Ing Eco May14

Monthly Economic Update May 2014
1

8
Monthly Economic Update
Going your own way

The major central banks face diverging threats. In Europe, we expect the ECB to
respond to low inflation and the strong euro with another rate cut whereas, in the
UK, the housing boom and strong growth might mean higher rates this year.
Elsewhere, the PBOC is seeking Chinese macro stability, while the Bank of Japan
is worried about a loss in momentum. By contrast, we see the US regaining
momentum, and the Fed may be underplaying the inflation risk. Added to the
unpredictable Ukraine crisis, this divergence suggests that the current lack of
volatility in asset markets might not persist.
While surveys suggest the Eurozone recovery is gaining traction, the ECB remains
preoccupied with downside risks. The euros strength is a key issue in an environment in
which the ECB is uncomfortable with the projected path of inflation. Given Mario Draghis
clear hints at the May press conference, the J une meeting might see a refi rate cut to
0.15%, with the deposit rate moving negative. If the ECB chooses to not cut the refi rate,
the euro could soar, compounding the problems for the bank.
We remain sceptical about the ECB adopting quantitative easing (QE). Sovereign bond
purchases could leave the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme redundant
since there would be no conditionality, thereby raising the moral hazard issues. At the same
time, we expect purchases of asset-backed securities (ABS) to be difficult given the relatively
small market and the desire to see similar credit improvements across all member states.
Despite an appalling 1Q14 GDP result (0.1%), the US is in good shape, and the run of weak
data due to poor weather in the first quarter is now giving way to much more robust figures.
In particular, the labour market and manufacturing production are firming up, and underlying
GDP growth is probably c.3.0%, with 2Q14 growth likely to bounce well above this level.
Given this, you would think that Treasury yields would have been nosing higher.
However, this has not been the case, partly because the Feds taper seems largely
invariant to the economic dataflow. However, the looming end to QE, higher inflation
numbers in the pipeline and robust activity suggest that this calm in bond markets will not
persist forever.
The UK story is getting even better, with employment and growth numbers continuing to
surprise. Consequently, the probability of a rate rise this year is increasing, but the
problem for the BoE is that the recovery is not as strong outside London and surrounding
areas.
Recent data from China supports the view that the economy has stabilised after a
slowdown earlier this year, with growth over the coming quarters likely to be supported by
fiscal stimulus and monetary indicators pointing to a more sustainable growth picture. The
CNY band widening to deter hot money inflows and introduce two-way risk also seems to
be working.
If the Bank of J apan (BoJ ) is to be believed, J apan is entering a virtuous circle of
production growth, employment gains, income increases and further production growth.
But while there are some positive signs, the impact of the consumption tax remains
unclear and evidence that inflation expectations are rising might not be reliable.
Expectations of negative ECB rates in J une are weighing on the EUR. This should be
enough to limit EUR:USD upside, before broader dollar strength wins through in 2H14.
FINANCIAL MARKETS RESEARCH

research.ing.com SEE THE DISCLOSURES APPENDIX FOR IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES & ANALYST CERTIFICATION

Global Economics
15 May 2014

Mark Cliffe
Head of Global Markets Research
London +44 20 7767 6283
mark.cliffe@uk.ing.com
Rob Carnell
Tim Condon
James Knightley
Chris Turner
Peter Vanden Houte

GDP gr ow t h (% YoY)
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16
J apan
Eurozone
US
Forecasts

Source: EcoWin, ING

10Y bond yi el ds (%)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
US
J apan
Eurozone
Forecasts

Source: EcoWin, ING

FX
60
80
100
120
140 0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
EUR/USD (eop) USD/J PY (eop)
Forecasts

Source: EcoWin, ING


2

US: Out of the cold
1Q14 GDP growth of only 0.1% is a difficult starting point for an upbeat message on the
US economy. However, like most of the other data pertaining to the first quarter, growth
was also abnormally affected by erratic weather, the impact of which will be at least partly
reversed in the second quarter, and the background picture on activity remains strong.
This is not to say that such an abysmal first quarter can be totally written off. The
arithmetic of GDP accounting makes it hard now for 2014 as a whole to hit the 3.0%
figure we had been forecasting, even with a 4.5% bounce-back in 2Q14. We now have a
marginally sub-3.0% 2014 growth figure pencilled in. But that still represents an
acceleration from 2013 and, in our view, is not far off trend growth for the US. Hence, the
growth picture for the US remains a fairly good one in absolute terms, and certainly
relative to developed market standards.
Fi g 1 G-7: GDP c ompar i son

Fi g 2 US: Labour mar k et sl ac k *
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
UK US Canada Germany J apan France Italy
2014 2015 2016
%

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ING US Labour Slack Measure
(lhs)
Less slack
More slack

Source: ING

*Composite weighted measure using part-time work, productivity, hours
worked unemployment rate, participation rate and hourly earnings
Source: ING

More recent and timely indicators of activity include the latest labour market report, which
was mostly very positive. Non-farm payrolls rose at their fastest rate in years, notching up
a 288,000 rise, alongside a drop in the unemployment rate to only 6.3%. For those
wishing to take a pessimistic view of the data, the wage component remained weak. We
have been talking about the prospects of a pick-up in wages for a long time now, and it is
still not happening. This is late relative to normal cycles (maybe not surprisingly), but the
shrinking pool of available labour should soon start to deliver rising wages, though
whether this is going to be in one month or six months is still up for debate.
Another factor the pessimists might be latching on to is the fact that the household survey
employment figures were soft. Most of the fall in the unemployment rate was a result of a
large decrease in the labour force. This topic has received a lot of airplay over recent
quarters, but in recent months, labour participation has actually been ticking higher, not
lower, and the downtrend had looked as if it was at least stabilising. Other explanations
for the falling labour market include a shift from unemployment to invalidity/sickness and
demographic trends towards earlier retirement. Whatever the medium-term explanation,
this data is extremely erratic on a month-by-month basis and we read nothing into the
latest volatility.
1Q14 provided a downbeat
framework for assessing the
US backdrop
Now 2014 is unlikel y to hit
3.0%, though the underl ying
growth rate still looks to be
3.0% or thereabouts
Labour data continues to
improve
and labour slack is
declining

3

These improvements in the economy were, perhaps unusually, noted in the most recent
FOMC statement with the possible exception of the housing market, which was a victim
of bad weather, but also higher mortgage rates at the end of last year. We are looking for
some improvement in the condition of the housing market in the coming months.
In addition, we believe the Fed is equally relaxed about housing, as it delivered another
US$10bn reduction in QE at its April meeting. Nevertheless, despite all the
improvements, Fed chairman J anet Yellens tone has remained dovish. Her commentary,
as well as Fed texts, is maintaining the idea that the unemployment rate remains
elevated. This might be true in a historical sense, but what seems to be missing is any
discussion on how elevated it is and whether this warrants zero rates and QE or a more
normal policy setting. Furthermore, concepts discussed by the Fed regarding labour
market slack appear to be poorly defined.
The other element that is frequently referred to is the sub-target inflation rate. As recently
as the March FOMC meeting, member Narayana Kocherlakota dissented, saying that the
new text did not give sufficient weight to sub-target inflation. Yellen too, perhaps as a nod
to Kocherlakota, has been keen to stress the risks from sub-target inflation in her recent
testimony. However, the reality is that inflation is not all that low. This week most likely
delivered another rise in CPI inflation (published after this note is published), taking the
headline inflation rate to 1.9-2.0% YoY. The Feds preferred measure of inflation the
PCE index tends to trend about 0.2/0.3ppt below the CPI, but should in any case move
up to about 1.6-1.7% in the next few weeks. Moreover, only a continuation of the current
CPI trends would be required to see CPI inflation breach the 2.0% target within the next
few months and drag PCE up to target.
When this happens, the Fed will no longer be able to refer to sub-target inflation as an
excuse for its accommodative stance and, by then, the unemployment rate is likely to
have fallen even further towards 6.0%. Over the same timescale, QE should have
declined to only about US$25bn and activity growth will be more visibl y running at
something closer to 3.0% than 2.0%.
Fi g 3 US: Tr easur y yi el ds l ow r el at i ve t o gr ow t h

Fi g 4 US: I nf l at i on and PCE headed up
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Mar 00 Mar 02 Mar 04 Mar 06 Mar 08 Mar 10 Mar 12 Mar 14
Nominal GDP, lhs
10Y US Treasury yield
YoY% 3QMA YoY%

0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
J an 10 J an 11 J an 12 J an 13 J an 14
Headline CPI
Headline PCE
YoY%
2.0% target
1.0% "deflation" worry
ING f April CPI

Source: EcoWin

Source: EcoWin

With all this likely to occur in the not-too-distant future, we find it slightly strange that the
10Y US Treasury bond yield is barely 2.60%, much lower than the notional underlying
rate of nominal GDP. Admittedly, the market is pricing in a reasonable amount of
tightening over 2015-17 and recent economic strength has not generated much reason to
alter what is already largely priced in. There has also apparently been strong demand
from the pension fund industry for longer-dated maturity assets, helping to keep bonds
Concern about the housing
market is premature
and does not seem to be
undul y worrying the Fed
The sub-target inflation angst
is likel y to disappear over the
next few months
alongside strong growth,
improving labour conditions,
waning QE and higher
inflation
Higher Treasury yields
seems probable, though they
may hold steady for some
further months

4

bid. However, even so, we find the lack of a pick-up in the yields slightly perplexing a
sort of bond yield conundrum II.
This will no doubt delight the Fed, which does not want to see economic growth
undermined as it normalises policy. However, we wonder whether this is a situation that
could continue, and still expect the yields to push higher towards the end of the year, on
the back of robust growth, target-or-above inflation, an end to QE and, in time, higher
wage growth.
Rob Carnell, London +44 20 7767 6909
Eurozone: ECB points to June
Will they or wont they? This now seems to be the most burning question regarding the
ECBs monetary policy meeting in J une. In an unusually outspoken manner, Draghi
expressed the Governing Councils dissatisfaction about the projected path of inflation
(too low) and said that it is comfortable with acting at its next meeting.
The ECB has shown itself to be rather cautious regarding the growth outlook, with
downward risks still prevailing. Indeed, an escalation in the Ukraine crisis is likely to have
a bigger impact on Europe than on the US. While we continue to believe that the recovery
will continue in the coming quarters, it is true that it is definitely not a straight upward line.
Growth in the first quarter was weaker than expected, even though it was boosted by the
unusually mild Winter weather. Some forward-looking indicators project an even slightly
weaker second quarter. That said, eyeballing the confidence figures in the services sector
it looks as if domestic demand also will now be one of the growth drivers, potentially
compensating for less buoyant net exports. All in all, the recovery remains on course, but
little acceleration is expected for the time being.
Fi g 5 Def l at i on r i sk has i nc r eased

Fi g 6 w hi l e gr ow t h i s no l onger ac c el er at i ng
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
J
a
n
-
0
8
M
a
y
-
0
8
S
e
p
-
0
8
J
a
n
-
0
9
M
a
y
-
0
9
S
e
p
-
0
9
J
a
n
-
1
0
M
a
y
-
1
0
S
e
p
-
1
0
J
a
n
-
1
1
M
a
y
-
1
1
S
e
p
-
1
1
J
a
n
-
1
2
M
a
y
-
1
2
S
e
p
-
1
2
J
a
n
-
1
3
M
a
y
-
1
3
S
e
p
-
1
3
J
a
n
-
1
4
% of items for which inflation <1%
% of items for which inflation <0%

-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
J
a
n
-
0
7
J
u
n
-
0
7
N
o
v
-
0
7
A
p
r
-
0
8
S
e
p
-
0
8
F
e
b
-
0
9
J
u
l
-
0
9
D
e
c
-
0
9
M
a
y
-
1
0
O
c
t
-
1
0
M
a
r
-
1
1
A
u
g
-
1
1
J
a
n
-
1
2
J
u
n
-
1
2
N
o
v
-
1
2
A
p
r
-
1
3
S
e
p
-
1
3
F
e
b
-
1
4
J
u
l
-
1
4
D
e
c
-
1
4
Household overnight deposits %
(9m lead)
Industrial production % (rhs)

Source: Thomson Reuters DataStream Source: Thomson Reuters DataStream

Interestingly, the ECB no longer seems comfortable with the projected path of inflation.
Indeed, HICP inflation increased to 0.7% in April, but this was below consensus. Although
food prices, which now lower inflation, might become less of a downward force in the
coming quarters, inflation is likely to remain closer to 1% than to 2%. Given the ECBs
strong emphasis on the exchange rate as a clear downward risk, we think the bank is
now all but sure to cut rates, reducing the refi to 0.15% and the deposit rate to -0.10%.
The absence of a cut could send the euro soaring again, thereby putting renewed
pressure on the ECB to reduce rates eventually.
This time, the bond yield
conundrum is welcome, but
it might not continue
The ECB is comfortable
with acting in June
as the recovery remains
vulnerable
o

and inflation too low

The deposit rate is likel y to
become negative

5

At the same time, the ECB is likely to put a ceiling on the amounts (above the required
reserves) that can be placed on the current account at the bank. As these measures are
likely to curtail the excess liquidity in the money market, we believe the Eonia is likely to
converge with the refi, thereby keeping market rates in positive territory. The ECB is
probably eager to keep the negative deposit rates cost for the banking sector as low as
possible. Finally, we believe the forward guidance will be further strengthened by
extending the full allotment in the refinancing operations until the end of 2015. This
should keep bond yields low, even if there is some contagion effect from the US once the
Fed starts its rate hiking cycle.
As for QE, we are still not convinced it will happen. The purchase of sovereign bonds is
probably a no-go as, in contrast with the OMT programme, there would be no conditions
attached to such a programme, which would entail significant moral hazard risks. While
the ECB has previously hinted at the possibility of targeted ABS purchases to unclog the
credit channel in peripheral countries, it is quite unlikely to see short-term action in this
regard. Indeed, the April 2014 bank lending survey already saw some easing in the credit
standards for households, while they remained broadly unchanged for loans to
enterprises. The survey of SMEs access to finance also reported that bank loan
availability had become less negative and already saw some improvement in several
Eurozone countries.
On top of that, the ECB is convinced that there is a lagged relationship between the
economic cycle and the credit cycle. Finally, the Asset Quality Review aims to foster a
sounder banking system, which should lead to a revival in credit activity. It has to be said
that an increasing number of banks have seized the more favourable stock market
environment to strengthen their capital base.
Meanwhile, the hunt for yield has certainly benefitted peripheral countries, with 10Y yields
falling to record lows in several countries, even though both debt levels and
unemployment rates remain very high, making long-term debt sustainibility still far from
guaranteed. This allowed Portugal to exit its bail-out programme without requesting a
precautionary credit line. As for Greece, the economic situation is finally stabilising, but
some additional debt relief is still on the cards following the European parliamentary
elections.
Peter Vanden Houte, Brussels +32 2 547 8009
UK: London versus the rest
UK data flow is going from strength to strength. The economy has added over 1.5m jobs
in the past four years, business confidence is at a 40-year high, wages are starting to pick
up and the housing market continues to surge ahead. GDP will probably accelerate in
2Q14 versus the 0.8% rate recorded in 1Q14, with momentum through the rest of the
year likely to be supported by the fact that aggregate household incomes are being
boosted by tax changes, rising pay awards and a 3% rise in the national minimum wage.
Thankfully, this means that one key criticism of the UK growth story that households
have not been feeling the recovery is starting to be addressed. Indeed, consumer
confidence is now at a seven-year high.
Companies are also looking to expand significantly, based on responses to investment
and hiring intention surveys. Even the trade numbers are not looking too bad given the
strength of the GBP. As such, we have revised our 2014 GDP growth forecast from 3.0%
to 3.2%. Our forecast of a first Bank of England (BoE) rate hike in February 2015 remains
unchanged, but the risks are increasingly skewed towards an earlier move.
The UK growth story
continues to strengthen, with
the household sector starting
to feel the positive effects
The economy is likel y to
grow 3.2% this year, with the
corporate sector providing
significant upside
Hunt for yield keeps spreads
low
though market rates should
remain positive
Sovereign bond purchases
are still unlikel y

and it is too soon to
implement the ABS
programme

6

Unfortunately, the other main criticism of the UK growth story that it is primarily a
London and South-East story still looks valid, as shown in Figures 7 and 8. Employment
in London has risen by 9.3% since the depths of the recession and accounted for one in
four new jobs created in the country despite the capital city accounting for only 13% of
the total UK population. House prices are also up, 52% from their lows in London versus
only 11% for the UK excluding London and the South-East. With wealth levels and
aggregate incomes rising far less quickly outside London, this creates problems for the
BoE when setting policy.
Fi g 7 Empl oyment gr ow t h: London vs r est of UK

Fi g 8 House pr i c es: London vs r est of UK
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
UK
London
UK excluding London
% change from 2008
employment peak

-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
UK
London
UK ex London
% change in house prices from 2008 peak

Source: EcoWin, ING

Source: EcoWin, ING

That said, there are changes happening. We are starting to see the employment gains
spreading out a little more, with all UK regions now seeing more people working than
before the crisis started. The West Midlands, East Midlands and Scotland remain the key
underperformers, while the East of England and Yorkshire & Humberside are performing
relatively well. With business surveys all firmly in expansion territory, we believe the ex-
London part of the UK will perform better over the next 12-24 months. Lower costs in
these areas are likely to be a key factor behind the expansion, but it might not be swift
enough for the BoE to avoid criticism from these regions when policy tightening starts.
James Knightley, London +44 20 7767 6614
China: Stability the priority
Chinas 1Q14 GDP data and the higher-frequency March economic releases convey the
sense of a stable economy. The small upticks in the official and HSBC/Markit
Manufacturing PMIs in April data convey the same. We expect the mini-stimulus
announced in early April to support second-quarter GDP growth equal to the first
quarters 7.4%. We cannot identify any macro issue pressing enough to distract the
authorities from moving on their ambitious agenda of micro reforms identified during the
Third Plenum. We consider this an investor-friendly state of affairs, with emerging market
risk assets as the biggest beneficiaries.
A smaller year-to-date increase in the CPI food component 3.5% in March versus 4.7% in
2013 and 3.9% a year earlier leads us to revise our 2014 inflation forecast from 2.6% to
2.3% (Bloomberg consensus: 2.6%). If an inflation spike occurs, it should come from the
food component; non-food inflation was 1.7% year-to-date in March (vs 1.6% in 2013 and
1.8% a year earlier). However, supply shocks are unpredictable and our forecast revision
assumes annual increases in the food component at the March year-to-date level.
The problem is that it is
London and the South-East
that is feeling most of the
benefits
Job growth is starting to rise
elsewhere, but the BoE is
likel y to have to raise rates
before the underperforming
regions would like
Stable growth and steady
reform progress
2014 inflation forecast
downgraded

7

The historically low 12.1% YoY growth in M2 in March put 1Q14 growth at 21.2% QoQ
annualised, which is close to the pre-GFC average and well below the 30% post-GFC
average (Figure 9). This is a hopeful sign of a return to stable monetary policy, which we
believe would fix most of Chinas macro ills, especially over-borrowing total credit is far
in excess of nominal GDP growth and the shortening of property market cycles.
Since the authorities widened the CNY trading band in March, analysts have been
scrutinising the USD:CNY fixings and moves in spot USD:CNY for clues about the
authorities intent. We take the authorities at their word that the band widening was aimed
at imparting greater two-way risk to USD:CNY. We currently believe they want evidence
of two-way risk to be manifest in the form of a 1% spot USD premium to the fixing rate.
We now expect them to appreciate the fixing rate, which experience has taught will result
in a widening of the premium, if the premium narrows too much.
We think the PBoC will stabilise its USD:CNY fixings at the prevailing 6.16. We forecast
spot USD:CNY trading at an average 1% premium to the fixing or around 6.22, to which
we have revised our year-end forecast from 6.00.
Foreign reserves rose by US$128.7bn to US$3.95tr in 1Q14. We think most of this
increase occurred in J anuary when the USD was trading around 1% weaker in the
offshore CNH market compared with the onshore CNY market (Figure 10). We believe
that arbitrage-related hot money flows were a factor sustaining the spot USD:CNY
discount to the fixing near the previous 1% limit. We also think halting the hot money flow
was one reason the authorities widened the USD:CNY trading band, since which time the
USD:CNH discount to USD:CNY has disappeared and spot USD:CNY to the fixing has
turned into a 1% premium.
Fi g 9 Chi na: M2 (%QoQ annual i sed)

Fi g 10 Chi na: USD:CNY and USD:CNY pr emi ums*
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Pre-GFC (2002 to 3Q08) Post-GFC (4Q08 to 2012) 2014

-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Apr
12
J un
12
Aug
12
Oct
12
Dec
12
Feb
13
Apr
13
J un
13
Aug
13
Oct
13
Dec
13
Feb
14
Apr
14
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
Offshore Onshore

Source: EMED data service, ING Bank

*Offshore denotes the USD:CNH premium to spot USD:CNY. Onshore denotes
the spot USD:CNY premium to the PBOC fixing rate.
Source: Bloomberg, ING Bank
Tim Condon, Singapore, +65 6232 6020
Japan: Wishful thinking
The BoJ s latest bi-annual outlook for economic activity and prices reads optimistically.
However, we wonder whether there is an element of wishful thinking in the text.
For example, there are frequent mentions of virtuous circles, in which rising domestic
demand pushes up production, employment, incomes and, in turn, domestic demand
The BoJ sounds fairl y upbeat
in its latest bi-annual report
citing the virtuous circle
of production, employment,
incomes, etc
Stabilising monetary policy
Watching the CNY
Restoration of pre-band
widening FX trends
End-2014 USD:CNY at 6.22

8

again. The catalyst for such changes is the stimulus measures currently underway, with
the self-styled quantitative and qualitative easing (QQE) providing the push.
Furthermore, the BoJ now assumes that the inflation rate adjusted for the effects of food
and energy and the direct effects of the consumption tax hike, will push inflation up to
2.0% over the middle of its projection period (through fiscal 2015), and it cites rising
inflation expectations to support this claim.
There is some support for the BoJ s optimism. Inflation expectations have been picking
up; in Figure 11, we show the breakeven rates for 10Y nominal bonds versus index-linked
bonds as evidence. We use the 10Y break-even to try to minimise the effects of the
consumption tax hike, which dominates one-year and two-year measures. It is unclear
that pricing expectations in surveys such as the Tankan are immune to the direct tax hike
impacts.
Fi g 11 J apan: Br eak even r at es f or nomi nal vs i ndex -
l i nk ed bonds

Fi g 12 J apan: Consumpt i on t ax i mpac t on spendi ng
and pr i c es
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Oct 13 Nov 13 Dec 13 J an 14 Feb 14 Mar 14 Apr 14
%
5Y 10Y

-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
J an-96 J ul-96 J an-97 J ul-97 J an-98 J ul-98 J an-99 J ul-99 J an-00
Retail sales, lhs Retail J an 2013
CPI, rhs CPI J an 2013
retail
front-
running
post tax hike
decline
"echo" from
previous year
(YoY%
(YoY%)

Source: Bloomberg

Source: EcoWin

Perhaps there is also some scope for optimism regarding the domestic demand side.
Looking at indicators such as household spending, the 16.1% YoY jump in March shows
that consumers waited until the last minute to stock up on goods before the consumption
tax hike hit. This is a similar jump to that seen in 1997, but comes against a backdrop of
gradually rising, not falling, spending. Consequently, we believe there is a better chance
that spending will pick up again in the coming months, rather than continuing to plunge,
as it did last time. Labour demand also seems to be firming, if we go by the job-offers-to-
applicants ratio, and labour cash earnings also seem to have shown further signs of
firming.
One aspect of the BoJ s forecast that seems particularly optimistic is its assessment of
external demand. While we agree with the general direction of improvement in external
demand, we do not see much of a pick-up anytime soon from J apans main trading
partners, one of which is China.
For now, the BoJ seems content to continue with its current QQE policy and, as a result,
the J PY is under little pressure to deviate from the narrow range around USD:J PY 102
that it has inhabited for the past three months. But we suspect that the risks around the
BoJ s assessment lie heavily to the downside and would be surprised if there was no
need for a further expansion of the J PY60-70tr QE target later this year.
Rob Carnell, London +44 207 767 6909
furthermore, it looks for
inflation (adjusted for the
consumption tax hike) to hit
2.0% in 2015
Admittedl y, some things are
picking up inflation
expectations (maybe)
and March saw an
inevitable jump in sales to
beat the consumption tax
hike
and we still expect the
JPY60-70tr QE target to be
raised later this year.
But it is less clear that other
parts of the economy are
doing so well

9

FX: ECB tries to limit EUR rally
In a relatively benign environment for risk, the FX focus has squarely shifted to the ECBs
attitude towards the strong EUR and the prospect of negative ECB deposit rates in J une.
Our team is indeed looking for a cut in the deposit rate to negative territory in J une a
move we think should at least cap EUR:USD upside near 1.40.
As we mentioned last month, Draghis speech in Vienna in March gave a strong hint that
the EUR was ascending on the ECBs list of worries. The May press conference saw the
strong EUR cited as a risk to both growth and inflation. The ECB now looks prepared to
act in J une. We think the move to a negative deposit rate will be done primarily to
address the strength of the EUR, rather than as a serious effort to promote credit growth.
And so far, EUR:USD has reacted to this threat by pulling away from 1.40.
Fi g 13 ECB appl yi ng br ak es t o EUR bul l t r end

Fi g 14 Car r y t r ade r emai ns popul ar
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
1.10
1.15
1.20
1.25
1.30
1.35
1.40
1.45
1.50
1.55
1.60
J an 07 J an 08 J an 09 J an 10 J an 11 J an 12 J an 13 J an 14
EUR/USD One year risk reversal (RHS %)

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
J an 00 J an 02 J an 04 J an 06 J an 08 J an 10 J an 12 J an 14
DM Carry Basket* EM Carry Basket*
Fed Funds Target (RHS %)
J an 2000 =100 for
carry baskets

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Bloomberg. *Both baskets funded equally out of USD, J PY, CHF. DM
basket invested equally in AUD, NZD, NOK. EM basket invested equally in
BRL, TRY, IDR

We doubt a negative deposit rate on its own will be sufficient to start a EUR bear trend.
After all, the Eurozone current account surplus is currently worth around 200bn per
annum and it will probably take several years for this position to return to a more
balanced setting. However, negative rates should drive money market flows away from
the EUR. And if they can keep Eurozone market rates anchored at a time when overseas
market interest rates start to rise (eg, in the US and UK), a clearer EUR bear trend should
start to emerge later in the year. We thus look for modest EUR:USD downside to 1.35
this summer, with a sharper fall occuring when US rates start to gain more upside
momentum later this year.
Limited EUR upside against the USD could start to see the EUR become the preferred
funding currency for 2H14, particularly if the ECB goes a step further and considers QE.
While there are not too many Fed tightening cycles to look at for historical comparison,
we note that Alan Greenspans well-telegraphed tightening cycle during the middle of the
last decade did not derail carry trade strategies. Thus, the EUR could start to reverse
some of the large gains posted against high-yield currencies last year.

Chris Turner, London +44 20 7767 1610
The FX focus has squarel y
shifted to the ECBs attitude
towards the strong EUR
Negative rates should drive
money market flows away
from the EUR
We thus look for modest
EUR:USD downside to 1.35
this summer
The EUR could start to
reverse some of the large
gains posted against high-
yield currencies last year

10

Fi g 15 I NG gl obal f or ec ast s
2013 2014F 2015F 2016F
1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q FY 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q FY 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q FY 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q FY
United States
GDP (% QoQ, ann) 1.1 2.5 4.1 2.6 1.9 0.1 4.5 3.5 3.2 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.4 2.8 2.5 3.6 3.1
CPI headline (% YoY) 1.7 1.4 1.6 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.9 2.0 2.4 1.8 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.6
Federal funds (%, eop) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 1.00 1.25 1.50 2.00 2.50
Fed monthly average asset
purchase total
48.8 85.0 85.0 85.0 65.0 45.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3-month interest rate (%, eop) 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.80 1.10 1.40 1.65 2.15 2.65
10-year interest rate (%, eop) 1.84 2.48 2.61 3.02 2.80 2.70 2.80 3.20 3.30 3.40 3.50 3.50 3.60 3.70 3.60 3.60
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) Fiscal Year 2013/14 -3.9 Fiscal Year 2014/15 -2.9 Fiscal Year 2015/16 -2.6 Fiscal Year 2016/7 -2.9
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP) -2.9 -0.8 0.0 0.4
Debt held by public (% of GDP) 72.0 72.6 72.4 72.4
Gross public debt/GDP 102.3 102.7 101.9 101.4
Total (Fed+local) debt held by
public / GDP
92.4 94.5 95.0 -
Eurozone
GDP (% QoQ, ann) -0.9 1.3 0.6 0.9 -0.4 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
CPI headline (% YoY) 1.8 1.4 1.3 0.8 1.3 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7
Refi minimum bid rate (%, eop) 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.50
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP) -0.8 -0.2 0.1 0.3
Japan
GDP (% QoQ, ann) 4.5 4.1 0.9 0.7 1.5 5.9 -1.3 0.0 0.8 1.7 1.0 2.2 2.6 0.7 1.2 0.1 1.0 1.1 1.6 1.0
CPI headline (% YoY) -0.6 -0.3 0.9 1.4 0.4 1.7 3.3 2.2 1.9 2.3 1.8 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 0.3 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8
BoJ O/n call rate (%, eop) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BoJ asset purchase total 68 91 113 136 158 181 203 225 240 260 280 300 320 335 345 350
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) Fiscal Year 2013/14 9.2 Fiscal Year 2014/15 9.5 Fiscal Year 2015/16 8.8 Fiscal Year 2016/17 6.9
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP) 0.0 -0.4 0.8 0.0
Gross public debt/GDP 241 248 251 255
Chi na
GDP (% YoY) 7.7 7.5 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
CPI headline (% YoY) 2.4 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
7-day repo rate (% eop) 3.60 5.70 4.25 5.40 4.19 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25
10-year T-bond yield (%, eop) 3.59 3.61 4.07 4.62 4.54 4.60 4.80 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP) n/a n/a n/a n/a
UK
GDP (% QoQ, ann) 1.4 3.1 3.4 2.7 1.9 3.2 3.8 2.6 2.8 3.2 2.7 2.7 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.6
CPI headline (% YoY) 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.1 2.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.7 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2
BoE official bank rate (%, eop) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50
BoE Quantitative Easing (bn) 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 370 360
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP) -1.0 -0.9 -0.8 -0.8
EUR:USD (eop) 1.28 1.30 1.35 1.37 1.38 1.35 1.33 1.28 1.25 1.23 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.22 1.25 1.30
USD:J PY (eop) 94 100 98 105 103 105 108 110 112 115 118 120 120 120 120 120
USD:CNY (eop) 6.21 6.14 6.12 6.05 6.21 6.22 6.22 6.22 6.22 6.22 6.22 6.22 6.22 6.22 6.22 6.22
EUR:GBP (eop) 0.84 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.80
Oil (US$/bbl, pa) 110 105 110 109 105 105 105 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110
Source: ING forecasts

11

Research anal yst contacts
Developed Markets Title Telephone Email
London Mark Cliffe Head of Global Markets Research 44 20 7767 6283 mark.cliffe@uk.ing.com
Rob Carnell Chief International Economist 44 20 7767 6909 rob.carnell@uk.ing.com
J ames Knightley Senior Economist, UK, US, $ Bloc 44 20 7767 6614 james.knightley@uk.ing.com
Chris Turner Global Head of Strategy and Head of EMEA
and LATAM Research
44 20 7767 1610 christopher.turner@uk.ing.com
Tom Levinson Foreign Exchange Strategist 44 20 7767 8057 tom.levinson@uk.ing.com
Aengus McMahon Head of European High Yield Research 44 20 7767 8044 aengus.mcmahon@uk.ing.com
Amsterdam Maarten Leen Head of Macro Economics 31 20 563 4406 maarten.leen@ing.nl
Martin van Vliet Senior Economist, Eurozone 31 20 563 9528 martin.van.vliet@ing.nl
Teunis Brosens Senior Economist, US 31 20 563 6167 teunis.brosens@ing.nl
Dimitry Fleming Senior Economist, Netherlands 31 20 563 9497 dimitry.fleming@ing.nl
Padhraic Garvey Global Head of Rates and Debt Strategy 31 20 563 8955 padhraic.garvey@ingbank.com
J eroen van den Broek Developed Markets Strategy and Research 31 20 563 8959 jeroen.van.den.broek@ingbank.com
Maureen Schuller Head of Covered Bond Strategy 31 20 563 8941 maureen.schuller@ingbank.com
Alessandro Giansanti Senior Rates Strategist 31 20 563 8801 alessandro.giansanti@ingbank.com
J ob Veenendaal Quantitative Strategist 31 20 563 8956 job.veenendaal@ingbank.com
Roelof-J an van den Akker Head of Technical Analysis 31 20 563 8178 roelof-jan.van.den.akker@ingbank.com
Mark Harmer Head of Developed Markets Credit Research 31 20 563 8964 mark.harmer@ingbank.com
Brussels Peter Vanden Houte Chief Economist, Belgium, Eurozone 32 2 547 8009 peter.vandenhoute@ing.be
Carsten Brzeski Senior Economist, Germany, Eurozone 32 2 547 8652 carsten.brzeski@ing.be
J ulien Manceaux Economist, France, Belgium, Switzerland 32 2 547 3350 julien.manceaux@ing.be
Philippe Ledent Economist, Belgium, Luxembourg 32 2 547 3161 philippe.ledent@ing.be
Anthony Baert Economist, Ireland, Slovenia, Portugal 32 2 547 3995 anthony.baert@ing.be
Milan Paolo Pizzoli Senior Economist, EMU, Italy, Greece 39 02 89629 3630 paolo.pizzoli@ing.it
Emerging Markets Title Telephone Email
New York Gustavo Rangel Chief Economist, LATAM 1 646 424 6464 gustavo.rangel@ing.com
London Dorothee Gasser-Chteauvieux Chief Economist, EMEA 44 20 7767 6023 dorothee.gasser@uk.ing.com
Hungary Andras Balatoni Senior Economist, Hungary 36 1 255 5581 andras.balatoni@ingbank.com
India Upasna Bhardwaj Economist, India 91 22 3309 5718 upasna.bhardwaj@ingvysyabank.com
Philippines J oey Cuyegkeng Economist, Philippines 632 479 8855 joey.cuyegkeng@asia.ing.com
Poland Rafal Benecki Chief Economist, Poland 48 22 820 4696 rafal.benecki@ingbank.pl
Grzegorz Ogonek Economist, Poland 48 22 820 4608 grzegorz.ogonek@ingbank.pl
Romania Vlad Muscalu Chief Economist, Romania 40 21 209 1393 vlad.muscalu@ing.ro
Mihai Tantaru Economist, Romania 40 21 209 1290 mihai.tantaru@ing.ro
Russia Dmitry Polevoy Chief Economist, Russia and CIS 7 495 771 7994 dmitry.polevoy@ingbank.com
Egor Fedorov Senior Credit Analyst, Russia and CIS 7 495 755 5480 egor.fedorov@ingbank.com
Singapore Tim Condon Head of Research & Chief Economist, Asia 65 6232 6020 tim.condon@asia.ing.com
Prakash Sakpal Economist, Asia 65 6232 6181 prakash.sakpal@asia.ing.com
Turkey Muhammet Mercan Senior Economist, Turkey 90 212 329 0751 muhammet.mercan@ingbank.com.tr
Muammer Kmrcolu Economist, Turkey 90 212 329 0753 muammer.komurcuoglu@ingbank.com.tr


12

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13


14


15

Disclosures Appendix
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indirectly related to the inclusion of specific recommendations or views in this report.
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