Title VIII SUPPORT

Article 194. Support comprises

everything indispens!le "or
sustennce# d$elling# clothing# medicl
ttendnce# eduction nd
trnsporttion# in %eeping $ith the
"inncil cpcity o" the "mily.
The eduction o" the person entitled to
!e supported re"erred to in the
preceding prgrph shll include his
schooling or trining "or some
pro"ession# trde or voction# even
!eyond the ge o" m&ority.
Trnsporttion shll include e'penses in
going to nd "rom school# or to nd "rom
plce o" $or%. ()9*+
Support demandable.
It is to be noted that under the law the fact that a
right to be supported is recognized in favor of
the person to be supported such recognition of
right does not automatically entitle him to
receive support as the obligation to give support
shall be demandable from the time the person
who has a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance and support will not be paid except
from the date it is extra-judicially demanded.
(Art. 203, [par. 1], Family Code). Ap-
propriately, therefore, the right to demand
support arises from im- perative necessity,
without which it cannot be demanded, and the
law presumes that such necessity does not exist
unless support is demanded. (Jocson, et al. vs.
Empire Insurance Co., et al., 50 O.G. 2628).
Unborn child entitled to support.
In accordance with existing jurisprudence, even
an unborn child is entitled to support. This is so,
because a conceived child, although as yet
unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for purposes favorable to
it and correspondingly, the right to support from
its progenitors, even if the said child is only en
ventre de sa
mere; just as a conceived child, even if as yet
unborn, may receive donations under Article
742, New Civil Code. (Quimiguing vs. Icao, 34
SCRA 132).
Ascendants and descendants required to
support one another.
Under the law, legitimate ascendants and
descendants are required to support each other.
(Art. 195, Family Code). In this regard, the
basis of the right to support is the legitimacy of
relationship so that in case the status of a child
is denied and placed in issue, no effect can be
given to the childs claim for support until an
authoritative declaration has been made as to
the existence of the cause. (Francisco vs.
Zandueta, 61 Phil. 752).
In Castillo vs. Castillo, O.G., March 27, 1941,
p. 968, it has been ruled by the Supreme Court
that abandonment of a descendant will deprive
the ascendant of the right to receive support
from the descendant so abandoned. Thus, where
a mother delivered her child to other persons
when the child was scarcely two years old, and
since then never took care of such child,
abandoning her entirely, such mother
relinquishes all parental claim and is not
entitled to be supported by the child.
Right of illegitimate to support.
Under the law, illegitimate children are entitled
to be supported. (Silva vs. Peralta, 2 SCRA
1025). This grant of right in favor of
illegitimate children has been recognized as a
form of assistance in order for them to
surmount the disadvantages facing them
through the misdeeds of their parents, since the
transgressions of social conventions committed
by the parents should not be visited upon such
children. (Report of the Code Commission,
Civil Code, p. 89).
Insofar as ascendants and descendants are
concerned, they are mutually bound to support
each other, but in Castillo vs. Castillo, 39 O.G.
No. 37, March 27, 1941, p. 968, it was ruled
that if the mother brought the child to the
custody of another when he was only two years
old, and since then, never took care of the child,
abandoning the same, the mother relinquishes
the right to be supported and parental care.
The unfair and unequal situation in Article 291
of the Civil Code has been remedied by Article
195 (Paragraphs 3 and 4) of the Family Code, in
that descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, whether
they proceed from parents legitimate or
illegitimate, are entitled to support. In short,
illegitimate descendants, whether from
legitimate or illegitimate children, are entitled
to support from their grandparents.
Brothers and sisters not legitimately related,
whether of the full or halfblood, are entitled to
support to the full extent under Article 194, of
the Family Code. This is not similar to the Civil
Code, as they were entitled only to natural
support or the necessities in life. But suppose,
such brother or sister is of age but he is very
lazy that he/ she does not want to work, can
he/she be entitled to such support? The answer
is no, because the law says, except only when
the need for support of the brother or sister,
being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the
claimants fault or negligence. (Art. 196,
Family Code).
Allowance to widow, etc. who are included.
Art. 133 of the Family Code provides that, from
the common mass of property, support shall be
given to the surviving spouse and to the
children during the liquidation of the
inventories of property x x. Does the term
children include grandchildren?
The Supreme Court in Estate of Hilario M.
Ruiz, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 118671,
January 29, 1996, 67 SCAD 420, said NO. It
limits the allowance to the widow and children
and it does not extend to the deceaseds
grandchildren regardless of their minority or
incapacity. (See also Babao vs. Villavicencio,
44 Phil. 921
Note that support is rooted on the fact that the
right and duty to support, especially the right to
education, subsist even beyond the age of
majority. (See Estate of Hilario Ruiz vs. CA, et
al., supra).
Married man cannot be required to
acknowledge a child of a woman he raped.
In People vs. Manahan, 315 SCRA 476, it was
said that if the rapist is a married man, he
cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring
of the crime, should there be any, as his child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. But he can be
required to support the child. (citing People vs.
Guerrero, 242 SCRA 606). The reason for the
rule is the existence of a legal impediment to
acknowledge as the accused is married.
Article 19,. Su!&ect to the provisions o"
the succeeding r- ticles# the "ollo$ing
re o!liged to support ech other to the
$hole e'tent set "orth in the preceding
rticle.
. (1+ The spouses/
. ()+ 0egitimte scendnts nd
descendnts/
. (1+ Prents nd their legitimte
children nd the legitimte nd
illegitimte children o" the ltter/
(4+ Prents nd their illegitimte children
nd the legitimte nd illegitimte
children o" the ltter/ nd
(,+ 0egitimte !rothers nd sisters#
$hether o" "ull or hl"- !lood. ()91+
Article 192. 3rothers nd sisters not
legitimtely relted# $hether o" the "ull
or hl"-!lood# re li%e$ise !ound to
support ech other to the "ull e'tent set
"orth in Article 194# e'cept only $hen
the need "or support o" the !rother or
sister# !eing o" ge# is due to cuse
imput!le to the climnt4s "ult or
negligence. ()91+
Spouses:
The right and obligation to support arises from
law, life Article 68 of the Family Code which
obliges the spouses to held and support one
another.
It has been recognized that the marriage relation
imposes upon the spouses the obligation to
support. (Santos vs. Sweeney, 4 Phil. 79; Lerma
vs. Mamaril, 9 Phil. 118; Clausen vs. Cabrera,
72 Phil. 252). Thus, if the wife is forced to
leave the conjugal dwelling by causes justifying
her establishment of a separate domicile, she is
entitled to separate maintenance from the
husband. (Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil.
252; Garcia vs. Santiago, 53 Phil. 952; Dadivas
de Villanueva vs. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92;
Panuncio vs. Sula, 34 O.G. 1291). In this
regard, the right of a wife to support depends
upon her status as such (Yangco vs. Rhoda, 1
Phil. 404), so that once the marriage has been
annulled, the right ceases, even during the
pendency of the action filed by her for the
liquidation of their conjugal property.
(Mendoza vs. Parugao, 49 Phil. 271). The right
to support exists even pendente lite. (Hashim
vs. Concepcion, 42 Phil. 694; Yabut vs. Agrava,
62 O.G. 3595). But there is a defense that if
there was adultery of the woman, support would
not be given. (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil.
285).
684 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS Arts. 197-
198
Article 195. 6or the support o" legitimte
scendnts/ descen- dnts# $hether
legitimte or illegitimte/ nd !rothers
nd sisters# $hether legitimtely or
illegitimtely relted# only the seprte
property o" the person o!liged to give
support shll !e ns$er!le provided
tht in cse the o!ligor hs no seprte
property# the !solute community or the
con&ugl prtnership# i" "inncilly c-
p!le# shll dvnce the support# $hich
shll !e deducted "rom the shre o" the
spouse o!liged upon the li7uidtion o"
the !so- lute community or o" the
con&ugl prtnership. (n+
Support of illegitimate children of a spouse.
If a person who is married has ascendants, or
descendants whether legitimate or illegitimate,
or brothers and sisters, and he is obliged to
support them, such support shall come from the
separate properties of such spouse. If he has no
separate properties, the absolute community or
conjugal partnership shall advance the support.
Upon the liquidation of the absolute community
of property or the conjugal partnership, such
advances shall be deducted from the share of
such spouse. The reason for the law is that there
is no obligation of the lawful spouse to support
the children of the other spouse with another
person, unless they have been adopted by them.
If that is so, the properties of the husband and
wife are not bound to answer for their support.
Article 198. 9uring the proceedings "or
legl seprtion or "or nnulment o"
mrrige# nd "or declrtion o" nullity
o" mrrige# the spouses nd their
children shll !e supported "rom the
properties o" the !solute community or
the con&ugl prtnership. A"ter the "inl
&udgment grnting the petition# the
o!ligtion o" mutul support !et$een
the spouses ceses. :o$ever# in cse o"
legl seprtion# the court my order
tht the guilty spouse shll give support
to the innocent one# speci"ying the
terms o" such order. ()9)+
The law is in conformity with Article 49 of the
Family Code mandating that during the
pendency of an action for annulment or
declaration of nullity of the marriage, the court
shall provide for the support of the spouses and
the children. The same is true in Article 62 in
cases of legal separation. The reason for the law
is that, of utmost consideration is the welfare,
moral or maternal, of the children. The support
shall come from the conjugal properties or the
absolute community of properties. The support
given is known as support pendente lite, but the
moment there is declaration of nullity of the
marriage, the obligation to support and the right
to be supported cease to exist. The reason is
that, after annulment or declaration of nullity of
the marriage, the relationship ceases to exist.
But in legal separation, the court may still order
the guilty spouse to support the other, but it is
discretionary on the part of the court and as
such, it cannot be demanded as a matter of
right.
In an action by a wife against her husband for
support the defendant may set up as a special
defense that the wife had forfeited her right to
support by committing adultery, the special
defense of adultery set up by the defendant is a
good defense and if properly proved and
sustained, will defeat the action.
Article 199. ;henever t$o or more
persons re o!liged to give support# the
li!ility shll devolve upon the "ollo$ing
persons in the order herein provided.
1.The spouse/
).The descendnts in the nerest
degree/
1.The scendnts in the nerest degree/
nd
4.The !rothers nd sisters. ()94+
This is an enumeration of the order of liability
in matters of support. Manresa reasoned out by
saying that, since the obligation to support
certain relatives rests primarily upon the
requirements of human nature and the ties
created by family relations, it is only logical
that the obligation should first be imposed upon
those who are closely related to the recipient
and it is only in default of those nearer in
degree of relationship that those more remote
are called upon to discharge the obligation. (1
Manresa 674).
The action for support may be brought against
any of those obliged to give it, but the plaintiff
must show that those who are called upon to
furnish the support before the defendant are
without means to give such support. If the
defendant can prove that another person who is
ahead of him in the order of liability can give
the support, the obligation must fall upon the
latter. Thus, a rich brother will not be obliged to
give support if he proves that the father has
enough means to give for support. (1 Manresa
679).
Article )**. ;hen the o!ligtion to give
support "lls upon t$o or more persons#
the pyment o" the sme shll !e
divided !et$een them in proportion to
the resources o" ech.
:o$ever# in cse o" urgent need nd !y
specil circumstnces# the &udge my
order only one o" them to "urnish the
support provisionlly# $ithout pre&udice
to his right to clim "rom the other
o!ligors the shre due "rom them.
;hen t$o or more recipients t the
sme time clim support "rom one nd
the sme person leglly o!liged to give
it# should the ltter not hve su""icient
mens to stis"y ll clims# the order
est!lished in the preceding rticle shll
!e "ollo$ed# unless the concurrent
o!ligees should !e the spouse nd
child su!&ect to prentl uthority# in
$hich cse the child shll !e pre"erred.
()9,+
This article makes the obligation of several
obligors in the same grade a joint and not a
solidary one. The proportionate share of each
will depend upon his means as compared to the
others. It may happen, however, that some
obligors may be absent and their domiciles
unknown, or for some other reason they cannot
immediately furnish their shares. In such case,
the law provides that any obligor may be
compelled to give the full amount of support,
without prejudice to his right to recover the
proportionate shares of the others. Thus,
although the general rule is that the recipient
should claim his support from all those obliged
to give it, under special circumstances he may
bring his action against any of them. If the court
finds that there is ground for the action against
the defendant, it will oblige him to
provisionally give the full support deserving his
rights against the others. (1 Manresa 677-678).
In matters of support, the law gives preference
to children under patria potestas over all other
relatives including the spouse. (Dela Cruz vs.
Santillan, [CA] G.R. No. 8491, February 12,
1943). This is irrespective of whether they are
legitimates, legitimated, or illegitimate. Such an
adopted child is entitled to the same right and
preference because he has the same rights as a
legitimate child.
Article )*1. The mount o" support# in
the cses re"erred to in Articles 19, nd
192# shll !e in proportion to the
resources or mens o" the giver nd to
the necessities o" the recipient. ()92+
Article )*). Support in the cses
re"erred to in the preceding rticle shll
!e reduced or incresed proportiontely#
ccording to the reduction or increse
o" the necessities o" the recipient nd
the resources or mens o" the person
o!liged to "urnish the sme. ()95+
Judgment of support is always subject to
modification.
In determining the amount of support to be
awarded, such amount should be in proportion
to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its
award of support on the evidence presented
before it. The evidence must prove the capacity
or resources of both parents who are jointly
obligated to support their children as provided
for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and
the monthly expenses incurred for the
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation of the
child.
In this case, the only evidence presented by the
plaintiff regarding her claim for support of the
child was her testimony. The same does not
establish the amount needed by the child nor the
amount that the parents are reasonably able to
give. (Jose Lam vs. Adriana Chua, G.R. No.
131286, March 18, 2004).
The amount of support is by no means
permanent. In Advincula vs. Advincula, 10
SCRA 189 (1964), it was held that another
action for support could be filed again by the
same plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that the
previous case for support filed against the same
defendant was dismissed. It was further held
that:
Judgment for support does not become final.
The right to support is of such nature that its
allowance is essentially provisional; for during
the entire period that a needy party is entitled to
support, his or her alimony may be modified or
altered, in accordance with his increased or
decreased needs, and with the same means of
the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to
final determination.
Thus, there is no merit to the claim that the
compromise agreement between the husband
and wife embodied in a decision in the case for
voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of
gains is a bar to any further award of support in
favor of their child. The provision for a
common fund for the benefit of their child as
embodied in the compromise agreement
between the parties which had been approved
by the court cannot be considered final and res
judicata since any judgment for support is
always subject to modification, depending upon
the needs of the child and the capabilities of the
parents to give support.
Article )*1. The o!ligtion to give
support shll !e demnd!le "rom the
time the person $ho hs right to
receive the sme needs it "or
mintennce# !ut it shll not !e pid
e'cept "rom the dte o" &udicil or e'tr-
&udicil demnd.
Support pendente lite my !e climed in
ccordnce $ith the Rules o" <ourt.
Pyment shll !e mde $ithin the "irst
"ive dys o" ech corresponding month.
;hen the recipient dies# his heirs shll
not !e o!liged to return $ht he hs
received in dvnce. ()98+
Article )*4. The person o!liged to give
support shll hve the option to "ul"ill
the o!ligtion either !y pying the
llo$nce "i'ed# or !y receiving nd
mintining in the "mily d$elling the
person $ho hs right to receive
support. The ltter lterntive cnnot !e
viled o" in cse there is morl or
legl o!stcle thereto. ()99+
No finality of support judgment.
A judgment for support does not become final
at all. The reason for this is that, it can be
reduced or increased proportionately according
to the reduction or increase of the necessities of
the recipient and the resources or means of the
giver.
Illustration:
If a person is obliged to give support by virtue
of a decision of the court and such decision
mandates that he should give the recipient
P1,000.00 per month and later on gets demoted
in his work and receives a lesser com-
pensation, he can ask for a reduction because
his resources or means of the said person has
diminished. Appropriately, however, the
reduction of means as a defense does not apply
to support of spouses for it refers more to a case
where the recipient is a stranger to the family of
the obligor. (Corral vs. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3158).
Support, judgment for support is
immediately executory.
A judgment for support is immediately
executory because it is needed by the person to
be supported. Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the
trial court, judgments in actions for support are
immediately executory and cannot be stayed by
an appeal. This is an exception to the general
rule which provides that the taking of an appeal
stays the execution of the judgment and that
advance execution will only be allowed if there
are urgent reasons therefore. The provision
peremptorily calls for immediate execution of
all judgments for support and makes no
distinction between those which are the subject
of an appeal and those which are not.
The rule has to be so because in all cases
involving a child, his interest and welfare are
always the paramount concerns. There may be
instances where, in view of the poverty of the
child, it would be a traversity of justice to
refuse him support until the decision of the trial
court attains finality while time continues to slip
away. (Gan vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 145527,
May 28, 2002, citing De Leon vs. Soriano, 95
Phil. 806).
Demand is necessary.
The provisions of Article 203, Family Code
requires that before support is paid, there must
be judicial or extrajudicial demand. This is so
because the right to demand support arises from
imperative necessity, without which, it cannot
be demanded, and the law presumes that such
necessity does not exist unless support is
demanded. (Jocson, et al. vs. Empire Insurance
Co., et al., 50 O.G. 2628).
When obligation ceases.
According to law, the obligation to give support
shall cease when the recipient engages in a
trade, profession or industry, or has obtained
work or has improved his fortune in such a way
that he no longer needs the allowance for his
subsistence. Thus, if in spite of the ability to
practice the profession, art or trade, or even its
actual practice, the necessities of the recipient
continue without his fault, the obligation to give
what is needed subsists. (Corral vs. Gallego, 38
O.G. 3158). Appropriately, it is the sufficiency
of income derived from the practice of the
profession, art or trade that determines the
necessity for support and so a father is not
obliged to give support to his children if they
have their own properties or profession or
indus- try, from which they get sufficient
income for their subsistence. (Manresa,
Comentario al Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, p. 697).
The person obliged to give support has the
option to give it by either paying a fixed
allowance to the person entitled to it or
maintaining him in the family dwelling the
person entitled to the support, but maintaining
and receiving him in the family dwelling cannot
be done if there is a moral or legal obstacle.
Some of these moral or legal obstacles may be:
. (1) when a daughter is already married as she
has to live with the husband;
. (2) where the defendant abducted the
plaintiff and married her to avoid
prosecution but never lived with her;
(Sentencia [Cuba] of February 15, 1937).
. (3) if the natural father of a child has already
married a woman, not the mother of the
child. (US vs. Alvin, 576; Pascual vs.
Martinez, 37 O.G. 2418).
Article )*,. The right to receive support
under this Title s $ell s ny money or
property o!tined s such support shll
not !e levied upon on ttchment or
e'ecution. (1*)+
The right to receive support is exempt from
attachment or levy. The reason is obvious in
that it would defeat the purpose of the law in
giving protection to the recipient against
misery. This is a situation which accepts certain
exceptions like when support is founded on
contract or will, the excess of which is subject
to attachment or levy.
Article )*2. ;hen# $ithout the
%no$ledge o" the person o!liged to give
support# it is given !y strnger# the
ltter shll hve right to clim the
sme "rom the "ormer# unless it ppers
tht he gve it $ithout intention o" !eing
reim!ursed. ()124+
Article )*5. ;hen the person o!liged to
support nother un&ustly re"uses or "ils
to give support $hen urgently needed
!y the ltter# ny third person my
"urnish support to the needy individul#
$ith right o" reim!ursement "rom the
person o!liged to give support. This
Article shll pply prticulrly $hen the
"ther or mother o" child under the ge
o" m&ority un&ustly re"uses to support
or "ils to give support to the child $hen
urgently needed. ()122+
. (1) The provisions of Articles 206 and 207
of the Family Code are similar to the
provisions of Article 1236 of the New
Civil Code which states that the creditor
is not bound to accept payment or
performance by a third person who has
no interest in the fulfillment of the
obligation, unless there is a stipulation to
the contrary. Whoever pays for another
may demand from the debtor what he has
paid, except that if he paid without the
knowledge or against the will of the
debtor, he can recover only insofar as the
payment has been beneficial to the
debtor. (1158a)
. (2) X is obliged to support Y. Without Xs
knowledge or consent, Z paid the amount
of support to Y. The right of Z is to ask
for reimbursement from X, unless there
is a showing that Z did not intend to be
reimbursed. If there is no evidence of
such intention, Z can ask for
reimbursement from X. The rule is also
true in case the person obliged to give
support fails or refuses to give support.
. (3) In order that the stranger under Article
206, Family Code may recover what he
gave to another by way of support, the
following must concur:
. (a) the person obliged to give support
failed to give it;
. (b) support was needed;
. (c) support was given without the
knowledge and consent of the
person who is required to give it;
. (d) support was given with the intention
of being reimbursed.
The stranger referred to in the law means one
who is not under obligation to support another,
like for example, X, who is not even related to
Y but he voluntarily gives support to Y on
account of his parents failure or inability to
give him support. It must be recalled that when
a person obliged to support an orphan or an
insane or other indigent person unjustly refuses
to give support to the latter, any third person
may furnish support to the needy individual,
with right of reimbursement from the person
obliged to give support. The provisions of this
article apply when the father or mother of a
child under eighteen years of age unjustly
refuses to support him. (Art. 2166, New Civil
Code).
The aforementioned law is a form of a quasi-
contract which requires the one who is
obligated to support another but who fails to do
so to reimburse a third person who voluntarily
gave support to the one entitled to it, otherwise,
he would be unduly enriching himself at the
expense of another person.
Article )*8. In cse o" contrctul
support or tht given !y $ill# the e'cess
in mount !eyond tht re7uired "or legl
support shll !e su!&ect to levy on
ttchment or e'ecution.
6urthermore# contrctul support shll
!e su!&ect to d&ustment $henever
modi"iction is necessry due to
chnges in circumstnces mni"estly
!eyond the contempltion o" the prties.
(n+
The law contemplates of a contractual support
or that support which is given through a will.
While the law does not allow the attachment or
levy on legal support, however, it allows
attachment or levy of the excess of a contractual
support over and above legal support. It also
says that contractual support can be adjusted
when necessary due to changes in the
circumstances manifestly beyond the
contemplation of the parties.