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Super Boethium De Trinitate
by
Thomas Aquinas
Questions 1-4, translated by Rose E. Brennan, S.H.N. (Herder, 1946)
Questions 5-6, translated by Armand Mauer (Toronto, 1953)
CONTENTS
ST. THOMAS' INTRODUCTION
BOETHIUS' PREFACE
St. Thomas' Commentary
QUESTION I: Concerning the knowledge of divine things
1. Whether the Human Mind in Order to Attain to a Knowledge of Truth Requires a New
Illumination of Divine Light
2. Whether the Human Mind Can Arrive at an Idea of God
3. Whether God Is the First Object Known by the Mind
4. Whether the Human Mind Is Capable of Arriving at a Knowledge of the Divine Trinity Through
Natural Reason
QUESTION II: Concerning the manifestation of knowledge of divine truth
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1. Whether Divine Truths Ought to Be Treated of by the Method of Inquiry
2. Whether There Can Be Any Science of Divine Truths Which Are Matters of Faith
3. Whether in the Science of Faith, Which Is Concerning God, it Is Permissible to Use the
Rational Arguments of the Natural Philosophers
4. Whether Divine Truths Ought to Be Concealed by New and Obscure Words
LECTIO 1
1. Boethius' Text
2. St. Thomas' Commentary
QUESTION III: Concerning Those Things That Pertain to the Knowledge Possessed by Faith
1. Whether Faith Is Necessary for Mankind
2. Whether Faith Should Be Distinguished from Religion
3. Whether the Christian Religion Is Aptly Called Catholic or Universal
4. Whether it Is a True Article of Faith, That the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit Are One God
QUESTION IV: Concerning Those Things That Pertain to the Cause of Plurality
1. Whether Otherness Is the Cause of Plurality
2. Whether Variety of Accidents Produces Diversity According to Number
3. Whether Two Bodies Can Be, or Can Be Conceived of as Being Simultaneously in the Same
Place
4. Whether Variety of Location Has Any Influence in Effecting Numerical Difference
LECTIO 2
1. Boethius' Text
2. St. Thomas' Commentary
QUESTION FIVE: The division of speculative science
1. Is Speculative Science Appropriately Divided into these Three Parts: Natural, Mathematical,
and Divine?
2. Does Natural Philosophy Treat of What Exists in Motion and Matter?
3. Does Mathematics Treat, Without Motion and Matter, of What Exists in Matter?
4. Does Divine Science Treat of What Exists Without Matter and Motion?
QUESTION SIX: The methods of speculative science
1. Must we Proceed according to the Mode of Reason in Natural Science, according to the
Mode of Learning in Mathematics, and according to the Mode of Intellect in Divine Science?
2. Should We Entirely Abandon the Imagination in Divine Science?
3. Can Our Intellect Behold the Divine Form Itself?
4. Can Our Intellect Behold the Divine Form by Means of Some Speculative Science?
Prooemium ST. THOMAS INTRODUCTION
Ab initio nativitatis investigabo et
ponam in lucem scientiam illius, Sap.
6.
I will seek her out from the beginning of her birth,
and bring the knowledge of her to light (Wis. 6:24)
Naturalis mentis humanae intuitus
pondere corruptibilis corporis
aggravatus in primae veritatis luce, ex
qua omnia sunt facile cognoscibilia,
defigi non potest. Unde oportet ut
secundum naturalis cognitionis
The natural intuition of the human mind, burdened
by the weight of a corruptible body, cannot fix its
gaze in the prime light of First Truth, in which all
things are easily knowable; whence it must be that,
according to the progress of its natural manner of
cognition, the reason advances from the things that
progressum ratio a posterioribus in
priora deveniat et a creaturis in Deum,
Rom. 1: invisibilia ipsius a creatura
mundi etc.; Sap. 13: a magnitudine
speciei creaturae et cetera. Et hoc est
quod dicitur Iob 36: omnes homines
vident eum, scilicet Deum,
unusquisque intuetur procul.
are posterior to those that are prior, and from
creatures to God. For the invisible things of Him,
from the creation of the world, are clearly seen,
being understood by the things that are made
(Rom. 1:20) and For by the greatness of the
beauty and of the creature, the Creator of them may
be seen, so as to be known thereby (Wis. 13:5);
and this is what is said in Job 36:25: All men see
Him, gazing from afar.
Creaturae enim, per quas naturaliter
cognoscitur Deus, in infinitum ab ipso
distant. Sed quia in his, quae procul
videntur, facile visus decipitur, idcirco
ex creaturis in Deum cognoscendum
tendentes in errores multiplices
inciderunt. Unde dicitur Sap. 14 quod
creaturae Dei sunt muscipulae pedibus
insipientium et in Psalmo: defecerunt
scrutantes scrutinio. Et ideo Deus
humano generi aliam tutam viam
cognitionis providit, suam notitiam
mentibus hominum per fidem
infundens. Unde dicitur 1 Cor. 2: quae
sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei,
nobis autem revelavit Deus per
spiritum suum. Et hic est spiritus, quo
efficimur credentes, 2 Cor. 4: habentes
eundem spiritum fidei credimus,
For creatures, through whom God can be known by
the natural light of reason, are at an infinite distance
from Him. But since, in those who look at a thing
from a great distance, vision may readily be
deceived, therefore those striving to attain to a
knowledge of God from creatures fell into many
errors: wherefore it is said: The creatures of God
are... a snare to the feet of the unwise (Wis. 14:
11), and: They have failed in their search (Ps.
63:7); and therefore God has provided for the
human race another safe road of cognition,
bestowing upon the minds of men, by faith, a
knowledge of Himself. Therefore, it is said: The
things also that are of God no man knows, but the
Spirit of God: but to us God has revealed them by
His Spirit (1 Cor. 2: 11): and this is the Spirit by
whom we are enabled to be believers: Having the
same spirit of faith, as it is written: I believed, for
which cause I have spoken (Ps. 115: 10); we also
propter quod et loquimur. believe, for which cause we speak also (2 Cor.
4:13)
Sicut ergo naturalis cognitionis
principium est creaturae notitia a sensu
accepta, ita cognitionis desuper datae
principium est primae veritatis notitia
per fidem infusa. Et hinc est quod
diverso ordine hinc inde proceditur.
Philosophi enim, qui naturalis
cognitionis ordinem sequuntur,
praeordinant scientiam de creaturis
scientiae divinae, scilicet naturalem
metaphysicae. Sed apud theologos
proceditur e converso, ut creatoris
consideratio considerationem
praeveniat creaturae.
Therefore, as the principle of our cognition is
naturally the knowledge of created things, obtained
by means of the senses, so the principle of
supernatural cognition is that knowledge of First
Truth conferred upon us, infused by faith; and hence
it follows that in advancing one proceeds according
to a diverse order. For philosophers, who follow
along the way of natural cognition, place knowledge
about created things before knowledge about
divine things: natural science before metaphysics:
but among theologians the procedure is in reverse
order, so that study of the Creator comes before
that of creatures.
Hunc ergo ordinem secutus Boethius
ea quae sunt fidei tractare intendens in
ipsa summa rerum origine principium
suae considerationis instituit, scilicet
Trinitate unius simplicis Dei. Unde ei
competunt verba praemissa: ab initio
nativitatis et cetera.
This order, therefore, Boethius followed: intending
to treat of those things which are of faith, he took as
the starting point of his study that highest origin of
things, namely, the Trinity of the one, simple God.
Whence it is that the above-quoted words are
applicable to him: I will seek her out from the
beginning of her birth, and bring the knowledge of
her to light.
In quibus circa praesens opusculum, In these words, as regards the present opusculum,
quod ad Symmachum patricium urbis
composuit, tria possunt notari, scilicet
materia, modus et finis.
which he addressed to Symmachus, a patrician of
Rome, three things can be noted: namely, the
matter, the mode, and the purpose.
Materia siquidem huius operis est in
una divina essentia Trinitas
personarum, quae consurgit ex prima
nativitate, qua divina sapientia a patre
aeternaliter generatur, Prov. 8: nondum
erant abyssi, et ego iam concepta
eram; in Psalmo: ego hodie genui te.
The matter of this work is the Trinity of Persons in
the one, divine Essence, that Trinity which has its
source in the primal nativity in which divine wisdom
is eternally generated by the Father. The depths
were not as yet, and I was already conceived
(Prov. 8:24), and: This day have I begotten you
(Ps. 2:7)
Quae quidem nativitas initium est
cuiuslibet nativitatis alterius, cum ipsa
sola sit perfecte naturam capiens
generantis; aliae vero omnes
imperfectae sunt, secundum quas
genitum aut partem substantiae
generantis accipit aut substantiae
similitudinem. Unde oportet quod a
praedicta nativitate omnis alia nativitas
per quandam imitationem derivetur,
Eph. 3: ex quo omnis paternitas in
caelo et in terra nominatur. Et propter
hoc filius dicitur primogenitus omnis
creaturae, Col. 1, ut nativitatis origo et
imitatio designetur, non eadem
generationis ratio. Unde convenienter
dicit: ab initio nativitatis; Prov. 8:
This nativity is the beginning of every other nativity,
as it is the only one involving perfect participation in
the nature of the generator: but all others are
imperfect according as the one generated receives
either a part of the substance of the generator, or
only a similitude: from this it follows that from the
aforesaid nativity, every other is derived by a kind
of imitation; and thus: Of whom all paternity in
heaven and in earth is named (Eph. 3: 15); and on
this account the Son ,is called the first-born of every
creature (Col. 1:15) so that the origin of nativity and
its imitation might be designated, but not according
to the same meaning of generation; and therefore it
is aptly said: I will seek her out from the beginning
of her birth. The Lord possessed me in the
beginning of his ways (Prov. 8:22); for not only of
creatures is the aforesaid nativity the beginning, but
dominus possedit me in initio viarum
suarum. Nec solum creaturarum est
initium praedicta nativitas, sed etiam
spiritus sancti, qui a generante
genitoque procedit.
even of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the
Generator and the Generated.
Per hoc autem quod non dicit: initium
nativitatis investigabo, sed ab initio
designatur quod in hoc nativitatis initio
eius perscrutatio non finitur, sed ab hoc
incipiens ad alia procedit.
But in saying this, he does not say: I will seek out
the beginning of nativity, but from the beginning
signifies that his search is not limited by initiation of
this kind of nativity, but that, beginning from this, he
proceeds to others.
Eius namque doctrina in tres partes
dividitur. Prima namque est de Trinitate
personarum, ex quarum processione
omnis alia nativitas vel processio
derivatur, in hoc quidem libro, qui prae
manibus habetur, quantum ad id quod
de Trinitate et unitate sciendum est, in
alio vero libro, quem ad Iohannem
diaconum Ecclesiae Romanae scribit,
de modo praedicandi, quo utimur in
personarum Trinitate, qui sic incipit:
quaero, an pater.
For his doctrine is divided into three parts. The first
part, concerning the Trinity of Persons, from the
procession of whom every other nativity and
procession are derived, is contained in that book
which we possess at hand, so far as anything can
be known about the Trinity and Unity. But in another
book which he wrote to John, a deacon of the
Roman Church, we find what he says about the
mode of predication which we employ in the
distinction of Persons and unity of essence; and
this book begins: I inquire whether the Father.
Secunda vero pars est de processione
bonarum creaturarum a Deo bono in
libro, qui ad eundem Iohannem
The second part, which is about the procession of
good creatures from a good God, is in a book that
is written to the same John (De hebdomadibus),
conscribitur de hebdomadibus, qui sic
incipit: postulas a me.
and this begins: You ask of me.
Tertia vero pars est de reparatione
creaturarum per Christum. Quae
quidem in duo dividitur. Primo namque
proponitur fides, quam Christus docuit
qua iustificamur, in libro qui intitulatur
de fide Christiana, qui sic incipit:
Christianam fidem. Secundo
explanatur, quid de Christo sentiendum
sit, quomodo scilicet duae naturae in
una persona conveniant, et hoc in libro
de duabus naturis in una persona
Christi ad Iohannem praedictum
conscripto, qui sic incipit: anxie te
quidem.
The third part is about the separation of creatures
through Christ. This is divided into two parts: For
first, there is set forth the faith which Christ taught
by which we are justified, in that book entitled De
fide Christiana, which begins: The Christian faith.
In the second part, an explanation is given of what
must be held about Christ: namely, how two natures
are united in one person. This discussion of the two
natures and the one person in Christ is also in a
book written to the same John, which begins: You,
indeed, solicitously.
Modus autem de Trinitate tractandi
duplex est, ut dicit Augustinus in I de
Trinitate, scilicet per auctoritates et per
rationes, quem utrumque modum
Augustinus complexus est, ut ipsemet
dicit.
Now the mode employed in treating of the Trinity is
twofold, as St. Augustine says in I De Trinitate,
namely, through truths known on the basis of
authority, and through those known by reason, both
of which modes Augustine combined, as he himself
says.
Quidam vero sanctorum patrum, ut
Ambrosius et Hilarius, alterum tantum
modum prosecuti sunt, scilicet per
Some of the holy Fathers, as Ambrose and Hilary,
employed but one mode of explanation: namely, by
setting forth those truths founded upon authority.
auctoritates. Boethius vero elegit
prosequi per alium modum, scilicet per
rationes, praesupponens hoc quod ab
aliis per auctoritates fuerat
prosecutum. Et ideo modus huius
operis designatur in hoc quod dicit:
investigabo, in quo rationis inquisitio
designatur, Eccli. 39: sapientiam,
scilicet Trinitatis notitiam, antiquorum,
scilicet quam antiqui sola auctoritate
asseruerunt, exquiret sapiens, id est
ratione investigabit.
But Boethius chose to proceed according to the
other mode; namely, according to reasoned
arguments, presupposing what had been
concluded by others on the grounds of authority.
Hence also the method of his work is indicated in
what he says: I shall investigate, in which an
inquiry of reason is signified. In Sirach 39:1 we
read: Wisdom, namely, knowledge of the Trinity;
of all the ancients, that is, which the ancients
affirmed solely on the grounds of authority; the
wise man will seek out, that is, he will investigate
by reason.
Unde in prooemio praemittit:
investigatam diutissime quaestionem.
Wherefore, in the preface he speaks of An
investigation carried on for a very long time.
Finis vero huius operis est, ut occulta
fidei manifestentur, quantum in via
possibile est, Eccli. 24: qui elucidant
me, vitam aeternam habebunt. Et ideo
dicit: ponam in lucem scientiam illius,
Iob 28: profunda fluviorum scrutatus
est, et abscondita produxit in lucem.
The purpose of this work is: that hidden things may
be made manifest, so far as that is possible in this
life. They that explain me shall have life
everlasting (Sirach 24:31); and therefore, he says:
I will bring the knowledge of her to light (Wis.
6:24). The depths also of rivers he searched, and
hidden things he brought forth to light (Job 2 8: 11).
BOETHIUS PREFACE
Investigatam diutissime The problem which has been for so long a
quaetionem quantum nostrae
mentis igniculum illustrare lux
divina dignata est, formatam
rationibus litterisque mandatam,
offerendam vobis
communicandamque curavi, tam
vestri cupidus iudicii, quam nostri
studiosus inventi.
time the subject of my investigationto the
extent that the divine light has deigned to
enkindle the feeble spark of my mindnow
arranged according to a reasoned plan and
consigned to writing, I have taken pains to
offer and share with you, prompted as much
by desire for your judgment as by zeal for my
task.
Qua in re quid mihi sit animi,
qoties stylo excogitata
commendo, tum ex ipsa
difficultate materiae, tum ex eo
quod viris, idest vobis tantum
colloquor, intelligi postest.
In this matter it is possible to understand what
my intention is whenever I entrust my thought
to pen, both because of the difficulty of the
matter and because it is only to you men that I
am addressing it.
Neque enim famae iactatione et
inanibus vulgi clamoribus
excitamur, sed si quis est fructus
exterior, hic non potest aliam nisi
materiae similem sperare
sententiam.
Indeed, I am not prompted by any desire for
fame or for empty popular applause; but if
there is any exterior reward, it can be no
other than to hope for a judgment in keeping
with the matter.
Quocumque igitur a vobis deieci
oculos, partim ignava segnities,
partim callidus livor occurit, ut
contumeliam videat divinis
tractatibus irrogare, qui talibus
For, wherever I have directed my gaze, apart
from you, I have encountered, on the one
side, stolid indifference or, on the other, sly
envy, so that I would appear to offer insult to
matters pertaining to divine things by putting
hominum monstris non
agnoscenda hic potius quam
conculcanda proiecerim.
them before such monsters of men to be
trampled under foot by them rather than to be
acknowledged.
Idcirco stylum brevitate contraho
et ex intimis sumpta philosophiae
disciplinis novorum verborum
significationibus velo, ut haec
mihi tantum vobisque, si quando
ad ea converteritis oculos,
colloquantur; ceteros vero ita
submovimus, ut qui capere
intellectu nequiverint, ad ea etiam
legenda videantur indigni.
On this account I restrain my pen by brevity,
and truths gleaned from the deepest
teachings of philosophy I veil over by the
signification of new words, so that they may
speak only to me and to you; if you, indeed,
will direct your attention to them. But, as for
others, I so disregard them that those who
are unable to grasp the meaning of my words
shall seem unworthy to read them.
Sane tantum a nobis oportet
quaeri, quantum humanae
rationis intuitus ad Deitatis valet
celsa conscendere. Nam ceteris
quoque artibus idem finis est
constitutus, quousque potest via
rationis accedere. Neque enim
medicina aegris semper affert
salutem. Sed nulla erit culpa
medentis, si nihil eorum quae fieri
oportebat, omiserit: idemque in
ceteris.
Only so much ought one require of me as the
intuition of human reason can approximate
about the sublime truths of the Godhead. For
in the case of other arts, the same limit is
also established, namely, that which by the
way of reason one can attain. Now, medicine
does not always effect the cure of the patient.
But no blame will be placed upon the
physician if he has omitted none of the things
which he ought to have done; and the same
is true in other matters.
At quantum haec difficilior
quaestio est, tantum facilior
debet esse ad veniam. Vobis
tamen illus etiam inspiciendum
est an ex beati Augustini scriptis
semina rationum in nos venientia
fructus attulerint.
Moreover, in proportion to the difficulty of a
problem, the pardoning of error ought to be
the more easily granted. You must also
determine this: whether the seeds of
speculation, gathered from the writings of the
blessed Augustine, have in my work borne
fruit.
Nunc de proposita quaestione
hinc sumamus initium.
Now, therefore, let us undertake at this point
the discussion of the proposed question.
St. Thomas Commentary
Huic ergo operi prooemium praemittit, in
quo tria facit. Primo breviter causas
operis praelibat, in quo reddit auditorem
docilem. Secundo excusationem
subiungit, in quo reddit auditorem
benevolum, ibi: idcirco stilum et cetera.
Tertio ostendit sui operis originem et
quasi subiectum esse doctrinam
Augustini, ex quo reddit auditorem
attentum, ibi: vobis tamen etiam illud
inspiciendum et cetera.
To this work the author prefixes a preface, in
which he does three things: First, he briefly
indicates the causes of the work, in doing which
he inclines his hearer to accept what he says.
Secondly, he adds an excuse or explanation in
which he gains the good will of his hearer, where
he says: I restrain my pen. In the third place, he
points out that the source of his work and, in a
certain way, its teaching, is the doctrine of St.
Augustine, and in doing this he renders his hearer
attentive, when he says: You must also determine
this: whether the seeds of speculation, gathered
from the writings of blessed Augustine, have in my
work borne fruit.
Proponit autem quattuor causas sui
operis in prima parte.
He likewise sets forth in the first part the four
causes of his work.
Primo materialem, cum dicit:
investigatam diutissime quaestionem,
scilicet de Trinitate personarum unius
Dei, in qua et difficultatem materiae
insinuat, quae diutina investigatione
indiguit, et studii diligentiam, qua ipse
eam diutissime investigavit, ut intelligatur
investigatam a nobis, quamvis etiam
intelligi possit investigatam a pluribus,
quia a principio nascentis Ecclesiae
haec quaestio ingenia fidelium maxime
fatigavit.
1) First, the material cause, when he says: the
problem which has been for so long a time the
subject of my investigation, that is, about the
Trinity of Persons of the one God; and in these
words he implies both the difficulty of the matter,
because he has carried on the investigation for a
very long time, and also the diligence of the study
with which he has for so long a period
investigated it, as investigation is understood by
us, although it can also be understood to mean
investigation by many; because from the
beginning of the existence of the Church, this
question has especially continued to challenge
the cleverest minds of Christians.
Secundo tangit causam efficientem: et
proximam sive secundariam in hoc quod
dicit: quantum mentis nostrae igniculum,
et primam sive principalem in hoc quod
dicit: illustrare lux divina dignata est.
2) Secondly, he indicates the proximate or
secondary efficient cause when he says: the
feeble spark of my mind. Moreover, he speaks
also of the first or principal cause when he adds:
that the divine light has deigned to enkindle.
Proxima siquidem causa huius
investigationis fuit intellectus auctoris,
qui recte igniculus dicitur. Ignis enim, ut
dicit Dionysius 15 c. caelestis
Now the proximate cause of this investigation is,
indeed, the intellect of the author, which is rightly
termed a spark. For fire, as Dionysius says (XV
Coel. hier.), especially serves to signify
hierarchiae, maxime competit ad
significandas divinas proprietates, tum
ratione subtilitatis, tum ratione luminis,
tum ratione virtutis activae per calorem,
tum ratione situs et motus.
properties of the divinity: at once by reason of its
subtlety, of its light, and also by reason of its place
and motion.
Quae quidem Deo maxime competunt,
in quo est summa simplicitas et
immaterialitas, perfecta claritas,
omnipotens virtus et altissima
sublimitas, Angelis autem mediocriter,
sed humanis mentibus infimo modo,
quarum propter corpus coniunctum et
puritas inquinatur et lux obscuratur et
virtus debilitatur et motus in suprema
retardatur; unde humanae mentis
efficacia recte igniculo comparatur.
These things, in the highest degree, pertain to
God, in whom exist the culmination of simplicity
and of immateriality, perfect charity, almighty
power, and highest majesty. To the angels, fire
(as indicative of intellect) may be applied in a
middle sense, but to human minds, with only a
more restricted meaning; for by union with a body,
its purity is lessened, its light is obscured, its
power weakened, and its upward motion
retarded: wherefore the efficacy of the human
mind is rightly compared to a spark.
Unde nec ad huius quaestionis veritatem
inquirendam sufficit, nisi divina luce
illustrata, et sic divina lux est causa
principalis, humana mens causa
secundaria.
Hence it would not be able to investigate the truth
of this question unless light were cast upon it by
the divine light; and thus the divine light is the
principal cause; but the human mind, a cause in
the secondary order.
Tertio tangit causam formalem in hoc
quod dicit: formatam rationibus, et tangit
modum agendi quantum ad tria.
3) Thirdly, he treats of the formal cause when he
says: arranged according to a reasoned plan,
and he indicates the mode of treatment under
three headings.
Primo quantum ad hoc quod
argumentando processit; unde dicit:
formatam rationibus. Quaestio namque
quamdiu probabilibus rationibus sub
dubio exagitatur, quasi informis est,
nondum ad certitudinem veritatis
pertingens, et ideo formata dicitur esse,
quando ad eam ratio additur, per quam
certitudo de veritate habetur. Et in hoc
providit intelligentiae, quia quod
credimus, debemus auctoritati, quod
intelligimus, rationi, ut Augustinus dicit.
a) First, since he proceeds by argumentation, he
therefore says, arranged according to a
reasoned plan. For a question discussed even
over a long period according to probable reasons
but still with doubt is, as it were, without form, not
yet laying claim to the certitude of truth; and hence
it is said to possess form when reasonable proof
is added, through which certitude regarding the
truth may be attained: in this process, intellect
gives us vision of the truth, because what we
believe, we owe to authority; but what we
understand, we owe to reason, as Augustine
says.
Secundo in hoc quod non solum verbis
disseruit, sed etiam scripto mandavit,
unde dicit: litterisque mandatam. In quo
providit memoriae.
b) In the second place he discusses the mode of
treatment, since he treats of this matter not only in
words, but has incorporated it in writing, he says:
I entrust my thought to pen. In so doing, he has
made provision against the weaknesses of
memory.
Tertio in hoc quod non ad praesentes
per modum doctrinae, sed ad absentes
per modum epistulae conscripsit.
c) Thirdly, since he has written, not after the
manner of one imparting doctrine to another
present with him, but as to one absent, by means
of a letter.
Sic enim etiam Aristoteles diversimode
libros suos composuit, quosdam quidem
Thus Aristotle also composed his books in
different ways: some addressed to those who in
ad praesentes, qui ab ipso audiebant -
et hi libri dicuntur auditus, sicut dicitur
liber de naturali auditu - quosdam autem
ad absentes scribens, sicut liber de
anima conscriptus esse significatur in I
Ethicorum, ubi nominantur exteriores
sermones, ut Commentator Graecus
ibidem dicit.
his presence listened to him, and these books are
called Auditus, as one such book is, entitled, De
naturali auditu; but certain others he wrote to
those absent, as we find in I Ethic. that the books
De anima were so written, where the names of
discourses addressed to those at a distance are
given, as the Greek commentator says.
Unde sequitur: offerendam vobis quasi
maiori ad iudicandum
communicandamque curavi quasi socio
ad profectum. Et in hoc iudicium requirit;
unde sequitur: tam vestri cupidus iudicii
quam nostri studiosus inventi. Ex hoc
enim quod fuit studiosus ad
inveniendum, praedictam quaestionem
rationibus formavit; ex hoc vero quod fuit
cupidus iudicii Symmachi, ei formatam
obtulit.
Accordingly, he adds: I have taken pains to offer
and share with you, prompted by desire for your
judgment, as if addressing an expert and asking
his opinion in this matter. Thus, he continues:
prompted as much by desire for your judgment
as by zeal for my task. Because he had been
zealous for ascertaining the truth, he had ordered
the aforesaid question according to reasonable
arguments; and, because he was desirous of the
judgment of Symmachus, he presented to him the
work thus arranged in orderly fashion.
Quarto tangit causam finalem, cum dicit:
qua in re quid mihi sit animi, id est quem
finem intendam ex supra dicta re,
quotiens excogitata animo de praedictis
vel quibuscumque aliis stilo commendo,
intelligi potest ex duobus, tum ex ipsa
difficultate materiae, tum ex eo quod
colloquor non multitudini, sed raris,
4) In the fourth place, he refers to the final cause
when he says: What my intention is, that is, what
end I am striving for in regard to the above-
mentioned problem: Whenever I entrust my
thought to pen concerning the aforesaid or
certain other matters, it is possible to
understand for two reasons: because of the
difficulty of the matter and also, because it is
scilicet sapientibus, id est vobis
tantummodo.
only to you men that I am addressing it.
Non enim hunc librum scripsit, ut
multitudini recitaret, quod quandoque fit
propter vulgi favorem, sed tantummodo
uni sapienti, unde sequitur: neque enim
excitamur, scilicet ad scribendum famae
iactatione, id est commendatione, et
clamoribus vulgi, sicut poetae recitantes
carmina in theatris, inanibus, quia tales
clamores frequenter sine ratione sunt. Et
sic removit finem inconvenientem et
subiungit finem debitum, insinuans
quidem finem principalem qui est
interior, scilicet perceptio divinae
veritatis, et explicans finem
secundarium, scilicet iudicium sapientis,
unde dicit: sed si quis est fructus
exterior, quasi dicat: principaliter quidem
me excitat fructus interior, sed si aliquis
est exterior, hic non potest aliam sperare
sententiam nisi materiae similem, id est
convenientem, quasi dicat: non aliud
iudicium requiro pro fructu exteriori nisi
qui deceat tantam materiam, de qua
iudicium concedi non debet ignaviter
pigris neque callide invidis, sed solum
benevolo sapienti, unde sequitur:
This book, therefore, he has not written in order to
read it to the many, which would be with hope of
popular acclaim, but rather, for one wise man
alone; wherefore, he continues: I am not
prompted by any desire for fame or for empty
popular applause, as are the poets who recite
their verses before the foolish crowds in the
theater, because such applause is often
altogether without reason. Thus he puts aside any
unworthy end and establishes one that is
honorable, implying a principal purpose, which is
interior, namely, knowledge of divine truth, and,
explicitly pointing out a secondary end, that is, the
judgment of a wise man, when he says: If there is
any exterior reward, as if he would say: It is an
interior reward that principally urges me on, but if
there is any that is exterior, this can be none other
than to wait and to hope for a judgment like to the
matter, that is, proportionate to it: By way of
exterior return I ask for nothing except what is
fitting in a matter of such importance, in regard to
which I have stated that a judgment of it should be
neither stolidly indifferent nor the bitter one of an
envious critic, but only that pronounced in good
will by a wise man. Accordingly, he adds:
Wherever I have directed my gaze apart from
quocumque igitur a vobis deieci oculos,
scilicet ad quoscumque respexi, non ad
vos tantum considerationi meae occurrit,
partim, id est in aliquibus, ignava, id est
stulta, segnities, id est pigritia, partim
livor, id est invidia, callidus, id est
astutus ad nocendum, in tantum ut
contumeliam videatur irrogare divinis
tractatibus, qui haec, scilicet divina,
proiecerit, id est inordinate exposuerit,
talibus monstris hominum - monstra
dicuntur homines qui in corpore humano
cor gerunt bestiale, propter peccatum
bestiis similes effecti in affectu - non
agnoscenda potius quam conculcanda,
quia non tam quaerunt cognoscere
quam vituperare quaecumque dicuntur,
propter invidiam; unde dicitur Matth. 7:
nolite sanctum dare et cetera. Alia littera:
ne et ego si aliter facerem, videar etc.
qui proiecerim et cetera.
you, that is, to whomsoever I have looked, except
to you alone, I have encountered on the one side,
stolid indifference; that is, lack of
comprehension, on the other side, sly envy, that
is, ill will, sly only in condemnation, so that he who
treated of these things, would seem to offer insult
to divine treatises, that is, by inordinately
explaining them to such monsters of men. Men
are called monsters who, though in human body,
bear within them the heart of a beast, since vice
has made them like to beasts in their affections;
hence these things would be trampled under foot
by them, rather than acknowledged, because
they do not so much seek to know, butbecause
of their envyto revile whatever is said;
wherefore, Give not what is holy to dogs, neither
cast your pearls before swine, lest they trample
them under their feet (Matt. 7:6). Therefore, that I
should not do otherwise than this, I restrain my
pen by brevity.
Idcirco stilum et cetera. Haec est
secunda pars prooemii, in qua subiungit
excusationem. Et primo excusat operis
difficultatem. Secundo operis
imperfectionem, ibi: sed tantum a nobis
et cetera. Tangit autem triplicem
difficultatem, quam sponte huic operi
This is the second part of the preface, in which he
adds an explanation of his manner of writing. And
first, he explains the difficulty of the task. In the
second place, he excuses its imperfection. Only
so much ought one require of me as the intuition
of human reason can approximate about the
sublime truths of the Godhead. He refers also to a
adhibet. threefold difficulty which purposely he attached to
it.
Prima est ex brevitate Scripturae, unde
dicit: idcirco stilum brevitate contraho,
secundum illud Horatii: brevis esse
laboro, obscurus fio.
The first is by reason of the brevity of his writing;
wherefore, he says, I restrain my pen by brevity,
according to that saying of Horace: While I labor
to be brief, I become obscure.
Secunda est ex subtilibus rationibus
quas inducit, et hoc est quod dicit: ex
intimis disciplinis philosophiae sumpta,
quae sunt disciplinae a sensibilibus
abstrahentes, quarum principiis et
conclusionibus utitur, ut metaphysicae et
logicae.
The second arises from the subtlety of the
reasoning which he introduces; thus he says:
truths gleaned from the deepest teachings of
philosophy, which are those doctrines abstracted
from the senses, the principles and conclusions
which metaphysics and logic make use of.
Tertia est ex novitate verborum, unde
dicit: haec, scilicet sumpta, velo
significationibus novorum verborum.
Quae quidem nova dicuntur vel quantum
ad materiam istam, quia alii tractatores
huius quaestionis talibus verbis usi non
sunt, vel quantum ad eos qui legunt, qui
talibus verbis non sunt assueti.
The third difficulty arises from the newness of the
words used; wherefore he says: I veil over by the
signification of new words. These words are
called new either with reference to the matter,
because others treating of this same question did
not employ the same vocabulary, or with
reference to those who read them, because they
are unaccustomed to such terms.
Tres autem has difficultates addit
quartae, quam supra tetigit, quae est
materiae difficultas, ut ea, quae in hoc
These three difficulties he adds to the fourth which
he had previously mentioned: that is, the difficulty
of the subject; consequently, in regard to those
libro scribuntur, tantum sapientibus
colloquatur, qui haec intelligere poterunt,
sicut est auctor ipse et ille, ad quem liber
conscribitur, alii vero, qui capere
intellectu non possunt, a lectione
excludantur. Non enim libenter leguntur
quae non intelliguntur. Et quia ratio ex
praecedentibus connectitur, ideo
praemisit: idcirco, quod est nota
conclusionis. Littera vero plana est.
things written in this book, the meaning is clear
only to the wise, to such men as the author himself
and the one to whom he has addressed it. But
others who cannot comprehend it are excluded
from the reading of it. For things which are not
understood are not read with pleasure. And
because his reason for so writing is connected
with preceding statements, he introduces it with
therefore, which is a sign of a conclusion. The
meaning is clear.
Deinde cum dicit: sed tantum a nobis
quaeri oportet etc., excusat operis
defectum, quia scilicet non debet requiri
ab eo in hoc opere plus certitudinis
quam quantum humana ratio valet ad
alta divinitatis conscendere. Quod
probat per locum a minori in aliis artibus,
in quibus iste finis unicuique artifici
constituitur ut tantum faciat, quantum
humana ratio sinit. Non enim medicus
semper curat, sed si nihil omittat de his
quae facere debet, sine culpa erit, et
similiter est in aliis artibus. Unde et in
hoc opere, ubi est difficillima materia
sensum humanae rationis excedens,
magis debet auctori venia dari, si non ad
perfectam certitudinem quaestionem
deducat.
Only so much ought one require of me as the
intuition of human reason can approximate about
the sublime truths of the Godhead. Here he
excuses a defect of the work, because, indeed,
one ought not demand from him in this task any
more certitude than that which the human reason,
in mounting up to the divine, is capable of; a
position which he justifies by reference to matters
of less importance in other arts, in which only such
an end is established for each craftsman as he
can accomplish, one such as human reason
allows. A physician does not always, indeed,
effect a cure, but if he omits nothing which he
ought to do, he will be without blame; and the
same is true in regard to other arts. Therefore in
this work, where the matter is difficult, going
beyond the experience of human nature, the
greater leniency ought to be granted if he does
not solve the question with perfect certitude.
Deinde cum dicit: vobis tamen, ostendit,
cuius auctoritatem in scribendo
sequatur, scilicet Augustini. Non ut ea
tantum dicat quae in libro Augustini
inveniuntur, sed quia ea quae
Augustinus de Trinitate dixit, scilicet
quod in absolutis divinae personae
conveniunt et in relativis distinguuntur,
accipit quasi semina et principia, quibus
utitur ad quaestionis difficultatem
enodandam. Et sic ipsa veritatis
explicatio per multas rationes sunt
fructus ex seminibus Augustini in ipso
provenientes. Qui autem sint
convenientes et uberes, ei, ad quem
scribit, inspiciendum committit ad
propositam quaestionem accedens.
Then, when he says: You must also determine
this: whether the seeds of speculation, gathered
from the writings of the blessed Augustine, have
in my work borne fruit, he adduces whose
authority he follows in his work, namely,
Augustine. Not that he says only those things that
are to be found in the books of Augustine, but
because those things which Augustine said
regarding the Trinitynamely, that the divine
Persons are equal in an absolute sense and are
distinguished according to relationshipshe
accepts as seeds and principles, which he uses
in resolving this difficult question; and so this
explanation of truth by means of many
considerations of reason is the fruit springing forth
from those seeds found in the writings of
Augustine himself; but whether they are
acceptable and productive, he leaves to the
judgment of him to whom he writes, thus coming
directly to the proposed question.
QUESTION I
Concerning the Knowledge of Divine Things
Hic duplex quaestio incidit. Prima est Here there occurs a twofold question: concerning
de divinorum cognitione, secunda de
eorum manifestatione.
the knowledge of divine things, and concerning the
manifestation of them.
Circa primum quaeruntur quattuor.
1. Primo. Utrum mens humana in
cognitione veritatis nova
illustratione divinae lucis indigeat.
2. Secundo. Utrum possit ad Dei
notitiam pervenire.
3. Tertio. Utrum Deus sit primum
quod a mente cognoscitur.
4. Quarto. Utrum ad divinae Trinitatis
cognitionem pervenire per se
sufficiat.
In regard to the first, four things are asked:
1. Whether the human mind in order to attain to
a knowledge of truth requires a new
illumination of divine light.
2. Whether it can attain to an idea of God.
3. Whether God is the first object known by the
mind.
4. Whether the human mind is capable of
arriving at a knowledge of the divine Trinity
by natural reason.
Article 1
Whether the Human Mind in Order to Attain to a Knowledge of Truth Requires a New
Illumination of Divine Light
Objections
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod
mens humana in cognitione cuiuslibet
veritatis indigeat nova illustratione divinae
lucis. 2 Cor. 3: non sumus sufficientes
1. It seems that the human mind in attaining to
any knowledge whatever requires a new
illumination of divine light. Not that we are
sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of
cogitare et cetera. Sed perceptio veritatis
non potest esse sine cogitatione. Ergo
humana mens non potest veritatem
aliquam cognoscere, nisi de novo
illustretur a Deo.
ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God (2
Cor 3:5); but there can be no perception of truth
of any kind whatever without thought; therefore
the human mind cannot know any truth unless it
is illuminated by a new light from God,
Praeterea, facilius est ab alio veritatem
addiscere quam per se ipsum eam
inspicere. Unde qui per se ipsos sciunt
praeferuntur illis, qui ab aliis addiscere
possunt, in I Ethicorum. Sed homo non
potest ab aliis addiscere, nisi mens eius
interius doceatur a Deo, ut dicit
Augustinus in libro de magistro et
Gregorius in homilia Pentecostes. Ergo
nec per se ipsum potest aliquis veritatem
inspicere, nisi de novo mens eius
illustretur a Deo.
2. It is easier to learn any truth from another than
to discover it for oneself: wherefore, those who
know things by their own efforts are preferred to
those who are able to learn from other men,
according to I Ethic.; but man is not able to learn
from another unless his mind is interiorly taught
by God, as Augustine says in his book, De
magistro, and Gregory in Hom. Pentec.;
therefore neither can anyone discover truth of
himself unless his mind is illuminated by God
with a new light.
Praeterea, sicut se habet oculus
corporalis ad corpora intuenda, ita se
habet intellectus ad intelligibilem
veritatem conspiciendam, ut patet in III de
anima. Sed oculus corporalis non potest
videre corpora nisi illustratione solis
materialis superveniente. Ergo nec
intellectus humanus potest veritatem
inspicere, nisi lumine solis invisibilis, qui
est Deus, illustretur.
3. As the eyes of the body are related to
corporeal things which they behold, so is the
intellect related to the intelligible truth which it
perceives, as is evident in III De anima; but the
bodily eye cannot see corporeal things unless it
is illuminated by the material sun; therefore
neither can the intellect behold the truth unless it
is illuminated by the light of the invisible sun,
which is God.
Praeterea, illi actus in nobis esse
dicuntur, ad quos exercendos principia
sufficientia in nobis habemus. Sed in
nobis non est cognoscere veritatem, cum
quandoque multi laborent ad veritatem
cognoscendam, qui eam cognoscere
nequeunt. Ergo non habemus sufficientia
principia in nobis ad veritatem
cognoscendam. Ergo oportet ad hoc,
quod eam cognoscamus, ab exteriori nos
iuvari, et sic idem quod prius.
4. Those acts are said to be in us (as our own)
for the exercise of which we possess within
ourselves principles that are sufficient; but in us
there is not the power to know truth altogether [or
absolutely] for there are many who labor to learn
the truth and who, nevertheless, are unable to do
so; therefore we have not in us sufficient
principles for knowing truth and so it must be that
to arrive at knowledge of it we require aid from
outside ourselves, and so the conclusion is like
the foregoing.
Praeterea, magis dependet operatio
mentis humanae a luce divina quam
operatio creaturae sensibilis inferioris a
luce corporis caelestis. Sed corpora
inferiora quamvis habeant formas quae
sunt principia naturalium operationum,
non tamen possunt operationes suas
perficere, nisi lumine solis et stellarum
superveniente iuvarentur. Unde dicit
Dionysius 4 c. de divinis nominibus quod
lumen solis ad generationem visibilium
corporum confert et ad vitam ipsa movet
et nutrit et auget. Ergo nec menti
humanae sufficit ad videndam veritatem
naturale lumen, quod est quasi forma
ipsius, nisi lumen aliud superveniat,
5. The operation of the human mind depends
more upon the divine light than does the
operation of sensible or inferior beings upon the
light of the material heaven; but inferior bodies,
although they have forms which are principles of
their natural operations, are, nevertheless,
incapable of perfecting these operations unless
they are aided by the influence of the light of the
stars; wherefore Dionysius (De div. nom., chap.
4) says that the light of the sun contributes to the
generation of visible bodies and that it moves
them to life and nourishes them and causes
them to grow; therefore its natural light, which is,
as it were, its form, would not, suffice to make
truth visible to the human mind unless another
light, namely, the divine, supervened to assist it.
scilicet divinum.
Praeterea, in omnibus causis ordinatis
per se et non secundum accidens effectus
non procedit a causa secunda nisi per
operationem causae primae, ut patet in
libro de causis. Sed mens humana
ordinatur sub luce increata ordine
essentiali et non accidentali. Ergo
operatio mentis quae est eius effectus
proprius, scilicet cognitio veritatis, non
potest provenire ex ea nisi operante
prima luce increata. Eius autem operatio
non videtur alia esse nisi illustratio. Et sic
idem quod prius.
6. In all causes that are ordered to one another
essentially, and not accidentally, no effect
proceeds from a second cause unless through
the operation of a first cause, as is established.
in the first proposition of De causis; but the
human mind is ordained beneath the uncreated
light according to an order that is essential and
not accidental; therefore the operation of the
human mind which is its proper effect, namely,
the cognition of truth, cannot proceed from it
unless by reason of the operation of the first
uncreated light: its operation, however, seems to
indicate nothing other than illumination;
therefore, etc.
Praeterea, sicut se habet voluntas ad
bene volendum, ita se habet intellectus ad
recte intelligendum. Sed voluntas non
potest bene velle, nisi divina gratia
adiuvetur, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo nec
intellectus potest veritatem intelligere, nisi
divina luce illustretur.
7. As the will is related to willing well, so the
intellect is related to right understanding: but the
will cannot will well unless it is aided by divine
grace, as Augustine says; therefore neither can
the intellect know the truth unless illuminated by
divine light.
Praeterea, illud, ad quod vires nostrae
sufficiunt, irreprehensibiliter nostris viribus
ascribimus, sicut currere vel aedificare.
8. That for which our powers do not suffice is
wrongly ascribed to our strength: but it is
reprehensible that anyone should ascribe
Sed reprehensibile est quod aliquis
scientiam veritatis suo ascribit ingenio,
quin immo iubemur illam Deo ascribere,
secundum illud Eccli. ult.: danti mihi
sapientiam dabo gloriam. Ergo ad
cognoscendam veritatem vires nostrae
non sufficiunt. Et sic idem quod prius.
knowledge of the truth to his own ability, since
indeed we are even commanded to ascribe it to
God, according to this saying of Sirach 51:23:
To Him that gives me wisdom, will I give glory;
therefore our powers do not suffice for
knowledge of truth, and so the conclusion is as
before.
Sed contra, mens humana illustrata est
divinitus lumine naturali, secundum illud
Psalmi: signatum est super nos lumen
vultus tui, domine. Si ergo hoc lumen, quia
creatum est, non sufficit ad veritatem
conspiciendam, sed requirit novam
illustrationem, pari ratione lumen
superadditum non sufficiet, sed indigebit
alio lumine, et sic in infinitum, quod
numquam compleri potest, et sic
impossibile erit cognoscere aliquam
veritatem. Ergo oportet stare in primo
lumine, ut scilicet mens lumine naturali
sine aliquo superaddito possit veritatem
videre.
Sed contra. The human mind is divinely
illuminated by its natural light, according to the
saying of Psalm 4:7: The light of Your
countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us. Thus,
therefore, if this created light is not sufficient for
the knowing of truth, but there is required a new
illumination, according to the same reasoning
this superadded light would not suffice either, but
would require still another light, and so on to
infinity, which cannot be encompassed; and so it
would be impossible to know any truth.
Therefore one must stand firm in reliance upon
the first light, namely, that the mind by its natural
light, without the superaddition of any other, can
see the truth.
Praeterea, sicut visibile in actu sufficiens
est ad hoc quod moveat visum, ita
intelligibile actu sufficit ad movendum
intellectum, si sit proportionatum. Sed
mens nostra habet in se unde possit
Again, as it suffices for what is actually visible
that it should he proportionate to the sight in
order to move it, so it suffices for what is
intelligible that it should be proportionate to the
intellect in order to move it: but our mind
facere intelligibile actu, scilicet intellectum
agentem, et tale intelligibile est ei
proportionatum. Ergo non indiget aliqua
nova illustratione ad hoc quod mens
veritatem cognoscat.
possesses within itself the power of making
things intelligible in act, namely, the active
intellect, and what is intelligible is proportionate
to it; therefore it does not require another new
illumination in order to know truth.
Praeterea, sicut se habet lux corporalis
ad visionem corporalem, ita se habet lux
intellectualis ad visionem intellectus. Sed
quaelibet lux corporalis quantumcumque
sit parva facit aliquid videri corporaliter,
ad minus se ipsam. Ergo et lux
intelligibilis, quae est menti connaturalis,
sufficit ad aliquam veritatem
cognoscendam.
Moreover, as corporeal light is related to bodily
vision, so is the intellect related to intelligible
vision. But any corporeal light at all, even though
it is weak, renders something corporeally visible,
at least itself; therefore, the light of the intellect
also, which is connatural to the mind, suffices for
the understanding of some truth.
Praeterea, omnia opera artificialia ex
cognitione alicuius veritatis dependent,
cum eorum principium sit scientia. Sed
quaedam opera artificialia sunt, in quae
potest liberum arbitrium per se ipsum
secundum Augustinum, ut aedificare
domos et huiusmodi. Ergo et in aliquam
veritatem cognoscendam sufficit mens
sine nova illustratione divina.
Furthermore, all things that are artificially made
depend upon the cognition of some truth since
the principle of them is knowledge; but it is
certain that products of art do exist in which,
according to Augustine, the free will is able [to
act] by itself, as in building houses and the like;
therefore man is sufficiently capable of knowing
some truth without a new divine illumination.
Responsio. Dicendum quod haec est
differentia inter virtutes activas et
Response. It must be said that between
potencies that are active and those that are
passivas quod passivae non possunt
exire in actum propriae operationis, nisi
moveantur a suis activis, sicut sensus non
sentit, nisi moveatur a sensibili, sed
virtutes activae possunt operari sine hoc
quod ab alio moveantur, sicut patet in
viribus animae vegetabilis. Sed in genere
intellectus invenitur duplex potentia:
activa, scilicet intellectus agens, et
passiva, scilicet intellectus possibilis.
passive there is this difference: passive
potencies cannot enter on the act of their proper
operation unless they are moved to do so by
their own active agents, just as the senses
experience no sensation unless moved by some
sensible object; but active potencies are
capable of operation without being moved by
another, as is evident in the case of the
potencies of the vegetative soul: but as regards
the intellect, a twofold potency is found, an active
potency, that is, the active intellect, and a
passive potency, that is, the possible intellect.
Quidam vero posuerunt quod solus
intellectus possibilis erat potentia animae,
intellectus vero agens erat quaedam
substantia separata. Et haec est opinio
Avicennae, secundum quam opinionem
sequitur quod anima humana non possit
in actum propriae operationis, quae est
cognitio veritatis, exire, nisi exteriori
lumine illustretur, illius scilicet substantiae
separatae, quam dicit intellectum
agentem.
Now, there are certain philosophers who
maintained that the possible intellect alone is a
faculty of the soul, while the active intellect is a
separate substance; and this is the opinion of
Avicenna. According to this opinion, it follows
that the human soul would not be capable of
entering upon its proper operation, which is
knowledge, unless illuminated by an exterior
light, namely, by the light of that separate
substance which they call the active intellect.
Sed quia verba philosophi in III de anima
magis videntur sonare quod intellectus
agens sit potentia animae et huic etiam
auctoritas sacrae Scripturae consonat,
But because the words of the Philosopher (III De
anima) seem to proclaim more convincingly that
the active intellect is a potency belonging to the
souland with this the authority of Scripture
quae lumine intelligibili nos insignitos
esse profitetur, cui philosophus comparat
intellectum agentem, ideo in anima
ponitur respectu intelligibilis operationis,
quae est cognitio veritatis, et potentia
passiva et potentia activa. Unde sicut
aliae potentiae activae naturales suis
passivis coniunctae sufficiunt ad naturales
operationes, ita etiam anima habens in se
potentiam activam et passivam sufficit ad
perceptionem veritatis.
agrees, which declares that we are
distinguished by that intellectual light to which the
Philosopher compares the active intellect
therefore it is held that there is in the soul, fitting
it for intelligible operation, that is, for undertaking
the cognition of truth, a potency which is active
and another which is passive. Wherefore, as
some powers which are naturally active, when
conjoined with those which are their passive
complements, suffice for the carrying on of their
natural operations, so also the soul of man,
having in itself an active and a passive potency,
is sufficient for perception of the truth.
Cum autem quaelibet virtus activa creata
finita sit, est eius sufficientia ad
determinatos effectus limitata. Unde in
alios effectus non potest, nisi nova virtus
addatur. Sic ergo sunt quaedam
intelligibiles veritates, ad quas se extendit
efficacia intellectus agentis, sicut principia
quae naturaliter homo cognoscit et ea
quae ab his deducuntur; et ad haec
cognoscenda non requiritur nova lux
intelligibilis, sed sufficit lumen naturaliter
inditum.
Since, however, the power of any created thing
is but finite, its efficacy will be limited to certain
determined effects. Consequently it cannot
attain to certain other effects unless new power
is added to it; but there are some intelligible
truths to which the efficacy of the active intellect
does extend, as, for example, those first
principles which man naturally knows, and those
truths which are deduced from them; and for
such knowledge no new light of intelligence is
required, but the light with which the mind is
naturally endowed suffices.
Quaedam vero sunt ad quae praedicta
principia non se extendunt, sicut sunt ea
But there are other truths to which the aforesaid
first principles do not extend; e.g., the truths of
quae sunt fidei, facultatem rationis
excedentia, et futura contingentia et alia
huiusmodi; et haec cognoscere mens
humana non potest, nisi divinitus novo
lumine illustretur superaddito lumini
naturali.
faith and things that exceed the faculty of reason,
such as knowledge of future contingent events,
and the like; and such things the human mind
cannot know unless it is divinely illuminated by a
new light, superadded to that which it naturally
possesses.
Quamvis autem non requiratur novi
luminis additio ad cognitionem eorum ad
quae ratio naturalis se extendit, requiritur
tamen divina operatio. Praeter
operationem enim qua Deus rerum
instituit naturas, singulis formas et virtutes
proprias tribuens, quibus possent suas
operationes exercere, operatur etiam in
rebus opera providentiae omnium rerum
virtutes ad actus proprios dirigendo et
movendo. Ita enim universa creatura
divinae gubernationi subicitur, sicut
instrumenta subduntur gubernationi
artificis et qualitates naturales virtutibus
animae nutritivae, ut dicitur in II de anima.
Unde sicut ex calore naturali sequitur
opus digestionis secundum regulam,
quam imponit calori vis digestiva, et
omnes virtutes inferiorum corporum
operantur, secundum quod moventur et
diriguntur ex virtutibus corporum
caelestium, ita omnes virtutes activae
For, although it does not require the addition of
new light for knowledge of those things to which
reason naturally extends, it does require divine
operation: for over and above that operation by
which God created the natures of things, giving
to each its proper form and ability, by which they
are able to exercise their proper operation. He
also operates in things the works of Providence,
directing and moving the capabilities of all things
to their proper acts. For in this way the whole
universe of creatures is subject to the divine
governance, as instruments are subject to the
direction of the workman and as natural qualities
are subject to the power of the nutritive soul, as
is said in II De anima. Therefore, as the work of
digestion is accompanied by a natural heat,
according to the measure which the digestive
function imposes upon heat, and as all the
inferior powers of the body operate according
as they are directed and moved by virtue of the
heavenly bodies, so all the active created
powers are governed and moved by the Creator.
creatae operantur, secundum quod
moventur et diriguntur a creatore.
Sic ergo in omni cognitione veritatis
indiget mens humana divina operatione,
sed in naturalibus cognoscendis non
indiget nova luce, sed solo motu et
directione eius, in aliis autem etiam nova
illustratione. Et quia de talibus Boethius
hic loquitur, ideo dicit: quantum divina lux
et cetera.
Thus, therefore, in all cognition of truth, the
human mind requires the divine operation. In the
realm of naturally known truths, however, it
requires no new light, but only the divine motion
and direction; for the knowledge of other
(supernatural) truths it needs also a new
illumination. And because it is of such things that
Boethius speaks, he says: To the extent that the
divine light has deigned to enkindle the feeble
spark of my mind.
Answers to objections.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quamvis
nihil simus sufficientes cogitare ex nobis
sine Dei operatione, non tamen oportet
quod in qualibet nostra cognitione novum
lumen nobis infundatur.
1. Although we are in no way sufficient of
ourselves, as from ourselves, to know anything
without the operation of God, yet it is not
necessary that for every operation of ours a new
light should be given to us.
Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum
hoc Deus nos interius docet in naturalibus
cognitis, quod lumen naturale in nobis
causat et ipsum dirigit in veritatem, in aliis
vero etiam novum lumen infundendo.
2. In matters of natural cognition God teaches us
interiorly in this way: that He is the cause of the
natural light which is in us, and He directs it to
the truth; but in other (supernatural) matters He
further teaches us by the infusion of a new light.
Ad tertium dicendum quod oculus
corporalis ex illustratione solis materialis
non consequitur lumen aliquod sibi
connaturale, per quod possit facere
visibilia in actu, sicut consequitur mens
nostra ex illustratione solis increati. Et
ideo oculus semper indiget exteriori
lumine, non autem mens.
3. The eye of the body, when illuminated by the
light of the material sun, does not respond to a
light which is in any way natural (i.e., intrinsic) to
itself, by means of which it makes things to be
actually visible; even as is the case with the mind
when it is illuminated by the uncreated Light; and
therefore the eye always requires an exterior
light, but not the mind.
Ad quartum dicendum quod lumen
intelligibile, ubi est purum sicut in Angelis,
sine difficultate omnia cognita naturaliter
demonstrat, ita quod in eis est omnia
naturalia cognoscere. In nobis autem
lumen intelligibile est obumbratum per
coniunctionem ad corpus et ad vires
corporeas, et ex hoc impeditur, ut non
libere possit veritatem etiam naturaliter
cognoscibilem inspicere, secundum illud
Sap. 10: corpus quod corrumpitur et
cetera. Et exinde est quod non est omnino
in nobis veritatem cognoscere, scilicet
propter impedimenta. Sed unusquisque
magis vel minus habet hoc in potestate,
secundum quod lumen intelligibile est in
ipso purius.
4. Where there is pure light of intellect, as in the
angels, it makes evident without difficulty all
things known in the natural order, so that in them
there is cognition of all objects naturally
intelligible to them: in us, however, this light is
obscure, being overshadowed as it were by
reason of conjunction with the body and with
corporeal powers, and on this account it ii
hindered so that it cannot freely and naturally
behold that truth which is itself knowable, as is
said in the Book of Wisdom (9:15): For the
corruptible body is a load upon the soul; and the
earthly habitation presses down the mind that
muses upon many things. From this it follows
that on account of the impediment (of the body) it
is not in our power to know truth altogether in its
fullness. But each one possesses more or less
the power to know in proportion to the purity of
the intellectual light which is in him.
Ad quintum dicendum quod corpora
inferiora, quamvis indigeant ad hoc quod
operentur ut moveantur a corporibus
caelestibus, non tamen indigent ad
proprias operationes efficiendas quod
novas formas ab eis recipiant. Et similiter
non oportet quod mens humana, quae
movetur a Deo ad cognoscendum
naturaliter cognita, nova luce perfundatur.
5. Although inferior bodies have need of
superior bodies for their operation, to the extent
that they must be moved by them; nevertheless,
for the perfect accomplishment of their proper
functions, they do not need to receive from these
superior bodies any new forms, And in like
manner it is not necessary that the human mind,
which is moved by God, should be endowed with
any new light in order to understand those things
which are within its natural field of knowledge.
Ad sextum dicendum quod, sicut dicit
Augustinus VIII super Genesim, sicut aer
illuminatur a lumine praesente, quod si
fuerit absens continuo tenebratur, ita et
mens illuminatur a Deo. Et ideo etiam
lumen naturale in anima semper Deus
causat, non aliud et aliud, sed idem; non
enim est causa fieri eius solum, sed etiam
esse illius. In hoc ergo continue Deus
operatur in mente, quod in ipsa lumen
naturale causat et ipsum dirigit, et sic
mens non sine operatione causae primae
in operationem suam procedit.
6. As Augustine says (VIII Super Gen. ad
litteram), as the air is illuminated by the
presence of light, but straightway grows dark if
the light should be removed, so the mind is
illuminated by God, and so also it is God who
continually causes the natural light in the soul, not
one kind now and another kind at another time,
but the same (natural light); for He is the cause
not only of its coming to be, but of its continued
existence in us. In this way, therefore, God
continually operates in the mind since He
causes and governs the natural light in it, and
thus the mind does not carry on its own function
without the operation of the First Cause.
Ad septimum dicendum quod voluntas
numquam potest bene velle sine divino
instinctu, potest autem bene velle sine
7. The will never can will the good without divine
incitement: nevertheless it can will the good
without infusion of grace, though not
gratiae infusione, sed non meritorie. Et
similiter intellectus non potest sine divino
motu veritatem quamcumque cognoscere,
potest autem sine novi luminis infusione,
quamvis non ea quae naturalem
cognitionem excedunt.
meritoriously. And likewise the intellect, without
divine influence, is incapable of knowing any
truth whatever; it can, however, know without
infusion of new light, though not those truths
which exceed natural cognition.
Ad octavum dicendum quod eo ipso quod
Deus in nobis lumen naturale
conservando causat et ipsum dirigit ad
videndum, manifestum est quod perceptio
veritatis praecipue sibi debet ascribi,
sicut operatio artis magis attribuitur artifici
quam serrae.
8. From the very fact that God causes the natural
light in us by conserving it and directing it to
seeing, it is manifest that perception of the truth
must be ascribed principally to Him, just as the
producing of a work of art is ascribed to the
artist rather than to the thing produced.
Article 2
Whether the Human Mind Can Arrive at an Idea of God
Articulus 2 Objections
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur
quod Deus nullo modo possit cognosci a
nobis. Illud enim, quod in summo gradu
nostrae cognitionis nobis ignotum
remanet, nullo modo est a nobis
cognoscibile. Sed in perfectissimo gradu
nostrae cognitionis Deo non coniungimur
1. It seems that in no way can God be known by
us. For that which in the highest degree of our
knowledge remains unknown to us, in no manner
is knowable: but in the most perfect degree of our
cognition we are not united with God, except as
with One who is, as it were, unknown, as
Dionysius says (Theologia mystica, chap. 1);
nisi quasi ignoto, ut dicit Dionysius 1 c.
mysticae theologiae. Ergo Deus nullo
modo est a nobis cognoscibilis.
therefore God is in no way knowable by us.
Praeterea, omne quod cognoscitur per
aliquam formam cognoscitur. Sed, sicut
dicit Augustinus, Deus omnem formam
nostri intellectus subterfugit. Ergo nullo
modo est a nobis cognoscibilis.
2. Anything that is known is known through some
other form; but, as Augustine says, God escapes
(by transcending) every form of our intellect;
therefore in no way is He knowable by us.
Praeterea, cognoscentis et cognoscibilis
oportet esse aliquam proportionem, sicut
et potentiae cuiuslibet ad suum
obiectum. Sed inter intellectum nostrum
et Deum nulla potest esse proportio,
sicut nec inter finitum et infinitum. Ergo
intellectus nullo modo potest Deum
cognoscere.
3. Between the knower and the thing known must
be some kind of proportion, as in the case of any
potency and its object; but between our intellect
and God there can be no proportion, as there can
be none between the infinite and the finite;
therefore our intellect can in no way know God.
Praeterea, cum potentia et actus
reducantur in idem genus, utpote quae
dividunt omnia genera entis, nulla
potentia potest in actum, qui est extra
genus suum, sicut sensus non potest
cognoscere substantiam intelligibilem.
Sed Deus est extra omne genus. Ergo
non potest aliquo intellectu cognosci qui
sit in aliquo genere. Sed noster
4. Since potency and act are reduced to the
same genus, inasmuch as they divide all classes
of being, no potency can be in act which is
outside its own genus: just as the senses are
incapable of knowing intelligible substance; but
God is outside every genus; therefore He cannot
be known by any intellect that is in a genus; but
our intellect is of this kind; therefore, etc.
intellectus est huiusmodi. Ergo et cetera.
Praeterea, remoto primo necesse est
omnia consequentia removeri. Sed
primum intelligibile est quiditas rei; unde
quod quid est dicitur esse obiectum
proprium intellectus in III de anima, et
quid est est medium demonstrandi an est
et omnes alias rei condiciones. Sed de
Deo non possumus scire quid est, ut
Damascenus dicit. Ergo nihil de illo
possumus cognoscere.
5. If that which stands first is done away with,
everything consequent upon it is likewise put
aside: but what is first intelligible about a thing is
its quiddity; hence that which a thing is, is said to
be the proper object of the intellect (III De anima);
and what is serves as a medium of
demonstrating whether it exists, and all the other
conditions of the thing. But concerning God, we
are unable to know what He is, as Damascene
says. Therefore, we can know nothing of God.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. 1:
invisibilia Dei et cetera.
But on the contrary is the saying of Rom. 1:20:
For the invisible things of Him, from the creation
of the world, are clearly seen, being understood
by the things that are made: His eternal power
also and divinity.
Praeterea, Ier. 10: in hoc glorietur qui
gloriatur scire et nosse me. Sed hoc
esset inanis gloria, nisi eum cognoscere
possemus. Ergo Deum cognoscere
possumus.
According to Jer. 9:24: But let him that glories
glory in this, that he understands and knows me;
but this would be empty glory unless we were
able to know Him; therefore we can know God.
Praeterea, nihil diligitur nisi cognitum, ut Nothing is loved unless it is known, as is evident
patet per Augustinum in libro de Trinitate.
Sed Deum diligere iubemur. Ergo eum
cognoscere possumus; non enim nobis
praecipitur impossibile.
from Augustine (II De Trinitate); but we are
commanded to love God; therefore we are
capable of knowing Him, since the impossible is
not enjoined by precept.
Responsio. Dicendum quod dupliciter
aliqua res cognoscitur. Uno modo per
formam propriam, sicut oculus videt
lapidem per speciem lapidis. Alio modo
per formam alterius similem sibi, sicut
cognoscitur causa per similitudinem
effectus et homo per formam suae
imaginis.
Response. I answer: It must be said that there is
a twofold way in which anything is known. One
manner is through its proper form, as the eye
sees a stone through the species of the stone.
Another way is through some other form similar
to it, as a cause is known through the similitude
of its effect, just as man is known through the
form of his image.
Per formam autem suam aliquid
dupliciter videtur. Uno modo per formam
quae est ipsa res, sicut Deus se
cognoscit per essentiam suam et etiam
Angelus se ipsum. Alio modo per
formam quae est ab ipso, sive sit
abstracta ab ipso, quando scilicet forma
immaterialior est quam res, sicut forma
lapidis abstrahitur a lapide; sive sit
impressa intelligenti ab eo, utpote
quando res est simplicior quam
similitudo per quam cognoscitur, sicut
Avicenna dicit quod intelligentias
cognoscimus per impressiones earum in
nobis.
Moreover, through its own form a thing is also
known in two ways. One way is the following:
when knowledge is through the form which is the
thing itself, as with God who eternally knows His
own essence, and as an angel knows itself.
According to another mode, knowledge is
through a form which is other than the thing: either
when the form has been abstracted from a thing
in which case the form is more immaterial than
the thing itself, as is the form of a stone
abstracted from the stone itself or when the
form is impressed on the intellect by a thing, as
occurs when the thing is more immaterial than the
similitude by which it is known; thus, as Avicenna
says, we know intellectual beings through their
impression in us.
Quia igitur intellectus noster secundum
statum viae habet determinatam
habitudinem ad formas, quae a sensu
abstrahuntur, cum comparetur ad
phantasmata sicut visus ad colores, ut
dicitur in III de anima, non potest ipsum
Deum cognoscere in hoc statu per
formam quae est essentia sua, sed sic
cognoscetur in patria a beatis.
Therefore, since our intellect has, in our present
state of wayfaring, a determined relation to forms
abstracted from sensible things (since it is
dependent upon phantasms in the same way as
sight is upon colors, as is said in III De anima), it
cannot know God in this life through that form
which is His essence; though it is in this way that
He is known by the blessed in heaven.
Similitudo etiam quaecumque impressa
ab ipso in intellectum humanum non
sufficeret ad hoc quod faceret eius
essentiam cognosci, cum in infinitum
excedat quamlibet formam creatam,
ratione cuius intellectui per formas
creatas pervius non potest esse Deus, ut
Augustinus dicit. Nec etiam in statu huius
viae cognoscitur Deus a nobis per
formas pure intelligibiles, quae sint aliqua
similitudo ipsius propter connaturalitatem
intellectus nostri ad phantasmata, ut
dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod
solummodo per effectus formam
cognoscatur.
No similitude, however, of whatever kind
impressed by Him upon the human intellect,
would suffice to make His essence known, since
He infinitely transcends every created form;
consequently God cannot be made accessible to
the mind through created forms, as Augustine
says. Nor, in this present state, can God become
known to us even through the species of things
which are purely intelligible, which have in a
certain way a likeness to Him, because our
intellect is connaturally related to phantasms, as
has been said. Therefore it remains certain that it
is only through the forms of His effects that He is
known.
Effectus autem est duplex: quidam, qui
adaequatur virtuti suae causae, et per
talem effectum cognoscitur plenarie virtus
causae, et per consequens quiditas
ipsius; alius effectus est, qui deficit a
praedicta aequalitate, et per talem
effectum non potest comprehendi virtus
agentis et per consequens nec essentia
eius; sed cognoscitur tantum de causa
quod est. Et sic se habet cognitio
effectus ut principium ad cognoscendum
de causa an est, sicut se habet quiditas
ipsius causae, cum per suam formam
cognoscitur. Hoc autem modo se habet
omnis effectus ad Deum. Et ideo non
possumus in statu viae pertingere ad
cognoscendum de ipso nisi quia est.
There are, moreover, two kinds of effects: those
which adequate the power of a cause, and
through such an effect the power of a cause is
fully known, and consequently the essence of the
cause; and another kind of effect which is not
completely equal to its cause. Through this latter
kind of effect it is not possible to comprehend the
power of the agent, and consequently not its
essence either; but regarding the cause it can be
known only that it exists. Thus the knowledge of
an effect stands as a principle whereby the
existence of its cause is known, just as does the
quiddity of the cause when it is known through its
own form. Now, it is according to this second
mode that every effect stands in relation to God;
and hence we are not able in this life to attain to
any knowledge of Him, except that He is.
Et tamen unus cognoscentium quia est
alio perfectius cognoscit, quia causa
tanto ex effectu perfectius cognoscitur,
quanto per effectum magis apprehenditur
habitudo causae ad effectum.
Nevertheless, of those knowing that He is, one
will know Him more perfectly than another,
because a cause is more perfectly understood
from its effect the more perfectly the relation of
the cause to its effect is apprehended.
Quae quidem habitudo in effectu non
pertingente ad aequalitatem suae
causae attenditur secundum tria, scilicet
secundum progressionem effectus a
causa et secundum hoc quod effectus
And in this relation of an effect not reaching in
equality to its cause, three things are noted:
namely, the progression of the effect from its
cause; secondly, the consequent similitude of the
effect to its cause; and thirdly, the failure on the
consequitur de similitudine suae causae
et secundum hoc quod deficit ab eius
perfecta consecutione. Et sic tripliciter
mens humana proficit in cognitione Dei,
quamvis ad cognoscendum quid est non
pertingat, sed an est solum.
part of the effect to attain to a perfect likeness of
its cause. Thus the human mind grows in the
knowledge of God, even though it cannot attain to
a knowledge of what He is, but only to a
knowledge that He is, in three ways.
Primo, secundum quod perfectius
cognoscitur eius efficacia in producendo
res. Secundo, prout nobiliorum effectuum
causa cognoscitur, qui cum eius
similitudinem aliquam gerant, magis
eminentiam eius commendant. Tertio in
hoc quod magis ac magis cognoscitur
elongatus ab omnibus his, quae in
effectibus apparent.
Thus, in the first place, God is known as His
productiveness and efficacy are more perfectly
known. Secondly inasmuch as He is known as
the Cause of the nobler of His effects, since
those creatures which display being of a higher
mode in their resemblance to Him manifest His
eminence more than others. In the third place, He
is better recognized as differentiated from all
those things which appear in His effects.
Unde dicit Dionysius in libro de divinis
nominibus quod cognoscitur ex omnium
causa et excessu et ablatione.
Hence, in De divinis nominibus, Dionysius says
that God is known inasmuch as He is the cause
of all things, by His transcending eminence in
comparison to all things, and by denial (of all
created imperfection).
In hoc autem profectu cognitionis maxime
iuvatur mens humana, cum lumen eius
naturale nova illustratione confortatur;
sicut est lumen fidei et doni sapientiae et
intellectus, per quod mens in
Moreover, in the attempt to arrive at some
knowledge of God, the human mind is greatly
assisted when its natural light is fortified by a new
illumination: namely, the light of faith and that of
the gifts of wisdom and of understanding, by
contemplatione supra se elevari dicitur,
in quantum cognoscit Deum esse supra
omne id, quod naturaliter comprehendit.
Sed quia ad eius essentiam videndam
penetrare non sufficit, dicitur in se ipsam
quodammodo ab excellenti lumine
reflecti, et hoc est quod dicitur Gen. 32
super illud: vidi dominum facie ad faciem,
in Glossa Gregorii: visus animae, cum in
Deum intenditur, immensitatis
coruscatione reverberatur.
which the mind is elevated above itself in
contemplation, inasmuch as it knows God to be
above anything which it naturally apprehends. But
because even this new light does not suffice to
penetrate to a vision of His essence, it is said to
be, in a certain way, turned back upon itself by
His excellent light; and this is what is said in
Gregorys gloss regarding the statement in Gen.
32:30 (I have seen God face to face): When the
vision of the soul is directed to God, it is reflected
back upon itself, overwhelmed by the brilliance of
His immensity.
Answers to objections
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod
secundum hoc dicimur in fine nostrae
cognitionis Deum tamquam ignotum
cognoscere, quia tunc maxime mens in
cognitione profecisse invenitur, quando
cognoscit eius essentiam esse supra
omne quod apprehendere potest in statu
viae, et sic quamvis maneat ignotum quid
est, scitur tamen quia est.
1. It is answered: God as an unknown is said to
be the terminus of our knowledge in the following
respect: that the mind is found to be most
perfectly in possession of knowledge of God
when it is recognized that His essence is above
everything that the mind is capable of
apprehending in this life; and thus, although what
He is remains unknown, yet it is known that He is.
Ad secundum dicendum quod ex hoc
quod Deus omnem formam intellectus
subterfugit, apparet quod non potest
2. It may be said: From the fact that the divine
essence escapes any form of our intellect,
evidently it is not possible to know what He is, but
cognosci quid est, sed solum an est, ut
dictum est.
only that He exists.
Ad tertium dicendum quod proportio nihil
aliud est quam quaedam habitudo
duorum ad invicem convenientium in
aliquo, secundum hoc quod conveniunt
aut differunt. Possunt autem intelligi esse
convenientia dupliciter.
3. It is answered: Proportion is nothing other than
the mutual relation of two things associated by
something in respect to which they either agree
or differ. Now, agreement may be of two kinds.
Uno modo ex hoc quod conveniunt in
eodem genere quantitatis aut qualitatis,
sicut habitudo superficiei ad superficiem
aut numeri ad numerum, in quantum
unum excedit aliud aut aequatur ei, vel
etiam caloris ad calorem, et sic nullo
modo potest esse proportio inter Deum
et creaturam, cum non conveniant in
aliquo genere.
In one way, things may be associated as
belonging to the same genus of quantity or
quality, as is the relation of one surface to
another or of one number to another inasmuch as
one excels the other or is equal to it, or even as
heat is related to heat; and according to this
mode of relation there is no possible proportion
between God and creature, since there is no
agreement in any genus.
Alio modo possunt intelligi convenientia
ita quod conveniant in aliquo ordine, et
sic attenditur proportio inter materiam et
formam, faciens et factum et alia
huiusmodi, et talis proportio requiritur
inter potentiam cognoscentem et
cognoscibile, cum cognoscibile sit quasi
actus potentiae cognoscentis. Et sic
In another way beings are said to be related
when they are associated in a certain order; and
in this way there is proportion between matter
and form, between the maker and the thing
made. This also is the kind of proportion required
between knower and knowable, since what is
knowable is, in a certain way, the act of the
knowing power. Such, too, is the proportion of a
etiam est proportio creaturae ad Deum ut
causati ad causam et cognoscentis ad
cognoscibile, sed propter infinitum
excessum creatoris super creaturam non
est proportio creaturae ad creatorem, ut
recipiat influentiam ipsius secundum
totam virtutem eius, neque ut ipsum
perfecte cognoscat, sicut ipse se ipsum
perfecte cognoscit.
creature to God: that of caused to its cause, and
of knower to the knowable; but according as the
excellence of the Creator transcends the
creature, there is no proportion of the creature to
the Creator which makes it possible to receive
from Him an influx proportionate to His complete
power, or to know Him perfectly, even as He
perfectly knows Himself.
Ad quartum dicendum quod intellectus et
intelligibile sunt unius generis, sicut
potentia et actus. Deus autem, quamvis
non sit in genere intelligibilium, quasi sub
genere comprehensum, utpote generis
naturam participans, pertinet tamen ad
hoc genus ut principium. Eius etiam
effectus non sunt extra genus
intelligibilium, unde et hic per effectus et
in patria per essentiam cognosci potest.
Praeterea, intelligibile videtur magis dici
per remotionem quam per positionem.
Ex hoc enim est unumquodque
intelligibile quod est a materia immune
vel separatum. Negationes autem in
divinis verificantur, quamvis affirmationes
sint incompactae, ut Dionysius dicit 2 c.
caelestis hierarchiae.
4. It may be said: The intellect and the intelligible
object are of one genus, as potency and act.
God, however, although not in the genus of
intelligible things, as if comprehended under a
genus participating in its nature, nevertheless is
related to this genus as its principle. For His
effects are not outside every genus of intelligible
beings; wherefore even here, He can be known
through His effects, and in heaven, through His
essence. Moreover, a thing seems to be called
intelligible more by negation than by,
affirmation; for a thing is said to be intelligible
inasmuch as it is either immune from matter or
separated from it. Hence, negations may be
stated in regard to divine things with truth; though
affirmations are inadequate in expressing
agreement, as Dionysius says (Coel. hier., chap.
2).
Ad quintum dicendum quod quando
aliquid non cognoscitur per formam
suam, sed per effectum suum, forma
effectus supplet locum formae ipsius rei;
nam ex ipso effectu scitur an causa sit.
5. It may be answered: When a thing is known,
not through its own form, but through an effect, the
form of that effect takes the place of the form of
the thing itself, and therefore from the effect it is
possible to know whether the cause exists.
Article 3
Whether God Is the First Object Known by the Mind
Objections
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod
primum, quod a mente cognoscitur, sit
Deus. Illud enim, in quo omnia alia
cognoscuntur et per quod de omnibus
quae cognoscimus iudicamus, est primo
cognitum a nobis, sicut lux est primo
nota oculo quam ea, quae per lucem
videntur, et principia intellectui prius
quam conclusiones. Sed omnia in prima
veritate cognoscuntur et per ipsam de
omnibus iudicamus, ut Augustinus dicit
in libro de Trinitate et de vera religione.
Ergo prima veritas, scilicet Deus, est id
quod primo a nobis cognoscitur.
1. It seems that the first object known or perceived
by the mind must be God Himself. For, that in
which all other things are known and through
which we form judgments of what we know from all
other things, is the first thing known by us, just as
light is known by the eye prior to what is seen by
the light; and as principles are understood before
conclusions: but all things are known in the First
Truth, and through that Truth we judge of all things,
as Augustine says in De Trinitate and in De vera
religione; therefore the First Truth is first known by
us.
Praeterea, quando sunt plures causae
ordinatae, prima causa prius influit in
causatum quam causa secunda et
ultimo dimittit ipsum, ut habetur in libro
de causis. Sed cum scientia humana sit
causata a rebus, scibile vel intelligibile
est menti humanae causa intelligendi.
Ergo primum intelligibilium primo influet
in ipsam. Sed influxus intelligibilis in
intellectum, in quantum huiusmodi, est ut
intelligatur. Ergo Deus, qui est primum
intelligibilium, ab intellectu nostro primo
intelligitur.
2. When there are many ordered causes, the influx
of the first cause into the thing caused is prior to
that of the second cause, and it is the last to leave
the effect, as is said in Liber de causis: but since
human knowledge is caused by things, the
knowable or the intelligible is the cause of the
minds intellection; therefore the first intelligible is
the first to influence it: but the influence of the
intelligible on the mind, as such is that it be
understood; therefore God is the first object
known by our intellect, since He is the first
intelligible.
Praeterea, in omni cognitione, in qua ea
quae sunt priora et simpliciora primo
cognoscuntur, id, quod est primum et
simplicissimum, primo cognoscitur. Sed
in cognitione humana ea, quae prius
occurrunt, sunt priora et simpliciora, ut
videtur, quia ens est illud quod primo
cadit in cognitione humana, ut Avicenna
dicit; esse autem est primum inter
creata. Ergo cognitioni humanae primo
occurrit Deus, qui est simpliciter primum
et simplicissimum.
3. In all cognition, in which those things that are
prior and simpler are first known, what is first and
simplest is known first: but in human cognition.
those things that are first experienced are things
prior to others and simpler, as is evident, since
being is that of which first the human mind forms a
concept, as Avicenna says; being, moreover, is
first among created things; therefore also, God
first comes to the knowledge of the human mind,
since He is absolutely first and most simple being.
Praeterea, finis, qui est ultimus
consecutione, est primus in intentione.
4. That end which is the last in attainment is the
first in intention: but God is the last end of the
Sed Deus est ultimus finis humanae
voluntatis, ad quem omnes alii fines
ordinantur. Ergo est primus in intentione.
Sed hoc non potest esse, nisi sit
cognitus. Ergo illud quod primo occurrit
cognoscendum est Deus.
human will, to whom all other ends are ordained;
and He is, therefore, the first in intention. But this
could not be unless He were known; therefore
God must be the first object of knowledge.
Praeterea, illud, quod non indiget aliqua
praecedenti operatione ad hoc quod
circa ipsum sit operatio alicuius
operantis, prius cadit sub operatione
illius operantis quam hoc quod indiget
aliqua operatione alia, sicut lignum iam
dolatum prius cadit sub operatione
facientis scamnum quam lignum adhuc
dolandum. Sed res sensibiles indigent
quod abstrahantur a materia per
intellectum agentem, antequam
intelligantur ab intellectu possibili. Deus
autem per se ipsum est maxime a
materia separatus. Ergo ipse prius
intelligitur ab intellectu possibili quam
res sensibiles.
5. That which requires no preliminary preparation
in order to be fitted to the need of the workman is
the first chosen for his task, rather than that which
needs some labor in order to be made ready, just
as one making a bench selects wood already cut
rather than uncut wood: but sensible things need
to be abstracted from matter by the active intellect
before they can be understood by the possible
intellect. God, on the other hand, is by His very
nature altogether separate from matter: therefore
He is understood by the possible intellect prior to
sensible things.
Praeterea, naturaliter cognita et quae
non possunt intelligi non esse sunt illa
quae primo nostrae cognitioni occurrunt.
Sed cognitio exsistendi Deum naturaliter
est omnibus inserta, ut dicit
6. Those things that are naturally known, and that
cannot be thought of as non-existing, are what first
occur to our cognition: but an idea of the
existence of God is naturally implanted in all
minds, as Damascene says. Neither is it possible
Damascenus. Nec potest Deus cogitari
non esse, ut dicit Anselmus. Ergo Deus
est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur.
to think of God as non-existent, as Anselm states;
therefore God is the first being known by us.
Sed contra
Sed contra, secundum philosophum
omnis nostra cognitio a sensu ortum
habet. Sed Deus est maxime remotus a
sensu. Ergo ipse non est a nobis primo,
sed ultimo cognitus.
On the contrary, according to the Philosopher,
everything known by us takes its origin from sense
knowledge: but God is absolutely remote from
sense experience; therefore He is not first known
by us, but is known last.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum ea,
quae sunt posteriora secundum
naturam, sunt priora quoad nos, et minus
nota secundum naturam sunt magis nota
quoad nos. Sed creaturae sunt
posteriores et minus notae secundum
naturam quam ipse Deus. Ergo Deus
est posterius notus quoad nos.
Again, according to the Philosopher, those things
that are posterior, according to nature, are first
known as far as we are concerned; and those
things which are less knowable in themselves are
better known as far as we are concerned. But
created things are posterior and less knowable by
nature than is God Himself; therefore, by us, He is
known after creatures.
Praeterea, illud quod promittitur ut
ultimum praemium non est primum quod
praecedit omnia merita. Sed cognitio
Dei promittitur nobis ut ultimum
praemium omnis cognitionis et actionis.
Ergo Deus non est primo a nobis
cognitus.
Again, what is promised as an ultimate reward
does not come first, preceding everything done to
deserve it: but knowledge of God is promised to
us as the ultimate reward of all cognition and
action; therefore God is not the first object known
by us.
Responsio. Dicendum quod quidam
dixerunt quod primum, quod a mente
humana cognoscitur etiam in hac vita,
est ipse Deus qui est veritas prima, et
per hoc omnia alia cognoscuntur. Sed
hoc apparet esse falsum, quia
cognoscere Deum per essentiam est
hominis beatitudo, unde sequeretur
omnem hominem beatum esse.
Response. I answer that it must be said: There
are those who declare that the first object known
by the human mind even in this life is God Himself,
who is first truth and the one through whom all
other things are known. But this is evidently false,
since to know God through His essence
constitutes the beatitude of man; wherefore it
would follow that every man would be blessed.
Et praeterea, cum in divina essentia
omnia quae dicuntur de ipsa sint unum,
nullus erraret circa ea, quae de Deo
dicuntur, quod experimento patet esse
falsum. Et iterum ea, quae sunt primo in
cognitione intellectus, oportet esse
certissima, unde intellectus certus est se
ea intelligere, quod patet in proposito
non esse.
Moreover, since in the divine essence all things
said of it are one, no one would err in regard to
anything he said concerning Goda thing which
from experience is evidently false; furthermore,
since things first in the comprehension of the
intellect ought to be most certainly known, the
intellect would be certain that it knew them; but it
is clear that this is not the case in the proposition
(as to knowing God).
Repugnat etiam haec positio auctoritati
Scripturae quae dicit Exodi 3: non
videbit me homo et vivet.
This position is also repugnant to the authority of
Scripture (Exod. 33:20): Man shall not see Me
and live.
Unde alii dixerunt quod essentia divina
non est primo cognitum a nobis in via,
sed influentia lucis ipsius, et secundum
hoc Deus est primum quod a nobis
Hence there are others who say that the divine
essence is not the first thing known by us in this
life, but the influx of its light is, and in this way God
is the first object known by us.
hoc Deus est primum quod a nobis
cognoscitur.
is the first object known by us.
Sed hoc etiam stare non potest, quia
prima lux divinitus influxa in mente est lux
naturalis per quam constituitur vis
intellectiva. Haec autem lux non est
primo cognita a mente neque cognitione
qua sciatur de ea quid est, cum multa
inquisitione indigeat ad cognoscendum
quid est intellectus; neque cognitione
qua cognoscitur an est, quia intellectum
nos habere non percipimus, nisi in
quantum percipimus nos intelligere, ut
patet per philosophum in IX Ethicorum.
Nullus autem intelligit se intelligere, nisi
in quantum intelligit aliquod intelligibile.
Ex quo patet quod cognitio alicuius
intelligibilis praecedit cognitionem qua
aliquis cognoscit se intelligere et per
consequens cognitionem qua aliquis
cognoscit se habere intellectum, et sic
influentia lucis intelligibilis naturalis non
potest esse primum cognitum a nobis, et
multo minus quaelibet alia influentia
lucis.
But this claim cannot be held; for the first influx of
divine light in the mind is the natural light by which
the power of intellectual life is constituted. This
light, however, is not at first known by the mind;
neither by cognition by which is known what this
light is, since much investigation is required to
know the essence of the intellect; nor by cognition
by which is known whether such a light exists; for
we do not perceive that we possess intellect,
except inasmuch as we perceive that we
understand, as is clear from the Philosophers
words in IX Ethic. For no one knows that he
understands anything, save inasmuch as he
understands something intelligible. From this it is
evident that cognition of an intelligible object-
precedes cognition by which one knows that he
himself understands, and consequently precedes
the cognition by which he knows that he
possesses an intellect; and so the influx of the
natural light of intelligence cannot be the first thing
known by us; and much less can any other kind of
influx of light be the first thing known.
Et ideo dicendum est quod primo
cognitum homini potest accipi dupliciter:
aut secundum ordinem diversarum
Therefore it must be said that the first thing
known to man is a phrase which can be
understood in two ways: either according to the
potentiarum aut secundum ordinem
obiectorum in una potentia.
order of diverse potencies, or according to the
order of objects in some one potency.
Primo quidem modo, cum cognitio
intellectus nostri tota derivetur a sensu,
illud, quod est cognoscibile a sensu, est
prius notum nobis quam illud, quod est
cognoscibile ab intellectu, scilicet
singulare vel sensibile intelligibili.
According to the first way, since all the knowledge
of our intellect is derived from sense experience,
what is made known to us by our senses is known
prior to what is known by the intellect; and this is
the singular, or the sensible-intelligible.
Alio modo, scilicet secundum alium
modum cuilibet potentiae est
cognoscibile primo suum proprium
obiectum. Cum autem in intellectu
humano sit potentia activa et passiva,
obiectum potentiae passivae, scilicet
intellectus possibilis, erit illud, quod est
actum per potentiam activam, scilicet
intellectum agentem, quia potentiae
passivae debet respondere proprium
activum.
According to the other meaning, that is, according
to the order of objects in any one potency, the
proper object of each potency is what is first
knowable by it. Since, however, in the human
intellect there is an active potency and a passive
one, the object of the passive potency, namely,
the possible intellect, will be that which is in act
through the active potency, that is, through the
active intellect, since to the passive potency there
must correspond that which activates it.
Intellectus autem agens non facit
intelligibilia formas separatas quae sunt
ex se ipsis intelligibiles, sed formas
quas abstrahit a phantasmatibus, et
ideo huiusmodi sunt, quae primo
intellectus noster intelligit. Et inter haec
The active intellect, however, does not render
intelligible separate forms, which are of
themselves intelligible, but those forms which it
abstracts from phantasms; and hence forms of
this latter kind are those which our intellect knows.
And among these forms, the ones that first come
illa sunt priora, quae primo intellectui
abstrahenti occurrunt. Haec autem sunt
quae plura comprehendunt vel per
modum totius universalis vel per modum
totius integralis, et ideo magis
universalia sunt primo nota intellectui et
composita componentibus, ut diffinitum
partibus diffinitionis.
to be abstracted by the intellect hold the place of
priority. These, furthermore, are the forms that
comprehend more noteseither after the manner
of a total universal or after the manner of an
integral wholetherefore the more universal
things are first known to the intellect; a composite
is known before its component parts, and a
definition before the parts of the definition.
Et secundum quod quaedam imitatio
intellectus est in sensu, qui etiam
quodammodo abstracta a materia
recipit, etiam apud sensum singularia
magis communia sunt primo nota, ut hoc
corpus quam hoc animal.
In this respect there is a certain imitation of the
intellect found in the sense powers, which also
receive as their objects things which in a certain
way are abstracted from matter. For even in the
case of the senses, singular things of a more
general nature are the first known, as this body
is known sooner than this animal.
Unde patet quod Deus et aliae
substantiae separatae nullo modo
possunt esse prima intellecta, sed
intelliguntur ex aliis, ut dicitur Rom. 1:
invisibilia et cetera.
Thus it is evident that God and other separate
substances cannot in any way be the first objects
of our intellection, but are understood from other
things, as is said in Rom. 1:20: For the invisible
things of Him, from the creation of the world, are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that
are made.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex 1. It may be said: From the words of Augustine
verbis illis Augustini et similibus non est
intelligendum quod ipsa veritas increata
sit proximum principium, quo
cognoscimus et iudicamus, sed quia per
lumen, quod est eius similitudo, nobis
inditum cognoscimus et iudicamus. Nec
hoc lumen habet aliquam efficaciam nisi
ex prima luce; sicut in demonstrationibus
secunda principia non certificant nisi ex
virtute primorum. Nec tamen oportet
quod etiam ipsum lumen inditum sit
primo a nobis cognitum. Non enim eo
alia cognoscimus sicut cognoscibili
quod sit medium cognitionis, sed sicut
eo quod facit alia esse cognoscibilia.
Unde non oportet quod cognoscatur nisi
in ipsis cognoscibilibus, sicut lux non
oportet quod primo videatur ab oculo
nisi in ipso colore illustrato.
and from other similar sayings, it is not to be
understood that the uncreated truth itself is the
proximate principle by which we know and judge
of things, but that through the light conferred upon
us, which is a similitude of that truth, we have
cognition and judgment. Nor would this light have
any efficacy except from the First Light: just as in
methods of demonstration second principles
would have no certitude unless founded upon the
truth of first principles. Nevertheless it should not
be thought that even this (natural) light is the first
thing known by us. For we do not know other
things by means of it, as if it were a medium for
cognition of the knowable, but because (as agent)
it makes other things knowable. Wherefore it
could not itself be known unless it were contained
among knowable things; even as light could not
be seen by the eye unless manifested in color
itself.
Ad secundum dicendum quod non
omnium causarum ordinatarum est
influentia unius rationis in ultimum
effectum. Unde non oportet quod
primum intelligibile hoc modo influat in
intellectum nostrum quod intelligatur, sed
quod praestet intelligendi virtutem. Vel
dicendum quod quamvis Deus sit in
ordine intelligibilium primum simpliciter,
2. It may be answered: In the case of a plurality of
ordered causes, the influx into the ultimate effect
is not always of the same nature. Therefore it
need not be that the first intelligible so influence
our intellect as to be Himself an object of our
knowledge; but it is only necessary that as cause
He bestow the power of intellection. Or it may be
said that although in the order of intelligible things
God is first absolutely, yet He is not first in the
non tamen est primum in ordine
intelligibilium nobis.
order of things that are intelligible to us.
Ad tertium dicendum quod quamvis illa,
quae sunt prima in genere eorum quae
intellectus abstrahit a phantasmatibus,
sint primo cognita a nobis, ut ens et
unum, non tamen oportet quod illa quae
sunt prima simpliciter, quae non
continentur in ratione proprii obiecti,
sicut et ista.
3. It may be said: Although those things which are
first in the genus of things abstracted by the
intellect from phantasms are first known by us, as
ens and unum, nevertheless it does not follow that
those which are first absolutely (simpliciter), which
are not contained in the genus of any proper
object, should be classed with the former [i.e.,
things abstracted from phantasms].
Ad quartum dicendum quod quamvis
Deus sit ultimus finis in consecutione et
primus in intentione appetitus naturalis,
non tamen oportet quod sit primus in
cognitione mentis humanae quae
ordinatur in finem, sed in cognitione
ordinantis, sicut et in aliis quae naturali
appetitu tendunt in finem suum.
Cognoscitur tamen a principio et
intenditur in quadam generalitate, prout
mens appetit se bene esse et bene
vivere, quod tunc solum est ei, cum
Deum habet.
4. Answer is made: Although God is the last end
in attainment and first in the intention of the natural
appetancy, it is not necessary that He be first in
the cognition of the human mind, which is
ordained to its end, but first in the mind of the One
ordaining it, as is the case in other things which by
natural appetancy tend toward their own end.
Nevertheless, the end is known from the
beginning and intended in a certain general way,
inasmuch as the mind desires its own well-being
and welfare, which is possible to it only on
condition that it (ultimately) possess God.
Ad quintum dicendum quod substantiae
separatae quamvis abstractione non
5. It may be answered: Although a process of
abstraction is not required for the understanding
indigeant ad hoc quod intelligantur,
tamen non sunt intelligibiles per lumen
intellectus agentis, unde non primo ab
intellectu nostro cognoscuntur.
Intelligibile enim per huiusmodi lumen
est obiectum intellectus, sicut visibile per
lumen corporale est obiectum visus.
of separate substances, they are not intelligible
through the light of the active intellect; wherefore
they are not the first objects of knowledge as far
as our intellect is concerned.
Ad sextum dicendum quod Deum esse,
quantum est in se, est per se notum,
quia sua essentia est suum esse - et
hoc modo loquitur Anselmus - non autem
nobis qui eius essentiam non videmus.
6. It may be said: The existence of God,
considered in itself, is a thing knowable in itself,
since His essence is His existence; and in this
way Anselm stated the matter.
Sed tamen eius cognitio nobis innata
esse dicitur, in quantum per principia
nobis innata de facili percipere
possumus Deum esse.
Nevertheless, to us, who do not behold His
essence, it is not self-evident that He exists;
though cognition of it may be said to be innate
inasmuch as it is through principles which are
innate in us that we are easily able to perceive
that God exists.
Article 4
Whether the Human Mind Is Capable of Arriving at a Knowledge of the Divine Trinity
Through Natural Reason
Objections
Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur
quod per rationem naturalem mens ad
cognitionem divinae Trinitatis sufficiat.
Quidquid enim convenit enti in quantum
ens, oportet maxime in primo ente
inveniri. Sed Trinitas convenit enti in
quantum ens, cum in omnibus entibus
inveniatur, eo quod omnia habeant
modum, speciem et ordinem, ut
Augustinus dicit. Ergo naturali ratione
sciri potest quod in Deo sit Trinitas.
1. It appears that the human mind is sufficiently
capable of attaining to a knowledge of the divine
Trinity through natural reason. Whatever belongs to
being inasmuch as it is being ought especially to
be found in first being: but a trinity does belong to
being inasmuch as it is being, since such is found
in everything, in this way: that all things have
species, mode, and order, as Augustine says;
therefore it is possible to know by natural reason
that in God there is a Trinity.
Praeterea, nulla perfectio Deo est
subtrahenda. Sed ternarius est
numerus perfectionis omnis rei, ut
dicitur in I caeli et mundi. Ergo Trinitas
Deo est attribuenda, et sic idem quod
prius.
2. No perfection can be wanting in God: but three
is the number of every perfect thing, as is said in I
De coelo et mundo: therefore Trinity must be
attributed to God, and thus the conclusion is like
that of the previous argument.
Praeterea, omnis inaequalitas ad
aequalitatem reducitur priorem sicut
multitudo ad unitatem. Sed inter Deum
et primum ens creatum est
inaequalitas. Ergo oportet praecedere
aliquam aequalitatem, quae cum non sit
nisi plurium, oportet esse aliquam
pluralitatem in divinis.
3. All inequality is reducible to prior equality, as
multitude is reducible to unity: but between God
and first created being there is inequality; there
must, therefore, be some preceding equality, but
this could be no other than that of a plurality;
therefore there must be some plurality in the Divine
Being.
Praeterea, omne aequivocum reducitur
ad univocum. Sed exitus creaturae a
Deo est aequivocus. Ergo oportet ante
hunc ponere processionem univocam,
qua Deus procedit a Deo, ex qua
Trinitas personarum consequitur.
4. Anything that is equivocal is reducible to what is
univocal: but the issuing forth of creatures from
God is equivocal; it is needful, therefore, to
presume as prior to it a univocal procession, by
which God proceeds from God, by reason of which
a Trinity of persons ensues.
Praeterea, nullius boni sine consortio
potest esse iucunda possessio. Sed in
Deo est ab aeterno iucundissima boni
possessio. Ergo habet aeternum
consortium, quod non est nisi divinarum
personarum, quia nulla creatura est
aeterna. Ergo oportet in deitate
personas plures ponere.
5. Without companionship, there can be no joy in
the possession of any good: but in God there is
from all eternity a most joyful possession of good;
therefore, He possesses eternal companionship;
but this could be no other than the companionship
of divine persons, since no creature is eternal.
Therefore, it is necessary to suppose a plurality of
persons in the Deity.
Praeterea, quod Deus sit intelligens,
ratione naturali haberi potest. Sed ex
hoc quod est intelligens sequitur quod
verbum concipiat, quia hoc est omni
intelligenti commune. Ergo naturali
ratione cognosci potest quod sit filii
generatio et eadem ratione amoris
processio.
6. It is possible to know from natural reason that
God is intelligent; but from the fact that He is
intelligent it follows that He conceives the Word,
since this is common to every intelligence;
therefore by natural reason it is possible to know of
the generation of the Son and, in the same way, of
the procession of love (between Father and Son:
the Holy Spirit).
Praeterea, Richardus de sancto Victore
dicit in I de Trinitate: credo sine dubio
quoniam ad quorumlibet
7. Richard of St. Victor in his De Trinitate says: I
believe without any doubt that in the case of
whatever things are necessary there cannot be
explanationem, quae necesse est esse,
non modo probabilia, verum etiam
necessaria argumenta non deerunt.
Sed Deum esse trinum et unum est
necesse, quia est aeternum. Ergo ad
hoc sunt etiam rationes necessariae. Et
sic idem quod prius.
wanting reasons to explain them, not only probable
arguments, but necessary ones; but that God is
three and one is a necessary truth, since He is
eternal; therefore in proof of this there are
necessary arguments of reason, and so the
conclusion is as the previous one.
Praeterea, Platonici non habuerunt
notitiam de Deo nisi per rationem. Sed
ipsi posuerunt ad minus duas
personas, scilicet Deum patrem et
mentem ab ipso genitam, quae omnium
rerum rationes continet, quod nos de
filio dicimus. Ergo ratione naturali
potest pluralitas personarum cognosci.
8. The Platonists had no knowledge of God except
through reason: but they held that there were at
least two persons: namely, the Father and the Mind
generated by the Father, and this Mind contained
the ideas of all thingsa truth which we claim in
regard to the Son; therefore by natural reason a
plurality of persons can be known.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in I caeli et
mundi: per hunc quidem numerum
adhibuimus nos ipsos magnificare
Deum creatorem. Et sic idem quod
prius.
9. The Philosopher at the beginning of De coelo et
mundo says: Through this same number (three)
we ourselves are accustomed to call upon God the
Creator; and so the conclusion is the same.
Praeterea, de Deo nullatenus in statu
viae possumus cognoscere quid est,
sed solum an est. Cognoscimus autem
aliquo modo Deum esse trinum et
unum, quia per fidem. Ergo hoc non
10. In this life we can in no way know what God is
but only that He is: but there is a way in which we
know that God is three and one, since we know it
by faith; therefore this truth does not pertain to a
quidditative knowledge of God, but only to an
pertinet ad quid est Dei, sed ad an est.
Sed an est de Deo possumus ratione
naturali ostendere. Ergo et Deum esse
trinum et unum ratione naturali sciri
potest.
entitative knowledge. But by natural reason we can
know God entitatively; therefore it is possible by
natural reason to know that God is three and one.
Sed contra
Sed contra, fides est de non
apparentibus rationi, ut patet Hebr. 11.
Sed Deum esse trinum et unum est
articulus fidei. Ergo ad hoc videndum
ratio non sufficit.
Faith is of things that are not apparent to reason,
as is clear from Heb. 11:1; but that God is three
and one is an article of faith; therefore reason does
not suffice for knowing this.
Praeterea, omnis ratio naturalis ex
primis principiis naturaliter cognitis
efficaciam habet. Sed Deum esse
trinum et unum non potest deduci ex
principiis naturaliter cognitis, quae a
sensu accipiuntur, cum in sensibilibus
nihil simile inveniatur, ut sint tria
supposita unius essentiae. Ergo Deum
esse trinum et unum non potest sciri per
rationem.
Again, natural reason has its efficacy from first
principles of natural cognition: but that God is three
and one cannot be deduced from principles
naturally known, for these are derived from sense
experience, and in sensible things there is found
nothing like to three supposita of one essence;
therefore God cannot be known as three and one
from reason.
Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit: mihi
impossibile est generationis scire
secretum, mens deficit, vox silet non
Moreover, according to the words of Ambrose: It
is impossible for anyone to know the secret of
generation; the mind fails; the voice is silent; not
solum mea, sed et Angelorum. Ergo
ratio naturalis non sufficit ad
cognoscendam generationem divinam,
et per consequens nec Trinitatem
personarum.
only mine, but even that of the angels; therefore
natural reason does not suffice for knowledge of
divine generation, and consequently for knowledge
of the Trinity of persons.
Responsio. Dicendum quod Deum
esse trinum et unum est solum
creditum, et nullo modo potest
demonstrative probari, quamvis ad hoc
aliquales rationes non necessariae nec
multum probabiles nisi credenti haberi
possint. Quod patet ex hoc quod Deum
non cognoscimus in statu viae nisi ex
effectibus, ut ex praedictis patere
potest. Et ideo naturali ratione de Deo
cognoscere non possumus nisi hoc
quod percipitur de ipso ex habitudine
effectuum ad ipsum, sicut illa quae
designant causalitatem ipsius et
eminentiam super causata et quae
removent ab ipso imperfectas
condiciones effectuum. Trinitas autem
personarum non potest percipi ex ipsa
causalitate divina, cum causalitas sit
communis toti Trinitati. Nec etiam
dicitur secundum remotionem. Unde
nullo modo demonstrative probari
potest Deum esse trinum et unum.
Response. I answer that the truth that God is three
and one is altogether a matter of faith; and in no
way can it be demonstratively proved. For,
although certain reasons can be found (by way of
demonstration ad hoc), they are not necessary, or
even very probable except to one who believes it.
This is evident from the fact that in this life we know
God only from His effects, as previous statements
have proved. Hence, according to natural
cognition, we can know nothing of God except
what we can derive concerning Him from viewing
the relationship of effects to Him. Thus there are
things that designate His causality and His
eminence over creatures and that deny in Him any
of the imperfections found in effects. The existence
of a Trinity of persons, however, cannot be
perceived from a consideration of divine causality,
since causality is common to the whole Trinity. Nor
can it be known from His lacking any imperfection.
Therefore in no way can it be demonstratively
proved that God is three and one.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea,
quae in creaturis sunt plura, in Deo sunt
unum secundum rem. Et ideo quamvis
in quolibet ente creato inveniatur aliqua
Trinitas, ex hoc tamen non potest
necessario concludi quod in Deo sint
aliqua tria nisi secundum rationem, et
haec pluralitas non sufficit ad
personarum distinctionem.
1. It may be said: Those things which are many
among created beings are in fact one in God: and
therefore, although in every creature there is found
a certain kind of trinity, it cannot be necessarily
concluded from this that there is such a trinity in
God, except logically, and this kind of plurality is
not sufficient to prove a distinction of persons.
Ad secundum dicendum quod perfectio
ternarii invenitur in Deo etiam
secundum essentiae unitatem, non
quod ipsa essentia numeretur, sed quia
virtute continet omnis numeri
perfectionem, ut dicitur in arithmetica
Boethii.
2. It may be answered: The perfection of the
number three is found in God according even to
the unity of His essence, not because His essence
is subject to numeration, but because in it there is
contained virtually the perfection of every number,
as is said in the Arithmetica of Boethius.
Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam
remota distinctione personarum est
aequalitas in divinis, secundum quod
eius potentia suae sapientiae
adaequatur. Vel potest dici quod in
aequalitate est duo considerare,
scilicet pluralitatem suppositorum, inter
quae attenditur relatio, et unitatem
3. It may be said: Apart from any distinction of
persons, there is equality in the Divinity, inasmuch
as Its wisdom is equal to Its power. Or it can be
said that in regard to equality there are two points
of consideration, namely, plurality of supposita,
among whom equality exists, and unity of quantity,
which is the cause of equality. The reduction of
inequality to equality, therefore, does not occur by
quantitatis quae est ratio aequalitatis.
Reductio ergo inaequalitatis ad
aequalitatem non fit ratione pluralitatis
suppositorum, sed ratione causae, quia
sicut unitas est causa aequalitatis, ita
inaequalitatis causa est pluralitas. Et
ideo oportet quod causa aequalitatis sit
ante causam inaequalitatis, non quod
ante quaelibet inaequalia sint aliqua
aequalia. Alias oporteret in ordine
numerorum esse aliquid ante unitatem
et dualitatem, quae sunt inaequalia, vel
in ipsa unitate inveniri pluralitatem.
reason of the plurality of supposita, but by reason
of the cause; for just as unity is the cause of
equality, so inequality is the cause of plurality.
Hence it must be that the cause of equality
precedes the cause of inequality, but not that any
kind of inequality is preceded by some kind of
equality: otherwise it would be necessary in an
order of numbers that there should be something
before unity and duality, which are unequals; or that
in unity itself there should be found plurality.
Ad quartum dicendum quod quamvis
omne aequivocum reducatur ad
univocum, non tamen oportet quod
generatio aequivoca reducatur ad
generationem univocam, sed ad
generans quod est in se univocum. In
rebus enim naturalibus videmus quod
generationes aequivocae sunt priores
generationibus univocis, eo quod
causae aequivocae habent influentiam
supra totam speciem, non autem
causae univocae, sed solum supra
unum individuum, unde sunt quasi
instrumenta causarum aequivocarum,
sicut corpora inferiora corporum
4. It must be said: Although anything equivocal is
reducible to what is univocal, it is not necessary
that equivocal generation should be reduced to
univocal generation, but that it should be reduced
to a generator which is univocal in itself. Now, in
natural things we see that equivocal generations
are prior to univocal because equivocal causes
have an influx extending to the total species,
whereas univocal causes have not, their influence
extending only to one individual; and thus they are
quasi-instruments of equivocal causes, just as
inferior bodies are of superior.
caelestium.
Ad quintum dicendum quod ex hoc
homo non potest habere vitam
iucundam sine consortio, quia non
habet in se unde sibi quantum ad
omnia sufficiat. Et propter hoc animalia,
quae habent in se singula, unde sibi
sufficiant, consortium vitae non
requirunt, sed sunt solitaria. Deus
autem maxime est sibi sufficiens, unde
remota distinctione personarum adhuc
manet in eo summa iucunditas.
5. It is answered: It is not possible for man to have
a joyous life without companionship because he
has not within himself that which makes him all-
sufficient; whereas, for the same reason, animals
that are self-sufficient require no association with
others for preservation of life, but are solitaries.
God, however, is supremely self-sufficient;
wherefore, even though there were no distinction of
persons, infinite joy would still be His.
Ad sextum dicendum quod in Deo idem
est intelligens et intellectum, et ideo non
oportet quod ex hoc quod intelligit
ponatur in ipso aliquid conceptum
realiter distinctum ab ipso, sicut est in
nobis. Trinitas autem personarum
requirit realem distinctionem.
6. It may be said: In God, intellect and object of
intellect are the same; and therefore, from the fact
that He is intelligent, it need not be supposed that
in Him there is any concept really distinct from
Himself, as is the case with us: Trinity of persons,
however, requires real distinction.
Ad septimum dicendum quod
intellectus illius verbi apparet ex hoc
quod sequitur: quamvis contingat
nostram industriam latere. Omnia ergo
necessaria in se ipsis sunt vel per se
ipsa nota vel per alia cognoscibilia, non
7. It may be answered: Understanding of this
passage is clarified by that which follows:
Although they (these truths) are of such kind as to
escape all our endeavors. All things that are
necessary in themselves, therefore, are either
known in themselves or are knowable through
tamen oportet quod ita sit quoad nos.
Unde non possumus ad omnia
necessaria probanda secundum
nostram industriam rationem
necessariam invenire.
other things: yet not in such a way that they are
necessarily apparent to us. Therefore we cannot,
even as a result of all our industry, discover
necessary arguments of reason sufficient to prove
all necessary truths.
Ad octavum dicendum quod
Platonicorum positio nihil facit ad
propositum secundum rei veritatem,
quamvis videatur facere secundum
verba. Non enim posuerunt Platonici
quod illa mens esset eiusdem
essentiae cum Deo patre, sed quod
esset quaedam alia substantia
separata ab ipso procedens, et tertiam
ponebant animam mundi, ut patet per
Macrobium. Et quia omnes substantias
separatas deos nominabant, inde est
quod has dicebant tres deos, ut dicit
Augustinus X de civitate Dei. Quia
tamen non ponebant aliquid spiritui
sancto simile, sicut patri et filio - anima
enim mundi non est nexus aliorum
duorum secundum eos, sicut spiritus
sanctus patris et filii - ideo dicuntur in
tertio signo defecisse, id est in
cognitione tertiae personae. Vel
dicendum, sicut communiter dicitur,
quod cognoverunt duas personas
8. It may be said: The position of the Platonists
affords no argument as regards the truth of this
matter, even though it appears to do so according
to words. For they did not hold that this Mind was
of the same essence with God the Father, but that
it was another substance proceeding from the first,
and separate; and they also supposed that there
was a third substance, the Soul-of-the-World, as is
evidenced by Macrobius. And because all these
separate substances they called gods, it came
about that they called upon or spoke of three gods,
as Augustine says in De civitate Dei (chap. 10);
because they did not hold that there was anything
like to the Holy Ghost, as there was to the Father
and the Son. For the Soul-of-the-World is not the
nexus of the other two, according to their doctrine,
as is the Holy Spirit between the Father and the
Son; therefore they are said to have lacked the
third sign, that is, knowledge of the Third Person.
Or it may be said, as the more common
explanation has it, that they knew two persons
according to the things appropriated to power and
wisdom, but not according to the things proper to
quantum ad appropriata potentiae et
sapientiae, non quantum ad propria.
Bonitas autem, quae spiritui sancto
appropriatur, maxime respicit effectus
quos illi non cognoverunt.
them. But goodness, which is appropriated to the
Holy Spirit especially, has as its effects things
which they did not know.
Ad nonum dicendum quod Aristoteles
non intendit dicere quod Deus esset
magnificandus ut trinus et unus, sed
quia ternario sacrificiorum et orationum
ab antiquis honorabatur propter ternarii
numeri perfectionem.
9. It may be said: Aristotle did not have any
intention of saying that God should be worshiped
as three in one, but that He was honored by the
ancients by the number three in their sacrifices and
prayers because of the perfection of three as a
number.
Ad decimum dicendum quod omnia,
quae in Deo sunt, sunt una eius simplex
essentia, sed ea, quae in ipso sunt
unum, in intellectu nostro sunt multa, et
propter hoc intellectus noster potest
apprehendere unum istorum sine altero.
Inde est quod in statu viae de nullo
eorum possumus cognoscere quid est,
sed solum an est, et contingit quod
cognoscatur, an est unum eorum et non
alterum; sicut si aliquis cognosceret, an
sit sapientia in Deo, non autem an in
ipso sit omnipotentia. Et similiter potest
ratione naturali sciri an Deus sit, non
tamen an sit trinus et unus.
10. It may be answered: All things in God are of
one, simple essence; but those things that in Him
are one, are many in our intellect, and on this
account our intellect can apprehend one of these
things without the other. Therefore in this life we
are able to understand the quiddity of none of
these things, but only their existence; and thus it
happens that one of them may be known to exist
and not another: just as one might know that there
is wisdom in God, but not know that there is also
omnipotence; and likewise it is possible, by natural
reason to know that God exists, but not that He is a
Trinity, and one God.
Quaestio 2, Prooemium
Deinde quaeritur de manifestatione
divinae cognitionis.
QUESTION II
Concerning the Manifestation of Knowledge of
Divine Truth
Et circa hoc quaeruntur quattuor.
1. Primo. Utrum divina liceat
investigando tractare.
2. Secundo. Utrum de divinis possit
esse aliqua scientia.
3. Tertio. Utrum in scientia fidei
quae est de Deo liceat rationibus
philosophicis et auctoritatibus uti.
4. Quarto. Utrum sint obscuris et
novis verbis divina velanda.
Here four questions are proposed:
1. Whether divine truths ought to be treated of by
the method of inquiry.
2. Whether there can be any science of divine
truths which are founded upon faith.
3. Whether in the science of faith, which is
concerning God, it is permissible to employ
arguments of the natural philosophers.
4. Whether divine truths ought to be veiled by
new and obscure words.
Article 1
Whether Divine Truths Ought to Be Treated of
by the Method of Inquiry
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur
quod divina investigare non liceat
argumentando. Eccli. 3: altiora te ne
quaesieris, et fortiora te ne scrutatus
fueris. Sed divina maxime sunt homine
altiora, et praecipue ea quae fidei sunt.
1. It seems that it is not permissible to investigate
divine things by the arguments of reason. In Sirach
3:22, it is said: Seek not the things that are too
high for thee; but divine truths are, in a special way,
too high for man, and particularly those truths which
are of faith; therefore it is not permissible to inquire
altiora, et praecipue ea quae fidei sunt.
Ergo huiusmodi scrutari non licet.
are of faith; therefore it is not permissible to inquire
into them.
Praeterea, poena non infertur nisi pro
culpa. Sed, sicut dicitur Prov. 25,
perscrutator maiestatis opprimetur a
gloria. Ergo perscrutari ea quae ad
divinam maiestatem pertinent est
illicitum.
2. Punishment is not inflicted except for some fault;
but, as it is said in Prov. 25:27, He that is a
searcher of majesty shall be overwhelmed by glory;
therefore, it is not right to search out those things
which pertain to divine majesty.
Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit: tolle
argumenta, ubi fides quaeritur. Sed in
divinis, et maxime circa Trinitatem,
praecipue requiritur fides. Ergo in hac
materia non licet per argumenta
veritatem investigare.
3. Ambrose says: Abandon arguments where faith
is sought. But in regard to divine truths, especially
those concerned with the Trinity, faith is required;
therefore in this matter it is not permissible to
inquire into truth by arguments of reason.
Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit de
generatione divina loquens: scrutari
non licet mysteria superna; licet scire
quod natus sit, non licet discutere
quomodo natus sit. Ergo eadem
ratione nihil eorum quae ad Trinitatem
pertinent licet argumentis investigare.
4. Ambrose, in speaking of divine generation, says:
Supernal mysteries are not to be scrutinized: one
may know that the Son was begotten; but how He
was begotten should not be analyzed. Accordingly,
for the same reason it is not permissible to make
rational investigation of those truths which pertain to
the Trinity.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Gregorius in
homilia octavae Paschae, fides non
habet meritum, cui humana ratio
praebet experimentum. Sed malum est
5. Gregory in his Homily for Easter (chap. 8) says:
Faith has no merit where human reason affords
proof ; but it is wrong to lose the merit of faith;
therefore it is not right to investigate matters of faith
meritum fidei evacuare. Ergo non licet
rationibus de his quae sunt fidei
perscrutari.
according to methods of reason.
Praeterea, omnis honorificentia Deo
debetur. Sed secreta per silentium
honorificantur; unde dicit Dionysius in
fine caelestis hierarchiae: super nos
secretum silentio honorificantes. Et
huic consonat quod dicitur in Psalmo
secundum litteram Hieronymi: tibi silet
laus, Deus, id est ipsum silentium est
laus tua. Ergo debemus a
perscrutatione divinorum silere.
6. All honor ought to be given to God: but divine
mysteries are honored by silence; wherefore
Dionysius says at the close of Coel. hier.: Honoring
by silence the hidden truth which is above us; and
with this there agrees what is said in Psalm 64,
according to the text of Jerome: Praise grows
silent before You, O God, that is, silence itself is
Your praise, O God; therefore we ought to refrain
ourselves in silence from searching into divine
truths.
Praeterea, nullus movetur ad infinitum,
ut philosophus dicit in I caeli et mundi,
quia omnis motus est propter
consecutionem finis, qui non invenitur
in infinito. Sed Deus in infinitum distat
a nobis. Cum ergo perscrutatio sit
quidam rationis motus in id quod
perscrutatur, videtur quod divina
perscrutari non debeamus.
7. No one is moved to infinity, as the Philosopher
says in I De Coelo et mundo, because all motion is
on account of the attaining of an end [terminus],
which is not to be found in infinity; but God is
infinitely distant from us. Since, therefore,
investigation is a kind of motion of reason toward
that which is being searched out, it appears that
divine truths ought not to be investigated.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod dicitur 1 Petr. 3: On the other hand, it is said (1 Pet. 3:15): Being
parati semper ad satisfactionem omni
poscenti vos rationem de ea quae in
vobis est fide. Sed hoc non potest
esse, nisi ea quae sunt fidei
argumentis perscrutentur. Ergo
perscrutatio per argumenta de his
quae sunt fidei est necessaria.
ready always to satisfy everyone that asks you a
reason of that (faith and) hope which is in you; but
this could not be done unless we inquired
reasonably into those things which are matters of
faith; therefore investigation according to methods
of reason into the truths of faith is necessary.
Praeterea, ut dicitur Tit. 1, ad
episcopum requiritur, ut sit potens
exhortari in doctrina sana et
contradicentes revincere. Sed
contradicentes fidei non possunt repelli
nisi argumentis. Ergo in his quae sunt
fidei argumentis oportet uti.
Again as is said in Titus 1:9, it pertains to a bishop
that he be capable of exhorting in sound doctrine
and of overcoming those contradicting it: but he
cannot do this without use of argumentation;
therefore one ought to employ the arguments of
reason in matters of faith.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in I de
Trinitate: adiuvante domino Deo nostro
suscipiamus et eam quam flagitant
rationem quod Trinitas sit unus Deus.
Ergo rationibus de Trinitate potest
homo perscrutari.
Again Augustine says in I De Trinitate: With the
help of God our Lord, we shall begin to discuss
according to reason that for which they [our
adversaries] seek explanation: that the Trinity is
one God. Therefore man can inquire about the
Trinity according to methods of reason.
Praeterea, Augustinus contra
Felicianum: quia non nimis
inconvenienter duo ista discernis, cum
ratione praemissa etiam testimonia
non omittis, fateor secuturum quod
Also Augustine says in his argument against
Felician: Since without too much disagreement you
recognize these two thingssince you do not
disregard the foregoing argument and the word of
authorityI present the matter to follow in such a
ipse probaveris, scilicet quod
rationibus et auctoritatibus utar. Et sic
idem quod prius.
way that you yourself may accept it as proof; that
is, I shall make use of arguments from reason and
authority; and thus the conclusion is like the
previous one.
Responsio. Dicendum quod cum
perfectio hominis consistat in
coniunctione ad Deum, oportet quod
homo ex omnibus quae in ipso sunt,
quantum possibile est, ad divina
annitatur, ut intellectus contemplationi
et ratio inquisitioni divinorum vacet,
secundum illud Psalmi: mihi adhaerere
Deo bonum est. Et ideo philosophus in
X Ethicorum excludit dictum
quorundam qui dicebant quod homo
non debeat se intromittere de rebus
divinis, sed solum de humanis, sic
dicens: oportet autem non secundum
suadentes humana sapere hominem
entem neque mortalia mortalem, sed in
quantum contingit immortale facere et
omnia facere ad vivere secundum
optimum eorum quae in ipso.
Response. I answer that it must be said that, since
the perfection of man consists in his union with
God, it is right that man, by all the means which are
in his power and in so far as he is able, mount up to
and strive to attain to divine truths, so that his
intellect may take delight in contemplation and his
reason in the investigation of things of God,
according to the saying of Ps. 72:28, It is good for
me to adhere to my God. Hence also the
Philosopher in X Ethic. opposes the saying of
those who maintained that man ought not concern
himself about divine things, but only about such as
are human, saying: One ought to be wise in regard
to man, however, not according to those treating of
human affairs alone, as a mortal knowing only
mortal things; but, inasmuch as it is fitting for a
mortal man to do so, he ought to do all things
according to the best of those powers that are in
him.
Tripliciter tamen contingit in hoc
peccare.
In a threefold manner, however, it is possible for
man to err on this point:
Primo ex praesumptione qua scilicet
aliquis sic ea scrutatur quasi ea
perfecte comprehensurus, et horum
praesumptio arguitur Iob 12: forsitan
vestigia Dei comprehendes et
omnipotentem usque ad perfectum
reperies? Et Hilarius dicit: ne te
inseras in illud secretum et arcanum
inopinabilis nativitatis; ne te immergas,
summam intelligentiae comprehendere
praesumens, sed intellige
incomprehensibilia esse.
First, by presumption, since one might enter upon
such investigation as if he could attain a perfect
comprehension, and it is this kind of presumption
that is denounced in Job 11:7: Do you think you
can comprehend the steps of God, and find out the
Almighty perfectly? And Hilary says: Do not
involve yourself in the hiddenness and mystery of
this inconceivable nativity; do not overwhelm
yourself, presuming to comprehend the loftiest of
intelligible things, but understand that it is
incomprehensible.
Secundo ex hoc quod in his quae sunt
fidei ratio praecedit fidem, non fides
rationem, dum scilicet aliquis hoc
solum vult credere quod ratione potest
invenire, cum debeat esse e converso;
unde Hilarius: credendo incipe, scilicet
inquire, percurre, persiste.
In the second place, error arises if, in matters of
faith, reason has precedence of faith and not faith
of reason, to the point that one would be willing to
believe only what he could know by reason, when
the converse ought to be the case: wherefore Hilary
says: While believing [in a spirit of faith], inquire,
discuss, carry through your speculation.
Tertio ultra modum suae capacitatis ad
divinorum perscrutationem se
ingerendo, unde dicitur Rom. 12: non
plus sapere, quam oportet sapere, sed
sapere ad sobrietatem, unicuique sicut
Deus divisit mensuram fidei. Non enim
omnes eandem mensuram sunt
consecuti, unde aliquid est ultra
In a third way error results from undertaking an
inquiry into divine things which are beyond ones
capacity. Wherefore it is said in Rom. 12:3, Not to
be more wise than it behooves to be wise, but to be
wise unto sobriety and according as God hath
divided to every one the measure of faith. All men,
indeed, have not been accorded the same
measure; wherefore a thing is beyond the capacity
modum unius quod non est ultra
modum alterius.
of one which is not beyond that of another.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa
dicuntur homine altiora quae
capacitatem eius excedunt, non quae
sunt digniora secundum naturam; quia
his quae sunt digniora, quanto homo
magis servato suo modo intendit, tanto
magis perficitur. Sed si etiam in
minimis considerandis aliquis modum
suae capacitatis excedat, de facili
incidit in errorem; unde Glossa ibidem
dicit: haeretici duobus modis fiunt,
scilicet cum de creatore vel de
creaturis ultra modum intendentes in
errores incidunt et a veritate recedunt.
1. It may be said: Those things are said to be too
high for man which exceed his capacity, no those
things which are of greater dignity according to
nature: for the more man fixes his gaze upon things
loftier by nature, in accordance with his capacity,
the more it is to his advantage; but in the
consideration of things which in the least exceed
his capacity, he easily falls into error. Therefore the
gloss on this same passage says: Heretics are
produced in two ways: namely, when men, beyond
their proper capacity entering upon inquiry
concerning the Creator or creatures fall into errors
and depart from the truth.
Ad secundum dicendum quod
perscrutari est quasi ad finem scrutari.
Hoc autem illicitum et
praesumptuosum est, ut aliquis sic
scrutetur divina quasi ad finem
comprehensionis perventurus.
2. Answer may be made: To search out is, as it
were, to press ones investigation to the very end;
but this would be unlawful and presumptuous if one
should so investigate divine truths as though he
could attain to complete comprehension as his
goal.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ubi 3. It is answered: Where faith is sought for, those
quaeritur fides, argumenta tolluntur
quae fidei adversantur et eam
praecedere conantur, non illa quae
ipsam modo debito sequuntur.
arguments which are in opposition to faith and
those which seek to have precedence over it are
cast aside, but not those which in due manner
follow it.
Ad quartum dicendum quod non licet
hoc modo scrutari superna mysteria, ut
ad eorum comprehensionem intentio
habeatur, quod patet ex hoc quod
sequitur: licet scire quod natus sit, non
licet discutere quomodo natus sit. Ille
enim modum nativitatis discutit, qui
quaerit scire quid sit illa nativitas, cum
de divinis possimus scire quia sunt,
non quid sunt.
4. It may be said: It is not lawful in this world to
inquire into divine mysteries in such a way that one
would have the intention of comprehending them,
as is evident from the words that follow: It is lawful
to know that He was begotten, etc. For he
undertakes an unlawful mode of inquiry who seeks
to know what the nature of this nativity is, since in
regard to divine things we are able to know what
they are not, but not what they are.
Ad quintum dicendum quod duplex est
humana ratio. Una demonstrativa
cogens intellectum ad consensum, et
talis ratio non potest haberi de his
quae fidei sunt, sed potest haberi ad
evacuandum ea quae fidem esse
impossibilem asserunt. Quamvis enim
ea quae sunt fidei demonstrari non
possint, non tamen possunt
demonstrative improbari. Si autem
talis ratio ad probanda ea quae sunt
fidei induceretur, evacuaretur meritum
fidei, quia iam assentire his non esset
5. It may be answered: Human reasoning may be
spoken of in two ways: in one way, it may be
regarded as demonstrative, forcing the intellect to
believe; and this kind of reasoning cannot be
possessed in regard to those truths which are of
faith; but it is possible to possess this kind of
reasoning in refuting those arguments which would
destroy faith or assert the impossible. For, although
reason cannot demonstrate those things which are
of faith, neither can these same truths be
demonstratively disproved. Moreover, if this kind of
reason could lead to a proving of those things which
are of faith, it would deprive man of the merit of
voluntarium, sed necessarium. faith, because then assent would not be voluntary,
but necessary.
Ratio autem persuasoria sumpta ex
aliquibus similitudinibus ad ea quae
sunt fidei inducta non evacuat fidei
rationem; quia non facit ea esse
apparentia, cum non fiat resolutio in
prima principia quae intellectu videntur.
Nec iterum meritum fidei evacuat, quia
non cogit intellectum ad consensum,
unde assensus remanet voluntarius.
Persuasive reasoning, however, derived from
certain likenesses to those things which are set
forth by faith does not void the meaning of faith,
since it does not make these truths to be apparent,
for there can be no resolution of them to those first
principles discernable by the intellect. Nor does it
take away the merit of faith, because it does not
force the intellect to comprehend truth, but assent
remains voluntary.
Ad sextum dicendum quod Deus
honoratur silentio, non quod nihil de
ipso dicatur vel inquiratur, sed quia
quidquid de ipso dicamus vel
inquiramus, intelligimus nos ab eius
comprehensione defecisse, unde
dicitur Eccli. 43: glorificantes dominum
quantumcumque potueritis,
supervalebit adhuc.
6. It may be said: God is honored by silence, but not
in such a way that we may say nothing of Him or
make no inquiries about Him, but, inasmuch as we
understand that we lack ability to comprehend Him.
Wherefore in Sirach 43: 32-34, Glorify the Lord as
much as ever you can, for He will yet far exceed,
and His magnificence is wonderful. Blessing the
Lord, exit Him as much as you can: for He is above
all praise. When you exalt Him put forth all your
strength, and be not weary: for you can never go far
enough.
Ad septimum dicendum quod cum
Deus in infinitum a creatura distet, nulla
creatura movetur in Deum, ut ipsi
7. Answer may be made: Since God is infinitely
distant from creatures, no creature is so moved
unto God as to be made His equal, either in
adaequetur vel recipiendo ab ipso vel
cognoscendo ipsum. Hoc ergo, quod
in infinitum a creatura distat, non est
terminus motus creaturae. Sed
quaelibet creatura movetur ad hoc
quod Deo assimiletur plus et plus
quantum potest. Et sic etiam humana
mens semper debet moveri ad
cognoscendum de Deo plus et plus
secundum modum suum. Unde dicit
Hilarius: qui pie infinita persequitur,
etsi non contingat aliquando, tamen
semper proficiet prodeundo.
receiving from Him or in knowing Him. Therefore,
by reason of the fact that God is infinitely distant
from creatures, there is no terminus to the motion of
creatures; but every creature is moved to this: that
he may be more and more like to God, so far as
this is possible, and so also the human mind ought
always be moved more and more to a knowledge
of God, according to the measure that is proper to
it. Therefore Hilary says: He who in pious spirit
undertakes the infinite, even though he can in no
wise attain it, nevertheless profits by advancing.
Article 2
Whether There Can Be Any Science of Divine Truths Which Are Matters of Faith
quod de divinis quae fidei subsunt
scientia esse non possit. Sapientia enim
contra scientiam dividitur. Sed sapientia
est divinorum. Non ergo scientia.
1. it appears that there can be no science of
those divine truths which are matters of faith. For
wisdom is distinguished from science; but
wisdom treats of divine truths; therefore science
cannot do so.
Praeterea, ut dicitur in I posteriorum, in
qualibet scientia oportet de subiecto
2. As is said in I Poster., in every science one
must suppose a quidditative knowledge of the
praesupponere quid est. Sed de Deo
nullo modo possumus scire quid est, ut
dicit Damascenus. Ergo de Deo non
potest esse scientia.
subject; but in regard to God, it is impossible for
us to know in any way what He is, as Damascene
says; therefore it is not possible to possess any
science of God.
Praeterea, cuiuslibet scientiae est
partes et passiones sui subiecti
considerare. Sed Deus, cum sit forma
simplex, nec partes habet in quas
dividatur nec passionibus aliquibus
subici potest. Ergo de Deo non potest
esse scientia.
3. It pertains to every science to consider the
parts and passive potencies of its subject; but,
since God is simple form [absolute act], He has
not any parts that can be distinguished, nor in Him
can there be any passive potencies; therefore
there can be no science about God.
Praeterea, in qualibet scientia ratio
praecedit assensum. Demonstratio enim
facit in scientiis scibilibus assentire. Sed
in his quae fidei sunt oportet esse e
converso, scilicet quod assensus fidei
praecedat rationem, ut dictum est. Ergo
de divinis praecipue quae fide capiuntur
non potest esse scientia.
4. In any science, reason precedes assent, for it
is demonstration which in the sciences makes
one assent to what is knowable; but in regard to
those truths which are of faith, the converse ought
to prevail, namely, assent on account of faith
ought to precede reason, as has been said;
therefore, of divine truths, especially of those
which are known by faith, there can be no
science.
Praeterea, omnis scientia procedit ex
principiis per se notis, quae quisque
probat audita, aut ex principiis quae ab
his fidem habent. Sed articuli fidei, qui
sunt prima principia in fide, non sunt
5. Every science proceeds from self-evident
principles which every man accepts upon first
hearing, or from principles in which he has faith
because of those first principles; but the articles
of faith which are first principles in matters of faith,
huiusmodi, quia neque sunt per se nota
neque ad principia per se nota resolvi
possunt demonstrative, ut dictum est.
Ergo de divinis quae fide tenentur non
are not principles of this same kind, since they
are not per se nota nor can they be resolved by
demonstration to those that are, as has been
said; therefore, there can be no science of divine
truths held by faith.
Praeterea, fides est de non
apparentibus. Sed scientia est de
apparentibus, quia per scientiam
apparent ea quae in scientia traduntur.
Ergo de divinis quae fide tenentur non
6. Faith is not of those things that are apparent:
but science is of things that are apparent,
because through science those things that are
treated of come to be clearly seen; therefore,
concerning divine truths that are held by faith there
can be no science.
Praeterea, cuiuslibet scientiae
principium est intellectus, quia ex
intellectu principiorum venitur in
scientiam conclusionum. Sed in his,
quae sunt fidei, intellectus non est
principium, sed finis, quia, ut dicitur Is. 7,
nisi credideritis, non intelligetis. Ergo de
divinis quae fidei sunt non potest esse
scientia.
7. Understanding is the principle of every science,
because from the intellection of principles one
comes to scientific knowledge of conclusions: but
in those things that are of faith, intellection is not
the beginning, but the end, for, as is said in Is. 7:9,
If you will not believe, you shall not understand;
therefore there can be no science of divine truths
held by faith.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit XII
de Trinitate: huic scientiae tribuo illud
tantum quo fides saluberrima, quae ad
But on the contrary is what Augustine says in XII
De Trinitate: To that science only do I attribute
any value by which faith is well served, which
veram beatitudinem ducit, gignitur,
defenditur, roboratur. Ergo de his quae
sunt fidei est scientia.
leads to, produces, defends, and strengthens
happiness; therefore there is a science of the
truths of faith.
Praeterea, hoc idem videtur per hoc
quod dicitur Sap. 10: dedit illi scientiam
sanctorum, quod de alia intelligi non
potest nisi de ea qua sancti ab impiis
discernuntur, quae est scientia fidei.
Also, Wis. 10:10: She gave him the science of
the saints, that is, of the truths of faith, because
no other science can be here meant except that
by which saints are distinguished from sinners,
which is the science of faith.
Praeterea, apostolus de cognitione
fidelium loquens 1 Cor. 8 dicit: sed non
omnium est scientia, et sic idem quod
prius.
Also the Apostle in speaking of the knowledge of
the faithful says in 1 Cor. 8:7: But there is not
knowledge in everyone, and thus we come to the
same conclusion as before.
Responsio. Dicendum quod cum ratio
scientiae consistat in hoc quod ex
aliquibus notis alia necessario
concludantur, hoc autem de divinis
contingat, constat quod de divinis potest
esse scientia.
Response. I answer that, since the essence of
science consists in this, that from things known a
knowledge of things previously unknown is
derived, and this may occur in relation to divine
truths, evidently there can be a science of divine
things.
Sed divinorum notitia dupliciter potest
aestimari. Uno modo ex parte nostra, et
sic nobis cognoscibilia non sunt nisi per
res creatas, quarum cognitionem a
sensu accipimus. Alio modo ex natura
ipsorum, et sic ipsa sunt ex seipsis
But knowledge of divine truths can be thought of in
two ways. In one way, as on our part, such truths
are not knowable except from created things, of
which we have a knowledge derived from sense
experience. In another way, on the part of the
nature of these things themselves, they are, in
maxime cognoscibilia, et quamvis
secundum modum suum non
cognoscantur a nobis, tamen a Deo
cognoscuntur et a beatis secundum
modum suum.
themselves, most knowable; and although they
are not known by us according to their essences,
they are known by God and by the blessed
according to their proper mode;
Et secundum hoc de divinis duplex
scientia habetur. Una secundum modum
nostrum, qui sensibilium principia accipit
ad notificandum divina, et sic de divinis
philosophi scientiam tradiderunt,
philosophiam primam scientiam divinam
dicentes. Alia secundum modum
ipsorum divinorum, ut ipsa divina
secundum se ipsa capiantur, quae
quidem perfecte in statu viae nobis est
impossibilis, sed fit nobis in statu viae
quaedam illius cognitionis participatio et
assimilatio ad cognitionem divinam, in
quantum per fidem nobis infusam
inhaeremus ipsi primae veritati propter
se ipsam.
and so science of divine things must be
considered in a twofold manner. One is according
to our mode of knowledge, in which knowledge of
sensible things serves as the principle for coming
to a knowledge of divine; and it was in this way
that the philosophers handed down a traditional
science of divine things, calling first philosophy a
divine science. The other mode is according to
that of divine things themselves as they are
understood in themselves. This is, indeed, a
mode of knowledge which we cannot possess
perfectly in this life; but there is for us, even in this
life, a certain participation and assimilation to
such a cognition of divine truth, inasmuch as
through the faith which is infused into our souls we
adhere to the very First Truth on account of Itself.
Et sicut Deus ex hoc, quod cognoscit se,
cognoscit alia modo suo, id est simplici
intuitu, non discurrendo, ita nos ex his,
quae per fidem capimus primae veritati
adhaerendo, venimus in cognitionem
aliorum secundum modum nostrum
And as God, since He knows Himself, knows in a
way that is His own, that is, by simple intuition, not
by discursive thought, so we, from those truths
that we possess in adhering to First Truth, come
to a knowledge of other truths, according to our
own mode of cognition, namely, by proceeding
discurrendo de principiis ad
conclusiones, ut sic ipsa, quae fide
tenemus, sint nobis quasi principia in
hac scientia et alia sint quasi
conclusiones. Ex quo patet quod haec
scientia est altior illa scientia divina,
quam philosophi tradiderunt, cum ex
altioribus procedat principiis.
from principles to conclusions. Wherefore, those
truths that we hold in the first place by faith are for
us, as it were, first principles in this science, and
the other truths to which we attain are quasi-
conclusions. From this it is evident that this
science is of a higher order than that which the
philosophers traditionally termed divine, since it
proceeds from higher principles.
sapientia non dividitur contra scientiam,
sicut oppositum contra suum oppositum,
sed quia se habet ex additione ad
scientiam. Est enim sapientia, ut dicit
philosophus in VI Ethicorum, caput
omnium scientiarum, regulans omnes
alias in quantum de altissimis principiis
est; propter quod etiam dea scientiarum
dicitur in principio metaphysicae et multo
magis haec quae non solum de
altissimis, sed ex altissimis est.
Sapientis autem est ordinare, et ideo
ista scientia altissima, quae omnes alias
regulat et ordinat, sapientia dicitur, sicut
in artibus mechanicis sapientes dicimus
illos qui alios regulant, ut architectores;
scientiae vero nomen aliis inferioribus
1. It may be said: Wisdom is not distinguished
from science as opposed to it, but as related to
science by adding to it. For wisdom is, indeed, as
the Philosopher says in VI Ethic., the head of all
the sciences, regulating all others inasmuch as it
treats of highest principles: on this account it is
also called the goddess of sciences in I
Metaph.; and much more is this true of that
wisdom which is not only about highest principles,
but from highest principles. Moreover, the function
of wisdom is to order, and therefore this highest
science, which orders and rules all others, is
called wisdom; just as in mechanical arts we call
those men wise who direct others, as the
architects: but the name of science is also left to
others that are inferior, and accordingly science is
distinguished from wisdom as a property from a
definition (i.e., as properties flow necessarily from
relinquitur. Et secundum hoc scientia
dividitur contra sapientiam sicut
proprium contra diffinitionem.
an essence, so do the other sciences from
wisdom).
Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut
supra dictum est, quando causae
cognoscuntur per suos effectus, effectus
cognitio supplet locum cognitionis
quiditatis causae, quae requiritur in illis
scientiis quae sunt de rebus quae per se
ipsas cognosci possunt; et sic non
oportet ad hoc quod de divinis scientiam
habeamus, quod praesciatur de eo quid
est. Vel potest dici quod hoc ipsum quod
scimus de eo quid non est supplet locum
in scientia divina cognitionis quid est;
quia sicut per quid est distinguitur res ab
aliis, ita per hoc quod scitur quid non est.
2. It may be said: As has been previously
declared, since causes are known through their
effects, the knowledge of an effect substitutes for
the quidditative knowledge of the cause; this is
necessarily required in those sciences treating of
things that cannot be known through themselves:
thus, for us to have a science of divine things, it is
not necessary that we first have a quidditative
knowledge of God. Or, again, it can be said that
what we know God is not, takes the place, in
divine science, of a cognition of what He is: for as
one thing is distinguished from others by what it
is, so God is here known by that which He is not.
Ad tertium dicendum quod partes
subiecti in scientia non solum sunt
intelligendae partes subiectivae vel
integrales, sed partes subiecti dicuntur
omnia illa quorum cognitio requiritur ad
cognitionem subiecti, cum omnia
huiusmodi non tractentur in scientia, nisi
in quantum habent ordinem ad
subiectum. Passiones etiam dicuntur
quaecumque de aliquo probari possunt,
3. It may be answered: In science the parts of a
subject are not to be understood only as
subjective or integral parts; but the parts of a
subject are all those things of which knowledge is
required in order to have cognition of the subject,
since all things of this sort are not dealt with in a
co-science except inasmuch as they are related
to the subject. Those also are called passive
potencies which can be proved in regard to
anything, whether they are negations or relations
sive negationes sive habitudines ad
aliquas res. Et talia multa de Deo
probari possunt et ex principiis
naturaliter notis et ex principiis fidei.
to other things. And many such things can be
proved in regard to God, both from naturally
known principles and from principles of faith.
Ad quartum dicendum quod in qualibet
scientia sunt aliqua quasi principia et
aliqua quasi conclusiones. Ratio ergo
quae inducitur in scientiis praecedit
assensum conclusionum, sed sequitur
assensum principiorum, cum ex eis
procedat. Articuli autem fidei in hac
scientia non sunt quasi conclusiones,
sed quasi principia quae etiam
defenduntur ab impugnantibus, sicut
philosophus in IV metaphysicae disputat
contra negantes principia, et
manifestantur per aliquas similitudines,
sicut principia naturaliter nota per
inductionem, non autem ratione
demonstrativa probantur.
4. It may be answered: In any science whatever
there are certain things that serve as principles,
and others as conclusions. Hence the reasoning
process set forth in the sciences precedes the
assent given to a conclusion, but follows upon
assent to principles, since it proceeds from them.
Now, it is true that the articles of faith are in this
science rather principles than conclusions, but
they must be defended against those opposing
them, as the Philosopher (IV Metaph.) proves
against those denying first principles: for they may
be made clearer of understanding by certain
similitudes, by inducing results of opposing
naturally known principles, but they cannot be
proved by demonstrative reasoning.
Ad quintum dicendum quod etiam in
scientiis humanitus traditis sunt
quaedam principia in quibusdam earum
quae non sunt omnibus nota, sed oportet
ea supponere a superioribus scientiis,
sicut in scientiis subalternatis
supponuntur et creduntur aliqua a
5. It must be said: Even in those sciences handed
down to us by human tradition, there are certain
principles in some of them which are not
universally known, but which presuppose truths
derived from a higher science, just as in
subordinate sciences certain things taken from
superior sciences are assumed and believed to
scientiis superioribus, et illa non sunt per
se nota nisi superioribus scientibus. Et
hoc modo se habent articuli fidei, qui
sunt principia huius scientiae, ad
cognitionem divinam, quia ea quae sunt
per se nota in scientia, quam Deus
habet de se ipso, supponuntur in
scientia nostra et creduntur ei nobis
haec indicanti per suos nuntios, sicut
medicus credit physico quattuor esse
elementa.
be true; and truths of this kind are not per se nota
except in the higher sciences. This is the case
with the articles of faith; for they are principles of
that science leading to knowledge of divine
things, since those truths which are per se nota in
the knowledge which God has of Himself, are
presupposed in our science; and He is believed
as the one manifesting these truths to us through
His messengers, even as the doctor believes
from the word of the physicist that there are four
elements.
Ad sextum dicendum quod apparentia
scientiae procedit ex apparentia
principiorum; quoniam scientia non facit
apparere principia, sed ex hoc, quod
apparent principia, facit apparere
conclusiones. Et per hunc modum
scientia, de qua loquimur, non facit
apparere ea de quibus est fides, sed ex
eis facit apparere alia per modum quo
de primis certitudo habetur.
6. Answer is made: The evident truths of a
science proceed from the evident truth of
principles. Wherefore a science does not make
clear the truth of its principles, but makes clear
that of its conclusions: and in this same way the
science of which we now speak does not make
evident the things of which we have faith, but on
the basis of them, it makes other things evident
with the same certitude as that belonging to their
first principles.
Ad septimum dicendum quod cuiuslibet
scientiae principium est intellectus
semper quidem primum, sed non
semper proximum, immo aliquando est
fides proximum principium scientiae.
Sicut patet in scientiis subalternatis, quia
7. It may be said: Understanding is always the first
principle of any science, but not always the
proximate principle; rather, it is often faith which is
the proximate principle of a science, as is evident
in the case of the subordinate sciences; since
their conclusions proceed from faith in truths
earum conclusiones sicut ex proximo
principio procedunt ex fide eorum quae
supponuntur a superiori scientia, sed
sicut a principio primo ab intellectu
superioris scientis, qui de his creditis
certitudinem per intellectum habet. Et
similiter huius scientiae principium
proximum est fides, sed primum est
intellectus divinus, cui nos credimus, sed
finis fidei est nobis, ut perveniamus ad
intelligendum quae credimus, sicut si
inferior sciens addiscat superioris
scientis scientiam, et tunc fient et
intellecta vel scita, quae prius erant
tantummodo credita.
accepted on the authority of a superior science as
from a proximate principle, but from the
understanding of scientists in the superior field
who have intellectual certitude of these created
truths as from their ultimate principle. So likewise
the proximate principle of this divine science is
faith, but the first principle is the divine intellect to
the revelation of which we give the assent of faith;
but faith is in us that we may attain to an
understanding of those things we believe; in the
same way that a scientist in an inferior field, if he
should gain knowledge of a higher, would then
possess understanding and science of truths
which previously were accepted only on faith.
Article 3
Whether in the Science of Faith, Which Is Concerning God, it Is Permissible to Use the
Rational Arguments of the Natural Philosophers
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in
his quae sunt fidei non liceat
philosophicis rationibus uti. 1 Cor. 1: non
misit me Christus baptizare, sed
evangelizare, non in sapientia verbi,
1. It seems that in regard to those truths that are
of faith it is not right to employ the rational
arguments of the natural philosophers, for,
according to 1 Cor. 1:17, Christ sent me not to
baptize, but to preach the gospel: not wisdom of
Glossa: in doctrina philosophorum. Et
super illud: ubi inquisitor huius saeculi?
Dicit Glossa: inquisitor est qui naturae
secreta rimatur, tales non recipit Deus
inter praedicatores. Et super illud 2 c.:
sermo meus et praedicatio mea fuit non
in persuasibilibus humanae sapientiae
verbis, dicit Glossa: etsi persuasibilia
fuerunt verba mea, non tamen per
humanam sapientiam, ut verba
pseudoapostolorum.
speech; that is, in the doctrine of the
philosophers, as the gloss says. And concerning
the line (1 Cor. 1:20), Where is the disputer of
this world? the gloss says: The disputer is he
who searches into the secrets of nature; such
men God does not accept as preachers. And on
the line (1 Cor. 2:4), And my speech and my
preaching was not in the persuasive words of
human wisdom, the gloss says: Although the
words were persuasive, they were not so
because of human wisdom, as is the word of
pseudo-apostles.
Ex quibus omnibus videtur quod in his
quae sunt fidei non liceat rationibus
philosophicis uti.
From all these lines it is evident that in matters of
faith it is not lawful to employ philosophical
reasoning.
Praeterea, Is. 15 super illud: nocte
vastata est Ar, dicit Glossa: Ar, id est
adversarius, scilicet scientia saecularis,
quae adversaria est Deo. Ergo scientia
saeculari in his quae Dei sunt uti non
debemus.
2. On that line (Is. 15:1), Because in the night Ar
of Moab is laid waste, the gloss says: Ar, that
is, the adversary, namely, secular science, which
is the adversary of God; therefore, etc.
Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit:
sacramentum fidei a philosophicis
argumentis est liberum. Ergo ubi de fide
agitur, philosophorum rationibus et dictis
3. Ambrose says: The deepest mysteries of faith
are free from the reasonings of the
philosophers; therefore, when a matter of faith is
dealt with, the reasonings and words of the
uti non licet. philosophers ought not to be used.
Praeterea, Hieronymus refert in epistula
ad Eustochium virginem se in visione
verberatum divino iudicio fuisse pro eo
quod in libris legerat Ciceronis, et qui
astabant precabantur ut veniam tribueret
adolescentiae, exacturus deinde
cruciatum, si gentilium libros aliquando
legisset; unde obtestans nomen Dei
clamavit: domine, si umquam habuero
saeculares codices, si legero, te negavi.
Si ergo non licet in eis studere et legere,
multo minus licet eis in divinis tractatibus
uti.
4. Jerome relates in a letter to Eustochium that in
vision he was beaten, according to divine justice,
because he had read the books of Cicero, and
that those standing by besought that leniency
might be granted on account of his youth, and
that afterward the extreme penalty should be
exacted if he read again the books of the
Gentiles; wherefore, calling upon the name of
God, he exclaimed: If ever I shall possess
secular books, if ever I read them, I shall have
denied You; therefore it is not lawful to use them
in treating of divine things.
Praeterea, saecularis sapientia
frequenter in Scriptura per aquam
significatur, sapientia vero divina per
vinum. Sed Is. 1 vituperabuntur caupones
aquam vino miscentes. Ergo vituperandi
sunt doctores qui sacrae doctrinae
philosophica documenta admiscent.
5. In Scripture, secular wisdom is often
represented by water, but divine wisdom by wine.
Now, according to Is., chap. 1, the innkeepers
are upbraided for mixing water with wine;
therefore the doctors are blameworthy for their
mingling of philosophical doctrine with sacred
Scripture.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Hieronymus in
Glossa Osee 2, cum haereticis nec
nomina debemus habere communia. Sed
haeretici utuntur ad fidei corruptionem
6. Jerome says, in his gloss on Hosea, chap. 2,
With heretics we ought not to have even names
in common. But heretics use the arguments of
philosophers to destroy faith, as is maintained in
philosophicis documentis, ut habetur in
Glossa Prov. 7 et Is. 15. Ergo Catholici
eis in suis tractatibus uti non debent.
the gloss on Prov., chap, 7 and Is., chap. 15;
therefore Catholics ought not to use such in their
discussions.
Praeterea, sicut quaelibet scientia habet
principia propria, ita et sacra doctrina,
scilicet articulos fidei. Sed in aliis
scientiis non recte proceditur, si
assumantur alterius scientiae principia,
sed oportet in unaquaque ex propriis
principiis procedere, secundum
doctrinam philosophi in I posteriorum.
Ergo nec in sacra doctrina recte
proceditur, si quis ex documentis
philosophorum procedit.
7. Every science has its proper principles, and
thus also sacred doctrine has those that belong
to it, namely, the articles of faith; but in other
sciences the process is not valid if principles are
taken from a different science, but each ought to
proceed from its own principles, according to the
teaching of the Philosopher (I Poster.); therefore
the method is not permissible in sacred doctrine.
Praeterea, si alicuius doctrina in aliquo
repudiatur, eius auctoritas invalida est ad
aliquid confirmandum; unde dicit
Augustinus quod si in sacra Scriptura
concesserimus aliquid esse falsitatis,
peribit eius auctoritas ad fidei
confirmationem. Sed sacra doctrina in
multis doctrinam philosophorum repudiat,
quia in multis errasse inveniuntur. Ergo
eorum auctoritas non est efficax ad
aliquid confirmandum.
8. If the doctrine of anyone is repudiated in any
respect, the authority of his teaching will not be
valid in proving anything; wherefore Augustine
says that, if in sacred doctrine we discover some
falsity, the authority of that teaching is destroyed
for confirming anything in regard to faith; but
sacred doctrine repudiates the doctrine of the
philosophers in many ways, because many
errors are found among them; therefore their
authority has no efficacy in proving anything
(regarding sacred doctrine).
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod apostolus Tit. 1
Epimenidis poetae versiculo usus est
dicens: Cretenses semper mendaces,
malae bestiae, ventres pigri, et 1 Cor. 15
verbis Menandri: corrumpunt bonos
mores colloquia prava, et Athenis usus
est verbis Arati: ipsius, scilicet Dei, et
genus sumus, ut habetur Act. 17. Ergo et
aliis divinae Scripturae doctoribus licet
philosophicis argumentis uti.
But on the contrary, the Apostle (Titus 1: 12)
makes use of a verse from the poet Epimenides,
saying, The Cretans are always liars, evil
beasts, etc.; and (1 Cor. 15:33) he employs the
words of Menander: Evil communications
corrupt good manners; and in Acts 17:28 are the
words of Aratus, For we are also his (i.e., Gods)
offspring. Therefore it is licit for other doctors of
divine Scripture also to make use of the
arguments of the philosophers.
Praeterea, Hieronymus in epistula ad
magnum urbis Romae oratorem
enumeratis pluribus sacrae Scripturae
doctoribus ut Basilio, Gregorio et
quibusdam aliis subiungit: qui omnes in
tantum philosophorum doctrinis atque
sententiis suos referserunt libros, ut
nescias, quid in eis primum mirari
debeas, utrum eruditionem saeculi vel
scientiam Scripturarum. Quod non
fecissent, si non licuisset vel inutile
fuisset.
Again, Jerome, in a letter to Magnus, a famous
orator of Rome, having enumerated many
doctors of Scripture, such as Basil and Gregory,
adds: All these have so intermingled in their
books the teachings and the sayings of the
philosophers that one knows not which to admire
first in them, their secular erudition or their
knowledge of the Scriptures. But this they would
not have done had such been illicit or useless.
Praeterea, Hieronymus in epistula ad
Pammachium de dormitione Paulinae: si
Also Jerome in a letter to Pammachius about the
death of Paula says: you have become
adamaveris mulierem captivam, id est
sapientiam saecularem, et eius
pulchritudine captus fueris, decalva eam,
et illecebras crinium atque ornamenta
verborum cum tenacibus unguibus seca,
lava eam prophetali nitro, et requiescens
cum illa dicito: sinistra eius sub capite
meo, et dextera illius amplexabitur me, et
multos tibi captiva fetus dabit, ac de
Moabitide efficietur tibi Israelites. Ergo
fructuosum est ut aliquis sapientia
saeculari utatur.
enamored of the captive woman, secular
wisdom, and captivated by her beauty, cut her
hair and her finger nails, cut away the enticement
of her tresses and the adornments of her words,
bathe her with prophetic niter, and, lying with her,
say: His left hand under my head, and his right
hand shall embrace me (Cant. 8:3), and many
children will the captive woman give to you, and
from the Moabite, Israelites will be born to you.
Therefore with fruitful results some make use of
secular wisdom.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in II de
Trinitate: non ero segnis ad inquirendam
substantiam Dei sive per Scripturam sive
per creaturam. Sed cognitio de creaturis
in philosophia proponitur. Ergo non est
inconveniens quod aliquis in sacra
doctrina rationibus philosophicis utatur.
Again Augustine (II De Trinitate) says: I shall not
be without zeal in seeking out knowledge of God,
whether through Scripture or creatures; but
knowledge of God through creatures is given in
philosophy; therefore it is not unfitting that in
sacred doctrine one should make use of
philosophical reasoning.
Praeterea, Augustinus in II de doctrina
Christiana: philosophi autem qui dicuntur
si qua forte vera et fidei nostrae
accomoda dixerunt, non solum
formidanda non sunt, sed ab eis
tamquam iniustis possessoribus in usum
nostrum vindicanda. Et sic idem quod
prius.
Again Augustine (Book II, De doctrina
Christiana) says: If the philosophers have by
chance uttered truths helpful to our faith, they are
not only not to be feared, but rather those truths
ought to be taken from them as from unjust
possessors and used to our advantage. Thus
the conclusion is as before.
Praeterea, Daniel 1 super illud: proposuit
autem Daniel etc., dicit Glossa: si quis
imperitus mathematicae artis contra
mathematicos scribat aut expers
philosophiae contra philosophos agat,
quis etiam ridendus vel ridendo non
rideat? Sed oportet quandoque
doctorem sacrae Scripturae contra
philosophos agere. Ergo oportet eum
philosophia uti.
Also on the saying in Dan. 1:8, But Daniel
purposed in his heart, the gloss says: If anyone
ignorant of mathematics should write in
opposition to the mathematicians, or knowing
nothing of philosophy should argue against the
philosophers, would he not be derided? But
doctors of sacred Scripture must at times argue
with philosophers; therefore it is needful that they
make use of philosophy.
Responsio. Dicendum quod dona
gratiarum hoc modo naturae adduntur
quod eam non tollunt, sed magis
perficiunt; unde et lumen fidei, quod nobis
gratis infunditur, non destruit lumen
naturalis rationis divinitus nobis inditum.
Et quamvis lumen naturale mentis
humanae sit insufficiens ad
manifestationem eorum quae
manifestantur per fidem, tamen
impossibile est quod ea, quae per fidem
traduntur nobis divinitus, sint contraria his
quae sunt per naturam nobis indita.
Oporteret enim alterum esse falsum; et
cum utrumque sit nobis a Deo, Deus
nobis esset auctor falsitatis, quod est
impossibile. Sed magis cum in
Response. I answer that it must be said that
gifts of grace are added to those of nature in
such a way that they do not destroy the latter, but
rather perfect them; wherefore also the light of
faith, which is gratuitously infused into our minds,
does not destroy the natural light of cognition,
which is in us by nature. For although the natural
light of the human mind is insufficient to reveal
those truths revealed by faith, yet it is impossible
that those things which God has manifested to us
by faith should be contrary to those which are
evident to us by natural knowledge. In this case
one would necessarily be false: and since both
kinds of truth are from God, God would be the
author of error, a thing which is impossible.
Rather, since in imperfect things there is found
some imitation of the perfect, though the image
imperfectis inveniatur aliqua imitatio
perfectorum, in ipsis, quae per naturalem
rationem cognoscuntur, sunt quaedam
similitudines eorum quae per fidem sunt
tradita.
is deficient, in those things known by natural
reason there are certain similitudes of the truths
revealed by faith.
Sicut autem sacra doctrina fundatur
supra lumen fidei, ita philosophia fundatur
supra lumen naturale rationis; unde
impossibile est quod ea, quae sunt
philosophiae, sint contraria his quae sunt
fidei, sed deficiunt ab eis. Continent
tamen aliquas eorum similitudines et
quaedam ad ea praeambula, sicut natura
praeambula est ad gratiam.
Now, as sacred doctrine is founded upon the
light of faith, so philosophy depends upon the
light of natural reason; wherefore it is impossible
that philosophical truths are contrary to those that
are of faith; but they are deficient as compared to
them. Nevertheless they incorporate some
similitudes of those higher truths, and some
things that are preparatory for them, just as
nature is the preamble to grace.
Si quid autem in dictis philosophorum
invenitur contrarium fidei, hoc non est
philosophia, sed magis philosophiae
abusus ex defectu rationis. Et ideo
possibile est ex principiis philosophiae
huiusmodi errorem refellere vel
ostendendo omnino esse impossibile vel
ostendendo non esse necessarium. Sicut
enim ea quae sunt fidei non possunt
demonstrative probari, ita quaedam
contraria eis non possunt demonstrative
ostendi esse falsa, sed potest ostendi ea
non esse necessaria.
If, however, anything is found in the teachings of
the philosophers contrary to faith, this error does
not properly belong to philosophy, but is due to
an abuse of philosophy owing to the insufficiency
of reason. Therefore also it is possible from the
principles of philosophy to refute an error of this
kind, either by showing it to be altogether
impossible, or not to be necessary. For just as
those things which are of faith cannot be
demonstratively proved, so certain things
contrary to them cannot be demonstratively
shown to be false, but they can be shown not to
be necessary.
Sic ergo in sacra doctrina philosophia
possumus tripliciter uti.
Thus, in sacred doctrine we are able to make a
threefold use of philosophy:
Primo ad demonstrandum ea quae sunt
praeambula fidei, quae necesse est in
fide scire, ut ea quae naturalibus
rationibus de Deo probantur, ut Deum
esse, Deum esse unum et alia huiusmodi
vel de Deo vel de creaturis in philosophia
probata, quae fides supponit.
1. First, to demonstrate those truths that are
preambles of faith and that have a necessary
place in the science of faith. Such are the truths
about God that can be proved by natural reason
that God exists, that God is one; such truths
about God or about His creatures, subject to
philosophical proof, faith presupposes.
Secundo ad notificandum per aliquas
similitudines ea quae sunt fidei, sicut
Augustinus in libro de Trinitate utitur
multis similitudinibus ex doctrinis
philosophicis sumptis ad manifestandum
Trinitatem.
2. Secondly, to give a clearer notion, by certain
similitudes, of the truths of faith, as Augustine in
his book, De Trinitate, employed any
comparisons taken from the teachings of the
philosophers to aid understanding of the Trinity.
Tertio ad resistendum his quae contra
fidem dicuntur sive ostendendo ea esse
falsa sive ostendendo ea non esse
necessaria.
3. In the third place, to resist those who speak
against the faith, either by showing that their
statements are false, or by showing that they are
not necessarily true.
Tamen utentes philosophia in sacra
doctrina possunt dupliciter errare.
Nevertheless, in the use of philosophy in sacred
Scripture, there can be a twofold error:
Uno modo in hoc quod utantur his quae In one way, by using doctrines contrary to faith,
Uno modo in hoc quod utantur his quae
sunt contra fidem, quae non sunt
philosophiae, sed corruptio vel abusus
eius, sicut Origenes fecit.
In one way, by using doctrines contrary to faith,
which are not truths of philosophy, but rather
error, or abuse of philosophy, as Origen did.
Alio modo, ut ea quae sunt fidei
includantur sub metis philosophiae, ut
scilicet si aliquis credere nolit nisi quod
per philosophiam haberi potest, cum e
converso philosophia sit ad metas fidei
redigenda, secundum illud apostoli 2
Cor. 10: in captivitatem redigentes
omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi.
In another way, by using them in such manner as
to include under the measure of philosophy truths
of faith, as if one should be willing to believe
nothing except what could be held by philosophic
reasoning; when, on the contrary, philosophy
should be subject to the measure of faith,
according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor.
10:5), Bringing into captivity every
understanding unto the obedience of Christ.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex
omnibus verbis illis ostenditur quod
doctrina philosophorum non sit utendum
quasi principali, ut scilicet propter eam
veritas fidei credatur; non tamen
removetur, quin ea possint uti sacri
doctores quasi secundaria. Unde ibidem
super illud: perdam sapientiam
sapientum, dicit Glossa: non ideo hoc
dicit ut veritatis intelligentia possit a Deo
reprobari, sed quia eorum prudentia
reprobatur, qui in sua eruditione
1. It may be said: From all these words it is
shown that philosophical doctrine ought not to be
used as if it had first place, as if on account of it
one believed by faith; nevertheless the fact is not
disproved that doctors of sacred learning may
employ philosophy, as it were, secondarily.
Wherefore, on the saying (1 Cor. 1:19), I will
destroy the wisdom of the wise, the gloss adds:
This he does not say because the understanding
of truth can be worthy of Gods anger, but
because the false prudence of those who trusted
in their erudition is worthy of reproof.
confidunt.
Ut tamen totum quod est fidei non
humanae potentiae aut sapientiae
tribueretur, sed Deo, voluit Deus ut
primitiva apostolorum praedicatio esset
in infirmitate et simplicitate, cui tamen
postea potentia et saecularis sapientia
superveniens ostendit per victoriam fidei
mundum esse Deo subiectum et quantum
ad potentiam et quantum ad sapientiam.
Nevertheless, in order that all that is of faith might
be attributed not to human power or wisdom but
to God, God willed that the primitive preaching of
the apostles should be in infirmity and simplicity;
though, on the other hand, with the later advent of
power and secular wisdom, He manifested by
the victory of the faith that the world is subject to
God as much by wisdom as by power.
Ad secundum dicendum quod sapientia
saecularis dicitur esse contraria Deo
quantum ad eius abusum, sicut ea
haeretici abutuntur, non quantum ad eius
veritatem.
2. It may be said: Secular wisdom is said to be
contrary to God in so far as it is an abuse of
wisdom (i.e., erroneous) as when heretics abuse
it, but not in so far as it is true.
Ad tertium dicendum quod sacramentum
fidei pro tanto dicitur liberum a
philosophicis argumentis, quia sub metis
philosophiae non coartatur, ut dictum est.
3. It may be answered: The sacred deposit of the
truth of faith is said to be free from philosophical
doctrine inasmuch as it is not confined by the
limits of philosophy.
Ad quartum dicendum quod Hieronymus
adeo afficiebatur ad gentilium libros quod
sacram Scripturam quodammodo
contemnebat; unde ipsemet ibidem dicit:
si quando in memet reversus prophetas
4. It may be said: Jerome was so influenced by
certain books of the Gentiles that he contemned,
in a way, sacred Scripture: wherefore he himself
says: If I began to read it while turning over the
words of the Prophets in my own mind, their
legere coepissem, sermo horrebat
incultus. Et hoc esse reprehensibile nullus
ambigit.
crude expression filled me with distaste. And no
one will deny that such was reprehensible.
Ad quintum dicendum quod ex tropicis
locutionibus non est sumenda
argumentatio, ut dicit Magister 11
distinctione III sententiarum, et Dionysius
dicit in epistula ad Titum quod symbolica
theologia non est argumentativa, et
praecipue cum illa expositio non sit
alicuius auctoris. Et tamen potest dici
quod quando alterum duorum transit in
dominium alterius, non reputatur mixtio,
sed quando utrumque a sua natura
alteratur. Unde illi, qui utuntur
philosophicis documentis in sacra
doctrina redigendo in obsequium fidei,
non miscent aquam vino, sed aquam
convertunt in vinum.
5. It may be said: No conclusive argument can be
drawn from figurative speech, as the Master
(Peter Lombard) says. Dionysius also says in his
letter to Titus that symbolic theology has no
weight of proof, especially when such interprets
no authority. Nevertheless it can be said that
When one of two things passes into the nature of
another, the product is not considered a mixture
except when the nature of both is altered.
Wherefore those who use philosophical
doctrines in sacred Scripture in such a way as to
subject them to the service of faith, do not mix
water with wine, but change water into wine.
Ad sextum dicendum quod Hieronymus
loquitur de illis nominibus quae ab
haereticis sunt inventa accomoda suis
erroribus. Philosophicae autem
disciplinae non sunt tales, immo earum
abusus solum in errorem ducit, et ideo
non sunt propter hoc vitandae.
6. It may be said: Jerome is speaking of those
arguments that were invented by heretics to give
support to their errors; but such doctrines do not
belong to philosophy; rather they lead only to
error; and consequently on their account the
truths of philosophy ought not be shunned.
Ad septimum dicendum quod scientiae
quae habent ordinem ad invicem hoc
modo se habent quod una potest uti
principiis alterius, sicut scientiae
posteriores utuntur principiis scientiarum
priorum, sive sint superiores sive
inferiores; unde metaphysica, quae est
omnibus superior, utitur his quae in aliis
scientiis sunt probata. Et similiter
theologia, cum omnes aliae scientiae sint
huic quasi famulantes et praeambulae in
via generationis, quamvis sint dignitate
posteriores, potest uti principiis omnium
aliarum scientiarum.
7. Answer may be made: Sciences which are
ordered to one another are so related that one
can use the principles of another, just as
posterior sciences can use the principles of prior
sciences, whether they are superior or inferior:
wherefore metaphysics, which is superior in
dignity to all, uses truths that have been proved in
other sciences. And in like manner theology
Although all other sciences are related to it in the
order of generation, as serving it and as
preambles to itcan make use of the principles
of all the others, even if they are posterior to it in
dignity.
Ad octavum dicendum quod in quantum
sacra doctrina utitur philosophicis
documentis propter se, non recipit ea
propter auctoritatem dicentium, sed
propter rationem dictorum, unde
quaedam bene dicta accipit et alia
respuit. Sed quando utitur eis propter
alios refellendos, utitur eis, in quantum
sunt in auctoritatem illis qui refelluntur,
quia testimonium ab adversariis est
efficacius.
8. It may be said: Inasmuch as sacred doctrine
makes use of the teachings of philosophy for
their own sake, it does not accept them on
account of the authority of those who taught them,
but on account of the reasonableness of the
doctrine; wherefore it accepts truth well said and
rejects other things: but when it uses these
doctrines to refute certain errors, it uses them
inasmuch as their authority is esteemed by those
whose refutation is desired, because the
testimony of an adversary has in that case
greater weight.
Article 4
Whether Divine Truths Ought to Be Concealed by New and Obscure Words
Ad quartum sic proceditur.
Videtur quod divina in scientia
fidei non sunt obscuritate
verborum velanda, quia, ut dicitur
Prov. 14, doctrina prudentium
facilis. Ergo sine obscuritate
verborum proponi debet.
1. It seems that in the science of faith divine truths ought
not to be veiled over by obscurity of words, for it is said in
Prov. 14:6, The learning of the wise is easy. Therefore
these truths ought to be presented without obscurity of
words.
Praeterea, Eccli. 4: ne
abscondas sapientiam in decore
eius; et Prov. 11: qui abscondit
frumenta, Glossa: praedicationis,
maledicetur in populis. Ergo
verba sacrae doctrinae non sunt
velanda.
2. According to Sirach 4:28, Hide not thy wisdom in her
beauty, and Prov. 11:26, He that hides up corn (the
gloss says that preaching is here meant) shall be cursed
among the people. Therefore the words of sacred
doctrine ought not to be hidden.
Praeterea, Matth. 10: quod dico
vobis in tenebris, Glossa: in
mysterio, dicite in lumine, Glossa:
aperte. Ergo obscura fidei sunt
magis reseranda quam
occultanda difficultate verborum.
3. The text of Matt. 10:27, That which I tell you in the dark
(gloss, in mystery) speak ye in the light (gloss, openly).
Therefore the obscure truths of faith ought to be made
more manifest, rather than hidden by the difficulties of
words.
Praeterea, doctores fidei sunt
sapientibus et insipientibus
debitores, ut patet Rom. 1. Ergo
taliter debent loqui, ut a magnis
et a parvis intelligantur, id est
sine obscuritate verborum.
4. The doctors of truths of faith are debtors to wise and
unwise, as is evident from Rom. 1:14: therefore they
ought so to speak that they may be understood by great
and small, that is, without obscurity of words.
Praeterea, Sap. 7 dicitur: quam
sine fictione didici et sine invidia
communico. Sed ille qui eam
occultat, non eam communicat.
Ergo videtur invidiae reus.
5. Wis. 7:13, Which I have learned without guile, and
communicate without envy; but those who hide do not,
communicate; therefore they seem guilty of envy.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit IV de
doctrina Christiana: expositores
sacrae Scripturae non ita loqui
debent, tamquam se ipsos
exponendos proponant, sed in
omnibus sermonibus suis
primitus ac maxime ut
intelligantur elaborent ea
perspicuitate dicendi, ut multum
tardus sit qui non intelligit.
6. Augustine in IV De doctrina Christiana says: Those
explaining sacred Scripture ought not to speak in such a
way that they themselves need explanation as of the
same authority; but in all their sermons they ought to
strive primarily and especially to be understood, and to
declare these truths with as much clarity as possible so
that he would be very dull who would not comprehend
them.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod dicitur
Matth. 7: nolite sanctum dare
But on the contrary is that which is said in Matt, 7:6, Give
not that which is holy to dogs, on which the gloss
canibus neque mittatis
margaritas vestras ante porcos,
ubi dicit Glossa: res absconsa
avidius quaeritur, celata
venerabilius conspicitur, diu
quaesita carius tenetur. Cum
ergo sacra documenta expediat
summa veneratione intueri,
videtur quod non debeant
publicari, sed obscure tradi.
comments: A hidden thing is more eagerly sought for, a
thing concealed appears more worthy of veneration, that
which is a long time sought for is held more dear. Since,
therefore, sacred writings ought to be regarded with the
greatest veneration, it seems that it is expedient they be
discussed with obscurity of speech.
Praeterea, Dionysius dicit 1 c.
ecclesiasticae hierarchiae:
omnem sanctam laudem non
tradas alteri praeter aeque
ordinatos tibi deiformes, id est
divinas laudes, quibus omnia
sacra documenta complectitur,
non tradas nisi tibi similibus. Sed
si verbis conspicuis scriberentur,
omnibus paterent. Ergo secreta
fidei sunt verborum obscuritate
velanda.
Again, Dionysius (I Eccles. hier.) says: Do not reveal to
another every holy thing in praise of God, except those
forms of praise generally ordained; that is, those divine
rites by which all the sacraments are surrounded should
not be revealed except to those like yourself; but if they
were written in conspicuous words, they would be
apparent to all; therefore the secrets of faith are to be
concealed by obscuring words.
Praeterea, ad hoc est quod
dicitur Luc. 8: vobis, id est
perfectis, datum est nosse
mysterium regni Dei, id est
intelligentiam Scripturarum, ut
Also it is said in Luke 8:10, To you it is given to know the
mystery of the kingdom of God (that is, to have
understanding of the Scriptures, as is evident from the
gloss); but to the rest in parables. Therefore one ought
by obscurity in speech conceal sacred truths from the
patet per Glossam, ceteris autem
in parabolis. Ergo oportet aliqua
verborum obscuritate a
multitudine occultari.
multitude.
Responsio. Dicendum quod
verba docentis ita debent esse
moderata ut proficiant, non
noceant audienti. Quaedam
autem sunt quae audita nemini
nocent, sicut ea quae omnes
scire tenentur; et talia non sunt
occultanda, sed manifeste
omnibus proponenda. Quaedam
vero sunt quae proposita
manifeste auditoribus nocent;
quod quidem contingit dupliciter.
Uno modo, si arcana fidei
infidelibus fidem abhorrentibus
denudentur. Eis enim venirent in
derisum; et propter hoc dominus
dicit Matth. 7: nolite sanctum dare
canibus; et Dionysius dicit c. 2
caelestis hierarchiae: quae
sancta sunt circumtegens ex
immunda multitudine tamquam
uniformia custodi.
Response. I answer that the words of a teacher ought to
be so moderated that they result to the profit and not to
the detriment of the one hearing him. Now, there are
certain things which on being heard harm no one, as are
the truths which all are held responsible to know: and
such ought not to be hidden but openly proposed to all.
But there are others which, if openly presented, cause
harm in those hearing them; and this can occur for two
reasons: in one way, if the secret truths of faith are
revealed to infidels who oppose the faith and so come to
be derided by them. On this account it is said in Matt.
7:6, Give not that which is holy to dogs. And Dionysius
(II Coel. hierar.) says, Listen reverently to these words,
to this doctrine given for our instruction by the divinity of
divinities, and hide these holy teachings in your minds,
shielding them from the unclean multitude so that you
may keep them as uniform as possible.
Secundo, quando aliqua subtilia Secondly, if any subtleties are proposed to uncultivated
rudibus proponuntur, ex quibus
perfecte non comprehensis
materiam sumunt errandi; unde
apostolus dicit 1 Cor. 3: ego,
fratres, non potui vobis loqui
quasi spiritualibus, sed tamquam
parvulis in Christo lac potum
vobis dedi, non escam. Unde
Exodi 22 super illud: si quis
aperuerit cisternam etc., dicit
Glossa Gregorii: qui in sacro
eloquio iam alta intelligit,
sublimes sensus coram non
capientibus per silentium tegat,
ne per scandalum interius aut
fidelem parvulum aut infidelem,
qui credere potuisset, interimat.
Haec ergo ab his, quibus nocent,
occultanda sunt.
people, these folk may find in the imperfect
comprehension of them matter for error; wherefore, in 1
Cor. 3:1 it is said: And I, brethren, could not speak to you
as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal. As unto little ones in
Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not meat. And therefore
also, on Exod. 21:33, If a man open a pit, the gloss of
Gregory says: He who in sacred eloquence now
understands lofty things should cover over these sublime
truths by silence when in the presence of those who do
not comprehend them, lest through some scandal of mind
he cause the loss of some little one among the faithful or
of an infidel who otherwise might have come to believe.
Those truths, therefore, ought to be hidden from those to
whom they might do harm; but a distinction can be made
as regards speaking, since these same truths may be
privately revealed to the wise, though publicly silence is
kept regarding them. Sed in collocutione potest fieri
distinctio, ut eadem seorsum sapientibus manifestentur
et in publico taceantur.
Unde dicit Augustinus in IV l. de
doctrina Christiana: sunt
quaedam quae vi sua non
intelliguntur aut vix intelliguntur,
quantolibet et quantumlibet
quamvis plenissime dicentis
versentur eloquio, quae in populi
audientiam vel raro, si aliquid
urget, vel numquam omnino
Thus, Augustine (IV De doctrina Christiana) says:
Where certain truths are, by reason of their own
character, not comprehensible, or scarcely so, even
when explained with every effort on the part of the
speaker to make them clear, these one rarely dwells
upon with a general audience, or never mentions, at all:
but in writing, the same distinction cannot be adhered to,
because a book, once published, can fall into the hands
of any one at all, and therefore some truths should be
mittenda sunt. Sed in scribendo
non potest talis distinctio
adhiberi, quia liber conscriptus
ad manus quorumlibet venire
potest, et ideo sunt occultanda
verborum obscuritatibus, ut per
hoc prosint sapientibus qui ea
intelligunt et occultentur a
simplicibus qui ea capere non
possunt.
shielded by obscuring words so that they may profit those
who will understand them and be hidden from the simple
who will not comprehend them.
Et in hoc nullus gravatur, quia qui
intelligunt, lectione detinentur, qui
vero non intelligunt, non coguntur
ad legendum. Unde Augustinus
dicit in eodem libro: in libris qui
ita scribuntur, ut ipsi sibi
quodammodo lectorem teneant,
cum intelliguntur, cum autem non
intelliguntur, molesti non sunt
volentibus legere, non est hoc
officium disserendi, ut vera,
quamvis ad intelligendum
difficillima, ad aliorum
intelligentiam perducamus.
And by this procedure no harm is done to anyone,
because those who understand are held by that which
they read, but those who do not understand are not
compelled to continue reading. And therefore Augustine
says in the same place: In books which are, so written
that they somehow keep a hold on the attention of the
reader who understands them, but cause no harm to the
one who does not understand them and so is unwilling to
read further, there is no failure in duty on the part of the
author as long as we bring these truths, even though they
are so difficult of comprehension, to the understanding of
some.
auctoritas illa non est ad
propositum. Non enim est sensus
auctoritatis quod doctrina
prudentium sit facilis active, id
est quod faciliter doceant, sed
passive, quia faciliter docentur, ut
patet per Glossam.
1. It is answered: The authority quoted is not relevant to
the proposition. For it is not to be understood that the
teaching of prudent men be easy in the active sense;
that is, that they easily teach everything; but in the
passive sense: that such men are easily taught, as is
evident from the gloss.
auctoritates illae loquuntur de illo
qui abscondit ea quae
manifestanda sunt, unde Eccli. 4
praemittitur: non retineas verbum
in tempore salutis. Per hoc autem
non removetur, quin ea, quae
sunt occultanda, debeant
obscuritate verborum celari.
2. It may be answered: These authorities speak of hiding
truths which ought to be made manifest; wherefore it is
previously said in Sirach 4:28, Refrain not to speak in
the time of salvation. By this, however, there is no denial
of the fact that gore are mysteries which ought to be
concealed by obscuring words.
Ad tertium dicendum quod
doctrina Christi est publice et
plane praedicanda, ita quod
unicuique sit planum illud quod
expedit ei scire, non autem ut
publicentur ea quae scire non
expedit.
3. It may be said: The doctrine of Christ ought to be
taught publicly and openly to this extent: that the truths
expedient for each one to know be made clear. Things
that are not expedient, however, need not be publicly
taught.
Ad quartum dicendum quod 4. It may be answered: The doctors of sacred Scripture
doctores sacrae Scripturae non
sunt ita sapientibus et
insipientibus debitores, ut eadem
utrisque proponant, sed ita quod
utrisque proponant ea quae eis
competunt.
are not debtors to the wise and to the foolish in such a
way that they must propose the same truths to both, but
that they propose to each what is to the advantage of
each.
Ad quintum dicendum quod non
est ex invidia quod subtilia
multitudini occultantur, sed magis
ex debita discretione, ut dictum
est.
5. It may be said: Subtle truths are not concealed from
the multitude on account of envy, but rather out of due
discretion.
Ad sextum dicendum quod
Augustinus loquitur de
expositoribus qui ad populum
loquuntur, non de his qui scripto
aliquid tradunt, ut ex
consequentibus patet.
6. It may be answered: Augustine is here speaking of
explanations made orally to the people, not of those
transmitted in writing, as is evident from what follows.
Pars 2
LECTIO 1
Prooemium: Boethius Text
Christianae religionis reverentiam
plures usurpant,
1.1.1.1 There are many who claim as
theirs the dignity of the Christian religion;
sed ea fides pollet maxime ac
solitarie quae cum propter
universalium praecepta regularum,
quibus eiusdem religionis
intellegatur auctoritas, tum
propterea, quod eius cultus per
omnes paene mundi terminos
emanarit, catholica vel universalis
vocatur.
1.1.1.2 but that form of faith has supreme
authority, and has it exclusively, which,
both on account of the universal character
of the rules and doctrines affirming its
authority, and because the worship in
which they are expressed has spread
throughout the world, is called catholic or
universal.
Cuius haec de trinitatis unitate
sententia est: "Pater," inquiunt,
"deus filius deus spiritus sanctus
deus".
1.1.2 The belief of this religion concerning
the Trinity is as follows: The Father is God,
the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God.
Igitur pater filius spiritus sanctus
unus non tres dii.
1.2.1 Therefore, Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit are one God, not three Gods.
Cuius coniunctionis ratio est
indifferentia.
1.2.2.1 The nature of Their Unity is such
that there is no difference.
Eos enim differentia comitatur qui
vel augent vel minuunt, ut Arriani qui
gradibus meritorum trinitatem
variantes distrahunt atque in
pluralitatem diducunt.
1.2.2.2 Difference cannot be avoided by
those who add to or take from the Unity,
as for instance the Arians, who by
graduating the Trinity according to merit,
break it up and convert it to Plurality.
Principium enim pluralitatis alteritas
est;
1.2.3.1.1 For the essence of plurality is
otherness;
praeter alteritatem enim nec
pluralitas quid sit intellegi potest.
1.2.2.1.2 apart from otherness plurality is
unintelligible.
Trium namque rerum vel quotlibet
tum genere tum specie tum numero
diversitas constat;
1.2.3.2 In fact, the difference between
things is to be found in genus or species
or number.
quotiens enim idem dicitur, totiens
diversum etiam praedicatur.
2.1 In as many ways as things are the
same, in the same number of ways they
are said to be diverse.
Idem vero dicitur tribus modis: aut
genere ut idem homo quod equus,
quia his idem genus ut animal; vel
specie ut idem Cato quod Cicero,
quia eadem species ut homo; vel
numero ut Tullius et Cicero, quia
unus est numero. Quare diversum
etiam vel genere vel specie vel
numero dicitur.
2.2 Sameness is predicated in three
ways: by genus; e.g., a man and a horse,
because of their common genus, animal.
By species; e.g., Cato and Cicero,
because of their common species, man.
By number; e.g., Tullius and Cicero,
because they are numerically one.
Similarly difference is expressed by
genus, species, and number.
Sed numero differentiam
accidentium varietas facit. Nam tres
homines neque genere neque
2.3 But a variety of accidents brings about
numerical difference; three men differ
neither by genus nor species, but by their
specie sed suis accidentibus
distant; nam vel si animo cuncta ab
his accidentia separemus, tamen
locus cunctis diversus est quem
unum fingere nullo modo possumus;
duo enim corpora unum locum non
obtinebunt, qui est accidens. Atque
ideo sunt numero plures, quoniam
accidentibus plures fiunt.
accidents, for if we mentally remove from
them all other accidents, still each one
occupies a different place which cannot
possibly be regarded as the same for
each, since two bodies cannot occupy the
same place, and place is an accident.
Wherefore it is because men are plural by
their accidents that they are plural in
number.
Post prooemium hic Boethius tractatum
suum incipit de Trinitate personarum et
unitate divinae essentiae. Et dividitur
liber iste in duas partes. In prima
prosequitur ea quae pertinent ad
unitatem essentiae contra Arianos. In
secunda prosequitur ea quae pertinent
ad Trinitatem personarum contra
Sabellium, ibi: sed hoc interim ad eam.
Hereupon, after the Prooemium, Boethius begins
his treatise De Trinitate Personarum, et Unitate
divinae essentiae: and this book is divided into
two parts. First, he discusses those things which
pertain to the unity of the divine essence, making
opposition the Arians. Secondly, he treats of those
things which pertain to the Trinity of persons, in
opposition to Sabellius, beginning: In as many
ways as things are the same, in the same number
of ways they are said to be diverse.
Prima pars dividitur in duas. In prima
proponit Catholicae fidei sententiam de
unitate divinae essentiae. In secunda
investigat propositae sententiae
The first part is also divided into two sections. In
the first, he proposes the doctrine of the Catholic
faith in regard to the unity of the divine essence.
Secondly, he investigates the truth of the doctrine
veritatem, ibi: age igitur, ingrediamur.
Prima dividitur in duas. In prima
describit fidei condicionem, cuius
sententiam prosequi intendit. In
secunda proponit descriptae fidei
sententiam de proposito, ibi: cuius
haec de Trinitatis.
proposed when he says: Therefore... In the first
section he treats of two things. First, he represents
the condition of that faith whose doctrine he
intends to explain. Secondly, he sets forth the
doctrine of the faith he has described concerning
this proposition, saying: The belief of this religion
concerning the Trinity.
Describit autem eam dupliciter, scilicet
ex comparatione haeresum, quibus
praepollet, et ex proprio nomine, quia
Catholica vel universalis vocatur. Dicit
ergo: plures, id est diversarum
haeresum sectae, usurpant, id est
indebite sibi attribuunt, reverentiam
Christianae religionis, id est quae
Christianae religioni debetur, ut scilicet
ei omnes subdantur, secundum illud 1
Ioh. 3: haec est victoria quae vincit
mundum, fides nostra. Vel reverentiam
quam Christiana religio Deo exhibet
credendo his quae divinitus sunt
praedicata.
1.1.1.1 He describes this religion in a twofold
manner, namely, by comparison with heretical
cutis, which it excels, and also in its own name
since it is called catholic or universal. He says,
therefore, that there are many, that is, many sects
of diverse heresies, who make unlawful claims,
since they unduly attribute to themselves the honor
of the Christian religion, that is, the honor which
ought to be paid to it: namely, that all others should
be subject to it. 1 John 5:4: This is the victory that
overcomes the world, our faith. Or, again, they
claim the dignity which belongs to the Christian
religion in that it manifests the glory of God by
believing those truths which have been divinely
revealed.
Sed ea fides pollet maxime ac solitarie.
Haec duo adiungit, ut discretionem
faciat eius quod est secundum
veritatem et eius quod est secundum
opinionem. Secundum enim rei
1.1.1.2 But that form of faith has supreme
authority, and has it exclusively. Here he adds the
two things that make it distinct both according to
truth and according to reputation. Now according
to the truth of the matter, heretics are not
veritatem haeretici Christiani non sunt,
cum a doctrina Christi recedant, et
quantum ad hoc Catholica fides
solitarie pollet; sed secundum
apparentiam et hominum opinionem
haeretici Christiani dicuntur, quia
saltem vel voce nomen Christi
confitentur, et quantum ad hoc fides
Catholica non sola, sed maxime pollet.
Christians, since they cut themselves off from the
teachings of Christ, and in this respect the Catholic
faith alone is valid. But according to appearances
and in the opinion of men, heretics are called
Christians because they do indeed still, at least in
word, confess the name of Christ; and according to
this aspect, the Catholic faith is not the only one,
but holds the place of greater authority.
Ipsa enim communius et diffusius est
recepta, unde subdit: quae vocatur
Catholica in Graeco vel universalis in
Latino, quod idem est; Catholicum enim
Graece Latine universale dicitur. Cuius
nominis assignat duas rationes, dicens:
tum propter praecepta universalium
regularum. Praecepta enim, quae fides
Catholica proponit, non uni tantum genti
observanda, sed omnibus proponit, in
quo praecipue differt a lege Moysi,
quae uni tantum populo praecepta
proponebat. Similiter etiam singulae
haereses suis tantum sectatoribus
praecepta accomoda tradunt, sed fides
Catholica de omnibus curam gerens
omnibus praecepta accomoda tribuit,
non solum continentibus, ut Manichaei,
sed etiam coniugatis; non solum
That this religion is the more common and the
more widely diffused is understood when he says,
is called catholic or universal. Now this is the
same thing; for catholic in the Greek, means the
same as the Latin universal. For the use of this
name, he assigns two reasons, saying: On
account of the precepts of its universal rules, for
the precepts which the Catholic religion sets forth
are not to be observed by one race alone, but by
all: and in this respect it differs especially from the
Law of Moses which gave precepts to one people
alone. Likewise even individual heresies propose
rules that are accommodated to their own
members only; while the Catholic faith, having the
care of all, gives its precepts to all: not to the
unmarried alone, as do the Manichaeans, but also
to the married; not to the innocent alone, as do the
Novatians, but to sinners as well, for whom that
sect would make salvation impossible. Wherefore
innocentibus, ut Novatiani, sed etiam
paenitentibus quibus illi salutem
denegant. Unde subdit: quibus, scilicet
universalibus regulis, intelligitur
auctoritas eiusdem religionis, qua
omnes ei subditi esse debent.
he adds: the authority of this religion is evident
because of its universal rules, on account of which
all ought to be subject to it.
Vel dicuntur universales regulae, quia
eis nihil falsitatis, nihil iniquitatis
admiscetur in quocumque articulo sive
in quocumque casu. Deinde subiungit
aliam causam dicens: tum propterea
quod eius cultus et cetera. Planum est
secundum illud Psalmi: in omnem
terram exivit et cetera.
Or they may be called universal rules since there is
in them no falsity or any admixture of evil, neither in
any essential article or accidentally. Then he adds
another reason, saying: Because the worship in
which they are expressed has spread throughout
the world, a thing which is evidently in accord with
that saying of Ps. 18:5: Their sound has gone forth
into all the earth: and their words unto the ends of
the world.
Cuius haec de Trinitatis et cetera. Hic
ponitur praenotatae fidei sententia de
proposita quaestione. Et circa hoc tria
facit. Primo ponit Catholicae fidei
sententiam de unitate Trinitatis.
Secundo eiusdem sententiae rationem,
ibi: cuius coniunctionis et cetera. Tertio
ostendit praedictae rationis
convenientiam, ibi: principium enim
pluralitatis.
1.1.2 Hereupon he next sets forth the doctrine of
the Catholic faith concerning the question
proposed: The belief of this religion concerning
the Trinity. Concerning this, he does three things:
First, he presents the teaching of the Catholic faith
on the unity of the Trinity. Secondly, the reason for
this opinion: The principle of this unity. Thirdly, he
shows the fitness of the reason, saying: Now the
essence of plurality.
Proponit autem fidei Catholicae
sententiam per modum argumenti, eo
quod fides argumentum non
apparentium dicitur Hebr. 11. In quo
quidem argumento ex hoc, quod deitas
singulis personis uniformiter attribuitur,
concluditur quod de omnibus non
pluraliter, sed singulariter hoc nomen
Deus praedicatur.
1.1.2.1 Moreover, he proposes the opinion of
Catholic faith in a certain argumentative form,
because faith is called the evidence of things that
appear not (Heb. 11:1). In the same argument,
indeed, from the fact that divinity is attributed
equally to each of the Persons, he concludes that
of all three the name God is predicated not
plurally, as taken together, but individually.
Deinde huius sententiae rationem
assignat. Et primo ponit rationem,
secundo per contrarium exponit, ibi:
eos enim et cetera.
1.1.2.2 Next he assigns the reason for this belief.
First, he states the reason, and secondly, he
explains it by its contrary where he says:
Difference cannot be avoided by those who add
to or take from the Unity.
Dicit ergo: cuius quidem coniunctionis,
id est coniunctae argumentationis, ratio
est indifferentia, scilicet deitatis in
tribus personis, quam fides Catholica
confitetur. Ex hoc enim est quod ex
praemissis praedicta conclusio
sequitur, quia indifferens deitas tribus
personis non differenter attribuitur.
Quam quidem rationem per contrarium
exponit, dicens: eos enim comitatur
differentia, deitatis scilicet, qui vel
augent vel minuunt, id est qui ponunt
unam personam maiorem vel minorem
1.1.2.2.1 Therefore he says: The nature of Their
Unity is such that there is no difference, namely,
the Unity of Deity in the three Persons, as
confessed by the Catholic faith. From this the
conclusion following upon the foregoing words is
that Deity without difference is attributed to each of
the three Persons; (1.1.2.2.2) and this reasoning
he explains by its contrary saying: Difference
cannot be avoided by those who add to or take
from the Unity (of the Deity): that is, who hold that
one Person is greater or less than the others, as
the Arians, who make the Father greater than the
Son. Wherefore he continues: As for instance the
alia, ut Ariani dicentes patrem esse
maiorem filio. Unde subdit: qui, scilicet
Ariani, variantes Trinitatem gradibus
meritorum, id est dignitatum, dum filium
patri subiciunt et spiritum sanctum
utrique, distrahunt, id est in diversa
trahunt deitatem in eis dividendo, atque
in pluralitatem deducunt. Ex divisione
enim sequitur pluralitas. E contrario
vero Catholici aequalitatem
personarum confitentes indifferentiam
profitentur et per consequens unitatem.
Arians, who by graduating the Trinity, break it up;
that is, by graduating the Trinity according to
dignity, since they make the Son subject to the
Father, and the Holy Spirit to both Father and Son,
and so convert it to Plurality; that is, produce
diversity by dividing the Deity among the Persons.
For from division there follows plurality.
Conversely, Catholics who confess an equality of
the Persons, an equality without difference, make
profession of consequent Unity.
Deinde cum dicit: principium enim etc.,
ostendit rationem praemissam esse
convenientem. Et dividitur in duas
partes. In prima demonstrat
praeassignatae rationis necessitatem.
In secunda quiddam, quod in sua
demonstratione supposuit, probat, ibi:
omnium namque et cetera. Circa
primum proponit duo. Primo quod
alteritas est principium pluralitatis,
alteritatem intelligens differentiam qua
aliqua inter se altera constituuntur. Et
maluit dicere alteritatem quam
alietatem, quia non solum substantiales
differentiae pluralitatem constituunt,
quarum est facere aliud, sed etiam
1.2.3.1.1 Next, he shows that the foregoing
reasoning is valid, saying: For the essence of
plurality is otherness, and first he points out the
necessity possessed by this reasoning. Secondly,
what in the demonstration itself had been
supposed is made clear: In fact, the difference
between three or more things lies in genus or
species or number. Regarding the first point he
does two things. First he shows that otherness is
the principle of plurality, understanding by
otherness any difference by which things can be
constituted among themselves as other. And he
prefers to say otherness rather than
separateness because not only substantial
differences constitute plurality, since they make
another thing, but accidental differences also
accidentales, quarum est facere
alterum; ad alietatem vero sequitur
alteritas, sed non e converso. Ex hoc
autem habetur ratio Arianicae
deductionis. Si enim alteritas est
principium pluralitatis et posita causa
ponitur effectus, ergo ponentibus
alteritatem per augmentum et
diminutionem sequitur pluralitas
deitatis.
constitute plurality, since they make for otherness:
they make a thing other. Now otherness follows
upon separateness; but the converse is not true.
And the reason for the deduction of the Arians
follows from this supposition. For if otherness is
the principle of plurality, and positing a cause
posits its effect, then supposing in them that
otherness is by augmentation and diminution,
plurality of divinity would follow.
Secundo proponit alteritatem esse
proprium principium pluralitatis, quia
praeter eam pluralitas intelligi non
potest. Ex quo habetur ratio Catholicae
coniunctionis. Remota enim propria
causa tollitur effectus. Si ergo in tribus
personis non est alteritas aliqua
deitatis, non erit pluralitas, sed unitas.
1.2.3.1.2 Secondly, he proposes that otherness is
properly the principle of plurality, because, except
for it, understanding of plurality is impossible; and
according to this principle is the Catholic
explanation of divine unity: for if a proper cause is
taken away, so also is the effect. If, therefore, in the
three Persons there is no otherness of Deity, there
will be no plurality, but unity.
Deinde cum dicit: omnium namque
rerum etc., probat quod supposuerat,
scilicet alteritatem esse proprium
principium pluralitatis. Et est ratio sua
talis. Omnium rerum genere vel specie
vel numero differentium est aliqua
alteritas sive differentia causa
diversitatis. Sed omnes res plures, sive
sint tres sive quotlibet, sunt diversae vel
1.2.3.2 Next, he proves what was supposed,
namely, that otherness is the proper principle of
plurality, when he says, In fact, the difference
between three or more things. And the reason is
that in all things that differ in genus or species or
number, there is some otherness or difference
which is the cause of plurality or, diversity. But all
plural things, whether three or more, are diverse
either generically, specifically, or numerically;
genere vel specie vel numero. Ergo
omnium plurium principium est aliqua
alteritas.
therefore some kind of otherness is the principle of
all plurality.
Circa hanc rationem tria facit. Primo
ponit minorem, secundo ibi: quotiens
enim etc. probationem minoris, quae
talis est. Quotiens dicitur idem, totiens
dicitur diversum. Sed idem dicitur tribus
modis: genere, specie et numero. Ergo
et diversum. Primam supponit ex hoc
quod dicitur in I topicorum quod
quotiens dicitur unum oppositorum,
totiens dicitur et reliquum, et ex hoc
quod dicitur X metaphysicae quod
idem et diversum sunt opposita.
2.1 In explaining this, he does three things. First,
he states the minor; secondly its proof, beginning,
In as many ways as things are the same, in the
same number of ways they are said to be diverse.
This is [the demonstration of] the proof: In as many
ways as things are said to be the same, in the
same number of ways they are said to be diverse.
But things are said to be the same in three ways,
namely, in genus, species, and number. Therefore
things are said to be diverse in the same number
of ways. The first is supposed from what is stated
in I Topic., that as much is said of one of two
opposites as is said of the other: and from the
saying of X Metaph., that the same and different
are opposites.
Secundam manifestat per exempla et
supponit eam ex I topicorum.
2.2 The second is made clear by examples and
supposes what is said in I Topic.
Tertio vero probat maiorem quantum ad
id quod poterat esse dubium, ibi: sed
numero differentiam et cetera. Quod
enim diversitatis illorum, quae sunt
diversa genere vel specie, principium
2.3 Thirdly, he proves the major in regard to that
point which might be held in doubt, saying: But a
variety of accidents brings about numerical
difference. That the diversity of those things which
are diverse according to genus or species must
sit aliqua alteritas, manifestum est ex
ipso nomine. Ex hoc enim aliqua sunt
diversa genere, quod est eis genus
alterum, et diversa specie, quod sub
altera specie continentur. Sed in his,
quae dicuntur diversa esse numero,
non est manifestum ex ipso nomine
quod aliqua alteritas sit principium
diversitatis et pluralitatis, immo magis
videtur e converso secundum nomen
quod pluralitas quae in numero
designatur sit principium diversitatis,
cum ita dicantur aliqua esse diversa
numero secundum nomen, sicut genere
vel specie. Et ideo ad verificandum
maiorem sui syllogismi ostendit quod
hanc etiam differentiam, qua aliqua
dicuntur differre numero, facit aliqua
alteritas sive varietas. Quod probat per
hoc quod in tribus hominibus, qui
conveniunt genere et specie,
inveniuntur altera accidentia, sicut in
homine et bove altera species et in
homine et lapide genus alterum. Unde
sicut homo et bos distant specie, ita
duo homines distant accidentibus.
have as principle some otherness, is evident from
the name itself. For from the fact that things are of
different genera it is evident that a different, or
other, genus belongs to each; and if they differ in
species, it is because they are contained under
other species. But in the case of things which are
said to be diverse numerically, it is not evident
from the name itself that otherness is the principle
of plurality. Furthermore, it might rather appear to
be the converse according to the name and that
plurality, which is designated by number, might be
the principle of diversity, since things numerically
different are different according to the same name
employed when difference is by genus or species:
Therefore, to prove the major of his syllogism, he
shows that this difference by which things are said
to differ numerically is produced by a certain kind
of otherness or variety. He proves this by the fact
that in three men who agree in genus and species,
but who differ numerically, there is found accidental
otherness, just as between man and ox there is
specific otherness and between man and stone
generic otherness. Wherefore, as man and ox
differ specifically, so two men differ accidentally.
Et quia posset aliquis dicere quod
varietas accidentium non est causa
And because some one might be able to say that
accidental variety is not the cause of numerical
pluralitatis secundum numerum, quia
remotis accidentibus vel secundum
rem, scilicet separabilibus, vel animo
sive cogitatione, sicut inseparabilibus,
adhuc remanent subiecta, cum
accidens sit quod adest et abest
praeter subiecti corruptionem, ideo huic
responsioni obviat dicens quod
quamvis omnia accidentia possint
saltem animo separari, tamen alicuius
accidentis diversitas nullo modo potest
nec etiam animo a diversis individuis
separari, scilicet diversitas loci. Duo
enim corpora non patiuntur eundem
locum nec secundum rem nec
secundum animi fictionem, quia hoc
non intelligi nec imaginari potest. Unde
concludit quod ex hoc sunt aliqui
homines plures numero, quod sunt
accidentibus plures, id est diversi, et in
hoc terminatur sententia huius partis.
plurality since, if accidents are done away with-
either removed actually, as when separable, or by
the mind and in thought, as when inseparable
substance still remains, since accident is that
which can be present or absent without corruption
of the substance: therefore he forestalls this
objection, saying that, although all accidents might
indeed be separated from a substance by the
mind, nevertheless the diversity of one accident
could in no way, even by the mind, be separated
from diverse individuals, namely, diversity of place.
For two individuals cannot be in the same place
either according to fact or according to any fiction
of the mind, since this cannot be understood or
imagined. Wherefore he concludes that from the
fact that men are plural in number they are plural by
reason of accidents; that is, they are for this reason
diversified; and with this is terminated the teaching
of this part of the treatise.
Quaestio 3 QUESTION III
Concerning Those Things That Pertain to
the Knowledge Possessed by Faith
Hic duplex est quaestio. Prima de his
quae pertinent ad fidei
This question is twofold. First, there is
consideration of those things that pertain to the
commendationem. Secunda de his quae
pertinent ad causam pluralitatis.
communion of faith: secondly, of those that
pertain to the cause of plurality.
Circa primum quaeruntur quattuor.
1. Primo. Utrum humano generi sit
fides necessaria.
2. Secundo. Quomodo se habet fides
ad religionem.
3. Tertio. Utrum convenienter vera
fides Catholica vel universalis
nominetur.
4. Quarto. Utrum haec sit verae fidei
confessio quod pater et filius et
spiritus sanctus singulus est Deus,
et tres sunt unus Deus absque omni
inaequalitatis distantia.
In regard to the first, four questions are asked:
1. Whether faith is necessary for mankind.
2. How faith is related to religion.
3. Whether the true faith is aptly called
Catholic or universal.
4. Whether this is the, confession of the true
faith: that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit each
is God, and that the Three are one God
without any difference owing to inequality.
Article 1
Whether Faith Is Necessary for Mankind
non fuerit necessarium humano generi
fidem habere. Ut enim dicitur Eccl. 7,
quid necesse est homini maiora se
1. It seems that faith should not be considered
necessary for mankind. As is said in Eccles. 7:1,
Why does a man need to seek things that are
above him? This is to say, there is no need. But
quaerere? Quasi dicat: nihil. Sed ea
quae per fidem traduntur sunt homine
maiora, utpote rationem eius excedentia;
alias ad ea cognoscenda sufficeret ratio
causans scientiam nec requireretur fides.
Ergo non fuit necessarium homini, ut ea
quae sunt fidei extra doceretur.
those things that are believed by faith are above
man, as exceeding his reason; otherwise ~his
reason, which is the cause of science, would
suffice. Therefore it was not necessary for man
that, over and above the truths of reason, he
should be taught those of faith.
Praeterea, Deus naturam humanam in
sua conditione perfecte instituit, unde
dicitur Deut. 32: Dei perfecta sunt opera.
Sed ex his, quae menti humanae in sua
conditione sunt indita, non potest homo
pertingere ad cognoscendum ea quae
sunt fidei; alias possent per scientiam
haberi, quae causatur ex hoc quod
conclusiones resolvuntur in principia
naturaliter nota. Cum igitur perfectum
dicatur aliquid, cui nihil deest eorum quae
debet habere, ut dicitur in V
metaphysicae, videtur quod homo fide
non indigeat.
2. God established human nature as something
perfect when He created it. Deut. 32:4, The
works of God are perfect. But from the ability
bestowed upon the human mind according to its
original condition, man cannot attain to those
things which must be known by faith; otherwise
he would be able to possess scientific
knowledge of them, a knowledge which is
caused by the fact that conclusions are resolved
into naturally known principles. Since, therefore,
a thing is called perfect if it lacks nothing that it
ought to possess, as is said in V Metaph., it
seems that man does not require faith.
Praeterea, unusquisque sapiens ad
perveniendum ad finem viam eligit
levissimam et ab impedimentis
remotissimam. Sed difficillimum videtur
credere ea quae supra rationem sunt et
valde hominibus periculosum, cum multi a
3. Every wise man makes choice of the shorter
way to reach a goal: but it would appear
exceedingly difficult for a creature to believe
truths which are above reason and, in the case of
men, extremely dangerous, since many fall away
from the state of salvation because they do not
salutis statu decidant propter hoc quod
non credunt. Ergo videtur quod Deus qui
est sapientissimus non debuerit viam
fidei praeparare hominibus ad salutem.
believe; therefore, it seems that God, who is all-
wise, ought not to have established faith as the
way of salvation for men.
Praeterea, ubicumque est acceptio
aliquorum cognitorum sine iudicio, est via
facilis ad errorem. Sed non habemus
aliquid in nobis, per quod possimus
iudicare de his quae per fidem
accipimus, cum iudicatorium naturale se
ad huiusmodi non extendat, utpote supra
rationem exsistentia. Ergo patet via
facilis ad errorem. Et ita videtur esse
homini potius noxium quam utile, ut
dirigatur in Deum per fidem.
4. Whenever there is acceptance of knowledge
without judgment, the road to error is easy; but
we have in ourselves no ability by which we are
able to judge of the things which we accept by
faith, since our natural judgment does not extend
to truths of this kind, as they exceed reason;
therefore evidently the road to error is an easy
one for us, and so it would appear rather harmful
than useful for man that he should be directed to
God by the way of faith.
Praeterea, ut dicit Dionysius, malum
hominis est praeter rationem esse. Sed
homo fidei inhaerens a ratione discedit,
et in hoc etiam assuescit rationem
contemnere. Ergo videtur quod via ista sit
hominibus noxia.
5. As Dionysius says, it is an evil for man to exist
apart from reason; but man in adhering to faith
departs from reason, and in this he is even
accustomed to despise reason; therefore it
seems that such a way is evil for men.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod dicitur Hebr. 11:
sine fide impossibile est placere Deo.
But on the contrary, it is said in Heb. 11:6,
Without faith it is impossible to please God; but
Sed hoc est homini maxime opportunum,
ut Deo placeat, sine quo nihil boni facere
aut habere potest. Ergo fides est homini
maxime necessaria.
it is supremely necessary for man that he be
pleasing to God, since otherwise he can neither
do nor possess any good; therefore faith is most
necessary for man.
Praeterea, homini maxime necessarium
est veritatem cognoscere, cum gaudium
de veritate cognita sit beatitudo, ut
Augustinus dicit. Sed, sicut dicit
Dionysius 7 c. de divinis nominibus, fides
collocat credentes in veritate et in eis
veritatem. Ergo fides est homini maxime
necessaria.
Again, it is most necessary for man to know the
truth, since beatitude is joy in knowing the truth,
as Augustine says; but faith establishes believers
in truth and establishes truth in them, as
Dionysius says (De div. nom., chap. 7); therefore
faith is most necessary for man.
Praeterea, illud, sine quo non potest
conservari humana societas, est humano
generi maxime necessarium, cum homo
sit naturaliter animal politicum, ut dicitur in
VIII Ethicorum. Sed sine fide humana
societas non potest conservari, quia
oportet quod unus homo alii credat in
promissis et in testimoniis et in aliis
huiusmodi quae sunt necessaria
hominibus ad commanendum. Ergo fides
humano generi est maxime necessaria.
Again, that without which human society cannot
be conserved is especially necessary for man,
since man is a political animal, as is said in VIII
Ethic.; but without faith human society cannot be
preserved, since it is requisite that one man
believe in the promises of another and in his
testimony and the like, for this is necessary if they
are to live together; therefore faith is most
necessary for mankind.
Responsio. Dicendum quod fides habet
aliquid commune cum opinione et aliquid
Response. I answer that it must be said that
faith has something in common with opinion, and
cum scientia et intellectu, ratione cuius
ponitur media inter scientiam et
opinionem ab Hugone de sancto Victore.
Cum scientia siquidem et intellectu
commune habet certum et fixum
assensum, in quo ab opinione differt,
quae accipit alterum contrariorum cum
formidine alterius, et a dubitatione quae
fluctuat inter duo contraria. Sed cum
opinione commune habet quod est de
rebus quae non sunt intellectui pervia, in
quo differt a scientia et intellectu.
something in common with knowledge and
understanding, by reason of which it holds a
position midway between opinion and
understanding or science, according to Hugh of
St. Victor. In common with understanding and
knowledge, it possesses certain and fixed
assent; and in this it differs from opinion, which
accepts one of two opposites, though with fear
that the other may be true, and on account of this
doubt it fluctuates between two contraries. But, in
common with opinion, faith is concerned with
things that are not naturally possible to our
understanding, and in this respect it differs from
science and intellection.
Quod autem aliquid non sit patens
humanae cognitioni, potest ex duobus
contingere, ut dicitur in II metaphysicae,
scilicet ex defectu ipsarum rerum
cognoscibilium et ex defectu intellectus
nostri.
That a thing should not be apparent to human
understanding can arise for two reasons, as is
said in II Metaph.: namely, because of lack of
knowability in things themselves, and because of
lack of intellectual ability on our part.
Ex defectu quidem rerum, sicut in rebus
singularibus et contingentibus quae a
nostris sensibus sunt remotae, sicut sunt
facta hominum et dicta et cogitata, quae
quidem talia sunt, ut uni homini possint
esse nota et alii incognita. Et quia in
convictu hominum oportet quod unus
1. It may be due to lack on the part of things, as in
the case of singular and contingent things which
are remote from our senses, like the deeds and
words and thoughts of men; for these are of such
a nature that they may be known to one man, but
unknown to others. And since among men
dwelling together one man should deal with
utatur altero sicut se ipso in his, in quibus
sibi non sufficit, ideo oportet ut stet illis
quae alius scit et sunt sibi ignota, sicut
his quae ipse cognoscit. Et exinde est
quod in conversatione hominum est fides
necessaria, qua unus homo dictis alterius
credat, et hoc est iustitiae fundamentum,
ut Tullius dicit in libro de officiis. Et inde
est quod mendacium nullum sine peccato
est, cum per omne mendacium huic fidei
tam necessariae derogetur.
another as with himself in what he is not self-
sufficient, therefore it is needful that he be able to
stand with as much certainty on what another
knows, but of which he himself is ignorant, as
upon the truths which he himself knows. Hence it
is that in human society faith is necessary in
order that one man give credence to the words of
another, and this is the foundation of justice, as
Tullius says in his book, De officiis. Hence also it
is that no lie is without sin, since every lie
derogates from that faith which is so necessary.
Ex defectu vero nostro sunt non
apparentia res divinae et necessariae,
quae sunt secundum naturam maxime
notae. Unde ad harum inspectionem non
sumus statim a principio idonei, cum
oporteat nos ex minus notis et
posterioribus secundum naturam in
magis nota et priora naturaliter pervenire.
Sed quia ex vi illorum, quae ultimo
cognoscimus, sunt nota illa quae primo
cognoscimus, oportet etiam a principio
aliquam nos habere notitiam de illis quae
sunt per se magis nota; quod fieri non
potest nisi credendo. Et etiam hoc patet
in ordine scientiarum, quia scientia quae
est de causis altissimis, scilicet
metaphysica, ultimo occurrit homini ad
2. The truth of things may also not be evident
because of defect on our part, as in the case of
divine and necessary things which, according to
their own nature, are most knowable. Wherefore,
to understand them, we are not capable of
immediate intellection, from the very beginning,
since it is in accordance with our nature to attain
from things less knowable and posterior in
themselves, to knowledge of those that are
themselves more knowable and prior. But since
from none of those things that we know last do
we have any knowledge of those that we know
first, it is needful for us even at first to have some
notion of those things that are most knowable in
themselves; but this cannot be except by
believing. And this is evident even in the order of
the sciences; since that science which is
cognoscendum, et tamen in scientiis
praeambulis oportet quod supponantur
quaedam quae in illa plenius innotescunt;
unde quaelibet scientia habet
suppositiones, quibus oportet
addiscentem credere.
concerned with highest causes, namely,
metaphysics, comes last in human knowledge;
yet in sciences that are preambles to it there
must be supposed certain truths which only in it
are more fully revealed; therefore every science
has some suppositions that must be believed in
order to carry on the process of learning.
Cum ergo finis humanae vitae sit
beatitudo, quae consistit in plena
cognitione divinorum, necessarium est
ad humanam vitam in beatitudinem
dirigendam statim a principio habere
fidem divinorum, quae plene
cognoscenda exspectantur in ultima
perfectione humana.
Since, therefore, the end of human life is
beatitude, which consists in the full cognition of
divine truths, it is necessary that human life be
directed to this beatitude by an initial possession
of divine truths by faith, truths which man can
hope to know fully in the ultimate state of human
perfection.
Ad quorum quaedam plene cognoscenda
possibile est homini pervenire per viam
rationis etiam in statu huius vitae. Et
horum quamvis possit haberi scientia et
a quibusdam habeatur, tamen
necessarium est habere fidem propter
quinque rationes, quas Rabbi Moyses
ponit.
Certain of these truths that must be known can be
attained by reason even in this life: however,
although knowledge of them is possible and even
possessed by certain men, nevertheless faith is
necessary for five reasons, which Rabbi Moses
enumerates:
Prima scilicet propter profunditatem et
subtilitatem materiae, per quam
1. First, on account of the depth and subtlety of
the matter, by which divine truths are hidden from
occultantur divina ab hominum intellectu.
Unde ne sit homo sine eorum
qualicumque cognitione, provisum est ei
ut saltem per fidem divina cognoscat,
Eccl. 7: alta profunditas, quis cognoscet
illam?
human understanding. Therefore, lest any man
be without some knowledge of them, provision is
made that through faith, at least, he know divine
truths. Therefore, in Eccles. 7:25 it is said: It is a
great depth, who shall find it out?
Secunda propter imbecillitatem
intellectus humani a principio. Non enim
provenit ei sua perfectio nisi in fine; et
ideo ut nullum tempus sit ei vacuum a
divina cognitione, indiget fide, per quam
ab ipso principio divina accipiat.
2. Secondly, on account of the weakness of the
human intellect from the beginning. For
perfection of knowledge does not belong to the
human intellect except at the end; therefore, that
it should at no time lack a knowledge of God, it
requires faith by which it may accept divine truths
from the very beginning.
Tertio propter multa praeambula, quae
exiguntur ad habendam cognitionem de
Deo secundum viam rationis. Requiritur
enim ad hoc fere omnium scientiarum
cognitio, cum omnium finis sit cognitio
divinorum; quae quidem praeambula
paucissimi consequuntur. Unde ne
multitudo hominum a divina cognitione
vacua remaneret, provisa est ei divinitus
via fidei.
3. Thirdly, because of the many preambles that
are required for a knowledge of God according
to reason. For this there is needed knowledge of
almost all the sciences, since cognition of divine
things is the end of them all. But few indeed
would comprehend these preambulatory truths or
investigate them completely. Therefore, lest large
numbers of men should be left without knowledge
of divine things, the way of faith has been
provided by God Himself.
Quarto, quia multi hominum ex naturali
complexione sunt indispositi ad
4. In the fourth place, many men on account of
their natural constitution are unfitted for perfect
perfectionem intellectus consequendam
per viam rationis; unde ut hi etiam divina
cognitione non careant, provisa est fidei
via.
intellectual investigation according to reason;
therefore, that these might not lack knowledge of
divine truths, the way of faith has been provided.
Quinto propter occupationes plurimas,
quibus oportet homines occupari; unde
impossibile est quod omnes
consequantur per viam rationis illud quod
est de Deo necessarium ad
cognoscendum, et propter hoc est via
fidei procurata, et hoc quantum ad illa
quae sunt ab aliquibus scita et aliis
proponuntur ut credenda.
5. In the fifth place, because of numerous
occupations with which men are busied, it would
be impossible for all of them to discover, by way
of reason, necessary truth in regard to God, and
on this account the way of faith has been
established, both as regards things that might in
some way be known and as regards those that
required revelation in order that they be believed.
Quaedam vero divinorum sunt, ad quae
plene cognoscenda nullatenus ratio
humana sufficit, sed eorum plena cognitio
exspectatur in futura vita, ubi erit plena
beatitudo, sicut unitas et Trinitas unius
Dei. Et ad hanc cognitionem homo
perducetur non ex debito suae naturae,
sed ex sola divina gratia. Unde oportet
quod huius etiam perfectae scientiae
quaedam suppositiones primo ei
credendae proponantur, ex quibus
dirigatur in plenam cognitionem eorum
quae a principio credit, sicut et in aliis
scientiis accidit, ut dictum est; et ideo
But in the case of certain divine truths, for a
complete understanding of them the human mind
in no way suffices, but full knowledge of them is
to be awaited in that future life when there will be
complete beatitude: such is the truth of the Trinity
and the unity of one God; and man is led to
knowledge of this, not in accordance with
anything due his nature, but by divine grace
alone. Therefore it is necessary that, for a
perfection of knowledge of this kind, certain
suppositions be proposed which must be
believed at first, and from these one is directed
into full cognition of those truths which at the
outset he held on faith, even as in other sciences
dicitur Is. 7 secundum aliam litteram: nisi
credideritis, non intelligetis. Et huiusmodi
suppositiones sunt illa quae sunt credita
quantum ad omnes et a nullo in hac vita
scita vel intellecta.
also, as has been said. Hence in Is. 7:9 it is said,
according to one translation: Unless you
believed, you would not understand. And
suppositions of this sort are those that must be
believed by all, since in this life they are neither
known nor understood by, any one.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod licet ea
quae sunt fidei sint maiora homine
naturae viribus consideratis, non sunt
tamen maiora homine divino lumine
elevato. Et ideo non est necesse homini,
ut huiusmodi propria virtute quaerat, sed
est ei necesse, ut divina revelatione ea
cognoscat.
1. It may be said: Although matters of faith
considered according to mans natural powers
are above him, they are not above man when he
is illuminated by divine light; hence it is not
necessary for man that he seek out such truths by
his own power, but it is necessary for him to
know them by divine revelation.
Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus in
prima rerum conditione hominem
perfectum instituit perfectione naturae,
quae quidem in hoc consistit, ut homo
habeat omnia quae sunt naturae debita.
Sed supra debitum naturae adduntur
postmodum humano generi aliquae
perfectiones ex sola divina gratia, inter
quas est fides quae est Dei donum, ut
patet Eph. 2.
2. It may be said: God, in the first creation of
things, established man as perfect in accordance
with the perfection of his nature, and this
consisted in the fact that man had all things due
to his nature. But over and above that due to
nature there were added afterward to the human
race certain other perfections owing their source
to divine grace alone, and among these was
faith, as is evident from Eph. 2:8, where it is said
of faith that it is the gift of God.
Ad tertium dicendum quod cuilibet in
beatitudinem tendenti necessarium est
cognoscere in quibus beatitudinem
quaerere debeat, et qualiter. Quod
quidem facilius fieri non poterat quam per
fidem, cum rationis inquisitio ad talia
pervenire non possit nisi multis
praecognitis quae non est facile scire.
Nec etiam potuit cum minori periculo,
cum humana inquisitio propter
imbecillitatem intellectus nostri sit facilis
ad errorem, et hoc aperte ostenditur ex
ipsis philosophis, qui per viam rationis
finem humanae vitae quaerentes et
modum perveniendi in ipsum in errores
multiplices et turpissimos inciderunt,
adeo sibi invicem dissentientes, ut vix
duorum aut trium esset de his per omnia
una concors sententia, cum tamen per
fidem videamus in unam sententiam
etiam plurimos populos convenire.
3. It may be said: For anyone striving to attain
beatitude it is necessary to know in what he
ought to seek this beatitude, and in what way. But
this, indeed, can be done in no easier way than
through faith, since investigation by reason
cannot attain to such knowledge except after a
previous knowledge of many other things, things
not easy to know. Nor can one attain to such
knowledge without danger, since human
investigation, because of the weakness of our
intellect, is prone to error; and this is clearly
shown by reference to those philosophers who, in
attempting to find out the purpose of human life
by way of reason, did not find in themselves the
true method, and so fell into many and shameful
errors; and so greatly did they differ among
themselves that scarcely two or three among
them all were in agreement on any one question;
yet, on the other hand, we see that by faith many
peoples are brought to the acceptance of one
common belief.
Ad quartum dicendum quod
quandocumque acceptis aliquo modo
assentitur, oportet esse aliquid quod
inclinet ad assensum, sicut lumen
naturaliter inditum in hoc quod assentitur
primis principiis per se notis et ipsorum
principiorum veritas in hoc quod
4. It may be said: Whenever there is acceptance
of a truth, by whatever mode of assent, there
must be something which moves the mind to
assent: just as the naturally possessed light of the
intellect causes assent to first principles, and the
truth of those first principles causes assent to
conclusions made from them; while in other ways
assentitur conclusionibus scitis et aliquae
verisimilitudines in hoc quod assentimus
his quae opinamur; quae si fuerint
aliquantulum fortiores, inclinant ad
credendum, prout fides dicitur opinio
iuvata rationibus. Sed illud, quod inclinat
ad assentiendum principiis intellectis aut
conclusionibus scitis, est sufficiens
inductivum et ideo etiam cogit ad
assensum et est sufficiens ad
iudicandum de illis quibus assentitur.
Quod vero inclinat ad opinandum
qualitercumque vel etiam fortiter, non est
sufficiens inductivum, unde nec cogit, nec
per hoc potest perfectum haberi iudicium
de his quibus assentitur. Unde et in fide
qua in Deum credimus non solum est
acceptio rerum quibus assentimus, sed
aliquid quod inclinat ad assensum; et hoc
est lumen quoddam, quod est habitus
fidei, divinitus menti humanae infusum.
Quod quidem sufficientius est ad
inducendum quam aliqua demonstratio,
per quam etsi numquam falsum
concludatur, frequenter tamen in hoc
homo fallitur, quod putat esse
demonstrationem quae non est. Est
sufficientius etiam quam ipsum lumen
naturale quo assentimus principiis, cum
lumen illud frequenter impediatur ex
we assent to things of which we have an opinion,
though, if motives were a little stronger, they
would incline us to belief, in so far as faith is said
to be opinion. But that which inclines the mind to
assent to the first principles of understanding or
to conclusions known from these principles is a
sufficient induction which forces assent, and is
sufficient to judge of those things to which the
mind gives its assent. On the other hand,
whatever inclines one to form an opinion, even
though with a good amount of conviction, is not
that sufficient form of induction whereby assent is
forced, nor by reason of it can there be perfect
judgment of the things to which assent is given.
Therefore also in faith by which we believe in
God, not only is there acceptance of the truths to
which we give assent, but also something which
inclines us to that assent; and this is the special
light which is the habit of faith, divinely infused
into the human mind. This, moreover, is more
sufficient for inducing belief than any
demonstration, for, though from the latter no false
conclusions are reached, still man frequently errs
in this: that he thinks something is a
demonstration which is not. The light of faith is
also more sufficient than the natural light of
reason by which we assent to first principles,
since this natural light is often impeded by bodily
infirmity, as is evident in the case of the. insane.
But the light of faith, which is, as it were, a kind of
lumen illud frequenter impediatur ex
corporis infirmitate, ut patet in mente
captis. Lumen autem fidei, quod est
quasi quaedam sigillatio primae veritatis
in mente, non potest fallere, sicut nec
Deus potest decipi vel mentiri, unde hoc
lumen sufficit ad iudicandum.
But the light of faith, which is, as it were, a kind of
impression of the First Truth in our minds, cannot
fail, any more than God can deceive us or lie;
therefore this light suffices for making judgment.
Hic tamen habitus non movet per viam
intellectus, sed magis per viam voluntatis;
unde non facit videre illa quae creduntur
nec cogit assensum, sed facit voluntarie
assentire. Et sic patet quod fides ex
duabus partibus est a Deo, scilicet et ex
parte interioris luminis quod inducit ad
assensum et ex parte rerum quae
exterius proponuntur, quae ex divina
revelatione initium sumpserunt. Et haec
se habent ad cognitionem fidei sicut
accepta per sensum ad cognitionem
principiorum, quia utrisque fit aliqua
cognitionis determinatio. Unde sicut
cognitio principiorum accipitur a sensu et
tamen lumen quo principia cognoscuntur
est innatum, ita fides est ex auditu, et
tamen habitus fidei est infusus.
This habit of faith, nevertheless, does not move
us by way of intellectual understanding, but more
by way of the will; therefore it does not make us
comprehend those truths which we believe, nor
does it force assent, but it causes us to assent to
them voluntarily. And thus it is evident that faith
comes in two ways: namely, from God by reason
of the interior light which induces assent, and
also by reason of those truths which are
proposed exteriorly and take their source from
divine revelation. These latter are related to the
knowledge which is of faith as things known by
the senses are to knowledge of first principles,
because in both cases there is a certain
determination given to cognition. Therefore, as
cognition of first principles is received by way of
sense experience, and yet the light by which
those principles are known is innate, so faith
comes by way of hearing, and yet the habit of
faith is infused.
Ad quintum dicendum quod vivere 5. It may be said: To live in accordance with
secundum rationem est bonum hominis in
quantum est homo, vivere autem praeter
rationem potest uno modo sonare in
defectum, sicut est in illis qui vivunt
secundum sensum, et hoc est hominis
malum. Alio modo potest sonare in
excessum, ut cum homo divina gratia
adducitur in id quod est supra rationem;
et sic praeter rationem vivere non est
hominis malum, sed bonum supra
hominem. Et talis est cognitio eorum
quae sunt fidei, quamvis et ipsa fides non
omnibus modis sit praeter rationem; hoc
enim naturalis ratio habet, quod
assentiendum est his quae a Deo
dicuntur.
reason is the good of man inasmuch as he is
man. Now, to live apart from reason, according to
one meaning, can be understood as a defect, as
it is in those who live according to sense; and
this is an evil in man. But in another way, it may
mean to live above reason as when, by divine
grace, a man is led to that which exceeds
reason: and in this case, to live apart from
reason is not an evil in man, but a good above
that which is human. And such is the cognition of
truths of faith, although faith itself is not in every
way outside reason; for, it is the natural reason
which holds that assent ought to be given to
truths declared by God.
Article 2
Whether Faith Should Be Distinguished from Religion
Ad secundum sic proceditur, videtur
quod fides a religione distinguenda
non sit, quia, ut Augustinus dicit in
Enchiridion, fide, spe et caritate
colendus est Deus. Sed cultus Dei est
1. It seems that faith ought not to be distinguished
from religion, because, as Augustine says in Ench.,
God is to be worshiped by faith, hope, and
charity; but worship of God is an act of religion, as
is evident from the definition of Tullius, which says:
actus religionis, ut patet per
diffinitionem Tullii qui dicit quod religio
est quae cuidam superiori naturae,
quam divinam vocant, cultum
caerimoniamque affert. Ergo fides ad
religionem pertinet.
Religion is that which offers to a superior nature,
which men call divine, worship and ceremony;
therefore faith pertains to religion.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in libro de
vera religione quod vera religio est qua
unus Deus colitur et purgatissima
pietate cognoscitur. Sed cognoscere
Deum est fidei. Ergo fides sub
religione continetur.
2. Augustine says in De vera religione: The true
religion is that by which the one God is honored
and known with a most unsullied piety or purity. But
to know God is a thing which belongs to faith;
therefore, faith is contained under religion.
Praeterea, offerre Deo sacrificium est
actus religionis. Sed hoc pertinet ad
fidem, quia, ut dicit Augustinus in V de
civitate Dei, verum sacrificium est
omne opus quod agitur, ut sancta
societate inhaereamus Deo. Prima
autem inhaesio hominis ad Deum est
per fidem. Ergo fides ad religionem
praecipue pertinet.
3. To offer sacrifice to God is a function or act of
religion, but this pertains to faith, as Augustine says
in IV De civ. Dei: True sacrifice is any work done
in order that we may adhere to God in holy
association; but the first adherence of man to God
is by faith; therefore faith pertains principally to
religion.
Praeterea, ut dicitur Ioh. 4, spiritus est
Deus, et eos, qui adorant eum, in
spiritu et veritate adorare oportet.
Magis ergo proprie adoratur Deus,
4. In John 4:24 it is said: God is a Spirit, and they
that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in
truth. Now, God is adored more when one submits
his intellect to Him than when a bodily prostration is
cum ei prosternitur intellectus, quam
cum ei prosternitur corpus. Sed per
fidem ei prosternitur intellectus, dum se
intellectus totaliter subicit ad
assentiendum his quae a Deo dicuntur.
Ergo fides ad religionem maxime
pertinet.
made; but through faith the intellect is submitted to
God, since it subjects itself entirely in assenting to
the truths revealed by God; therefore faith pertains
especially to religion.
Praeterea, omnis virtus, quae habet
Deum pro obiecto, est virtus
theologica. Sed religio habet Deum
pro obiecto; non enim nisi Deo cultum
debitum affert. Ergo est virtus
theologica. Sed magis videtur
pertinere ad fidem quam ad aliquam
aliarum, cum non dicantur esse extra
religionem Christianam nisi qui sunt
extra fidem. Ergo religio videtur idem
esse quod fides.
5. Every virtue having God as its object is a
theological virtue: but religion has God as its
object, since it is nothing else than the offering of
due reverence to God; therefore it is a theological
virtue. But it appears to belong more to faith than to
any of the others, since only those are said to be
outside the Christian religion who are outside [i.e.,
without] faith; therefore religion seems to be the
same as faith.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod Tullius in II veteris
rhetoricae ponit religionem partem
iustitiae, quae est virtus cardinalis.
Ergo cum fides sit virtus theologica,
religio erit alterius generis quam fides.
On the contrary is what Tullius says in II Veteris
Rhetoricae, where he makes religion a part of
justice, which is a moral virtue. Therefore, since
faith is a theological virtue, religion is of a genus
other than that of faith.
Praeterea, religio consistit etiam in
actu qui est ad proximum, ut patet Iac.
2: religio munda et immaculata et
cetera. Sed fides non habet actum nisi
qui est ad Deum. Ergo religio est
omnino a fide distincta.
Again, religion consists also in activity regarding
the neighbor, as is evident in Jas. 1:27: Religion
clean and undefiled before God and the Father is
this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their
tribulation; faith has no act except that which is
referred to God; therefore religion is altogether
distinct from faith.
Praeterea, religiosi dicuntur
communiter, qui quibusdam
specialibus votis astringuntur. Non
solum autem ipsi dicuntur fideles. Ergo
non est idem fidelis et religiosus. Ergo
nec idem fides et religio.
Again, those are commonly called religious who
are bound by special vows, but they are not the only
ones called 1. the faithful. Since, therefore, one of
the faith and a religious are not the same thing,
faith and religion are not the same.
Responsio. Dicendum quod, sicut
patet per Augustinum X de civitate Dei,
theosebia quae cultus Dei dicitur,
religio, pietas et latria ad idem
pertinere intelliguntur, scilicet ad Deum
colendum. Cultus autem cuilibet rei
impensus nihil aliud esse videtur quam
debita operatio circa illud adhibita. Et
ex hoc dicuntur aliqui diversimode
colere agros, parentes, patriam et alia
huiusmodi, quia diversis diversae
operationes coaptantur. Deus autem
non hoc modo colitur, quod ei nostra
operatio aliquid prosit aut subveniat,
Response. I answer that it must be said that, as is
evident from Augustine (X De civ. Dei), theosebia,
which the worship of God is called, includes as
pertaining to it in the same way, religion, piety and
latria, since all have as their purpose the worship of
God. Reverence paid to anything, however, seems
to be nothing else than a due operation performed
with regard to it; and consequently men are said to
cherish in various ways their fields, their parents,
their country, and other like things because different
works are fitting to each. But God is not cherished
in this same way: that any operation of ours would
be of benefit or assistance to Him, as in the case of
the above-mentioned instances; but it implies only
sicut est in praedictis, sed solum in
quantum nos ei subdimus et subditos
demonstramus. Hic ergo cultus divinus
absolute nomine theosebiae
designatur. Sed religio importat
quandam ligationem, secundum quod
homo quodammodo se astringit ad
cultum istum; unde, ut dicit Augustinus
in libro de vera religione, religio a
religando dicta creditur, vel etiam a
reeligendo, ut dicit in X de civitate Dei.
Ex propria enim electione aliquis
ligatur ad aliquid faciendum. Oportet
autem nos eum reeligere quem
amiseramus neglegentes, ut ibidem
dicit. Et inde est quod illi, qui vitam
suam totam et se ipsos ad divinum
obsequium votis quibusdam obligant,
religiosi dicuntur. Sed pietas animum
colentis respicit, qui non ficte nec
mercennario affectu obsequitur.
that we submit ourselves to Him and show
ourselves to be His subjects. Therefore this
reverence which is absolutely divine is designated
by the name of theosebia. But religion implies a
certain binding, back according to which man
obliges himself in some manner to this worship of
God; wherefore Augustine says in his book, De
vera religione: The word religion is thought to be
derived from the religare (to bind back), or from
recte eligere (to choose rightly), as is said in IV
De civ. Dei. For it is by proper choice that a person
binds himself to do something that must be done.
We must also reelect those things which by
negligence we have lost, as he also says.
Therefore it is that those who consecrate their
whole lives and themselves to the service of God
by certain vows are called religious; but piety
regards the mind of the worshiper, that it be not
insincere or moved by desire of gain.
Et quia his, quae supra nos sunt, quasi
quaedam divina veneratio debetur,
beneficia etiam quae miseris
exhibentur sunt quasi quaedam Dei
sacrificia, secundum illud Hebr. ultimo:
communionis et beneficentiae nolite
oblivisci, talibus enim hostiis
Since also a certain divine veneration, as it were, is
due to those above us, even the acts of kindness
which are done for the unfortunate are in a way
sacrifices to God, according to the last part of the
Epistle to the Hebrews (13: 16): And do not forget
to do good and to impart: for by such sacrifices
Gods favor is obtained. Hence it is that the name
promeretur Deus, hinc est quod nomen
pietatis et religionis ad opera
misericordiae transfertur et maxime ad
beneficia quae in parentes et patriam
exhibentur. Sed latria importat debitum
colendi sive rationem cultus, ex hoc
scilicet quod eius sumus servi quem
colimus, non hoc modo, quo homo
servus hominis dicitur propter
quodcumque accidentale debitum, sed
quia totum, quod sumus, ei debemus
tamquam creatori. Unde et latria
servitus dicitur non quaelibet, sed illa
tantum, qua homo Dei servus est. Sic
ergo religio consistit in operatione, qua
homo Deum colit se ei subdendo.
Quae quidem operatio debet esse
conveniens et ei, qui colitur, et colenti.
of piety and of religion are transferred to works of
mercy, and especially to benefits done to parents
and country. But latria implies a reverence that is of
obligation, or worship in its essence; and this is so
because we are, indeed, the subjects of Him whom
we honor, not after the manner in which one man is
said to be the servant of another, because of some
accidental debt to him, but because all that we are
we owe to Him as our Creator. Therefore latria is
not any kind of service, but that by which man
acknowledges his subjection to God. Thus,
therefore, religion consists in an operation by which
man honors God by submitting to Him; and this
operation ought to be in harmony with Him who is
honored, and with the one offering homage.
Ipse autem qui colitur, cum sit spiritus,
non potest corpore, sed sola mente
contingi. Et sic cultus ipsius
principaliter in mentis actibus consistit,
quibus mens ordinatur in Deum. Et hi
sunt praecipue actus theologicarum
virtutum, et secundum hoc dicit
Augustinus quod Deus colitur fide, spe
et caritate; et his adiunguntur actus
donorum tendentium in Deum, ut
Now since He who is reverenced is a spirit, He
cannot be approached by the body, but only by the
mind; and so worship of Him consists chiefly in acts
of the mind by which the mind itself is ordained to
God. These acts are principally those of the
theological virtues; and in accordance with this,
Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith,
hope, and charity, to which are added also the acts
of the gifts ordained toward God, such as those of
wisdom and of fear.
sapientiae et timoris.
Sed quia nos, qui Deum colimus,
corporei sumus et per corporeos
sensus cognitionem accipimus, inde
est quod ex parte nostra requiruntur ad
cultum praedictum etiam aliquae
corporales actiones, tum ut ex toto
quod sumus Deo serviamus, tum ut per
huiusmodi corporalia nos ipsos et alios
excitemus ad actus mentis ordinatos in
Deum. Unde dicit Augustinus in libro
de cura pro mortuis agenda: orantes
de membris sui corporis faciunt quod
supplicantibus congruit, cum genua
figunt, cum extendunt manus vel
prosternuntur solo et si quid aliud
visibiliter faciunt, quamvis eorum
invisibilis voluntas et cordis intentio
Deo nota sit nec ille indigeat his
indiciis, ut animus pandatur humanus;
sed hinc magis se ipsum excitat homo
ad orandum gemendumque humilius
atque ferventius.
But because we who honor God are also
possessed of bodies and receive our knowledge
through bodily senses, there is the necessity that
certain physical actions accompany the worship of
God, not only that we may render service to God
with our whole being, but also that by these bodily
actions we may arouse in ourselves and in others
acts of the mind ordained to God. Wherefore
Augustine says in his book, De cura pro mortuis
habenda: Those who pray make the members of
their bodies conform to their acts of supplication
when they genuflect, extend their hands, or
prostrate themselves upon the ground, or perform
any other visible action; and although it is their
invisible will and the intention of the heart that is
known to God, it is not unseemly that the human
soul should so express itself, but rather by so doing
man stirs himself to pray and to lament his sins the
more humbly and fervently.
Sic ergo omnes actus, quibus homo se
Deo subdit, sive sint mentis sive
corporis, ad religionem pertinent. Sed
quia ea, quae proximis propter Deum
Hence, all acts by which man subjects himself to
God, whether they are acts of mind or of body,
pertain to religion. But because those things that
are rendered to the neighbor on account of God
impenduntur, ipsi Deo impenduntur,
constat quod pertinent ad eandem
subiectionem, in qua cultus religionis
consistit. Et sic diligenter consideranti
apparet omnem actum huiusmodi ad
religionem pertinere. Unde Augustinus
dicit quod verum sacrificium est omne
opus quod agitur, ut sancta societate
inhaereamus Deo. Tamen quodam
ordine. Primo namque et principaliter
ad cultum praedictum pertinent actus
mentis ordinati in Deum. Secundo
actus corporis qui ad hos excitandos et
designandos fiunt, ut prostrationes,
sacrificia et huiusmodi. Tertio ad
eundem cultum pertinent omnes alii
actus in proximum ordinati propter
Deum.
are rendered to God Himself, it is evident that they
also pertain to this same subjection in which
religious worship consists; and so to one diligently
considering the matter it is apparent that every
good act pertains to religion. Hence Augustine
says (loc. cit.): True sacrifice is every work done
that we may adhere to God in holy companionship;
however, in a certain order. First and foremost,
those acts of the mind ordained to God pertain to
the worship which we are speaking of. Secondly,
there are acts of the body intended to arouse
reverence of mind or to give expression to it, such
as prostrations, sacrifices, and the like. Thirdly,
there also pertain to divine worship all other acts
ordained to the neighbor for the sake of God.
Et tamen sicut magnanimitas est
specialis virtus, quamvis omnium
virtutum actibus utatur secundum
specialem rationem obiecti, utpote
coniectans magnum in actibus omnium
virtutum, ita et religio est specialis
virtus, in actibus omnium virtutum
specialem rationem obiecti
considerans, scilicet Deo debitum; sic
enim est iustitiae pars. Illi tamen actus
Nevertheless, as magnanimity is a certain special
virtue, although it uses the acts of all virtues, since it
bestows a grandeur in the exercise of them all and
so regards its object under a certain special
aspect; so also religion is a special virtue in the
acts of all the virtues, considering a special aspect
of its object, namely, that which is due to God; and
thus it forms a part of justice. There are, moreover,
special acts assigned to religion, which pertain to
no other virtue, such as prostrations and the like, in
specialiter religioni assignantur, qui
nullius alterius virtutis sunt, sicut
prostrationes et huiusmodi, in quibus
secundario Dei cultus consistit.
which the worship of God consists secondarily.
Ex quo patet quod actus fidei pertinet
quidem materialiter ad religionem,
sicut et actus aliarum virtutum, et
magis, in quantum actus fidei est
primus motus mentis in Deum. Sed
formaliter a religione distinguitur,
utpote aliam rationem obiecti
considerans. Convenit etiam fides cum
religione praeter hoc, in quantum fides
est religionis causa et principium. Non
enim aliquis eligeret cultum Deo
exhibere, nisi fide teneret Deum esse
creatorem, gubernatorem et
remuneratorem humanorum actuum.
From this it is evident that acts of faith pertain,
indeed, materially to religion, as do the acts of
other virtues, and the more so inasmuch as acts of
faith are the first motions of the mind toward God;
but formally faith is distinguished from religion, as
regarding another aspect of its object. Faith agrees
with religion also because faith is the cause and
principle, of religion. For no one would elect to
manifest reverence to God unless by faith he held
that God was the Creator, Ruler, and Rewarder of
human actions.
Ipsa tamen religio non est virtus
theologica. Habet enim pro materia
quasi ipsos actus vel fidei vel alterius
virtutis, quos Deo tamquam debitos
offert. Sed Deum habet pro fine.
Colere enim Deum est huiusmodi
actus ut debitos Deo offerre.
Nevertheless religion is not a theological virtue: for
it has as its matter all acts, as those of faith or of
any other virtue inasmuch as these are offered as
due to God; but it has God as its end. For to
worship God is to offer acts of this kind as due to
God.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad omnia
obiecta.
From what has been said, the response to all the
objections is evident.
Article 3
Whether the Christian Religion Is Aptly Called Catholic or Universal
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod
fides Christiana Catholica nominari non
debeat, quia cognitio debet esse
cognoscibili proportionata. Non enim
quidlibet modo cognoscitur. Sed fides
est cognitio Dei, qui neque est
universalis neque particularis, ut
Augustinus dicit in libro de Trinitate.
Ergo nec fides debet universalis dici.
1. It seems that the Christian religion ought not be
called Catholic, because knowledge must be
proportionate to the knowability of a thing. Now an
indefinite thing is not known in any way at all: but
faith is a knowledge of God who is neither
universal nor particular, as Augustine says in his
book, De Trinitate; therefore this religion cannot
be called universal.
Praeterea. De singularibus non potest
esse nisi singularis cognitio. Sed fide
quaedam singularia facta tenemus, ut
passionem Christi, resurrectionem et
huiusmodi. Ergo fides non debet dici
universalis.
2. One can have only singular knowledge about
singular things; but by faith we hold the truth of
certain singular facts, as the Passion and
Resurrection of Christ, and the like; therefore the
Christian faith cannot be called universal.
Praeterea, ab eo quod est commune
multis non debet proprium nomen alicui
3. From what is common to many, it is not
permissible to impose a name as proper to any
eorum imponi, cum nomen causa
innotescendae rei imponatur. Sed
quaelibet traditio vel secta proponit ea
quae tradit ut universaliter ab omnibus
credenda vel observanda et ut
universaliter vera. Ergo non debet fides
Christiana specialiter Catholica dici.
one of them, since a name is given in order that a
thing may be known as distinct: but every school or
sect proposes certain things that must be
universally held by all its followers, or certain
doctrines that must be universally affirmed as true;
therefore the Christian religion has no special right
to be called Catholic.
Praeterea, idolatria ad omnes mundi
angulos pervenit. Sed Christiana fides
nondum invenitur ad omnes mundi fines
pervenisse, cum aliqui barbari sint, qui
fidem Christi non cognoscant. Ergo
idolatriae secta magis debet dici
Catholica quam Christiana fides.
4. Idolatry extends to every corner of the earth; but
the Christian religion has not yet been brought to
all the regions of the world, since there are yet
some barbarians who do not know the faith of
Christ; therefore these idolatrous sects, rather than
the Christian religion, deserve the name of
Catholic.
Praeterea, quod non convenit omnibus,
non potest dici universale. Sed fides
Christiana a multis non recipitur. Ergo
inconvenienter Catholica vel universalis
dicitur.
5. What does not include all should not be called
universal; but the Christian religion is not accepted
by many; therefore it is inaptly called universal or
Catholic.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus in
libro de vera religione: tenenda est
nobis Christiana religio et eius
Ecclesiae communicatio, quae
On the contrary is that which Augustine says in De
vera religione: The Christian religion must be held
by us, and the communication of that Church which
is catholic and which is called Catholic, not only by
Catholica est et Catholica nominatur
non solum a suis, verum etiam ab
omnibus inimicis.
its own members, but even by its enemies.
Praeterea, universale et commune
idem esse videtur. Sed fides Christiana
ab apostolo communis fides dicitur, ut
patet Tit. 1: Tito dilecto filio secundum
communem fidem et cetera. Ergo
convenienter potest dici universalis vel
Catholica.
Again, universal and common appear to be the
same; but the Christian faith is called the common
faith by the Apostle (Titus 1:4): To Titus, my
beloved son according to the common faith;
therefore it is rightly called Catholic.
Praeterea, illud, quod universaliter
omnibus proponitur, maxime debet dici
universale. Sed fides Christiana
omnibus proponitur, ut patet Matth.
ultimo: docete omnes gentes et cetera.
Ergo ipsa merito debet dici Catholica
vel universalis.
Again what is universally proposed to all should in
a special way be called universal; but the Christian
faith is universally proposed to all, as is evident in
the last chapter of Matthew (28:19), Teach all
nations, etc.; therefore it is deservedly called
Catholic or universal.
Responsio. Dicendum quod fides sicut
et quaelibet alia cognitio duplicem
habet materiam, scilicet in qua, id est
ipsos credentes, et de qua, id est res
creditas, et ex parte utriusque materiae
fides Christiana Catholica dici potest.
Response. I answer that it must be said that faith,
just as any other cognition, has a twofold matter:
namely, that in which it exists (the believers
themselves) and that about which it is concerned
(the truths believed); and as regards both types of
matter, the Christian religion can be called
Catholic.
Ex parte quidem credentium, quia illam
fidem veram asserit apostolus Rom. 3,
quae est testificata a lege et prophetis.
Cum autem prophetarum tempore
diversae gentes diversorum deorum
cultibus insisterent, solus autem
populus Israel Deo vero cultum debitum
exhiberet, et sic non esset una
universalis religio, praedixit per eos
spiritus sanctus cultum veri Dei ab
omnibus esse assumendum. Unde
dicitur Is. 45: mihi curvabitur omne genu
et confitebitur omnis lingua; quod
quidem per Christianam fidem et
religionem impletur.
As regards the believers it is Catholic because the
Apostle (Rom. 3:2) asserts that that is the true
religion which was given testimony to by the law
and the prophets. Since, however, in the times of
the prophets various tribes offered worship to
different gods, only one nation, the people of Israel,
gave due honor to the true God, and so there did
not exist that one universal religion which was
foretold to them by the Holy Spirit, that worship of
the true God which would be paid by all. Therefore
Isaiah (45:24) says: For every knee shall be
bowed to Me, and every tongue shall swear. And
this prophecy has, indeed, been fulfilled by faith
and the Christian religion.
Unde merito Catholica nominatur,
utpote a cuiuslibet condicionis
hominibus recepta. Et sic illi, qui ab hac
fide et religione communiter promissa
et recepta in proprias quasdam
sententias declinarunt, non Catholici,
sed, quasi a communione divisi,
haeretici nominantur.
Therefore deservedly is that faith called Catholic
since it has been accepted by men of every
condition. And thus, those who have fallen away
from this faith and this religion which has been so
universally foretold and received, and who have
become divided into various sects, are not called
Catholics, but as it were, having been cut off from
the communion of the faithful, they are called
heretics.
Sed ex parte etiam rerum creditarum in
fide Christiana universalitas invenitur.
Fuerunt namque antiquitus diversae
As regards the truths proposed for belief in the
Christian religion, there is also found truth that is
catholic. Now, there were various arts and ways in
artes et viae, quibus hominibus
quantum ad diversa providebatur vel
provideri credebatur. Quidam namque
bonum hominis in solis corporalibus
ponebant, vel in divitiis vel honoribus
aut voluptatibus. Quidam in solis
animae bonis, ut in virtutibus moralibus
vel intellectualibus. Quidam etiam, ut
Augustinus dicit in libro de civitate Dei,
aestimabant deos esse colendos
propter temporalia bona istius vitae,
quidam vero propter bona quae sunt
post vitam. Porphyrius etiam ponebat
quibusdam gentilibus teletis animae
imaginariam partem purgari, non totam
animam, dicebatque, ut Augustinus dicit
X de civitate Dei, nondum esse
receptam unam sectam, quae
universalem contineat viam animae
liberandae.
ancient times according as there was vision, or
belief in the vision of the human mind among men.
For certain men placed the good of man in
corporeal things alone, either in riches or in honors
or in pleasures. Some others placed this good in
the soul alone, as in moral or intellectual virtues.
Certain others, as Augustine says in his book, De
civ. Dei, thought that gods ought to be honored
because of the corporeal blessings of this life; but
others, on account of blessings to be realized after
death. Porphyry also relates that it was believed
among certain peoples of the earth that the
imaginative part of the soul would be cleansed, but
not the whole soul; and he said, as Augustine tells
in X De civ. Dei, that there had not yet been found
a single sect that possessed a universal way for
liberty of spirit. Now this way, as Augustine says in
the same place, is the Christian religion.
Haec autem est religio Christiana, ut
Augustinus ibidem dicit. Ipsa enim
docet Deum esse colendum non solum
propter aeterna, sed etiam propter
temporalia beneficia, nec solum in
spiritualibus, sed etiam in usu
corporalium hominem dirigit et
beatitudinem animae et corporis
This religion teaches that God is to be honored not
only on account of eternal, but also because of
temporal benefits; that He rules man not only in
spiritual ways but also in all that concerns him
bodily, and that He promises beatitude for both
soul and body. Hence His regulations are called
universal, as pertaining to the whole life of man
and as extending to all that in any way affects man.
repromittit. Et ideo regulae eius
universales dicuntur, utpote totam vitam
hominis et omne, quod ad ipsum
quolibet modo pertinet, ordinantes. Et
has duas rationes universalitatis
assignat Boethius, ut in littera patet.
For these two reasons, therefore, the name
universal is given to the Christian religion, as
Boethius in the text makes clear.
quamvis Deus in se non sit neque
universalis neque particularis, est
tamen universalis omnium rerum causa
et finis, et sic cognitio, quae de ipso
habetur, ad omnia quodammodo
universalis est.
1. It may, therefore, be answered: Although God is
in Himself neither universal nor particular, yet He is
the universal cause and end of all things, and thus
knowledge which is held concerning Him is
universal since it extends to all things.
Ad secundum dicendum quod illa
particularia facta tenet fides ut
universalia remedia ad totum genus
humanum liberandum.
2. It may be said: Faith holds these particular facts
as universal remedies for the healing and the
liberation of the whole human race.
Ad tertium dicendum quod aliae sectae
hoc sibi vindicare nituntur, quod est
proprium fidei Christianae, sed non
possunt pertingere, unde eis non
proprie universalitatis competit nomen.
3. Answer may be made: Other sects claim for
themselves what is proper to the Christian faith,
but they cannot vindicate this claim; therefore, the
name of universality does not properly belong to
them.
Ad quartum dicendum quod idolatria
non erat una religio, sed apud diversos
diversa, cum diversi diversos sibi deos
colendos instituerent. Nec iterum ab
omnibus nationibus est acceptata, cum
a veri Dei cultoribus fuerit reprobata et
etiam a sapientibus gentilium, qui
dicebant huiusmodi caerimonias esse
observandas tamquam legibus iussas,
non tamquam diis placitas, ut de
Seneca dicit Augustinus in VI de
civitate Dei.
4. It may be said: Idolatry was no one form of
religion, but differed among various peoples, since
they set up for themselves various gods to be
worshiped. Nor again, were those forms of idolatry
accepted by all nations, since they were rejected
by those who honored the true God, and even by
the philosophers of the Gentiles, who said that
certain religious ceremonies ought to be observed
since they were commanded by law, but not
because they could be known to please the gods,
as Seneca said, according to Augustine in De civ.
Dei.
Ad quintum dicendum quod fides
Christiana non dicitur Catholica vel
universalis propter singula generum,
sed propter genera singulorum, quia ex
omni condicione hominum ei aliqui
adhaeserunt.
5. It may be answered: The Christian religion is not
called Catholic on account of individual nations
who adhere to it, but on account of the body of
individual men from all conditions of mankind who
adhere to it.
Article 4
Whether it Is a True Article of Faith, That the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit Are One God
Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur
quod non sit Catholicae fidei
1. It seems that it is not the confession of the
Catholic faith that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are
confessio quod pater et filius et
spiritus sanctus sint unus Deus, quia,
ut ipse dicit, ad inaequalitatem horum
trium sequitur pluralitas deorum. Sed
sacra Scriptura, quae est caput
Catholicae religionis, ut dicit
Augustinus in libro de vera religione,
ponit inaequalitatem patris et filii, ut
videtur per hoc quod dicitur Ioh. 14:
pater maior me est, ex persona filii.
Ergo non est haec sententia
Catholicae fidei quam dicit.
one God: because, as Boethius himself says, upon
inequality there follows plurality of gods. But the
Catholic Scripture, which is the head of the Catholic
religion, as Augustine says in De vera religione,
states that there is inequality between Father and
Son, as is evident from what is said in the person of
the Son in John 14:28: The Father is greater than I.
Therefore what is said is not the confession of the
Catholic religion.
Praeterea, 1 Cor. 15: cum subiecta illi
fuerint omnia, scilicet filio, tunc et ipse
subiectus erit ei, scilicet patri, qui sibi
subiecit omnia; et sic idem quod
prius.
2. 1 Cor. 15:28 says: And when all things shall be
subdued unto Him, then the Son also Himself shall
be subject unto Him that put all things under Him,
that God may be all in all. And so the conclusion is
like the former.
Praeterea, orare non est nisi inferioris
ad superiorem. Sed filius orat pro
nobis, Rom. 8: Christus Iesus qui
etiam interpellat pro nobis. Similiter et
spiritus sanctus, eodem: spiritus
postulat pro nobis gemitibus
inenarrabilibus. Ergo filius et spiritus
sanctus sunt patre inferiores
secundum confessionem Catholicae
fidei; et sic idem quod prius.
3. Prayer is not made except by an inferior to a
superior: but the Son prays for us. Rom. 8:34, Christ
Jesus... who also makes intercession for us.
Likewise of the Holy Spirit it is said in the same
place (8:26), The Spirit Himself asks for us with
unspeakable groanings. Therefore the Son and the
Holy Spirit are inferior to the Father according to the
confession of the Catholic faith, and so the
conclusion is the same.
Praeterea, Ioh. 17 dicit filius loquens
ad patrem: haec est vita aeterna, ut
cognoscant te solum verum Deum et
quem misisti Iesum Christum. Ergo
solus pater est verus Deus, non ergo
filius et spiritus. Et sic videntur esse
creaturae, et sic idem quod prius.
4. John 17:3 gives the words of the Son addressing
Himself to the Father: That they may know You, the
only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom You have
sent. Therefore the Father alone is the true God,
and not the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore they
seem to be creatures, and so the same conclusion
is reached.
Praeterea, apostolus de filio loquens
1 Tim. ultimo dicit: quem scilicet
Christum suis temporibus ostendit
beatus et solus potens rex regum et
dominus dominantium, qui solus
habet immortalitatem et lucem habitat
inaccessibilem. Ergo haec omnia soli
patri conveniunt.
5. In 1 Tim. 6:15, the Apostle says: Which in His
times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only
Mighty, the King of kings, and Lord of lords. Who
only has immortality and inhabits light inaccessible.
Therefore all these titles belong only to the Father,
and so the conclusion is as before.
Praeterea, Marc. 13 dicitur: de die
autem illa et hora nemo scit neque
Angeli in caelo neque filius nisi pater.
Ergo maior est scientia patris quam
filii. Ergo et maior essentia. Et sic
idem quod prius.
6. In Mark 13:32 it is said: But of that day or hour no
man knows, neither the angels in heaven, nor the
Son, but the Father. Therefore the Fathers
knowledge is greater than that of the Son.
Consequently His essence also is greater, and thus
the conclusion is the same.
Praeterea, Matth. 20 dicitur: sedere
ad dexteram meam vel sinistram non
est meum dare vobis, sed quibus
7. Matt. 20:23 says: To sit on My right or left hand, is
not Mine to give to you, but to them for whom it is
prepared by My Father. Therefore the power of the
paratum est a patre meo. Ergo filius
non est aequalis potestatis cum patre.
Son is not equal to that of the Father.
Praeterea, Col. 1 dicitur de filio quod
est primogenitus omnis creaturae.
Sed comparatio non est nisi eorum
quae sunt unius generis. Ergo filius
est creatura.
8. In Col. 1:15, it is said of the Son that He is the
firstborn of every creature. But this comparison
would not be made unless of beings of one genus;
therefore the Son is a creature.
Praeterea, Eccli. 24 dicitur ex
persona divinae sapientiae: ab initio
et ante saecula creata sum, et sic
idem quod prius.
9. In Sirach 24:14 it is said in the person of divine
Wisdom, From the beginning, and before the world,
was I created. Thus the conclusion is the same.
Praeterea, ille qui clarificatur minor
est eo qui clarificat. Sed filius
clarificatur a patre, ut patet Ioh. 12.
Ergo filius est minor patre.
10. He who is revealed is less than he who reveals;
but the Son is revealed by the Father, as is evident
in John, chap. 12; therefore, the Son is less than the
Father.
Praeterea, mittens est maior eo qui
mittitur. Sed pater mittit filium, ut patet
Gal. 4: misit Deus filium suum factum
ex muliere et cetera. Mittit etiam
spiritum sanctum, Ioh. 14: Paraclitus
spiritus sanctus, quem mittet pater et
cetera. Ergo pater est maior filio et
spiritu sancto. Et sic ista sententia
quam dicit non videtur esse fidei
11. The one sending is greater than the one sent.
But the Father sends the Son, as is clear from Gal.
4:4, God sent His Son, etc. And He also sends the
Holy Spirit, according to John 14:26, The Paraclete,
the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in My
name. Therefore the Father is greater than the Son
and the Holy Spirit. And thus the aforesaid doctrine
does not seem to be in accordance with the Catholic
faith.
Catholicae.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioh. 1: in
principio erat verbum, et Deus erat
verbum, omnia per ipsum facta sunt.
Ex quo habetur quod filius sit
aeternus, alias non esset in principio;
et quod sit patri aequalis, alias Deus
non esset; et quod non sit creatura,
alias non omnia per ipsum facta
essent.
But on the contrary it is said in John 1:1, 3: In the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with
God, and the Word was God.... All things were made
by Him, etc. From this it is to be held that the Son is
eternal, for otherwise He could not have been in the
beginning: and that He is equal to the Father, for
otherwise He would not be God: and that He is not a
creature, for otherwise all things would riot have
been made by Him.
Praeterea, filius, cum sit veritas, de se
mentitus non est. Sed filius dicebat se
patri aequalem. Unde dicitur Ioh. 5:
patrem suum dicebat Deum,
aequalem se Deo faciens. Ergo ipse
est aequalis patri.
Again, since the Son is truth, He could not lie
concerning Himself. But the Son said that He was
equal to the Father (John 5: 18): He also said God
was His Father, making Himself equal to God.
Therefore He is equal to the Father.
Praeterea, Phil. 2: non rapinam
arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo.
Esset autem rapina, si arbitraretur et
non esset. Ergo est aequalis Deo.
Again, Phil. 2:6 says: He thought it not robbery to be
equal with God. But it would have been robbery if
He thought that was so which was not. Therefore He
is equal to God.
Praeterea, Ioh. 10 dicitur: ego et pater
unum sumus, praeterea Ioh. 14: ego in
Again, John 10:30, I and the Father are one. And
John 14:11, I am in the Father, and the Father in
patre et pater in me est. Ergo unus
alio minor non est.
Me. Therefore one is not greater than the other.
Praeterea, Rom. 9: ex quibus
Christus, qui est super omnia Deus
benedictus in saecula. Ergo nullus est
eo superior, et sic non est minor
patre.
Again, Rom. 9:5: And of whom is Christ, according
to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed
forever. Therefore no one is superior to Him; and
thus He is not less than the Father.
Praeterea, 1 Ioh. ultimo: dedit nobis
sensum ut cognoscamus verum Deum
et simus in vero filio eius. Hic est
verus Deus et vita aeterna. Ergo non
est minor patre.
Again, 1 John 5:20, And we know that the Son of
God is come: and He hath given us understanding
that we may know the true God, and may be in His
true Son. This is the true God and life eternal.
Therefore He is not less than the Father.
Item ostenditur quod spiritus sanctus
sit aequalis patri et verus Deus per
hoc quod dicitur Phil. 3 secundum
Graecam litteram: nos sumus
circumcisio, qui spiritui Dei servimus,
et intelligitur de latriae servitute, ut in
Graeco patet. Sed talis servitus nulli
creaturae debetur, Deut. 6 et Matth. 4:
dominum Deum tuum adorabis, et illi
soli servies. Ergo spiritus sanctus non
est creatura.
Again, it is shown that the Holy Spirit is the true God
and equal to the Father by what is said in Phil. 3:3,
according to the Greek text. We are the
circumcision, who serve God the Spirit, and in
regard to this service, that of latria is understood, as
is evident in the Greek. And such honor is due to no
creature. Deut. 6:13 and Matt. 4:10: The Lord your
God you shall adore, and Him only you shall serve.
Therefore, the Holy Spirit is not a creature.
Praeterea, membra Christi non Again, the members of Christ cannot be the temple
possunt esse templum alicuius qui sit
minor quam Christus. Sed corpora
nostra, quae sunt membra Christi
secundum apostolum, sunt templum
spiritus sancti, ut dicitur 1 Cor. 6. Ergo
spiritus sanctus non est minor Christo,
et sic nec patre. Et ita verum est id
quod auctor dicit esse Catholicae
fidei sententiam.
of anyone who is less than Christ: but our bodies,
which are members of Christ, according to the
Apostle, are temples of the Holy Spirit, as is said in
1 Cor. 6: 19. Therefore the Holy Spirit is not less
than Christ, or less than the Father; and thus it is
true, as the author says, that this is a doctrine of the
Catholic religion.
Responsio. Dicendum quod
Arianorum positio inaequalitatem in
personis divinis constituens non est
Catholicae fidei professio, sed magis
gentilis impietas, quod sic patet.
Response. I answer that it must be said that the
position of the Arians, which establishes inequality
among the divine persons, is not a confession of the
Catholic religion, but rather an impiety of the
Gentiles, as is thus evident.
Apud gentiles enim omnes
substantiae immortales dii dicebantur.
Inter has autem ponebant Platonici
tres primas et principales, ut patet per
Augustinum in X de civitate Dei et per
Macrobium super somnium Scipionis,
scilicet Deum omnium creatorem,
quem dicebant Deum patrem propter
hoc, quod ab ipso omnia derivarentur,
et quandam inferiorem substantiam,
quam paternam mentem sive
paternum intellectum dicebant,
plenam omnium rerum ideis, et hanc
Among the Gentiles all immortal substances are
called gods. Among these, moreover, they hold, or
rather the Platonists hold, that there are three
principal persons, as is made clear by Augustine in
De civitate Dei (Bk. X), and by Macrobius on the
Somnium Scipionis, namely, the God, who is the
Creator of all things, whom they call also the Father,
since all things have their source in Him; and,
secondly, a certain inferior substance, whom they
call the Paternal Mind or the Paternal Intellect, who
contains the ideas of all things, and who is made by
God the Father, they say; and thirdly, after Him they
suppose a Soul-of-the-World, a spirit who is, as it
factam a Deo patre dicebant, et post
hoc ponebant animam mundi quasi
spiritum vitae totius mundi. Et has tres
substantias tres principales deos
nominabant et tria principia, per quae
animae purgantur.
were, the life of the whole world. And these three
substances they name as their chief gods, and as
the three principles by which souls are purified.
Origenes autem Platonicis
documentis insistens arbitratus est
hoc modo in fide nostra ponendum
esse tres, qui testimonium dant in
caelo, 1 Ioh. ultimo, sicut Platonici tres
principales substantias posuerunt,
unde posuit esse filium creaturam et
minorem patre in libro, quem peri
archon, id est de principiis, nominavit,
ut patet per Hieronymum in quadam
epistula de erroribus Origenis. Et cum
ipse Alexandriae docuerit, ex eius
scriptis suum errorem Arius hausit. Et
propter hoc dicit Epiphanius quod
Origenes fuit fons et pater Arii.
Origen, moreover, following the teachings of the
Platonists, thought that after the same manner the
doctrine of the true faith ought to be interpreted,
because it is said, There are three who give
testimony in heaven (1 John 5:7). And so, as the
Platonists supposed that there were three principal
substances, Origen held that the Son was a creature
and less than the Father, in that book which is
entitled Peri Archon (Concerning the Principles),
as is made clear by Jerome in a certain epistle
regarding the errors of Origen. And since Origen
himself taught at Alexandria, Arius drank in his error
from the things he wrote. On this account Epiphanius
says that Origen was the father and font of Arius.
Tantum ergo Christianae et
Catholicae fidei positio Arii de
Trinitate est contraria, quantum error
gentilium, qui creaturas deos dicentes
eis latriae servitutem exhibebant.
Quod arguit apostolus Rom. 1 dicens
Therefore the position of the Christian and Catholic
faith regarding the Trinity differs as much from the
position of Arius as does the error of the Gentiles,
which, in calling creatures gods, rendered to them
the service of divine praise. This the Apostle (Rom.
1:25) criticizes when he says, They worshiped and
quod coluerunt et servierunt creaturae
potius quam creatori et cetera.
served the creature rather than the Creator.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut
dicit Augustinus in II de Trinitate, de
patre et filio tripliciter dicitur aliquid in
Scripturis.
1. It may be said: As Augustine states in II De
Trinitate, passages found in the Scriptures in regard
to the Father and the Son are threefold.
Quaedam namque unitatem
substantiae et aequalitatem ipsorum
ostendunt, ut: ego et pater unum
sumus.
a) First, some show a certain unity of substance and
equality of persons, as, I and the Father are one
(John 10:30).
Quaedam vero filium minorem
ostendunt propter formam servi,
secundum quam factus est etiam se
ipso minor, secundum illud Phil. 2:
semet ipsum exinanivit formam servi
accipiens.
b) Other passages show the Son to be less because
of His having the form of a servant, according as He
made Himself less, as is said in Phil. 2:7, He
emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant.
Quaedam ita dicuntur, ut neque minor
neque aequalis ostendatur, sed
tantum quod filius sit de patre, sicut
dicitur Ioh. 5: sicut habet pater vitam in
semet ipso, sic dedit et filio vitam
habere.
c) Certain things are also said that show Him to be
neither less nor the equal of the Father, but only that
the Son is from the Father, as in John 5:26, As the
Father has life in Himself, so He hath given to the
Son also to have life in Himself.
Primae ergo auctoritates sunt
Catholicis in adminiculum ad veritatis
defensionem. Sed ea, quae secundo
et tertio modo dicuntur in Scriptura,
assumpserunt haeretici ad sui erroris
confirmationem, sed vane. Non enim
ea quae de Christo dicuntur
secundum humanam naturam sunt
referenda ad eius divinitatem; alias
sequeretur quod secundum
divinitatem esset mortuus, cum hoc
de ipso secundum humanitatem
dicatur. Similiter nec ostenditur patre
minor filius, quamvis filius sit ex patre,
quia filius a patre omnia, quae pater
habet, accepit, ut habetur Ioh. 16 et
Matth. 11. Unde per hoc ordo originis,
non inaequalitas deitatis astrui potest.
The first authoritative passages are used by
Catholics in making a defense of the truth. But those
of the second and third kind are employed by
heretics in confirmation of their error, though in a
vain attempt. For the things that are stated of Christ
according to His human nature should not be
referred to His divinity; otherwise it would follow that
His death, which is recorded of Him according to
His humanity, would be according to His divinity.
Likewise, neither is it shown that the Son is less than
the Father, although the Son is from the Father,
because the Son has from the Father all that the
Father possesses, as is held in John 16, and
Matthew 11. Wherefore no inequality of divinity can
be asserted because of the order of origin.
Quod ergo dicitur: pater maior me est,
dictum est de filio secundum
humanam naturam secundum
Augustinum, vel secundum Hilarium
secundum divinam ita quod maioritas
non importet inaequalitatem, quia
filius non est minor patre, cui datum
est nomen super omne nomen, sed
importat auctoritatem principii,
When, therefore, it is said, The Father is greater
than I, this is said of the Son according to His
human nature and not according to His divine nature,
as Augustine maintains; or, as Hilary says,
according to His divine nature in such a way that
greater does not imply inequality (because the Son
is not less than the Father, inasmuch as to Him is
given a name above all names); but it implies dignity
of a principle inasmuch as it is from the Father that
secundum quod hoc nomen, quo filius
est aequalis patri, habet filius a patre.
the Son possesses that by which He is the equal of
the Father.
Ad secundum dicendum quod filio
subiecit omnia non solum pater, sed
etiam ipse sibi, secundum illud Phil. 3:
secundum virtutem, qua potens est
sibi subicere omnia, et hoc secundum
deitatem, qua aequalis est patri. Et
ideo in hoc quod dicitur quod Christus
subiectus erit ei, qui subiecit sibi
omnia, non fit comparatio filii
secundum divinitatem ad patrem, sed
magis secundum humanitatem ad
divinitatem patris, quae toti Trinitati
est communis.
2. It may be said: All things the Father not only
subjected to the Son, but the Son Himself made
them subject to Himself, according to the saying of
Phil. 3:21: According to the operation whereby also
He is able to subdue all things unto Himself, i.e.,
according to the Divinity which is equal in Him to that
of the Father. Wherefore, when it is said that Christ
will be subject, this does not imply relation of the Son
to the Father according to Divinity, but rather the
relation of the human nature of the Son to the Divinity
of the Father, which Divinity is common to the whole
Trinity.
Regnum ergo Christi sunt fideles ipsi;
quod regnum tradet Deo et patri, non
tamen sibi adimens, cum fideles ad
visionem patris adducet, qua visione
etiam ipsius deitas videbitur. Et tunc
apparebit maxime esse secundum
humanam naturam divinae subiectus,
quando divina natura perfecte
cognoscetur, non tali subiectione, ut
quidam haeretici dixerunt, quod ipsa
humana natura a Christo assumpta
transeat in divinam, sed secundum
And when the divine nature shall be perfectly known,
then it will be apparent that especially according to
His human nature He is subject to the divine nature;
but not with such a subjection as that which certain
heretics claim who say that the very human nature
which was assumed by the divine nature is
transmuted into it, but rather that He is less than the
Father by reason of His humanity. This is made
especially clear by the fact that He will deliver His
kingdom, that is, the faithful, to the Father, not
claiming them for Himself, but leading them to the
vision of the Father, a vision in which His own
quod est minor patris divinitate. Divinity also will be seen.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut
Augustinus dicit in I de Trinitate, ex
hoc filius rogat, quo minor est patre;
quo vero aequalis est, exaudit cum
patre; id est secundum humanam
naturam orat, secundum divinam
exaudit.
3. It may be answered: According to Augustine (III
De Trinitate), inasmuch as the Son prays He is less
than the Father; but inasmuch as He obtains hearing
with the Father, He is the equal of the Father.
Sed spiritus sanctus interpellare
dicitur, in quantum nos interpellantes
facit et nostris orationibus efficaciam
praestat.
But the Holy Spirit is said to intercede for us
inasmuch as He causes us to make intercession
and renders our prayers efficacious.
Ad quartum dicendum quod
secundum Augustinum in VI de
Trinitate solus unus verus Deus non
est tantum de patre intelligendum, sed
simul de patre et filio et spiritu sancto,
qui dicuntur solus unus verus Deus,
quia nihil praeter Trinitatem illam est
verus Deus. Unde sic intelligendum: ut
cognoscant te patrem et quem misisti
Iesum Christum esse unum solum
verum Deum. De spiritu autem sancto
tacet, quia, cum sit nexus amborum,
ex utroque intelligitur.
4. It may be said: According to Augustine (VI De
Trinitate), the statement that there is one only true
God must not be interpreted to refer to the Father
alone, but as including Father, Son, and Holy Ghost
simultaneously; and they are said to be, the one true
God because no being outside the Trinity is true
God. Wherefore, it must be in this way that one
understands: That they may know You, the only true
God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent (John
17:3). For there is one only true God, and no
mention is here made of the Holy Spirit, because,
since He is the nexus of the other two Persons, He is
understood by mention of the other two.
Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut
patet per Augustinum in I de Trinitate,
verbum illud non est intelligendum
solum de persona patris, sed de tota
Trinitate. Tota enim est beatus et
solus potens etc.; tota etiam Trinitas
filium ostendit. Si tamen dixisset:
quem ostendit pater beatus et solus
potens, non propter hoc filius
separaretur, sicut nec pater separatur,
cum dicitur Eccli. 24 ex persona filii
qui est Dei sapientia: gyrum caeli
circuivi sola. Et hoc ideo, quia in his,
quae ad essentiam pertinent, pater et
filius sunt omnino unum. Et ideo quod
de uno dicitur, ab alio per dictionem
exclusivam non removetur, sed solum
a creaturis, quae habent diversam
essentiam.
5. It may be answered: According to Augustine (I De
Trinitate), this saying is not to be understood of the
Person of the Father alone, but of the entire Trinity.
For the whole Trinity is blessed and powerful, and
the whole Trinity shows forth the Son. Even if He did
say: He shall show, who is the Blessed and only
Mighty, etc., this would not indicate that the Son is
separate from the Father, or that the Father is
considered as being separated from the Son,
because it is said in Sirach 24:8, in the person of the
Son, who is the Wisdom of God, I alone have
compassed the circuit of heaven. This is said,
therefore, because in those things which pertain to
the essence of God, Father and Son are altogether
one, and hence what is said of one of them by
diction which may be exclusive does not imply any
mutual separation, but only their separation from
creatures.
Ad sextum dicendum quod filius non
solum secundum divinam naturam scit
diem illam et horam, sed etiam
secundum humanam, quia eius anima
scit omnia. Dicitur autem illam
nescire, ut Augustinus dicit in I de
Trinitate, quia non facit nos eam scire.
Unde de hoc quaerentibus dixit: non
est vestrum nosse tempora etc., Act.
6. It may be said: The Son knows that day and
hour, not only according to His divine nature, but
even according to His human nature, since His soul
knows all things. Hence He is said not to know that
day, as Augustine explains in I De Trinitate,
because He does not make it known to us;
wherefore He said to those questioning Him: It is
not for you to know the times, etc. (Acts 1:7). And in
the same way the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 2:2, I
1, per quem modum et apostolus dixit
1 Cor. 1: neque iudicavi me scire
aliquid inter vos etc., quia scilicet alia
eis dicere noluerat, quia capaces non
erant.
judged not myself to know anything among you,
because he was unwilling to disclose lofty things to
them since they lacked capacity to understand.
Vel hoc intelligendum est de filio non
quantum ad personam ipsius capitis,
sed quantum ad corpus eius, quod est
Ecclesia, quae hoc nescit, ut
Hieronymus dicit. In hoc vero, quod
dicitur solus pater scire, ostenditur
etiam filius scire secundum regulam
praedictam.
Or this may be understood as regarding the Son, not
in His character as head of the Church, but in the
person of His members, since the Church, as
Jerome says, is without knowledge of these truths.
However, in saying that the Father alone knows
them, it is evident that the Son also knows them,
according to the aforesaid reason.
Ad septimum dicendum quod, sicut
dicit Augustinus in I de Trinitate, sic
exponendum est verbum illud: non est
meum dare vobis, id est non est
humanae potestatis hoc dare, ut per
illud intelligatur hoc dare, per quod est
Deus et aequalis patri.
7. Answer may be made: As Augustine says in I De
Trinitate, the verse: It is not Mine to give to you,
etc., must be understood to mean that it is not in the
power of human nature to give this, so that He may
be known to grant it by reason of the fact that He is
God and equal to the Father.
Ad octavum dicendum quod, sicut
Augustinus dicit in I de Trinitate, hunc
apostolicum locum haeretici non
intelligentes in contumeliam filii Dei
saepe proponunt astruentes quod
8. It may be said: According to Augustine, I De
Trinitate, many heretics, not understanding this point
of apostolic doctrine, broke out into insult of the Son
of God, saying and declaring that He was a creature,
having little regard for the import of words. For He is
creatura sit minus considerantes
verborum vim. Primogenitus quippe
dictus est, non primus creatus, ut et
genitus pro natura divina, quam habet,
et primus propter perpetuitatem
credatur. Quamvis autem filius non sit
de genere creaturarum, tamen
secundum Basilium habet aliquid cum
creaturis commune, scilicet accipere
a patre, sed habet prae creaturis
quod per naturam habet quae a patre
accipit. Et propter hoc potest ordo
inter genituram filii et creaturarum
productionem notari.
said, indeed, to be the first begotten, but not the first
created, so that He might be believed to have been
begotten, according to His divine nature, and to be
first on account of His perpetuity. Moreover, although
the Son belongs to no genus of creatures, yet, as
Basil holds, He has something in common with
creatures: namely, the fact that He received from the
Father that which He has; but this possession is
superior to that of creatures, since through His own
nature He possesses what He receives from the
Father. On this account there can be noted a certain
order between the generation of the Son and the
production of creatures.
Ad nonum dicendum quod illud
verbum et alia similia, quae de
sapientia Dei leguntur, vel sunt
referenda ad sapientiam creatam,
sicut sunt Angeli, vel ad ipsum
Christum secundum humanam
naturam. Et sic dicitur ab initio vel
initio creatus, quasi ab aeterno
praedestinatus creaturam assumere.
9. It may be said: This saying and all sayings similar
to it, which are read in regard to the wisdom of God,
ought to be referred to the wisdom of creatures,
such as the angels, or to Christ Himself according to
His human nature. Thus His wisdom is said to be
from the beginning, or at the beginning of
creation, as if from eternity it predestined that
creation should belong to Him.
Ad decimum dicendum quod, sicut
dicit Augustinus in II de Trinitate, ex
hoc, quod pater clarificat filium, non
ostenditur filius minor patre, alias
10. Answer may be made: As Augustine says in II
De Trinitate: From the fact that the Father will glorify
the Son, it does not follow that the Son is inferior to
the Father; otherwise, He would be less than the
esset etiam spiritu sancto minor, quia
dicit filius de spiritu sancto, Ioh. 16: ille
me clarificabit. Illa enim clarificatio
non ostendit aliquid in persona filii Dei
fieri, sed vel in notitia hominum,
secundum quod clarificare est ipsius
notitiam claram facere, vel in corpore
assumpto, prout refertur ad claritatem
resurrectionis.
Holy Spirit, because the Son says of the Holy Spirit
in John 16:14: He shall glorify Me. Now, this
glorification refers not to the Person of the Son, but
to the fact that in the knowledge of men He will be
glorified, since the Spirit will make Him known; or it
may be referred to the body which He had assumed
and to the glory of the Resurrection.
Ad undecimum dicendum quod filius
et spiritus sanctus dicuntur missi a
patre, non quod essent ubi prius non
fuerant, sed ut essent aliquo modo
quo prius non fuerant, quod est
secundum aliquem effectum in
creatura. Unde per hoc, quod filius et
spiritus sanctus dicuntur a patre missi,
non ostenditur Trinitatis inaequalitas,
sed ordo originis, quo una persona
est ab alia - unde pater non mittitur,
qui non est ab alio - et efficientia
respectu illius effectus, secundum
quem persona divina mittitur.
11. It may be said: The Son and the Holy Spirit are
said to be sent by the Father, not that they now are
where they had previously not been; but that, they
are now there in a certain manner in which they had
not previously been: that is to say, as regards a
certain effect in creatures. Wherefore, when the Son
and the Holy Spirit are said to have been sent by the
Father, no inequality in the Trinity is revealed, but an
order of origin, by which one Person is from another.
Therefore the Father is not sent, because He is not
from another in such a way that He has from another
His efficacy in relation to any of His effects; and it is
in this way that a divine Person is sent.
Quaestio 4, Prooemium
QUESTION IV
Concerning Those Things That Pertain to the
Cause of Plurality
Deinde quaeritur de his quae ad
causam pluralitatis pertinent. Et circa
hoc quaeruntur quattuor.
1. Primo. Utrum alteritas sit causa
pluralitatis.
2. Secundo. Utrum varietas
accidentium faciat diversitatem
secundum numerum.
3. Tertio. Utrum duo corpora possint
esse vel intelligi esse in eodem
loco.
4. Quarto. Utrum varietas loci aliquid
operetur ad differentiam
secundum numerum.
Inquiry is made of those things that pertain to the
cause of plurality. And this inquiry involves four
questions:
1. Whether otherness is the cause of plurality.
2. Whether variety of accidents produces
diversity according to number.
3. Whether two bodies can be, or can be
thought of as being, simultaneously in the
same place.
4. Whether difference of location exerts some
influence as to difference according to
number.
Article 1
Whether Otherness Is the Cause of Plurality
pluralitatis causa non sit alteritas. Ut
enim dicitur in arithmetica Boethii,
omnia quaecumque a primaeva rerum
natura constructa sunt, numerorum
videntur ratione esse formata. Hoc enim
fuit principale in animo conditoris
exemplar. Et huic consonat quod dicitur
Sap. 11: omnia in pondere, numero et
1. It seems that the cause of plurality cannot be
otherness. For as is said in the Arithmetica of
Boethius, all things whatever of the sum-total of
beings that have been established in nature seem
to have been formed by reason of numbers. For
this was the principal exemplar in the mind of the
builder of the universe: and this is in agreement
with what is said in Wis. 11:21, You have
disposed all things in weight and in number and in
mensura disposuisti. Ergo pluralitas
sive numerus est primum inter res
creatas, et non est eius aliqua causa
creata quaerenda.
measure. Therefore plurality or number is first
among created things, and no cause of it is to be
sought for.
Praeterea, ut dicitur in libro de causis,
prima rerum creatarum est esse. Sed
ens primo dividitur per unum et multa.
Ergo multitudine nihil potest esse prius
nisi ens et unum. Ergo non videtur esse
verum, quod aliquid aliud sit eius causa.
2. As said in the book De causis, the first of
created things is being; but being is divided at first
by one and many; hence nothing can exist as prior
to multitude except being and unity. Therefore it
does not seem to be true that anything else should
be its cause.
Praeterea, pluralitas vel circuit omnia
genera, secundum quod condividitur
contra unum, quod est convertibile cum
ente, vel est in genere quantitatis,
secundum quod condividitur uni quod
est principium numeri. Sed alteritas est
in genere relationis. Relationes autem
non sunt causae quantitatum, sed
magis e converso, et multo minus
relationes sunt causae eius quod est in
omnibus generibus, quia sic essent
causae etiam substantiae. Ergo
alteritas nullo modo est causa
pluralitatis.
3. Plurality either includes all genera according as
it is distinguished from unity, which is convertible
with being: or it is itself in the genus of quantity,
according as it is distinguished from that unity
which is the principle of number. But otherness is
in the genus of relation, and relations are not
causes of quantities, but rather the converse is
true. Much less, then, is relation the cause of what
is in every genus, because in that case it would be
the cause of substance; therefore otherness can in
no way be the cause of plurality.
Praeterea, contrariorum contrariae sunt 4. For contrary things there are contrary causes:
causae. Sed identitas et diversitas sive
alteritas sunt opposita. Ergo habent
oppositas causas. Sed unitas est
causa identitatis, ut patet in V
metaphysicae. Ergo pluralitas vel
multitudo est causa diversitatis sive
alteritatis. Non ergo alteritas est causa
pluralitatis.
but identity and otherness or diversity are
opposites; therefore they have opposite causes.
But unity is the cause of identity, as is evident in V
Metaph.; therefore plurality or multitude is the
cause of diversity; and consequently otherness is
not the cause of plurality.
Praeterea, alteritatis principium est
accidentalis differentia; huiusmodi enim
differentiae secundum Porphyrium
faciunt alterum. Sed non in omnibus, in
quibus est pluralitas, invenitur
accidentalis differentia nec etiam
differentia qualiscumque. Quaedam
enim sunt quae accidentibus subici non
possunt, sicut formae simplices;
quaedam vero sunt quae in nullo
conveniunt, unde non possunt differentia
dici, sed diversa, ut patet per
philosophum in X metaphysicae. Ergo
non omnis pluralitatis causa est
alteritas.
5. The principle of otherness is accidental
difference; for differences of this kind, according to
Porphyry, make a thing other. But accidental
difference is not found in all things in which there is
plurality; in fact, in some cases there is no
difference of any kind. Certain things, such as
simple forms, cannot be subjects of accidents; and
there are other things that agree in no way, so that
they cannot be called different, but diverse, as is
evident by the words of the Philosopher in X
Metaph. Therefore otherness is not the cause of all
plurality.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit But on the contrary is what Damascene says, that
quod divisio est causa numeri. Sed
divisio in diversitate vel alteritate
consistit. Ergo diversitas vel alteritas
principium pluralitatis est.
division is the cause of number; but division
consists in diversity or otherness; therefore
diversity, or otherness, is the principle of plurality.
Praeterea, Isidorus dicit quod numerus
dicitur quasi nutus, id est signum,
memeris, id est divisionis. Et sic idem
quod prius.
Again, Isidore says that number is called, as it
were, the master of numeration, that is, of division;
and so the conclusion is like the first.
Praeterea, pluralitas non constituitur nisi
per recessum ab unitate. Sed ab
unitate non recedit aliquid nisi per
divisionem, cum ex hoc aliquid dicatur
unum, quod est indivisum, ut patet in X
metaphysicae. Ergo divisio pluralitatem
constituit, et sic idem quod prius.
Again, plurality is not constituted except by
recession from unity; but there is no loss of unity
except by division, since a thing is said to be one
in that it is undivided, as is evident from X Metaph.;
therefore division constitutes plurality, and thus the
conclusion is as before.
Responsio. Dicendum quod, sicut dicit
philosophus in X metaphysicae, plurale
dicitur aliquid ex hoc quod est divisibile
vel divisum. Unde omne illud quod est
causa divisionis oportet ponere
causam pluralitatis.
Response. I answer that it must be said, as the
Philosopher states in X Metaph., that a thing is
said to be plural (many) from the fact that it is
divisible or has been divided. Wherefore anything
that is the cause of division ought to be regarded
as a cause of plurality.
Causa autem divisionis aliter est
accipienda in posterioribus et
compositis et in primis et simplicibus. In
Now, the cause of division cannot be considered
the same in posterior and composite beings as in
those that are first and simple. For in posterior and
posterioribus namque et compositis
causa divisionis quasi formalis, id est
ratione cuius fit divisio, est diversitas
simplicium et priorum. Quod patet in
divisione quantitatis. Dividitur enim una
pars lineae ab alia per hoc quod habet
diversum situm, qui est quasi formalis
differentia quantitatis continuae
positionem habentis. Patet etiam in
divisione substantiarum. Dividitur enim
homo ab asino per hoc quod habent
diversas differentias constitutivas. Sed
diversitas, qua dividuntur posteriora
composita secundum priora et
simplicia, praesupponit pluralitatem
priorum simplicium. Ex hoc enim homo
et asinus habent diversas differentias,
quod rationale et irrationale non sunt
una, sed plures differentiae. Nec potest
semper dici quod illius pluralitatis sit
aliqua diversitas aliquorum priorum et
simpliciorum causa, quia sic esset
abire in infinitum.
composite things, the cause of division which is,
as it were, the formal cause of division by reason
of which division comes about, is diversity found in
more simple and primary beings, as is made clear
in the case of division according to quantity. For
one part of a line is divided from another part by
the fact that they have each a different place, which
is, as it were, the formal difference of a thing of
continuous quantity having position. It is also
evident in the division of substances. For man is
different from an ass because he has diverse
constitutive differences: but the diversity by which
posterior, composite beings are divided according
as prior and simpler beings are, presupposes
plurality of these same primary and more simple
beings. For the reason why man and ass have
diverse differences is that rationality and
irrationality are not one and the same thing, but
differ in many ways. Nor can it be said endlessly
that the plurality of one thing is owing to another
diversity in another prior and simpler cause,
because thus we would go on to infinity.
Et ideo pluralitatis vel divisionis
primorum et simplicium oportet alio
modo causam assignare. Sunt enim
huiusmodi secundum se ipsa divisa.
Non potest autem hoc esse, quod ens
Therefore it is necessary in some other way to
assign a cause of plurality and division in prior and
more simple beings. Now, there are some beings
of this kind divided in themselves. Nevertheless it
cannot be that being is divided from being,
dividatur ab ente in quantum est ens;
nihil autem dividitur ab ente nisi non
ens. Unde et ab hoc ente non dividitur
hoc ens nisi per hoc quod in hoc ente
includitur negatio illius entis. Unde in
primis terminis propositiones negativae
sunt immediatae, quasi negatio unius
sit in intellectu alterius. Primum etiam
creatum in hoc facit pluralitatem cum
sua causa, quod non attingit ad eam. Et
secundum hoc quidam posuerunt
quodam ordine pluralitatem ab uno
primo causari, ut ab uno primo
procedat primo unum, quod cum causa
pluralitatem constituat, et ex eo iam
possunt duo procedere: unum
secundum se ipsum, aliud secundum
coniunctionem ipsius ad causam. Quod
dicere non cogimur, cum unum primum
possit aliquid imitari, in quo alterum ab
eo deficit, et deficere, in quo alterum
imitatur. Et sic possunt inveniri plures
primi effectus, in quorum quolibet est
negatio et causae et effectus alterius
secundum idem vel secundum
remotiorem distantiam etiam in uno et
eodem.
inasmuch as it is being: for nothing is divided from
being except non-being. Likewise also from this-
being, this-being is not divided, unless in this-
being there is included negation of the same
being. Wherefore in primary termini of thought
negative propositions are immediately, as it were,
negations, one of the other, in the intellect. For the
first thing caused constitutes plurality with its
cause, which does not reach to it [so as to be
identical with it]. And according to this, certain
philosophers hold that plurality is caused in a
certain order from one and the selfsame thing; so
that from one thing proceeds, at first, one being,
which with its cause constitutes a plurality, and
from this plurality, now two things can proceed, one
according to the thing itself, and the other
according to its conjunction to a cause. But we are
not forced to say this, since one thing might be
able to imitate the first in some way in which the
second would fail to agree with it; and this defect
could be imitated in another; and so there can be
found many effects of the first cause in any number
of which there is both negation of the cause and
negation of the effects in the same way, or
according to distance separating one from the
other.
Sic ergo patet quod prima pluralitatis So, therefore, it is evident that the first reason or,
vel divisionis ratio sive principium est
ex negatione et affirmatione, ut talis
ordo originis pluralitatis intelligatur,
quod primo sint intelligenda ens et non
ens, ex quibus ipsa prima divisa
constituuntur, ac per hoc plura.
principle of plurality or division is from affirmation
and negation, as the order of origin of such
plurality is understood, because first there must be
understanding of being and non-being, by which
first divisions are constituted, and by this, there are
the many.
Unde sicut post ens, in quantum est
indivisum, statim invenitur unum, ita
post divisionem entis et non entis statim
invenitur pluralitas priorum simplicium.
Hanc autem pluralitatem consequitur
ratio diversitatis, secundum quod manet
in ea suae causae virtus, scilicet
oppositionis entis et non entis. Ideo
enim unum plurium diversum dicitur
alteri comparatum, quia non est illud. Et
quia causa secunda non producit
effectum nisi per virtutem causae
primae, ideo pluralitas primorum non
facit divisionem et pluralitatem in
secundis compositis, nisi in quantum
manet in ea vis oppositionis primae,
quae est inter ens et non ens, ex qua
habet rationem diversitatis. Et sic
diversitas primorum facit pluralitatem
secundorum.
Hence, just as first being, inasmuch as it is
undivided, is immediately recognized as one, so
after division of being and non-being there is
immediate recognition of the plurality of first simple
beings. The nature of diversity, moreover, follows
upon plurality according as there remains in it the
virtue of its cause, that is, the opposition of being
and nonbeing. Therefore one of many diverse
things is said to be related to another because it is
not that other. And since a second cause does not
produce its effect except by virtue of a first cause,
therefore the plurality of first causes does not
make division and plurality in secondary,
composite beings unless there remains in that
plurality the virtue of prime opposition, which is
between being and non-being, by reason of which
it has the nature of diversity; and thus the diversity
of first causes produces the diversity of second.
Et secundum hoc verum est quod According to this, it is true, as Boethius says, that
Boethius dicit quod alteritas est
principium pluralitatis. Ex hoc enim
alteritas in aliquibus invenitur, quod eis
diversa insunt. Quamvis autem divisio
praecedat pluralitatem priorum, non
tamen diversitas, quia divisio non
requirit utrumque condivisorum esse
ens, cum sit divisio per affirmationem et
negationem; sed diversitas requirit
utrumque esse ens, unde praesupponit
pluralitatem. Unde nullo modo potest
esse quod pluralitatis primorum causa
sit diversitas, nisi diversitas pro
divisione sumatur.
otherness is the principle of plurality. indeed,
otherness is to be found in things because there is
diversity among them. However, although division
precedes plurality of first causes, diversity does
not; because division does not require the being of
things divided among themselves, since division is
by affirmation and negation, but diversity does
require each to be a distinct being; wherefore it
presupposes plurality. Hence it is in no way
possible that the cause of the plurality of first
beings should be diversity, unless diversity is
employed as meaning division.
Loquitur ergo Boethius de pluralitate
compositorum, quod patet ex hoc, quod
inducit probationem de his quae sunt
diversa genere vel specie vel numero,
quod non est nisi compositorum. Omne
enim, quod est in genere, oportet esse
compositum ex genere et differentia.
Eos autem, qui ponunt patrem et filium
inaequales deos, sequitur compositio
saltem ratione, in quantum ponunt eos
convenire in hoc quod sunt Deus et
differre in hoc quod sunt inaequales.
Boethius, therefore, is speaking of the plurality of
composite beings, as is evident from the fact that
he presents a proof involving those things that are
diverse according to genus or species or number,
and these kinds of diversity exist only in composite
beings. For anything which is in a genus must be
composed of genus and difference. Those,
therefore, who declare the Father and Son to be
unequal make declaration of composition, at least
according to reason, inasmuch as they say the
Father and Son agree in this, that they are God,
but differ in the fact that they are unequal.
numerus ex verbis illis ostenditur esse
prior rebus aliis creatis, ut elementis et
aliis huiusmodi, non autem aliis
intentionibus, utpote affirmatione et
negatione aut divisione vel aliis
huiusmodi. Nec tamen quilibet numerus
est prior omnibus rebus creatis, sed
numerus qui est exemplar omnis rei,
scilicet ipse Deus, qui secundum
Augustinum est numerus omni rei
speciem praebens.
1. It may be said: In these words, number is shown
to be prior to other created things, such as the
elements and other such beings; but it is not prior
to other notions, such as affirmation and negation
or division and the like. Moreover, not every kind of
number is prior to all created beings, but only
number which is the cause of each thing, namely,
God Himself, who, according to Augustine, is
Number, giving species to every creature.
Ad secundum dicendum quod pluralitas
communiter loquendo immediate
sequitur ens, non tamen oportet quod
omnis pluralitas. Et ideo non est
inconveniens, si pluralitas secundorum
causetur ex diversitate priorum.
2. It may be answered: Plurality, commonly
speaking, immediately follows upon being; but this
is not necessarily true of all plurality, and so it is not
unfitting that the plurality of posterior beings should
be caused by the diversity of those that are prior.
Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut unum
et multa, ita idem et diversum non sunt
propria unius generis, sed sunt quasi
passiones entis, in quantum est ens. Et
ideo non est inconveniens, si aliquorum
diversitas aliorum pluralitatem causet.
3. It may be said: As one and many are not
properly of one genus, so neither are the same
and the diverse, but they are passiones of being
inasmuch as it is being, and hence there is no
difficulty if the diversity of certain beings causes
the plurality of others.
Ad quartum dicendum quod omnem
diversitatem praecedit aliqua pluralitas,
sed non omnem pluralitatem praecedit
diversitas, sed aliquam pluralitatem
aliqua diversitas. Unde et utrumque
verum est, scilicet quod multitudo
diversitatem faciat communiter
loquendo, ut philosophus dicit, et quod
diversitas in compositis faciat
pluralitatem, ut Boethius hic dicit.
4. It may be said: Some kind of plurality precedes
all diversity, but diversity does not precede all
plurality, yet some kind of diversity precedes
certain plurality. Hence two things are equally true:
namely, that, commonly speaking, multitude
produces diversity, as the Philosopher says; and
that diversity in composite things produces
plurality, as Boethius here declares.
Ad quintum dicendum quod Boethius
accepit alteritatem pro diversitate, quae
constituitur ex aliquibus differentiis, sive
sint accidentales sive substantiales. Illa
vero, quae sunt diversa et non
differentia, sunt prima, de quibus hic
Boethius non loquitur.
5. It may be answered: Boethius is using
otherness in place of diversity, which is
constituted by certain differences, whether they are
accidental or substantial. But those beings that are
diverse yet not different are first beings, and
Boethius is here not speaking of them.
Article 2
Whether Variety of Accidents Produces Diversity According to Number
quod varietas accidentium non possit
esse causa pluralitatis secundum
1. It seems that variety of accidents cannot be the
cause of plurality according to number. For the
Philosopher says in V Metaph. that those things
numerum. Philosophus enim dicit in V
metaphysicae quod numero sunt unum,
quorum est materia una. Ergo et numero
plura, quorum sunt materiae plures. Ergo
diversitatem in numero non facit varietas
accidentium, sed magis diversitas
materiae.
are numerically one in which the matter is one;
therefore they are numerically plural in which the
matter is plural; therefore variety of accidents
does not produce diversity in number, but rather
diversity of matter does so.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in X
metaphysicae quod idem est rebus
causa substantiae et unitatis. Sed
accidentia non sunt individuis causa
substantiae, ergo nec unitatis, et ita per
consequens nec pluralitatis secundum
numerum.
2. As the Philosopher says in IV Metaph., the
cause of the substance and of the unity in things
is the same; but accidents are not the cause
either of the substance or of the unity in the
individual; consequently they cannot be the cause
of numerical plurality.
Praeterea, omnia accidentia, cum sint
formae, ex se ipsis sunt communicabilia
et universalia. Sed nihil tale potest esse
alteri principium individuationis. Ergo
accidentia non sunt individuationis
principium. Sed aliqua sunt secundum
numerum diversa, in quantum in sua
individuatione dividuntur. Igitur
accidentia non possunt esse principium
diversitatis secundum numerum.
3. All accidents, since accidents are indeed
forms, are themselves communicable or common
and universal: but nothing of this kind can be the
cause of individuation in another, or a principle of
individuation; therefore accidents cannot be
principles of individuation. But certain things are
diverse according to number inasmuch as they
are divided in their own individuation; therefore
accidents cannot be causes of diversity
according to number.
Praeterea, sicut ea, quae differunt 4. As those things that are in a genus or a
genere vel specie in genere substantiae,
differunt secundum substantiam et non
solum secundum accidens, ita et ea
quae differunt secundum numerum. Sed
aliqua dicuntur diversa genere vel specie
per id quod est in genere substantiae.
Igitur et similiter dicuntur diversa numero
per id quod est in genere substantiae et
non per accidentia.
species differ according to their substance, and
not only according to an accident, so also those
things that differ according to number must do
likewise; but certain things are said to be diverse
in genus or in species by reason of what is in the
genus of substance, and not according to their
accidents; therefore, in like manner, things are
said to be numerically diverse according to what
is in the genus of substance, and not according to
accidents.
Praeterea, remota causa removetur
effectus. Sed omne accidens contingit a
subiecto removeri vel actu vel
cogitatione. Si ergo accidens est
principium identitatis secundum
numerum et diversitatis, contingeret actu
vel cogitatione eadem quandoque esse
unum secundum numerum, quandoque
vero diversa.
5. If a cause is removed, so is its effect. Now it
happens that every accident is removed from a
subject either actually or by thought. If, therefore,
an accident were the principle of plurality
according to number and diversity, it would
happen that the same things would sometimes be
numerically one and sometimes diverse, either
actually or by thought.
Praeterea, posterius numquam est
causa prioris. Sed inter omnia
accidentia primum locum tenet quantitas,
ut dicit Boethius in commento
praedicamentorum. Inter quantitates
autem naturaliter numerus prior est, cum
sit simplicior et magis abstractus. Ergo
impossibile est quod aliquod aliud
6. What is posterior is never the cause of what is
prior. But among all accidents, quantity holds first
place, as Boethius says in Lib. praedicam.
Among quantities, however, number is prior since
it is more simple and more abstract. Therefore an
accident cannot be the principle of plurality
according to number.
accidens sit principium pluralitatis
secundum numerum.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod dicit Porphyrius
quod individuum facit collectio
accidentium, quae in alio reperiri non
possunt. Sed illud, quod est principium
individuationis, est principium
diversitatis secundum numerum. Ergo
accidentia sunt principium pluralitatis
secundum numerum.
On the contrary is the statement made by
Porphyry, that a collection of accidents which are
not to be found in another produces the individual.
But what is the principle of individuation is the
principle of numerical plurality; therefore
accidents are the principle of plurality according
to number.
Praeterea, in individuo nihil invenitur nisi
forma et materia et accidentia. Sed
diversitas formae non facit diversitatem
secundum numerum, sed secundum
speciem, ut patet in X metaphysicae.
Diversitatem vero secundum genus facit
diversitas materiae. Dicit enim
philosophus in X metaphysicae quod
genere differunt, quorum non est materia
communis nec generatio ad invicem.
Ergo diversitatem secundum numerum
nihil potest facere nisi diversitas
accidentium.
Again, in the individual, there is found nothing
except matter, form, and accidents. Diversity of
form, however, does not produce diversity
according to number, but according to species,
as is said in X Metaph. Now, diversity of matter
produces diversity of genus. For the Philosopher
says in X Metaph. that those things differ in genus
in which there is not common matter, or
generation of one into the other (mutual
generation). Therefore diversity according to
number cannot be produced except by diversity of
accidents.
Praeterea, illud, quod invenitur commune
in pluribus specie differentibus, non est
causa diversitatis secundum numerum,
quia divisio generis in species praecedit
divisionem speciei in individua. Sed
materia invenitur communis in diversis
secundum speciem, quia eadem
materia formis contrariis subditur; alias
habentia contrarias formas non
transmutarentur invicem. Ergo materia
non est principium diversitatis secundum
numerum, nec forma, ut probatum est.
Ergo relinquitur quod accidentia sint
huius diversitatis causa.
Moreover, what is found as common in many
things that are specifically different is not the
cause of diversity according to number, because
the division of genus into species precedes the
division of species into individuals; but matter is
found to be common in things that are different in
species because the same matter is possessed
by contrary forms, otherwise beings having
contrary forms would not be transmuted one into
the other; therefore matter is not the principle of
individuation according to number, and neither is
form, as has been noted at the beginning. Hence
it remains that accidents are the cause of this
kind of diversity.
Praeterea, in genere substantiae nihil
invenitur nisi genus et differentia. Sed
individua unius speciei non differunt
genere nec substantialibus differentiis.
Ergo non differunt nisi differentiis
accidentalibus.
Again, in the genus of substance there is found
only genus and difference; but the individuals of
one species differ neither in genus, nor by reason
of substantial differences; therefore they do not
differ except because of accidental differences.
Responsio. Dicendum quod ad
evidentiam huius quaestionis et eorum,
quae in littera dicuntur, oportet videre,
quid sit causa huius triplicis diversitatis,
quae in littera assignatur.
Response. I answer: For the clarification of this
question and of those other questions treated of
in the text of Boethius, it is necessary to see what
may be the cause of the threefold diversity
spoken of in the text.
Cum autem in individuo composito in
genere substantiae non sint nisi tria,
scilicet materia, forma et compositum,
oportet ex aliquo horum cuiuslibet harum
diversitatum causas invenire. Sciendum
est ergo quod diversitas secundum
genus reducitur in diversitatem materiae,
diversitas vero secundum speciem in
diversitatem formae, sed diversitas
secundum numerum partim in
diversitatem materiae, partim in
diversitatem accidentis.
Now, since in the individual composite in the
genus of substance there are only three things
(matter, form, and the composite), it must be that
in each of these things the causes of their
diversities are to be found. Accordingly it must be
evident that diversity of genus is reduced to
diversity of matter; but diversity according to
species is reduced to diversity of form; whereas
diversity according to number is owing partly to
diversity of matter, and partly to accidental
diversity.
Cum autem genus sit principium
cognoscendi, utpote prima diffinitionis
pars, materia autem secundum se sit
ignota, non potest secundum se ex ea
accipi diversitas generis, sed solum illo
modo, quo cognoscibilis est. Est autem
cognoscibilis dupliciter. Uno modo per
analogiam sive per proportionem, ut
dicitur in I physicorum. Hoc est, ut
dicamus illud esse materiam quod hoc
modo se habet ad res naturales sicut
lignum ad lectum. Alio modo cognoscitur
per formam, per quam habet esse in
actu. Unumquodque enim cognoscitur,
secundum quod est in actu, et non
secundum quod est in potentia, ut dicitur
Since, moreover, genus is the principle for
knowableness of a thing, inasmuch as it is the
first part of a definition, though matter in itself is
unknowable, it is not possible that from matter in
se diversity of genus should be known, but only
according to that mode by which it is knowable.
Now, a thing is knowable in two ways. (1) In one
way, by analogy, or by comparison, as is said in I
Physic. Thus we say that this is matter or that
matter is related to natural things as wood is to a
couch. (2) In another way, a thing is known by the
form because of which it has actual being. For
everything is known inasmuch as it is in act, not
according as it is in potency, as is said in X
Metaph.
in IX metaphysicae.
Et secundum hoc dupliciter sumitur
diversitas generis ex materia. Uno modo
ex diversa analogia ad materiam, et sic
penes materiam distinguuntur prima
rerum genera. Id enim, quod est in
genere substantiae, comparatur ad
materiam sicut ad partem sui; quod vero
est in genere quantitatis, non habet
materiam partem sui, sed comparatur ad
ipsam sicut mensura, et qualitas sicut
dispositio. Et his duobus generibus
mediantibus omnia alia genera
nanciscuntur diversas comparationes ad
materiam, quae est pars substantiae, ex
qua substantia habet rationem subiecti,
secundum quam ad accidentia
comparatur. Alio modo penes materiam
sumitur diversitas generis, secundum
quod materia est perfecta per formam.
Cum enim materia sit potentia pura et
Deus actus purus, nihil est aliud
materiam perfici in actum qui est forma,
nisi quatenus participat aliquam
similitudinem actus primi, licet
imperfecte, ut sic illud, quod est iam
compositum ex materia et forma, sit
medium inter potentiam puram et actum
According to this aspect, diversity of genus
derives from matter in two ways. (1) In one way,
by analogous diversity in relation to form, and thus
the first genera of things are distinguished
according to matter. For what is in the genus of
substance is referred to matter as to a part of
itself; but what is in the genus of quantity has no
matter as a part of itself, but is related to it as its
measure, and quality is related as its disposition.
And by means of these two genera (namely,
quantity and quality), all other genera are
diversely related to matter, which is a part of
substance; hence substance has the nature of a
subject and as such has a certain relation to
accidents. (2) In another way, diversity of genus
has its, origin in matter inasmuch as matter is
perfected by form. And since matter is pure
potency, just as God is Pure Act, to say that
matter is perfected by act (which is form) is to say
nothing else than that in some way it shares in a
certain similitude to First Act, imperfectly indeed,
since what is composed of matter and form is
midway between pure potency and pure act.
purum.
Non autem materia ex omni parte recipit
aequaliter similitudinem primi actus, sed
a quibusdam imperfecte, a quibusdam
vero perfectius, utpote quaedam
participant divinam similitudinem
secundum hoc tantum quod subsistunt,
quaedam vero secundum quod vivunt,
quaedam vero secundum quod
cognoscunt, quaedam secundum quod
intelligunt. Ipsa igitur similitudo primi
actus in quacumque materia exsistens
est forma eius. Sed forma talis in
quibusdam facit esse tantum, in
quibusdam esse et vivere, et sic de aliis
una et eadem. Similitudo enim perfectior
habet omne illud quod habet similitudo
minus perfecta, et adhuc amplius.
Aliquid ergo invenitur commune in
utraque similitudine, quod in una
substernitur imperfectioni et in alia
perfectioni, sicut materia substernebatur
actui et privationi. Et ideo materia simul
accepta cum hoc communi est adhuc
materialis respectu perfectionis et
imperfectionis praedictae.
Moreover, matter does not receive similitude to
First Act in an altogether equal way, but in some
things it is received imperfectly and in others
more perfectly; thus, for example, some beings
participate in a divine similitude inasmuch only as
they subsist; others, in that they have knowledge;
and still others, by possession of intellect.
Therefore what is the similitude of First Act in any
existing matter is its form. But in some beings this
form causes it only to exist, in others to exist and
to live, and so, in one and the same being, form
may be the cause of other perfections. For what
is the more perfect similitude has everything that
less perfect similitudes have by way of
perfections, and more besides. Something
common, therefore, may be found in various
similitudes, but possessed more imperfectly in
some and more perfectly in others; just as matter
may be subjected to both act and privation. And
so matter, once taken together with this common
element, is still material in regard to the
aforementioned perfection and imperfection.
Et ex hoc materiali sumitur genus, From this material element it takes its genus, but
differentiae vero ex perfectione et
imperfectione praedicta. Sicut ex hoc
communi materiali, quod est habere
vitam, sumitur hoc genus animatum
corpus; ex perfectione vero superaddita
haec differentia sensibile; ex
imperfectione vero haec differentia
insensibile. Et sic diversitas talium
materialium inducit diversitatem generis,
sicut animal a planta. Et propter hoc
dicitur materia esse principium
diversitatis secundum genus. Et eadem
ratione forma est principium diversitatis
secundum speciem, quia a praedictis
formalibus, quae habent ad dicta
materialia, unde genera sumuntur,
comparationem formae ad materiam,
sumuntur differentiae quae constituunt
species.
its difference is from the perfection or
imperfection of which we spoke above. For
example, from this common material element
(namely, having life), there is derived the genus
animated body; but because of a superadded
perfection there derives the difference sensible,
while, on the other hand, from imperfection there
is derived the difference insensible. Thus the
diversity of such material things brings about
diversity of genus, as that between animal and
plant. On this account matter is said to be the
principle of diversity according to genus, and in
the same way, form is the principle of diversity
according to species; because it is by reason of
formal qualities which material things possess in
addition to those which are the cause of their
genus as material things, or by relation of form to
matter, that the differences constituting species
are derived.
Sciendum tamen quod cum illud
materiale, unde sumitur genus, habeat in
se materiam et formam, logicus
considerat genus solum ex parte eius
quod formale est, unde et eius
diffinitiones dicuntur formales, sed
naturalis considerat genus ex parte
utriusque. Et ideo contingit quandoque
quod aliquid communicat in genere
However, it must be borne in mind that this
matter whence genus is derived has in itself
both form and matter. While the logician
considers genus only according to its formal
aspect, his definitions are said to be formal; but
the natural philosopher considers genus from
both aspects. Hence it sometimes happens that a
thing shares in a logical genus in which it would
not be classed according to the natural
secundum logicum, quod non
communicat secundum naturalem.
Contingit enim quandoque quod illud de
similitudine primi actus quod consequitur
res aliqua in materia tali, aliud
consequatur sine materia et aliud in alia
materia omnino diversa. Sicut patet
quod lapis in materia, quae est
secundum potentiam ad esse, pertingit
ad hoc quod subsistat, ad quod idem
pertingit sol secundum materiam ad ubi
et non ad esse et Angelus omni materia
carens. Unde logicus inveniens in
omnibus his illud materiae, ex quo genus
sumebat, ponit omnia in uno genere
substantiae. Naturalis vero et
metaphysicus, qui considerant omnia
principia rei, non invenientes
convenientiam in materia dicunt genere
differre secundum hoc quod dicitur in X
metaphysicae quod corruptibile et
incorruptibile differunt genere et quod illa
conveniunt genere, quorum materia est
una et generatio ad invicem.
philosopher. Now, this happens when something
by way of similitude to First Act is found in a
material thing, and again in one without matter,
and again in a being altogether different in matter.
Thus it is evident that a stone which is in matter in
such a way as to be potential to being, attains to
something of similitude to First Act by being
subsistent, and the sun also attains to the same
similitude, though being in matter which is
potential to place, but not any longer to being
(having subsistent existence); and an angel
likewise, although lacking any kind of matter.
Hence the logician, finding in all these beings that
from which a genus derives, places them all in the
genus of substance; but the natural philosopher
and the metaphysician, who considers the
principles of things, not finding these all to be in
material agreement, says that they differ in genus;
as is said in X Metaph.: that corruptible and
incorruptible differ generically and that those
beings agree in genus whose matter is one and
among which there is mutual generation.
Sic ergo patet, quomodo materia facit
diversitatem in genere et forma
diversitatem in specie. Inter individua
vero unius speciei hoc modo
Thus therefore it is evident in what way matter
produces diversity in genus, and form produces
diversity in species. But among individuals of the
same species diversity should be considered,
consideranda est diversitas. Secundum
philosophum enim in VII metaphysicae
sicut partes generis et speciei sunt
materia et forma, ita partes individui sunt
haec materia et haec forma. Unde sicut
diversitatem in genere vel specie facit
diversitas materiae vel formae absolute,
ita diversitatem in numero facit haec
forma et haec materia. Nulla autem
forma in quantum huiusmodi est haec ex
se ipsa. Dico autem in quantum
huiusmodi propter animam rationalem,
quae quodammodo ex se ipsa est hoc
aliquid, sed non in quantum forma.
Intellectus enim quamlibet formam, quam
possibile est recipi in aliquo sicut in
materia vel in subiecto, natus est
attribuere pluribus, quod est contra
rationem eius quod est hoc aliquid. Unde
forma fit haec per hoc quod recipitur in
materia. Sed cum materia in se sit
indistincta, non potest esse quod
formam receptam individuet, nisi
secundum quod est distinguibilis. Non
enim forma individuatur per hoc quod
recipitur in materia, nisi quatenus
recipitur in hac materia distincta et
determinata ad hic et nunc.
according to that laid down by the Philosopher
(VII Metaph.); namely, that just as parts of genus
and species are matter and form, so the parts of
the individual are this matter and this form.
Therefore, just as diversity of matter causes
diversity in genus, or diversity of form causes
diversity in species, absolutely, so this form and
this matter produce diversity in number: but no
form, as such, is of itself. I say, however, no form,
as such, because of the rational soul, which in a
manner is this something of itself, but not merely
inasmuch as it is a form. Intellect, in truth, since it
is a form capable of being received into anything
as its matter, or as its subjectcan naturally be
attributed to many; a thing which is contrary to the
nature of that which is this something; hence it is,
made a form by the fact that it is received in
matter. But since matter, considered in itself, is
indistinct, it is not possible that it would
individuate a form received into it, except as it is
distinguishable. For no form is individuated by the
fact that it is received into matter, except in so far
as it is received into this matter, or it is this
distinct form, determined to this, and at this time.
Materia autem non est divisibilis nisi per
quantitatem. Unde philosophus dicit in I
physicorum quod subtracta quantitate
remanebit substantia indivisibilis. Et
ideo materia efficitur haec et signata,
secundum quod subest dimensionibus.
Dimensiones autem istae possunt
dupliciter considerari.
Moreover, matter is not divisible except by
quantity. Therefore the Philosopher says in I
Physic., that if quantity were removed, a
substance would remain indivisible: hence matter
is made to be this matter and is signate inasmuch
as it exists under dimensions. Dimensions,
however, can be considered in two ways.
Uno modo secundum earum
terminationem; et dico eas terminari
secundum determinatam mensuram et
figuram, et sic ut entia perfecta
collocantur in genere quantitatis. Et sic
non possunt esse principium
individuationis; quia cum talis terminatio
dimensionum varietur frequenter circa
individuum, sequeretur quod individuum
non remaneret semper idem numero.
1. In one way according to their termination, and I
say that they are terminated according to limited
measure and figure; and so, as complete beings,
dimensions are classed in the genus of quantity,
and thus they cannot be the principle of
individuation: because such termination of
dimensions may frequently vary in regard to the
same individual, and in such case it would follow
that the individual would not remain numerically
the same.
Alio modo possunt considerari sine ista
determinatione in natura dimensionis
tantum, quamvis numquam sine aliqua
determinatione esse possint, sicut nec
natura coloris sine determinatione albi et
nigri; et sic collocantur in genere
quantitatis ut imperfectum. Et ex his
dimensionibus indeterminatis materia
efficitur haec materia signata, et sic
2. In another way, dimensions may be considered
without this certain determination, merely in the
nature of dimension, although they never could
exist without some kind of determination; just as
the nature of color cannot exist without
determination to white or black; and according to
this aspect dimensions are classed in the genus
of quantity as imperfect. And by these
indeterminate dimensions matter is made to be
individuat formam, et sic ex materia
causatur diversitas secundum numerum
in eadem specie.
this signate matter, and thus gives individuality to
a form, and thus also by matter there is caused
the numerical diversity of things in the same
species.
Unde patet quod materia secundum se
accepta nec est principium diversitatis
secundum speciem nec secundum
numerum, sed sicut est principium
diversitatis secundum genus, prout
subest formae communi, ita est
principium diversitatis secundum
numerum, prout subest dimensionibus
interminatis. Et ideo cum hae
dimensiones sint de genere
accidentium, quandoque diversitas
secundum numerum reducitur in
diversitatem materiae, quandoque in
diversitatem accidentis, et hoc ratione
dimensionum praedictarum. Alia vero
accidentia non sunt principium
individuationis, sed sunt principium
cognoscendi distinctionem individuorum.
Et per hunc modum etiam aliis
accidentibus individuatio attribuitur.
Therefore it is evident that matter, according as it
is considered in itself, is not the principle of
diversity, either according to species or
according to number; but as it is the principle of
generic diversity inasmuch as it is considered the
subject of a common form, so it is the principle of
numerical diversity inasmuch as it is considered
as subject to indeterminate dimensions.
Therefore also, since these dimensions are in the
genus of accidents, diversity according to number
is reduced to diversity of matter, or to accidental
diversity, according to the nature of the aforesaid
dimensions. Other accidents, however, are not
principles of individuation, but they are the
principle of knowing the individual to be distinct. In
this way individuation is also attributed to other
accidents.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum
dicit philosophus quod numero sunt
unum, quorum est materia una,
intelligendum est de materia signata,
quae subest dimensionibus, alias
oporteret dicere quod omnia generabilia
et corruptibilia sint unum numero, cum
eorum sit materia una.
1. It may be said: When the Philosopher says that
those things are numerically one in which the
matter is one, this must be understood of signate
matter which is the subject of dimensions;
otherwise it would be necessary to say that all
generable and corruptible things are numerically
one, since their matter is one.
dimensiones, cum sint accidentia, per se
non possunt esse principium unitatis
individuae substantiae; sed materia,
prout talibus dimensionibus subest,
intelligitur esse principium talis unitatis et
multitudinis.
2. It may be answered: Since dimensions are
accidents, they cannot per se be the principle of
the unity of an individual substance; but matter,
inasmuch as it underlies such and such
dimensions, is understood to be the principle of
this unity and of this multitude.
Ad tertium dicendum quod de ratione
individui est quod sit in se indivisum et
ab aliis ultima divisione divisum. Nullum
autem accidens habet ex se propriam
rationem divisionis nisi quantitas. Unde
dimensiones ex se ipsis habent
quandam rationem individuationis
secundum determinatum situm, prout
situs est differentia quantitatis. Et sic
dimensio habet duplicem rationem
individuationis: unam ex subiecto, sicut
et quodlibet aliud accidens, et aliam ex
3. It may be said: It is according to the nature of
an individual thing that it be undivided in itself,
and divided from other things by an ultimate
division. No accident, however, has in itself the
proper nature of division, unless it is quantity;
therefore dimensions of themselves have a
certain nature of individuation according to a
determined place, inasmuch as place is a
difference of quantity. Thus there is a twofold
meaning of individuation: the one on the part of a
subject, and this is the same for any accident; the
other meaning, on the part of individuation itself,
se ipsa, in quantum habet situm, ratione
cuius etiam abstrahendo a materia
sensibili imaginamur hanc lineam et
hunc circulum. Et ideo recte materiae
convenit individuare omnes alias formas
ex hoc, quod subditur illi formae, quae ex
se ipsa habet individuationis rationem,
ita quod etiam ipsae dimensiones
terminatae, quae fundantur in subiecto
iam completo, individuantur
quodammodo ex materia individuata per
dimensiones interminatas
praeintellectas in materia.
inasmuch as it has place, by reason of which, in
abstracting from sensible matter, we may
imagine this line and this circle. Hence it rightly
pertains to matter to individuate all other forms,
because it gives to this form, which of itself has
the nature of individuation, that it also be
terminated by those dimensions that are found in
a subject now made complete; accordingly they
are individuated by matter which is individuated
by indeterminate dimensions conceived of as in
matter.
Ad quartum dicendum quod illa, quae
differunt numero in genere substantiae,
non solum differunt accidentibus, sed
etiam forma et materia. Sed si
quaeratur, quare differens est eorum
forma, non erit alia ratio, nisi quia est in
alia materia signata. Nec invenitur alia
ratio, quare haec materia sit divisa ab
illa, nisi propter quantitatem. Et ideo
materia subiecta dimensioni intelligitur
esse principium huius diversitatis.
4. It may be said: Things that differ numerically in
the genus of substance, differ not only because of
accidents, but also by reason of form and matter;
but if it is asked how this form differs from that,
the only reason can be that it is in other signate
matter. Nor can there be found another reason
why this matter is divided from that except by
reason of its quantity. Hence matter subject to
dimension is understood to be the principle of this
kind of diversity.
Ad quintum dicendum quod ratio illa
procedit de accidentibus completis,
quae sequuntur esse formae in materia,
5. It may be said: This reasoning relates to
completed accidents which follow upon the
existence of a form in matter; but not to those
non autem de dimensionibus
interminatis, quae praeintelliguntur ante
ipsam formam in materia. Sine his enim
non potest intelligi individuum, sicut nec
sine forma.
indeterminate dimensions which may be
conceived of before the reception of the form in
matter. For without these, a thing cannot be
understood to be individual, any more than it can
be conceived of without form.
Ad sextum dicendum quod numerus
formaliter loquendo est prius quam
quantitas [84594] Super De continua,
sed materialiter quantitas continua est
prior, cum numerus ex divisione continui
relinquatur, ut dicitur in III physicorum. Et
secundum hanc viam causat
diversitatem secundum numerum divisio
materiae secundum dimensiones.
6. It may be answered: Number, formally
speaking, is prior to continuous quantity: but
materially, continuous quantity is prior, since
number is the result of the division of a continuum,
as is said in IV Physic. In this way, division of
matter, according to dimensions, causes
numerical diversity.
Rationes autem quae sunt in contrarium
patet ex dictis qualiter sunt concedendae
et qualiter falsum concludunt.
As to contrary reasons proposed, it is clear what
must be conceded and what false conclusions
have been deduced.
Article 3
Whether Two Bodies Can Be, or Can Be Conceived of as Being Simultaneously in the
Same Place
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod 1. It seems that two bodies can be conceived of as
duo corpora possint intelligi esse in
eodem loco. Omnis enim propositio
videtur esse intelligibilis, in cuius
subiecto non includitur oppositum
praedicati, quia talis propositio non
habet repugnantiam intellectuum. Sed
haec propositio duo corpora sunt in
eodem loco non est huiusmodi; alias
numquam posset miraculose fieri quod
duo corpora sint in eodem loco; quod
patet esse falsum in corpore dominico
quod exivit clauso utero virginis et
intravit ad discipulos clausis ianuis.
Non enim Deus potest facere quod
affirmatio et negatio sint simul vera, ut
dicit Augustinus contra Faustum. Ergo
potest aliquis saltem intellectu fingere
duo corpora esse in eodem loco.
being in the same place. For any proposition
seems to be intelligible in which there is included
no opposition of the predicate to the subject, since
such a proposition contains nothing repugnant to
understanding. But this proposition, Two bodies
are in the same place, is not a proposition
repugnant to the intellect. Otherwise it could not
happen miraculously, a thing evidently false
regarding the body of our Lord, which came forth
from the closed womb of the Virgin, and which
entered into the midst of the disciples, the doors
being shut. Now, even God cannot cause
affirmation and negation to be simultaneously true,
as Augustine says in answer to Faustus; therefore
one can understand, or at least conceive of in his
mind, that two bodies could be in the same place
at the same time.
Praeterea, a corporibus glorificatis non
removetur natura corporeitatis, sed
solum natura corpulentiae. Sed
removetur ab eis ista condicio, quod
non possunt esse in eodem loco, per
dotem subtilitatis, ut a multis dicitur.
Ergo haec condicio non sequitur
naturam corporeitatis, sed corpulentiae
sive grossitiei cuiusdam. Ergo non est
impossibile universaliter duo corpora
2. From glorified bodies there will be removed not
the nature of corporeity, but only that of corpulentia
(bodily mass). When this is removed, the
possibility of being with other bodies in the same
place is theirs by reason of the gift of subtlety, as is
said by many. Therefore this condition does not
follow the nature of corporeity, but that of
corpulentia, of a certain mass. Therefore it is not
impossible to conceive of two bodies being
simultaneously in the same place.
esse in eodem loco.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit super
Genesim ad litteram quod lux in
corporibus primum tenet locum. Sed lux
est simul in eodem loco cum aere.
Ergo duo corpora possunt esse simul
in eodem loco.
3. Augustine, in commenting upon the Book of
Genesis speaks of light as holding first place
among corporeal things; but light is simultaneously
in the same place with air; therefore two bodies
can be in the same place at the same time.
Praeterea, quaelibet species ignis est
corpus. Sed lux est quaedam species
ignis, ut dicit philosophus in V
topicorum. Ergo lux est corpus. Et sic
idem quod prius.
Any species of fire, as the Philosopher says in V
Topic., is a body; and so the conclusion is like the
previous one.
Praeterea, in ferro ignito simul est ignis
et ferrum. Utrumque autem est corpus.
Ergo possibile est simul esse duo
corpora in eodem loco.
5. In glowing iron, the fire and the iron are
simultaneous; but each is a body; therefore it is
possible for two bodies to be in the same place at
the same time.
Praeterea, elementa in mixto non sunt
corrupta, alias mixtum non sequeretur
dominantis motum. Sed omnia quattuor
elementa sunt corpora et simul in
qualibet parte mixti. Ergo possibile est
duo corpora esse in eodem loco.
6. Elements in a compound are not corrupted;
otherwise a compound would not follow the motion
of a dominant element; but all four elements are
bodies and are simultaneously in every part of the
compound; therefore it is possible for two bodies
to be simultaneously in the same place.
Praeterea, quod duo corpora non sint 7. The fact that two bodies are not simultaneously
in eodem loco, hoc non potest
convenire corporibus ratione materiae,
cum materiae secundum se non
debeatur locus, nec ratione formae
propter idem nec ratione dimensionis,
cum dimensiones non repleant locum,
quod patet ex hoc quod quidam locum,
ubi erant solae dimensiones, dicebant
esse vacuum. Ergo hoc non convenit
corpori nisi ratione aliquorum
accidentium posteriorum, quae non
sunt omnibus corporibus communia et
quae possibile est a corporibus
separari. Et sic videtur quod duo
corpora possint esse in eodem loco.
in one place does not occur by reason of the
matter of the bodies, since to matter in itself there
is no due place; nor does it occur because of the
form, for the same reason; nor is it because of
dimension, since dimensions do not fill up place,
as is evident from the fact that certain philosophers
are accustomed to say that the place where there
are only dimensions is a vacuum. Therefore this
characteristic of a body must arise only from
certain posterior accidents, which are not
altogether common and which can be separated
from the body; and so it seems that two bodies
could be simultaneously in the same place.
Praeterea, secundum astrologos, qui
sequuntur Ptolemaeum, sex planetarum
corpora moventur in epicyclis, qui sunt
circuli intersecantes sphaeras
excentricas planetarum. Oportet ergo
quod planetae corpus quandoque
perveniat ad locum sectionis. Sed non
potest dici quod ibi sit aliquid vacuum,
cum vacuum natura non patiatur, neque
quod substantia sphaerarum sit
divisibilis, ut intelligatur cedere corpori
planetae quando pervenit illuc, sicut
cedit aer lapidi aut alii corpori, cum
8. According to the astrologers who follow Ptolemy,
the six bodies of the planets move in epicycles,
which are circles intersecting the spheres extrinsic
to the planets. Therefore it must be that a body of a
planet at some time would arrive at the place of
section. But it cannot be said that at that place
there is any vacuum, since nature does not suffer
this; nor that the substance of the spheres is
divisible, so that it might be thought of as giving
way when the planetary body had reached it, as air
gives way to a stone, for the heavens are most
solid, being formed, as it were, of molten brass, as
is said in Job, 37:18. Therefore it must be that the
caeli solidissimi quasi aere fundati sint,
ut dicitur Iob 37. Ergo oportet quod
corpus planetae sit simul cum corpore
sphaerae eius in eodem loco. Et sic
falsum est quod dicit Boethius hic quod
duo corpora numquam unum obtinent
locum.
body of the planet is simultaneously in the same
place as the body of the sphere; and so Boethius
falsely says that two bodies cannot occupy one and
the same place.
Sed contra
Sed contra est, quia si duo corpora
sunt in eodem loco, eadem ratione et
quotlibet. Sed aliquod corpus
quantumcumque magnum potest dividi
in parva cuiuscumque quantitatis
secundum aliquem numerum. Ergo
sequetur quod in loco parvissimo
continebitur maximum corpus; quod
videtur absurdum.
On the contrary is the fact that if two bodies are in
one and the same place, they are the same in
nature and in every respect; but any body, however
large, can be divided into small bodies of any
quantity, according to any number; therefore, it
would follow that in the very smallest place there
would be contained the largest body, a thing which
appears to be absurd.
Praeterea, impossibile est inter duo
puncta signata esse plures lineas
rectas. Hoc autem sequetur, si duo
corpora sint in eodem loco. Signatis
enim duobus punctis ex duabus
partibus loci oppositis erunt inter ea
duae lineae rectae signatae in duobus
corporibus locatis. Non enim potest dici
Again, it is impossible for there to be many straight
lines between two given points. But this would
follow if two bodies could be in the same place.
For then, given two points in two opposite parts of
space, there will be between them two straight
lines assigned corporeally to two places. Now, it
cannot be said that between these two points there
will be no lines at all, or that a line of one location
quod inter illa duo puncta nulla sit linea
neque quod unius locati linea magis sit
inter ea quam alia neque quod sit ibi
aliqua una linea praeter corpora locata
quae sit inter duo puncta loci, quia sic
illa linea esset non in subiecto. Ergo
impossibile est duo corpora esse in
eodem loco.
would be greater than the other, or that there could
be any one line apart from those corporeally
located between the two points of given location,
for in that case the two lines would not be in a
subject. Therefore it is impossible for two bodies to
be simultaneously in the same place.
Praeterea, demonstratum est in
geometria quod duo circuli non se
contingunt nisi in puncto. Sed ponamus
duo corpora quae sunt in eodem loco;
sequetur quod duo circuli signati in eis
se secundum totum contingunt. Ergo
impossibile est duo corpora esse in
eodem loco.
Again, it has been demonstrated in geometry that
two circles are tangent only at one point: but if we
posit two bodies being simultaneously in the same
place, it would follow that two circles could be
totally tangent. Therefore it is impossible that two
bodies should be in the same place at the same
time.
Praeterea, quaecumque uni et eidem
sunt eadem, sibi invicem sunt eadem.
Sed cum oporteat eandem esse
dimensionem loci et locati ex eo quod
non est ponere dimensiones sine
subiecto, si duo corpora sint in eodem
loco, sequetur dimensiones utriusque
corporis esse easdem dimensionibus
loci. Ergo sequetur eas esse easdem
ad invicem, quod est impossibile.
Again, whatever things are equal to one and the
same thing are equal to each other; but since local
dimension must be one with a localized body
(since no dimension can be supposed without a
subject), if two bodies could be simultaneously in
the same place, it would follow that the dimensions
of each body would be equal to the dimensions of
the place; therefore it would follow that the bodies
would be the same, but this is impossible.
Responsio. Dicendum quod in his quae
apud nos sunt, quae omnes esse
corpora confitentur, ad sensum
videmus quod adveniente uno corpore
ad locum aliquem aliud corpus a loco
illo expellitur. Unde experimento patet
talium corporum duo in eodem loco
esse non posse.
Response. I answer that it must be said that in
those things belonging to our world, all of which are
judged to be corporeal, we see from sense
experience that when one body arrives at any given
place, any other body is expelled from that place;
therefore it is experimentally evident that two such
bodies cannot be in the same place.
Quidam autem dicunt quod non
prohibentur duo horum corporum ab
hoc, quod sint simul, propter
corporeitatem vel propter aliquid quod
sit de ratione corporis, in quantum est
corpus; sic enim sequeretur omnino
duo corpora prohiberi ab hoc quod est
esse simul. Sed dicunt quod ab hoc
prohibentur propter corpulentiam
ipsorum. Sed quidquid sit hoc quod
corpulentiam nominant, sive sit
densitas sive impuritas vel
corruptibilitas aliquorum corporum vel
etiam aliqua natura specialis naturae
generali corporeitatis superaddita, non
potest esse causa huius prohibitionis.
There are, however, certain philosophers who
declare that two bodies are not thus prohibited
from simultaneous occupation of the same place
on account of their corporeity, or on account of
anything else which belongs to the nature of a
body, as a body, for thus it would follow that it
would be altogether impossible for two bodies to
exist simultaneously [in the same place]. But they
say that this prohibition is due only to their
corpulentia. But whatever this corpulentia may
meanwhether density or impurity or corruptibility
which attends certain bodies, or even some
special nature superadded to the general nature of
corporeitythe prohibition can be on account of
none of these things.
Invenitur enim duplex comparatio
corporis ad locum. Una, secundum
quam ponitur in loco hoc vel illo
Now, there is to be found a double relation of a
body to place. One is according as it has location
in this or that determined place; and this
determinato; et haec comparatio
sequitur naturam specialem huius vel
illius corporis, sicut quod gravia ex
natura gravitatis sunt deorsum, levia
vero sursum ex natura levitatis.
relationship follows upon the specific nature of this
or that body, just as heavy things, by the very nature
of their gravity, hold a lower place, but light bodies,
a higher place.
Alia vero comparatio est, secundum
quam dicitur esse in loco simpliciter; et
haec comparatio sequitur corpus ex
ipsa natura corporeitatis, non propter
aliquid additum. Secundum hoc enim
corpus est in loco, quod loco se
commetitur; hoc autem est, secundum
quod est dimensionatum
dimensionibus aequalibus et similibus
dimensionibus loci. Dimensiones
autem insunt cuilibet corpori ex ipsa
corporeitatis natura. Esse autem plura
corpora in eodem loco vel non esse
non respicit locum determinatum, sed
locum absolute. Unde oportet quod
causa huius impedimenti referatur ad
ipsam naturam corporeitatis, ex qua
convenit omni corpori quod, in quantum
est corpus, natum sit esse in loco.
But another relationship prevails according as a
body is said, absolutely, to be in place: and this
relationship characterizes a bodily thing by the very
nature of its corporeity, not because of anything
additional. For according as a particular body is in
place, it is commensurate with that place; but this
is because it has dimensions that are equal and
similar to the dimensions of the place; moreover,
dimensions belong to every body by reason of its
very corporeity. For, that many bodies should or
should not be in the same place, has no relation to
a determined place, but regards place absolutely;
therefore it must be that the cause of this
impediment should be referred to the nature of
corporeity, by reason of which every body,
inasmuch as it is a body, is destined to be in place.
Et si ultima sphaera non sit in loco, hoc
non est nisi quia nihil potest esse extra
ipsam, non autem propter defectum
And if the last sphere should not be in place, this is
so only because nothing can be outside it, but not
because it is lacking in the aforesaid aptitude to
aptitudinis praedictae. occupy place.
Et ideo alii concedunt simpliciter quod
nulla duo corpora possunt esse in
eodem loco et rationem huius referunt
ad principia mathematica, quae oportet
salvari in omnibus naturalibus, ut dicitur
in III caeli et mundi. Sed hoc non videtur
esse conveniens, quia mathematicis
non competit esse in loco nisi
similitudinarie et non proprie, ut habetur
in I de generatione. Et ideo ratio
praedicti impedimenti non est sumenda
ex principiis mathematicis, sed ex
principiis naturalibus, quibus proprie
locus debetur. Praeterea, rationes
mathematicae non sufficienter
concludunt in ista materia. Etsi enim
mathematica salventur in naturalibus,
tamen naturalia addunt aliquid supra
mathematica, scilicet materiam
sensibilem, et ex hoc addito potest
assignari ratio alicuius in naturalibus,
cuius ratio in mathematicis non poterat
assignari. In mathematicis enim non
potest assignari ratio diversitatis harum
duarum linearum nisi propter situm.
Unde remota diversitate situs non
remanet pluralitas linearum
Hence there are others who concede that,
absolutely, no two bodies can be in the same place
at the same time, and they assign the reason for
this to mathematical principles, which ought to be
observed in all the natural sciences, as is said in III
Coel. et mundo. But this reason does not seem
fitting, because it does not pertain to the objects of
mathematics to be in place, except improperly and
by similitude, as is said in II De generatione.
Hence, the reason for maintaining this impediment
should not be derived from mathematical
principles, but from the principles of natural things,
to which place is properly due. Furthermore,
mathematical reasoning is sufficiently conclusive
only in regard to its own matter. For, Although
mathematical truths are preserved in natural
sciences, beings of the natural order add
something over and above what is possessed by,
mathematical beings: namely, sensible matter; and
because of this addition it is possible to assign as
an explanation of something in the natural order
what would not be assigned in explanation of an
object of mathematics. For in mathematics no
reason for diversity of two given lines can be
assigned except because of their situation;
wherefore, if diversity of situation is removed, there
remains no plurality of mathematical lines, and
mathematicarum et similiter nec
superficierum aut corporum. Et propter
hoc non potest esse quod corpora
mathematica sint plura et sint simul; et
similiter de lineis et superficiebus.
likewise no diversity of surfaces or of bodies. On
this account mathematical bodies cannot be both
many and simultaneous, and in like manner neither
can lines or surfaces.
Sed in corporibus naturalibus posset
ab adversario assignari alia ratio
diversitatis, scilicet ex materia sensibili,
etiam remota diversitate situs. Et ideo
illa, quae probabat duo corpora
mathematica non esse simul, non est
sufficiens ad probandum duo corpora
naturalia simul non esse.
But in regard to corporeal things in nature, it is
possible to assign another and different reason for
diversity: namely, that of sensible matter, even
though diversity of situation were removed. Hence
the reasoning which proves that two mathematical
bodies cannot be simultaneously in the same place
does not suffice for proving that two bodies in the
natural order could not be simultaneous.
Et ideo accipienda est via Avicennae,
qua utitur in sua sufficientia in tractatu
de loco, per quam assignat causam
prohibitionis praedictae ex ipsa natura
corporeitatis per principia naturalia.
Dicit enim quod non potest esse causa
huius prohibitionis nisi illud cui primo et
per se competit esse in loco; hoc est
enim quod natum est replere locum.
Formae autem non competit esse in
loco nisi per accidens, quamvis aliquae
formae sint principium, quo corpus
determinatur ad hunc vel illum locum.
Similiter nec materia secundum se
And therefore the explanation of Avicenna must be
accepted, which he uses in his Sufficientia, in the
treatise De loco. In this explanation he assigns as
reason of the aforesaid prohibition one which, by
natural principles, is owing to the very nature of
corporeity itself. For he says there can be no cause
of this prohibition except that it pertains, first and
per se, to a thing to be in place: but this means that
it is destined by its nature to fill a place. Moreover,
it does not pertain to a form to be in place, except
accidentally; Although certain forms are the
principles by which a body is inclined to this or that
place. Likewise neither does it pertain to matter,
considered per se, to be in place, because, as so
considerata, quia sic intelligitur praeter
omnia alia genera, ut dicitur in VII
metaphysicae. Unde oportet quod
materia secundum quod subest ei, per
quod habet primam comparationem ad
locum, hoc prohibeat. Comparatur
autem ad locum, prout subest
dimensionibus.
considered, it is understood apart from all genera,
as is said in VII Metaph. Wherefore it must be that
matter, according as it is subject to that by which it
has primary relation to place, is the cause of this
prohibition; but it is related to place inasmuch as it
is subject to dimensions:
Et ideo ex natura materiae subiectae
dimensionibus prohibentur corpora
esse in eodem loco plura. Oportet enim
esse plura corpora, in quibus forma
corporeitatis invenitur divisa, quae
quidem non dividitur nisi secundum
divisionem materiae, cuius divisio cum
sit solum per dimensiones, de quarum
ratione est situs, impossibile est esse
hanc materiam distinctam ab illa, nisi
quando est distincta secundum situm,
quod non est quando duo corpora
ponuntur esse in eodem loco. Unde
sequitur illa duo corpora esse unum
corpus, quod est impossibile. Cum
ergo materia dimensionibus subiecta
inveniatur in quibuslibet corporibus,
oportet quaelibet duo corpora prohiberi
ex ipsa natura corporeitatis, ne sint in
eodem loco.
Hence it is by nature of matter subject to
dimensions that many bodies are prohibited from
being in the same place. For, wherever the form of
corporeity is found to be divided, there must be a
plurality of bodies; but this division does not take
place except by division of matter. Since division
of matter is only by dimensions, because of which
matter has situation, it is impossible that this
matter should be distinct from that unless it is
distinct according to situation. But this would not be
the case if two bodies were posited as being in the
same place; for then they would not be two bodies
but one body, a thing which is impossible. Since,
therefore, matter subject to dimensions is found in
all corporeal things, it must be by reason of the very
nature of corporeity that any two bodies are
prohibited from being in the same place at the
same time.
dupliciter aliqua propositio potest dici
non intelligibilis. Uno modo ex parte
intelligentis qui deficit intellectu, sicut
haec propositio: in tribus personis
divinis est una essentia. Et huiusmodi
propositio non oportet quod implicet
contradictionem.
1. It may be said: A proposition may be called not-
intelligible in two ways. In one way, it may be on the
part of the one understanding, because of the
deficiency of his intellect, as is the case in relation
to this proposition: In the three divine Persons
there is one essence. In a proposition of this kind,
there can be, indeed, no contradiction.
Alio modo ex parte ipsius
propositionis. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno
modo implicat contradictionem
absolute, sicut rationale est irrationale
et similia; et huiusmodi nullo miraculo
verificari possunt. Alia vero implicant
contradictionem aliquo modo, sicut
ista: mortuus redit ad vitam. Implicat
enim contradictionem, secundum quod
intelligitur redire ad vitam propria
virtute, cum ponatur per hoc quod
dicitur mortuum omni vitae principio
destitutum. Et talia possunt verificari
per miraculum superiori virtute
operante. Et similiter est in proposito.
Non enim in duobus corporibus in
eodem loco positis potest aliqua
In another way, non-intelligibility may be on the part
of the proposition, and this again for two reasons.
In one way because it implies a contradiction,
absolutely, as for example, The rational is
irrational; and not even by a miracle can
propositions of this sort be made true. In another
way, because they imply a contradiction in a
certain manner, as this proposition: The dead man
rose to life by his own (proper) power; for, by the
fact that he is said to be dead, it is posited that
he is destitute of every principle of life.
Propositions of this kind can be made true by the
miraculous operation of a superior power; and
such is the case in regard to this proposition. For
just as there can be found no natural cause of
diversity for two bodies in the same place, so, by
divine power, it is possible that two bodies be in
naturalis causa diversitatis inveniri. Sed
divina virtus potest ea, quamvis sint
unita in situ, in sua distinctione
conservare. Et sic miraculose fieri
potest quod duo corpora sint in eodem
loco.
the same place and that, Although united in
situation, their, distinction be conserved, as does
miraculously happen.
Ad secundum dicendum quod quidquid
sit illa corpulentia quae ponitur
removeri a corporibus gloriosis, tamen
planum est quod corporeitas ab eis
numquam removebitur et ideo nec
causa naturaliter prohibens aliquod
eorum simul esse cum alio corpore in
eodem loco. Sed solum miraculose hoc
esse poterit quod sint simul cum aliis
corporibus in eodem loco.
2. It may be said: Whatever may be this
corpulentia, which is said to be removed from
glorified bodies, nevertheless it is evident that
corporeity will not be removed from them;
therefore, neither will the cause which naturally
prohibits any one of them from simultaneously
occupying the same place with another; but only by
a miracle is it possible that a glorified body be in
the same place simultaneously with other bodies.
Ad tertium dicendum quod lux non est
corpus, sed qualitas quaedam, ut
Damascenus dicit et etiam Avicenna.
Augustinus autem lucem nominat ipsum
ignem, quod patet ex hoc quod
condividit lucem contra aerem, aquam
et terram.
3. It may be answered: Light is not a body, but a
certain quality, as Damascene says, and Avicenna
also. But Augustine gives light the same name as
fire, as is evident from the fact that he speaks of
light as contradistinguished from air, water, and
earth.
Ad quartum dicendum quod tres
species ignis a philosopho assignatae
4. It may be answered: The three species of fire
spoken of by the Philosopher are to be understood
sic sunt intelligendae, ut per lucem
intelligatur ignis in propria materia
exsistens, dato etiam, ut quidam dicunt,
quod ignis in propria sphaera non lucet.
Lucis enim non est lucere, sed quod ex
eius participatione alia luceant. Et
similiter ignis, etsi in propria materia
non luceat, tamen eius participatione
alia lucentia fiunt. Per flammam autem
intelligitur ignis exsistens in materia
aerea, per carbonem in materia terrea.
In materia autem aquea non potest
ignis convalescere in tantum quod ignis
nomen habeat, quia aqua habet omnes
qualitates oppositas igni.
in such a way that by light is understood fire
existing in its proper matter, and granted also, as
some say, that fire in its own proper sphere emits
no light. For it does not belong to the nature of light
to be luminous, but by participation in it other things
become so. The same is true of fire: for, Although
in its own sphere it emits no light, nevertheless, by
participation in it, other things become refulgent.
By flame, however, is to be understood fire in the
air; and by carbon, fire in terrestrial matter. In
aqueous matter, however, fire cannot continue in
such a way as to have the nature of fire, because
water has qualities which are altogether opposed
to fire.
Ad quintum dicendum quod in ferro
ignito non sunt duo corpora, sed unum
corpus habens quidem speciem ferri,
sed aliquas proprietates ignis.
5. It must be said: In iron which has become ignited
there are not two bodies, but one body having
indeed the species of iron, but certain properties of
fire.
Ad sextum dicendum quod etsi
ponantur elementa in corpore mixto
remanere secundum suas formas
substantiales, non tamen ponuntur esse
plura corpora in actu, alias nullum
corpus mixtum esset vere unum, sed
est unum in actu et multa in potentia.
6. It may be answered: Although elements in a
compound are supposed to remain according to
their substantial forms, nevertheless it is not
supposed that there are then many bodies in act,
for otherwise no compound would be truly one; but
while it is potentially many, it is one in act.
Probabilior tamen videtur esse opinio
Commentatoris in III caeli et mundi, qui
hanc opinionem Avicennae improbans
dicit elementorum formas in mixto non
remanere nec totaliter corrumpi, sed
fieri ex his unam mediam formam, in
quantum suscipiunt magis et minus.
Sed cum formae substantiales magis
et minus suscipere sit absonum, videtur
eius dictum esse intelligendum hoc
modo, quod formae elementorum
suscipiant magis et minus non
secundum se, sed secundum quod
manent virtute in qualitatibus
elementaribus quasi in propriis
instrumentis, ut sic dicatur quod formae
secundum se non remanent, sed solum
prout sunt virtute in qualitatibus, ex
quibus fit una media qualitas.
Nevertheless the opinion of the Commentator, III
Coel. et mundo, seems the more probable. In
rejecting the opinion of Avicenna, he says that the
forms of elements neither remain in a compound
nor are altogether corrupted, but that from them
there comes to be one common or neuter form
inasmuch as they comprise it, more or less. But
since to give rise to a substantial form more or
less seems an improbability, it appears that this
saying ought to be understood in this way: that the
forms of the elements are receptive of more or less
(or comprise the form of the compound, more or
less), not secundum se, but according as they
remain in elementary qualities, as it were in their
proper instruments. And thus it is said: Forms
remain virtually in the qualities of the elements
certain instrumental properties, as it were. Forms
secundum se, do not remain, but only according as
they remain virtually in their qualities, out of which
there is made one, median, or common quality.
Ad septimum dicendum quod quamvis
dimensiones per se non possent
replere locum, tamen corpus naturale
ex hoc quod eius materia intelligitur
subiecta dimensionibus habet quod
repleat locum.
7. It may be said: Although dimensions of
themselves cannot fill out a place, nevertheless a
natural body, because of the fact that its matter is
understood to be subject to dimensions, has the
natural characteristic of filling a place.
Ad octavum dicendum quod opinio 8. It may be said: The opinion of Ptolemy regarding
Ptolemaei de epicyclis et excentricis
non videtur consonare principiis
naturalibus quae Aristoteles ponit; et
ideo illa opinio sectatoribus Aristotelis
non placet. Si tamen sustineatur, nulla
necessitas erit quod duo corpora sint in
eodem loco, quia secundum tenentes
illam opinionem triplex substantia
distinguitur in caelestibus corporibus,
scilicet substantia stellarum, quae est
luminosa, et substantia sphaerarum,
quae est diaphana et solida non
divisibilis, et substantia alia quae est
inter sphaeras, quae est divisibilis et
inspissabilis ad modum aeris, quamvis
sit incorruptibilis. Et per hanc
substantiam defenduntur, ne oporteat
eos ponere substantiam sphaerarum
dividi aut duo corpora esse in eodem
loco.
epicycles and eccentrics does not seem
consonant with principles of natural philosophy
which Aristotle holds; hence this opinion is not
acceptable to the followers of Aristotle. If, however,
it should be sustained, no necessity arises for
supposing two bodies to be in the same place
since, according to those who hold this opinion, the
substances of heavenly bodies are distinguished
as of three kinds: namely, the substance of the
stars, which is luminous; the substance of the
spheres, which is diaphanous and solid, but not
divisible; and another kind of substance, which is
between the spheres, and which is divisible and of
resisting density, after the manner of the air,
Although this substance is incorruptible. And thus
those who hold the theory of this third substance
have no need to say that the substance of the
spheres is divided or that two bodies occupy the
same place simultaneously.
Article 4
Whether Variety of Location Has Any Influence in Effecting Numerical Difference
Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod 1. It seems that variety of location effects nothing
loci varietas nihil faciat ad diversitatem
secundum numerum. Causa enim
diversitatis secundum numerum est in
ipsis quae numero differunt. Sed locus est
extra locata. Ergo ex diversitate locorum
non potest esse causa diversitatis
secundum numerum.
as regards diversity according to number. For
the cause of diversity according to number is in
those things which differ numerically; but place
is outside things that are located; therefore
diversity of place cannot be the cause of
numerical diversity.
Praeterea, res non est completa in esse
nisi secundum quod est ab aliis distincta.
Sed locus advenit post esse completum,
unde etiam motus ad locum est motus
perfecti secundum substantiam, ut dicitur
in VIII physicorum. Ergo non potest ex loco
sumi aliqua causa distinctionis in
corporibus locatis.
2. A thing is not complete in being unless it is
distinct from others; but place comes after
complete being; therefore motion to a place is
the motion of that which is perfect according to
substance, as is said in IX Physic. Therefore it
is not possible that any cause of the distinction
of bodies occupying space should be derived
from place.
Praeterea, distinctio secundum numerum
est invariabilis circa ipsa distincta. Sed a
causa variabili non procedit effectus
invariabilis. Ergo cum locus varietur circa
locatum, non potest esse quod diversitas
secundum locum sit causa diversitatis
secundum numerum.
3. Numerical distinction is invariable as regards
things that are distinct: but an invariable effect
cannot proceed from a variable cause;
therefore, since place varies in regard to that
having location, it is not possible for diversity
according to place to be the cause of numerical
diversity.
Praeterea, remota causa removetur
effectus. Sed aliquando a duobus
corporibus removetur per miraculum
4. If a cause is removed, so also is its effect: but
it sometimes happens by a miracle that
distinction of place is removed in respect to two
distinctio secundum locum, ut prius dictum
est, et tamen non removetur distinctio
secundum numerum. Ergo distinctio
secundum locum non est causa
diversitatis secundum numerum.
bodies, as has been previously said; yet
distinction according to number is not removed;
therefore distinction according to place is not
the cause of numerical diversity.
Praeterea, diversitas secundum numerum
non solum invenitur in corporibus, sed
etiam in substantiis incorporeis. Sed in
eis diversitas locorum non potest esse
causa diversitatis secundum numerum,
cum incorporalia in loco non sint, ut dicit
ipsemet in libro de hebdomadibus. Ergo
diversitas secundum locum non potest
poni causa diversitatis secundum
numerum universaliter, ut ipse videtur
dicere.
5. Diversity according to number is found not
only in corporeal things, but even in incorporeal
substances; but in these latter, diversity
according to place cannot be the cause of
numerical diversity, since incorporeal beings
are not in a place, as Boethius himself says in
his book, De hebdomadibus; therefore diversity
according to place cannot be taken as the
cause of diversity according to number, that is,
as its cause by very reason of its nature, as he
himself seems to say.
Sed contra
Sed contra est quod ea, quae differunt
secundum numerum, differunt
accidentibus. Sed nullius accidentis
diversitas ita inseparabiliter se habet ad
diversitatem in numero, sicut diversitas
loci. Ergo diversitas in loco maxime
videtur facere ad diversitatem in numero.
On the contrary is the fact that things differing
according to number differ by reason of their
accidents: but the diversity of no other accident
is so inseparably related to diversity in number
as is diversity of location; therefore diversity in
place seems especially to influence diversity in
number.
Praeterea, diversitas locorum secundum
speciem concomitatur diversitatem
corporum secundum speciem, sicut patet
in gravibus et levibus. Ergo et diversitas
locorum secundum numerum indivisibiliter
concomitatur diversitatem corporum
secundum numerum, et sic idem quod
prius.
Again, diversity of location according to the
species of things is concomitant with the
diversity of bodies according to their species,
as is evident in the case of heavy and light
bodies. Therefore also diversity of places
according to number is indivisibly concomitant
with diversity of bodies according to number,
and so the conclusion is the same as before.
Praeterea, sicut tempus est mensura
motus, ita locus est mensura corporis.
Sed motus dividitur numero secundum
tempus, ut dicitur in V physicorum. Ergo et
corpus dividitur numero secundum locum.
Again, as time is the measure of motion, so
place is the measure of a body: but motion is
divided numerically according to time, as is said
in V Physic.; therefore also what is corporeal is
divided numerically according to place.
Responsio. Dicendum quod, sicut ex
supra dictis patet, diversitas secundum
numerum causatur ex divisione materiae
sub dimensionibus exsistentis. Ipsa etiam
materia, secundum quod sub
dimensionibus exsistit, prohibet duo
corpora esse in eodem loco, in quantum
oportet duorum corporum distinctas
secundum situm esse materias. Et sic
patet quod ex eodem causatur diversitas
secundum numerum, ex quo causatur
necessitas diversitatis locorum in diversis
corporibus. Et ideo ipsa diversitas
locorum in se considerata est signum
Response. I answer: It must be said that, as is
evident from previous statements, diversity
according to number is caused by division of
matter existing under dimensions. Now, matter
itself, according as it exists under dimensions,
prohibits two bodies from being in the same
place, inasmuch as in each of the two bodies
there must be matter distinct in its situation. And
thus it is evident that diversity according to
number is caused by the same thing as diversity
of location in diverse bodies. Hence diversity of
location, considered in itself, is a sign of the
diversity which exists according to numberjust
as is also true of other accidents, except the first
diversitatis secundum numerum, sicut et
de aliis accidentibus praeter dimensiones
primas interminatas supra dictum est. Sed
si diversitas loci consideretur secundum
suam causam, sic planum est quod
diversitas loci est causa diversitatis
secundum numerum. Et ideo Boethius
quod varietas accidentium facit
diversitatem secundum numerum omnibus
aliis remotis in locorum diversitate hic
inevitabiliter verificari constituit, quia
scilicet nullum aliud accidentium, quae
exterius apparent completa, est ita
propinquum ad causam diversitatis
secundum numerum sicut diversitas
locorum.
indeterminate dimensions which have been
previously discussed. But if diversity of place is
considered according to its own cause, then it is
clear that diversity of place is the cause of
diversity according to number. Therefore
Boethius says it is variety of accidents that
produces diversity according to number. But if
all other accidents are removed, numerical
diversity still remains verifiable by reason of the
diversity of things in place; since, indeed, no
other of those accidents which appear as
extrinsic to a complete being is so closely
related to the cause of diversity according to
number as is diversity of location.
Ad primum ergo dicendum et secundum
et tertium quod rationes illae concludunt
quod diversitas loci non est causa
diversitatis individuorum secundum se.
Sed per hoc non removetur, quin causa
diversitatis locorum sit causa diversitatis
secundum numerum.
Answers to objections. 1-3. To the first,
second, and third objections it may be said:
These reasons show conclusively that diversity
of place is not the cause of diversity of
individuals, secundum se., but this does not
refute the fact that the cause of diversity of
locations is the cause of diversity according to
number.
Ad quartum dicendum quod omnes
effectus causarum secundarum magis
dependent a Deo quam etiam ab ipsis
4. It may be answered: All effects of second
causes depend more on God than on secondary
causes, since either with these second causes,
causis secundis, et ideo etiam remotis
causis secundis ipse miraculose potest
producere effectus quos voluerit.
or without them, He is able to produce
miraculously whatever effects He wills.
Ad quintum dicendum quod in substantiis
incorporeis diversitas secundum numerum
sequitur diversitatem secundum speciem
excepta anima rationali, quae sequitur
divisionem materiae sibi dispositae. Hic
autem Boethius loquitur de diversitate
secundum numerum, ubi est eadem
species.
5. It may be said: In corporeal substances
diversity according to species follows diversity
according to number, except in the case of the
rational soul, which follows division of matter
disposed for it. Here, however, Boethius is
speaking of diversity according to number
where the species is the same.
Further answers
Ad primum vero eorum quae in contrarium
obiciuntur dicendum quod varietas aliorum
accidentium praeter dimensiones
interminatas non facit diversitatem in
numero sicut causa, sed dicitur facere
sicut signum demonstrans, et sic maxime
diversitas loci facit, in quantum est
propinquius signum.
1. In contradiction to the first objection, it may be
said: Variety of accidents, because of
indeterminate dimensions, does not produce
diversity in number after the manner of a cause,
but this variety is said to produce, a sign
indicating numerical diversity; and diversity of
place does this in a special way, inasmuch as it
is the sign, most closely related to numerical
diversity.
Ad secundum dicendum quod diversitas
locorum secundum speciem est signum
diversitatis corporum secundum speciem,
2. To the second, it may be answered: Diversity
of locations according to species is a sign of
diversity of bodies according to their species,
sed non causa. but not a cause of specific diversity.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum divisio
temporis causetur ex divisione motus,
diversitas etiam temporis non est causa
diversitatis motus, sed signum. Et similiter
est de loco ad corpora.
3. To the third, it may be said: Although division
of time is caused by division of motion, diversity,
even diversity of time is not the cause of
diversity of motion, but a sign of it; and the same
is true of location in its relation to a body.
Pars 3, Prooemium
LECTIO 2
Boethius Text
Age igitur ingrediamur et
unumquodque ut intellegi
atque capi potest
dispiciamus; nam, sicut
optime dictum videtur,
eruditi est hominis
unumquodque ut ipsum est
ita de eo fidem capere
temptare.
1.1 Let us now begin a careful consideration of
each several point, as far as it can be grasped and
understood; for it has been wisely said, in my
opinion, that it is a scholars duty to formulate his
belief about anything according to its real nature.
Nam cum tres sint
speculativae partes,
naturalis, in motu
inabstracta
anupexairetos~g
1.2. Speculative science may be divided into three
kinds: physics, mathematics, and theology.
(considerat enim corporum
formas cum materia, quae
a corporibus actu separari
non possunt, quae corpora
in motu sunt ut cum terra
deorsum ignis sursum
fertur, habet que motum
forma materiae coniuncta),
1.2.1.1 Physics deals with motion and is not
abstract or separable; for it is concerned with forms
of bodies together with their constituent matter,
which forms cannot be separated in reality from
their bodies. As bodies are in motionthe earth,
for instance, tending downward, and fire tending
upwardform takes on the movement of the
particular thing to which it is annexed.
mathematica, sine motu
inabstracta (haec enim
formas corporum
speculatur sine materia ac
per hoc sine motu, quae
formae cum in materia sint,
ab his separari non
possunt),
1.2.1.2 Mathematics does not deal with motion and
is not abstract, for it investigates forms of bodies
apart from matter, and therefore apart from
movement, which forms being connected with
matter cannot really be separated from bodies.
theologica, sine motu
abstracta atque separabilis
(nam dei substantia et
materia et motu caret),
1.2.1.3 Theology does not deal with motion and is
abstract and of things inseparable, for the divine
substance is without matter or motion.
in naturalibus igitur
rationabiliter, in
mathematicis
disciplinaliter,
1.2.2.1 In physics we are bound to use scientific
concepts, in mathematics systematic concepts, in
theology intellectual concepts;
in divinis intellectualiter
versari oportebit neque
diduci ad imaginationes,
sed potius ipsam inspicere
formam
1.2.2.2 and in theology we will not let ourselves be
diverted to play with imaginations, but will consider
simply form.
quae vere forma neque
imago est et quae esse
ipsum est et ex qua esse
est...
2. Which form, indeed...
Proposuit superius Boethius
sententiam Catholicae fidei de unitate
Trinitatis et rationem sententiae
prosecutus est. Nunc intendit
procedere ad inquisitionem
praedictorum. Et quia secundum
sententiam philosophi in II
metaphysicae ante scientiam oportet
inquirere modum scientiae, ideo pars
ista dividitur in duas. In prima Boethius
ostendit modum proprium huius
inquisitionis, quae est de rebus divinis.
In secunda vero parte secundum
modum assignatum procedit ad
1.1 Boethius has previously set forth the doctrine of
the Catholic faith regarding the unity of the Trinity,
and indicated the reason of this belief. Now he
intends to proceed to an investigation of the
aforesaid doctrine. Since, according to the opinion
of the Philosopher in II Metaph., inquiry into the
method of a science ought to precede science
itself, he therefore divides this section into two
parts. In the first place Boethius points out the
method proper for this kind of inquiry, which is
concerned with divine things. In the second place he
proceeds, according to the method he has
indicated, to inquire into the proposition determined
upon, where he says, Which form, indeed.
propositum inquirendum, ibi: quae
vere forma est et cetera.
Prima pars dividitur in duas. In prima
ponit necessitatem ostendendi
modum inquisitionis. In secunda
modum congruum inquisitioni
praesenti ostendit, ibi: nam cum tres
sint et cetera. Dicit ergo: igitur, ex quo
constat hanc esse sententiam
Catholicae fidei de unitate Trinitatis et
indifferentiam esse rationem unitatis,
The first part is again divided into two sections: first,
he indicates the necessity of making clear the
method of investigation. Secondly, he shows that
the method of the present inquiry is suitable, saying:
Speculative science may be divided into three
kinds. Therefore he says: Wherefore it is certain
that this is the doctrine of the Catholic faith
regarding the unity of the Trinity, and the nature of
that unity without difference.
age, adverbium exhortandi,
ingrediamur, id est interius inquiramus
ipsa intima rerum principia
considerantes et veritatem quasi
velatam et absconditam perscrutantes,
et hoc modo convenienti; unde subdit:
et unumquodque dicendorum
discutiamus, ut potest intelligi atque
capi, id est per modum quo possit
intelligi et capi.
Thereupon, he says by way of exhortation, Let us
now begin, that is, let us inquire more deeply,
carrying our investigation to an examination of the
intimate principle of things and of truth which is, as it
were, veiled and hidden away from view. And that
method which he deems fitting is indicated by the
words: Let us now begin a careful consideration of
each several point, as far as it can be grasped and
understood, that is, according to the mode by
which. understanding and apprehension are
possible.
Et dicit haec duo, quia modus, quo
aliqua discutiuntur, debet congruere et
rebus et nobis. Nisi enim rebus
Moreover, he uses the two words (grasped and
understood) because the method of any
investigation ought to be in harmony both with things
congrueret, res intelligi non possent;
nisi vero congrueret nobis, nos capere
non possemus, utpote res divinae ex
natura sua habent quod non
cognoscantur nisi intellectu. Unde si
aliquis vellet sequi imaginationem in
consideratione earum, non posset
intelligere, quia ipsae res non sunt sic
intelligibiles. Si autem aliquis vellet res
divinas per se ipsas videre ea
certitudine et comprehendere, sicut
comprehenduntur sensibilia et
demonstrationes mathematicae, non
posset hoc modo capere propter
defectum intellectus sui, quantumvis
ipsae res sint secundum se hoc modo
intelligibiles.
and with us. For if it is not suited to the matter,
things will not be understood; and if it is not suited to
us, we shall not be able to apprehend the matter; for
example, divine things are such by their very nature
that they cannot be known except by intellect.
Wherefore, if anyone wished to follow another way
and to use imagination instead, he would not be
able to understand anything of them as a result of
his consideration, because truths, of this kind are
not thus to be known. But if, on the other hand, one
wished to know divine things so as to see them in
themselves, and to comprehend them with the same
certitude with which sensible things or mathematical
demonstrations are comprehended, this too would
be impossible; even things which are, in
themselves, understandable in this way cannot be
perfectly grasped because of the weakness of our
intellect.
Et quod modus congruus sit in
inquisitione qualibet observandus,
probat inducendo auctoritatem
philosophi in principio Ethicorum, et
hoc est quod subiungit: nam sicut
optime dictum videtur, scilicet ab
Aristotele in principio Ethicorum:
eruditi hominis est ut unumquodque
ipsum est, id est per modum
congruum ipsi rei, ita de eo fidem
He also shows that the mode of inquiry used must
always correspond to the kind of investigation
undertaken, by reference to the authority of the
Philosopher in I Ethic. when he says: For it has
been wisely said that it is a scholars duty to
formulate his belief about anything according to its
real nature. So, in regard to a doctrine of faith, the
same principle must be applied: for in all cases,
equal certitude and demonstrative evidence cannot
be demanded. And these are the very words of the
capere temptare. Non enim de
omnibus rebus potest aequalis
certitudo et evidentia demonstrationis
servari. Et sunt haec verba philosophi
in I Ethicorum: disciplinati enim est in
tantum certitudinem inquirere
secundum unumquodque genus, in
quantum natura rei recipit.
Philosopher in I Ethic.: It is the duty of the scholar to
demand as much certitude in his investigation of
each thing as the nature of that thing permits.
Deinde cum dicit: nam cum tres etc.,
inquirit modum congruum huic
inquisitioni per distinctionem a modis
qui observantur in aliis scientiis. Et
quia modus debet esse congruus rei
de qua est perscrutatio, ideo dividitur
haec pars in duas.
1.2 In the second place, when he says: Speculative
science may be divided into three kinds, he
inquires into the method of his own investigation,
testing its congruousness by distinguishing it from
the methods employed in other sciences; and, since
method ought to correspond to the matter under
investigation, he therefore divides this part of his
consideration into two sections.
In prima enim distinguit scientias
secundum res, de quibus determinant.
In secunda ostendit modos singulis
earum congruos, ibi: in naturalibus
igitur et cetera.
First, he distinguishes sciences according to the
matter with which each is concerned. Secondly, he
indicates the methods suitable for each kind of
matter, beginning, Physics deals.
Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit,
de quibus consideret naturalis
philosophia. Secundo, de quibus
mathematica, ibi: mathematica et
In regard to the first point, he does three things.
First, he shows what the objects of natural
philosophy are. Secondly, he indicates the objects
of mathematics. Thirdly, he speaks of the truths with
cetera. Tertio, de quibus considerat
divina scientia, ibi: theologia est sine
motu et cetera.
which divine science is concerned, when he says:
Theology does not.
Dicit ergo: bene dictum est quod ut
unumquodque est, ita debet de eo
fides capi. Nam cum tres sint partes
speculativae, scilicet philosophiae -
hoc dicit ad differentiam Ethicae, quae
est activa sive practica - in omnibus
requiritur modus competens materiae.
Sunt autem tres partes praedictae:
physica sive naturalis, mathematica,
divina sive theologia. Cum, inquam,
sint tres partes, naturalis, quae est una
earum, est in motu, inabstracta, id est
versatur eius consideratio circa res
mobiles a materia non abstractas,
quod probat per exempla, ut patet in
littera. Quod autem dicit: habetque
motum forma materiae coniuncta, sic
intelligendum est: ipsum compositum
ex materia et forma, in quantum
huiusmodi, habet motum sibi debitum,
vel ipsa forma in materia exsistens est
principium motus; et ideo eadem est
consideratio de rebus secundum quod
sunt materiales et secundum quod
sunt mobiles.
1.2.1.1 Therefore he says: It has been wisely said
that it is a scholars duty to formulate his belief
about anything according to its real nature. For,
since there are three divisions of speculative
science (or philosophy), and he calls it speculative
to differentiate it from ethics, which is operative or
practical; in each of these the method must be in
conformity with the matter. The three divisions of
speculative science indicated are physics or natural
science, mathematics, and divine science or
theology. While, I say, there are three divisions,
natural philosophy, which is one of the, three, deals
with motion and is not abstract, that is, it is
concerned with things in motion and not abstracted
from matter. This he proves by examples, as is
evident in his treatise. When, however, he says:
Form takes on the movement of the particular thing
to which it is annexed, his words should be
understood as follows: that what is composite of
matter and form, inasmuch as it is due the nature of
a thing of this kind, has motion; or, in other words, a
form existing in matter is the principle of motion.
Therefore the consideration of things that are
material and of things that are in motion is the
same.
Deinde exponit de quibus sit
mathematica: mathematica est sine
motu, id est sine motus et mobilium
consideratione, in quo differt a naturali,
inabstracta, id est considerat formas
quae secundum esse suum non sunt a
materia abstractae, in quo convenit
cum naturali; quod quomodo sit
exponit. Haec enim, scilicet
mathematica, speculatur formas sine
materia ac per hoc sine motu, quia
ubicumque est motus, est materia, ut
probatur in IX metaphysicae, eo modo
quo est ibi motus, et sic ipsa
speculatio mathematici est sine
materia et motu. Quae formae, scilicet
de quibus mathematicus speculatur,
cum sint in materia, non possunt ab his
separari secundum esse, et sic
secundum speculationem sunt
separabiles, non secundum esse.
1.2.1.2 He then indicates the subject matter of
mathematics, saying: Mathematics does not deal
with motion; that is, it involves no consideration of
motion or of movable things, and on this point it
differs from natural philosophy. Mathematics,
moreover, is said to be not abstract; that is, it
considers forms which according to their existence
are not abstract from matter, and in this respect it is
in agreement with natural philosophy. He then
explains. how this is: Mathematics considers forms
which are without matter and hence without motion,
because wherever there is matter there is motion,
as is proved in X Metaph. For according as things
have matter there will also be motion, and thus the
speculations of a mathematician are without matter
and without motion, Although these forms, namely,
those about which the mathematician speculates,
being connected with matter, cannot really be
separated from bodies, according to their being
[real existence]; but according to speculation, they
can be considered as separable.
Deinde ostendit de quibus sit tertia,
scilicet divina: theologia, id est tertia
pars speculativae, quae dicitur divina
vel metaphysica vel philosophia prima,
est sine motu, in quo convenit cum
mathematica et differt a naturali,
1.2.1.3 Then he indicates the objects of divine
science, calling it, theology, that is, the third
division of speculative science, which is termed
divine, or metaphysics, or first philosophy; and it
deals with objects apart from motion, in which it
agrees with mathematics and differs from natural
abstracta, scilicet a materia, atque
inseparabilis, per quae duo differt a
mathematica. Res enim divinae sunt
secundum esse abstractae a materia
et motu, sed mathematicae
inabstractae, sunt autem
consideratione separabiles; sed res
divinae inseparabiles, quia nihil est
separabile nisi quod est coniunctum.
Unde res divinae non sunt secundum
considerationem separabiles a
materia, sed secundum esse
abstractae; res vero mathematicae e
contrario. Et hoc probat per Dei
substantiam, de qua scientia divina
considerat principaliter, unde et inde
nominatur.
philosophy. It also is abstract, namely, from matter,
and inseparable; and because of these two facts it
differs from mathematics. For the objects of divine
science are of themselves abstract from matter and
motion, but those of mathematics are not thus
naturally abstract, but separable in thought. The
objects of divine science, however, are called
inseparable because a thing is not separable
unless there is some conjunction with matter. Hence
the objects of divine science are not separable from
matter by thought, but are abstract according to
their very being; while the converse is true in the
case of the objects of mathematics. This he proves
by the fact that the substance with which divine
science is principally concerned is that of God, and
on this account it is called divine.
Deinde cum dicit: in naturalibus igitur
etc., ostendit, quis sit modus congruus
praedictis partibus. Et circa hoc duo
facit. Primo concludit modos congruos
singulis partium praedictarum, et huius
partis expositio relinquitur disputationi.
Secundo exponit ultimum modum qui
est proprius praesenti inquisitioni. Et
hoc dupliciter. Primo removendo id
quod est impeditivum dicens: neque
oportet in divinis deduci ad
1.2.2.1 In the next place, when he says, In physics,
then, we are bound to use scientific concepts, in
mathematics systematic concepts, in theology
intellectual concepts. He points out the methods
that correspond to the aforesaid divisions. Here he
treats of two things. First, he draws conclusions
about the methods appropriate for each of the
divisions named, and the disposition of this section
is left open for discussion. Secondly, he describes
the last mode, which is that proper to the present
investigation, and indicates a twofold procedure:
imaginationes, ut scilicet de eis
iudicando sequamur imaginationis
iudicium.
first, by the removal of that which is an impediment
to speculation saying, In theology we will not let
ourselves be diverted to play with imaginations (that
is, in such a way that in formulating judgments we
follow the judgment of the imagination) but will
consider simply form.
Secundo ostendendo id quod est
proprium, ibi: sed potius ipsam
inspicere formam sine motu et
materia, cuius condiciones
consequenter exponit ingrediens ad
propositam inquisitionem.
1.2.2.2 Secondly, he indicates the method which is
the proper one when he says: but will consider
simply form (apart from motion and matter), the
nature of which he consequently explains in
beginning his treatment of the proposed question.
Quaestio 5 QUESTION FIVE
The Division of Speculative Science
Hic est duplex quaestio. Prima de
divisione speculativae, quam in littera
ponit. Secunda de modis, quos partibus
speculativae attribuit. Circa primum
quaeruntur quattuor.
1. Primo. Utrum sit conveniens divisio
qua dividitur speculativa in has tres
partes: naturalem, mathematicam et
divinam.
2. Secundo. Utrum naturalis philosophia
There are two questions here. The first
concerns the division of speculative science
which the text proposes, the second concerns
the methods it attributes to the parts of
speculative science. With regard to the first
question there are four points of inquiry:
1. Is speculative science appropriately
divided into these three parts: natural,
mathematical, and divine?
2. Does natural philosophy treat of what
2. Secundo. Utrum naturalis philosophia
sit de his quae sunt in motu et
materia.
3. Tertio. Utrum mathematica
consideratio sit sine motu et materia
de his quae sunt in materia.
4. Quarto. Utrum divina scientia sit de
his quae sunt sine materia et motu.
2. Does natural philosophy treat of what
exists in motion and matter?
3. Does mathematics treat, without motion
and matter, of what exists in matter?
4. Does divine science treat of what exists
without matter and motion?
ARTICLE ONE
Is Speculative Science Appropriately Divided into these Three Parts:
Natural, Mathematical, and Divine?
Articulus 1. Ad primum sic proceditur. We proceed as follows to the first article:
Videtur quod speculativa inconvenienter in
has partes dividatur.
It seems that speculative science is not
appropriately divided into these three parts, for:
Partes enim speculativae sunt illi habitus
qui partem contemplativam animae
perficiunt. Sed philosophus in VI Ethicorum
ponit quod scientificum animae, quod est
pars eius contemplativa, perficitur tribus
habitibus, scilicet sapientia, scientia et
intellectu. Ergo ista tria sunt partes
speculativae et non illa quae in littera
ponuntur.
1. The parts of speculative science are the
habits that perfect the contemplative part of the
soul. But the Philosopher says in the Ethics that
the scientific part of the soul, which is its
contemplative part, is perfected by three habits,
namely, wisdom, science, and understanding.
Therefore these are the three divisions of
speculative science, not those proposed in the
text.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in VIII de
civitate Dei quod rationalis philosophia,
quae est logica, sub contemplativa
philosophia vel speculativa continetur. Cum
ergo de ea mentionem non faciat, videtur
quod divisio sit insufficiens.
2. Again, Augustine says that rational
philosophy, or logic, is included under
contemplative or speculative philosophy.
Consequently, since no mention is made of it, it
seems the division is inadequate.
Praeterea, communiter dividitur
philosophia in septem artes liberales, inter
quas neque naturalis neque divina
continetur, sed sola rationalis et
mathematica. Ergo naturalis et divina non
debuerunt poni partes speculativae.
3. Again, philosophy is commonly divided into
seven liberal arts, which include neither natural
nor divine science, but only rational and
mathematical science. Hence natural and
divine should not be called parts of speculative
science.
Praeterea, scientia medicinae maxime
videtur esse operativa, et tamen in ea
ponitur una pars speculativa et alia
practica. Ergo eadem ratione in omnibus
aliis operativis scientiis aliqua pars est
speculativa, et ita debuit in hac divisione
mentio fieri de Ethica sive morali, quamvis
sit activa, propter partem eius
speculativam.
4. Again, medicine seems to be the most
practical science, and yet it is said to contain a
speculative part and a practical part. By the
same token, therefore, all the other practical
sciences have a speculative part.
Consequently, even though it is a practical
science, ethics or moral science should be
mentioned in this division because of its
speculative part.
Praeterea, scientia medicinae quaedam
pars physicae est, et similiter quaedam
aliae artes quae dicuntur mechanicae, ut
scientia de agricultura, alchimia et aliae
5. Again, the science of medicine is a branch of
physics, and similarly certain other arts called
mechanical, like the science of agriculture,
alchemy, and others of the same sort.
huiusmodi. Cum ergo istae sint operativae,
videtur quod non debuerit naturalis
absolute sub speculativa poni.
Therefore, since these sciences are practical, it
seems that natural science should not be
included without qualification under speculative
science.
Praeterea, totum non debet dividi contra
partem. Sed divina scientia esse videtur ut
totum respectu physicae et mathematicae,
cum subiecta illarum sint partes subiecti
istius. Divinae enim scientiae, quae est
prima philosophia, subiectum est ens,
cuius pars est substantia mobilis, quam
considerat naturalis, et similiter quantitas
quam considerat mathematicus, ut patet in
III metaphysicae. Ergo scientia divina non
debet dividi contra naturalem et
mathematicam.
6. Again, a whole should not be contra-
distinguished from its part. But divine science
seems to be a whole in relation to physics
mathematics, since their subjects are parts of
its subject of divine science or first philosophy
is being; and changeable substance, which the
natural scientist considers, and also quantity,
which the mathematician considers, are parts
of being. This is clear in the Metaphysics.
Therefore, divine science should not be contra-
distinguished from natural science and
mathematics.
Praeterea, scientiae dividuntur
quemadmodum et res, ut dicitur in III de
anima. Sed philosophia est de ente; est
enim cognitio entis, ut dicit Dionysius in
epistula ad Polycarpum. Cum ergo ens
primo dividatur per potentiam et actum, per
unum et multa, per substantiam et
accidens, videtur quod per huiusmodi
deberent partes philosophiae distingui.
7. Again, as it is said in the De Anima,
sciences are divided in the same manner as
things. But philosophy concerns being, for it is
knowledge of being, as Dionysius says. Now
being is primarily divided into potency and act,
one and many, substance and accident. So it
seems that the parts of philosophy ought to be
distinguished by such divisions of being.
Praeterea, multae aliae divisiones sunt
entium, de quibus sunt scientiae, magis
essentiales quam istae quae sunt per
mobile et immobile, per abstractum et non
abstractum, utpote per corporeum et
incorporeum, animatum et inanimatum et
per alia huiusmodi. Ergo magis deberet
divisio partium philosophiae accipi per
huiusmodi differentias quam per illas quae
hic tanguntur.
8. Again, there are many other divisions of
beings studied by sciences more essential than
the divisions into mobile and immobile and into
abstract and non-abstract; for example, the
divisions into corporeal and incorporeal and
into living and non-living, and the like. Therefore
differences of this sort should be the basis for
the division of the parts of philosophy rather
than those mentioned here.
Praeterea, illa scientia, a qua aliae
supponunt, debet esse prior eis. Sed
omnes aliae scientiae supponunt a
scientia divina, quia eius est probare
principia aliarum scientiarum. Ergo debuit
scientiam divinam aliis praeordinare.
9. Again, that science on which others depend
must be prior to them. Now all the other
sciences depend on divine science because it
is its business to prove their principles.
Therefore Boethius should have placed divine
science before the others.
Praeterea, mathematica prius occurrit
addiscenda quam naturalis, eo quod
mathematicam facile possunt addiscere
pueri, non autem naturalem nisi provecti, ut
dicitur in VI Ethicorum. Unde et apud
antiquos hic ordo in scientiis addiscendis
fuisse dicitur observatus, ut primo logica,
deinde mathematica, post quam naturalis
et post hanc moralis, et tandem divinae
scientiae homines studerent. Ergo
mathematicam naturali scientiae
10. Again, mathematics should be studied
before natural science, for the young can easily
learn mathematics, but only the more advanced
natural science, as is said in the Ethics. This is
why the ancients are said to have observed the
following order in learning the sciences: first
logic, then mathematics, then natural science,
after that moral science, and finally men studied
divine science. Therefore, Boethius should
have placed mathematics before natural
science. And so it seems that this division is
praeordinare debuit. Et sic videtur divisio
haec insufficiens.
unsuitable.
Sed e contra, quod haec divisio sit
conveniens, probatur per philosophum in VI
metaphysicae, ubi dicit: quare tres erunt
philosophicae et theoricae: mathematica,
physica, theologia.
On the contrary, the Philosopher proves the
appropriateness of this division in the
Metaphysics, where he says, There will be
three philosophical and theoretical sciences,
mathematics, physics, and theology.
Praeterea, in II physicorum ponuntur tres
modi scientiarum, qui ad has etiam tres
pertinere videntur.
Moreover, in the Physics three methods of the
sciences are proposed which indeed seem to
belong to these three.
Praeterea, Ptolemaeus etiam in principio
Almagesti hac divisione utitur.
Moreover, Ptolemy also uses this division in the
beginning of his Almagest.
Responsio. Dicendum quod theoricus sive
speculativus intellectus in hoc proprie ab
operativo sive practico distinguitur quod
speculativus habet pro fine veritatem quam
considerat, practicus vero veritatem
consideratam ordinat in operationem
tamquam in finem. Et ideo dicit
philosophus in III de anima quod differunt
ad invicem fine, et in II metaphysicae
dicitur quod finis speculativae est veritas,
sed finis operativae scientiae est actio.
Cum ergo oporteat materiam fini esse
Reply: The theoretical or speculative intellect
is properly distinguished from the operative or
practical intellect by the fact that the
speculative intellect has for its end the truth
that it contemplates, while the practical intellect
directs the truth under consideration to activity
as to an end. So the Philosopher says in the De
Anima that they differ from each other by their
ends; and in the Metaphysics he states that
the end of speculative knowledge is truth, but
the end of practical knowledge is action. Now,
since matter must be proportionate to the end,
proportionatam, oportet practicarum
scientiarum materiam esse res illas quae a
nostro opere fieri possunt, ut sic earum
cognitio in operationem quasi in finem
ordinari possit.
the subject-matter of the practical sciences
must be things that can be made or done by us,
so that we can direct the knowledge of them to
activity as to an end.
Speculativarum vero scientiarum materiam
oportet esse res quae a nostro opere non
fiunt; unde earum consideratio in
operationem ordinari non potest sicut in
finem. Et secundum harum rerum
distinctionem oportet scientias
speculativas distingui.
On the other hand, the subject-matter of the
speculative sciences must be things that
cannot be made or done by us, so that our
knowledge of them cannot be directed to
activity as to an end. And the speculative
sciences must differ according to the
distinctions among these things.
Sciendum tamen quod, quando habitus vel
potentiae penes obiecta distinguuntur, non
distinguuntur penes quaslibet differentias
obiectorum, sed penes illas quae sunt per
se obiectorum in quantum sunt obiecta.
Esse enim animal vel plantam accidit
sensibili in quantum est sensibile, et ideo
penes hoc non sumitur distinctio sensuum,
sed magis penes differentiam coloris et
soni. Et ideo oportet scientias speculativas
dividi per differentias speculabilium, in
quantum speculabilia sunt. Speculabili
autem, quod est obiectum speculativae
potentiae, aliquid competit ex parte
intellectivae potentiae et aliquid ex parte
Now we must realize that when habits or
powers are differentiated by their objects they
do not differ according to just any distinction
among these objects, but according to the
distinctions that are essential to the objects as
objects. For example, it is incidental to a sense
object as such whether it be an animal or a
plant. Accordingly, the distinction between the
senses is not based upon this difference but
rather upon the difference between color and
sound. So the speculative sciences must be
divided according to differences between
objects of speculation, considered precisely as
such. Now an object of this kind namely, an
object of a speculative power derives one
habitus scientiae quo intellectus perficitur.
Ex parte siquidem intellectus competit ei
quod sit immateriale, quia et ipse
intellectus immaterialis est; ex parte vero
scientiae competit ei quod sit
necessarium, quia scientia de necessariis
est, ut probatur in I posteriorum. Omne
autem necessarium, in quantum
huiusmodi, est immobile; quia omne quod
movetur, in quantum huiusmodi, est
possibile esse et non esse vel simpliciter
vel secundum quid, ut dicitur in IX
metaphysicae. Sic ergo speculabili, quod
est obiectum scientiae speculativae, per
se competit separatio a materia et motu
vel applicatio ad ea. Et ideo secundum
ordinem remotionis a materia et motu
scientiae speculativae distinguuntur.
characteristic from the side of the power of
intellect and another from the side of the habit
of science that perfects the intellect. From the
side of the intellect it has the fact that it is
immaterial, because the intellect itself is
immaterial. From the side of habit of science it
has the fact that it is necessary, for science
treats of necessary matters, as is shown in the
Posterior Analytics. Now everything that is
necessary is, as such, immobile, because
everything changeable is, as such, able to be or
not to be, either absolutely or in a certain
respect, as is said in the Metaphysics.
Consequently, separation from matter and
motion, or connection with them, essentially
belongs to an object of speculation, which is the
object of speculative science. As a result, the
speculative sciences are differentiated
according to their degree of separation from
matter and motion.
Quaedam ergo speculabilium sunt, quae
dependent a materia secundum esse, quia
non nisi in materia esse possunt. Et haec
distinguuntur, quia quaedam dependent a
materia secundum esse et intellectum,
sicut illa, in quorum diffinitione ponitur
materia sensibilis; unde sine materia
sensibili intelligi non possunt, ut in
(1) Now there are some objects of speculation
that depend on matter for their being, for
they can exist only in matter. And these are
subdivided. (a) Some depend on matter both
for their being (+) and for their being
understood, as do those things whose
definition contains sensible matter and which,
as a consequence, cannot be understood
diffinitione hominis oportet accipere
carnem et ossa. Et de his est physica sive
scientia naturalis. Quaedam vero sunt,
quae quamvis dependeant a materia
secundum esse, non tamen secundum
intellectum, quia in eorum diffinitionibus
non ponitur materia sensibilis, sicut linea et
numerus. Et de his est mathematica.
Quaedam vero speculabilia sunt, quae non
dependent a materia secundum esse, quia
sine materia esse possunt, sive numquam
sint in materia, sicut Deus et Angelus, sive
in quibusdam sint in materia et in
quibusdam non, ut substantia, qualitas,
ens, potentia, actus, unum et multa et
huiusmodi. De quibus omnibus est
theologia, id est scientia divina, quia
praecipuum in ea cognitorum est Deus,
quae alio nomine dicitur metaphysica, id
est trans physicam, quia post physicam
discenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex
sensibilibus oportet in insensibilia
devenire. Dicitur etiam philosophia prima,
in quantum aliae omnes scientiae ab ea
sua principia accipientes eam
consequuntur. Non est autem possibile
quod sint aliquae res quae secundum
intellectum dependeant a materia et non
secundum esse, quia intellectus, quantum
est de se, immaterialis est. Et ideo non est
without sensible matter. For example, it is
necessary to include flesh and bones in the
definition of man. It is things of this sort that
physics or natural science studies. (b) On the
other hand, there are some things that,
Although dependent upon matter for their being,
do not depend upon it (~) for their being
understood, because sensible matter is not
included in their definitions. This is the case
with lines and numbers the kind of objects
with which mathematics deals. (2) There are
still other objects of speculative knowledge that
do not depend upon matter(~) for their being,
because they can exist without matter; (a) either
they never exist in matter, as in the case of God
and the angels, or (b) they exist in matter in
some instances and not in others, as in the
case of substance, quality, being, potency, act,
one and many, and the like. The science that
treats of all these is theology or divine science,
which is so called because its principal object
is God. By another name it is called
metaphysics; that is to say, beyond physics,
because it ought to be learned by us after
physics; for we have to proceed from sensible
things to those that are non-sensible. It is also
called first philosophy, inasmuch as all the
other sciences, receiving their principles from
it, come after it. Now there can be nothing that
depends upon matter for its being understood
est de se, immaterialis est. Et ideo non est
quartum genus philosophiae praeter
praedicta.
depends upon matter for its being understood
but not for its being, because by it; very nature
the intellect is immaterial. So there is no fourth
kind of philosophy besides the ones
mentioned.
Reply to the Opposing Arguments:
philosophus in VI Ethicorum determinat de
habitibus intellectualibus, in quantum sunt
virtutes intellectuales. Dicuntur autem
virtutes, in quantum perficiunt in sua
operatione. Virtus enim est quae bonum
facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit;
et ideo secundum quod diversimode
perficitur per huiusmodi habitus
speculativos, diversificat huiusmodi
virtutes. Est autem alius modus quo pars
animae speculativa perficitur per
intellectum, qui est habitus principiorum,
quo aliqua ex se ipsis nota fiunt et quo
cognoscuntur conclusiones ex huiusmodi
principiis demonstratae, sive demonstratio
procedat ex causis inferioribus, sicut est in
scientia, sive ex causis altissimis, ut in
sapientia. Cum autem distinguuntur
scientiae ut sunt habitus quidam, oportet
quod penes obiecta distinguantur, id est
penes res, de quibus sunt scientiae. Et sic
Reply to 1. In the Ethics the Philosopher
considers the intellectual habits insofar as they
are intellectual virtues. Now they are called
virtues because they perfect the intellect in its
operation; for virtue makes its possessor good
and renders his work good. So he
distinguishes between virtues of this sort in as
much as speculative habits perfect the intellect
in different ways. In one way the speculative
part of the soul is perfected by understanding,
which is the habit of principles, through which
some things become known of themselves. In
another way it is perfected by a habit through
which conclusions demonstrated from these
principles are known, whether the
demonstration proceeds from inferior causes,
as in science, or from the highest causes, as in
wisdom. But when sciences are differentiated
insofar as they are habits, they must be
distinguished according to their objects, that is,
according to the things of which the sciences
treat. And it is in this way that both here and in
distinguuntur hic et in VI metaphysicae tres
partes philosophiae speculativae.
the Metaphysics speculative philosophy is
distinguished into three parts.
Ad secundum dicendum quod scientiae
speculativae, ut patet in principio
metaphysicae, sunt de illis quorum cognitio
quaeritur propter se ipsa. Res autem, de
quibus est logica, non quaeruntur ad
cognoscendum propter se ipsas, sed ut
adminiculum quoddam ad alias scientias.
Et ideo logica non continetur sub
speculativa philosophia quasi principalis
pars, sed sicut quiddam reductum ad
philosophiam speculativam, prout ministrat
speculationi sua instrumenta, scilicet
syllogismos et diffinitiones et alia
huiusmodi, quibus in scientiis speculativis
indigemus. Unde secundum Boethium in
commento super Porphyrium non tam est
scientia quam scientiae instrumentum.
Reply to 2. As is evident in the beginning of
the Metaphysics, the speculative sciences
concern things the knowledge of which is
sought for their own sake. However, we do not
seek to know the things studied by logic for
themselves, but as a help to the other sciences.
So logic is not included under speculative
philosophy as a principal part but as something
brought under speculative philosophy as
furnishing speculative thought with its
instruments, namely, syllogisms, definitions,
and the like, which we need in the speculative
sciences. Thus, according to Boethius, logic is
not so much a science as the instrument of
science.
Ad tertium dicendum quod septem
liberales artes non sufficienter dividunt
philosophiam theoricam, sed ideo, ut dicit
Hugo de sancto Victore in III sui
didascalicon, praetermissis quibusdam
aliis septem connumerantur, quia his
primum erudiebantur, qui philosophiam
discere volebant, et ideo distinguuntur in
Reply to 3. The seven liberal arts do not
adequately divide theoretical philosophy; but,
as Hugh of St. Victor says, seven arts are
grouped together (leaving out certain other
ones), because those who wanted to learn
philosophy were first instructed in them. And the
reason why they are divided into the trivium and
quadrivium is that they are as it were paths
trivium et quadrivium, eo quod his quasi
quibusdam viis vivax animus ad secreta
philosophiae introeat. Et hoc etiam
consonat verbis philosophi qui dicit in II
metaphysicae quod modus scientiae
debet quaeri ante scientias; et
Commentator ibidem dicit quod logicam,
quae docet modum omnium scientiarum,
debet quis addiscere ante omnes alias
scientias, ad quam pertinet trivium. Dicit
etiam in VI Ethicorum quod mathematica
potest sciri a pueris, non autem physica,
quae experimentum requirit. Et sic datur
intelligi quod post logicam consequenter
debet mathematica addisci, ad quam
pertinet quadrivium; et ita his quasi
quibusdam viis praeparatur animus ad
alias philosophicas disciplinas. Vel ideo
hae inter ceteras scientias artes dicuntur,
quia non solum habent cognitionem, sed
opus aliquod, quod est immediate ipsius
rationis, ut constructionem syllogismi vel
orationem formare, numerare, mensurare,
melodias formare et cursus siderum
computare. Aliae vero scientiae vel non
habent opus, sed cognitionem tantum,
sicut scientia divina et naturalis; unde
nomen artis habere non possunt, cum ars
dicatur ratio factiva, ut dicitur in VI
metaphysicae. Vel habent opus corporale,
(viae) introducing the quick mind to the secrets
of philosophy. This is also in harmony with the
Philosophers statement in the Metaphysics
that we must investigate the method of
scientific thinking before the sciences
themselves. And the Commentator says in the
same place that before all the other sciences a
person should learn logic, which teaches the
method of all the sciences; and the trivium
concerns logic. The Philosopher also says in
the Ethics that the young can know
mathematics but not physics, because it
requires experience. So we are given to
understand that after logic we should learn
mathematics, which the quadrivium concerns.
These, then, are like paths leading the mind to
the other philosophical disciplines. We may
add that among the other sciences these are
called arts because they involve not only
knowledge but also a work that is directly a
product of reason itself; for example, producing
a composition, syllogism or discourse,
numbering, measuring, composing melodies,
and reckoning the course of the stars. Other
sciences (such as divine and natural science)
either do not involve a work produced but only
knowledge, and so we cannot call them arts,
because, as the Metaphysics says, art is
productive reason; or they involve some bodily
activity, as in the case of medicine, alchemy,
metaphysicae. Vel habent opus corporale,
sicut medicina, alchimia et aliae
huiusmodi. Unde non possunt dici artes
liberales, quia sunt hominis huiusmodi
actus ex parte illa, qua non est liber,
scilicet ex parte corporis. Scientia vero
moralis, quamvis sit propter operationem,
tamen illa operatio non est actus scientiae,
sed magis virtutis, ut patet in libro
Ethicorum. Unde non potest dici ars, sed
magis in illis operationibus se habet virtus
loco artis. Et ideo veteres diffinierunt
virtutem esse artem bene recteque vivendi,
ut Augustinus dicit in IV de civitate Dei.
activity, as in the case of medicine, alchemy,
and other sciences of this kind. These latter,
then, cannot be called liberal arts because such
activity belongs to man on the side of his nature
in which he is not free, namely, on the side of
his body. And Although moral science is
directed to action, still that action is not the act
of the science but rather of virtue, as is clear in
the Ethics. So we cannot call moral science an
art; but rather in these actions virtue takes the
place of art. Thus, as Augustine says, the
ancients defined virtue as the art of noble and
well-ordered living.
Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut dicit
Avicenna in principio suae medicinae,
aliter distinguitur theoricum et practicum,
cum philosophia dividitur in theoricam et
practicam, aliter cum artes dividuntur in
theoricas et practicas, aliter cum medicina.
Cum enim philosophia vel etiam artes per
theoricum et practicum distinguuntur,
oportet accipere distinctionem eorum ex
fine, ut theoricum dicatur illud, quod
ordinatur ad solam cognitionem veritatis,
practicum vero, quod ordinatur ad
operationem. Hoc tamen interest, cum in
hoc dividitur philosophia totalis et artes,
quod in divisione philosophiae habetur
Reply to 4. As Avicenna says, the distinction
between theoretical and practical is not the
same when philosophy is divided into
theoretical and practical, when the arts are
divided into theoretical and practical, and when
medicine is so divided. For when we
distinguish philosophy or the arts into
theoretical and practical we must do so on the
basis of their end, calling that theoretical which
is directed solely to knowledge of the truth, and
that practical which is directed to operation.
However, there is this difference when we
distinguish the whole of philosophy and the arts
on this basis. We divide philosophy with
respect to the final end or happiness, to which
respectus ad finem beatitudinis, ad quem
tota humana vita ordinatur. Ut enim dicit
Augustinus XX de civitate Dei ex verbis
Varronis, nulla est homini alia causa
philosophandi nisi ut beatus sit. Unde cum
duplex felicitas a philosophis ponatur, una
contemplativa et alia activa, ut patet in X
Ethicorum, secundum hoc etiam duas
partes philosophiae distinxerunt, moralem
dicentes practicam, naturalem et
rationalem dicentes theoricam. Cum vero
dicuntur artium quaedam esse
speculativae, quaedam practicae, habetur
respectus ad aliquos speciales fines
illarum artium, sicut si dicamus
agriculturam esse artem practicam,
dialecticam vero theoricam. Cum autem
medicina dividitur in theoricam et
practicam, non attenditur divisio secundum
finem. Sic enim tota medicina sub practica
continetur, utpote ad operationem ordinata.
Sed attenditur praedicta divisio secundum
quod ea, quae in medicina tractantur, sunt
propinqua vel remota ab operatione. Illa
enim pars medicinae dicitur practica, quae
docet modum operandi ad sanationem,
sicut quod talibus apostematibus sunt talia
remedia adhibenda, theorica vero illa pars,
quae docet principia, ex quibus homo
dirigitur in operatione, sed non proxime,
the whole of human life is directed. For, as
Augustine says, following Varro, There is no
other reason for a man philosophizing except to
be happy. And since the philosophers teach
that there is a twofold happiness, one
contemplative and the other active, as is clear
in the Ethics, they have accordingly a]so
distinguished between two parts of philosophy,
calling moral philosophy practical and natural
and rational philosophy theoretical. But when
they call some arts speculative and some
practical, this is on the basis of some special
ends of those arts; as when we say that
agricuIture is a Practical art but dialectic is
theoretical. However, when we divide medicine
into theoretical and practical, the division is not
on the basis of the end. For on that basis the
whole of medicine is practical, since it is
directed to practice. But the above division is
made on the basis of whether what is studied in
medicine is proximate to, or remote from
practice. Thus we call that part of medicine
practical which teaches the method of healing;
for instance, that these particular medicines
should be given for these abscesses. On the
other hand, we call that part theoretical which
teaches the principles directing a man in his
practice, Although not immediately; for
instance, that there are three virtues, and that
there are so many kinds of fever. Consequently,
dirigitur in operatione, sed non proxime,
sicut quod virtutes sunt tres et quod genera
febrium sunt tot. Unde non oportet, ut si
alicuius activae scientiae aliqua pars
dicatur theorica, quod propter hoc illa pars
sub philosophia speculativa ponatur.
there are so many kinds of fever. Consequently,
if we call some part of a practical science
theoretical, we should not on that account place
that part under speculative philosophy.
Ad quintum dicendum quod aliqua scientia
continetur sub alia dupliciter, uno modo ut
pars ipsius, quia scilicet subiectum eius
est pars aliqua subiecti illius, sicut planta
est quaedam pars corporis naturalis; unde
et scientia de plantis continetur sub
scientia naturali ut pars. Alio modo
continetur una scientia sub alia ut ei
subalternata, quando scilicet in superiori
scientia assignatur propter quid eorum, de
quibus scitur in scientia inferiori solum
quia, sicut musica ponitur sub arithmetica.
Medicina ergo non ponitur sub physica ut
pars. Subiectum enim medicinae non est
pars subiecti scientiae naturalis secundum
illam rationem, qua est subiectum
medicinae. Quamvis enim corpus sanabile
sit corpus naturale, non tamen est
subiectum medicinae, prout est sanabile a
natura, sed prout est sanabile ab arte. Sed
quia in sanatione, quae fit etiam per artem,
ars est ministra naturae, quia ex aliqua
naturali virtute sanitas perficitur auxilio
Reply to 5. One science is contained under
another in two ways: in one way, as its part,
because its subject is part of the subject of that
other science, as plant is part of natural body.
So the science of plants is also contained
under natural science as one of its parts. In
another way, one science is contained under
another as subalternated to it. This occurs when
in a higher science there is given the reason for
what a lower science knows only as a fact. This
is how music is contained under arithmetic.
Medicine, therefore, is not contained under
physics as a part, for the subject of medicine is
not part of the subject of natural science from
the point of view from which it is the subject of
medicine. For Although the curable body is a
natural body, it is not the subject of medicine
insofar as it is curable by nature, but insofar as
it is curable by art. But because art is natures
handmaid in healing (in which art too plays a
part, for health is brought about through the
power of nature with the assistance of art), it
follows that the reason for the practices used in
artis, inde est quod propter quid de
operatione artis oportet accipere ex
proprietatibus rerum naturalium. Et propter
hoc medicina subalternatur physicae, et
eadem ratione alchimia et scientia de
agricultura et omnia huiusmodi. Et sic
relinquitur quod physica secundum se et
secundum omnes partes suas est
speculativa, quamvis aliquae scientiae
operativae subalternentur ei.
the art must be based on the properties of
natural things. So medicine is subalternated to
physics, and for the same reason so too are
alchemy, the science of agricuIture, and all
sciences of this sort. We conclude, then, that
physics in itself and in all its parts is
speculative, Although some practical sciences
are subalternated to it.
Ad sextum dicendum quod quamvis
subiecta aliarum scientiarum sint partes
entis, quod est subiectum metaphysicae,
non tamen oportet quod aliae scientiae sint
partes ipsius. Accipit enim unaquaeque
scientiarum unam partem entis secundum
specialem modum considerandi alium a
modo, quo consideratur ens in
metaphysica. Unde proprie loquendo
subiectum illius non est pars subiecti
metaphysicae; non enim est pars entis
secundum illam rationem, qua ens est
subiectum metaphysicae, sed hac ratione
considerata ipsa est specialis scientia aliis
condivisa. Sic autem posset dici pars
ipsius scientia, quae est de potentia vel
quae est de actu aut de uno vel de aliquo
huiusmodi, quia ista habent eundem
Reply to 6. Although the subjects of the other
sciences are parts of being, which is the
subject of metaphysics, the other sciences are
not necessarily parts of metaphysics. For each
science treats of one part of being in a special
way distinct from that in which metaphysics
treats of being. So its subject is not properly
speaking a part of the subject of metaphysics,
for it is not a part of being from the point of view
from which being is the subject of metaphysics;
from this viewpoint it is a special science
distinct from the others. However, the science
treating of potency, or that treating of act or
unity or anything of this sort, could be called a
part of metaphysics because these are
considered in the same manner as being,
which is the subject of metaphysics.
modum considerandi cum ente, de quo
tractatur in metaphysica.
Ad septimum dicendum quod illae partes
entis exigunt eundem modum tractandi
cum ente communi, quia etiam ipsa non
dependent ad materiam, et ideo scientia
de ipsis non distinguitur a scientia quae
est de ente communi.
Reply to 7. These parts of being require the
same manner of consideration as being-in-
general (ens commune) because they too are
independent of matter. For this reason the
science dealing with them is not distinct from
the science of being-in-general.
Ad octavum dicendum quod aliae
diversitates rerum, quas obiectio tangit,
non sunt differentiae per se earum in
quantum sunt scibiles; et ideo penes eas
scientiae non distinguuntur.
Reply to 8. The other diversities of things
mentioned in the objection do not differentiate
those things essentially as objects of
knowledge. So the sciences are not
distinguished according to them.
Ad nonum dicendum quod quamvis
scientia divina sit prima omnium
scientiarum naturaliter, tamen quoad nos
aliae scientiae sunt priores. Ut enim dicit
Avicenna in principio suae metaphysicae,
ordo huius scientiae est, ut addiscatur post
scientias naturales, in quibus sunt multa
determinata, quibus ista scientia utitur, ut
generatio, corruptio, motus et alia
huiusmodi. Similiter etiam post
mathematicas. Indiget enim haec scientia
ad cognitionem substantiarum
Reply to 9. Although divine science is by
nature the first of all the sciences, with respect
to us the other sciences come before it. For as
Avicenna says, the position Or this science is
that it be learned after the natural sciences,
which explain many things used by
metaphysics, such as generation, corruption,
motion, and the like. It should also be learned
after mathematics, because to know the
separate substances metaphysics has to know
the number and disposition of the heavenly
spheres, and this is impossible without
separatarum cognoscere numerum et
ordinem orbium caelestium, quod non est
possibile sine astrologia, ad quam tota
mathematica praeexigitur. Aliae vero
scientiae sunt ad bene esse ipsius, ut
musica et morales vel aliae huiusmodi.
Nec tamen oportet quod sit circulus, quia
ipsa supponit ea, quae in aliis probantur,
cum ipsa aliarum principia probet, quia
principia, quae accipit alia scientia, scilicet
naturalis, a prima philosophia, non probant
ea quae item philosophus primus accipit a
naturali, sed probantur per alia principia
per se nota; et similiter philosophus primus
non probat principia, quae tradit naturali,
per principia quae ab eo accipit, sed per
alia principia per se nota. Et sic non est
aliquis circulus in diffinitione. Praeterea,
effectus sensibiles, ex quibus procedunt
demonstrationes naturales, sunt notiores
quoad nos in principio, sed cum per eos
pervenerimus ad cognitionem causarum
primarum, ex eis apparebit nobis propter
quid illorum effectuum, ex quibus
probabantur demonstratione quia. Et sic et
scientia naturalis aliquid tradit scientiae
divinae, et tamen per eam sua principia
notificantur. Et inde est quod Boethius
ultimo ponit scientiam divinam, quia est
ultima quoad nos.
astronomy, which presupposes the whole of
mathematics. Other sciences, such as music,
ethics, and the like, contribute to its fullness of
perfection. Nor is there necessarily a vicious
circle because metaphysics presupposes
conclusions proved in the other sciences while
it itself proves their principles. For the
principles that another science (such as natural
philosophy) takes from first philosophy do not
prove the points which the first philosopher
takes from the natural philosopher, but they are
proved through other self-evident principles.
Similarly the first philosopher does not prove
the principles he gives the natural philosopher
by principles he receives from him, but by other
self-evident principles. So there is no vicious
circle in their definitions. Moreover, the sensible
effects on which the demonstrations of natural
science are based are more evident to us in
the beginning. But when we come to know the
first causes through them, these causes will
reveal to us the reason for the effects, from
which they were proved by a demonstration
quia. In this way natural science also
contributes something to divine science, and
nevertheless it is divine science that explains
its principles. That is why Boethius places
divine science last, because it is the last
relative to us.
ultima quoad nos.
Ad decimum dicendum quod quamvis
naturalis post mathematicam addiscenda
occurrat, ex eo quod universalia ipsius
documenta indigent experimento et
tempore, tamen res naturales, cum sint
sensibiles, sunt naturaliter magis notae
quam res mathematicae a sensibili
materia abstractae.
Reply to 10. Although we should learn natural
science after mathematics because the general
proofs of natural science require experience
and time, still, since natural things fall under the
senses, they are by nature better known than
the mathematical entities abstracted from
sensible matter.
Article Two
Does Natural Philosophy Treat of What Exists in Motion and Matter?
Ad secundum sic proceditur. We proceed as follows to the second article:
Videtur quod scientia naturalis non sit de his
quae sunt in motu et materia.
It seems that natural science does not treat of
things that exist in motion and matter, for
Materia enim est individuationis principium.
Sed nulla scientia est de individuis, sed de
solis universalibus, secundum sententiam
Platonis, quae ponitur in Porphyrio. Ergo
scientia naturalis non est de his quae sunt in
materia.
1. Matter is the principle of individuation, Now,
according to Platos doctrine, which is
followed by Porphyry, no science treats of
individual things but only of universals.
Therefore, natural science does not treat of
what is in matter.
Praeterea, scientia ad intellectum pertinet. 2. Again, science pertains to the intellect. But
Sed intellectus cognoscit abstrahendo a
materia et a condicionibus materiae. Ergo
de his, quae non sunt a materia abstracta,
nulla scientia esse potest.
the intellect knows by abstracting from matter
and from the conditions of matter. Therefore,
no science can treat of what is not abstracted
from matter.
Praeterea, in scientia naturali agitur de
primo motore, ut patet in VIII physicorum.
Sed ipse est immunis ab omni materia.
Ergo scientia naturalis non est de his solis
quae sunt in materia.
3. Again, as is clear in the Physics, the First
Mover is considered in natural science. But
The First Mover is free from all matter.
Therefore, natural science does not treat only
of what is in matter.
Praeterea, omnis scientia de necessariis
est. Sed omne quod movetur, in quantum
huiusmodi, est contingens, ut probatur in IX
metaphysicae. Ergo nulla scientia potest
esse de rebus mobilibus, et sic nec scientia
naturalis.
4. Again, every science has to do with what is
necessary. But whatever is moved, as such is
contingent, as is proved in the Metaphysics.
Therefore, no science can treat of what is
subject to motion; and so neither can natural
science.
Praeterea, nullum universale movetur; homo
enim universalis non sanatur, sed hic homo,
ut dicitur in principio metaphysicae. Sed
omnis scientia de universalibus est. Ergo
naturalis scientia non est de his quae sunt in
motu.
5. Again, no universal is subject to motion; for
as is said in the beginning of the Metaphysics,
it is not man in general who is healed, but this
man. But every science concerns that which is
universal. Therefore natural science does not
treat of what is in motion.
Praeterea, in scientia naturali determinatur
de quibusdam quae non moventur, sicut est
anima, ut probatur in I de anima, et terra, ut
6. Again, some of the things with which natural
science deals are not subject to motion; for
instance, the soul, as is shown in De Anima,
probatur in II caeli et mundi; et etiam omnes
formae naturales non fiunt nec corrumpuntur,
et eadem ratione non moventur nisi per
accidens, ut probatur in VII metaphysicae.
Ergo non omnia, de quibus est physica, sunt
in motu.
and the earth, as is proved in the De Caelo et
Mundo. What is more, all natural forms neither
come into being nor perish, and for the same
reason they are not subject to motion, except
accidentally. This is shown in the
Metaphysics. Therefore everything that
physics considers is in motion.
Praeterea, omnis creatura est mutabilis,
cum vera immutabilitas soli Deo conveniat,
ut Augustinus dicit. Si ergo ad naturalem
pertinet consideratio de his, quae in motu
sunt, eius erit considerare de omnibus
creaturis, quod apparet expresse esse
falsum.
7. Again, every creature is mutable for, as
Augustine says, true immutability belongs to
God alone. So if it is the task of natural
science to consider what is in motion, it will be
its business to consider all creatures, which
clearly appears to be false.
Sed contra, ad scientiam naturalem pertinet
de rebus naturalibus determinare. Sed res
naturales sunt, in quibus est principium
motus. Ubicumque autem est motus, oportet
et esse materiam, ut dicitur in IX
metaphysicae. Ergo scientia naturalis est
de his quae sunt in motu et materia.
On the contrary, it is the work of natural
science to reach conclusions about natural
things. Now, natural things are those in which
there is a principle of motion; and, as the
Metaphysics says, wherever there is motion
there must be matter. So natural science
treats of what is in motion and matter.
Praeterea, de his, quae sunt in materia et
motu, oportet esse aliquam scientiam
speculativam, alias non esset perfecta
traditio philosophiae quae est cognitio entis.
Moreover, these must be some speculative
science dealing with what is in matter and
motion, for otherwise the teaching of
philosophy, which is knowledge of being,
Sed nulla alia speculativa scientia est de
his, quia neque mathematica nec
metaphysica. Ergo est de his naturalis.
would be incomplete. Now no other
speculative science treats of these things, for
neither mathematics nor metaphysics does
so. Therefore, natural science treats of them.
Praeterea, hoc apparet ex hoc quod dicit
philosophus in VI metaphysicae et in II
physicorum.
Moreover, the fact is clear from the statements
of the Philosopher in the Metaphysics and the
Physics.
Responsio. Dicendum quod propter
difficultatem huius quaestionis coactus est
Plato ad ponendum ideas. Cum enim, ut
dicit philosophus in I metaphysicae,
crederet omnia sensibilia semper esse in
fluxu, secundum opinionem Cratyli et
Heracliti, et ita existimaret de eis non posse
esse scientiam, posuit quasdam
substantias a sensibilibus separatas, de
quibus essent scientiae et darentur
diffinitiones. Sed hic defectus accidit ex eo
quod non distinxit quod est per se ab eo
quod est secundum accidens, nam
secundum accidens falluntur plerumque
etiam sapientes, ut dicitur in I elenchorum.
Ut autem probatur in VII metaphysicae, cum
in substantia sensibili inveniatur et ipsum
integrum, id est compositum, et ratio, id est
forma eius, per se quidem generatur et
corrumpitur compositum, non autem ratio
Reply: It was the difficulty of this problem that
drove Plato to posit Ideas. Believing that all
sensible things were always in flux, as Cratylus
and Heraclitus taught, he thought there can be
no science concerning them, as the
Philosopher says in the Metaphysics. So he
claimed that there were substances separated
from the sense world, which might serve as
the objects of science and of definitions. He
made this mistake because he failed to
distinguish what is essential from what is
accidental. For it happens that by accident
even the wise often fall into error, as is said in
the Sophistic Refutations. Now, as is shown
in the Metaphysics, we find in a sensible
substance both the whole or the composite
itself, and also its nature (ratio) or form; and it
is the composite that is essentially generated
and corrupted and not the nature or form,
except accidentally. As the Metaphysics says,
sive forma, sed solum per accidens. Non
enim fit domum esse, ut ibidem dicitur, sed
hanc domum.
It is not house that is made, but this house.
Unumquodque autem potest considerari
sine omnibus his quae ei non per se
comparantur. Et ideo formae et rationes
rerum quamvis in motu exsistentium, prout in
se considerantur, absque motu sunt. Et sic
de eis sunt scientiae et diffinitiones, ut
ibidem philosophus dicit. Non autem
scientiae sensibilium substantiarum
fundantur super cognitione aliquarum
substantiarum a sensibilibus separatarum,
ut ibidem probatur.
Now anything can be thought of without all the
items that are not essentially related to it.
Consequently, forms and natures, though
belonging to things existing in motion, are
without motion when they are considered in
themselves; and so they can be the objects of
sciences and of definitions, as the
Philosopher says. As he proves, the sciences
of sensible reality are not based upon the
knowledge of certain substances separated
from the sense world.
Huiusmodi autem rationes, quas
considerant scientiae quae sunt de rebus,
considerantur absque motu. Sic oportet
quod considerentur absque illis, secundum
quae competit motus rebus mobilibus. Cum
autem omnis motus tempore mensuretur et
primus motus sit motus localis, quo remoto
nullus alius motus inest, oportet quod
secundum hoc aliquid sit mobile, quod est
hic et nunc. Hoc autem consequitur rem
ipsam mobilem, secundum quod est
individuata per materiam exsistentem sub
dimensionibus signatis. Unde oportet quod
Natures of this kind, which are the objects of
the sciences of real beings, are thought of
without motion; and so they must be thought of
without those conditions by reason of which
motion belongs to mobile things. Now,
because every motion is measured by time,
and the primary motion is local motion (for
without it there is no other motion), a thing
must be subject to motion inasmuch as it
exists here and now; and it exists under these
conditions insofar as it is individuated by
matter having determinate dimensions.
Consequently, natures of this kind, which
huiusmodi rationes, secundum quas de
rebus mobilibus possunt esse scientiae,
considerantur absque materia signata et
absque omnibus his quae consequuntur
materiam signatam, non autem absque
materia non signata, quia ex eius notione
dependet notio formae quae determinat sibi
materiam. Et ideo ratio hominis, quam
significat diffinitio et secundum quam
procedit scientia, consideratur sine his
carnibus et sine his ossibus, non autem sine
carnibus et ossibus absolute. Et quia
singularia includunt in sui ratione materiam
signatam, universalia vero materiam
communem, ut dicitur in VII metaphysicae,
ideo praedicta abstractio non dicitur formae
a materia absolute, sed universalis a
particulari.
make possible sciences of things subject to
motion, must be thought of without
determinate matter and everything following
upon such matter; but not without
indeterminate matter, because on its notion
depends the notion of form that determines
matter to itself. Thus the nature of man, which
his definition signifies and which is the object
of science, is considered without this flesh
and these bones, but not absolutely without
flesh and bones. And because individuals
include determinate matter in their nature,
whereas universals include common matter,
as is said in the Metaphysics, the above-
mentioned abstraction is not said to be the
abstraction of form from matter absolutely, but
the abstraction of the universal from the
particular.
Possunt ergo huiusmodi rationes sic
abstractae considerari dupliciter. Uno modo
secundum se, et sic considerantur sine
motu et materia signata, et hoc non invenitur
in eis nisi secundum esse quod habent in
intellectu. Alio modo secundum quod
comparantur ad res, quarum sunt rationes;
quae quidem res sunt in materia et motu. Et
sic sunt principia cognoscendi illa, quia
omnis res cognoscitur per suam formam. Et
Natures of this sort, thus abstracted, can be
considered in two ways. First, in themselves;
and then they are thought of without motion
and determinate matter. This happens to them
only by reason of the being they have in the
intellect. Second, they can be viewed in
relation to the things of which they are the
natures; and these things exist with matter and
motion. Thus they are principles by which we
know these things, for everything is known
ita per huiusmodi rationes immobiles et sine
materia particulari consideratas habetur
cognitio in scientia naturali de rebus
mobilibus et materialibus extra animam
exsistentibus.
through its form. Consequently, in natural
science we know mutable and material things
existing outside the soul through natures of
this kind; that is to say, natures that are
immobile and considered without particular
matter.
Replies to opposing arguments:
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod materia
non est individuationis principium nisi
secundum quod est sub dimensionibus
signatis exsistens. Et sic etiam scientia
naturalis a materia abstrahit.
Reply to 1. Matter is the principle of
individuation only insofar as it exists with
determinate dimensions, and in this sense
natural science indeed abstracts from matter.
Ad secundum dicendum quod forma
intelligibilis est quiditas rei. Obiectum enim
intellectus est quid, ut dicitur in III de anima.
Quiditas autem compositi universalis, ut
hominis aut animalis, includit in se materiam
universalem, non autem particularem, ut
dicitur in VII metaphysicae. Unde intellectus
communiter abstrahit a materia signata et
condicionibus eius, non autem a materia
communi in scientia naturali, quamvis etiam
in scientia naturali non consideretur materia
nisi in ordine ad formam. Unde etiam forma
per prius est de consideratione naturalis
Reply to 2. The intelligible form is a things
quiddity, for, as the De Anima says, the object
of the intellect is the quiddity of a thing. Now,
as is said in the Metaphysics, the quiddity of a
universal composite, like man or animal,
includes within itself common but not particular
matter. So the intellect regularly abstracts from
determinate matter and its conditions; but in
natural science it does not abstract from
common matter, Although matter itself is
considered in natural science only in relation
to form. For this reason the natural scientist is
more concerned with form than with matter.
quam materia.
Ad tertium dicendum quod de primo motore
non agitur in scientia naturali tamquam de
subiecto vel de parte subiecti, sed tamquam
de termino ad quem scientia naturalis
perducit. Terminus autem non est de natura
rei, cuius est terminus, sed habet aliquam
habitudinem ad rem illam, sicut terminus
lineae non est linea, sed habet ad eam
aliquam habitudinem, ita etiam et primus
motor est alterius naturae a rebus
naturalibus, habet tamen ad eas aliquam
habitudinem, in quantum influit eis motum, et
sic cadit in consideratione naturalis, scilicet
non secundum ipsum, sed in quantum est
motor.
Reply to 3. Natural science does not treat of
the First Mover as its subject or as part of its
subject, but as the end to which natural
science leads. Now the end does not belong
to the nature of the thing of which it is the end,
but it has a relation to it; as the end of a line is
not the line but is related to it. So also the First
Mover is of a different nature from natural
things, but it is related to them because it
moves them. So it falls under the
consideration of natural science, not in itself,
but insofar as it is a mover.
Ad quartum dicendum quod scientia est de
aliquo dupliciter. Uno modo primo et
principaliter, et sic scientia est de rationibus
universalibus, supra quas fundatur. Alio
modo est de aliquibus secundario et quasi
per reflexionem quandam, et sic de illis
rebus, quarum sunt illae rationes, in
quantum illas rationes applicat ad res etiam
particulares, quarum sunt, adminiculo
inferiorum virium. Ratione enim universali
utitur sciens et ut re scita et ut medio
Reply to 4. Science treats of something in
two ways: in one way, primarily and principally;
and in this sense science is concerned
universal natures, which are its very
foundation. In another way it treats of
something secondarily, as by a sort of
reflection; and in this sense it is concerned
with the things whose natures they are,
inasmuch as, using the lower powers, it
relates those natures to the particular things
possessing them. For a knower uses a
sciendi. Per universalem enim hominis
rationem possum iudicare de hoc vel de illo.
Rationes autem universales rerum omnes
sunt immobiles, et ideo quantum ad hoc
omnis scientia de necessariis est. Sed
rerum, quarum sunt illae rationes, quaedam
sunt necessariae et immobiles, quaedam
contingentes et mobiles, et quantum ad hoc
de rebus contingentibus et mobilibus
dicuntur esse scientiae.
universal nature both as a thing known and as
a means of knowing. Thus, through the
universal nature of man we can judge of this or
that particular man. Now, all universal natures
of things are immutable; and so, in this
respect, all science is concerned with what is
necessary. But some of the things possessing
these natures are necessary and immutable,
whereas others are contingent and subject to
movement, and in this respect sciences are
said to be concerned with the contingent and
mutable.
Ad quintum dicendum quod quamvis
universale non moveatur, est tamen ratio rei
mobilis.
Reply to 5. Although a universal is not
mutable, it is nevertheless the nature of a
mutable thing.
Ad sextum dicendum quod anima et aliae
formae naturales, quamvis non moveantur
per se, moventur tamen per accidens, et
insuper sunt perfectiones rerum mobilium, et
secundum hoc cadunt in consideratione
naturalis. Terra vero, quamvis secundum
totum non moveatur, quod accidit ei, in
quantum est in suo loco naturali, in quo
aliquid quiescit per eandem naturam, per
quam movetur ad locum, tamen partes eius
moventur ad locum, cum sunt extra locum
proprium. Et sic terra et ratione quietis totius
Reply to 6. Although the soul and other
natural forms are not themselves subject to
motion, they are moved accidentally, and they
are, moreover, the perfections of mutable
things; and for this reason they come within
the domain of natural science. But even
though the earth as a whole is not moved (for it
happens to be in its natural place, where a
thing is at rest in virtue of the same nature
through which it is moved to a place),
nevertheless, when its parts are outside their
proper place, they are moved to a place. Thus
et ratione motus partium cadit in
considerationem naturalis.
the earth falls within the domain of natural
science both by reason of the immobility of the
whole earth and by reason of the movement of
its parts.
Ad septimum dicendum quod mutabilitas
illa, quae competit omni creaturae, non est
secundum aliquem motum naturalem, sed
secundum dependentiam ad Deum, a quo
si sibi deserentur, deficerent ab eo quod
sunt. Dependentia autem ista pertinet ad
considerationem metaphysici potius quam
naturalis. Creaturae etiam spirituales non
sunt mutabiles nisi secundum electionem, et
talis mutatio non pertinet ad naturalem, sed
magis ad divinum.
Reply to 7. The mutability characteristic of all
creatures is not with respect to any natural
motion, but with respect to their dependence
on God, separation from whom entails
destruction of their very being. And that
dependence falls under the consideration of
metaphysics rather than under that of natural
philosophy. Spiritual creatures, moreover, are
mutable only with regard to choice; and this
sort of motion is not the concern of the natural
philosopher but rather of the metaphysician.
Article THREE
Does Mathematics Treat, Without Motion and Matter, of What Exists in Matter?
Ad tertium sic proceditur. We proceed as follows to the third article:
Videtur quod mathematica consideratio
non sit sine materia de his quae habent
esse in materia.
It seems that mathematical thinking does not
treat, without motion and matter, of what exists
in matter, for:
Cum enim veritas consistat in 1. Since truth consists in the conformity of thing
adaequatione rei ad intellectum, oportet
esse falsitatem, quandocumque res
consideratur aliter quam sit. Si ergo res,
quae sunt in materia, sine materia
considerat mathematica, eius consideratio
erit falsa, et sic non erit scientia, cum
omnis scientia sit verorum.
to intellect, there must be falsehood whenever
we think of something otherwise than it is. If then
in mathematics we consider what is in matter in
abstraction from matter, we will consider it
falsely; and so mathematics will not be a
science, for every science is concerned with
what is true.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum in I
posteriorum cuiuslibet scientiae est
considerare subiectum et partes subiecti.
Sed omnium materialium secundum esse
materia pars est. Ergo non potest esse
quod aliqua scientia consideret de his
quae sunt in materia, absque hoc quod
materiam consideret.
2. Again, as the Philosopher states, every
science has the task of considering a subject
and the parts of the subject. Now in actual
existence matter is a part of all material things.
So it is impossible for a science to treat of what
is in matter without treating of matter.
Praeterea, omnes lineae rectae sunt
eiusdem speciei. Sed mathematicus
considerat lineas rectas numerando eas,
alias non consideraret triangulum et
quadratum. Ergo considerat lineas,
secundum quod differunt numero et
conveniunt specie. Sed principium
differendi his, quae secundum speciem
conveniunt, est materia, ut ex supra dictis
patet. Ergo materia consideratur a
mathematico.
3. Again, all straight lines are specifically the
same. But the mathematician treats of straight
lines by numbering them; otherwise he would
not treat of the triangle and the square. It follows
that he considers lines as specifically the same
and numerically different. But it is clear from the
above that matter is the principle differentiating
things specifically the same. So the
mathematician treats of matter.
Praeterea, nulla scientia, quae penitus
abstrahit a materia, demonstrat per
causam materialem. Sed in mathematica
fiunt aliquae demonstrationes, quae non
possunt reduci nisi ad causam
materialem, sicut cum demonstratur
aliquid de toto ex partibus. Partes enim
sunt materia totius, ut dicitur in II
physicorum. Unde et in II posteriorum
reducitur ad causam materialem
demonstratio, qua demonstratur quod
angulus qui est in semicirculo est rectus ex
hoc quod utraque pars eius est
semirectus. Ergo mathematica non
omnino abstrahit a materia.
4. Again, no science completely abstracting
from matter demonstrates through a material
cause. But in mathematics some
demonstrations are made which can only be
reduced to a material cause, as when we
demonstrate something about a whole by its
parts. For, as the Physics says, parts are the
matter of the whole. Thus in the Posterior
Analytics the demonstration that the angle in a
semi-circle is a right angle from the fact that
each of its two parts is half of a right angle, is
reduced to a material cause. Therefore,
mathematics does not entirely abstract from
matter.
Praeterea, motus non potest esse sine
materia. Sed mathematicus debet
considerare motum, quia cum motus
mensuretur secundum spatium, eiusdem
rationis et scientiae videtur esse
considerare quantitatem spatii, quod
pertinet ad mathematicum, et quantitatem
motus. Ergo mathematicus non omnino
dimittit considerationem materiae.
5. Again, motion cannot exist without matter.
But the mathematician ought to consider
motion, because, since motion is measured
relative to space, to consider the quantity of
space, which pertains to the mathematician,
and the quantity of motion, has the same nature
and belongs to the same science. Therefore,
the mathematician does not entirely leave
matter out of consideration.
Praeterea, astrologia quaedam pars
mathematicae est; et similiter scientia de
sphaera mota et scientia de ponderibus et
6. Again, astronomy is a part of mathematics,
and so too is the science of the moved sphere,
the science of weights, and music, all of which
musica, in quibus omnibus fit consideratio
de motu et rebus mobilibus. Ergo
mathematica non abstrahit totaliter a
materia et motu.
treat of motion and mobile things So
mathematics does not entirely abstract from
matter and motion.
Praeterea, naturalis consideratio tota est
circa materiam et motum. Sed quaedam
conclusiones demonstrantur communiter a
mathematico et naturali, ut utrum terra sit
rotunda, et utrum sit in medio caeli. Ergo
non potest esse quod mathematica
omnino abstrahat a materia. Si dicatur
quod abstrahit tantum a materia sensibili,
contra. Materia sensibilis videtur esse
materia particularis, quia sensus
particularium est, a qua omnes scientiae
abstrahunt. Ergo mathematica
consideratio non debet dici magis
abstracta quam aliqua aliarum
scientiarum.
7. Again, natural science is entirely concerned
with matter and motion. But some conclusions
are demonstrated alike by the mathematician
and the natural scientist, for instance, whether
the earth is round and whether it is in the middle
of the universe. Therefore, mathematics cannot
entirely abstract from matter. If it be said that
mathematics abstracts only from sensible
matter, the contrary seems true. Sensible
matter seems to be particular matter, because
what the senses perceive are particular things,
and all the sciences abstract from this kind of
matter. So mathematical thinking should not be
called more abstract than that of the other
sciences.
Praeterea, philosophus in II physicorum
dicit tria esse negotia. Primum est de
mobili et corruptibili, secundum de mobili
et incorruptibili, tertium de immobili et
incorruptibili. Primum autem est naturale,
tertium divinum, secundum mathematicum,
ut Ptolemaeus exponit in principio
Almagesti. Ergo mathematica est de
8. Again, the Philosopher says that there are
three branches of study: the first concerns what
is mutable and corruptible, the second what is
mutable and incorruptible, and the third what is
immutable and incorruptible. As Ptolemy
explains, the first is natural science the third
divine science, and the second mathematics.
Therefore mathematics concerns what is
mobilibus. mutable.
Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit in VI
metaphysicae.
To the contrary is the Philosophers statement
in the Metaphysics.
Praeterea, quaedam res sunt, quae
quamvis sint in materia, tamen non
recipiunt in sui diffinitione materiam, ut
curvum, et in hoc differt a simo. Sed
philosophia debet de omnibus entibus
considerare. Ergo oportet de huiusmodi
esse aliquam partem philosophiae, et
haec est mathematica, cum ad nullam
aliam pertineat.
Moreover, some things, Although existing in
matter, do not contain matter in their definition;
for instance, curve, which differs in this respect
from snub. Now philosophy should treat of all
beings. Hence some part of philosophy must
consider beings of this sort; and this is
mathematics, for this does not belong to any
other part.
Praeterea, ea, quae sunt priora secundum
intellectum, possunt sine posterioribus
considerari. Sed mathematica sunt priora
naturalibus, quae sunt in materia et motu;
habent enim se ex additione ad
mathematica, ut dicitur in III caeli et mundi.
Ergo mathematica consideratio potest
esse sine materia et motu.
Moreover, what is prior from the point of view of
the intellect can be considered without what is
posterior. Now mathematicals are prior to
natural things existing in matter and motion, for
the latter are so related to mathematicals that
they add something to them, as is said in the
De Caelo et Mundo. Therefore, mathematical
investigation can be without matter and motion.
Responsio. Dicendum quod ad evidentiam
huius quaestionis oportet videre, qualiter
intellectus secundum suam operationem
abstrahere possit.
Reply: In order to throw light on this question
we must understand how the intellect in its
operation is able to abstract.
Sciendum est igitur quod secundum
philosophum in III de anima duplex est
operatio intellectus. Una, quae dicitur
intelligentia indivisibilium, qua cognoscit
de unoquoque, quid est. Alia vero, qua
componit et dividit, scilicet enuntiationem
affirmativam vel negativam formando. Et
hae quidem duae operationes duobus,
quae sunt in rebus, respondent. Prima
quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam
rei, secundum quam res intellecta aliquem
gradum in entibus obtinet, sive sit res
completa, ut totum aliquod, sive res
incompleta, ut pars vel accidens. Secunda
vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei,
quod quidem resultat ex congregatione
principiorum rei in compositis vel ipsam
simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in
substantiis simplicibus.
We must realize that, as the Philosopher says,
the intellect has two operations, one called the
understanding of indivisibles, by which it
knows what a thing is, and another by which it
joins and divides, that is to say, by forming
affirmative and negative statements. Now these
two operations correspond to two principles in
things, The first operation concerns the nature
itself of a thing, in virtue of which the object
known holds a certain rank among beings,
whether it be a complete thing, like some whole,
or an incomplete thing, like a part or an
accident. The second operation has to do with
a things being (esse), which results from the
union of the principles of a thing in composite
substances, or, as in the case of simple
substances, accompanies the things simple
nature.
Et quia veritas intellectus est ex hoc quod
conformatur rei, patet quod secundum
hanc secundam operationem intellectus
non potest vere abstrahere quod
secundum rem coniunctum est, quia in
abstrahendo significaretur esse separatio
secundum ipsum esse rei, sicut si
abstraho hominem ab albedine dicendo:
Now, since the truth of the intellect results from
its conformity with reality, it is clear that in this
second operation the intellect cannot truthfully
abstract what is united in reality, because the
abstraction would signify a separation with
regard to the very being of the thing. For
example, if I abstract man from whiteness by
saying, Man is not white, I signify that there is
homo non est albus, significo esse
separationem in re. Unde si secundum
rem homo et albedo non sint separata, erit
intellectus falsus. Hac ergo operatione
intellectus vere abstrahere non potest nisi
ea quae sunt secundum rem separata, ut
cum dicitur: homo non est asinus.
a separation in reality. So if in reality man and
whiteness are not separate, the intellect will be
false. Through this operation, then, the intellect
can truthfully abstract only those things that are
separate in reality, as when we say, Man is not
an ass.
Sed secundum primam operationem
potest abstrahere ea quae secundum rem
separata non sunt, non tamen omnia, sed
aliqua. Cum enim unaquaeque res sit
intelligibilis, secundum quod est in actu, ut
dicitur in IX metaphysicae, oportet quod
ipsa natura sive quiditas rei intelligatur: vel
secundum quod est actus quidam, sicut
accidit de ipsis formis et substantiis
simplicibus, vel secundum id quod est
actus eius, sicut substantiae compositae
per suas formas, vel secundum id quod est
ei loco actus, sicut materia prima per
habitudinem ad formam et vacuum per
privationem locati. Et hoc est illud, ex quo
unaquaeque natura suam rationem sortitur.
Through the first operation, however, we can
abstract things that are not separate in reality;
not all, it is true, but some. For, since everything
is intelligible insofar as it is in act, as the
Metaphysics says, we must understand the
nature itself or the quiddity of a thing either
inasmuch as it is a certain act (as happens in
the case of forms themselves and simple
substances); or through that which is its act (as
we know composite substances through their
forms); or through that which takes the place of
act in it (as we know prime matter through its
relation to form, and a vacuum through the
absence of a body in place). And it is from this
that each nature is given its definition.
Quando ergo secundum hoc, per quod
constituitur ratio naturae et per quod ipsa
natura intelligitur, natura ipsa habet
ordinem et dependentiam ad aliquid aliud,
Therefore, when the nature itself is related to,
and depends on something else, with regard to
that which forms the definition (ratio) of the
nature, and through which the nature itself is
tunc constat quod natura illa sine illo alio
intelligi non potest, sive sint coniuncta
coniunctione illa, qua pars coniungitur toti,
sicut pes non potest intelligi sine intellectu
animalis, quia illud, a quo pes habet
rationem pedis, dependet ab eo, a quo
animal est animal, sive sint coniuncta per
modum quo forma coniungitur materiae,
vel ut pars comparti vel accidens subiecto,
sicut simum non potest intelligi sine naso,
sive etiam sint secundum rem separata,
sicut pater non potest intelligi sine
intellectu filii, quamvis istae relationes
inveniantur in diversis rebus. Si vero unum
ab altero non dependeat secundum id
quod constituit rationem naturae, tunc
unum potest ab altero abstrahi per
intellectum ut sine eo intelligatur, non
solum si sint separata secundum rem,
sicut homo et lapis, sed etiam si
secundum rem coniuncta sint, sive ea
coniunctione, qua pars et totum
coniunguntur, sicut littera potest intelligi
sine syllaba, sed non e converso, et animal
sine pede, sed non e converso, sive etiam
sint coniuncta per modum quo forma
coniungitur materiae et accidens subiecto,
sicut albedo potest intelligi sine homine, et
e converso.
understood, clearly we cannot know the nature
without that other thing. This is true whether they
are connected as a part is united to a whole (as
we cannot know foot without knowing animal,
because that whereby foot has the nature of foot
depends on that whereby animal is animal); or
whether they are connected as form is united to
matter, or as one part to another part, or as
accident to subject (as we cannot know snub
without nose); or even whether they are
separated in reality (as we cannot know father
without knowing son, Although these
relationships are found in different things). But if
one thing does not depend on another with
regard to that which forms the definition of the
nature, then the intellect can abstract the one
from the other so as to know it without the other.
This is true not only if they are separated in
reality, like man and stone, but also if they are
united in reality, whether they are joined as part
and whole (as letter can be understood without
syllable, but not vice versa, and animal without
foot, but not conversely); or even if they are
joined as form is united to matter and accident
to subject (as whiteness can be understood
without man and vice versa).
Sic ergo intellectus distinguit unum ab
altero aliter et aliter secundum diversas
operationes; quia secundum operationem,
qua componit et dividit, distinguit unum ab
alio per hoc quod intelligit unum alii non
inesse. In operatione vero qua intelligit,
quid est unumquodque, distinguit unum ab
alio, dum intelligit, quid est hoc, nihil
intelligendo de alio, neque quod sit cum
eo, neque quod sit ab eo separatum. Unde
ista distinctio non proprie habet nomen
separationis, sed prima tantum. Haec
autem distinctio recte dicitur abstractio,
sed tunc tantum quando ea, quorum unum
sine altero intelligitur, sunt simul secundum
rem. Non enim dicitur animal a lapide
abstrahi, si animal absque intellectu
lapidis intelligatur.
Accordingly, through its various operations the
intellect distinguishes one thing from another in
different ways. Through the operation by which it
composes and divides, it distinguishes one
thing from another by understanding that the
one does not exist in the other. Through the
operation, however, by which it understands
what a thing is, it distinguishes one thing from
another by knowing what one is without knowing
anything of the other, either that it is united to it
or separated from it. So this distinction is not
properly called separation, but only the first. It is
correctly called abstraction, but only when the
objects, one of which is known without the other,
are one in reality. For if we consider animal
without considering stone, we do not say that
we abstract animal from stone.
Unde cum abstractio non possit esse,
proprie loquendo, nisi coniunctorum in
esse, secundum duos modos
coniunctionis praedictos, scilicet qua pars
et totum uniuntur vel forma et materia,
duplex est abstractio, una, qua forma
abstrahitur a materia, alia, qua totum
abstrahitur a partibus.
It follows that since, properly speaking, we can
only abstract objects united in existence, there
are two sorts of abstraction corresponding to
the two modes of union mentioned above,
namely, the union of part and whole, and the
union of form and matter. The first is that in
which we abstract form from matter, and the
second is that in which we abstract a whole
from its parts.
Forma autem illa potest a materia aliqua
abstrahi, cuius ratio essentiae non
dependet a tali materia. Ab illa autem
materia non potest forma abstrahi per
intellectum, a qua secundum suae
essentiae rationem dependet. Unde cum
omnia accidentia comparentur ad
substantiam subiectam sicut forma ad
materiam et cuiuslibet accidentis ratio
dependeat ad substantiam, impossibile
est aliquam talem formam a substantia
separari. Sed accidentia superveniunt
substantiae quodam ordine. Nam primo
advenit ei quantitas, deinde qualitas,
deinde passiones et motus. Unde
quantitas potest intelligi in materia
subiecta, antequam intelligantur in ea
qualitates sensibiles, a quibus dicitur
materia sensibilis. Et sic secundum
rationem suae substantiae non dependet
quantitas a materia sensibili, sed solum a
materia intelligibili. Substantia enim
remotis accidentibus non manet nisi
intellectu comprehensibilis, eo quod
sensitivae potentiae non pertingunt usque
ad substantiae comprehensionem. Et de
huiusmodi abstractis est mathematica,
quae considerat quantitates et ea quae
quantitates consequuntur, ut figuras et
Now a form can be abstracted from matter if the
essential nature of the form does not depend on
that particular kind of matter; but the intellect
cannot abstract form from the kind of matter
upon which the form depends according to its
essential nature. Consequently, because all
accidents are related to the underlying
substance as form to matter, and because it is
the nature of every accident to depend upon
substance, no form of this kind can be
separated from substance. But accidents befall
substance in a definite order. Quantity comes to
it first, then quality, after that passivities
(passiones) and actions. So quantity can be
thought of in substance before the sensible
qualities (because of which matter is called
sensible) are considered in it. Quantity, then,
according to its essential nature does not
depend upon sensible matter but only upon
intelligible matter. For, after accidents have
been abstracted, substance is intelligible only to
the intellect, because it is beyond the sense
powers to comprehend substance. And
abstract objects of this kind are the concern of
mathematics; it treats of quantities and the
properties of quantity, such as figures and the
like.
huiusmodi.
Totum etiam non a quibuslibet partibus
abstrahi potest. Sunt enim quaedam
partes, ex quibus ratio totius dependet,
quando scilicet hoc est esse tali toti quod
ex talibus partibus componi, sicut se habet
syllaba ad litteras et mixtum ad elementa;
et tales partes dicuntur partes speciei et
formae, sine quibus totum intelligi non
potest, cum ponantur in eius diffinitione.
Quaedam vero partes sunt quae accidunt
toti, in quantum huiusmodi, sicut
semicirculus se habet ad circulum. Accidit
enim circulo, quod sumantur per
divisionem duae eius partes aequales vel
inaequales vel etiam plures; non autem
accidit triangulo, quod in eo designentur
tres lineae, quia ex hoc triangulus est
triangulus. Similiter etiam per se competit
homini quod inveniatur in eo anima
rationalis et corpus compositum ex
quattuor elementis, unde sine his partibus
homo intelligi non potest, sed haec oportet
poni in diffinitione eius; unde sunt partes
speciei et formae. Sed digitus, pes et
manus et aliae huiusmodi partes sunt post
intellectum hominis, unde ex eis ratio
essentialis hominis non dependet; et homo
Moreover, we cannot abstract a whole from just
any parts. For there are some parts upon which
the nature of the whole depends, namely, when
the being of a particular whole consists in the
composition of particular parts. It is in this way
that a syllable is related to letters and a mixed
body to the elements. Parts of this sort, which
are necessary for understanding the whole
because they enter into its definition, are called
parts of the species and of the form. There are
some parts, however, that are accidental to the
whole as such. The semicircle, for instance, is
related to the circle in this way, for it is
accidental to a circle that it be divided into two
or more equal or unequal parts. But it is not
accidental to a triangle that three lines are
designated in it, for because of this a triangle is
a triangle. Similarly, it is an essential
characteristic of man that there be found in him
a rational soul and a body composed of the four
elements. So man cannot be understood
without these parts and they must be included in
his definition; so they are parts of his species
and form. But finger, foot, and hand, and other
parts of this kind are outside the definition of
man; and thus the essential nature of man does
not depend on them and he can be understood
sine his intelligi potest. Sive enim habeat
pedes sive non, dummodo ponatur
coniunctum ex anima rationali et corpore
mixto ex elementis propria mixtione, quam
requirit talis forma, erit homo. Et hae
partes dicuntur partes materiae, quae non
ponuntur in diffinitione totius, sed magis e
converso. Et hoc modo se habent ad
hominem omnes partes signatae, sicut
haec anima et hoc corpus et hic unguis et
hoc os et huiusmodi. Hae enim partes sunt
quidem partes essentiae sortis et Platonis,
non autem hominis, in quantum homo; et
ideo potest homo abstrahi per intellectum
ab istis partibus, et talis abstractio est
universalis a particulari.
without them. For whether or not he has feet, as
long as he is constituted of a rational soul and a
body composed of the elements in the proper
mixture required by this sort of form, he will be a
man. These parts are called parts of matter:
they are not included in the definition of the
whole, but rather the converse is true. This is
how all determinate (signatae) parts are related
to man; for instance, this soul, this body, this
nail, this bone, etc. These indeed are parts of
the essence of Socrates and Plato, but not of
man precisely as man; and therefore the
intellect can abstract man from these parts. And
this is the abstraction of the universal from the
particular.
Et ita sunt duae abstractiones intellectus.
Una quae respondet unioni formae et
materiae vel accidentis et subiecti, et haec
est abstractio formae a materia sensibili.
Alia quae respondet unioni totius et partis,
et huic respondet abstractio universalis a
particulari, quae est abstractio totius, in
quo consideratur absolute natura aliqua
secundum suam rationem essentialem, ab
omnibus partibus, quae non sunt partes
speciei, sed sunt partes accidentales. Non
autem inveniuntur abstractiones eis
So there are two abstractions of the intellect.
One corresponds to the union of form and
matter or accident and subject. This is the
abstraction of form from sensible matter. The
other corresponds to the union of whole and
part; and to this corresponds the abstraction of
the universal from the particular. This is the
abstraction of a whole, in which we consider a
nature absolutely, according to its essential
character, in independence of all parts that do
not belong to the species but are accidental
parts. But we do not find abstractions opposed
oppositae, quibus pars abstrahatur a toto
vel materia a forma; quia pars vel non
potest abstrahi a toto per intellectum, si sit
de partibus materiae, in quarum diffinitione
ponitur totum, vel potest etiam sine toto
esse, si sit de partibus speciei, sicut linea
sine triangulo vel littera sine syllaba vel
elementum sine mixto. In his autem quae
secundum esse possunt esse divisa,
magis habet locum separatio quam
abstractio. Similiter autem cum dicimus
formam abstrahi a materia, non intelligitur
de forma substantiali, quia forma
substantialis et materia sibi
correspondens dependent ad invicem, ut
unum sine alio non possit intelligi, eo quod
proprius actus in propria materia fit. Sed
intelligitur de forma accidentali, quae est
quantitas et figura, a qua quidem materia
sensibilis per intellectum abstrahi non
potest, cum qualitates sensibiles non
possint intelligi non praeintellecta
quantitate, sicut patet in superficie et
colore, nec etiam potest intelligi esse
subiectum motus, quod non intelligitur
quantum. Substantia autem, quae est
materia intelligibilis quantitatis, potest
esse sine quantitate; unde considerare
substantiam sine quantitate magis pertinet
ad genus separationis quam abstractionis.
to these, by which a part is abstracted from a
whole by the intellect if it is one of the parts of
matter in whose definition the whole is included,
or it can even exist without the whole if it is one
of the parts of the species, for instance, a line
without a triangle, a letter without a syllable, or
an element without a mixed body. But in the
case of things that can exist separately,
separation rather than abstraction obtains.
Similarly, when we say from is abstracted from
matter, we do not mean substantial form,
because substantial form and the matter
correlative to it are interdependent, so that one
is not intelligible without the other, because the
appropriate act is in its appropriate matter.
Rather, we mean the accidental forms of
quantity and figure, from which indeed sensible
matter cannot be abstracted by the intellect,
because sensible qualities cannot be
understood unless quantity is presupposed, as
is clear in the case of surface and color. And
neither can we understand something to be the
subject of motion unless we understand it to
possess quantity. Substance, however, which is
the intelligible matter of quantity, can exist
without quantity. Consequently, the
consideration of substance without quantity
belongs to the order of separation rather than to
that of abstraction.
ad genus separationis quam abstractionis.
Sic ergo in operatione intellectus triplex
distinctio invenitur. Una secundum
operationem intellectus componentis et
dividentis, quae separatio dicitur proprie;
et haec competit scientiae divinae sive
metaphysicae. Alia secundum
operationem, qua formantur quiditates
rerum, quae est abstractio formae a
materia sensibili; et haec competit
mathematicae. Tertia secundum eandem
operationem quae est abstractio
universalis a particulari; et haec competit
etiam physicae et est communis omnibus
scientiis, quia in scientia praetermittitur
quod per accidens est et accipitur quod
per se est. Et quia quidam non
intellexerunt differentiam duarum ultimarum
a prima, inciderunt in errorem, ut ponerent
mathematica et universalia a sensibilibus
separata, ut Pythagorici et Platonici.
We conclude that there are three kinds of
distinction in the operation of the intellect. There
is one through the operation of the intellect
joining and dividing which is properly called
separation and this belongs to divine science or
metaphysics. There is another through the
operation by which the quiddities of things are
conceived which is the abstraction of form from
sensible matter, and this belongs to
mathematics. And there is a third through the
same operation which is the abstraction of a
universal from a particular, and this belongs to
physics and to all the sciences in general,
because science disregards accidental
features and treats of necessary matters. And
because certain men (for example, the
Pythagoreans and the Platonists) did not
understand the difference between the last two
kinds of distinction and the first, they fell into
error, asserting that the objects of mathematics
and universals exist separate from sensible
things.
Replies to Opposing Arguments:
mathematicus abstrahens non considerat
Reply to 1. When the mathematician abstracts
he does not consider something otherwise than
rem aliter quam sit. Non enim intelligit
lineam esse sine materia sensibili, sed
considerat lineam et eius passiones sine
consideratione materiae sensibilis, et sic
non est dissonantia inter intellectum et
rem, quia etiam secundum rem id, quod
est de natura lineae, non dependet ab eo,
quod facit materiam esse sensibilem, sed
magis e converso. Et sic patet quod
abstrahentium non est mendacium, ut
dicitur in II physicorum.
it is. Thus, he does not think that a line exists
without sensible matter, but he treats of a line
and its properties without considering sensible
matter. So there is no disagreement between
his intellect and reality, because even in reality
what belongs to the nature of a line does not
depend upon that which makes matter sensible,
but vice versa. Consequently, it is evident that
there is no error in the one who abstracts, as
is said in the Physics.
Ad secundum dicendum quod materiale
dicitur non solum id, cuius pars est
materia, sed etiam illud, quod in materia
esse habet, secundum quem modum linea
sensibilis materiale quoddam dici potest.
Unde per hoc non prohibetur quin linea
sine materia intelligi possit. Non enim
materia sensibilis comparatur ad lineam
sicut pars, sed magis sicut subiectum, in
quo esse habet, et similiter est de
superficie et corpore. Non enim
mathematicus considerat corpus, quod est
in genere substantiae, prout eius pars est
materia et forma, sed secundum quod est
in genere quantitatis tribus dimensionibus
perfectum, et sic comparatur ad corpus
quod est in genere substantiae, cuius pars
Reply to 2. By material is meant not only that
which has matter as a part, but also that which
exists in matter; and in this way sensible line
can be called something material. So this does
not prevent a line from being understood without
matter. For sensible matter is not related to a
line as a part, but rather as the subject in which
it exists, and this is also the case with a surface
or body. Obviously, the mathematician does not
treat of the kind of body that is in the category of
substance, whose parts are matter and form,
but rather the body in the category of quantity,
constituted by three dimensions. Body, in this
sense of the term, is related to body the
category of substance (of which physical matter
is a part) as accident to its subject.
est materia physica, sicut accidens ad
subiectum.
Ad tertium dicendum quod materia non est
principium diversitatis secundum numerum
nisi secundum quod in multas partes
divisa in singulis partibus formam
recipiens eiusdem rationis plura individua
eiusdem speciei constituit. Materia autem
dividi non potest nisi ex praesupposita
quantitate, qua remota omnis substantia
indivisibilis remanet, et sic prima ratio
diversificandi ea, quae sunt unius speciei,
est penes quantitatem. Quod quidem
quantitati competit, in quantum in sui
ratione situm quasi differentiam
constitutivam habet, qui nihil est aliud
quam ordo partium. Unde etiam abstracta
quantitate a materia sensibili per
intellectum adhuc contingit imaginari
diversa secundum numerum unius speciei,
sicut plures triangulos aequilateros et
plures lineas rectas aequales.
Reply to 3. Matter is the principle of numerical
diversity or inasmuch as, being divided into
many parts, and receiving in each part a form of
the same nature, it constitutes many individuals
of the same species. Now matter can be
divided only if we presuppose quantity in it; if
that is taken away, even substance remains
indivisible. So the primary reason for the
diversification of things of one species lies in
quantity. And this is due to quantity because
position, which is the arrangement of parts in
place, is contained in its notion as a kind of
formal difference. So even when the intellect
has abstracted quantity from sensible matter, it
is still possible to imagine numerically different
things in the same species, for example,
several equilateral triangles and several equal
straight lines.
Ad quartum dicendum quod mathematica
non abstrahuntur a qualibet materia, sed
solum a materia sensibili. Partes autem
quantitatis, a quibus demonstratio sumpta
quodammodo a causa materiali videtur
Reply to 4. Mathematics does not abstract
from every kind of matter but only from sensible
matter. Now the parts of quantity that seem to
be in a way the basis for a demonstration by
means of a material cause are not sensible
sumi, non sunt materia sensibilis, sed
pertinent ad materiam intelligibilem, quae
etiam in mathematicis invenitur, ut patet in
VII metaphysicae.
matter; rather, they pertain to intelligible matter,
which indeed is found in mathematics, as is
clear in the Metaphysics.
Ad quintum dicendum quod motus
secundum naturam suam non pertinet ad
genus quantitatis, sed participat aliquid de
natura quantitatis aliunde, secundum quod
divisio motus sumitur vel ex divisione
spatii vel ex divisione mobilis; et ideo
considerare motus non pertinet ad
mathematicum, sed tamen principia
mathematica ad motum applicari possunt.
Et ideo secundum hoc, quod principia
quantitatis ad motum applicantur, naturalis
considerat de divisione et continuitate
motus, ut patet in VI physicorum. Et in
scientiis mediis inter mathematicam et
naturalem tractatur de mensuris motuum,
sicut in scientia de sphaera mota et in
astrologia.
Reply to 5. By its very nature motion is not in
the category of quantity, but it partakes
somewhat of the nature of quantity from another
source, namely, according as the division of
motion derives from either the division of space
or the division of the thing subject to motion. So
it does not belong to the mathematician to treat
of motion, Although mathematical principles can
be applied to motion. Therefore, inasmuch as
the principles of quantity are applied to motion,
the natural scientist treats of the division and
continuity of motion, as is clear in the Physics.
And the measurements of motions are studied
in the intermediate sciences between
mathematics and natural science: for instance,
in the science of the moved sphere and in
astronomy.
Ad sextum dicendum quod in compositis
simplicia salvantur et proprietates eorum,
licet per alium modum, sicut propriae
qualitates elementorum et motus ipsorum
proprii inveniuntur in mixto; quod autem est
compositorum proprium, non invenitur in
Reply to 6. Simple bodies and their properties
remain in composite bodies Although in a
different way, as the proper qualities of the
elements and their proper movements are
found in a mixed body. What is proper to
composite bodies, however, is not found in
simplicibus. Et inde est quod quanto
aliqua scientia est abstractior et
simpliciora considerans, tanto eius
principia sunt magis applicabilia aliis
scientiis. Unde principia mathematicae
sunt applicabilia naturalibus rebus, non
autem e converso, propter quod physica
est ex suppositione mathematicae, sed
non e converso, ut patet in III caeli et
mundi. Et inde est quod de rebus
naturalibus et mathematicis tres ordines
scientiarum inveniuntur. Quaedam enim
sunt pure naturales, quae considerant
proprietates rerum naturalium, in quantum
huiusmodi, sicut physica et agricultura et
huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt pure
mathematicae, quae determinant de
quantitatibus absolute, sicut geometria de
magnitudine et arithmetica de numero.
Quaedam vero sunt mediae, quae
principia mathematica ad res naturales
applicant, ut musica, astrologia et
huiusmodi. Quae tamen magis sunt affines
mathematicis, quia in earum
consideratione id quod est physicum est
quasi materiale, quod autem est
mathematicum est quasi formale; sicut
musica considerat sonos, non in quantum
sunt soni, sed in quantum sunt secundum
numeros proportionabiles, et similiter est
simple bodies. And so it is that the more
abstract and simple the objects of a science
are, the more applicable its principles are to the
other sciences. Thus the principles of
mathematics are applicable to natural things,
but not visa versa, because physics
presupposes mathematics; but the converse is
not true, as is clear in the De Caelo et Mundo.
So there are three levels of sciences
concerning natural and mathematical entities.
Some are purely natural and treat of the
properties of natural things as such, like
physics, agricuIture, and the like. Others are
purely mathematical and treat of quantities
absolutely, as geometry considers magnitude
and arithmetic numbers. Still others are
intermediate, and these apply mathematical
principles to natural things; for instance, music,
astronomy, and the like. These sciences,
however, have a closer affinity to mathematics,
because in their thinking that which is physical
is, as it were, material, whereas that which is
mathematical is, as it were, formal. For
example, music considers sounds, not
inasmuch as they are sounds, but inasmuch as
they are proportionable according to numbers;
and the same holds in other sciences. Thus they
demonstrate their conclusions concerning
natural things, but by means of mathematics.
Therefore nothing prevents their being
numeros proportionabiles, et similiter est
in aliis. Et propter hoc demonstrant
conclusiones suas circa res naturales, sed
per media mathematica; et ideo nihil
prohibet, si in quantum cum naturali
communicant, materiam sensibilem
respiciunt. In quantum enim cum
mathematica communicant, abstractae
sunt.
Therefore nothing prevents their being
concerned with sensible matter insofar as they
have something in common with natural
science, but insofar as they have something in
common with mathematics they are abstract.
Ad septimum dicendum quod, quia
scientiae mediae, de quibus dictum est,
communicant cum naturali secundum id
quod in earum consideratione est
materiale, differunt autem secundum id
quod in earum consideratione est formale,
ideo nihil prohibet has scientias cum
naturali habere interdum easdem
conclusiones. Non tamen per eadem
demonstrant nisi secundum quod scientiae
sunt immixtae et una interdum utitur eo
quod est alterius, sicut rotunditatem terrae
naturalis probat ex motu gravium,
astrologus autem per considerationem
lunarium eclipsium.
Reply to 7. Because the intermediate sciences
mentioned above have something in common
with natural science as regards what is material
in their procedure, but differ from it as regards
what is formal in it, nothing prevents these
sciences from occasionally having the same
conclusions as natural science. Nevertheless,
they do not use the same means of
demonstration, unless the sciences are mixed
and one occasionally uses what belongs to
another, as the natural scientist proves that the
earth is round from the movement of heavy
bodies, while the astronomer proves it by
considering eclipses of the moon.
Ad octavum dicendum quod, sicut dicit
Commentator ibidem, philosophus non
intendit ibi distinguere scientias
speculativas, quia de quolibet mobili, sive
Reply to 8. As the Commentator says, the
Philosopher there did not intend to distinguish
between the speculative sciences, because the
natural scientist treats of everything subject to
sit corruptibile sive incorruptibile,
determinat naturalis. Mathematicus autem,
in quantum huiusmodi, non considerat
aliquod mobile. Intendit autem distinguere
res, de quibus scientiae speculativae
determinant, de quibus seorsum et
secundum ordinem agendum est, quamvis
illa tria genera rerum tribus scientiis
appropriari possint. Entia enim
incorruptibilia et immobilia praecise ad
metaphysicum pertinent. Entia vero
mobilia et incorruptibilia propter sui
uniformitatem et regularitatem possunt
determinari quantum ad suos motus per
principia mathematica, quod de mobilibus
corruptibilibus dici non potest; et ideo
secundum genus entium attribuitur
mathematicae ratione astrologiae. Tertium
vero remanet proprium soli naturali. Et sic
loquitur Ptolemaeus.
motion, whether it be corruptible or
incorruptible, while the mathematician as such
does not treat of anything subject to motion. But
he intended to distinguish between the things
studied by the speculative sciences, which must
be treated separately and in order, Although
these three sorts of things can be apportioned
to the three sciences. For incorruptible and
immobile beings pertain precisely to the
metaphysician. However, mobile and
incorruptible beings, owing to their uniformity
and regularity, can be determined in their
movements by mathematical principles; this
cannot be said of beings that are mobile and
corruptible. Therefore, as Ptolemy says, the
second kind of beings is ascribed to
mathematics through astronomy, while the third
kind remains the proper domain of natural
science alone.
Article FOUR
Does Divine Science Treat of What Exists Without Matter and Motion?
Ad quartum sic proceditur. We proceed as follows to the fourth
article:
Videtur quod scientia divina non sit de rebus
a motu et materia separatis.
It seems that divine science does not treat of
things separate from motion and matter, for:
Scientia enim divina maxime videtur esse
de Deo. Sed ad Dei cognitionem pervenire
non possumus nisi per effectus visibiles, qui
sunt in materia et motu constituti, Rom. 1:
invisibilia enim ipsius et cetera. Ergo
scientia divina non abstrahit a materia et
motu.
1. Divine science seems to he especially
concerned with God. Now we can come to
know God only by way of his visible effects,
which are created in matter and motion, as it
is said in the Epistle to the Romans, The
invisible things of him, from the creation of the
world, are clearly seen, being understood by
the things that are made. Therefore, divine
science does not abstract from matter and
motion.
Praeterea, illud, cui aliquo modo motus
convenit, non est omnino a motu et materia
separatum. Sed motus aliquo modo Deo
convenit; unde dicitur Sap. 7 de spiritu
sapientiae quod est mobilis et mobilior
omnibus mobilibus. Et Augustinus dicit VIII
super Genesim quod Deus movet se sine
tempore et loco, et Plato posuit primum
movens movere se ipsum. Ergo scientia
divina, quae de Deo determinat, non est
omnino a motu separata.
2. Again, that to which motion in some way
belongs is not entirely separate from motion
and matter. But motion in some way belongs
to God. Thus it is said in Wisdom that the
Spirit of Wisdom is mobile and more
mobile than all mobile things. And Augustine
says that God moves himself without time and
place. Plato also asserted that the First Mover
moves itself. Therefore divine science, which
treats of God, is not entirely separate from
motion.
Praeterea, scientia divina non solum habet
considerare de Deo, sed etiam de Angelis.
3. Again, divine science must treat not only of
God but also of angels. But angels change
Sed Angeli moventur et secundum
electionem, quia de bonis facti sunt mali, et
secundum locum, ut patet in illis qui
mittuntur. Ergo illa, de quibus scientia divina
considerat, non sunt omnino a motu
separata.
both with regard to choice, because they
became bad after having been good, and also
with regard to place, as is evident in the case
of those who are sent as messengers. So the
objects of divine science are not entirely
separated from motion.
Praeterea, ut videtur Commentator dicere in
principio physicorum, omne, quod est, vel
est materia pura vel forma pura vel
compositum ex materia et forma. Sed
Angelus non est forma pura, quia sic esset
actus purus, quod solius Dei est, nec iterum
est materia pura. Ergo est compositus ex
materia et forma. Et sic scientia divina non
abstrahit a materia.
4. Again, as the Commentator seems to say
in the beginning of the Physics, every being is
either pure matter, or pure form, or a
composite of matter and form. But an angel is
not a pure form, because then he would be
pure act, which is true of God alone. Neither is
he pure matter. So he is a composite of
matter and form. Therefore divine science
does not abstract from matter.
Praeterea, scientia divina, quae ponitur
tertia pars speculativae philosophiae, est
idem quod metaphysica, cuius subiectum
est ens, et principaliter ens quod est
substantia, ut patet in IV metaphysicae. Sed
ens et substantia non abstrahit a materia,
alias nullum ens inveniretur quod haberet
materiam. Ergo scientia divina non est a
materia abstrahens.
5. Again, divine science, the third part of
speculative philosophy, is the same as
metaphysics, whose subject is being, and
especially substantial being. This is clear in
the Metaphysics. But being and substance do
not abstract from matter; otherwise there
would be no material being. So divine science
does not abstract from matter.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum in I 6. Again, according to the Philosopher, it is
posteriorum ad scientiam pertinet
considerare non solum subiectum, sed
partes et passiones subiecti. Sed ens est
subiectum scientiae divinae, ut dictum est.
Ergo ad ipsam pertinet considerare de
omnibus entibus. Sed materia et motus sunt
quaedam entia. Ergo pertinent ad
considerationem metaphysicae, et sic
scientia divina ab eis non abstrahit.
the business of a science to consider not only
a subject but also the divisions and attributes
of that subject. Now, as we have said, being is
the subject of divine science. Therefore it is
the business of this science to treat of all
beings. But matter and motion are beings.
Therefore they come under the consideration
of metaphysics, and so divine science does
not abstract from them.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Commentator in I
physicorum, scientia divina demonstrat per
tres causas, scilicet efficientem, formalem et
finalem. Sed causa efficiens non potest
considerari sine consideratione motus,
similiter nec finis, ut dicitur in III
metaphysicae. Unde in mathematicis
propter hoc quod sunt immobilia nulla
demonstratio per huiusmodi causas datur.
Ergo scientia divina non abstrahit a motu.
7. Again, divine science demonstrates by
means of three causes: efficient, formal, and
final, as the Commentator says, But we cannot
consider an efficient cause without taking
motion into account; and the same thing is
true of a final cause, as the Metaphysics says.
Thus, because the objects of mathematics are
immobile, there are no demonstrations
through these causes in that science.
Consequently, divine science does not
abstract from motion.
Praeterea, in theologia determinatur de
creatione caeli et terrae et actibus hominum
et multis huiusmodi, quae in se materiam et
motum continent. Ergo non videtur theologia
a materia et motu abstrahere.
8. Again, in theology we treat of the creation of
the heavens and the earth, of acts of men, and
many similar things that involve matter and
motion. So theology does not seem to
abstract from matter and motion.
Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit in VI
metaphysicae quod prima philosophia est
circa separabilia, scilicet a materia, et
immobilia. Prima autem philosophia est
scientia divina, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo
scientia divina est abstracta a materia et
motu.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the
Metaphysics that first philosophy deals with
things that can exist separately, that is, from
matter, and with immobile things. Now first
philosophy is divine science, as he says in the
same place. Therefore divine science
abstracts from matter and motion.
Praeterea, nobilissima scientia est de
nobilissimis entibus. Sed scientia divina est
nobilissima. Cum ergo entia immaterialia et
immobilia sint nobilissima, de eis erit
scientia divina.
Moreover, the most excellent science deals
with the most excellent beings. But the most
excellent science is divine science. Therefore,
since immaterial and immobile beings are the
most excellent, divine science will treat of
them.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in principio
metaphysicae quod scientia divina est de
primis principiis et causis. Huiusmodi autem
sunt immaterialia et immobilia. Ergo de
talibus est scientia divina.
Moreover, the Philosopher says in the
beginning of the Metaphysics that divine
science concerns first principles and causes.
Now these are immaterial and immobile.
Therefore things of this sort are the objects of
divine science.
Responsio. Dicendum quod ad evidentiam
huius quaestionis scire oportet quae
scientia divina scientia dici debeat.
Sciendum siquidem est quod quaecumque
scientia considerat aliquod genus
subiectum, oportet quod consideret
Reply: In order to throw light on this question
we must understand what science should be
called divine science. We must realize indeed
that if a science considers a subject-genus, it
must investigate the principles of that genus,
since science is perfected only through
principia illius generis, cum scientia non
perficiatur nisi per cognitionem
principiorum, ut patet per philosophum in
principio physicorum. Sed principiorum duo
sunt genera. Quaedam enim sunt quae et
sunt in se ipsis quaedam naturae completae
et sunt nihilominus principia aliorum, sicut
corpora caelestia sunt quaedam principia
inferiorum corporum et corpora simplicia
corporum mixtorum. Et ideo ista non solum
considerantur in scientiis ut principia sunt,
sed etiam ut sunt in se ipsis res quaedam;
et propter hoc de eis non solum tractatur in
scientia quae considerat ipsa principiata,
sed etiam habent per se scientiam
separatam, sicut de corporibus caelestibus
est quaedam pars scientiae naturalis
praeter illam, in qua determinatur de
corporibus inferioribus, et de elementis
praeter illam, in qua tractatur de corporibus
mixtis. Quaedam autem sunt principia, quae
non sunt naturae completae in se ipsis, sed
solum sunt principia naturarum, sicut unitas
numeri et punctus lineae et forma et materia
corporis physici, unde huiusmodi principia
non tractantur nisi in scientia, in qua de
principiatis agitur.
knowledge of principles, as the Philosopher
explains in the beginning of the Physics. Now
there are two kinds of principles. (1) Some
are complete natures in themselves and
nevertheless they are the principles of other
things, as the heavenly bodies are principles
of lower bodies and simple bodies are
principles of mixed bodies. In the sciences,
therefore, we study them not only insofar as
they are principles, but also insofar as they
are certain things in themselves. And for this
reason they are considered not only in the
science of the beings of which they are the
principles, but also in a separate science.
Thus there is a branch of natural science
treating of heavenly bodies distinct from that
treating of lower bodies, and there is one
treating of the elements distinct from that
treating of mixed bodies. (2) There are some
principles, however, that are not complete
natures in themselves, but only principles of
natures, as unity is the principle of number,
point the principle of line, and form and matter
principles of natural bodies. Principles of this
sort, then, are investigated only in the science
dealing with the things of which they are
principles.
Sicut autem uniuscuiusque determinati Now just as there are certain common
generis sunt quaedam communia principia
quae se extendunt ad omnia principia illius
generis, ita etiam et omnia entia, secundum
quod in ente communicant, habent quaedam
principia quae sunt principia omnium
entium. Quae quidem principia possunt dici
communia dupliciter secundum Avicennam
in sua sufficientia: uno modo per
praedicationem, sicut hoc quod dico: forma
est commune ad omnes formas, quia de
qualibet praedicatur; alio modo per
causalitatem, sicut dicimus solem unum
numero esse principium ad omnia
generabilia.
principles of any particular genus extending to
all the principles of that genus, so too all
beings, inasmuch as they share in being, have
certain principles that are the principles of all
beings. And as Avicenna says, these
principles can be called common in two
ways, (1) first, by predication, as when I say
that form is common to all forms because it is
predicated of all; (2) second, by causality, as
we say that the sun, which is numerically one,
is the principle of all things subject to
generation.
Omnium autem entium sunt principia
communia non solum secundum primum
modum, quod appellat philosophus in XI
metaphysicae omnia entia habere eadem
principia secundum analogiam, sed etiam
secundum modum secundum, ut sint
quaedam res eadem numero exsistentes
omnium rerum principia, prout scilicet
principia accidentium reducuntur in principia
substantiae et principia substantiarum
corruptibilium reducuntur in substantias
incorruptibiles, et sic quodam gradu et
ordine in quaedam principia omnia entia
reducuntur.
Now there are principles common to all
beings not only in the first way (in this sense
the Philosopher says that all beings have
proportionately the same principles), but also
in the second way, so that there are certain
beings, each numerically one, which are the
principles of all things. Thus the principles of
accidents are reducible to the principles of
substance, and the principles of perishable
substances are reducible to imperishable
ones, with the result that all beings are
reducible to certain principles in a definite
graded order.
Et quia id, quod est principium essendi
omnibus, oportet esse maxime ens, ut
dicitur in II metaphysicae, ideo huiusmodi
principia oportet esse completissima, et
propter hoc oportet ea esse maxime actu, ut
nihil vel minimum habeant de potentia, quia
actus est prior et potior potentia, ut dicitur in
IX metaphysicae. Et propter hoc oportet ea
esse absque materia, quae est in potentia,
et absque motu, qui est actus exsistentis in
potentia. Et huiusmodi sunt res divinae; quia
si divinum alicubi exsistit, in tali natura,
immateriali scilicet et immobili, maxime
exsistit, ut dicitur in VI metaphysicae.
And since the principle of the being of all
things must be being in the highest degree as
the Metaphysics says, these principles must
be most perfect and therefore supremely in
act, so that they have no potentiality
whatsoever, or the least possible, because
actuality is prior to, and more excellent than
potentiality, as the Metaphysics says. For this
reason they must be free from matter, which is
in potency, and free from motion, which is
actuality of that which exists in potency. Divine
beings are of this sort, because if the divine
exists anywhere, it exists especially in such a
nature (that is to say, in a nature that is
immaterial and immutable), as is sad in the
Metaphysics.
Huiusmodi ergo res divinae, quia sunt
principia omnium entium et sunt nihilominus
in se naturae completae, dupliciter tractari
possunt: uno modo, prout sunt principia
communia omnium entium; alio modo, prout
sunt in se res quaedam. Quia autem
huiusmodi prima principia quamvis sint in se
maxime nota, tamen intellectus noster se
habet ad ea ut oculus noctuae ad lucem
solis, ut dicitur in II metaphysicae, per lumen
naturalis rationis pervenire non possumus in
Accordingly, because these divine beings are
the principles of all things and nevertheless
they are complete natures in themselves, they
can be studied in two ways: (1) first, insofar as
they are the common principles of all things,
and (2) second insofar as they are beings in
their own right. But even though these first
principles are most evident in themselves, our
intellect regards them as the eye of an owl
does the light of the sun, as the Metaphysics
says. We can reach them by the light of natural
ea nisi secundum quod per effectus in ea
ducimur; et hoc modo philosophi in ea
pervenerunt, quod patet Rom. 1: invisibilia
Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta
conspiciuntur. Unde et huiusmodi res
divinae non tractantur a philosophis, nisi
prout sunt rerum omnium principia. Et ideo
pertractantur in illa doctrina, in qua ponuntur
ea quae sunt communia omnibus entibus,
quae habet subiectum ens in quantum est
ens; et haec scientia apud eos scientia
divina dicitur.
reason only to the extent that their effects
reveal them to us. It was in this way that the
philosophers came to know them as is clear
from the Epistle to the Romans: The invisible
things of God... are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made.
Philosophers, then, study these divine beings
only insofar as they are the principles of all
things. Consequently, they are the objects of
the science that investigates what is common
to all beings, which has for its subject being as
being. The philosophers call this divine
science.
Est autem alius modus cognoscendi
huiusmodi res, non secundum quod per
effectus manifestantur, sed secundum quod
ipsae se ipsas manifestant. Et hunc modum
ponit apostolus 1 Cor. 2: quae sunt Dei,
nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei. Nos autem non
spiritum huius mundi accepimus, sed
spiritum qui a Deo est, ut sciamus. Et
ibidem: nobis autem revelavit Deus per
spiritum suum. Et per hunc modum tractantur
res divinae, secundum quod in se ipsis
subsistunt et non solum prout sunt rerum
principia.
There is, however, another way of knowing
beings of this kind, (a) not as their effects
reveal them, but (b) as they reveal themselves.
The Apostle mentions this way in his First
Epistle to the Corinthians: So the things also
that are of God no man knows, but the Spirit of
God. Now we have received not the spirit of
this world, but the Spirit that is of God, that we
may understand. And again, But to us God
has revealed them by his Spirit. In this way
we consider divine beings as they subsist in
themselves and not only inasmuch as they are
the principles of things.
Sic ergo theologia sive scientia divina est Accordingly, there are two kinds of theology or
duplex. Una, in qua considerantur res
divinae non tamquam subiectum scientiae,
sed tamquam principia subiecti, et talis est
theologia, quam philosophi prosequuntur,
quae alio nomine metaphysica dicitur. Alia
vero, quae ipsas res divinas considerat
propter se ipsas ut subiectum scientiae et
haec est theologia, quae in sacra Scriptura
traditur.
divine science. (1) There is one that treats of
divine things, not as the subject of the science
but as the principles of the subject. This is
the kind of theology pursued by the
philosophers and that is also called
metaphysics. (2) There is another theology,
however, that investigates divine things for
their own sakes as the subject of the
science. This is the theology taught in Sacred
Scripture.
Utraque autem est de his quae sunt
separata a materia et motu secundum esse,
sed diversimode, secundum quod dupliciter
potest esse aliquid a materia et motu
separatum secundum esse. Uno modo sic,
quod de ratione ipsius rei, quae separata
dicitur, sit quod nullo modo in materia et
motu esse possit, sicut Deus et Angeli
dicuntur a materia et motu separati. Alio
modo sic, quod non sit de ratione eius quod
sit in materia et motu, sed possit esse sine
materia et motu, quamvis quandoque
inveniatur in materia et motu. Et sic ens et
substantia et potentia et actus sunt separata
a materia et motu, quia secundum esse a
materia et motu non dependent, sicut
mathematica dependebant, quae numquam
nisi in materia esse possunt, quamvis sine
Both treat of beings that exist separate from
matter and motion, but with a difference, for
something can exist separate from matter and
motion in two distinct ways: (1) first, because
by its nature the thing that is called separate in
no way can exist in matter and motion, as God
and the angels are said to be separate from
matter and motion. (2) Second, because by its
nature it does not exist in matter and motion;
but it can exist without them, though we
sometimes find it with them. In this way being,
substance, potency, and act are separate
from matter and motion, because they do not
depend on them for their existence, unlike the
objects of mathematics, which can only exist
in matter, though they can be understood
without sensible matter.
materia sensibili possint intelligi.
Theologia ergo philosophica determinat de
separatis secundo modo sicut de subiectis,
de separatis autem primo modo sicut de
principiis subiecti. Theologia vero sacrae
Scripturae tractat de separatis primo modo
sicut de subiectis, quamvis in ea tractentur
aliqua quae sunt in materia et motu,
secundum quod requirit rerum divinarum
manifestatio.
Thus philosophical theology investigates
beings separate in the second sense as its
subjects, and beings separate in the first
sense as the principles of its subject. But the
theology of Sacred Scripture treats of beings
separate in the first sense as its subjects,
though it concerns some items in matter and
motion insofar as this is needed to throw light
on divine things.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa, quae
non assumuntur in scientia nisi ad alterius
manifestationem, non pertinent per se ad
scientiam, sed quasi per accidens. Sic enim
in naturalibus quaedam mathematica
assumuntur, et per hunc modum nihil
prohibet in scientia divina esse quaedam
quae sunt in materia et motu.
Reply to 1. When something is incorporated
into a science only to throw light on something
else, it does not belong to the science
essentially, but, in a way, incidentally, as some
mathematics are incorporated into the natural
sciences. In this way nothing prevents some
things in matter and motion being in divine
science.
Ad secundum dicendum quod moveri non
attribuitur Deo proprie, sed quasi
metaphorice, et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo,
secundum quod improprie operatio
intellectus vel voluntatis motus dicitur, et
Reply to 2. We do not attribute motion to God
properly, but by a kind of metaphor, and this in
two ways, first, according as the operation of
the intellect or will is improperly called motion;
and in this way a person is said to move
secundum hoc dicitur aliquis movere se
ipsum, quando intelligit vel diligit se. Et per
hunc modum potest verificari dictum
Platonis qui dixit quod primus motor movet
se ipsum, quia scilicet intelligit et diligit se,
ut Commentator dicit in VIII physicorum. Alio
modo, secundum quod ipse effluxus
causatorum a suis causis nominari potest
processio sive motus quidam causae in
causatum, in quantum in ipso effectu
relinquitur similitudo causae, et sic causa,
quae prius erat in se ipsa, postmodum fit in
effectu per suam similitudinem. Et hoc modo
Deus, qui similitudinem suam omnibus
creaturis impartitus est, quantum ad aliquid
dicitur per omnia moveri vel ad omnia
procedere, quo modo loquendi utitur
frequenter Dionysius. Et secundum hunc
etiam modum videtur intelligi quod dicitur
Sap. 7 quod omnium mobilium mobilior est
sapientia et quod attingit a fine usque ad
finem fortiter. Hoc autem non est proprie
moveri, et ideo ratio non sequitur.
himself when he knows or loves himself. In this
sense, as the Commentator says, the
statement of Plato is true, that the First Mover
moves himself because he knows and loves
himself. Second, according as the flowing
forth of effects From their causes can be
called a procession or motion of cause to
effect insofar as the likeness of the cause is
left in the effect itself; and so the cause, which
previously existed in itself, afterward comes to
be in the effect through its likeness. And in this
way God, who has communicated his likeness
to all creatures, in a certain respect is said to
be moved by all of them or to go forward to all
things. Dionysius frequently uses this manner
of speaking. This also seems to be the
meaning of the statement in Wisdom, that
Wisdom is more mobile than all mobile
things, and that She reaches from end to end
mightily. However, this is not motion in the
proper sense the term, and so the argument
does not follow.
Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia divina,
quae est per inspirationem divinam
accepta, non est de Angelis sicut de
subiecto, sed solum sicut de his, quae
assumuntur ad manifestationem subiecti.
Reply to 3. Divine science received through
divine inspiration does not treat of the angels
as its subject, but only as something
incorporated into the science to throw light on
its subject. For Sacred Scripture treats of the
Sic enim in sacra Scriptura agitur de
Angelis sicut et de ceteris creaturis. Sed in
scientia divina, quam philosophi tradunt,
consideratur de Angelis, quos intelligentias
vocant, eadem ratione qua et de prima
causa, quae Deus est, in quantum ipsi etiam
sunt rerum principia secunda, saltem per
motum orbium, quibus quidem nullus motus
physicus accidere potest. Motus autem, qui
est secundum electionem, reducitur ad illum
modum, quo actus intellectus vel voluntatis
motus dicitur, quod est improprie dictum
motu pro operatione sumpto. Motus etiam,
quo dicuntur secundum locum moveri, non
est secundum circumscriptionem localem,
sed secundum operationem, quam exercent
in hoc vel in illo loco, aut secundum aliquam
aliam habitudinem, quam habent ad locum,
omnino aequivocam ab illa habitudine,
quam habet corpus locatum ad locum. Et
ideo patet quod eis non convenit motus,
secundum quod naturalia in motu esse
dicuntur.
angels just as it does other creatures. In the
divine science taught by the philosophers,
however, the angels, which they call
Intelligences, are considered from the same
point of view as the First Cause or God,
insofar as they are also secondary principles
of things, at least through the movement of the
spheres, though the angels themselves are
subject to no physical motion. Moreover,
motion with respect to choice is reducible to
the sense in which the act of the intellect or will
is called motion, which is an improper sense
of the term, motion being understood as
operation. Further, when angels are said to
move in place, their motion is not with
reference to enclosure in place but with
reference to the activity they exercise in this or
that place, or with reference to some other
relation they have to place, Although that
relation is absolutely equivocal to that which a
localized body has to place. So it is clear that
they do not move in the sense in which we say
natural things move.
Ad quartum dicendum quod actus et
potentia sunt communiora quam materia et
forma; et ideo in Angelis, etsi non inveniatur
compositio formae et materiae, potest
tamen inveniri in eis potentia et actus.
Reply to 4. Act and potency are more
common than matter and form. Therefore,
even though we do not find the composition of
form and matter in the angels we can still find
potency and act in them. For matter and form
Materia enim et forma sunt partes compositi
ex materia et forma, et ideo in illis tantum
invenitur compositio materiae et formae,
quorum una pars se habet ad aliam ut
potentia ad actum. Quod autem potest esse,
potest et non esse; et ideo possibile est
unam partem inveniri cum alia et sine alia, et
ideo compositio materiae et formae non
invenitur secundum Commentatorem in I
caeli et mundi et in VIII metaphysicae nisi in
his quae sunt per naturam corruptibilia. Nec
obstat quod aliquod accidens in aliquo
subiecto perpetuo conservetur, sicut figura
in caelo, cum tamen corpus caeleste
impossibile sit esse sine tali figura et omnia
accidentia consequuntur substantiam sicut
causam, et ideo subiectum se habet ad
accidentia non solum ut potentia passiva,
sed etiam quodammodo ut potentia activa,
et ideo aliqua accidentia naturaliter
perpetuantur in suis subiectis. Materia
autem non est hoc modo causa formae, et
ideo omnis materia, quae subest alicui
formae, potest etiam non subesse, nisi
fortassis a causa extrinseca contineatur;
sicut virtute divina ponimus aliqua corpora
etiam ex contrariis composita esse
incorruptibilia, ut corpora resurgentium.
are parts of a thing composed of matter and
form; and so we find the composition of matter
and form only in things with parts, one of which
is related to the other as potency to act. Now
what can be, can also not be; and so one part
can be found with or without the other; and
therefore, as the Commentator says, we find
the composition of matter and form only in
those things that are by nature corruptible. Nor
is the objection valid, that an accident may be
eternally conserved in a subject, like shape in
the heavens. For a heavenly body cannot exist
without such a shape, since shape and all
accidents in general follow upon substance as
their cause. So a subject is related to its
accidents not only as passive potency, but
also in a way as an active power; and for this
reason some accidents are naturally
conserved forever in their subjects. But matter
is not the cause of form in this way; and
therefore all matter subject to form can cease
to be subject to it, unless perhaps an extrinsic
cause preserves it; thus we maintain that by
the divine power even some bodies
composed of contraries, like the bodies of
those arisen from the dead, are incorruptible.
Essentia autem Angeli secundum naturam
suam incorruptibilis est, et ideo non est in
ea compositio formae et materiae. Sed quia
non habet esse a se ipso Angelus, ideo se
habet in potentia ad esse quod accipit a
Deo, et sic esse a Deo acceptum
comparatur ad essentiam eius simplicem ut
actus ad potentiam. Et hoc est quod dicitur
quod sunt compositi ex quod est et quo est,
ut ipsum esse intelligatur quo est, ipsa vero
natura Angeli intelligatur quod est. Tamen si
ex materia et forma Angeli compositi
essent, non tamen ex materia sensibili, a
qua oportet et mathematica abstracta esse
et metaphysica separata.
Now, since the essence of an angel is
incorruptible by its nature, it is not composed
of form and matter. But an angel does not
exist of himself, and so he is potential to the
being (esse) he receives from God.
Consequently, the being (esse) received from
God is related to his simple essence as act to
potency. This is what is meant by saying that
angels are composed of what they are (quod
est) and that by which they are (quo est);
being (esse) is understood as that by which
they are and the angelic nature as what they
are. However, even if angels were composed
of matter and form, they would not be
composed of sensible matter, from which both
the objects of mathematics must be
abstracted and those of metaphysics must be
separated.
Ad quintum dicendum quod ens et
substantia dicuntur separata a materia et
motu non per hoc quod de ratione ipsorum
sit esse sine materia et motu, sicut de
ratione asini est sine ratione esse, sed per
hoc quod de ratione eorum non est esse in
materia et motu, quamvis quandoque sint in
materia et motu, sicut animal abstrahit a
ratione, quamvis aliquod animal sit
rationale.
Reply to 5. We say that being and substance
are separate from matter and motion not
because it is of their nature to be without
them, as it is of the nature of ass to be without
reason, but because it is not of their nature to
be in matter and motion, Although sometimes
they are in matter and motion, as animal
abstracts from reason, Although some
animals are rational.
Ad sextum dicendum quod metaphysicus
considerat etiam de singularibus entibus
non secundum proprias rationes, per quas
sunt tale vel tale ens, sed secundum quod
participant communem rationem entis, et sic
etiam pertinet ad eius considerationem
materia et motus.
Reply to 6. The metaphysician deals with
individual beings too, not with regard to their
special natures, in virtue of which they are
special kinds of being, but insofar as they
share the common character of being. And in
this way matter and motion also fall under his
consideration.
Ad septimum dicendum quod agere et pati
non convenit entibus secundum quod sunt in
consideratione, sed secundum quod sunt in
esse. Mathematicus autem considerat res
abstractas secundum considerationem
tantum, et ideo illae res, prout cadunt in
consideratione mathematici, non convenit
esse principium et finis motus, et ideo
mathematicus non demonstrat per causas
efficientem et finalem. Res autem, quas
considerat divinus, sunt separatae
exsistentes in rerum natura, tales quae
possunt esse principium et finis motus; unde
nihil prohibet quin per causas efficientem et
finalem demonstret.
Reply to 7. Action and passion do not belong
to things as they exist in thought but as they
exist in reality. Now since the mathematician
deals with things that are abstract only in
thought, insofar as they come under his
consideration they cannot be the principle or
the end of motion. So the mathematician does
not demonstrate by means of efficient and
final causes. But the things the metaphysician
deals with are separate, existing in reality, and
these can be the principle and end of motion.
So nothing prevents his demonstrating by
means of efficient and final causes.
Ad octavum dicendum quod sicut fides,
quae est quasi habitus principiorum
theologiae, habet pro obiecto ipsam
veritatem primam et tamen quaedam alia ad
Reply to 8. Just as faith, which is in a way the
habit of the principles of theology, has for its
object the First Truth itself, and yet the articles
of faith contain certain other things relating to
creaturas pertinentia in articulis fidei
continentur, in quantum contingunt aliquo
modo veritatem primam, per eundem
modum theologia est principaliter de Deo
sicut de subiecto, de creaturis autem multa
assumit ut effectus eius vel quomodolibet
habentia habitudinem ad ipsum.
creatures insofar as they have some
connection with the First Truth, in the same
way theology is primarily concerned with God
as its subject, but it includes many things
about creatures as his effects, or as being in
some way related to him.
Quaestio 6.
Prooemium
QUESTION SIX
THE METHODS OF SPECULATIVE SCIENCE
Deinde quaeritur de modis quos
scientiis speculativis attribuit. Et circa
hoc quaeruntur quattuor.
1. Primo. Utrum oporteat versari in
naturalibus rationabiliter, in
mathematicis disciplinabiliter, in
divinis intellectualiter.
2. Secundo. Utrum in divinis sit
omnino imaginatio relinquenda.
3. Tertio. Utrum intellectus noster
possit ipsam formam divinam
inspicere.
4. Quarto. Utrum hoc possit fieri per
viam alicuius scientiae
speculativae.
The next question concerns the methods ascribed
by Boethius to the speculative sciences. There
are four points of inquiry in this connection:
1. Must we proceed according to the mode of
reason in natural science, according to the
mode of learning in mathematics, and
according to the mode of intellect in divine
science?
2. Should we entirely abandon the imagination
in divine science?
3. Can our intellect behold the divine form
itself?
4. Can our intellect behold the divine form by
means of some speculative science?
ARTICLE ONE
Must we proceed according to the Mode of Reason in Natural Science,
according to the Mode of Learning in Mathematics,
and according to the Mode of Intellect in Divine Science?
(a)
non oporteat in naturalibus rationabiliter
versari.
On the first point we proceed as follows: It
seems that we must no proceed according to the
mode of reason in natural science, for:
Philosophia enim rationalis contra
naturalem dividitur. Sed rationabiliter
procedere videtur proprie ad rationalem
pertinere. Ergo non competenter
attribuitur naturali.
1. Rational philosophy is contra-distinguished
from natural philosophy. But it seems to belong
properly to rational philosophy to proceed
according to the mode of reason. So this method
is not appropriately ascribed to natural
philosophy.
Praeterea, philosophus frequenter in
libro physicorum distinguit processus ad
aliquas conclusiones rationales et
physicas. Ergo non est proprium naturali
scientiae rationabiliter procedere.
2. Again, in the Physics the Philosopher
frequently distinguishes between the methods of
arriving at rational conclusions and physical
conclusions. Therefore it is not the special
characteristic of natural science to proceed
rationally.
Praeterea, illud, quod est commune
omnibus scientiis, non debet uni
3. Again, what is common to all the sciences
should not be reserved to one. But every science
appropriari. Sed quaelibet scientia
ratiocinando procedit discurrendo vel ex
effectibus in causas vel ex causis in
effectus vel ex aliquibus signis. Ergo non
debet naturali appropriari.
proceeds by reasoning, advancing from effects to
causes or from causes to effects or from certain
signs So this method should not be reserved to
natural science.
Praeterea, ratiocinativum in VI
Ethicorum contra scientificum
distinguitur a philosopho. Sed
philosophia naturalis ad scientificum
pertinet. Ergo non convenienter
attribuitur ei rationabiliter procedere.
4. Again, in the Ethics the Philosopher
distinguishes the reasoning part of the soul from
the scientific part. But natural philosophy belongs
to the scientific part. Therefore it is not
appropriately said to proceed according to the
mode of reason.
Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de
spiritu et anima quod ratio circa formas
corporum versatur. Sed considerare
corpora maxime pertinet ad naturalem.
Ergo convenienter attribuitur ei
rationabiliter procedere.
On the contrary, the De Spiritu et Anima says
that reason is concerned with the forms of bodies.
Now it belongs most especially to natural
philosophy to consider bodies. Therefore the
rational method is appropriately attributed to it.
Praeterea, in V de consolatione
Boethius dicit: ratio cum quid universale
respicit, nec imaginatione nec sensu
utens imaginabilia tamen et sensibilia
comprehendit. Sed imaginabilia et
sensibilia comprehendere ad solum
naturalem pertinet. Ergo rationalis
processus convenienter naturali
Moreover, Boethius says: When reason
contemplates some universal nature, using neither
imagination nor sense, it nevertheless
comprehends imaginable and sensible things.
Now it belongs to the natural philosopher alone to
comprehend what is imaginable and sensible.
Therefore the rational method is suitably attributed
to natural philosophy.
attribuitur.
(b)
Ulterius videtur quod inconvenienter
dicatur mathematica disciplinabiliter
procedere.
In the second place, it seems inappropriate to
say that mathematics proceeds according to the
mode of learning, for:
Disciplina enim nihil aliud esse videtur
quam acceptio scientiae. Sed in
qualibet parte philosophiae accipitur
scientia, quia omnes demonstrative
procedunt. Ergo procedere
disciplinaliter est commune omnibus
partibus philosophiae, et ita non debet
appropriari mathematicae.
1. Learning seems to be nothing else than the
receiving knowledge. But we receive scientific
knowledge in all branches of philosophy, because
all proceed by means of demonstration. So it is
common to all parts of philosophy to proceed
according to the mode of learning; and so this
procedure should not be made exclusive to
mathematics.
Praeterea, quanto est aliquid certius,
tanto facilius esse videtur, ut de eo sit
disciplina. Sed naturalia sunt certiora, ut
videtur, quam mathematica, quia
capiuntur sensu, a quo omnis nostra
cognitio ortum habet. Ergo hic modus
magis competit naturali quam
mathematico.
2. Again, the more certain something is, the
easier it seems to learn it. But natural things seem
to be more certain than mathematics because
they are apprehended by the senses, from which
all our knowledge takes its origin. Therefore this
method belongs to the natural philosopher rather
than to the mathematician.
Praeterea, ut dicitur in V metaphysicae,
initium in scientiis est, a quo fit facilior
3. Again, as the Metaphysics says, in the
sciences we begin at the point from which we
disciplina. Sed initium addiscendi
accipitur a logica, quam oportet
praeaddiscere mathematicae et
omnibus aliis. Ergo disciplinalis modus
magis convenit logicae quam aliis.
learn more easily. But learning begins with logic,
which must be mastered before mathematics and
all the other sciences. Therefore it belongs to
logic rather than to the other sciences to proceed
according to the mode of learning.
Praeterea, modus naturalis scientiae et
divinae assumitur a potentiis animae,
scilicet a ratione et intellectu. Ergo
similiter et modus mathematicae ab
aliqua animae potentia sumi deberet, et
sic non convenienter ponitur eius modus
disciplinabiliter versari.
4. Again, the methods of natural and divine
science are taken from powers of the soul, namely
from reason and intellect. Therefore in the same
way the method of mathematics ought to be taken
from some power of the soul. So it is not
appropriate to say that its method is to proceed
according to the mode of learning.
Sed contra, disciplinaliter procedere est
demonstrative procedere et per
certitudinem. Sed, sicut Ptolemaeus in
principio Almagesti dicit, solum
mathematicum genus, si quis huic
diligentiam exhibeat inquisitionis,
firmam stabilemque fidem intendentibus
notitiam dabit, velut demonstratione per
indubitabiles vias facta. Ergo
disciplinaliter procedere maxime
proprium est mathematici.
On the contrary, to proceed according to the
mode of learning is to proceed by demonstration
and with certitude. But as Ptolemy says,
Mathematics alone, if one applies himself
diligently to it, will give the inquirer after
knowledge firm and unshaken certitude by
demonstrations carried out with unquestionable
methods. Therefore it is most characteristic of
mathematics to proceed according to the mode of
learning.
Praeterea, hoc patet per philosophum,
qui in pluribus locis suorum librorum
Moreover, this is evident from the Philosopher
who, in several places in his works, calls the
scientias mathematicas disciplinas
nominat.
mathematical sciences disciplines.
(c)
Ulterius videtur quod non sit conveniens
modus divinae scientiae intellectualiter
procedere.
In the third place, it seems that it is not
appropriate to divine science to proceed
according to the mode of intellect, for:
Intellectus enim secundum philosophum
est principiorum, scientia autem
conclusionum. Sed non omnia, quae in
scientia divina traduntur, sunt principia,
sed quaedam etiam conclusiones. Ergo
intellectualiter procedere non est
conveniens scientiae divinae.
1. According to the Philosopher, there is
understanding (intellectus) of principles, whereas
there is science of conclusions. But principles
alone are not considered in divine science; some
conclusions are also considered. Therefore to
proceed according to the mode of intellect is not
appropriate to divine science.
Praeterea, in illis, quae omnem
intellectum excedunt, intellectualiter
versari non possumus. Sed divina
excedunt omnem intellectum, ut
Dionysius dicit 1 c. de divinis nominibus
et philosophus in libro de causis. Ergo
intellectualiter tractari non possunt.
2. Again, we cannot proceed intellectually with
regard to those things that transcend every
intellect. But divine things transcend every
intellect, as Dionysius and the Philosopher say.
Therefore they cannot be dealt with intellectually.
Praeterea, Dionysius dicit 7 c. de divinis
nominibus quod Angeli habent
intellectualem virtutem, in quantum
3. Again, Dionysius says that angels have
intellectual power inasmuch as they do not gather
their divine knowledge from what is sensible and
divinam cognitionem non congregant a
sensibilibus aut a rebus divisis. Sed hoc
est supra animae potestatem, ut ibidem
subditur. Cum ergo divina scientia, de
qua nunc agitur, sit scientia humanae
animae, videtur quod non sit proprius
modus eius intellectualiter tractare.
divided; but, as he adds, this is beyond the power
of the soul. Therefore, since the divine science
that is now under discussion is a science
belonging to the human soul, it appears that its
proper method is not to proceed intellectually.
Praeterea, theologia praecipue videtur
esse de his, quae fidei sunt. Sed in his,
quae fidei sunt, intelligere est finis. Unde
dicitur Is. 7 secundum aliam litteram: nisi
credideritis, non intelligetis. Ergo
intellectualiter versari circa divina non
debet poni theologiae modus, sed finis.
4. Again, theology seems particularly concerned
with the things of faith. But understanding
(intelligere) is the goal of the things of faith. Thus
it is said in Isaiah, according to another version,
Unless you believe, you will not understand. So
we should not say that proceeding intellectually
about divine things is the method of theology but
the goal.
Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de
spiritu et anima quod intellectus est
spirituum creatorum, intelligentia vero
ipsius Dei. De his autem praecipue est
scientia divina. Ergo intellectualiter
procedere videtur esse ipsius proprium.
On the contrary, the De Spiritu et Anima says
that intellect (intellectus) has for its object created
spirits, while understanding (intelligentia) has for
its object God himself. Now divine science is
principally concerned with them. Therefore it
seems proper to it to proceed intellectually.
Praeterea, modus scientiae debet
respondere materiae. Sed res divinae
sunt res intelligibiles per se ipsas. Ergo
modus conveniens divinae scientiae est
Moreover, the method of a science must
correspond to its subject matter. But divine things
are intelligible in virtue of themselves. Therefore
the method appropriate to divine science is to
intellectualiter procedere. proceed intellectually.
Responsio. Dicendum ad primam
quaestionem quod processus aliquis,
quo proceditur in scientiis, dicitur
rationabilis tripliciter.
Reply: To the first question (a) I reply that a
method of proceeding in the sciences is called
rational in three ways:
Uno modo ex parte principiorum, ex
quibus proceditur, ut cum aliquis
procedit ad aliquid probandum ex
operibus rationis, cuiusmodi sunt genus
et species et oppositum et huiusmodi
intentiones, quas logici considerant. Et
sic dicetur aliquis processus esse
rationabilis, quando aliquis utitur in
aliqua scientia propositionibus, quae
traduntur in logica, prout scilicet utimur
logica, prout est docens, in aliis
scientiis. Sed hic modus procedendi
non potest proprie competere alicui
particulari scientiae, in quibus peccatum
accidit, nisi ex propriis procedatur.
Contingit autem hoc proprie et
convenienter fieri in logica et
metaphysica, eo quod utraque scientia
communis est et circa idem subiectum
quodammodo.
In one way, because of the principles from which
we begin; for instance, when we proceed to prove
something beginning with mental beings, like
genus, species, opposite, and concepts of this
sort, which the logicians study. In this sense a
method will be called rational when in a science
we use the propositions taught in logic; namely,
when we use logic as having a teaching function
in the other sciences. But this method of
proceeding cannot belong properly to any
particular science: it will fall into error unless it
proceeds from its own proper principles.
However, logic and metaphysics may properly
and suitably use this method, because both are
universal sciences and in a sense treat of the
same subject.
Alio modo dicitur processus rationalis ex
termino in quo sistitur procedendo.
Ultimus enim terminus, ad quem rationis
inquisitio perducere debet, est
intellectus principiorum, in quae
resolvendo iudicamus; quod quidem
quando fit non dicitur processus vel
probatio rationabilis, sed demonstrativa.
Quandoque autem inquisitio rationis non
potest usque ad praedictum terminum
perduci, sed sistitur in ipsa inquisitione,
quando scilicet inquirenti adhuc manet
via ad utrumlibet; et hoc contingit,
quando per probabiles rationes
proceditur, quae natae sunt facere
opinionem vel fidem, non scientiam. Et
sic rationabilis processus dividitur
contra demonstrativum. Et hoc modo
rationabiliter procedi potest in qualibet
scientia, ut ex probabilibus paretur via
ad necessarias probationes. Et hic est
alius modus, quo logica utimur in
scientiis demonstrativis, non quidem ut
est docens, sed ut est utens. Et his
duobus modis denominatur processus
rationalis a scientia rationali; his enim
modis usitatur logica, quae rationalis
scientia dicitur, in scientiis
demonstrativis, ut dicit Commentator in I
physicorum.
In a second way, a method is called rational
because of the end that terminates the thinking
process. (1) For the ultimate end that rational
inquiry ought to reach is the understanding of
principles, in which we resolve our judgments.
And when this takes place, it is not called a
rational procedure or proof but a demonstration.
(2) Sometimes, however, rational inquiry, cannot
arrive at the ultimate end, but stops in the course
of the investigation itself; that is to say, when
several possible solutions still remain open to the
investigator. This happens when we proceed by
means of probable arguments, which by their
nature produce opinion or belief, but not science.
In this sense, rational method is opposed to
demonstrative method. We can proceed by this
rational method in all the sciences, preparing the
way for necessary, proofs by probable arguments.
This is another use of logic in the demonstrative
sciences; not indeed as having a teaching
function, but as being an instrument. In these two
ways, then, a method is called rational from
rational science, for, as the Commentator says, in
both of them logic (which is another name for
rational science) is used in the demonstrative
sciences.
physicorum.
Tertio modo dicitur aliquis processus
rationalis a potentia rationali, in quantum
scilicet in procedendo sequimur
proprium modum animae rationalis in
cognoscendo, et sic rationabilis
processus est proprius scientiae
naturalis. Scientia enim naturalis in suis
processibus servat proprium modum
rationalis animae quantum ad duo.
Primo quantum ad hoc, quod sicut
anima rationalis a sensibilibus, quae
sunt nota magis quoad nos, accipit
cognitionem intelligibilium, quae sunt
magis nota secundum naturam, ita
scientia naturalis procedit ex his, quae
sunt nota magis quoad nos et minus
nota secundum naturam, ut patet in I
physicorum, et demonstratio, quae est
per signum vel effectum, maxime usitatur
in scientia naturali. Secundo, quia cum
rationis sit de uno in aliud discurrere,
hoc maxime in scientia naturali
observatur, ubi ex cognitione unius rei in
cognitionem alterius devenitur, sicut ex
cognitione effectus in cognitionem
causae. Et non solum proceditur ab uno
in aliud secundum rationem, quod non
est aliud secundum rem, sicut si ab
In a third way, a method is called rational from the
rational power, that is, inasmuch as in our
procedure we follow the manner proper to the
rational soul in knowing, and in this sense the
rational method is proper to natural science. For
in its procedures natural science keeps the
characteristic method of the rational soul in two
ways. (1) First, in this respect, that just as the
rational soul receives from sensible things (which
are more knowable relatively to us) knowledge of
intelligible things (which are more knowable in
their nature), so natural science proceeds from
what is better known to us and less knowable in
its own nature. This is evident in the Physics.
Moreover, demonstration by means of a sign or
an effect is used especially in natural science. (2)
Secondly, natural science uses a rational method
in this respect, that it is characteristic of reason to
move from one thing to another; and this
method is observed particularly in natural science,
where we go from the knowledge of one thing to
the knowledge of another; for example, from the
knowledge of an effect to the knowledge of its
cause. (a) And the procedure in natural science is
not only a movement from one thing to another
distinct from it in the mind and not in reality, as
when we go from the concept animal to the
concept man. In the mathematical sciences we
animali procedatur ad hominem. In
scientiis enim mathematicis proceditur
per ea tantum, quae sunt de essentia
rei, cum demonstrent solum per causam
formalem; et ideo non demonstratur in
eis aliquid de una re per aliam rem, sed
per propriam diffinitionem illius rei. Etsi
enim aliquae demonstrationes dentur de
circulo ex triangulo vel e converso, hoc
non est nisi in quantum in circulo est
potentia triangulus et e converso. Sed in
scientia naturali, in qua fit demonstratio
per causas extrinsecas, probatur aliquid
de una re per aliam rem omnino
extrinsecam. Et ita modus rationis
maxime in scientia naturali observatur,
et propter hoc scientia naturalis inter
alias est maxime hominis intellectui
conformis. Attribuitur ergo rationabiliter
procedere scientiae naturali, non quia ei
soli conveniat, sed quia ei praecipue
competit.
proceed only by means of what is of the essence
of a thing, since they demonstrate only through a
formal cause. In these sciences, therefore, we do
not demonstrate something about one thing
through another thing, but through the proper
definition of that thing. It is true that some
demonstrations about the circle are made by
means of the triangle or vice versa, but this is only
because the triangle is potentially in the circle and
vice versa. (b) But in natural science, where
demonstration takes place through extrinsic
causes, something is proved of one thing through
another thing entirely external to it. So the method
of reason is particularly observed in natural
science; and on this account natural science
among all the others is most in conformity with the
human intellect. Consequently, we say that natural
science proceeds rationally, not because this is
true of it alone, but because it is especially
characteristic of it.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio
illa procedit de processu, qui dicitur
rationabilis secundum primum modum.
Sic enim processus rationabilis est
Reply to 1. That argument is based on the
method that is called rational in the first way. In
this sense a rational method is proper to rational
and divine science, but not to natural science.
proprius rationali scientiae et divinae,
non autem naturali.
Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa
procedit de processu, qui dicitur
rationabilis secundo modo.
Reply to 2. That argument is based on the
method that is called rational in the second way.
Ad tertium dicendum quod in omnibus
scientiis servatur quantum ad hoc
modus rationis, quod proceditur de uno
in aliud secundum rationem, non autem
quod procedatur de una re in aliam, sed
hoc est proprium naturalis scientiae. Et
sic ei rationabiliter procedere attribuitur,
ut dictum est.
Reply to 3. The method of reason is observed in
all the sciences insofar as they proceed from one
item to another that is mentally distinct from it, but
not in the sense that they go from one thing to
another thing. As has been said, that is proper to
natural science.
Ad quartum dicendum quod philosophus
ibi pro eodem ponit ratiocinativum et
opinativum, unde patet quod pertinet ad
secundum modum assignatum.
Ratiocinativo autem vel opinativo
attribuit philosophus ibidem agibilia
humana, de quibus est scientia moralis,
ratione suae contingentiae. Unde potest
ex dictis colligi quod primus modus
rationabilitatis est maxime proprius
scientiae rationali, secundus scientiae
morali, tertius scientiae naturali.
Reply to 4. In that place the Philosopher
considers the reasoning and deliberative parts of
the soul to be identical: so it is clear that they are
related to the second mode of rational procedure
mentioned above. In the same place, moreover,
because of their contingency he assigns human
actions, which are the objects of moral science, to
the reasoning or deliberative part of the soul.
From what has been said, then, we can gather
that the first mode of rationality is most
characteristic of rational science, the second of
moral science, and the third of natural science.
Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum
quod disciplinaliter procedere attribuitur
scientiae mathematicae, non quia ipsa
sola disciplinaliter procedat, sed quia
hoc ei praecipue competit. Cum enim
discere nihil sit aliud quam ab alio
scientiam accipere, tunc dicimur
disciplinabiliter procedere, quando
processus noster ad certam
cognitionem perducit, quae scientia
dicitur; quod quidem maxime contingit in
mathematicis scientiis. Cum enim
mathematica sit media inter naturalem
et divinam, ipsa est utraque certior.
To the second question (b) I reply that
mathematical science is said to proceed
according to the mode of learning, not because it
alone does so, but because this is especially
characteristic of it. For, since learning is nothing
else than the taking of knowledge from another,
we are said to proceed according to the mode of
learning when our procedure leads to certain
knowledge, which is called science. Now this
occurs particularly in the mathematical sciences.
Because mathematics is situated between natural
and divine science, it is more certain than either.
Naturali quidem propter hoc quod eius
consideratio est a motu et materia
absoluta, cum naturalis consideratio in
materia et motu versetur. Ex hoc autem
quod consideratio naturalis est circa
materiam, eius cognitio a pluribus
dependet, scilicet ex consideratione
materiae ipsius et formae et
dispositionum materialium et
proprietatum quae consequuntur formam
in materia. Ubicumque autem ad aliquid
It is more certain than natural science because its
investigation is not bound up with motion and
matter, while the investigation of natural science
centers upon matter and motion. Now from the
very fact that natural science deals with matter, its
knowledge depends upon many factors, upon the
consideration of matter itself, of form, and of the
material dispositions and properties
accompanying form in matter. And whenever
there are many factors to be considered in order
to know something, knowledge is more difficult.
cognoscendum oportet plura
considerare, est difficilior cognitio; unde
in I posteriorum dicitur quod minus certa
scientia est quae est ex additione, ut
geometria arithmetica. Ex hoc vero quod
eius consideratio est circa res mobiles
et quae non uniformiter se habent, eius
cognitio est minus firma, quia eius
demonstrationes frequenter procedunt,
ut in maiori parte, ex hoc quod contingit
aliquando aliter se habere. Et ideo
etiam quanto aliqua scientia magis
appropinquat ad singularia, sicut
scientiae operativae, ut medicina,
alchimia et moralis, minus possunt
habere de certitudine propter
multitudinem eorum quae consideranda
sunt in talibus scientiis, quorum
quodlibet si omittatur, sequetur error, et
propter eorum variabilitatem.
Thus the Posterior Analytics says that a science
is less certain that results from adding on some
item, as geometry adds something to arithmetic. If
the inquiry in a science is about things that are
mobile and lack uniformity, its knowledge is less
exact because its demonstrations are often valid
only in the majority of cases, owing to the fact that
things sometimes happen differently. So, too, the
more a science draws close to particulars (as do
practical sciences like medicine, alchemy, and
ethics), the less certain they can be because of
the many factors to be taken into account in these
sciences, the omission of any one of which will
lead to error, and also because of their variability.
Est etiam processus mathematicae
certior quam processus scientiae
divinae, quia ea, de quibus est scientia
divina, sunt magis a sensibilibus remota,
a quibus nostra cognitio initium sumit, et
quantum ad substantias separatas, in
quarum cognitionem insufficienter
inducunt ea, quae a sensibilibus
The method of mathematics is also more certain
than the method of divine science, because the
objects of divine science are further removed from
sensible things, from which our knowledge takes
its origin. This is true both in the case of the
separate substances (to which our knowledge of
the sense world gives us inadequate access), and
also in the case of the principles common to all
accipimus, et quantum ad ea quae sunt
communia omnibus entibus, quae sunt
maxime universalia et sic maxime
remota a particularibus cadentibus sub
sensu. Mathematica autem ipsa in
sensu cadunt et imaginationi subiacent,
ut figura, linea et numerus et huiusmodi.
Et ideo intellectus humanus a
phantasmatibus accipiens facilius capit
horum cognitionem et certius quam
intelligentiae alicuius vel etiam quam
quiditatem substantiae et actum et
potentiam et alia huiusmodi.
things (which are most universal and therefore
furthest removed from the particular things falling
under the senses). But mathematical entities do
fall under the senses and they are objects of our
imagination; for example, figures, lines, numbers,
and the like. So the human intellect, which takes
its knowledge from images, knows these things
with greater ease and certainty than it does a
separate Intelligence, or even the nature of
substance, act, potency, and the like.
Et sic patet quod mathematica
consideratio est facilior et certior quam
naturalis et theologica, et multo plus
quam scientiae aliae operativae, et ideo
ipsa maxime dicitur disciplinaliter
procedere. Et hoc est quod Ptolemaeus
dicit in principio Almagesti: alia duo
genera theorici potius quis opinionem
quam conceptionem scientialem dicat:
theologicum quidem propter inapparens
ipsius et incomprehensibile, physicum
vero propter materiae instabile et
immanifestum. Solum autem
mathematicum inquisitionis firmam
stabilemque fidem intendentibus dabit,
It is clear, then, that mathematical inquiry, is
easier and more certain than physical and
theological, and much more so than that of the
other sciences that are practical, and for this
reason it is said especially to proceed according
to the mode of learning. This is what Ptolemy
asserts in the beginning of the Almagest: Let us
call the other two kinds of theoretical knowledge
opinion rather than science: theology because of
its obscurity and incomprehensibility, physics
because of the instability and obscurity of matter.
The mathematical type of investigation alone will
give the inquirer firm and unshaken certainty
through demonstrations carried out by
unquestionable methods.
velut utique demonstratione per
indubitabiles vias facta.
Replies to Opposing Arguments.
quamvis in qualibet scientia disciplina
accipiatur, tamen in mathematica
facilius et certius, ut dictum est.
Reply to 1. Although we learn in all the sciences,
nevertheless, as we have said, we do so with
greater ease and certitude in mathematics.
Ad secundum dicendum quod naturalia
quamvis sensui subiaceant, tamen
propter sui fluxibilitatem non habent
magnam certitudinem, cum extra
sensum fiunt, sicut habent mathematica,
quae sunt absque motu et tamen sunt in
materia sensibili secundum esse, et sic
sub sensu et imaginatione cadere
possunt.
Reply to 2. Natural things come under the
senses; but because of their instability when they
begin to exist in reality they do not have the great
certitude of the objects of mathematics. These
latter are not subject to change; and yet they exist
in sensible matter, and as such they can come
under the senses and imagination.
Ad tertium dicendum quod in
addiscendo incipimus ab eo quod est
magis facile, nisi necessitas aliud
requirat. Quandoque enim necessarium
est in addiscendo incipere non ab eo
quod est facilius, sed ab eo, a cuius
cognitione sequentium cognitio
dependet. Et hac ratione oportet in
Reply to 3. In learning we begin with what is
easier, unless necessity dictates otherwise. For
sometimes in learning it is necessary to start, not
with what is easier, but with that on which the
knowledge of subsequent matters depends. That
is why in acquiring knowledge we must begin with
logic, not because it is easier than other sciences
(for it involves the greatest difficulty, concerned as
addiscendo a logica incipere, non quia
ipsa sit facilior ceteris scientiis, habet
enim maximam difficultatem, cum sit de
secundo intellectis, sed quia aliae
scientiae ab ipsa dependent, in quantum
ipsa docet modum procedendi in
omnibus scientiis. Oportet autem primo
scire modum scientiae quam scientiam
ipsam, ut dicitur in II metaphysicae.
it is with second intentions), but because the
sciences depend on it inasmuch as it teaches the
method of proceeding in all the sciences. And, as
the Metaphysics says, we must know the method
of science before science itself.
Ad quartum dicendum quod a potentiis
animae sumitur modus scientiarum
propter modum quem habent potentiae
animae in agendo. Unde modi
scientiarum non respondent potentiis
animae, sed modis quibus potentiae
animae procedere possunt, qui non
solum diversificantur penes potentias
tantum, sed etiam penes obiecta; et sic
non oportet quod modus cuiuslibet
scientiae denominetur ab aliqua
potentia animae. Potest tamen dici quod
sicut modus physicae sumitur a ratione,
secundum quod a sensu accipit, modus
autem divinae scientiae ab intellectu,
secundum quod nude aliquid considerat,
ita etiam et modus mathematicae potest
sumi a ratione, secundum quod accipit
ab imaginatione.
Reply to 4. The method of the sciences is taken
from the powers of the soul because of the way in
which these powers operate. So the methods of
the sciences do not correspond to the souls
powers, but rather to the ways in which these
powers can operate, and these are diversified not
only according to the powers, but also according
to their objects. So it is not necessary that the
method of every science be named after a power
of the soul. However, we can say that just as the
method of physics is taken from reason inasmuch
as it gets its objects from the senses, and the
method of divine science is taken from the
intellect inasmuch as it understands something
purely and simply (nude), so also the method of
mathematics can be taken from reason inasmuch
as it obtains its objects from the imagination.
Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum quod
sicut rationabiliter procedere attribuitur
naturali philosophiae, eo quod in ipsa
maxime observatur modus rationis, ita
intellectualiter procedere attribuitur
divinae scientiae, eo quod in ipsa
maxime observatur modus intellectus.
Differt autem ratio ab intellectu, sicut
multitudo ab unitate. Unde dicit Boethius
in IV de consolatione quod similiter se
habent ratio ad intelligentiam et tempus
ad aeternitatem et circulus ad centrum.
Est enim rationis proprium circa multa
diffundi et ex eis unam simplicem
cognitionem colligere. Unde Dionysius
dicit 7 c. de divinis nominibus quod
animae secundum hoc habent
rationalitatem quod diffusive circueunt
exsistentium veritatem, et in hoc
deficiunt ab Angelis; sed in quantum
convolvunt multa ad unum, quodam
modo Angelis aequantur. Intellectus
autem e converso per prius unam et
simplicem veritatem considerat et in illa
totius multitudinis cognitionem capit,
sicut Deus intelligendo suam essentiam
To the third question (c) I reply that just as we
attribute the rational method to natural philosophy
because it adheres most closely to the method of
reason, so we attribute the intellectual method to
divine science because it adheres most closely
to the method of intellect. Now reason differs from
intellect as multitude does from unity. Thus
Boethius says that reasoning is related to
understanding as time to eternity and as a circle
to its center. For it is distinctive of reason to
disperse itself in the consideration of many things,
and then to gather one simple truth from them.
Thus Dionysius says, Souls have the power of
reasoning in that they approach the truth of things
from various angles, and in this respect they are
inferior to the angels; but inasmuch as they gather
a muItiplicity into unity they are in a way equal to
the angels. Conversely, intellect first
contemplates a truth one and undivided and in
that truth comprehends a whole multitude, as God,
by knowing his essence, knows all things. Thus
Dionysius says: Angelic minds have the power of
intellect in that they understand divine truths in a
unified way.
omnia cognoscit. Unde Dionysius
ibidem dicit quod angelicae mentes
habent intellectualitatem, in quantum
uniformiter intelligibilia divinorum
intelligunt.
Sic ergo patet quod rationalis
consideratio ad intellectualem terminatur
secundum viam resolutionis, in quantum
ratio ex multis colligit unam et simplicem
veritatem. Et rursum intellectualis
consideratio est principium rationalis
secundum viam compositionis vel
inventionis, in quantum intellectus in uno
multitudinem comprehendit. Illa ergo
consideratio, quae est terminus totius
humanae ratiocinationis, maxime est
intellectualis consideratio.
It is clear, then, that rational thinking ends in
intellectual thinking, Following the process of
analysis, in which reason gathers one simple truth
from many things. And again, intellectual thinking
is the beginning of rational thinking, following the
process of synthesis, in which the intellect
comprehends a multiplicity in unity. So the thinking
that is the terminus of all human reasoning is
supremely intellectual.
Tota autem consideratio rationis
resolventis in omnibus scientiis ad
considerationem divinae scientiae
terminatur. Ratio enim, ut prius dictum
est, procedit quandoque de uno in aliud
secundum rem, ut quando est
demonstratio per causas vel effectus
extrinsecos: componendo quidem, cum
proceditur a causis ad effectus; quasi
resolvendo, cum proceditur ab effectibus
Now all rational thinking in all the sciences,
following the way of analysis, terminates in the
knowledge of divine science. For, as we have
said, reason sometimes advances from one thing
to another in the order of reality; for example,
when a demonstration is made through external
causes or effects, by synthesis when we go from
causes to effects, by analysis when we proceed
from effects to causes, for causes are more
simple, unchangeable, and uniformly constant
ad causas, eo quod causae sunt
effectibus simpliciores et magis
immobiliter et uniformiter permanentes.
Ultimus ergo terminus resolutionis in hac
via est, cum pervenitur ad causas
supremas maxime simplices, quae sunt
substantiae separatae. Quandoque vero
procedit de uno in aliud secundum
rationem, ut quando est processus
secundum causas intrinsecas:
componendo quidem, quando a formis
maxime universalibus in magis
particulata proceditur; resolvendo autem
quando e converso, eo quod
universalius est simplicius. Maxime
autem universalia sunt, quae sunt
communia omnibus entibus. Et ideo
terminus resolutionis in hac via ultimus
est consideratio entis et eorum quae
sunt entis in quantum huiusmodi. Haec
autem sunt, de quibus scientia divina
considerat, ut supra dictum est, scilicet
substantiae separatae et communia
omnibus entibus. Unde patet quod sua
consideratio est maxime intellectualis.
than their effects. Consequently, the ultimate end
of analysis in this process is attainment of the
highest and most simple causes, which are the
separate substances. At other times, however,
reason advances from one item to another distinct
in the mental order, as when we proceed
according to intrinsic causes, by synthesis when
we go from the most universal forms to the more
particular ones, by analysis when we proceed
conversely, because what is more universal is
more simple. Now that which is most universal is
common to all beings; and so the ultimate end of
analysis in this process is the consideration of
being and the properties of being as being. And,
as we said above, these are the objects of divine
science; namely, the separate substances and
that which is common to all beings. It is evident,
therefore, that its thinking is supremely intellectual.
Et exinde etiam est quod ipsa largitur
principia omnibus aliis scientiis, in
quantum intellectualis consideratio est
It also follows that divine science gives principles
to all the other sciences, because intellectual
thinking is the starting point of rational thinking;
principium rationalis, propter quod
dicitur prima philosophia; et nihilominus
ipsa addiscitur post physicam et ceteras
scientias, in quantum consideratio
intellectualis est terminus rationalis,
propter quod dicitur metaphysica quasi
trans physicam, quia post physicam
resolvendo occurrit.
and for this reason it is called first philosophy.
Nevertheless it is learned after physics and the
other sciences, because intellectual thinking is the
terminus of rational thinking. For this reason it is
called metaphysics, as if to say beyond physics,
for in the process of analysis it comes after
physics.
intellectualiter procedere non attribuitur
scientiae divinae, quasi ipsa non
ratiocinetur procedendo de principiis ad
conclusiones, sed quia eius ratiocinatio
est intellectuali considerationi
propinquissima et conclusiones eius
principiis.
Reply to 1. We say that divine science proceeds
intellectually not as though it makes no use of
reason, moving forward from principles to
conclusions, but because its reasoning most
closely approaches intellectual consideration and
its conclusions are closest to its principles.
Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus est
supra omnem intellectum creatum
quantum ad comprehensionem, non
autem supra intellectum increatum, cum
ipse se ipsum intelligendo
comprehendat. Est vero supra omnem
intellectum viatoris quantum ad
cognitionem, qua cognoscitur quid est,
Reply to 2. God is beyond the comprehension of
every created intellect, but he is not beyond the
uncreated intellect, since in knowing himself he
comprehends himself. However, he is above the
intellect of everyone here on earth as regards
knowing what he is, but not as regards knowing
that he is, The blessed in heaven, however, also
know what he is, because they see his essence.
non autem quantum ad cognitionem, qua
cognoscitur an est. A beatis autem
cognoscitur etiam quid est, quia vident
eius essentiam. Et tamen scientia divina
non est solum de Deo, sed et de aliis
quae intellectum humanum etiam
secundum statum viae non excedunt
quantum ad quid est cognoscendum de
eis.
Nevertheless divine science is not only about
God. It is concerned with other things as well,
which are not beyond the human intellect even in
its present state as regards knowing what they
are.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra
dictum est, humana consideratio
quantum ad sui terminum quodammodo
pertingit ad angelicam cognitionem, non
secundum aequalitatem, sed secundum
quandam assimilationem. Unde
Dionysius dicit 7 c. de divinis nominibus
quod animae multorum convolutione ad
unum sunt dignae habitae intellectibus
aequalibus Angelis, in quantum
animabus est proprium et possibile.
Reply to 3. As we said above, human thought at
its terminus in a way approaches angelic
knowledge; not that it equals it, but bears a
resemblance to it. So Dionysius says: Souls, by
reducing multitude to unity, are rightly considered
the equal of the angelic intelligences, as far as
this is proper and possible to souls.
Ad quartum dicendum quod cognitio
etiam fidei maxime pertinet ad
intellectum. Non enim ea rationis
investigatione accipimus, sed simplici
acceptione intellectus tenemus. Dicimur
autem ea non intelligere, in quantum
intellectus eorum plenariam cognitionem
Reply to 4. The knowledge of faith also belongs
in a special way to understanding (intellectus).
For we do not possess the things of faith through
the investigation of reason, but we hold them by
simply receiving understanding. But we are said
not to understand them because the intellect does
not have a full knowledge of them. That indeed is
non habet; quod quidem nobis in
praemium repromittitur.
promised to us as our reward.
Article TWO
Should We Entirely Abandon the Imagination in Divine Science?
Ad secundum sic proceditur. We proceed as follows to the second
article:
Videtur quod in divinis oporteat ad
imaginationes deduci.
It seems that in divine science we must turn to
images, for:
Scientia enim divina numquam
competentius traditur quam in sacra
Scriptura. Sed in sacra Scriptura in divinis
deducimur ad imaginationes, dum divina
nobis sub figuris sensibilibus describuntur.
Ergo oportet in divinis ad imaginationes
deduci.
1. Divine science was never more
appropriately taught than in Sacred Scripture.
But treating of the divine in Sacred Scripture
we resort to images when divine things are
described for us under sensible figures.
Therefore in divine science we must turn to
images.
Praeterea, divina non capiuntur nisi
intellectu, unde et in eis intellectualiter
versari oportet, ut dictum est. Sed non est
intelligere sine phantasmate, ut dicit
philosophus in I et III de anima. Ergo in
divinis oportet ad imaginationes deduci.
2. Again, we grasp divine things only by the
intellect; and this is why, as we have said, we
must proceed intellectually when treating of
them. But, as the Philosopher says, it is
impossible to understand without the
imagination. Therefore in divine science we
must resort to images.
Praeterea, divina nobis innotescunt maxime
per illustrationem divini radii. Sed, sicut dicit
Dionysius in 1 c. caelestis hierarchiae,
impossibile est nobis aliter superlucere
divinum radium nisi varietate sacrorum
velaminum circumvelatum; et vocat sacra
velamina sensibilium imagines. Ergo in
divinis oportet ad imaginationes deduci.
3. Again, we know the divine especially
through divine illumination. But as Dionysius
says, It is impossible for the divine light to
illumine us from above unless it be hidden
within the covering of many sacred veils. And
he calls these sacred veils images of sensible
things. So in divine science we must turn to
images.
Praeterea, circa sensibilia oportet
imaginabiliter versari. Sed divinorum
cognitionem ex sensibilibus effectibus
accipimus, secundum illud Rom. 1:
invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt
intellecta conspiciuntur. Ergo in divinis
oportet ad imaginationes deduci.
4. Again. when dealing with what is sensible
we must make use of the imagination. But we
know divine things from sensible effects,
according to the statement of the Epistle to the
Romans: The invisible things of God... are
clearly seen, being understood by the things
that are made. Therefore in divine science we
must resort to images.
Praeterea, in cognoscitivis maxime
regulamur per id quod est cognitionis
principium, sicut in naturalibus per sensum,
a quo nostra cognitio incipit. Sed principium
intellectualis cognitionis in nobis est
imaginatio, cum phantasmata hoc modo
comparentur ad intellectum nostrum sicut
colores ad visum, ut dicitur in III de anima.
Ergo in divinis oportet ad imaginationem
5. Again, in cognitive matters we are guided
especially by the starting point of knowledge;
for instance in the sciences of nature we are
guided by the senses, from which our
knowledge begins. Now in us intellectual
knowledge begins in the imagination, since
images are related to our intellect as colors to
sight, as the De Anima says. Therefore in
divine science we must go to the imagination.
deduci.
Praeterea, cum intellectus non utatur organo
corporali, ex laesione organi corporalis non
impeditur actio intellectus, nisi quatenus ad
imaginationem convertitur. Sed per
laesionem organi corporalis, scilicet
cerebri, impeditur intellectus in
consideratione divinorum. Ergo intellectus
divina considerans ad imaginationem
deducitur.
6. Again, since the intellect does not use a
bodily organ, an injury to such an organ
hinders the action of the intellect only insofar
as it turns to the imagination. Now the intellect
is hindered in its consideration of divine things
through an injury of a bodily organ, namely the
brain. Therefore in considering divine things
the intellect resorts to the imagination.
Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit 1 c.
mysticae theologiae ad Timotheum
loquens: tu, inquit, o amice Timothee, circa
mysticas visiones sensus derelinque. Sed
imaginatio non est nisi sensibilium, cum sit
motus factus a sensu secundum actum, ut
dicitur in II de anima. Ergo cum divinorum
considerationes sint maxime mysticae, in
eis non debemus ad imaginationes deduci.
On the contrary, Dionysius says in his
Mystical Theology, speaking to Timothy: O
beloved Timothy, in mystic contemplation
abandon the senses. But the imagination has
to do only with the sensible, for it is a
movement produced by the sense in act, as
the De Anima says. Therefore, since the
considerations of divine things are eminently
mystical, we should not have recourse to
images in them.
Praeterea, in cuiuslibet scientiae
consideratione vitandum est illud quod in ea
errorem facit. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus in I
libro de Trinitate, primus error circa divina
est eorum, qui ea, quae de corporalibus
Moreover, in the procedure of any science we
should avoid what leads to error in it. But, as
Augustine says, the principal error regarding
divine things is the mistake of those who try
transfer to them what they know of the
rebus noverunt, ad res divinas transferre
conantur. Cum ergo imaginatio non sit nisi
corporalium rerum, videtur quod in divinis
non debeamus ad imaginationes deduci.
corporeal world. Therefore, since the
imagination has to do only with the corporeal,
it seems that in divine science we should not
go to images.
Praeterea, virtus inferior non se extendit in
id quod est superioris proprium, ut patet per
Boethium in V de consolatione. Sed
cognoscere divina et spiritualia pertinet ad
intellectum et intelligentiam, ut dicitur in libro
de spiritu et anima. Cum ergo, ut ibidem
dicitur, imaginatio sit infra intelligentiam et
intellectum, videtur quod in divinis et
spiritualibus non debeamus ad
imaginationem deduci.
Moreover, as is clear from Boethius, a lower
power does not extend to that which is proper
to a higher power. But it belongs to an intellect
and to an intelligence to know the divine and
the spiritual, as is said in the De Spiritu et
Anima. Therefore, since, as is said in the
same work, imagination is below intelligence
and intellect, it seems that in the domain of the
divine and the spiritual we should no go to the
imagination.
Responsio. Dicendum quod in qualibet
cognitione duo est considerare, scilicet
principium et terminum. Principium quidem
ad apprehensionem pertinet, terminus
autem ad iudicium; ibi enim cognitio
perficitur.
Reply: In all knowledge two factors must be
taken into account: the beginning and the end.
Knowledge begins with apprehension but it
ends with judgment, for it is there that
knowledge is completed.
Principium igitur cuiuslibet nostrae
cognitionis est in sensu, quia ex
apprehensione sensus oritur apprehensio
phantasiae, quae est motus a sensu factus,
ut dicit philosophus, a qua iterum oritur
Now all our knowledge begins in the senses;
from sense perception results the
apprehension of the imagination (which is a
movement arising from sensory knowledge, as
the Philosopher says), and from it in turn
apprehensio intellectiva in nobis, cum
phantasmata sint intellectivae animae ut
obiecta, ut patet in III de anima.
springs our intellectual apprehension, for
images are like objects to the intellectual soul,
as is clear in the De Anima.
Sed terminus cognitionis non semper est
uniformiter: quandoque enim est in sensu,
quandoque in imaginatione, quandoque
autem in solo intellectu. Quandoque enim
proprietates et accidentia rei, quae sensu
demonstrantur, sufficienter exprimunt
naturam rei, et tunc oportet quod iudicium
de rei natura quod facit intellectus
conformetur his quae sensus de re
demonstrat. Et huiusmodi sunt omnes res
naturales, quae sunt determinatae ad
materiam sensibilem, et ideo in scientia
naturali terminari debet cognitio ad sensum,
ut scilicet hoc modo iudicemus de rebus
naturalibus, secundum quod sensus eas
demonstrat, ut patet in III caeli et mundi; et
qui sensum neglegit in naturalibus, incidit in
errorem. Et haec sunt naturalia quae sunt
concreta cum materia sensibili et motu et
secundum esse et secundum
considerationem.
But knowledge does not always terminate in
the same way. Sometimes it terminates in the
senses, sometimes in the imagination, and
sometimes in the intellect alone. In some
cases the properties and accidents of a thing
disclosed by the senses adequately reveal its
nature, and then the intellects judgment of that
nature must conform to what the senses reveal
about it. All natural things, which are bound up
with sensible matter, are of this kind. So the
terminus of knowledge in natural science must
be in the senses, with the result that we judge
of natural beings as the senses manifest them,
as is evident in the De Caelo et Mundo.
Accordingly, the man who neglects the senses
when dealing with natural things falls into error.
By natural things I mean those that are bound
up with sensible matter and motion both in
existence and in thought.
Quaedam vero sunt, quorum iudicium non
dependet ex his quae sensu percipiuntur,
quia quamvis secundum esse sint in
Our judgment about some things, however,
does not depend upon what the sense
perceives, because even though they exist in
materia sensibili, tamen secundum
rationem diffinitivam sunt a materia sensibili
abstracta. Iudicium autem de unaquaque re
potissime fit secundum eius diffinitivam
rationem. Sed quia secundum rationem
diffinitivam non abstrahunt a qualibet
materia, sed solum a sensibili et remotis
sensibilibus condicionibus remanet aliquid
imaginabile, ideo in talibus oportet quod
iudicium sumatur secundum id quod
imaginatio demonstrat. Huiusmodi autem
sunt mathematica. Et ideo in mathematicis
oportet cognitionem secundum iudicium
terminari ad imaginationem, non ad
sensum, quia iudicium mathematicum
superat apprehensionem sensus. Unde non
est idem iudicium quandoque de linea
mathematica quod est de linea sensibili,
sicut in hoc quod recta linea tangit
sphaeram solum secundum punctum, quod
convenit rectae lineae separatae, non
autem rectae lineae in materia, ut dicitur in I
de anima.
sensible matter they abstract from it when their
essences are defined, and we judge of
anything chiefly according to the definition of
its essence. But because they do not abstract
from every kind of matter when their essences
are defined but only from sensible matter, and
because an object for the imagination remains
after sensible characteristics have been set
aside, we must judge about such things
according to what the imagination reveals.
Now the objects of mathematics are of this
kind. Accordingly, the knowledge we have
through judgment in mathematics must
terminate in the imagination and not in the
senses, because mathematical judgment goes
beyond sensory perception. Thus, the
judgment about a mathematical line is not
always the same as that about a sensible line.
For example, that a straight line touches a
sphere at only one point is true of an abstract
straight line but not of a straight line in matter,
as is said in the De Anima.
Quaedam vero sunt quae excedunt et id
quod cadit sub sensu et id quod cadit sub
imaginatione, sicut illa quae omnino a
materia non dependent neque secundum
esse neque secundum considerationem, et
There are other beings, however, that
transcend both that which falls under the
senses and that which falls under the
imagination; namely, those that are entirely
independent of matter both with respect to
ideo talium cognitio secundum iudicium
neque debet terminari ad imaginationem
neque ad sensum.
their being and with respect to their being
understood. So, when we know things of this
kind through judgment, our knowledge must
terminate neither in the imagination nor in
the senses.
Sed tamen ex his, quae sensu vel
imaginatione apprehenduntur, in horum
cognitionem devenimus vel per viam
causalitatis, sicut ex effectu causa
perpenditur, quae non est effectui
commensurata, sed excellens, vel per
excessum vel per remotionem, quando
omnia, quae sensus vel imaginatio
apprehendit, a rebus huiusmodi
separamus; quos modos cognoscendi
divina ex sensibilibus ponit Dionysius in
libro de divinis nominibus.
Nevertheless we reach some knowledge of
them through the objects of the senses and the
imagination, either by way of causality (as
when from an effect we come to know its
cause, which is not proportionate to the effect
but transcends it), or by way of
transcendence, or by way of negation (as
when we separate from such beings whatever
the sense or imagination apprehends). These
are the means of knowing divine things from
the sensible world proposed by Dionysius in
his Divine Names.
Uti ergo possumus in divinis et sensu et
imaginatione sicut principiis nostrae
considerationis, sed non sicut terminis, ut
scilicet iudicemus talia esse divina, qualia
sunt quae sensus vel imaginatio
apprehendit. Deduci autem ad aliquid est
ad illud terminari. Et ideo in divinis neque
ad imaginationem neque ad sensum
debemus deduci, in mathematicis autem ad
imaginationem et non ad sensum, in
It follows that we can use the senses and the
imagination (+) as the starting points but not
(~) as the termini of our knowledge of divine
things, so that we judge them to be the sort of
objects the sense or the imagination
apprehends. Now to go to something is to
terminate at it. Therefore, we should go neither
to the imagination nor to the senses in divine
science, to the imagination and not to the
senses in mathematics, and to the senses in
naturalibus autem etiam ad sensum. Et
propter hoc peccant qui uniformiter in his
tribus speculativae partibus procedere
nituntur.
the natural sciences. For this reason they are
in error who try to proceed in the same way in
these three parts of speculative science.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sacra
Scriptura non proponit nobis divina sub
figuris sensibilibus, ut ibi intellectus noster
remaneat, sed ut ab his ad immaterialia
ascendat. Unde etiam per vilium rerum
figuras divina tradit, ut minor praebeatur
occasio in talibus remanendi, ut dicit
Dionysius in 2 c. caelestis hierarchiae.
Reply to 1. Sacred Scripture does not
present divine things to us under sensible
images so that our intellect may stop with
them, but that it may rise from them to the
immaterial world. Thus, as Dionysius says, it
even teaches the divine through symbols of
base objects in order to offer less occasion of
stopping with them.
Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus
nostri operatio non est in praesenti statu
sine phantasmate quantum ad principium
cognitionis; non tamen oportet quod nostra
cognitio semper ad phantasmata
terminetur, ut scilicet illud, quod intelligimus,
iudicemus esse tale quale est illud quod
phantasia apprehendit.
Reply to 2. The operation of our intellect in its
present state is never without an image as
regards the beginning of knowledge. But our
knowledge need not always terminate at
images, so that, in other words, we judge the
objects of our understanding to be of the same
kind as the objects of the imagination.
Ad tertium dicendum quod auctoritas illa
Dionysii loquitur quantum ad principium
cognitionis et non quantum ad terminum.
Reply to 3. The text of Dionysius refers to the
beginning of knowledge and not to its end,
Ad quartum dicendum quod ex effectibus
sensibilibus venimus in cognitionem
divinorum tribus modis praedictis; non
autem ita quod oporteat iudicium formari de
divinis secundum modum, quo se habent
isti sensibiles effectus.
Reply to 4. which is reached when we know
divine things from their sensible effects by the
three methods described above; but not in
such a way that we must form our judgment of
the divine according to the manner of being of
these sensible effects.
Ad quintum dicendum quod ratio illa
procedit, quando principium cognitionis est
sufficienter ducens in id, cuius cognitio
quaeritur, et sic est principium sensus in
naturalibus, non autem in divinis, ut dictum
est.
Reply to 5. That argument is valid when the
starting point of knowledge adequately leads
to the object we seek to know. This is the way
the senses are the starting point in the natural
sciences, but not, as we have said, in divine
science.
Ad sextum dicendum quod phantasma est
principium nostrae cognitionis, ut ex quo
incipit intellectus operatio non sicut
transiens, sed sicut permanens ut quoddam
fundamentum intellectualis operationis; sicut
principia demonstrationis oportet manere in
omni processu scientiae, cum phantasmata
comparentur ad intellectum ut obiecta, in
quibus inspicit omne quod inspicit vel
secundum perfectam repraesentationem vel
per negationem. Et ideo quando
phantasmatum cognitio impeditur, oportet
totaliter impediri cognitionem intellectus
etiam in divinis. Patet enim quod non
Reply to 6. An image is the starting point of
our knowledge, for it is that from which the
operation of the intellect begins; not that it
passes away, but it remains as the foundation
of intellectual activity, just as the principles of
demonstration must remain throughout the
whole process of science. This is because
images are related to the intellect as objects in
which it sees whatever it sees, either through a
perfect representation or through a negation.
Consequently, when our knowledge of images
is impeded, we must be completely incapable
of knowing anything with our intellect even
about divine things. Clearly, we cannot know
possumus intelligere Deum esse causam
corporum sive supra omnia corpora sive
absque corporeitate, nisi imaginemur
corpora, non tamen iudicium divinorum
secundum imaginationem formatur. Et ideo
quamvis imaginatio in qualibet divinorum
consideratione sit necessaria secundum
statum viae, numquam tamen ad eam
deduci oportet in divinis.
that God causes bodies, or transcends all
bodies, or is not a body, if we do not form an
image of bodies; but our judgment of what is
divine is not made according to the
imagination. Consequently, even though in our
present state of life the imagination is
necessary in all our knowledge of the divine,
with regard to such matters we must never
terminate in it.
Article THREE
Can Our Intellect Behold the Divine Form Itself?
Ad tertium sic proceditur. We proceed as follows to the third article:
Videtur quod non possimus ipsam
formam divinam ad minus in statu viae
inspicere.
It seems that we are unable to behold the divine
form itself, at least in this life, for:
Ut enim dicit Dionysius in prima epistula
ad Gaium monachum, si quis videntium
Deum intellexit quod vidit, non ipsum vidit,
sed aliquid eorum quae sunt eius. Sed
forma divina est ipse Deus. Ergo non
possumus ipsam formam divinam
inspicere.
1. As Dionysius says, If anyone seeing God
understood what he saw, he did not see God
himself but one of his creations. Now the divine
form is God himself. Therefore we are not able
to behold the divine form itself.
Praeterea, forma divina est ipsa divina
essentia. Sed Deum per essentiam nemo
in statu viae videre potest, ergo nec
ipsam divinam formam inspicere.
2. Again, the divine form is the divine essence
itself. Now no one in the present life can see
God through his essence. Therefore neither can
he behold the divine form.
Praeterea, quicumque inspicit formam
alicuius rei, aliquid de ipsa re cognoscit.
Sed secundum Dionysium in 1 c.
mysticae theologiae intellectus noster
secundum quod melius potest Deo unitur,
quando omnino nihil eius cognoscit. Ergo
non possumus divinam formam inspicere.
3. Again, if we see the form of something, we
have some knowledge of that thing. But
according to Dionysius, our intellect is most
united to God when it knows absolutely nothing
of him. Therefore we are unable to behold the
divine form.
Praeterea, sicut dictum est, totius nostrae
cognitionis principium est a sensu. Sed
ea, quae sensu percipimus, non sunt
sufficientia ad demonstrandum formam
divinam nec etiam aliarum substantiarum
separatarum. Ergo non possumus ipsam
divinam formam inspicere.
4. Again, as was said above, all our knowledge
begins from the senses. But what we perceive
by the senses is inadequate to reveal the divine
form or even the other separate substances.
Therefore we are unable to behold the divine
form itself.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum in II
metaphysicae intellectus noster se habet
ad rerum manifestissima sicut oculus
noctuae ad solem. Sed oculus noctuae
nullo modo potest videre solem, ergo nec
intellectus noster formam ipsam divinam
et alias formas separatas quae sunt
5. Again, according to the Philosopher, our
intellect is related to what is most evident as the
eye of an owl to the sun. But the eye of an owl
cannot see the sun at all. Therefore neither can
our intellect see the divine form itself or other
separate forms, which are natures most evident
beings.
naturae manifestissima.
Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit Rom.
1 quod invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta
sunt intellecta conspiciuntur a creatura
mundi, id est homine, sempiterna quoque
virtus eius et divinitas. Nihil autem aliud
est forma divina quam ipsa divinitas. Ergo
ipsam formam divinam cognoscere
intellectu aliquo modo possumus.
On the contrary, the Apostle says in the Epistle
to the Romans: The invisible things of God are
clearly seen by a creature of the world (that is,
by man), ...his eternal power also and divinity.
Now the divine form is simply the divinity itself.
Therefore in some way we can know the divine
form with our intellect.
Praeterea, Gen. 32 super illud: vidi
dominum facie etc., dicit Glossa Gregorii:
nisi homo illam, scilicet veritatem divinam,
utcumque conspiceret, non eam
conspicere se non posse sentiret. Sed
nos sentimus divinam essentiam non
posse perfecte conspicere. Ergo aliquo
modo ipsam conspicimus.
Moreover, commenting on the text of Genesis, I
have seen God face to face, the gloss of
Gregory says, Unless a person somehow
beheld it (namely, divine truth), he would not
feel himself incapable of beholding it. But we
feel that we cannot perfectly see the divine
essence. Therefore in some way we do behold
it.
Praeterea, Dionysius dicit 2 c. caelestis
hierarchiae quod humanus animus
assuescit extendi per visibilia in
supermundanas altitudines, quae nihil
aliud sunt quam ipsae formae separatae.
Ergo formas separatas possumus aliquo
modo cognoscere.
Moreover, Dionysius says that the human mind
gradually becomes accustomed to rise from the
world of sense to heights beyond this world,
which are nothing else than the separate forms.
Therefore we can somehow know the separate
forms.
Responsio. Dicendum quod dupliciter
aliquid cognoscitur: uno modo, dum scitur
de eo an est, alio modo, dum scitur de eo
quid est. Ad hoc autem quod de aliqua re
sciamus quid est, oportet quod intellectus
noster feratur in ipsius rei quiditatem sive
essentiam vel immediate vel mediantibus
aliquibus quae sufficienter eius quiditatem
demonstrent. Immediate quidem
intellectus noster ferri non potest
secundum statum viae in essentiam Dei
et in alias essentias separatas, quia
immediate extenditur ad phantasmata, ad
quae comparatur sicut visus ad colorem,
ut dicitur in III de anima. Et sic immediate
potest concipere intellectus quiditatem rei
sensibilis, non autem alicuius rei
intelligibilis. Unde dicit Dionysius 2 c.
caelestis hierarchiae quod nostra
analogia non valet immediate extendi in
invisibiles contemplationes. Sed
quaedam invisibilia sunt, quorum quiditas
et natura perfecte exprimitur ex
quiditatibus rerum sensibilium notis. Et de
his etiam intelligibilibus possumus scire
quid est, sed mediate, sicut ex hoc quod
scitur quid est homo et quid est animal,
sufficienter innotescit habitudo unius ad
alterum et ex hoc scitur, quid est genus et
quid est species.
Reply: We know a thing in two ways: in one way
when we know that it is, and in another way
when we know what it is. Now in order to know
what anything is, our intellect must penetrate its
quiddity or essence either directly or by means
of other things that adequately reveal its quiddity.
But in this life our intellect cannot directly
penetrate the essence of God or other separate
essences, because it directly extends to
images, to which it bears the same relation as
sight does to color, as the De Anima says. So
the intellect can directly conceive the quiddity of
a sensible reality but not of an intelligible reality.
Thus Dionysius says, According to our way of
knowing, we cannot immediately attain to the
contemplation of the invisible. There are some
invisible things, however, whose quiddity or
nature is perfectly revealed by the known
quiddities of sensible things; and we can also
know what these intelligible objects are, although
indirectly. For instance, from the fact that we
know what man and animal are, we come to
know adequately the relation of one to the other,
and from this we know what a genus and a
species are.
quid est species.
Sensibiles autem naturae intellectae non
sufficienter exprimunt essentiam divinam
neque etiam alias essentias separatas,
cum non sint unius generis naturaliter
loquendo et quiditas et omnia huiusmodi
nomina fere aequivoce dicantur de
sensibilibus et de illis substantiis. Unde
similitudines rerum sensibilium ad
substantias immateriales translatas vocat
Dionysius 2 c. caelestis hierarchiae
dissimiles similitudines alio modo
intellectualibus habentibus quae
sensibilibus aliter distributa sunt. Et sic
per viam similitudinis non sufficienter illae
substantiae ex his innotescunt. Neque
etiam per viam causalitatis, quia ea, quae
ab illis substantiis inveniuntur effecta in his
inferioribus, non sunt effectus
adaequantes earum virtutes, ut sic
perveniri possit ad sciendum quod quid
est de causa.
But the sensible natures known to us do not
adequately reveal the divine essence or even
other separate essences, since naturally
considered they do not belong to one genus;
and quiddity and all such terms predicated
almost equivocally of sensible things and of
these substances. That is why Dionysius calls
the likenesses of sensible things, transferred to
immaterial substances, unlike likenesses, which
intellectual beings participate in one way and
sensible beings in another. Consequently, we
cannot have adequate knowledge of the former
from the latter by way of likeness or even by way
of causality, because the effects of those
substances found in lower beings do not
measure up to their powers so that we can come
to know the essence of their cause in this way.
Unde de substantiis illis immaterialibus
secundum statum viae nullo modo
possumus scire quid est non solum per
viam naturalis cognitionis, sed etiam nec
per viam revelationis, quia divinae
revelationis radius ad nos pervenit
Accordingly, in the present life it is absolutely
impossible to know the essence of immaterial
substances, not only (~) by natural knowledge
but also (~) by revelation; for, as Dionysius say,
the light of divine revelation comes to us
adapted to our condition. Thus even though
secundum modum nostrum, ut Dionysius
dicit. Unde quamvis per revelationem
elevemur ad aliquid cognoscendum, quod
alias esset nobis ignotum, non tamen ad
hoc quod alio modo cognoscamus nisi
per sensibilia. Unde dicit Dionysius in 1 c.
caelestis hierarchiae quod impossibile
est nobis superlucere divinum radium nisi
circumvelatum varietate sacrorum
velaminum. Via autem quae est per
sensibilia non sufficit ad ducendum in
substantias immateriales secundum
cognitionem quid est. Et sic restat quod
formae immateriales non sunt nobis notae
cognitione quid est, sed solummodo
cognitione an est, sive naturali ratione ex
effectibus creaturarum sive etiam
revelatione quae est per similitudines a
sensibilibus sumptas.
revelation elevates us to know something of
which we should otherwise be ignorant, it does
not elevate us to know in any other way than
through sensible things. Thus Dionysius says: It
is impossible for the divine light to illumine us
from above unless it be hidden within the
covering of many sacred veils. Now knowledge
by way of the sensible is inadequate to enable
us to know the essences of immaterial
substances. So we conclude that we do not
know what immaterial forms are, but only that
they are, whether by natural reason based upon
created effects or even by revelation, by means
of likenesses taken from sensible things.
Et tamen sciendum quod de nulla re
potest sciri an est, nisi quoquo modo
sciatur de ea quid est vel cognitione
perfecta vel saltem cognitione confusa,
prout philosophus dicit in principio
physicorum quod diffinita sunt
praecognita partibus diffinitionis. Oportet
enim scientem hominem esse et
quaerentem quid est homo per
It should be noticed, however, that we cannot
know that a thing is without knowing in some
way what it is, either perfectly or at least
confusedly, as the Philosopher says we know
things defined before we know the parts of their
definition. For if a person knows that man exists
and wants to find out what man is by definition,
he must know the meaning of the term man.
And this is possible only if he somehow forms a
diffinitionem scire quid hoc nomen homo
significat. Nec hoc esset, nisi aliquam
rem quoquo modo conciperet quam scit
esse, quamvis nesciat eius diffinitionem.
Concipit enim hominem secundum
cognitionem alicuius generis proximi vel
remoti et aliquorum accidentium quae
extra apparent de ipso. Oportet enim
diffinitionum cognitionem, sicut et
demonstrationum, ex aliqua
praeexsistenti cognitione initium sumere.
concept of what he knows to exist, even though
he does not know its definition. That is to say, he
forms a concept of man by knowing a proximate
or remote genus and accidental characteristics
which reveal him externally. For our knowledge
of definitions, like that of demonstrations, must
begin with some previous knowledge.
Sic ergo et de Deo et aliis substantiis
immaterialibus non possemus scire an
est, nisi sciremus quoquo modo de eis
quid est sub quadam confusione. Hoc
autem non potest esse per cognitionem
alicuius generis proximi vel remoti, eo
quod Deus in nullo genere est, cum non
habeat quod quid est aliud a suo esse,
quod requiritur in omnibus generibus, ut
Avicenna dicit. Aliae autem substantiae
immateriales creatae sunt quidem in
genere, et quamvis logice considerando
conveniant cum istis substantiis
sensibilibus in genere remoto quod est
substantia, naturaliter tamen loquendo
non conveniunt in eodem genere, sicut
nec etiam corpora caelestia cum istis
Similarly, therefore, we cannot know that God
and other immaterial substances exist unless we
know somehow, in some confused way, what
they are. (~) Now we cannot do this by knowing
a proximate or remote genus, for God is in no
genus, since his essence is not distinct from his
being; a condition required in all genera, as
Avicenna says. Created immaterial substances,
however, are indeed in a genus; but even though
from the viewpoint of logic they share the same
remote genus of substance with sensible
substances, from the viewpoint of physics they
do not belong to the same genus, as neither do
heavenly and terrestrial bodies. For the
corruptible and the incorruptible do not belong to
the same genus, as the Metaphysics says. For
the logician considers concepts in themselves;
inferioribus. Corruptibile enim et
incorruptibile non sunt unius generis, ut
dicitur in X metaphysicae. Logicus enim
considerat absolute intentiones,
secundum quas nihil prohibet convenire
immaterialia materialibus et incorruptibilia
corruptibilibus. Sed naturalis et
philosophus primus considerant essentias
secundum quod habent esse in rebus, et
ideo ubi inveniunt diversum modum
potentiae et actus et per hoc diversum
modum essendi, dicunt esse diversa
genera. Similiter etiam Deus non habet
aliquod accidens, ut infra probabitur.
Aliae vero immateriales substantiae si
habent aliqua accidentia, non sunt nobis
nota.
and from this point of view nothing prevents the
immaterial and the material, or the incorruptible
and the corruptible, from having something in
common. But the philosopher of nature and the
metaphysician treat of essences as existing in
reality; and therefore they say that there are
different genera wherever they find diverse
modes of potency and act, and consequently
diverse modes of being. Neither has God any
accidental characteristics, as we will prove later.
If other immaterial substances have such
characteristics, we do not know them.
Accordingly, we cannot say that we know
immaterial substances obscurely by knowing
their genus and observable accidents.
Et ideo non possumus dicere quod
confusa cognitione cognoscantur a nobis
substantiae immateriales per cognitionem
generis et apparentium accidentium. Sed
loco cognitionis generis habemus in istis
substantiis cognitionem per negationes,
ut cum scimus quod huiusmodi
substantiae sunt immateriales,
incorporeae non habentes figuras et alia
huiusmodi. Et quanto plures negationes
de eis cognoscimus, tanto et minus
Instead of knowing the genus of these
substances, we know them (+) by negations; for
example, by understanding that they are
immaterial, incorporeal, without shapes, and so
on. The more negations we know of them the
less vaguely we understand them, for
subsequent negations limit and determine a
previous negation as differences do a remote
genus. Our knowledge of the heavenly bodies is
also negative for the most part, because they
belong to a different genus from that of inferior
confusa est earum cognitio in nobis, eo
quod per negationes sequentes prior
negatio contrahitur et determinatur, sicut
genus remotum per differentias. Unde
etiam et corpora caelestia, in quantum
sunt alterius generis ab istis inferioribus, a
nobis ut plurimum per negationes
cognoscuntur, utpote quia neque sunt
levia neque gravia neque calida neque
frigida. Loco autem accidentium habemus
in substantiis praedictis habitudines
earum ad substantias sensibiles vel
secundum comparationem causae ad
effectum vel secundum comparationem
excessus.
bodies. We know, for instance, that they are not
light or heavy, or hot or cold. And instead of
accidental characteristics in these substances
we have their connections with sensible ones,
either with regard to (+) the relationship of
cause to effect or with regard to (+) the
relationship of transcendence.
Ita ergo de formis immaterialibus
cognoscimus an est et habemus de eis
loco cognitionis quid est cognitionem per
negationem, per causalitatem et per
excessum, quos etiam modos Dionysius
ponit in libro de divinis nominibus. Et hoc
modo Boethius intelligit esse
inspiciendam ipsam divinam formam per
remotionem omnium phantasmatum, non
ut sciatur de ea quid est. Et per hoc patet
solutio ad obiecta, quia primae rationes
procedunt de cognitione quid est
perfecta, aliae autem de cognitione
We conclude, then, that in the case of immaterial
forms we know that they exist; and instead of
knowing what they are we have knowledge of
them by way of negation, by way of causality,
and by way of transcendence. These are the
same ways Dionysius proposes in his Divine
Names; and this is how Boethius understands
that we can know the divine form by removing all
images, and not that we know that it is. The
solution of the opposing arguments is clear from
what has been said: for the first arguments are
based on perfect knowledge of what a thing is,
the others on imperfect knowledge of the sort
imperfecta, qualis dicta est. described.
Article FOUR
Can Our Intellect Behold the Divine Form by Means of Some Speculative Science?
Ad quartum sic proceditur. We proceed as follows to the fourth
article:
Videtur quod ad formam divinam
inspiciendam per scientias speculativas
perveniri possit.
It seems that we can come to behold the
divine form through the speculative sciences,
for:
Theologia enim pars scientiae speculativae
est, ut hic Boethius dicit. Sed ad theologiam
pertinet ipsam formam inspicere divinam, ut
hic dicitur. Ergo ad cognoscendam divinam
formam potest perveniri per scientias
speculativas.
1. As Boethius says here, theology is a part
of speculative science. But, as he says, it
belongs to theology to behold the divine form
itself. Therefore we can arrive at a knowledge
of that form through the speculative sciences.
Praeterea, de substantiis immaterialibus in
aliqua scientia speculativa determinatur,
quia in scientia divina. Sed quaecumque
scientia determinat de aliqua substantia,
inspicit formam illius substantiae, quia omnis
cognitio est per formam et omnis
demonstrationis secundum philosophum
principium est quod quid est. Ergo inspicere
2. Again, there is a speculative science
treating of immaterial substances, namely
divine science. Now any science treating of a
substance beholds the form of that
substance, because all knowledge is by
means of form, and according to the
Philosopher all demonstration begins with
essence. Therefore we can behold separate
formas separatas possumus per scientias
speculativas.
forms through the speculative sciences.
Praeterea, ultima felicitas hominis secundum
philosophos consistit in intelligendo
substantias separatas. Cum enim felicitas sit
operatio perfectissima, oportet quod sit
optimorum sub intellectu cadentium, ut potest
accipi ex philosopho in X Ethicorum. Est
autem felicitas illa, de qua philosophi
loquuntur, operatio a sapientia procedens,
cum sapientia sit perfectissima virtus
perfectissimae potentiae, scilicet intellectus,
et haec operatio sit felicitas, ut dicitur in X
Ethicorum. Ergo per sapientiam intelliguntur
substantiae separatae. Sed sapientia est
scientia quaedam speculativa, ut patet in
principio metaphysicae et in VI Ethicorum.
Ergo per scientias speculativas possumus
intelligere substantias separatas.
3. Again, according to the philosophers, the
ultimate happiness of man is to understand
the separate substances For, since
happiness is the most perfect activity, it must
have to do with the most excellent things
falling under the intellect, as we can learn
from the Philosopher in the Ethics. Now the
happiness described by the philosophers is
an activity springing from wisdom, since
wisdom is the most perfect virtue of the most
perfect power the intellect; and, as the
Ethics says, this activity is happiness.
Through wisdom, therefore, we understand
the separate substances. Now wisdom is a
speculative science, as is clear in the
Metaphysics and Ethics. So we can
understand the separate substances through
the speculative sciences.
Praeterea, frustra est quod non potest
pertingere ad finem propter quem est. Sed
omnium scientiarum speculativarum
consideratio ordinatur sicut in finem in
cognitionem substantiarum separatarum,
quia perfectissimum in quolibet genere est
finis. Ergo si per scientias speculativas
4. Again, if something is unable to reach the
end for which it exists it is to no purpose. But
the inquiry in all the speculative sciences is
directed to a knowledge of the separate
substances as to its end, because in any
class of things the most perfect is the goal [of
all the rest], Therefore if substances of this
huiusmodi substantiae intelligi non possent,
omnes scientiae speculativae essent frustra,
quod est inconveniens.
sort cannot be understood through the
speculative sciences, all of them would be to
no purpose, which is absurd.
Praeterea, omne, quod ordinatur naturaliter
in finem aliquem, habet sibi indita aliqua
principia, quibus potest pervenire in finem
illum, ex quibus inclinatur etiam in finem illum;
naturalium enim motionum principia sunt
intra. Sed homo naturaliter est ordinatus ad
cognitionem substantiarum immaterialium
sicut ad finem, ut a sanctis et a philosophis
traditur. Ergo habet in se aliqua principia
illius cognitionis naturaliter indita. Sed omne
illud, in quod possumus devenire ex
principiis naturaliter notis, pertinet ad
considerationem alicuius scientiae
speculativae. Ergo cognitio substantiarum
immaterialium ad aliquas scientias
speculativas pertinet.
5. Again, everything directed by nature to an
end has been previously endowed with
principles by which it is able to arrive at that
end and by which it also tends toward that
end; for the Principles of natural motions are
within a thing. Now the end of man to which
he is directed by nature is to know the
immaterial substances, as both the saints
and the philosophers teach. So man is
naturally endowed with principles of that
knowledge. But everything we can arrive at
from naturally known principles is included in
one of the speculative sciences. Therefore
the knowledge of immaterial substances
pertains to some speculative sciences.
Sed contra est quod Commentator dicit in III
de anima quod ad hanc positionem sequitur
vel quod scientiae speculativae nondum sint
perfectae, cum illae scientiae nondum sint
inventae, quibus possimus substantias
separatas intelligere, et hoc, si contingat ex
ignorantia aliquorum principiorum quod
nondum substantias praedictas intelligamus;
On the contrary, the Commentator says that
there are two possible consequences of this
position. (1) Either the speculative sciences
are not yet perfect, because we have not
discovered the sciences by which we can
know the separate substances, and this
owing to the fact we do not yet understand
these substances because of our ignorance
vel si contingat ex defectu naturae nostrae
quod non possimus illas scientias
speculativas invenire, quibus praedictae
substantiae intelligantur, sequetur quod si
aliqui nati sunt huiusmodi scientias invenire,
quod nos et ipsi simus aequivoce homines;
of some principles; or (2) if it happens
because of some defect in our nature that
we cannot discover the speculative sciences
by which these substances may be known, it
follows that, if some men can discover these
sciences, we and they are men only in an
equivocal sense.
quorum primum est improbabile, secundum
autem est impossibile. Ergo non potest hoc
per aliquas speculativas scientias esse quod
substantias praedictas intelligamus.
The first of these is improbable; the second is
impossible. So we cannot understand these
substances through some speculative
sciences.
Praeterea, in scientiis speculativis
investigantur diffinitiones, quibus rerum
essentiae intelliguntur per viam divisionis
generis in differentias et per investigationem
causarum rei et accidentium ipsius quae
magnam partem conferunt ad
cognoscendum quod quid est. Sed haec non
possumus de substantiis immaterialibus
cognoscere, quia, ut iam dictum est,
naturaliter loquendo non conveniunt in
genere cum istis sensibilibus substantiis
nobis notis; causam autem vel non habent, ut
Deus, vel est nobis occultissima, sicut causa
Angelorum; accidentia etiam eorum sunt
nobis ignota. Ergo non potest aliqua scientia
speculativa esse, per quam perveniamus ad
Moreover, in the speculative sciences we
search after definitions, by which we
understand the essences of things through
the division of a genus into differences and
through the examination of a things causes
and accidents, which contribute a great deal
to our knowledge of the essence. But we
cannot know these in the case of immaterial
substances, because, as we have already
said, from the viewpoint of physics they have
no (~) genus in common with the sensible
substances known to us. And either they do
not have a (~) cause, as in the case of God,
or their cause is deeply hidden from us, as in
the case of the angels, Their (~) accidents
are also unknown to us. So there can be no
intelligendas substantias immateriales. speculative science through which we may
come to understand immaterial substances.
Praeterea, in scientiis speculativis rerum
essentiae per diffinitiones cognoscuntur.
Diffinitio autem est sermo quidam
compositus ex genere et differentiis.
Substantiarum autem illarum essentiae sunt
simplices, nec intercidit in earum quiditatibus
aliqua compositio, ut videtur per
philosophum et Commentatorem in IX
metaphysicae. Ergo per scientias
speculativas non possumus substantias
praedictas intelligere.
Moreover, in the speculative sciences we
know the essences of things through
definitions. Now a definition is a phrase
made up of a genus and differences. But the
essences of these substances are simple
and there is no composition in their
quiddities, as is clear from the Philosopher
and the Commentator. So we cannot
understand these substances through the
speculative sciences.
Responsio. Dicendum quod in scientiis
speculativis semper ex aliquo prius noto
proceditur tam in demonstrationibus
propositionum quam etiam in inventionibus
diffinitionum. Sicut enim ex propositionibus
praecognitis aliquis devenit in cognitionem
conclusionis, ita ex conceptione generis et
differentiae et causarum rei aliquis devenit in
cognitionem speciei. Hic autem non est
possibile in infinitum procedere, quia sic
omnis scientia periret et quantum ad
demonstrationes et quantum ad diffinitiones,
cum infinita non sit pertransire. Unde omnis
consideratio scientiarum speculativarum
Reply: In the speculative sciences we always
proceed from something previously known,
both in demonstrating propositions and also
in finding definitions. For just as one comes
to know a conclusion by means of
propositions previously known, so also from
the concept of a genus and difference and
from the causes of a thing he comes to know
its species. But it is impossible to go on to
infinity in this case, because then all science
would cease, both as regards
demonstrations and as regards definitions,
since the infinite cannot be traversed. So
inquiry in all the speculative sciences works
reducitur in aliqua prima, quae quidem homo
non habet necesse addiscere aut invenire,
ne oporteat in infinitum procedere, sed
eorum notitiam naturaliter habet. Et
huiusmodi sunt principia demonstrationum
indemonstrabilia, ut omne totum est maius
sua parte et similia, in quae omnes
demonstrationes scientiarum reducuntur, et
etiam primae conceptiones intellectus, ut
entis et unius et huiusmodi, in quae oportet
reducere omnes diffinitiones scientiarum
praedictarum.
back to something first given, which one does
not have to learn or discover (otherwise he
would have to go on to infinity), but which he
knows naturally. Such are the indemonstrable
principles of demonstration (for example,
Every whole is greater than its part, and the
like), to which all demonstrations in the
sciences are reducible. Such, too, are the
first conceptions of the intellect (for example,
being, one, and the like), to which all
definitions in the sciences must be reduced.
Ex quo patet quod nihil potest sciri in
scientiis speculativis neque per viam
demonstrationis neque per viam diffinitionis
nisi ea tantummodo, ad quae praedicta
naturaliter cognita se extendunt. Huiusmodi
autem naturaliter cognita homini
manifestantur ex ipso lumine intellectus
agentis, quod est homini naturale, quo
quidem lumine nihil manifestatur nobis, nisi
in quantum per ipsum phantasmata fiunt
intelligibilia in actu. Hic enim est actus
intellectus agentis, ut dicitur in III de anima.
Phantasmata autem a sensu accipiuntur;
unde principium cognitionis praedictorum
principiorum est ex sensu et memoria, ut
patet per philosophum in fine posteriorum, et
From this it is clear that the only things we can
know in the speculative sciences, either
through demonstration or definition, are those
that lie within the range of these naturally
known principles. Now these principles are
revealed to man by the light of the agent
intellect, which is something natural to him;
and this light makes things known to us only
to the extent that it renders images actually
intelligible; for in this consists the operation of
the agent intellect, as the De Anima says.
Now images are taken from the senses. So
our knowledge of the above-mentioned
principles begins in the senses and memory,
as is evident from the Philosopher.
Consequently, these principles do not carry
sic huiusmodi principia non ducunt nos
ulterius nisi ad ea quorum cognitionem
accipere possumus ex his quae sensu
comprehenduntur.
us beyond that which we can know from the
objects grasped by the senses.
Quiditas autem substantiarum separatarum
non potest cognosci per ea quae a sensibus
accipimus, ut ex praedictis patet, quamvis
per sensibilia possimus devenire ad
cognoscendum praedictas substantias esse
et aliquas earum condiciones. Et ideo per
nullam scientiam speculativam potest sciri
de aliqua substantia separata quid est,
quamvis per scientias speculativas
possimus scire ipsas esse et aliquas earum
condiciones, utpote quod sunt intellectuales,
incorruptibiles et huiusmodi. Et haec est
etiam sententia Commentatoris in III de
anima, quamvis Avempace contrarium
dixerit ex hoc quod aestimabat quiditates
rerum sensibilium sufficienter exprimere
quiditates immateriales, quod patet esse
falsum, ut ibidem Commentator dicit, cum
quiditas de utrisque dicatur quasi aequivoce.
Now we cannot know the essence of the
separate substances through that which we
take from the senses. This is clear from what
was said above. But through sensible things
we can arrive at a knowledge of the existence
of these substances and of some of their
characteristics. So we cannot know the
quiddity of any separate substance by means
of a speculative science, though the
speculative sciences enable us to know the
existence of these substances and some of
their traits; for instance, that they are
intellectual, incorruptible, and the like. This is
also the teaching of the Commentator.
Avempace (Ibn-Bajja) was of the opposite
opinion; he thought that the quiddities of
sensible things adequately reveal immaterial
quiddities; but, as the Commentator says, this
is clearly false, because quiddity is
predicated of both almost in an equivocal
sense.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Boethius
non intendit dicere quod per scientiam
theologiae possumus ipsam formam divinam
contemplari quid est, sed solum eam esse
ultra omnia phantasmata.
Reply to 1. Boethius does not intend to say
that through the science of theology we can
contemplate the essence of the divine form
itself, but only that is transcends all images.
Ad secundum dicendum quod quaedam res
sunt a nobis per se ipsas cognoscibiles, et in
talibus manifestandis scientiae speculativae
utuntur earum diffinitionibus ad
demonstrandum ipsarum proprietates, sicut
accidit in scientiis quae demonstrant propter
quid. Quaedam vero res sunt, quae non sunt
nobis cognoscibiles ex se ipsis, sed per
effectus suos. Et si quidem effectus sit
adaequans causam, ipsa quiditas effectus
accipitur ut principium ad demonstrandum
causam esse et ad investigandum
quiditatem eius, ex qua iterum proprietates
eius ostenduntur. Si autem sit effectus non
adaequans causam, tunc diffinitio effectus
accipitur ut principium ad demonstrandum
causam esse et aliquas condiciones eius,
quamvis quiditas causae sit semper ignota,
et ita accidit in substantiis separatis.
Reply to 2. Some things are knowable to us
through themselves; and in clarifying them the
speculative sciences use the definitions of
these objects to demonstrate their properties,
as in the case of the sciences that
demonstrate through causes. Other things are
not knowable to us through themselves but
through their effects. If the effect is
proportionate to its cause, we take the
quiddity itself of the effect as our starting point
to prove that the cause exists and to
investigate its quiddity, from which in turn its
properties are demonstrated. But if the effect
is not proportionate to its cause, we take the
definition of the effect as the starting point to
prove only the existence of the cause and
some of its properties, while the quiddity of
the cause remains unknown. This is what
happens in the case of the separate
substances.
Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est
felicitas hominis. Una imperfecta quae est in
Reply to 3. Mans happiness is twofold. One
is the imperfect happiness found in this life, of
via, de qua loquitur philosophus, et haec
consistit in contemplatione substantiarum
separatarum per habitum sapientiae,
imperfecta tamen et tali, qualis in via est
possibilis, non ut sciatur ipsarum quiditas.
Alia est perfecta in patria, in qua ipse Deus
per essentiam videbitur et aliae substantiae
separatae. Sed haec felicitas non erit per
aliquam scientiam speculativam, sed per
lumen gloriae.
which the Philosopher speaks, and this
consists in contemplating the separate
substances through the habit of wisdom. But
this contemplation is imperfect and such as is
possible in our present life, not such that we
can know their quiddity. The other is the
perfect happiness of heaven, where we will
see God himself through his essence and the
other separate substances. But this
happiness will not come through a
speculative science; it will come through the
light of glory.
Ad quartum dicendum quod scientiae
speculativae ordinantur in cognitionem
substantiarum separatarum imperfectam, ut
dictum est.
Reply to 4. As we have said, the speculative
sciences are directed to an imperfect
knowledge of the separate substances.
Ad quintum dicendum quod nobis sunt indita
principia, quibus nos possimus praeparare
ad illam cognitionem perfectam
substantiarum separatarum, non autem
quibus ad eam possimus pertingere.
Quamvis enim homo naturaliter inclinetur in
finem ultimum, non tamen potest naturaliter
illum consequi, sed solum per gratiam, et
hoc est propter eminentiam illius finis.
Reply to 5. We are endowed with principles
by which we can prepare for that perfect
knowledge of separate substances but not
with principles by which to reach it. For even
though by his nature man is inclined to his
ultimate end, he cannot reach it by nature but
only by grace, and this owing to the loftiness
of that end.

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