G.R. No.

L-48926 December 14, 1987

MANUEL SOSITO, petitioner,
vs.
AGUINALDO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
We gave due course to this petition and required the parties to file simultaneous memoranda on the sole question of whether or not
the petitioner is entitled to separation pay under the retrenchment program of the private respondent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Manuel Sosito was employed in 1964 by the private respondent, a logging company, and was in charge of logging
importation, with a monthly salary of P675.00, 1 when he went on indefinite leave with the consent of the company on January 16,
1976.
2
On July 20, 1976, the private respondent, through its president, announced a retrenchment program and offered separation
pay to employees in the active service as of June 30, 1976, who would tender their resignations not later than July 31, 1976. The
petitioner decided to accept this offer and so submitted his resignation on July 29, 1976, "to avail himself of the gratuity benefits"
promised.
3
However, his resignation was not acted upon and he was never given the separation pay he expected. The petitioner
complained to the Department of Labor, where he was sustained by the labor arbiter.
4
The company was ordered to pay Sosito the
sum of P 4,387.50, representing his salary for six and a half months. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, this
decision was reversed and it was held that the petitioner was not covered by the retrenchment program.
5
The petitioner then came
to us.
For a better understanding of this case, the memorandum of the private respondent on its retrenchment program is reproduced i n
full as follows:
J
u
l
y

2
0
,

1
9
7
6

Memorandum To: ALL EMPLOYEES
Re: RETRENCHMENT PROGRAM
As you are all aware, the operations of wood-based industries in the Philippines for the last two (2) years were
adversely affected by the worldwide decline in the demand for and prices of logs and wood products. Our
company was no exception to this general decline in the market, and has suffered tremendous losses. In 1975
alone, such losses amounted to nearly P20,000,000.00.
The company has made a general review of its operations and has come to the unhappy decision of the need to
make adjustments in its manpower strength if it is to survive. This is indeed an unfortunate and painful decision to
make, but it leaves the company no alternative but to reduce its tremendous and excessive overhead expense in
order to prevent an ultimate closure.
Although the law allows the Company, in a situation such as this, to drastically reduce it manpower strength
without any obligation to pay separation benefits, we recognize the need to provide our employees some financial
assistance while they are looking for other jobs.
The Company therefore is adopting a retrenchment program whereby employees who are in the active service as
of June 30, 1976 will be paid separation benefits in an amount equivalent to the employee's one-half (1/2) month's
basic salary multiplied by his/her years of service with the Company. Employees interested in availing of the
separation benefits offered by the Company must manifest such intention by submitting written letters of
resignation to the Management not later than July 31, 1976. Those whose resignations are accepted shall be
informed accordingly and shall be paid their separation benefits.
After July 31, 1976, this offer of payment of separation benefits will no longer be available. Thereafter, the
Company shall apply for a clearance to terminate the services of such number of employees as may be necessary
in order to reduce the manpower strength to such desired level as to prevent further losses.
(SGD.) JOSE G. RICAFORT
Presiden
t
N.B.
For additional information
and/or resignation forms,
please see Mr. Vic Maceda
or Atty. Ben Aritao.
6

It is clear from the memorandum that the offer of separation pay was extended only to those who were in the active service of the
company as of June 30, 1976. It is equally clear that the petitioner was not eligible for the promised gratuity as he was not actually
working with the company as of the said date. Being on indefinite leave, he was not in the active service of the private respondent
although, if one were to be technical, he was still in its employ. Even so, during the period of indefinite leave, he was not entitled to
receive any salary or to enjoy any other benefits available to those in the active service.
It seems to us that the petitioner wants to enjoy the best of two worlds at the expense of the private respondent. He has insulated
himself from the insecurities of the floundering firm but at the same time would demand the benefits it offers. Being on indefinite
leave from the company, he could seek and try other employment and remain there if he should find it acceptable; but if not, he
could go back to his former work and argue that he still had the right to return as he was only on leave.
There is no claim that the petitioner was temporarily laid off or forced to go on leave; on the contrary, the record shows that he
voluntarily sought the indefinite leave which the private respondent granted. It is strange that the company should agree to such an
open-ended arrangement, which is obviously one-sided. The company would not be free to replace the petitioner but the petitioner
would have a right to resume his work as and when he saw fit.
We note that under the law then in force the private respondent could have validly reduced its work force because of its financial
reverses without the obligation to grant separation pay. This was permitted under the original Article 272(a), of the Labor Code,
7

which was in force at the time. To its credit, however, the company voluntarily offered gratuities to those who would agree to be
phased out pursuant to the terms and conditions of its retrenchment program, in recognition of their loyalty and to tide them over
their own financial difficulties. The Court feels that such compassionate measure deserves commendation and support but at the
same time rules that it should be available only to those who are qualified therefore. We hold that the petitioner is not one of them.
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed
that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights which, as such, are
entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, this
Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism,
however, has not blinded us to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established
facts and the applicable law and doctrine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
























G.R. No. 73681 June 30, 1988
COLGATE PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, Inc., petitioners,
vs.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, COLGATE PALMOLIVE SALES UNION, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for certiorari seeking to set aside and annul the Order of respondent Minister of Labor and Employment
(MOLE) directly certifying private respondent as the recognized and duly-authorized collective bargaining agent for petitioner's sales
force and ordering the reinstatement of three employees of petitioner.
Acting on the petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondents from enforcing and/or carrying out the assailed order.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On March 1, 1985, the respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unfair labor
practice consisting of alleged refusal to bargain, dismissal of union officers/members; and coercing employees to retract their
membership with the union and restraining non-union members from joining the union.
After efforts at amicable settlement proved unavailing, the Office of the MOLE, upon petition of petitioner assumed jurisdiction over
the dispute pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code, Thereafter the case was captioned AJML-3-142-85, BLR-3-86-85 "In Re:
Assumption of Jurisdiction over the Labor Dispute at Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc." In its position paper, petitioner pointed out
that
(a) There is no legal basis for the charge that the company refused to bargain collectively with the union
considering that the alleged union is not the certified agent of the company salesmen;
(b) The union's status as a legitimate labor organization is still under question because on 6 March 1985, a certain
Monchito Rosales informed the BLR that an overwhelming majority of the salesmen are not in favor of the Notice
of Strike allegedly filed by the Union (Annex "C");
(c) Upon verification of the records of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, it appeared that a petition for
cancellation of the registration of the alleged union was filed by Monchito Rosales on behalf of certain salesmen of
the company who are obviously against the formation of the Colgate Palmolive Sales Labor Union which is
supposed to represent them;
(d) The preventive suspensions of salesmen Peregrino Sayson, Salvador Reynante and Cornelio Mejia, and their
eventual dismissal from the employ of the company were carried out pursuant to the inherent right and
prerogative of management to discipline erring employees; that based on the preliminary investigation conducted
by the company, there appeared substantial grounds to believe that Sayson, Reynante and Mejia violated company
rules and regulations necessitating their suspension pending further investigation of their respective cases;
(e) It was also ascertained that the company sustained damages resulting from the infractions committed by the
three salesmen, and that the final results of the investigation fully convinced the company of the existence of just
causes for the dismissal of the three salesmen;
(f) The formation of the union and the membership therein of Sayson, Reynante and Mejia were not in any manner
connected with the company's decision to dismiss the three; that the fact that their dismissal came at a time when
the alleged union was being formed was purely coincidental;
(g) The union's charge therefore, that the membership in the union and refusal to retract precipitated their
dismissal was totally false and amounted to a malicious imputation of union busting;
(h) The company never coerced or attempted to coerce employees, much less interferred in the exercise of their
right to self-organization; the company never thwarted nor tried to defeat or frustrate the employees' right to
form their union in pursuit of their collective interest, as long as that right is exercised within the limits prescribed
by law; in fact, there are at present two unions representing the rank and file employees of the company-the
factory workers who are covered by a CBA which expired on 31 October 1985 (which was renewed on May 31,
1985) and are represented by Colgate Palmolive Employees Union (PAFLU); whereas, the salaried employees are
covered by a CBA which will expire on 31 May 1986 represented by Philippine Association of Free Labor Union
(PAFLU)-CPPI Office Chapter. (pp. 4-6, Rollo)
The respondent Union, on the other hand, in its position paper, reiterated the issue in its Notice to Strike, alleging that i t was duly
registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations under Registry No. 10312-LC with a total membership of 87 regular salesmen
(nationwide) out of 117 regular salesmen presently employed by the company as of November 30, 1985 and that since the
registration of the Union up to the present, more than 2/3 of the total salesmen employed are already members of the Union,
leaving no doubt that the true sentiment of the salesmen was to form and organize the Colgate-Palmolive Salesmen Union. The
Union further alleged that the company is unreasonably delaying the recognition of the union because when it was informed of the
organization of the union, and when presented with a set of proposals for a collective bargaining agreement, the company took an
adversarial stance by secretly distributing a "survey sheet on union membership" to newly hired salesmen from the Visayas,
Mindanao and Metro Manila areas, purposely avoiding regular salesmen who are now members of the union; that in the
accomplishment of the form, District Sales Managers, and Sales Supervisors coerced salesmen from the Visayas and Mindanao by
requiring them to fill up and/or accomplish said form by checking answers which were adverse to the union; that with a handful of
the survey sheets secured by management through coercion, it now would like to claim that all salesmen are not in favor of the
organization of the union, which acts are clear manifestations of unfair labor practices.
On August 9,1985, respondent Minister rendered a decision which:
(a) found no merit in the Union's Complaint for unfair labor practice allegedly committed by petitioner as regards
the alleged refusal of petitioner to negotiate with the Union, and the secret distribution of survey sheets allegedly
intended to discourage unionism,
(b) found the three salesmen, Peregrino Sayson, Salvador Reynante & Cornelio Mejia "not without fault" and that
"the company
1
has grounds to dismiss above named salesmen"
and at the same time respondent Minister directly certified the respondent Union as the collective bargaining agent for the sales
force in petitioner company and ordered the reinstatement of the three salesmen to the company on the ground that the
employees were first offenders.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by respondent Minister in his assailed Order, dated December 27,
1985. Petitioner now comes to Us with the following:
Assignment of Errors
I
Respondent Minister committed a grave abuse of discretion when he directly certified the Union solely on the
basis of the latter's self-serving assertion that it enjoys the support of the majority of the sales force in petitioner's
company.
II
Respondent Minister committed a grave abuse of discretion when, notwithstanding his very own finding that there
was just cause for the dismissal of the three (3) salesmen, he nevertheless ordered their reinstatement. (pp. 7-8,
Rollo)
Petitioner concedes that respondent Minister has the power to decide a labor dispute in a case assumed by him under Art. 264 (g) of
the Labor Code but this power was exceeded when he certified respondent Union as the exclusive bargaining agent of the
company's salesmen since this is not a representation proceeding as described under the Labor Code. Moreover the Union did not
pray for certification but merely for a finding of unfair labor practice imputed to petitioner-company.
The petition merits our consideration. The procedure for a representation case is outlined in Arts. 257-260 of the Labor Code, in
relation to the provisions on cancellation of a Union registration under Arts. 239-240 thereof, the main purpose of which is to aid in
ascertaining majority representation. The requirements under the law, specifically Secs. 2, 5, and 6 of Rule V, Book V, of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code are all calculated to ensure that the certified bargaining representative is the true choice of the
employees against all contenders. The Constitutional mandate that the State shall "assure the rights of the workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and humane conditions of work," should be achieved under a system
of law such as the aforementioned provisions of the pertinent statutes. When an overzealous official by-passes the law on the
pretext of retaining a laudable objective, the intendment or purpose of the law will lose its meaning as the law itself is disregarded.
When respondent Minister directly certified the Union, he in fact disregarded this procedure and its legal requirements. There was
therefore failure to determine with legal certainty whether the Union indeed enjoyed majority representation. Contrary to the
respondent Minister's observation, the holding of a certification election at the proper time is not necessarily a mere formality as
there was a compelling legal reason not to directly and unilaterally certify a union whose legitimacy is precisely the object of
litigation in a pending cancellation case filed by certain "concerned salesmen," who also claim majority status. Even in a case where
a union has filed a petition for certification elections, the mere fact that no opposition is made does not warrant a direct
certification. More so as in the case at bar, when the records of the suit show that the required proof was not presented in an
appropriate proceeding and that the basis of the direct certification was the Union's mere allegation in its position paper that it has
87 out of 117 regular salesmen. In other words, respondent Minister merely relied on the self-serving assertion of the respondent
Union that it enjoyed the support of the majority of the salesmen, without subjecting such assertion to the test of competing claims.
As pointed out by petitioner in its petition, what the respondent Minister achieved in rendering the assailed orders was to make a
mockery of the procedure provided under the law for representation cases because:
(a) He has created havoc by impliedly establishing a procedural short-cut to obtaining a direct certification-by
merely filing a notice of strike.
(b) By creating such a short-cut, he has officially encouraged disrespect for the law.
(c) By directly certifying a Union without sufficient proof of majority representation, he has in effect arrogated
unto himself the right, vested naturally in the employees, to choose their collective bargaining representative.
(d) He has in effect imposed upon the petitioner the obligation to negotiate with a union whose majority
representation is under serious question. This is highly irregular because while the Union enjoys the blessing of the
Minister, it does not enjoy the blessing of the employees. Petitioner is therefore under threat of being held liable
for refusing to negotiate with a union whose right to bargaining status has not been legally established. (pp. 9-10,
Rollo)
The order of the respondent Minister to reinstate the employees despite a clear finding of guilt on their part is not in conformity
with law. Reinstatement is simply incompatible with a finding of guilt. Where the totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant
the dismissal of the employees the law warrants their dismissal without making any distinction between a first offender and a
habitual delinquent. Under the law, respondent Minister is duly mandated to equally protect and respect not only the labor or
workers' side but also the management and/or employers' side. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. To order the reinstatement of the erring employees namely, Mejia, Sayson and
Reynante would in effect encourage unequal protection of the laws as a managerial employee of petitioner company involved in the
same incident was already dismissed and was not ordered to be reinstated. As stated by Us in the case of San Miguel Brewery vs.
National Labor Union,
2
"an employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was
guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to
his interest."
In the subject order, respondent Minister cited a cases
3
implying that "the proximity of the dismissal of the employees to the
assumption order created a doubt as to whether their dismissal was really for just cause or due to their activities."
4

This is of no moment for the following reasons:
(a) Respondent Minister has still maintained in his assailed order that a just cause existed to justify the dismissal of the employees.
(b) Respondent Minister has not made any finding substantiated by evidence that the employees were dismissed because of their
union activities.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the Order of the respondent Minister, dated December
27, 1985 for grave abuse of discretion. However, in view of the fact that the dismissed employees are first offenders, petitioner is
hereby ordered to give them separation pay. The temporary restraining order is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
























ELMER M. MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. RURAL BANK OF LUCBAN, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The law protects both the welfare of employees and the prerogatives of management. Courts will not interfere with business
judgments of employers, provided they do not violate the law, collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play
and justice. The transfer of personnel from one area of operation to another is inherently a managerial prerogative that shall be
upheld if exercised in good faith -- for the purpose of advancing business interests, not of defeating or circumventing the rights of
employees.
The Case
The Court applies these principles in resolving the instant Petition for Review1[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
June 14, 2002 Decision2[2] and September 25, 2002 Resolution3[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 68030. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.4[4]
The challenged Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
On April 25, 1999, the Board of Directors of the Rural Bank of Lucban, Inc., issued Board Resolution Nos. 99-52 and 99-53, which
read:
Board Res. No. 99-52
RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that in line with the policy of the bank to familiarize bank employees with the various
phases of bank operations and further strengthen the existing internal control system[,] all officers and employees are subject to
reshuffle of assignments. Moreover, this resolution does not preclude the transfer of assignment of bank officers and employees
from the branch office to the head office and vice-versa.
Board Res. No. 95-53
Pursuant to Resolution No. 99-52, the following branch employees are hereby reshuffled to their new assignments without changes
in their compensation and other benefits.
NAME OF EMPLOYEES PRESENT ASSIGNMENT NEW ASSIGNMENT
JOYCE V. ZETA Bank Teller C/A Teller
CLODUALDO ZAGALA C/A Clerk Actg. Appraiser
ELMER L. MENDOZA Appraiser Clerk-Meralco Collection
CHONA R. MENDOZA Clerk-Meralco Bank Teller5[5]






Collection
In a letter dated April 30, 1999, Alejo B. Daya, the banks board chairman, directed Briccio V. Cada, the manager of the banks
Tayabas branch, to implement the reshuffle.6[6] The new assignments were to be effective on May 1, 1999 without changes in
salary, allowances, and other benefits received by the aforementioned employees.7[7]
On May 3, 1999, in an undated letter addressed to Daya, Petitioner Elmer Mendoza expressed his opinion on the reshuffle, as
follows:
RE: The recent reshuffle of employees as per
Board Resolution dated April 25, 1999
Dear Sir:
This is in connection with the aforementioned subject matter and which the undersigned received on April 25, 1999.
Needless to state, the reshuffling of the undersigned from the present position as Appraiser to Clerk-Meralco Collection is deemed
to be a demotion without any legal basis. Before this action on your part[,] the undersigned has been besieged by intrigues due to
[the] malicious machination of a certain public official who is bruited to be your good friend. These malicious insinuations were
baseless and despite the fact that I have been on my job as Appraiser for the past six (6) years in good standing and never involved in
any anomalous conduct, my being reshuffled to [C]lerk-[M]eralco [C]ollection is a blatant harassment on your part as a prelude to
my termination in due time. This will constitute an unfair labor practice.
Meanwhile, may I beseech your good office that I may remain in my position as Appraiser until the reason [for] my being reshuffled
is made clear.
Your kind consideration on this request will be highly appreciated.8[8]
On May 10, 1999, Daya replied:
Dear Mr. Mendoza,
Anent your undated letter expressing your resentment/comments on the recent managements decision to reshuffle the duties of
bank employees, please be informed that it was never the intention (of management) to downgrade your position in the bank
considering that your due compensation as Bank Appraiser is maintained and no future reduction was intended.
Aside from giving bank employees a wider experience in various banking operations, the reshuffle will also afford management an
effective tool in providing the bank a sound internal control system/check and balance and a basis in evaluating the performance of
each employee. A continuing bankwide reshuffle of employees shall be made at the discretion of management which may include
bank officers, if necessary as expressed in Board Resolution No. 99-53, dated April 25, 1999. Management merely shifted the duties
of employees, their position title [may be] retained if requested formally.
Being a standard procedure in maintaining an effective internal control system recommended by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
we believe that the conduct of reshuffle is also a prerogative of bank management.9[9]





On June 7, 1999, petitioner submitted to the banks Tayabas branch manager a letter in which he applied for a leave of absence from
work:
Dear Sir:
I wish I could continue working but due to the ailment that I always feel every now and then, I have the honor to apply for at least
ten (10) days sick leave effective June 7, 1999.
Hoping that this request [merits] your favorable and kind consideration and understanding.10[10]
On June 21, 1999, petitioner again submitted a letter asking for another leave of absence for twenty days effective on the same
date.11[11]
On June 24, 1999, while on his second leave of absence, petitioner filed a Complaint before Arbitration Branch No. IV of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Complaint -- for illegal dismissal, underpayment, separation pay and damages -- was filed
against the Rural Bank of Lucban and/or its president, Alejo B. Daya; and its Tayabas branch manager, Briccio V. Cada. The case was
docketed as NLRC Case SRAB-IV-6-5862-99-Q.12[12]
The labor arbiters June 14, 2000 Decision upheld petitioners claims as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring respondents guilty of illegal dismissal.
2. Ordering respondents to reinstate complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights with full backwages
from date of dismissal to actual reinstatement in the amount of P55,000.00 as of June 30, 2000.
3. Ordering the payment of separation pay if reinstatement is not possible in the amount of P30,000.00 in addition to 13
th

month pay of P5,000.00 and the usual P10,000.00 annual bonus afforded the employees.
4. Ordering the payment of unpaid salary for the period covering July 1-30, 1999 in the amount of P5,000.00
5. Ordering the payment of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
6. Ordering the payment of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
7. Ordering the payment of Attorneys fees in the amount of P18,000.00 which is 10% of the monetary award.13[13]
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the labor arbiter.14[14] In its July 18, 2001 Resolution, it held:
We can conceive of no reason to ascribe bad faith or malice to the respondent bank for its implementation of its Board Resolution
directing the reshuffle of employees at its Tayabas branch to positions other than those they were occupying. While at first the
employees thereby affected would experience difficulty in adjusting to their new jobs, it cannot be gainsaid that the objective for
the reshuffle is noble, as not only would the employees obtain additional knowledge, they would also be more well-rounded in the
operations of the bank and thus help the latter further strengthen its already existing internal control system.






The only inconvenience, as [w]e see it, that the [petitioner] may have experienced is that from an appraiser he was made to
perform the work of a clerk in the collection of Meralco payments, which he may have considered as beneath him and his
experience, being a pioneer employee. But it cannot be discounted either that other employees at the Tayabas branch were
similarly reshuffled. The only logical conclusion therefore is that the Board Resolution was not aimed solely at the [petitioner], but
for all the other employees of the x x x bank as well. Besides, the complainant has not shown by clear, competent and convincing
evidence that he holds a vested right to the position of Appraiser. x x x.
How and by what manner a business concern conducts its affairs is not for this Commission to interfere with, especially so if there is
no showing, as in the case at bar, that the reshuffle was motivated by bad faith or ill-will. x x x.15[15]
After the NLRC denied his Motion for Reconsideration,16[16] petitioner brought before the CA a Petition for Certiorari17[17]
assailing the foregoing Resolution.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Finding that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the NLRC, the CA Decision ruled thus:
The so-called harassment which Mendoza allegedly experienced in the aftermath of the reshuffling of employees at the bank is
but a figment of his imagination as there is no evidence extant on record which substantiates the same. His alleged demotion, the
cold shoulder stance, the things about his chair and table, and the alleged reason for the harassment are but allegations bereft of
proof and are perforce inadmissible as self-serving statements and can never be considered repositories of truth nor serve as
foundations of court decisions anent the resolution of the litigants rights.
When Mendoza was reshuffled to the position of clerk at the bank, he was not demoted as there was no [diminution] of his salary
benefits and rank. He could even retain his position title, had he only requested for it pursuant to the reply of the Chairman of the
banks board of directors to Mendozas letter protesting the reshuffle. There is, therefore, no cause to doubt the reasons which the
bank propounded in support of its move to reshuffle its employees, viz:
1. to familiarize bank employees with the various phases of bank operations, and
2. to further strengthen the existing internal control system of the bank.
The reshuffling of its employees was done in good faith and cannot be made the basis of a finding of constructive dismissal.
The fact that Mendoza was no longer included in the banks payroll for July 1 to 15, 1999 does not signify that the bank has
dismissed the former from its employ. Mendoza separated himself from the banks employ when, on June 24, 1999, while on leave,
he filed the illegal dismissal case against his employer for no apparent reason at all.18[18]
Hence, this Petition.19[19]
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:






I. Whether or not the petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily separated himself from the service and/or abandoned his job
when he filed his Complaint for constructive and consequently illegal dismissal;
II. Whether or not the reshuffling of private respondent[s] employees was done in good faith and cannot be made as the
basis of a finding of constructive dismissal, even as the [petitioners] demotion in rank is admitted by both parties;
III. Whether or not the ruling in the landmark case of Ruben Serrano vs. NLRC [and Isetann Department Store (323 SCRA 445)]
is applicable to the case at bar;
IV. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petitioners money claims, damages, and unpaid salaries for
the period July 1-30, 1999, although this was not disputed by the private respondent; and
V. Whether or not the entire proceedings before the Honorable Court of Appeals and the NLRC are a nullity since the appeal
filed by private respondent before the NLRC on August 5, 2000 was on the 15
th
day or five (5) days beyond the reglem[e]ntary period
of ten (10) days as provided for by law and the NLRC Rules of Procedure.20[20]
In short, the main issue is whether petitioner was constructively dismissed from his employment.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Constructive Dismissal
Constructive dismissal is defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or
disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.21[21] Petitioner argues that he was compelled to file an action for
constructive dismissal, because he had been demoted from appraiser to clerk and not given any work to do, while his table had been
placed near the toilet and eventually removed.22[22] He adds that the reshuffling of employees was done in bad faith, because it
was designed primarily to force him to resign.23[23]
Management Prerogative
to Transfer Employees
Jurisprudence recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives. For this reason, courts often decline to interfere in legitimate
business decisions of employers.24[24] Indeed, labor laws discourage interference in employers judgments concerning the conduct
of their business.25[25] The law must protect not only the welfare of employees, but also the right of employers.
In the pursuit of its legitimate business interest, management has the prerogative to transfer or assign employees from one office or
area of operation to another -- provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges; and the
action is not motivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient







cause.26[26] This privilege is inherent in the right of employers to control and manage their enterprise effectively.27[27] The right of
employees to security of tenure does not give them vested rights to their positions to the extent of depriving management of its
prerogative to change their assignments or to transfer them.28[28]
Managerial prerogatives, however, are subject to limitations provided by law, collective bargaining agreements, and general
principles of fair play and justice.29[29] The test for determining the validity of the transfer of employees was explained in Blue
Dairy Corporation v. NLRC30[30] as follows:
[L]ike other rights, there are limits thereto. The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave
abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and fair play. Having the right should not be confused with the
manner in which that right is exercised. Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable
worker. In particular, the employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the
employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits. Should the employer
fail to overcome this burden of proof, the employees transfer shall be tantamount to constructive dismissal, which has been defined
as a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; as an offer involving a demotion in
rank and diminution in pay. Likewise, constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an
employer has become so unbearable to the employee leaving him with no option but to forego with his continued
employment.31[31]
Petitioners Transfer Lawful
The employer bears the burden of proving that the transfer of the employee has complied with the foregoing test. In the instant
case, we find no reason to disturb the conclusion of the NLRC and the CA that there was no constructive dismissal. Their finding is
supported by substantial evidence -- that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as justification for a
conclusion.32[32]
Petitioners transfer was made in pursuit of respondents policy to familiarize bank employees with the various phases of bank
operations and further strengthen the existing internal control system33[33] of all officers and employees. We have previously
held that employees may be transferred -- based on their qualifications, aptitudes and competencies -- to positions in which they
can function with maximum benefit to the company.34[34] There appears no justification for denying an employer the right to
transfer employees to expand their competence and maximize their full potential for the advancement of the establishment.
Petitioner was not singled out; other employees were also reassigned without their express consent.
Neither was there any demotion in the rank of petitioner; or any diminution of his salary, privileges and other benefits. This fact is
clear in respondents Board Resolutions, the April 30, 1999 letter of Bank President Daya to Branch Manager Cada, and the May 10,
1999 letter of Daya to petitioner.










On the other hand, petitioner has offered no sufficient proof to support his allegations. Given no credence by both lower tribunals
was his bare and self-serving statement that he had been positioned near the comfort room, made to work without a table, and
given no work assignment.35[35] Purely conjectural is his claim that the reshuffle of personnel was a harassment in retaliation for an
alleged falsification case filed by his relatives against a public official.36[36] While the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law
are not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC,37[37] parties must nonetheless submit evidence to support their contentions.
Secondary Issues:
Serrano v. NLRC Inapplicable
Serrano v. NLRC38[38] does not apply to the present factual milieu. The Court ruled therein that the lack of notice and hearing
made the dismissal of the employee ineffectual, but not necessarily illegal.39[39] Thus, the procedural infirmity was remedied by
ordering payment of his full back wages from the time of his dismissal.40[40] The absence of constructive dismissal in the instant
case precludes the application of Serrano. Because herein petitioner was not dismissed, then he is not entitled to his claimed
monetary benefits.
Alleged Nullity of NLRC
and CA Proceedings
Petitioner argues that the proceedings before the NLRC and the CA were void, since respondents appeal before the NLRC had
allegedly been filed beyond the reglementary period.41[41] A careful scrutiny of his Petition for Review42[42] with the appellate
court shows that this issue was not raised there. Inasmuch as the instant Petition challenges the Decision of the CA, we cannot rule
on arguments that were not brought before it. This ruling is consistent with the due-process requirement that no question shall be
entertained on appeal, unless it has been raised in the court below.43[43]
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DENIED, and the June 14, 2002 Decision and the September 25, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.