to this
reversal.

2. We have gathered from three sources that you received a cash gift of P10
million after you issued the decision early September. Please comment.

3. Were checking if this is accurate. Your secretary, who opened the gift-
wrapped box thinking that it contained perishable items, found cash
instead. It was after this incident that you removed her.
[4]

Upon receipt of the faxed letter, Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago called for ACA Marquez,
showed him the letter of Daguilan-Vitug, and requested him to tell Daguilan-Vitug that she
(Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago) had been consistent on her position in the Go case, that she
never reversed herself, that she never received a cash gift, and that no secretary was terminated
for opening a gift-wrapped box containing money. Accordingly, ACA Marquez went back to his
office, called up Daguilan-Vitug and told her what Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago told him.
[5]

That same evening, at around seven, Daguilan-Vitug faxed the corrected version of the
earlier letter

1. On April 13, 2007, you dissented against the decision penned by Justice
Romeo Callejo, Sr. ruling that the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion by finding probable cause against Henry
Go. The vote was 3-2 in favor of Callejas (sic) decision. Five months later
(September 3, 2007), acting on Gos motion for reconsideration (by that time,
Callejo had already retired), you ordered the dismissal of the graft case
against Go. I understand the exchanges were bitter and the deliberations
long. Please explain the contentious issues.

2. We have gathered from three sources that you received a cash gift of P10
million in March 2007 in the midst of deliberations on the case. Please
comment.

3. Were checking if this is accurate. Your secretary, who opened the gift-
wrapped box thinking that it contained perishable items, found cash
instead. It was after this incident that you removed her in March 2007.
[6]

The following day, September 21, 2007, respondent Macasaet, in his column, named the
supposed secretary who was forthwith x x x fired allegedly after opening the box of money: It
turns out that Cecilia Muoz Delis from Bicol picked up the last five boxes several times in
March.

From the foregoing series of articles, respondent Macasaet has painted a clear picture: a
Chinese-Filipino businessman who was acquitted of a crime supposedly left P10 million in five
different boxes with the security guard at the Supreme Court guardhouse, which was picked up
by Cecilia Muoz Delis who was forthwith fired for opening one of the boxes.

Upon the request of Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago, the Chief Justice instructed ACA
Marquez to have the 18
th
, 19
th
, 20
th
, and 21
st
September 2007 Business Circuit columns of
respondent Macasaet included in the September 25, 2007 agenda of the Court En Banc,
[7]
which
case was docketed as A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC. (Re: In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in
the Columns of Mr. A.P. Macasaet Published in Malaya dated September 18, 19, 20, and 21,
2007).

On September 24, 2007, Daisy Cecilia Muoz Delis, accompanied by the Clerk of
Court En Banc, Hon. Ma. Luisa D. Villarama, went to see Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago and
gave the latter copies of her letter to respondent Macasaet and her affidavit. Delis, in her letter to
respondent Macasaet, described his articles as baseless reports. In other words, she wrote
respondent Macasaet, the scenario you painted and continue to paint is improbable and could
only have emanated from a polluted source, who, unfortunately, chose me to be a part of this
fictional charge. She clarified that she was a Judicial Staff Officer, and not a secretary as the
articles claimed she was; that she voluntarily resigned from office and was not fired; that as a
matter of procedure, she would not have been tasked to receive boxes, as such was a duty
assigned to their utility personnel; that it was highly unlikely for something as blatant as [a]
bribery attempt to have been done right in the doors of the Court.
[8]
Delis ended her letter to
respondent Macasaet with a plea

My family and I have been suffering ever since your article came out last
Tuesday, because I was being alluded to. This suffering has increased because
the name of my beloved aunt x x x has been drawn into a controversy that should
not have involved me or any member of my family in the first place.

And so, I ask you, Sir, to please cease from mentioning my name or any of
my relatives, living or deceased, in order to promote your tabloid journalism. If
your source is as reliable as you believe, I suggest you practice better judgment
and journalistic responsibility by verifying your data before printing anything and
affecting the lives of innocent people. If this is some kind of war you are waging
against the lady justice, we do not want to be collateral damage.
[9]

In her affidavit, Delis stated that she had nothing to do with, nor did x x x have any
knowledge of such alleged attempted bribery,
[10]
and that she executed her affidavit to allow
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago to defend her honor,
[11]
and for the purpose of correcting the
erroneous information of Mr. Macasaet.
[12]

That same morning, too, despite the prior telephone conversation between ACA Marquez
and Daguilan-Vitug, Newsbreak posted an on-line article written by Danguilan-Vitug herself
and Aries Rufo, which was regularly updated, entitled Supreme Court Justice Suspected of
Accepting Payoff (update)
[13]
with the picture of Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago

We pieced the story of the alleged bribery from accounts of various
sources within and outside the Supreme Court who have requested not to be
named because of their sensitive disclosures.

In March this year, Ynares-Santiago fired her staff member, Cecilia Delis,
supposedly after the latter opened a gift-wrapped box delivered to their office,
thinking that it contained perishable items. Delis, however, found wads of peso
bills instead. The amount, two sources say, is estimated at P10 million.
[14]

Later that morning, Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago called ACA Marquez to her office and
gave him copies of her written statement categorically deny(ing) the accusations and
insinuations, all malicious and unfounded, published in Malaya and in Newsbreak; and
underscoring that these are blatant lies clearly aimed at smearing and maligning my character
and person, and the integrity of the Judiciary which (she has) been faithfully serving for 34 years
now.
[15]
Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago also gave ACA Marquez copies of Delis letter to
respondent Macasaet and her affidavit, which Delis herself had brought to Mme. Justice Ynares-
Santiago earlier that morning.
[16]

In the afternoon of September 24, 2007, ACA Marquez held a press conference and
released to the media copies of Delis letter to respondent Macasaet, her affidavit, and the written
statement of Mme. Justice Santiago.
[17]

On September 25, 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution stating

Upon evaluation of the columns Business Circuit of Amado P. Macasaet
in the September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007 issues of the Malaya, it appears that
certain statements and innuendoes therein tend, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, within the purview of Section
3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

WHEREFORE, Amado P. Macasaet is ORDERED to EXPLAIN why no
sanction should be imposed on him for indirect contempt of court in accordance
with Section 3(d), (Rule 71) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, within five (5)
days from receipt hereof. Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.
[18]

The following day, September 26, 2007, Newsbreak posted its on-line article entitled
Supreme Court Orders Malaya Publisher to Explain Stories with a banner headline, This is
not meant to chill the media.

On October 16, 2007, the Court En Banc noted respondent
Macasaets Explanation dated October 1, 2007,
[19]
and directed the Clerk of Court to include in
the records of the case the affidavit of Delis dated September 24, 2007. The High Court also
created an investigating committee composed of retired Supreme Court justices, namely, Justice
Carolina Grio-Aquino as Chairperson; and Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Romeo J. Callejo,
Sr., as members, to receive the evidence from all parties concerned. The Committee may, on its
own, call such persons who can shed light on the matter. It shall be endowed with all the powers
necessary to discharge its duty. The Committee was likewise directed to submit its report and
recommendation within thirty (30) days from the start of its hearing.
[20]
Retired Justices
Mendoza and Callejo, however, both begged off and were eventually replaced by retired
Supreme Court Justices Jose C. Vitug
[21]
and Justo P. Torres.
[22]

The Investigation

From October 30, 2007 to March 10, 2008, the Investigating Committee held hearings
and gathered affidavits and testimonies from the parties concerned.

The Committee invited respondent Macasaet, Daguilan-Vitug, Delis, and ACA Marquez
to a preliminary meeting, in which they were requested to submit their respective affidavits
which served as their testimonies on direct examination.
[23]
They were then later cross-examined
on various dates: respondent Macasaet on January 10, 2008,Daguilan-Vitug on January 17,
2008, Delis on January 24, 2008, and ACA Marquez on January 28, 2008. The Chief of the
Security Services and the Cashier of the High Court likewise testified on January 22 and 24,
2008, respectively.

According to the Committee

AMADO P. MACASAET testified on January 10, 2008 but, as expected,
he invoked his right under R.A. No. 53, as amended by R.A. No. 1477 to refuse to
disclose the source/s of his story regarding the rumored bribery of a Lady Justice
(later identified as Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago) of a high court (later
revealed as the Supreme Court) who allegedly received Php 10 million contained
in a gift-wrapped Carnation carton box (later changed to five [5] gift-wrapped
boxes), for deciding a criminal case in favor of a rich Chinese-Filipino
businessman. (Pls. see columns of September 18 and 19, 2007)

The pay-off was allegedly discovered when Cecilia Muoz-Delis (not the
Lady Justices secretary but a judicial staff officer V of the PET or Presidential
Electoral Tribunal) who is a niece and namesake of retired Supreme Court Justice
Cecilia Muoz Palma, allegedly opened the last box (according to his column
of September 21, 2007 titled Wrong date same facts); but the first (according
to his testimony on January 10, 2008, pp. 71, 89, 92, 125, tsn).

By his own conclusion, the boxes of money were delivered on
different dates because I dont think a bribe giver will deliver five boxes at the
same time (87, tsn, January 10, 2008).

Macasaet testified that his source is not a relative of his, nor a
government employee, certainly not an employee of the judiciary, and, that he
(Macasaet) has known him for some 10 to 15 years (12-20, tsn, January 10, 2008).

Significantly, in his column of September 19, 2007, Macasaet revealed
that he did not have only one source, but several sources, i.e., some lawyers,
who told him that the bribe money given to a lady justice came from a Chinese-
Filipino businessman who has been criminally charged.

He emphatically declared on the witness chair that he trusts his source
with my heart and soul and believes his word as coming straight out of the
Bible (94, 113, tsn, January 10, 2008; 14, tsn, January 17, 2008). But because
this source did not have direct knowledge of the bribery (26, tsn, January 10,
2008), he allegedly tried to verify from other sources the information he had
received, but I could not get confirmation (29, tsn, January 10, 2008).

Notwithstanding the lack of confirmation and the paucity of details as to
the identity of the Lady Justice and of the High Court where she sits, Macasaet
believes that the bribery had actually taken place because I trust my source
with my heart and soul (93-94, 113, tsn, January 10, 2008).

He decided to go ahead and publish the story because he thought that
eventually my effort at consistently x x x exposing the alleged bribery, one day
sooner or later somebody will come up and admit or deny (it). And I think that
(was) what really happened (29, tsn, January 10, 2008).

He found out that the Lady Justice involved is Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago of the Supreme Court, after he received a letter dated September 21,
2007 from Cecilia Muoz-Delis, the Cecilia mentioned in his columns, denying
any knowledge of the alleged bribery or boxes of money for she had
already resigned (not dismissed) from the Court on March 15, 2007, six (6)
months before the alleged bribery supposedly occurred a week before Macasaet
wrote about it in his column of September 18, 2007. (Annex A, Letter
dated September 21, 2007 of Cecilia Delis to Macasaet)

So, when did the bribery happen? The date was never made certain, for in
his first column of September 18, 2007, Macasaet stated that the gift-wrapped box
of money was delivered to the office of the Lady Justice, a day last week when
the Lady Justice did not report for work. That must have been sometime
on September 10-14, 2007 the week before September 18, 2007.

However, the next day, September 19, 2007, he wrote in his column that
the delivery of five boxes (not just one box) of money, coincided on the day that
the Lady Justice, acting asponente, dismissed the criminal case against Chinese-
Filipino businessman Henry T. Go in the Sandiganbayan. That must
be September 3, 2007 because the Resolution in G.R. No. 172602 Henry T.
Go versus The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, et al. was promulgated on that
date. This he affirmed when he testified on January 10, 2008 (46, 74, tsn, January
10, 2008).

However, when he returned to the witness chair on January 17, 2008, after
going back to his informant (on his own request) to ascertain the dates when the
boxes of money were delivered to the Office of Justice Santiago, so that the
Investigating Committee could subpoena the relevant logbooks of the Security
Services of the Court to verify the truth of the alleged deliveries, Macasaet again
changed his earlier testimonies on date/dates of the deliveries. He informed the
Committee that, according to his informant, the deliveries were made between
November 2006 and March 2007; before Cecilia Delis resigned or was
dismissed from the Court.
[24]

On March 11, 2008 the Investigating Committee submitted to the Office of the Chief
Justice its March 10, 2008 Report and Recommendation,
[25]
with the followingfindings of
facts on the subject columns

The following statements in Macasaets columns appear to the Supreme
Court to be innuendoes (that) tend, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, within the purview of
Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
1) From the column of Tuesday, September 18, 2007

The gift gives proof to the pernicious rumor that the
courts are dirty. This time, the lady justice is with a higher court.

The court is like a basket of apples. There (are) a few
which are rotten. That makes the whole basket rotten.

The names and reputation of highly-respected jurists must
be saved from suspicion that they are thieves.

Her name should be known so that the Supreme Court can
act swiftly on a clear case of bribery. Otherwise, this case
becomes one where the pot calls the kettle black. Or, is that the
reason the employee would not talk, that her former boss could
spill the beans on her peers?

2) From the column of Wednesday, September 19, 2007

The lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or
be impeached. That is the only way the soiled reputation of
the Highest Court could be restored.

3) From the column of Thursday, September 20, 2007

Cecilia x x x you have a duty to save the sagging
reputation of the Supreme Court.

Inasmuch as Macasaets snide remarks about the courts,
particularly the Highest Court, and about the justices being
suspected as thieves, appear to have [been] provoked by the
rumored bribery in the Court, the Investigating Committee was
constrained to find out how true the accusations were and whether
the columnist had exercised due care and diligence in checking out
the credibility of his informant and the veracity of the derogatory
information fed to him before he published it in his columns in the
Malaya.
[26]

Additional observations and conclusion were submitted, like the following

The Committee finds that neither Macasaets columns in Malaya, nor
Ms. Vitugs story in Newsbreak, about the pay-off of Php 10 million to Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago for rendering a Resolution favorable to Henry T. Go in
his petition against the Sandiganbayan (according to Macasaet), or, a decision
favoring Barque against Manotok in a big land case (according to Ms.
Vitug), have a leg to stand on. As Justice Vitug has observed during the last
hearing before the Committee, everything that has been heard thus far would
appear to be hearsay. Ms. Vitug admitted there is no paper trail to support the
charge of bribery against Justice Santiago, for although her sources had pointed to
Cecilia Muoz Delis as the root source of the story, the information she
received was second-hand or may be third-hand because none of her sources
had talked with Delis herself (70, 72 tsn Jan. 17, 2008). Delis had refused to be
interviewed by her, and had emphatically denied in her letter and affidavit any
knowledge of the alleged bribery because she was no longer working in the Court
when it supposedly happened.

Macasaets sources likewise fed him double hearsay information from
a source that refused to reveal the identity of the Lady Justice nor a high court but
alleged that the Php 10 million bribe was discovered by her secretary named
Cecilia, a niece and namesake of the late Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma, who was
fired from her job on account of it.

The Committee observed that Macasaets story about the bribery and of
Cecilias role in supposedly discovering it, is full of holes, inconsistencies, and
contradictions, indicating that he did not exercise due diligence, patience,
and care in checking the veracity of the information fed to him, before giving
it publicity in his columns. Nor was he bothered by the damage that his
columns would inflict on the reputation of a member of the Highest
Court and on the Court itself. In fact, he was happy that he wrote the
columns (103 tsn Jan. 10, 2008). Even if he failed to get confirmation of the
bribery, one day sooner or later, somebody would come up and admit or deny
it. He did not care that he smeared the whole Judiciary to fish her out,
because after she is fished out, the suspicion on the rest would be removed (29-
30 tsn Jan. 10, 2008).
[27]
(Emphasis supplied)

The Committee likewise noted the inconsistencies and assumptions of Macasaet, betraying
lack of veracity of the alleged bribery

1. For instance, he said that he could not get confirmation of the bribery story
given to him by his source. Later, he said that his sources told me they had
personal knowledge but would not reveal the name of the Lady Justice (65,
tsn, January 10, 2008).

2. His allegation that the Lady Justice (later identified as Justice Santiago) did
not report for work last week, i.e., the week before his first column came
out on September 18, 2007, was refuted by the Courts Public Information
Officer (PIO) Atty. Midas Marquez, who testified that no Lady Justice was
absent that week.

3. The date when the gift-wrapped box of money was allegedly opened by
Cecilia is also uncertain because of Macasaets conflicting allegations about
it. Macasaets first column ofSeptember 18, 2007, stated that it happened
last week, i.e., sometime in the week of September 10-14, 2007.

The next day, September 19, 2007, he, however, wrote in his column that
the five boxes (not one) of money were delivered on the day (September 3,
2007) when the Lady Justice, acting as ponente, acquitted the accused Henry
T. Go.

But again, because his story about Cecilias role in the discovery of the
bribery in September 2007, was contradicted by the record of Cecilias
resignation from the Court on March 15, 2007 (Annexes D and D-1,
Cecilia Delis Letter of Resignation & Clearance), Macasaet, after consulting
his source again, changed his story when he testified on January 17,
2008. He said that, according to his source, the boxes of money were
delivered, not any one time in September 2007, but on different dates in
November 2006 up to March 2007, before Cecilia resigned or was fired
from the office of Justice Santiago (5-6, tsn, January 17, 2008).

That allegation is, however, refuted by the logbooks of the Security Services
for the period of November 2006 to March 2007 which contain no record of
the alleged deliveries of boxes of money to the office of Justice
Santiago. Danilo Pablo, head of the Courts Security Services affirmed that
in his ten (10) years of service in the Court, he has not received any report of
boxes of money being delivered to any of the Justices (45-46, tsn, January 22,
2008).
[28]

The Committee further wondered which of the five (5) boxes was opened and yielded
money. It found

1. x x x In his column of September 21, 2007, Macasaet alleged that Cecilia
picked up the five boxes of money several times in March (not last week
as I mistakenly reported), and she never opened the first four boxes
x x x she opened the last and saw the money because the Lady Justice was
absent on that day.

But when he testified before the Committee on January 10, 2008, Macasaet
alleged that it was the first one that was opened according to his source
(71, 89, 92, 125, tsn, January 10, 2008).

2. Contradicting his published story that five (5) boxes of money were delivered
on the day the Lady Justice acquitted Henry Go, Macasaet testified at the
investigation that they were delivered on different occasions according to
my source (70, tsn, January 10, 2008).

But no sooner had he attributed that information to my source than he
admitted that it was only my own conclusion x x x I assumed that the giver
of the money is not so stupid as to have them delivered all in one trip. As a
matter of fact, I even wondered why said boxes were not delivered in the
home of the Lady Justice (72, tsn, January 10, 2008).

3. The amount of the bribe is also questionable. For while in his own column
of September 18, 2007, Macasaet stated that the gift was estimated at Php 10
million, he later testified onJanuary 10, 2008 that the amount was my own
calculation because I talked to people, I said this kind of box how much
money in One Thousand Pesos bills can it hold, he told me it is ten
(million). So that was a calculation (77, tsn, January 10, 2008).

He also merely assumed that the money was in one thousand pesos bills (78,
tsn, January 10, 2008). No one really knows their denomination.

He said he was told that the size of the box where the money was placed was
this milk called carnation in carton (79, tsn, January 10, 2008). But, at
the final hearing on February 1, 2008, he denied that said that, I never said
carnation boxes; I said milk boxes that should make a lot of difference (84,
tsn, February 1, 2008).

4. Since only one gift-wrapped box of money was opened, Macasaet admitted
that he has no knowledge of whether the four (4) other boxes were also
opened, when and where they were opened, and by whom they were opened
(90, tsn, January 10, 2008). Therefore, no one knows whether they also
contained money.

That the five (5) boxes contained a total of ten million pesos, is just
another assumption of Macasaets. It is a calculation based on estimates
obtained from friends and how much five boxes can hold in one thousand
peso bills, more or less ten million, he explained (91, tsn, January 10, 2008).

The sin of assumption which is a cardinal sin in Newsbreaks Guide to
Ethical Journalistic Conduct was repeatedly committed by Macasaet in
writing his story about the bribery of a Lady Justice of the Supreme
Court. (Annex E, page 1, Newsbreak Guide to Ethical Journalistic
Conduct).
[29]

Consequently, the Committee concluded

In view of its tenuous underpinnings, we find the bribery story in
Macasaets columns of September 18-21, 2007, and in Ms. Vitugs
Newsbreak issue of September 25, 2007,unbelievable. Why should five
boxes supposedly containing a total of Php 10 million as bribe money be
delivered to the office of a Lady Justice in the Supreme Court, where it would
have to pass examination by the security guards and the quizzical eyes of her
own employees? Why not to her home? Or at some agreed meeting place
outside the Court and her home? Or why not quietly deposit it in her bank
account? And why was she absent from her office on the day of the
presumably agreed date for the payment of the bribe? If the bribe was for
dismissing the information against Henry Go in the Sandiganbayan, why was
it paid prematurely in November 2006-March 2007 when the case of Henry
Go was still up in the air and, in fact, was decided against him on April 13,
2007? The favorable resolution on his motion for reconsideration, penned by
Justice Santiago, was promulgated on September 3, 2007, almost one year
after the pay-off, if there was such a pay-off?

x x x x

The Committee considers this case not just another event that should pass
unnoticed for it has implications far beyond the allocated ramparts of free
speech. Needless to say, that while we espouse the enjoyment of freedom of
expression by media, particularly, it behooves it to observe great circumspection
so as not to destroy reputations, integrity and character so dear to every
individual, more so to a revered institution like the Supreme Court. Everyone
deserves respect and dignity.
[30]

Finding sufficient basis to hold respondent Macasaet in indirect contempt of court, the
Committee recommended

The Committee finds that the statements of respondent Amado P.
Macasaet about the Supreme Court in his Business Circuit columns in
the September 18-21, 2007 issues of the newspaper Malaya, maligning and
degrading the Supreme Court and tending directly or indirectly to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, to be utterly unjustified.

WHEREFORE, the Committee believes there exist valid grounds for this
Honorable Court, if it is so minded, to cite Amado P. Macasaet for indirect
contempt within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
[31]
(Emphasis supplied)

Our Ruling

IN view of respondents invocation of his right to press freedom as a defense, it is essential
to first examine the nature and evolution of this preferred liberty, together with the
countervailing interest of judicial independence, which includes the right to due process of law,
the right to a fair trial, and the preservation of public confidence in the courts for the proper
administration of justice.

Nature and History of Press Freedom

Freedom of expression, which includes freedom of speech and of the press, is one of the
hallmarks of a democratic society. It has been recognized as such for centuries.

The history of press freedom dates back to the English Magna Carta, promulgated in
1215, which established the principle that not even the lawmaker should be above the
law. Through the years, many treatises on press freedom arose in reaction to various measures
taken to curtail it.

In the 17th Century, John Milton wrote Areopagitica, a philosophical defense of the right
to free speech. It was a reaction to the Licensing Order of June 14, 1643, which declared that no
book, pamphlet, paper, nor part of any such book, pamphlet, or paper, shall from henceforth be
printed, bound, stitched or put to sale by any person or persons whatsoever, unless the same be
first approved of and licensed under the hands of such person or persons as both, or either of the
said Houses shall appoint for the licensing of the same. Milton advocated that a written work
should not be suppressed before publication. Writers of treacherous, slanderous, or blasphemous
materials should first be tried according to law. Only after it has been established that their
writings are of a treacherous, slanderous, or blasphemous nature should they be subsequently
punished for their wrongful acts.

Sir William Blackstone, 19th Century English jurist, in his still widely cited historical
and analytical treatise on English common law, aptly described the twin aspects of press
freedom:

x x x Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he
pleases before the public: to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press: but
if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the
consequences of his own temerity. To subject the press to the restrictive power of
a licenser, as was formerly done, both before and since the Revolution, is to
subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the
arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion and
government. But to punish as the law does at present any dangerous or offensive
writings, which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of
a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order,
of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty. Thus, the
will of individuals is still left free: the abuse only of that free will is the object of
legal punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or
inquiry: liberty of private sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or making
public, of bad sentiments destructive to the ends of society, is the crime which
society corrects.
[32]
(Emphasis supplied)

In the United States, press freedom was first put into organic law with the First
Amendment to its Constitution, declaring that Congress shall make no law x x x abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press. This set in stone the basis for virtually all contemporary
laws and jurisprudence on the subject of press freedom.

Our Constitutions and jurisprudence are no different. Section 4, Article III, 1987
Constitution, which in part provides that [n]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press x x x x, is a provision found in the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions.
[33]

Media and I ts Multiplying Roles in
Democracy

Due to their preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties, the freedoms of speech, of
expression, and of the press have progressed dramatically. As early as 1942, even before the
advent of television, the distinguished U.S. appellate court Judge Learned Hand had already
observed that [t]he hand that rules the press, the radio, the screen, and the far-spread magazine,
rules the country. He concluded that medias power was an unchangeable fact of
life: Whether we like or not, we must learn to accept it. There is much truth today in those
statements.

One of the notable features of recent years is the accelerated development of the
media. They have grown from strength to strength, and have substantially influenced people,
either favorably or unfavorably, towards those in government. The use of information
technology has firmed up the media networks hold on power. Traditional media for mass
communication newspapers, magazines, radio, and standard television have been joined by
satellite and cable television, electronic mail, short messaging and multi-media service, and the
internet, giving rise to new opportunities for electronic news and information companies to even
intensify their influence over the general public.

Studies show that people rely heavily on the media for their knowledge of events in the
world and for impressions that form the basis for their own judgments. The media exert a strong
influence on what people think and feel. Certainly, the power of Philippine media is of no small
measure

The power of the press to influence politics is proven. Policy issues and
the implementation of government programs requiring greater public discussion
are sometimes displaced in the government agenda by matters that have been
given more importance in the news. Public officials are obliged to attend to
media queries even if these are not necessarily the most important questions of the
day. Nowhere in Southeast Asia are government officials so accessible to the
press. Cabinet ministers are available from the earliest hours to answer questions
from radio show hosts on the news of the day involving their responsibilities.

Furthermore, television news programs have spawned media celebrities
whose popularity with the masses has catapulted their entry into politics. Medias
focus on celebrity has infected the political culture with exaggerated concern for
personality and color, and the kind of impact associated with sports and
entertainment. Political parties have tended to recruit popular figures from these
fields to assure they have winners in the race for seats in Congress.
[34]

The reach of Philippine media is quite extensive

In the Philippines radio has the biggest audience among all the mass media
(85 percent), followed by television at 74 percent, and print, 32 percent. Print,
however, has an 82 percent reach in Metropolitan Manila, which has a population
of some 10 million and is the countrys business, political, and cultural
center. Print may thus be surmised to be as influential in the capital as television,
which has a reach of 96 percent among residents.
[35]

The mass media in a free society uphold the democratic way of life. They provide
citizens with relevant information to help them make informed decisions about public issues
affecting their lives. Affirming the right of the public to know, they serve as vehicles for the
necessary exchange of ideas through fair and open debate. As the Fourth Estate in our
democracy, they vigorously exercise their independence and vigilantly guard against
infringements. Over the years, the Philippine media have earned the reputation of being the
freest and liveliest in Asia.
[36]

Members of Philippine media have assumed the role of a watchdog and have been
protective and assertive of this role. They demand accountability of government officials and
agencies. They have been adversarial when they relate with any of the three branches of
government. They uphold the citizens right to know, and make public officials, including
judges and justices, responsible for their deeds or misdeeds. Through their watchdog function,
the media motivate the public to be vigilant in exercising the citizens right to an effective,
efficient and corrupt-free government.

Open J ustice and J udicial I ndependence

Closely linked with the right to freedom of speech and of the press is the public right to
scrutinize and criticize government. The freedom to question the government has been a
protected right of long-standing tradition throughout American history. There is no doubt that
the fundamental freedom to criticize government necessarily includes the right to criticize the
courts, their proceedings and decisions. Since the drafting of their Constitution over 200 years
ago, American judges have anticipated and sometimes even encouraged public scrutiny
of themselves, if not of the judiciary as a whole.
[37]

This open justice principle, which is as fundamental to a democratic society as freedom
of speech, has been an accepted doctrine in several jurisdictions. It is justified on the ground that
if the determination of justice cannot be hidden from the public, this will provide: (1) a safeguard
against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy, and (2) the maintenance of the publics confidence
in the administration of justice.
[38]

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free
and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so
far.
[39]
Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary.

The debate over the independence of the judiciary is nothing new. More than 200 years
ago, the Founding Fathers of the American Constitution engaged in heated arguments, both
before and after the Constitutional Convention, focusing on the extent and nature of the
judiciarys role in the newly-formed government.
[40]
The signers of the Declaration of
Independence, well aware of the oppressive results of the unchecked political power of the King
of England who established absolute tyranny over American colonies, recognized the importance
of creating a stable system of justice to protect the people.

Cognizant of the need to create a system of checks and balances to ensure that the rule of
law shall rule, the resulting Constitution provided for a three-tiered system of government, so
structured that no branch holds limitless power.

The judicial branch is described as the least dangerous branch of government.
[41]
But it
holds a special place in the tripartite system, as it is primarily responsible for protecting basic
human liberties from government encroachment. It completes the nations system of checks and
balances. It serves as an arbiter of disputes between factions and instruments of government.

In our constitutional scheme and democracy, our courts of justice are vested with judicial
power, which includes the duty x x x to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
[42]
The present judicial system allows the people to rely
upon our courts with substantial certainty; it encourages the resolution of disputes in courtrooms
rather than on the streets.

To accomplish these tasks, an independent judiciary is very vital. Judicial independence
is the backbone of democracy. It is essential not only to the preservation of our justice system,
but of government as well. Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has observed that judicial independence encompasses two distinct but related concepts of
independence.
[43]

One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge
and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the
law. A judge has this kind of independence when he can do his job without having to hear or
at least without having to take it seriously if he does hear criticisms of his personal morality
and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional judicial independence. It
focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a
class.

A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are
preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is
maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of this
confidence threatens the maintenance of an independent Third Estate.

For sure, judicial criticism can be constructive, uncovering and addressing a problem that
merits public attention. Public awareness, debate, and criticism of the courts ensure that people
are informed of what they are doing that have broad implications for all citizens. Informed
discussion, comment, debate and disagreement from lawyers, academics, and public officials
have been hallmarks of a great legal tradition and have played a vital role in shaping the law.

But there is an important line between legitimate criticism and illegitimate attack upon
the courts or their judges. Attacks upon the court or a judge not only risk the inhibition of all
judges as they conscientiously endeavor to discharge their constitutional responsibilities; they
also undermine the peoples confidence in the courts.

Personal attacks, criticisms laden with political threats, those that misrepresent and distort
the nature and context of judicial decisions, those that are misleading or without factual or legal
basis, and those that blame the judges for the ills of society, damage the integrity of the judiciary
and threaten the doctrine of judicial independence. These attacks do a grave disservice to the
principle of an independent judiciary and mislead the public as to the role of judges in a
constitutional democracy, shaking the very foundation of our democratic government.

Such attacks on the judiciary can result in two distinct yet related undesirable
consequences.
[44]
First, the criticism will prevent judges from remaining insulated from the
personal and political consequences of making an unpopular decision, thus placing judicial
independence at risk. Second, unjust criticism of the judiciary will erode the publics trust and
confidence in the judiciary as an institution. Both judicial independence and the publics trust
and confidence in the judiciary as an institution are vital components in maintaining a healthy
democracy.

Accordingly, it has been consistently held that, while freedom of speech, of expression,
and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake
of democracy, these freedoms are not absolute. For, if left unbridled, they have the tendency to
be abused and can translate to licenses, which could lead to disorder and anarchy.

Thus, in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,
[45]
this Court ruled that [f]rom the
language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right (to free
expression) is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of
speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude, however, a literal
interpretation. Freedom of expression is not absolute. It would be too much to insist that, at all
times and under all circumstances, it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other
societal values that press for recognition.
[46]

In Lagunzad v. Vda. De Gonzales,
[47]
it was held that while the right of freedom of
expression occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties, it is not without
limitations. As the revered Holmes once said, the limitation on ones right to extend ones fist is
when it hits the nose of another.

Indeed, freedom of speech cannot be absolute and unconditional. In legal, political, and
philosophical contexts, it is always regarded as liable to be overridden by important
countervailing interests, such as state security, public order, safety of individual citizens,
protection of reputation, and due process of law, which encompasses not only the right to a fair
trial, but also the preservation of public confidence in the proper administration of justice.

As early as 1930, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice George Malcolm, declared that
[a]s important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of
the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary.
[48]

In Zaldivar v. Gonzalez,
[49]
the Court said that freedom of speech and expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be
adjusted to and accommodated with requirements of equally important public interests. One of
these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of
the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of
expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of
dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for
delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.

As Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter put it:

x x x A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an
independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are
indispensable to a free society.

The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary
through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the
potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press.
[50]

Even the major international and regional human rights instruments of civil and political
rights the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
[51]
the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
[52]
the American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR),
[53]
and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR)
[54]
protect both
freedom of expression and the administration of justice. Freedom of expression is protected
under Article 19 of the ICCPR

(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form
of art, or through any other media of his choice.

However, Article 19 of the ICCPR is made subject to Article 14(1), which guarantees the
right of individuals to be equal before the courts and tribunals and be entitled to a fair x x x
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, where [t]he press and the public
may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (order public) or
national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the Parties so
requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances
where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice x x x.

Article 10(2) of the ECHR goes further by explicitly mentioning the maintenance of the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary

The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society, in the
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)

Judges have an affirmative duty to defend and uphold the integrity and independence of
the judiciary. The courts need to be able to sanction those who obstruct their processes. The
judiciary itself must continue to be a voice that explains and preserves its own
independence. The respect accorded to judges is an adjunct of the social-contract necessity for
impartial judges in the creation of a civil society. In the words of the great political philosopher
John Locke

The great and chief end, therefore, for mens uniting into commonwealths,
and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property, to
which in the state of nature there are many things wanting x x x there wants
an established, settled, known law x x x there wants a known and indifferent
judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the
established law x x x there often wants power to back and support the sentence
when right, and to give it due execution.
[55]
(Emphasis supplied)

A Survey of Philippine J urisprudence

The very first case decided by the Supreme Court, In the matter of the proceedings
against Marcelino Aguas for contempt of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
[56]
was a
contempt proceeding. Before, as it is now, this Court had to use this power to impress upon
contemnors the legal theory and constitutional premises of judicial legitimacy complementing
popular sovereignty and public interest. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice James Smith stated
that contempt proceedings against a contemnor were against someone who had done an act or
was about to do such act which was disrespectful to the court or offensive to its dignity.
[57]

Through the years, the Court has punished contemnors for a variety of offenses that have
attempted to degrade its dignity and impeded the administration of justice.

In 1916, Amzi B. Kelly was fined P1,000 and sentenced to six months in prison for
contempt of court after he published a letter to the editor of The Independent criticizing the Court
for its decision to hold him in contempt for having published a book stating that various
government officials, including the members of the Supreme Court, were guilty of politically
assassinating General Mariano Noriel, who was executed for the killing of a political rival in
1915.
[58]

In 1949, Atty. Vicente Sotto was fined P1,000.00 for publishing a statement in
the Manila Times objecting to one of the High Courts decisions, citing that such decision by the
majority was but another evidence of the incompetency or narrow-mindedness of the majority
of its members and called for the resignation of the Courts entire membership in the wake of
so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years.
[59]

In 1987, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre,
[60]
in almost identical letters dated October 20, 1986 sent to
four (4) Justices of the Supreme Court (all members of the First Division), stated among others

It is important to call your attention to the dismissal of (case cited) by
an untenable minute-resolution x x x which we consider as
an unjust resolution deliberately and knowinglypromulgated by the First Division
of the Supreme Court of which you are a member.

We consider the three minute-resolutions x x x railroaded with such
hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the SC under circumstances
that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.

There is nothing final in this world. We assure you that this case is far
from finished by a long shot. For at the proper time, we shall so act and bring this
case before another forum where the members of the Court can no longer deny
action with minute resolutions that are not only unjust but are knowingly and
deliberately promulgated x x x.

Please understand that we are pursuing further remedies in our quest for
justice under the law. We intend to hold responsible members of the First
Division who participated in the promulgation of these three minute-resolutions in
question x x x.

In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid having injustice to anyone,
particularly the members of the First Division, providing that they had no hand in
the promulgation of the resolution in question. x x x If, however, we do not hear
from you after a week, then we will consider your silence that you supported the
dismissal of our petition. We will then be guided accordingly.
[61]

The letter to one of the Justices further stated

We leave the next move to you by informing us your participation x x
x. Please do not take this matter lightly. x x x The moment we take action in the
plans we are completing, we will then call a press conference with TV and radio
coverage. Arrangements in this regard are being done. The people should or
ought to know why we were thwarted in our quest for plain justice.
[62]

These letters were referred by the First Division en consulta to the Court en banc.

True to her threats, after having lost her case before the Supreme Court, Ilustre filed
on December 16, 1986 an affidavit-complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging, among others,
some Justices of both the Supreme Court and the CA with knowingly and deliberately rendering
unjust resolutions.

On January 29, 1987, the Supreme Court en banc required Ilustre to show cause why she
should not be held in contempt for her foregoing statements, conduct, acts, and charges against
the Supreme Court and/or official actions of the justices concerned which, unless satisfactorily
explained, transcended the permissible bounds of propriety and undermined and degraded the
administration of justice.

In her answer, Ilustre contended, inter alia, that she had no intention to affront the honor
and dignity of the Court; that the letters to the individual justices were private in character; that
the Court was estopped, having failed to immediately take disciplinary proceedings against her;
and that the citation for contempt was a vindictive reprisal against her.

The Supreme Court found her explanation unsatisfactory. The claim of lack of evil
intention was disbelieved in the face of attendant circumstances. Reliance on the privacy of
communication was likewise held as misplaced. Letters addressed to individual Justices in
connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial records
and are a matter of public concern for the entire Court. (Underscoring supplied)

The Court likewise stated that it was only in the exercise of forbearance that it refrained
from immediately issuing a show-cause order, expecting that she and her lawyer would realize
the unjustness and unfairness of their accusations. Neither was there any vindictive reprisal
involved. The Courts authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to
preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his
client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.

In resum, the Court found that Ilustre had transcended the permissible bounds of fair
comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice: (a) in her letters
addressed to the individual Justices, quoted in the show-cause Resolution, particularly the
underlined portions thereof; (b) in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan
quoted in the same Resolution; (c) in her statement, conduct, acts, and charges against the
Supreme Court and/or official actions of the Justices concerned and her description of improper
motives; and (d) in her unjustified outburst that she could no longer expect justice from the
Court.

The fact that said letter was not technically considered pleadings nor the
fact that they were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved
does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional
right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for
contemptuous acts against the Court.
[63]

Ilustre was fined P1,000.00 for contempt, evidently considered as indirect, taking into
account the penalty imposed and the fact that the proceedings taken were not summary in nature.

In Perkins v. Director of Prisons,
[64]
the Court had an occasion to examine the
fundamental foundations of the power to punish for contempt: The power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts,
and, consequently, to the due administration of justice.
[65]

The Court there held that the exercise of this power is as old as the English history itself,
and has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts. Being a common-
law power, inherent in all courts, the moment the courts of the United States were called into
existence they became vested with it. It is a power coming to us from the common law, and, so
far as we know, has been universally admitted and recognized.
[66]

After World War II, this Court reiterated it had an inherent power to punish for contempt,
to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including
lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court.
[67]
This
power to punish for contempt is necessary for its own protection against improper interference
with the due administration of justice x x x. It is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the
parties-litigant.
[68]
These twin principles were to be succinctly cited in the later case of Zaldivar
v. Gonzales.
[69]

Of course, the power to punish for contempt is exercised on the preservative
principle. There must be caution and hesitancy on the part of the judge whenever the possible
exercise of his awesome prerogative presents itself. The power to punish for contempt, as was
pointed out by Mr. Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban,
[70]
should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its
inherent power to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or
fail. But when called for, most especially when needed to preserve the very existence and
integrity of no less than the Highest Court, this principle bears importance.

In the 1995 case People v. Godoy,
[71]
the Court, citing In Re: Vicente Sotto,
[72]
had the
opportunity to define the relations of the courts and of the press. Quoting the statements made
by Judge Holmes in U.S. v. Sullen,
[73]
the Court said:

The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate
and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The
press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to
uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former
receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. x x x In a clear case where
it is necessary in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by
publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or
otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, the Court will not hesitate to
exercise undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be
permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free
from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right
will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an
individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as
an unprejudiced tribunal.
[74]
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, while the Court in Godoy agreed that our Constitution and our laws recognize the
First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and of the press, these two constitutional
guaranties must not be confused with an abuse of such liberties. Quoting Godoy further

Obstructing, by means of the spoken or written word, the administration of
justice by the courts has been described as an abuse of the liberty of the speech or
the press such as will subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of court.
[75]

Finally, in the more recent 2007 case Roxas v. Zuzuarregui,
[76]
the Court en banc in a
unanimous per curiam resolution imposed a P30,000 fine on Atty. Romeo Roxasfor making
unfair and unfounded accusations against a member of this Court, and mocking the Court for
allegedly being part of the wrongdoing and being a dispenser of injustice. We found the letter
of Atty. Roxas full of contemptuous remarks that tended to degrade the dignity of the Court and
erode public confidence that should be accorded to it. We also said that his invocation of free
speech and privacy of communication will not, however, free him from liability. As already
stated, his letter contained defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity
of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an
exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of
the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to
impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and confidence
therein. Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to
demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates. Accordingly,
Atty. Roxas was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and fined P30,000.00, with a warning
that a repetition of a similar act would warrant a more severe penalty.

Application of Existing J urisprudence to the Case at
Bar

In determining the liability of the respondent in this contempt proceeding, we weigh the
conflicting constitutional considerations respondents claim of his right to press freedom, on
one hand; and, on the other hand, ensuring judicial independence by upholding public interest in
maintaining the dignity of the judiciary and the orderly administration of justice both
indispensable to the preservation of democracy and the maintenance of a just society.

The apparently conflicting constitutional considerations summed up by a distinguished
former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, Justice H.R. Khanna, bears a hand in resolving the
issue

There are one or two matters to which I would like to make pointed
reference in the context of the freedom of the press. One of them relates to the
danger of trial by the press. Certain aspects of a case are so much highlighted by
the press that the publicity gives rise to strong public emotions. The inevitable
effect of that is to prejudice the case of one party or the other for a fair trial. We
must consider the question as to what extent are restraints necessary and have to
be exercised by the press with a view to preserving the purity of judicial
process. At the same time, we have to guard against another danger. A person
cannot x x x by starting some kind of judicial proceedings in respect of matter of
vital public importance stifle all public discussions of that matter on pain of
contempt of court. A line to balance the whole thing has to be drawn at some
point. It also seems necessary in exercising the power of contempt of court x x x
vis--vis the press that no hyper-sensitivity is shown and due account is taken of
the proper functioning of a free press in a democratic society. This is vital for
ensuring the health of democracy. At the same time, the press must also keep in
view its responsibility and see that nothing is done as may bring the courts x x x
into disrepute and make people lose faith in these institution(s). One other matter
which must not be lost sight of is that while comment is free, facts are sacred.
[77]

We have no problems with legitimate criticisms pointing out flaws in our decisions,
judicial reasoning, or even how we run our public offices or public affairs. They should even be
constructive and should pave the way for a more responsive, effective and efficient judiciary.

Unfortunately, the published articles of respondent Macasaet are not of this genre. On
the contrary, he has crossed the line, as his are baseless scurrilous attacks which demonstrate
nothing but an abuse of press freedom. They leave no redeeming value in furtherance of
freedom of the press. They do nothing but damage the integrity of the High Court, undermine
the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, and threaten the doctrine of judicial
independence.

A veteran journalist of many years and a president of a group of respectable media
practitioners, respondent Macasaet has brilliantly sewn an incredible tale, adorned it with some
facts to make it lifelike, but impregnated it as well with insinuations and innuendoes, which,
when digested entirely by an unsuspecting soul, may make him throw up with seethe. Thus, he
published his highly speculative articles that bribery occurred in the High Court, based on
specious information, without any regard for the injury such would cause to the reputation of the
judiciary and the effective administration of justice. Nor did he give any thought to the undue,
irreparable damage such false accusations and thinly veiled allusions would have on a member of
the Court.

The Investigating Committee could not have put it any better when it found respondent
feigning his highest respect for this Court

Macasaets diatribes against the Court generate public distrust in the
administration of Justice by the Supreme Court, instead of promoting respect for
its integrity and honor. They derogate his avowal of highest respect for this
Court (10, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008); his declaration that he has always upheld the
majesty of the law as interpreted by the Court (96, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008); that his
opinion of the Court has actually been elevated ten miles up because of its
decisions in the cases involving Proclamation No. 1017, the CPR, EO 464, and
the Peoples Initiative (97, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008); that he has done everything to
preserve the integrity and majesty of the Court and its jurists (84-85, tsn, Feb. 1,
2008); that he wants the integrity of the Court preserved because this is the last
bastion of democracy (32, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008).

These tongue-in cheek protestations do not repair or erase the damage and
injury that his contemptuous remarks about the Court and the Justices have
wrought upon the institutional integrity, dignity, and honor of the Supreme
Court. As a matter of fact, nowhere in his columns do we find a single word
of respect for the Court or the integrity and honor of the Court. On the
contrary, what we find are allegations of pernicious rumor that the courts are
dirty, suspicions that the jurists are thieves, that the Highest Court has a
soiled reputation, and that the Supreme Court has a sagging reputation.

He admitted that the rumor about the courts being dirty referred
specifically (to) the Supreme Court (100, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008) and was based on
personal conclusion which (was), in turn, based on confidential information fed
to me. It is in that respect that I thought that I have (a) duty to protect and keep
the Honor of this Court (98, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008).

He unburdened his heretofore hidden anger, if not disgust, with the Court
when he clarified that the word dirty x x x is not necessarily related to money
(101, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008). It is my belief that lack of familiarity with the law is x x
x kind of dirty referring to then Associate Justice Artemio Panganibans support
for, and Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.s act of swearing into office then Vice-
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as Acting President of the Philippines even
while then President Joseph Estrada was still in Malacaang, which Macasaet
believed to be quite a bit of dirt (102-106, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008).
[78]

To reiterate the words of the Committee, this case is not just another event that should
pass unnoticed for it has implications far beyond the allocated ramparts of free speech.
[79]
To
allow respondent to use press freedom as an excuse to capriciously disparage the reputation of
the Court and that of innocent private individuals would be to make a mockery of this liberty.

Respondent has absolutely no basis to call the Supreme Court a court of thieves and a
basket of rotten apples. These publications directly undermine the integrity of the justices and
render suspect the Supreme Court as an institution. Without bases for his publications, purely
resorting to speculation and fishing expeditions in the hope of striking or creating a story,
with utter disregard for the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court, he has committed acts
that degrade and impede the orderly administration of justice.

We cannot close our eyes to the comprehensive Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Committee. It enumerated the inconsistencies and assumptions of respondent
which lacked veracity and showed the reckless disregard of whether the alleged bribery was false
or not.
[80]

Indeed, the confidential information allegedly received by respondent by which he swears
with his heart and soul
[81]
was found by the Investigating Committeeunbelievable. It was a
story that reeked of urban legend, as it generated more questions than answers.
[82]

Respondent Macasaets wanton disregard for the truth was exhibited by his apathetic
manner of verifying the veracity of the information he had gathered for his September 18, 19, 20,
and 21, 2007 articles concerning the alleged bribery of a Lady Justice. His bases for the amount
of money, the number of boxes, the date of delivery of the boxes, among other important details,
were, by his own admission founded on personal assumptions. This nonchalant attitude
extended to his very testimony before the investigating committee

Justice Aquino: You did not endeavor to verify the information
given by your source before publishing the story
about the bribery?
Mr. Macasaet: I tried, I could not get confirmation, I thought
that eventually my effort at consistently trying or
exposing the alleged bribery one day sooner or
later somebody will come up and admit or deny.

x x x x

Justice Vitug: Do you confirm the fact of authorship of the
columns of September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007?
Mr. Macasaet: On a stack of Bible, I confirm it.

Justice Vitug: Does that mean that you also confirm the
accuracy of those information that were said?
Mr. Macasaet: I am not confirming the accuracy of the
information and I think that is precisely the
reason for this hearing, I must repeat that the
purpose is to fish [the Lady Justice] out so that
the rest of the Lady Justices in all the Courts
suspicion can be removed from them. I failed in
the sense that one denied, she felt alluded to and
said she is not involved.
[83]

Respondent thus admits to having written his articles as means to fish out the Lady
Justice involved in an alleged bribery fed to him by his source, with reckless disregard of
whether or not such bribery indeed took place. It defies reason why any responsible journalist
would go on to publish any material in a newspaper of general circulation without having
ascertained even the five Ws and one H of the story.
[84]

That he could not, through his extensive network of informants, confirm the approximate
date when the alleged bribery took place, the identities of the persons involved, or any other
important detail, before he began his series of articles only leads to the rational conclusion that
he did not care whether or not the story he published was true. His aim, as he admits, was to go
on a fishing expedition to see if someone would confirm or deny his now clearly baseless
accusations. This practice of fishing for information by publishing unverified information in a
manner that leads the reading public to believe such is true cannot be tolerated.

Aggravating respondents affront to the dignity of the Court is his unwillingness to show
any remorse or repentance for his contemptuous acts. In fact, as he made clear in his testimony
before the Investigating Committee when asked what his thoughts were about his having
published the instant articles, he replied that he was happy in the sense that [he] did a job in
[his] best lights and the effort ended up in the creation of [the investigating panel].
[85]

However, such assertions of having acted in the best interest of the Judiciary are belied
by the fact that he could have caused the creation of an investigating panel to look into such
allegations in a more rational and prudent manner. In the words of the Investigating Committee

If he had no malice toward the Court, if, as he professes, the purpose of his
columns was to save the integrity and honor of the Court, Macasaet should, and
could, have reported the rumored bribery directly to the Chief Justice and asked
for its investigation. He should have refrained from calling the Court names,
before giving it a chance to act on his report and on his suggestion to investigate
the matter. Since he knew the name of the Court employee who allegedly
discovered the bribe money, the Court could have begun its investigation with her
to ascertain the identity of the nameless Lady Justice and the veracity of the
rumored bribery. His disparaging remarks about the Court and jurists in
conjunction with his unverified report on the alleged bribery were totally uncalled
for and unjustified.
[86]

It is precisely because of his failure to abide by the tenets of responsible journalism that
we accept the findings of the Investigating Committee in holding respondent Macasaet guilty of
indirect contempt of court. He must be made accountable for his complete failure to exercise
even a single vestige of responsible journalism in publishing his unfounded and ill-thought
diatribes against the Judiciary and the honorable people who serve it.

Respondent also asserts that the subject matter of his articles is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of Congress. He cites Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which partly
states that x x x members of the Supreme Court x x x may be removed from office, on
impeachment for, and conviction of x x x bribery x x x and Section 3(1), Article XI, which
provides that [t]he House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all case
of impeachment.

We cannot agree. What Macasaet conveniently forgets is that no impeachment complaint
has been filed against Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago. Thus, his cited constitutional provisions
do not come into play.

Respondent claims that there is a violation of his right to due process. From the time his
articles were published, no formal charge has been filed against him as required under Section 3,
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Respondent fails to see, however, that under Section 4 of the same Rule, proceedings for
indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was
committed, by an order or any other formal charge requiring respondent to show why he should
not be punished for contempt. Our Resolution dated September 25, 2007 satisfies the Rule. He
cannot validly claim that such resolution is vague. He cannot feign ignorance of the contents of
his September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007 articles in the Malaya.

Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure pertinently provides:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.
After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court
and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt.

x x x x

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice;

x x x x

SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. If the respondent is adjudged
guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty
thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. x x
x (Underscoring supplied)

We are not unaware of the vigorous dissent of then Associate Justice, now our Chief
Justice, Reynato S. Puno, in an earlier case,
[87]
in which he so lucidly argued for the right to
journalistic shield, behind which the Dissenting Opinion of an esteemed colleague, Mr.
Justice Carpio, and respondent Macasaet, take full refuge. While we hold his thesis in high
regard, the case at bar does not fall within his erudite defense of press freedom. The critical
issues then were the right of newsmen to refuse subpoenas, summons, or invitations to appear
in administrative investigations, and not to reveal their confidential sources of information under
R.A. No. 53, as amended. None of these are the issues at hand. Be that as it may, elementary
decision-making teaches that we cite the majority opinion as precedent, not lonely dissenting
opinions.
[88]

In his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio assails the Committee proceedings as
fatally defective for patent denial of due process
[89]
because when the witnesses the
Committee summoned testified, the Committee monopolized the right to propound questions to
the witnesses, denying to Macasaet such right.
[90]
He continues to say that [w]ith the
procedure the Committee adopted, Macasaet was reduced to a passive participant, unable to
subject the testimonies of adverse witnesses to rigorous probing under cross-examination. As
matters stand, Macasaet will be subjected to punitive sanctions based on evidence he had no
opportunity to scrutinize.
[91]

We disagree on triple grounds.

First, the proceedings of the Committee are presumed to be regular. Thus,
the onus probandi to prove otherwise rests on Macasaet, not on the Committee. Suffice it to say
that the Dissenting Opinion which cites People v. Godoy as to the criminal character of a
contempt proceeding,
[92]
fails to state what Godoy likewise instructs

Strictly speaking however, they are not criminal proceedings or
prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The
proceeding has been characterized as suigeneris, partaking of some of the
elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting
neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in
accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as
such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt
proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal
prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to
be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that
proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However,
criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the
substantial rights of the accused are preserved.
[93]

Second, assuming arguendo that Macasaet was not able to cross-examine his witnesses,
this does not necessarily mean that his right to due process of law was violated.

The right of an accused to cross-examine the witnesses against him, although an adjunct
of the Constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face,
[94]
can be waived when not
timely asserted. In the case of Macasaet, never did he assert his right to cross-examine the
witnesses against him despite the opportunity to do so. During the entire course of the
proceedings in the Committee, respondent was vigorously represented by
counsel de parte. Respondent or his counsel could have moved to cross-examine the adverse
witnesses. Respondent had every opportunity to do so. Lamentably, he failed to exercise the
said right.

Interestingly, during the last hearing date, counsel for respondent requested that
respondent be allowed to say something, which the Committee granted. Respondent then
proceeded with a lengthy discourse, all of 45 pages, on everything and anything, except his right
to cross-examination.
[95]
Verily, it cannot be validly claimed now that his right to cross-examine
was violated.

Third, the Court is bereft of any power to invoke the right to cross-examine the witnesses
against respondent, for and in his behalf. Otherwise, the Court will be acting as his counsel,
which is absurd.

J ust a Word More

A free press is regarded as a key pillar of democracy. Reporters must be free to report,
expose, and hold government officials and agencies including an independent judiciary
accountable. Press attention surrounding the judiciary ensures public accountability. Such
publicity acts as a check on judicial competence and integrity, exposes inefficiencies and
irregularities, keeps vigil over various public interest cases, and puts pressure on responsible
judicial officials. This freedom has been used and has benefited the cause of justice. The press
has become an important actor a judicial watchdog in the ongoing judicial
transformation. When properly validated, its acts are protected speech from an accepted
function.
Freedom, however, has not guaranteed quality journalism. The press has been vulnerable
to a host of legitimate criticisms such as incompetence, commercialism, and even
corruption. By disproportionately informing the public about specific court processes, or by
spreading unsubstantiated allegations about corruption and other forms of judicial misconduct,
the press dramatically undermines the publics faith in the courts and threatens the very
foundation of our democratic government.

Oftentimes, journalists writing about the judiciary and court cases lack basic knowledge of
the law and judicial procedures, on the basis of which they draw faulty conclusions which they
pass on to their readers as gospel truths. Trial by publicity also influences the independence of
judges as the public is fed with partial information and vocal opinions, and judges are pressured
to decide in accordance with the public opinion. Faith in the judiciary is undermined when
judges rule against the expectations of the public which has been brainwashed by dramatic
reports and graphic comments. In some cases, unchecked rumors or allegations of irregularities
are immediately published because journalists lack professional competence to verify the
information, or are simply eager to break the news and attract a wider readership.

The role of the press in relation to the judiciary needs to be regulated. This can be done
through voluntary codes of conduct on the part of the press and through judicial policies, such as
the rule on sub judice and contempt of court rulings. The absence of clear voluntary codes
developed by the press, as its self-regulator, strengthens the need for the Court to use its power in
the meantime to cite critics for contempt. This is necessary in cases where such criticism is
obviously malicious or in violation of the sub judicerule, or where there is an evident attempt to
influence the outcome of a case. Judges have the duty to defend and uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary. They should sanction those who obstruct or impede the judicial
processes. The effective administration of justice may only be realized with the strong faith and
confidence of the public in the competence and integrity of the judiciary, free from political and
popular pressure.

Criticism at every level of government is certainly welcome. After all, it is an essential
part of the checks and balances in our republican system of government. However, criticisms
should not impede or obstruct an integral component of our republican institutions from
discharging its constitutionally-mandated duties.

As the Court said in In Re: Almacen:
[96]

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical
evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative
branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by
the periodic appraisal of the citizen whom it is expected to serve.

x x x x

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and
the judges thereof, on the other. x x x
[97]

All told, illegitimate and uninformed criticisms against the courts and judges, those which
cross the line and attempt to subvert the judicial process, must be avoided. They do a great
disservice to the Constitution. They seriously mislead the public as to the proper functioning of
the judiciary. While all citizens have a right to scrutinize and criticize the judiciary, they have an
ethical and societal obligation not to cross that too important line.

Senator Ernesto Maceda, the seasoned politician who has graced both the executive and
the legislative departments in various capacities, in a Privilege Speech, once appealed for
voluntary self-restraint with respect to this Court

There are proper procedures for dealing with instances of official
misdemeanor without setting an entire institution on fire. Arson is not the best
means for pest-control.

In case of possibility of corruption in the Supreme Court, one possible
means is the initiation of impeachment proceedings against specifically identified
justices. A move for impeachment, of course, requires much sobriety and solid
evidence. Whatever charges are brought forward must be substantiated. Those
who dare prosecute must come into the open and append their names to the
accusations they make, with courage and conviction. This is the manner civil
society conserves its civility x x x.

The ends of justice are not served by heckling nor by crude insinuation or
by irresponsible reporting. The house of democracy is never strengthened by
those who choose to throw rocks under the cover of darkness and anonymity. The
institutions of our liberty are never enriched by the irresponsible accusations of
the uninformed. The bedrocks of our Republic are not reinforced by those who
evade responsibility under the veil of freedom.
[98]

During interpellation, he went on to say

x x x And in the context of what I have just said, I think that all
newspapers, all media are welcome to do their worse, criticize the members of the
Executive Department, Members of the Senate, and any other agency of the
Government. But I am just suggesting that when it comes to the judiciary, and
specifically to the Supreme Court, that a different policy, one of more caution,
should be adopted precisely because x x x people may lose faith in the Executive
or the President; they may lose faith in Congress, the Congressmen and the
Senators, but as long as they have their faith unshaken and complete in the last
bulwark of democracy x x x which is the Supreme Court, then our democracy will
survive.
[99]

Each of us has important responsibilities in a constitutional democracy. We, judges, will
continue to discharge our judicial functions with fairness. We urge all and sundry to abide by
theirs. We need to respect each other. As the golden rule goes let us not do to others what we
do not want others to do to us. I galang natin ang isat-
isa. Huwag nating gawin sa iba ang ayaw nating gawin nila sa atin.

Given the gravity of respondent Macasaets improper conduct, coupled with the
recalcitrant manner in which he responded when confronted with the reality of his wrongdoing, a
penalty of fine in the amount of P20,000.00 would be right and reasonable.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the Court declares respondent Amado P. Macasaet GUILTY of indirect
contempt of court and sentences him to pay a fine of P20,000.00, in accordance with Sections
3(d) and 7, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

(No part)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

N RE MAJOR AQUINO Major Aquino, along with several military men allegedly met atthe
resthouse of Captain Aldomovar to plot a breach of theCamp Defense Plan of Camp General
Emilio Aguinaldo and totake over Camp Aquinaldo, as well as the Headquarters of thePhilippine
Army. In the wake of the groups alleged withdrawalof support from the AFP chain of
command and the currentadministration of PGMA, Major Aquino was ordered arrestedand
confined. On the same day, Lt. Gen. Esperon
ordered the Army Inspector General to conduct an investigation todetermine: 1) the
circumstances attending Major Aquinosalleged withdrawal of support; 2) the veracity of
reports anentthe alleged troop movement of some Philippine Militarypersonnel from their
respective stations to Manila to join theprotest march at EDSA with Brigadier General Danilo
Lim; and3) the participation, responsibility and culpability of all PhilippineMilitary personnel
involved, if any. For this purpose, a panel of investigators was formed. During the
investigation, Major Aquino denied the accusations hurled against him. Heintimated, inter
alia, that he had no plan nor did he make anypronouncement of withdrawing support from the
chain of command, and that he pledged to continue to support the sameand the duly
constituted authorities.The panel of investigators submitted its Investigation Report tothe
Commanding General of the Philippine Army. In its report,the panel of investigators found
that the troop movement bysome military personnel from their respective stations to
Manilawas illegal, implicating Major Aquino therein. Further, thepanels Investigation Report
was referred by Lt. Gen. Esperon tothe Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO) of the
Philippine Army for review. JAGO found the existence of probable causeagainst Major Aquino,
among other military officers, for violations of Article 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and
aGentleman), Article 97 (Disorders and Neglects Prejudicial toGood Order and Military
Discipline), and Article 67 (Attemptingto Begin or Create Mutiny) of the Articles of War.On the
basis of JAGOs recommendations, Col. Jose R.Recuenco (Col. Recuenco), then Army Provost
Marshal, signedunder oath a charge sheet against Major Aquino, charging thelatter with
violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or CreateMutiny) and Article 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer andGentleman) of the Articles of War, which was indorsed to theChief
of Staff of the AFP.Petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the Court
of Appeals, praying that the AFP Chief of Staff and theCommanding General of the Philippine
Army, or whoever areacting in their place and stead, be directed to immediatelyproduce the
body of Major Aquino and explain forthwith why heshould not be set at liberty without
delay. After hearing, theCourt of Appeals rendered a Decision, denying the Petition
for Habeas Corpus. The Court of Appeals held that the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is
futile because charges had alreadybeen preferred against Major Aquino.Issue: WON MAJOR
AQUINOS CONFINEMENT IS LEGAL?Held: YES. As a regular officer of the Armed Forces of
thePhilippines, Major Aquino falls squarely under Article 2 of
the Articles of War. Consequently, he is subject to the applicableprovisions of the Articles of
War and Executive Order No. 178;or the Manual for Courts-Martial, Philippine Army.Perforce,
we do not find that the Court of Appeals erred indenying petitioners Petition for Habeas
Corpus for the person of Major Aquino. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprivedof his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person iswithheld from the person entitled to it. As a general rule,
thewrit of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged tobe restrained of his liberty is
in the custody of an officer under aprocess issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do
so. Itsessential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of nvoluntary restraint and to
relieve a person from it if suchrestraint is illegal. In the case at bar, Major Aquino
standscharged in court martial proceedings for alleged violations of Article 67 (Attempting to
Begin or Create Mutiny) and Article 96(Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the
Articlesof War. The legality of Major Aquinos restraint having beensettled, the privilege of
the writ is unavailing.We reiterate the pronouncement of this Court in Alejano: Theruling in this
case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners from
petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions indetention
and prison facilities that violate the Constitutionalrights of the detainees and prisoners will be
reviewed by thecourts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could affordinjunctive relief or
damages to the detainees and prisonerssubjected to arbitrary and inhumane
conditions. However,habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions
of confinement. The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what ischallenged is the fact or
duration of confinement.

NICOLAS-LEWIS V COMELECPetitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to suchapplicants the right of suffrage, among
others. Long before theMay 2004 national and local elections, petitioners soughtregistration
and certification as "overseas absentee voter" onlyto be advised by the Philippine Embassy in
the United Statesthat, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairsdated
September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to vote insuch elections owing to their lack of the
one-year residencerequirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter,however,
urged the different Philippine posts abroad not todiscontinue their campaign for voters
registration, as theresidence restriction adverted to would contextually affectmerely certain
individuals who would likely be eligible to vote infuture elections.Issue: WON petitioners and
others who might have meanwhileretained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant
toR.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189?Held: YES. As may be noted, there is
no provision in the dualcitizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actuallyestablish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines firstbefore they can exercise their right to
vote. On the contrary,R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are mostlikely non-
residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same rightof suffrage as that granted an absentee
voter under R.A. 9189.It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence,to
enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who,save for the residency requirements
exacted of an ordinaryvoter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.Considering the
unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189and the expansion of the scope of that law with
the passageof R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may nowexercise the right of
suffrage thru the absentee voting schemeand as overseas absentee
voters.While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein,we note that the
expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation
of "duals". This maybe deduced from the inclusion of the provision on
derivativecitizenship in R.A. 9225.It is very likely that a considerable number
of thoseunmarried children below eighteen (18) years of age hadnever set foot in the
Philippines. Now then, if the nextgeneration of "duals" may nonetheless avail
themselves theright to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5 of
the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why thepetitioners and other present
day "duals," provided they meetthe requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution inrelation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as anoverseas
absentee voter. Congress could not have plausiblyintended such absurd
situation.TABASA V. CA Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of
thePhilippines. In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old, hisfather, Rodolfo
Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of theUnited States. By derivative
naturalization (citizenship derivedfrom that of another as from a person who holds
citizenship byvirtue of naturalization), petitioner also acquired Americancitizenship.
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines in 1995, and wasadmitted as a balikbayan for one
year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the
BID,pursuant to a letter from the Consul General of the US Embassythat his passport
had been revoked by the US State Dept.Hence, Tabasa became an undocumented and
undesirablealien and summarily deported pursuant to Law and IntelligenceInstructions
No. 53 issued by then Commissioner MiriamDefensor Santiago to effect his
deportation.Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he hadacquired Filipino
citizenship by repatriation in accordance withRepublic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171), and that
because he is now aFilipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by
therespondent Bureau.Issue: WON petitioner has validly reacquired
Philippinecitizenship under RA 8171. (If there is no valid repatriation, thenhe can be
summarily deported for his being an undocumentedalien.)Held: NO. RA 8171, An Act
Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine
Citizenship byMarriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos, was enactedon October
23, 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two(2) classes of persons, viz:
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens
andnatural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their
minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire
Philippinecitizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not
a:(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with anyassociation or
group of persons who uphold and teach doctrinesopposing organized government;(2)
Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,personal assault, or
association for the predominance of their ideas;(3) Person convicted of crimes involving
moral turpitude; or (4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagiousdiseases.
To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA8171 are the following: (a)
Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (b)
Natural-bornFilipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippinecitizenship
on account of political or economic necessity.Petitioner theorizes that he could be
repatriated under RA 8171because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he
losthis Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when hewas still a minor.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilegeof repatriation under RA 8171 is available
only to natural-bornFilipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political
or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This
means that if a parent who had renouncedhis Philippine citizenship due to political or
economic reasonslater decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation willalso
benefit his minor children according to the law. Thisincludes a situation where a former
Filipino subsequently hadchildren while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign
country.The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship and automatically vest Philippinecitizenship on his children of jus sanguinis
or blood relationship:the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who
arenatural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171,however, the children must be
of minor age at the time thepetition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is
so becausea child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil lifemuch less the
capacity to undertake a political act like theelection of citizenship. On their own, the
minor children cannotapply for repatriation or naturalization separately from
their parents.In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was aFilipino at
birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was naturalized as an American
citizen; and by derivativenaturalization, petitioner acquired
U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to
automaticrepatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left thecountry due to
political or economic necessity. This is absurd.Petitioner was no longer a minor at the
time of his repatriationon June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171
belongs tochildren who are of minor age at the time of the filing of thepetition for
repatriation.Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left thecountry due to
political or economic necessity. Clearly, he losthis Philippine citizenship by operation of
law and not due topolitical or economic exigencies. It was his father who couldhave
been motivated by economic or political reasons indeciding to apply for naturalization.
The decision was hisparents and not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA8171 is
extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who couldprove that they acquired
citizenship of a foreign country due topolitical and economic reasons, and extended
indirectly to theminor children at the time of repatriation.In sum, petitioner is not qualified
to avail himself of repatriationunder RA 8171. However, he can possibly reacquire
Philippinecitizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply takingan oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines.Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after hisadmission into
the country, became an undocumented alienwho can be summarily deported. His
subsequent repatriation cannot bar such deportation especially considering that he hasno
legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine citizenship

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