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The viability of deterrence strategies in the 21st century

In more quotidian terms, the underlying question is: are deterrence strategies
appropriate for the 21st century global security environment? The short answer: yes,
but not really. Deterrence strategies can be viable for the 21st century global security
environment, but, unlike the Cold War period, they should not represent the back-
bone of todays national securities. Deterrence strategies are extremely circumstantial
and vary from case to case. Precisely due to this reason, deterrence strategies have do
be constantly updated and re-conceptualised in order to meet the current security
threats. If tailored appropriately, deterrence strategies are very much viable in the
21st century. Providing a comprehensive answer first and foremost require identify-
ing the 21st century global security environment and defining deterrence strategies. I
start by outlining the most relevant characteristics of todays security arena, and
move on to discuss deterrence strategies. In sustaining my argument, I specifically
employ the example of terrorism and discuss why are deterrence strategies consid-
ered inefficient in this case. I argue there is a need for a greater intellectual effort to
contextualise relations between states and non-state actors, and to understand how
should deterrence be tailored to meet this threat. I move on to analyse deterrence of
terrorism by punishment and by denial and provide the appropriate examples to vali-
date my statement.

The 21st century global security environment - the novelty

While the post-World War II security environment was characterised by a
great power dyad, the end of the Cold War left the world unipolar. Many argued that
the 21st century would see emerging great powers, comparing it to the Congress of
Vienna world order. But now this comparison seems difficult to digest. In addition to
emerging powers, what strongly characterises the current global security environment
is the multi-dimensional and non-conventional aspects of conflicts and their horizon-
tal proliferation (Harknett, 2008). Todays global security environment accommo-
dates states, non-state actors, international institutions, conventional warfare, nuclear
build-up, terrorism, piracy, cyberwar etc. States find non-state actors irrational and
illegitimate, and condemn their warring tactics for being unconventional. Both in ac-
ademia and in policymaking circles, the emergence of these unconventional actors
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and theatres of war points out a wide conceptual and analytical gap. There seems to
be an urgent need to acknowledge these unconventional threats and adapt current se-
curity strategies to these new patterns.

Deterrence - the basics

Deterrence, both as a practical and theoretical concept, emerged during the
Cold War. It was conceived in response to nuclear threats, but it also became useful
in the context of conventional force. Deterrence as a strategy is coercive in nature,
but it is different from coercion itself (Freedman, 2004). According to the dictionary,
it implies the action of deterring, which is instilling doubt or fear of implications in
order to discourage a particular course of action (Oxforddictionaries.com, 2014). The
most widely employed strategies are deterrence by punishment and deterrence by de-
nial. The first one implies threatening to inflict same or higher costs on the aggressor
than he would benefit from following a specific course of action (Kroenig and Pavel,
2012, p. 23). The second one focuses on deterring the aggressor by denying the bene-
fits of him following a specific course of action (Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p. 23). As
a theoretical concept, deterrence developed to incorporate specific structural charac-
teristics. The strategies address costs and benefits for both the aggressor and the de-
terrer and so rationality is deemed imperative (Harknett, 2008). Further, there has to
be shared accurate information about each other in order to successfully approximate
the real costs and benefits. Incomplete communication could lead to a misevaluation
of the costs and benefits and might lead to ineffective deterrence. The good flow of
information will lead to each side determining the others capability, which is of par-
amount importance when formulating or carrying credible deterrence (Mearsheimer,
1983, p.46). These structural units underpin the circumstantial character of the deter-
rence.
Jeffrey Knopf summarises best the theoretical development of the concept as
the four waves in deterrence research (Knopf, 2010). During the first wave, in the
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, deterrence emerged as a strategy to
efficiently respond to the threat posed by the atomic bomb. In the 1950s and the
1960s, the second wave of research approached nuclear strategy from a game theory
perspective. During the third wave, which emerged in the 1970s, deterrence strategy
became a more sophisticated concept which employed statistical and case-study
methods on conventional deterrence (Knopf, 2010, p.1). The first three waves of de-
terrence consisted in the academic and theoretical efforts to conceptualise the strate-
gy which was the backbone of the US national security against the Soviet threat
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(Betts, 2013). Deterrence as we know it today is a contextualised concept. The forth
wave of deterrence research focuses on deconstructing its contextualisation, as it is a
direct response to real-world developments (Knopf, 2010, p.1). As opposed to the
previous waves, now it is the academia which tailors deterrence to meet the contem-
porary asymmetric threats. It is precisely this fourth wave of research which seems to
bridge the gap between yesterdays security and todays insecurities.

Preconditions for viably deterring terrorism contextualising relations and
strategic culture

One relevant example of 21st centurys security threats is terrorism. Needless
to mention, there are obvious reasons why deterrence seems inappropriate in the con-
text of terrorism. Terrorist groups are said to be un-deterrable because they are irra-
tional actors who lack a return address for retaliation and do not fear death (Betts,
2013). However, I argue that these remarks are based on a very rigid understanding
of conventional deterrence. One mistake, I believe, is that deterrence strategies are
expected to work against Al Qaeda in the same fashion they worked against the Sovi-
et Union. However, contextualising the relationship between targeted states and ter-
rorist groups will reveal why deterrence cannot be the main strategy against terror-
ism, but still be viable.

In conventional relations, states acknowledge each other as legitimate units of
the international system. Contrary, in unconventional relations such as terrorism, tar-
geted states do not acknowledge terrorist groups and, in fact, wish to eradicate them.
In conventional relations, states use deterrence to maintain a status quo marked by no
military or nuclear conflict. However, applying deterrence in unconventional rela-
tions implies that states would be content on maintaing the status quo of terrorist
groups. But what about suicide bombers whose status quo is by default carrying an
explosion? Deterring the terrorist groups from carrying attacks does not imply the
eradication of the organisation and so further counterterrorism policies are required to
achieve this end. But this does not rule out the viability of deterrence against terror-
ism completely. Drawing on Knopfs fourth wave of deterrence research, a more
broadly conceptualised deterrence becomes one viable strategy in countering terror-
ism. Efforts have been made towards bridging the conceptual and analytical gap be-
tween deterrence and terrorism.

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Deterring terrorists by limiting calculations of costs and benefits to material
aspects resulted in failure. Labelling terrorists irrational lies in the inability to under-
stand the fundamental strategic logic of terrorism and the sources of their motiva-
tion (Lantis, 2009, p. 477). Terror tactics translate in the strategical use of limited re-
sources to achieve a cause. An example which supports the strategic employment of
terror tactics is Ayman al-Zawahiris letter to Abu Musab al-Zarkawi, the former be-
ing second most important person in Al-Qaeda and the latter being the head of Al-
Qaeda in Iraq. In 2006 Al-Zawahiri warned Al-Zarkawi that his indiscriminate use of
violence will result in counterproductive consequences (Knopf, 2010, p.18). Ac-
knowledging this as a valid type of warfare provides incentives for rational en-
gagement with non-state actors.

Moreover, even religious interpretations behind Al-Qaedas behaviour or be-
hind martyrdom can most certainly be rationally approached and deterred. In these
cases, for a deterrence strategy to be viable, it must take into into consideration im-
material aspects such as identity, motivation, norms etc (Lantis, 2009). Therefore
constructivists plead for the incorporation of strategic culture in deterrence analysis.
Approaching these groups with a reasonable amount of respect and recognition, as
well as positive incentives to address historic grievances reveals a wider range of
costs and benefits (Lantis, 2009, p. 478). Tailoring deterrence to address non-state ac-
tors requires a broader conceptual horizon which moves beyond the rationale of na-
tion-states. I will assess the two most relevant deterrence strategies, by punishment
and by denial, respectively, and show how they are relevant in countering terrorism.

Deterring terrorism by punishment

Accurate knowledge on the location of terrorists safe havens can sometimes
make retaliation by force possible. There can and have been cases when terrorist
groups have been directly punished, with the best examples being George W Bushs
operational war on terror or Israels offensives against Hamas. Nevertheless, direct
violent engagements are strongly discouraged (Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p. 26).
Show of force can trigger strategic victimisation which might, in fact, act as an incen-
tive for some groups to radicalise and join forces (Trager and Zagorcheva, 2006, p.
101) (Knopf, 2010, p.12). Current research toys with the idea of directly punishing
terrorists themselves, but not through massive use of force. Such deterrence strategies
imply attacking high-value targets, such as demolishing houses of suicide bombers
families post-martyrdom or attacking families and supporters. While most of them
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are subject to debate due to obvious reasons such as domestic liberal constrains, other
have already been proven inefficient. Israels demolition of martyrs houses during
the Second Intifada has, in fact, seen the number of suicide bombers increase from
167 to 225 in 2003 (Vira, 2011, p. 6).

When engaging with groups such as Al-Qaeda it is important to bear in mind
that, unlike nation-states, they are not single entities (Knopf, 2010, p.10). Nowadays
terrorist groups represent systems or networks which incorporate actors performing
specific functions. In this case, deterring terrorism by punishment requires a deep un-
derstanding of the internal organisation of such networks. While it is true that terror-
ist groups are extremely difficult to be punished because they do not have a return
address, there are many actors in the system which do (Betts, 2013). For instance,
for Al-Qaeda to function it requires leaders, lieutenants, financiers, logisticians, fa-
cilitators, foot soldiers, recruiters, supporting population segments, and religious or
otherwise ideological figures (Knopf, 2010, p.10). In the case of non-state actors ef-
fective deterrence by punishment is unlikely to target the group itself.

There are many functional parts of a terrorist system which can be successfully
deterred from participating in or supporting terrorist activities. Because non-state ac-
tors lack legitimate financial sources, they are partly dependent on external financiers
to support them. In most cases, financiers are not eager to sacrifice their lives, so they
will be more prone to deterrence. Punishment in such cases can vary from imprison-
ment to financial sanctions, depending on their legal status (Knopf, 2010, p.10). In
the aftermath of 9/11 in Saudi Arabia, enhanced scrutiny on donors has led to suc-
cessfully deterring financing of some terrorist activity (Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p.
26).

Deconstructing non-state actors might reveal that some states are greatly in-
volved in finance and support networks. In this case, it is easier for targeted states to
apply conventional deterrence strategies against state supporters of terrorism. Bushs
famous statement after the 9/11 event, youre either with us or against us, made it a
lot easier for the US to punish or deter states which were actively supporting terrorist
networks (Edition.cnn.com, 2001). One very relevant example in this case is Paki-
stan, which post-9/11 started cooperating with the US in fighting Al Qaeda (Quinlan,
2012). Taking action against a state could also imply toppling existing regimes which
are outspokenly supportive of terrorist organisation, such as the overthrow of the Tal-
iban regime in Afghanistan (Knopf, 2010, p. 11). A relevant concern in todays secu-
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rity agenda is nuclear terrorism and efforts are increasingly being made to deter nu-
clear states from providing terrorist with nuclear arsenals. Although this debate is far
too expansive to be covered in the current paper, one interesting deterrent states came
up with is nuclear forensics. The ability to determine the general isotopic composi-
tion and age of the fissile materials used to make a bomb would carry severe conse-
quences for states which turn out to be involved in the potential attack (Knopf, 2010,
p. 21). This technique provides strong incentives for states to abstain from providing
terrorists with nuclear assets.

Furthermore, radical clerics represent a fundamental part of jihadi groups in
both gaining legitimacy for their actions and as recruitment means. In such cases, ef-
fectively punishing radical clerics could successfully deter further mass radicalisa-
tion. One example which proves the deterrent effect of such practices is UKs stern
decision to ban the glorification of terrorism after the 2005 London bombings
(Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p.26). In fact, it turns out that after the successful imple-
mentation of imprisonment policies against radical clerics, very prominent ones have
left the UK or renounced the radical overtones (Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p.26).
However, dealing with the non-rational elements of terrorist groups will require more
than imprisonment of radical clerics. Strategic deterrence which focuses on long-term
results require more in-depth engagements with terrorist actors.

Deterring terrorism by denial

I will assess two main ways by which targeted states can deny terrorists the
benefits of their action. The first one implies preventing individual attacks from being
carried and the second one is achieving their delegitimisation as groups by denying
their political objectives. States can successfully deter terrorism by persuading terror-
ists that their attacks are likely to fail (Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p. 29). Deterrence by
denial in the operational and tactical sphere can be successfully achieved by means of
strengthened homeland security. Based on glaring mistakes made by domestic securi-
ty authorities, the US government has been strongly criticised in the aftermath of 9/11
for not having been able to prevent the attack. As evidence shows, the 9/11 hijack-
ers took flight lessons in the US and carried tests trips on the very same flights they
later hijacked in order to check the security levels (Knopf, 2010, p. 12). As it turned
out, these procedures were extremely lax. Had it been otherwise, they could have
been identified, arrested and the attack could have been prevented.

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In the aftermath of 9/11, the US government focused on enhancing
homeland security practices such as the improvement of domestic intelligence, hard-
ening key targets, randomised screening, periodic surges in security levels at key
sites etc (Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p. 30). The main purpose of these practices is to
make terrorists renounce carrying an attack based on the facts that strengthened de-
fence systems will most certainly lead to failure. As an example, in 2003 an Al-
Qaeda affiliate was planning to attack a US military base in Turkey, but as the base
strengthened its security systems, the attack was called off (Kroenig and Pavel, 2012,
p. 29). Long term, strengthened homeland security might affect the morale of terrorist
networks because lack of publicity will decrease financial sponsorship and fail to
attract the required amount of attention or new recruits (Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p.
30). Short-term benefits, such as social unrest, over-sensationalisation by media out-
lets and major disruption in social routines, can also be denied. For example, after an
attack on a resort in the Sharm el-Sheikh, Egyptian authorities have covered the ven-
ue with a white sheet (Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p.31). As there was nothing sensa-
tional to report on, the attack did not get the expected amount of attention. Although
it is difficult to measure the viability of such deterrence strategies, they are likely to
contribute to strategically deterring terrorism on the long term.

Strategic deterrence aims at preventing terrorists from achieving their goals.
Attempting strategic deterrence thereby encourages researchers and policymakers to
recognise and acknowledge that terrorism does entail rational objectives. In cases
where terrorist groups are motivated by ideological rather than political factors, deter-
rence strategies should concentrate on deterring the expansion and spread of the ide-
ology. In other words, states should try and prevent terrorist organisations from
achieving their strategic goals, while looking to delegitimise their authority. The most
relevant and detailed example in this case is Al-Qaeda. Its long term political goals
focus on expelling the US from the Middle East and then toppling the apostate re-
gimes in order to establish a state according to Sharia (Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p.
32). Moreover, Al Qaeda gained popularity in the Islamist world by successfully
crafting and exporting a radical interpretation of the Quran and the Hadith. In this
case, the most successful deterrence strategies encourage the US to resist withdrawal
demands and develop stronger anti-terrorist military and strategic partnership with
key states in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait and the UAE
(Kroenig and Pavel, 2012, p. 33). Although the success of such strategies is yet to be
demonstrated, they require long term commitment on convincing terrorists that they
will not prevail (Knopf, 2010, p. 14). Another strategic deterrent to the long term
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success of terrorism is delegitimisation of their actions and rhetoric. In this regard,
states concentrate their efforts on forging avenues for constructive dialogues with the
moderate clergy and the wider Muslim public (Lantis, 2009, p. 477). While this strat-
egy will most likely deter public support and discourage new recruits, it might also be
the only viable option for delegitimising martyrdom.

Conclusion

The blind, straightforward comparison between past and current theatres of
wars has led policymakers and analysts to conclude that deterrence strategies are by
default unfit for the non-conventional threats. As the 21st century unraveled novel
security threats and actors, there was a widespread belief that the emerging security
environment required completely new security strategies. Moreover, there was an un-
founded rejection of acknowledging, analysing and deconstructing non-conventional
and emerging actors. It was only later, after failed wars and military campaigns, that
researchers and policymakers started reconsidering old security strategies in light of
the new security threats.

This paper looks specifically at the case of jihadi terrorism in order to argue
that deterrence strategies, when tailored appropriately, remain an integral part of the
counterterrorist agenda. Analytical rigidity and conceptual limitations proved detri-
mental to most counterterrorist efforts. However, a fourth wave in deterrence re-
search suggested the tailoring of strategies to acknowledge non-state actors as ration-
al and to take into consideration their strategic culture. Researchers have focused on
both deterrence by punishment and by denial from direct, indirect, tactical, operation-
al and strategic perspectives. Some deterrence strategies have already turned out via-
ble and examples include targeting component parts of the terrorist network, state
supporters, punishing radical clerics and enhanced homeland security. Strategic de-
terrence has also been forged with the main aim to delegitimise their extremist inter-
pretation, but it has yet to be proven viable or not. A major downfall of deterrence
strategies remains the inability to accurately measure their success. However, if prov-
en right, long term deterrence strategies against terrorism might in fact lead towards
its very extinction. All in all, deterrence strategies remain valid against terrorism, a
vivid threat dominating the 21st century security agenda.



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