Garcia v.

Lacuesta
90:489 | Castillo

FACTS:
This case involves the will of Antero Mercado, which among other defects was signed by the testator
through a cross mark (an X). The will was signed by Atty. Javier who wrote the name of Mercado as testator and
the latter allegedly wrote a cross mark after his name. The CFI allowed the will but the CA disallowed it because its
attestation clause was defective for failing to certify 1) that the will was signed by Atty. Javier at the express
direction of the testator, 2) that the testator wrote a cross at the end of his name after Atty. Javier signed for him,
and 3) that the 3 witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.

ISSUE:
Whether the will should be allowed despite the defect of the attestation clause since the testator had placed a
cross mark himself as his signature.

HELD:
The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Mercado directed Javier to write the
testators name under his express direction. Petitioners argument that such recital is unnecessary because the
testator signed the will himself using a cross mark which should be considered the same as a thumb-mark (which
has been held sufficient in past cases) is not acceptable. A cross mark is not the same as a thumb mark, because
the cross mark does not have the same trustworthiness of a thumb mark.


CAYETANO v LEONIDAS
129 SCRA 524
GUTIERREZ; May 30, 1984

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS
- Adoracion Campos died, leaving her father, Hermogenes and her sisters, Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs.
- As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the
entire estate of Adoracion
- Eleven months after, Nenita Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of Adoracion, which was allegedly executed in the US and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
- An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by Hermogenes alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a
forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not
apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.
- Hermogenes filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will)
and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the
questioned will was made.
- Respondent judge issued an order admitting the Last Will and Testament of Adoracion and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Paguia was
appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent.
- Hermogenes filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was
secured through fraudulent means. He filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case
for lack of jurisdiction.
- Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit.

ISSUE
WON the provisions of the will are valid.

HELD
- NO. As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared
that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue.
- Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private
respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
- Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
which is the national law of the decedent. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and
1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.
- The settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that
Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner.
Moreover, petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief.


ICASIANO v ICASIANO
11 SCRA 4222
REYES; June 30, 1964

FACTS
. This special proceeding was begun on October 2, 1958 by a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the original as the alleged will of Josefa
Villacorte (testatrix), deceased.
. The court set the proving of the alleged will and caused notice thereof to be published for 3 successive weeks, previous to the time appointed, in the newspaper
"Manila Chronicle", and also caused personal service of copies thereof upon the known heirs.
A daughter and son of the testatrix opposed the probate of the alleged will.
. Celso later filed a motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the
legal requirements, and that he was submitting the signed duplicate. This was also opposed.
-Court, after hearing the parties, issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate to probate. Natividad and Enrique were unhappy so they appealed to SC
directly
.The evidence presented for the petitioner is summarized as follows: Testatrix executed a last will and testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs.
Felisa Icasiano at Manila, published before and attested by 3 instrumental witnesses, namely; attorneys Torres, Jr. and Jose Natividad (Jose), and Dr. Diy; that
the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three instrumental witnesses on the same date before attorney Ong, Notary Public in and for Manila;
and that the will was actually prepared by attorney Samson, who was also present during the execution and signing of the decedent's last will and testament,
together with former Governor Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano, and a little girl. Of the said three instrumental witnesses to the execution of the
decedent's last will and testament attorneys Torres and Jose were in the Philippines at the time of the hearing, and both testified as to the due execution and
authenticity of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and attesting witnesses, and also attorney
Samson.
. The original consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses,
Jose, on page (3); but the duplicate copy is signed by the testatrix and her 3 attesting witnesses in each and every page.
.Witness Jose admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page 3 was signed in his presence.

ISSUE
WON the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing,
is NOT per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.

HELD
YES. It DOES NOT JUSTIFY DENIAL of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses
did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and
all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over
whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no
intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil
vs. Murciano, "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause".
.This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are
otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses,
but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan); and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a
will, the failure to mark the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require
satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.
. SC is satisfied that : the testatrix signed both original and duplicate copies of the will spontaneously, on the same occasion, in the presence of the three
attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will, and Atty. Samson, who actually prepared the documents; that the will and its duplicate were
executed in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by both the testator and the witnesses, and read to and by the testatrix and Atty. Samson together before
they were actually signed; that the attestation clause is also in a language known to and spoken by the testatrix and the witnesses. .The opinion of expert for
oppositors did not convince the SC principally because said expert failed to show convincingly that there are radical differences that would justify the charge of
forgery, taking into account the advanced age of the testatrix.
.There is also no adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither.
.That the carbon duplicate was produced & admitted without a new publication does not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, already conferred by the
original publication of the petition for probate


Gago v. Mamuyac
49:902| Saranillo

FACTS:
Miguel Mamuyac died on January 2, 1922. It appears from the record that Miguel executed a last will and
testament on July 27, 1918. Gago presented such will for probate which was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac et. al.
Said petition for probate was denied on the ground that the deceased executed another will on April 16, 1919.
Gago presented the April 16 will for probate which was again opposed by Cornelio et. al. alleging that the will
presented by Gago is a carbon copy of the original April 16 will; such will was cancelled during the lifetime of the
deceased; and that said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased. The RTC found that the deceased
executed another will on December 30, 1920.

ISSUE:

W/N the April 16 will was cancelled.

HELD:
YES. With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not denied,
which was accepted by the lower court, that will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require
any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to
prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must
either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be
found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last
seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed.
The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be
found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the
knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator,
while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be
overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator Miguel
Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the conclusion that
the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a proceeding to probate a
will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its existence. Having
proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a
great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the
act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills
should be admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will
was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then
the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not
cancelled or destroyed by the testator.



MICIANO v BRIMO
50 Phil 867
ROMUALDEZ

NATURE
Appeal from various Manila CFI orders

FACTS
- Joseph Brimo. a Turkish national but a long time resident of the Philippines, died and left behind a testamentary will with Andre Brimo, one the decedents
brother as a legatee.
- Andre Brimo opposed the will on the ground that the provisions therein are not in accord with Turkish law and thus a violation of the Philippine Civil Code,
Article 10 which states:
"Nevertheless, legal a testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity
of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the
country in which it may be situated."
- He was also excluded from the will in view of the provision therein that the testator annuls and cancels the disposition found in the will favorable to persons who
do not respect the provisions of the said will.
- The lower court also dismissed the opposition to the will as the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws ae on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they
are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)

ISSUES
1. WON the will complied with Turkish law xxx
2. WON the exclusion of Andre Brimo from the will is valid

HELD
1. Yes. The ratiocination of the lower court with regard the presumption that Philippine and Turkish laws are the same is valid in the absence of evidence that
showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter. Hence the will must be complied with and executed as the same is not contrary to Philippine laws.
2. No. The condition imposed in the will that legatees must respect the testators will to distribute his property in accordance with the laws of the Philippines is
void for being contrary to law under Article 792 0f the Civil Code which provides as follows:
"Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner
whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide."
Said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the Civil Code above quoted, such
national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.