Persuasive

Advertising, Autonomy,
and the Creation of Desire
Roger Crisp
ABSTRACT. It is
argued
that
persuasive advertising
over
rides the
autonomy
of consumers, in that it
manipulates
them without their
knowledge
and for no
good
reason. Such
advertising
causes desires in such a
way
that a
necessary
condition of
autonomy
?
the
possibility
of decision
?
is
removed. Four notions central to autonomous action are
discussed
?
autonomous
desire,
rational desire and
choice,
free
choice,
and control or
manipulation
?
following
the
strategy
of Robert
Arrington
in a recent
paper
in this
journal. Replies
are made to
Arlington's arguments
in favour
of
advertising.
It is also claimed that the
argument developed
by Philip
Nelson,
which concludes that even if
persuasive
advertising
does override
autonomy,
it is still in the interests
of consumers to be
subjected
to
it,
is
seriously
mistaken.
Finally,
some caveats
concerning
informative
advertising
are
presented.
In this
paper,
I shall
argue
that all forms of a certain
common
type
of
advertising
are
morally wrong,
on the
ground
that
they
override the
autonomy
of
consumers.
One effect of an
advertisement
might
be the
creation of a desire for the advertised
product.
How
such desires are caused is
highly
relevant as to
whether we would describe the case as one in which
the
autonomy
of the
subject
has been overridden. If
I read an
advertisement for a sale of
clothes,
I
may
rush down to
my
local clothes store and
purchase
a
The author has
recently
received the
degrees ofB.
A. and B. Phil, at
Oxford University,
and is
presently working
on a D. Phil,
thesis,
in which an ideal
utilitarian/perfectionist theory
is
developed.
It is
hoped
that this
theory
will
supply plausible
solutions to a
number
of problems
in
practical
ethics. He has had an
article,
'The
Argument from Marginal
Cases]
published
in
Journal
of
Applied Philosophy,
II, 2, 1985,
and
another,
'The Avoidance
of
the Problem
of
Evil: A
Reply
to McGrath' will be
published
this
year
in
Analysis.
jacket
I like.
Here,
my
desire for the
jacket
has arisen
partly
out of
my
reading
the advertisement.
Yet,
in
an
ordinary
sense, it is based on or answers to certain
properties
of the
jacket
?
its
colour,
style,
material.
Although
I could not
explain
to
you why my
tastes
are as
they
are,
we still describe such cases as
examples
of autonomous
action,
in that all the
decisions are
being
made
by
me:
What kind of
jacket
do I like? Can I afford one? And so on. In certain
other cases,
however,
the causal
history
of a
desire
may
be different. Desires can be
caused,
for
instance,
by
subliminal
suggestion.
In New
Jersey,
a cinema
flashed sub-threshold advertisements for ice cream
onto the screen
during
movies,
and
reported
a
dramatic increase in sales
during
intermissions. In
such cases, choice is
being deliberately
ruled out
by
the method of
advertising
in
question.
These cus
tomers for ice cream were
acting 'automatonously',
rather than
autonomously. They
did not
buy
the ice
cream because
they happened
to
like it and decided
they
would
buy
some, but rather because
they
had
been
subjected
to subliminal
suggestion.
Subliminal
suggestion
is the most extreme form of what I shall
call,
adhering
to a
popular dichotomy, persuasive,
as
opposed
to
informative,
advertising.
Other tech
niques
include
puffery,
which involves the
linking
of the
product, through suggestive language
and
images,
with the unconscious desires of consumers
for
power,
wealth, status, sex, and so
on; and
repetition,
which is
self-explanatory,
the name of
the
product being
'drummed into' the mind of the
consumer.
The obvious
objection
to
persuasive advertising
is that it somehow violates the
autonomy
of con
sumers. I believe that this
objection
is
correct, and
that,
if one
adopts
certain common-sensical stand
ards for
autonomy, non-persuasive
forms of adver
tising
are not
open
to such an
objection. Very high
Journal of
Business Ethics 6
(1987)
413-418.
? 1987
by
D.Reidel
Publishing Company.
This content downloaded from 128.91.113.134 on Tue, 14 Jan 2014 12:46:17 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Persuasive Advertising, Autonomy,
and the Creation of Desire Roger Crisp
ABSTRACT. It is argued that persuasive advertising over-
rides the autonomy of consumers, in that it manipulates
them without their knowledge and for no good reason. Such
advertising causes desires in such a way that a necessary
condition of autonomy - the possibility of decision - is
removed. Four notions central to autonomous action are
discussed - autonomous desire, rational desire and choice,
free choice, and control or manipulation - following the
strategy of Robert Arrington in a recent paper in this
journal. Replies are made to Arrington's arguments in favour
of advertising. It is also claimed that the argument developed
by Philip Nelson, which concludes that even if persuasive
advertising does override autonomy, it is still in the interests
of consumers to be subjected to it, is seriously mistaken.
Finally, some caveats concerning informative advertising are
presented.
In this paper, I shall argue that all forms of a certain
common type of advertising are morally wrong,
on the ground that they override the autonomy of
consumers.
One effect of an advertisement might be the
creation of a desire for the advertised product. How
such desires are caused is highly relevant as to
whether we would describe the case as one in which
the autonomy of the subject has been overridden. If
I read an advertisement for a sale of clothes, I may
rush down to my local clothes store and purchase a
The author has recently received the degrees of B. A. and B. phi!. at
Oxford University, and is presently working on a D. phil. thesis,
in which an ideal utilitarian/perfectionist theory is developed. It is
hoped that this theory will supply plausible solutions to a number
oj problems in practical ethics. He has had an article, 'The
Argument from Marginal a s e s ~ published in Journal of
Applied Philosophy, II, 2, 1985, and another, 'The Avoidance
of the Problem of Evil: A Reply to McGrath' will be published
this year in Analysis.
Journal oJBusiness Ethics 6 (1987) 413-418.
1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
jacket I like. Here, my desire for the jacket has arisen
pardy out of my reading the advertisement. Yet, in
an ordinary sense, it is based on or answers to certain
properties of the jacket - its colour, style, material.
Although I could not explain to you why my tastes
are as they are, we still describe such cases as
examples of autonomous action, in that all the
decisions are being made by me: What kind of jacket
do I like? Can I afford one? And so on. In certain
other cases, however, the causal history of a desire
may be different. Desires can be caused, for instance,
by subliminal suggestion. In New Jersey, a cinema
flashed sub-threshold advertisements for ice cream
onto the screen during movies, and reported a
dramatic increase in sales during intermissions. In
such cases, choice is being deliberately ruled out by
the method of advertising in question. These cus-
tomers for ice cream were acting 'automatonously',
rather than autonomously. They did not buy the ice
cream because they happened to like it and decided
they would buy some, but rather because they had
been subjected to subliminal suggestion. Subliminal
suggestion is the most extreme form of what I shall
call, adhering to a popular dichotomy, persuasive,
as opposed to informative, advertising. Other tech-
niques include puffery, which involves the linking
of the product, through suggestive language and
images, with the unconscious desires of consumers
for power, wealth, status, sex, and so on; and
repetition, which is self-explanatory, the name of
the product being 'drummed into' the mind of the
consumer.
The obvious objection to persuasive advertising
is that it somehow violates the autonomy of con-
sumers. I believe that this objection is correct, and
that, if one adopts certain common-sensical stand-
ards for autonomy, non-persuasive forms of adver-
tising are not open to such an objection. Very high
414
Roger Crisp
Standards for
autonomy
are set
by
Kant,
who
requires
that an
agent
be
entirely
external to the
causal nexus found in the
ordinary empirical
world,
if his or her actions are to be autonomous. These
standards are too
high,
in that it is doubtful whether
they
allow
any
autonomous action. Standards for
autonomy
more
congenial
to common sense will
allow that
my
buying
the
jacket
is
autonomous,
although continuing
to
deny
that the
people
in New
Jersey
were
acting autonomously.
In the former case,
we have what has come to be known in recent
discussions of freedom of the will as both free will
and free action. I both decide what to
do,
and am not
obstructed in
carrying through
my
decision into
action. In the latter case, there is free
action,
but not
free will. Noone
prevents
the customers
buying
their
ice cream, but
they
have not themselves made
any
genuine
decision whether
or not to do so. In a
very
real sense, decisions are made for consumers
by
persuasive
advertisers,
who
occupy
the motivational
territory properly belonging
to the
agent.
If what
we mean
by autonomy,
in the
ordinary
sense, is to
be
present,
the
possibility
of decision must exist
alongside.
Arrington (1981)
discusses,
in a
challenging
paper,
the
techniques
of
persuasive advertising
I have
mentioned,
and
argues
that such
advertising
does not
override the
autonomy
of consumers. He examines
four notions central to autonomous
action,
and
claims
that,
on each count,
persuasive advertising
is
exonerated on the
charge
we have made
against
it. I
shall now follow in the
footsteps
of
Arrington,
but
argue
that he sets the standards for
autonomy
too
low for them to be
acceptable
to common
sense, and
that the
charge
therefore still sticks.
(a)
Autonomous desire:
Arrington argues
that an
autonomous desire is a
first-order desire
(a
desire for
some
object, say, Pongo
Peach
cosmetics) accepted
by
the
agent
because it fulfils a second-order desire
(a
desire about
a
desire,
say,
a desire that
my
first
order desire for
Pongo
Peach be
fulfilled),
and that
most of the first-order desires
engendered
in us
by advertising
are desires that
we
do
accept.
His
example
is an advertisement for Grecian Formula
16,
which
engenders
in him a desire to be
younger.
He
desires that both his desire to be
younger
and his
desire for Grecian Formula 16 be fulfilled.
Unfortunately,
this
example
is not
obviously
one
of
persuasive advertising.
It
may
be the case that he
just
has this desire to look
young again
rather as I
had certain sartorial tastes before I saw the ad about
the clothes
sale,
and then decides to
buy
Grecian
Formula 16 on the basis of these tastes.
Imagine
this
form of advertisement: a
person
is
depicted using
Grecian Formula
16,
and is then shown in a
position
of
authority,
surrounded
by admiring
members of
the
opposite
sex. This would be a case of
puffery.
The advertisement
implies
that
having
hair coloured
by
the
product
will lead to
positions
of
power,
and to
one's
becoming
more attractive to the
opposite
sex.
It
links,
by suggestion,
the
product
with
my
uncon
scious desires for
power
and sex. I
may
still claim
that I am
buying
the
product
because I want to look
young again.
But the real reasons for
my purchase
are
my
unconscious desires for
power
and sex, and
the link made between the
product
and the fulfil
ment of those desires
by
the advertisement. These
reasons are not reasons I could avow to
myself
as
good
reasons for
buying
the
product,
and,
again,
the
possibility
of decision is absent.
Arrington's
claim is that an autonomous desire is
a first-order desire which
we
accept.
Even if we
allow that it is
possible
for the
agent
to consider
whether to
accept
or to
repudiate
first-order desires
induced
by persuasive advertising,
it seems that all
first-order desires induced
purely by persuasive
advertising
will be non-autonomous in
Arrington's
sense.
Many
of us have a
strong
second-order desire
not to be
manipulated by
others without our
knowledge,
and for no
good
reason.
Often,
we are
manipulated by
others without our
knowledge,
but
for
a
good
reason, and one that
we can
accept.
Take
an
accomplished
actor: much of the skill of
an actor
is to be found in unconscious
body-language.
This
manipulation
we see as essential to our
being
entertained,
and thus
acquiesce
in it. What is
important
about this case is that there seems to be no
diminution of
autonomy.
We can still
judge
the
quality
of the
acting,
in that the
manipulation
is
part
of its
quality.
In other cases, however,
manipulation
ought
not to be
present,
and these are cases where
the
ability
to decide is
importantly
diminished
by
the
manipulation.
Decision is central to the
theory
of
the
market-process:
I should be able to decide
whether to
buy product
A or
product
B,
by judging
them on their merits.
Any manipulation
here I shall
repudiate
as
being
for no
good
reason. This is not to
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
414
Roger Crisp
standards for autonomy are set by Kant, who
requires that an agent be entirely external to the
causal nexus found in the ordinary empirical world,
if his or her actions are to be autonomous. These
standards are too high, in that it is doubtful whether
they allow any autonomous action. Standards for
autonomy more congenial to common sense will
allow that my buying the jacket is autonomous,
although continuing to deny that the people in New
Jersey were acting autonomously. In the former case,
we have what has come to be known in recent
discussions of freedom of the will as both free will
and free action. I both decide what to do, and am not
obstructed in carrying through my decision into
action. In the latter case, there is free action, but not
free will. Noone prevents the customers buying their
ice cream, but they have not themselves made any
genuine decision whether or not to do so. In a very
real sense, decisions are made for consumers by
persuasive advertisers, who occupy the motivational
territory properly belonging to the agent. If what
we mean by autonomy, in the ordinary sense, is to
be present, the possibility of decision must exist
alongside.
Arrington (1981) discusses, in a challenging paper,
the techniques of persuasive advertising I have
mentioned, and argues that such advertising does not
override the autonomy of consumers. He examines
four notions central to autonomous action, and
claims that, on each count, persuasive advertising is
exonerated on the charge we have made against it. I
shall now follow in the footsteps of Arrington, but
argue that he sets the standards for autonomy too
low for them to be acceptable to common sense, and
that the charge therefore still sticks.
(a) Autonomous desire: Arrington argues that an
autonomous desire is a first-order desire (a desire for
some object, say, Pongo Peach cosmetics) accepted
by the agent because it fulfils a second-order desire
(a desire about a desire, say, a desire that my first-
order desire for Pongo Peach be fulfilled), and that
most of the first-order desires engendered in us
by advertising are desires that we do accept. His
example is an advertisement for Grecian Formula 16,
which engenders in him a desire to be younger. He
desires that both his desire to be younger and his
desire for Grecian Formula 16 be fulfilled.
Unfortunately, this example is not obviously one
of persuasive advertising. It may be the case that he
just has this desire to look young again rather as I
had certain sartorial tastes before I saw the ad about
the clothes sale, and then decides to buy Grecian
Formula 16 on the basis of these tastes. Imagine this
form of advertisement: a person is depicted using
Grecian Formula 16, and is then shown in a position
of authority, surrounded by admiring members of
the opposite sex. This would be a case of puffery.
The advertisement implies that having hair coloured
by the product will lead to positions of power, and to
one's becoming more attractive to the opposite sex.
It links, by suggestion, the product with my uncon-
scious desires for power and sex. I may still claim
that I am buying the product because I want to look
young again. But the real reasons for my purchase
are my unconscious desires for power and sex, and
the link made between the product and the fulfil-
ment of those desires by the advertisement. These
reasons are not reasons I could avow to myself as
good reasons for buying the product, and, again, the
possibility of decision is absent.
Arrington's claim is that an autonomous desire is
a first-order desire which we accept. Even if we
allow that it is possible for the agent to consider
whether to accept or to repudiate first-order desires
induced by persuasive advertising, it seems that all
first-order desires induced purely by persuasive
advertising will be non-autonomous in Arrington's
sense. Many of us have a strong second-order desire
not to be manipulated by others without our
knowledge, and for no good reason. Often, we are
manipulated by others without our knowledge, but
for a good reason, and one that we can accept. Take
an accomplished actor: much of the skill of an actor
is to be found in unconscious body-language. This
manipulation we see as essential to our being
entertained, and thus acquiesce in it. What is
important about this case is that there seems to be no
diminution of autonomy. We can still judge the
quality of the acting, in that the manipulation is part
of its quality. In other cases, however, manipulation
ought not to be present, and these are cases where
the ability to decide is importantly diminished by
the manipulation. Decision is central to the theory of
the market-process: I should be able to decide
whether to buy product A or product B, by judging
them on their merits. Any manipulation here I shall
repudiate as being for no good reason. This is not to
Persuasive
Advertising
415
say, incidentally,
that once the fact that
my
desires
are
being manipulated by
others has been made
transparent
to
me,
my
desire will
lapse.
The
people
in New
Jersey
would have been
unlikely
to cease
their
craving
for ice cream, if we
had told them that
their desire had been
subliminally
induced. But
they
would no
longer
have voiced
acceptance
of this
desire, and,
one
assumes, would have resented the
manipulation
of their desires
by
the
management
of
the cinema.
Pace
Arrington,
it is no evidence for the claim that
most of our desires are autonomous in this sense that
we
often return to
purchase
the same
product
over
and over
again.
For this
might
well show that
persuasive advertising
has been
supremely
efficient
in
inducing
non-autonomous desires in
us, which we
are unable even to
attempt
not to act
on,
being
unaware of their
origin.
Nor is it an
argument
in
Arrington's
favour that certain members of
our
society
will claim not to have the second-order
desire we have
postulated.
For it
may
be that this is a
desire which we can see is one that human
beings
ought
to
have,
a desire which it would be in their
interests to
have,
and the lack of which is itself
evidence of
profound manipulation.
(b)
Rational desire and choice: One
might
argue
that
the desires induced
by advertising
are often irra
tional,
in the sense that
they
are not
present
in an
agent
in full
possession
of the facts about the
product.
This
argument
fails,
says Arrington,
because
if we
require
all the facts about a
thing
before we can
desire that
thing,
then all our desires will be
irrational;
and if we
require only
the relevant infor
mation,
then
prior
desires determine the relevance of
information.
Advertising
may
be said to enable us to
fulfil these
prior
desires,
through
the transfer of
information,
and the
supplying
of means to ends is
surely
a
paradigm example
of
rationality.
But,
what about
persuasive,
as
opposed
to infor
mative,
advertising?
Take
puffery.
Is it not true that a
person may
buy Pongo
Peach
cosmetics,
hoping
for
an adventure in
paradise,
and that the
product
will
not fulfil these
hopes?
Are
they really
in
possession
of even the relevant facts?
Yes,
says Arrington.
We
wish to
purchase subjective
effects,
and these are
genuine enough.
When I use
Pongo
Peach,
I will
experience
a
genuine feeling
of adventure.
Once
again,
however,
our
analysis
can
help
us to
see the
strength
of the
objection.
For a desire to be
rational,
in
any plausible
sense, that desire must at
least not be induced
by
the interference of other
persons
with
my system
of tastes,
against my
will and
without
my
knowledge.
Can we
imagine
a
person,
asked for a reason
justifying
their
purchase
of
Pongo
Peach,
replying:
'I have an unconscious desire to
experience
adventure,
and the
product
has been
linked with this desire
through advertising'?
If a
desire is to be
rational,
it is not
necessary
that all the
facts about the
object
be known to the
agent,
but one
of the facts about that desire must be that it has not
been induced in the
agent through techniques
which
the
agent
cannot
accept.
Thus,
applying
the schema
of
Arrington's
earlier
argument,
such
a desire will be
repudiated by
the
agent
as non-autonomous and
irrational.
Arrington's
claim
concerning
the
subjective
effects
of the
products
we
purchase
fails to deflect the
charge
of
overriding autonomy
we have made
against
persuasive advertising.
Of course,
very
often the
subjective
effects will be
lacking.
If I use Grecian
Formula
16,
I am
unlikely
to find
myself being
promoted
at
work,
or surrounded
by admiring
members of the
opposite
sex. This is
just straight
deception.
But even when the effects do manifest
themselves,
such advertisements have still overridden
my autonomy. They
have activated desires which lie
beyond my
awareness, and
over behaviour
flowing
from which I therefore have no control. If these
claims
appear
doubtful,
consider whether this ad
vertisement is
likely
to be successful: 'Do
you
have
a
feeling
of adventure? Then use this brand of
cosmetics'. Such an advertisement will
fail,
in that it
appeals
to a conscious
desire,
either which we do
not
have,
or which
we
realise will not be fulfilled
by
purchasing
a certain brand of cosmetics. If the adver
tisement were for a course in
mountain-climbing,
it
might
meet with more success. Our conscious self is
not so
easily duped by advertising,
and this is
why
advertisers make such
frequent
use of the
techniques
of
persuasive advertising.
(c)
Free choice: One
might object
to
persuasive
advertising
that it creates desires so covert that an
agent
cannot resist
them,
and that
acting
on them is
therefore neither free nor
voluntary. Arrington
claims that a
person
acts or chooses
freely
if
they
can
adduce considerations which
justify
their act in their
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Persuasive Advertising 415
say, incidentally, that once the fact that my desires
are being manipulated by others has been made
transparent to me, my desire will lapse. The people
in New Jersey would have been unlikely to cease
their craving for ice cream, if we had told them that
their desire had been subliminally induced. But they
would no longer have voiced acceptance of this
desire, and, one assumes, would have resented the
manipulation of their desires by the management of
the cinema.
Pace Arrington, 1t is no evidence for the claim that
most of our desires are autonomous in this sense that
we often return to purchase the same product over
and over again. For this might well show that
persuasive advertising has been supremely efficient
in inducing non-autonomous desires in us, which we
are unable even to attempt not to act on, being
unaware of their origin. Nor is it an argument in
Arrington's favour that certain members of our
society will claim not to have the second-order
desire we have postulated. For it may be that this is a
desire which we can see is one that human beings
ought to have, a desire which it would be in their
interests to have, and the lack of which is itself
evidence of profound manipulation.
(b) Rational desire and choice: One might argue that
the desires induced by advertising are often irra-
tional, in the sense that they are not present in an
agent in full possession of the facts about the
product. This argument fails, says Arrington, because
if we require all the facts about a thing before we can
desire that thing, then all our desires will be
irrational; and if we require only the relevant infor-
mation, then prior desires determine the relevance of
information. Advertising may be said to enable us to
fulfil these prior desires, through the transfer of
information, and the supplying of means to ends is
surely a paradigm example of rationality.
But, what about persuasive, as opposed to infor-
mative, advertising? Take puffery. Is it not true that a
person may buy Pongo Peach cosmetics, hoping for
an adventure in paradise, and that the product will
not fulfil these hopes? Are they really in possession
of even the relevant facts? Yes, says Arrington. We
wish to purchase subjective effects, and these are
genuine enough. When I use Pongo Peach, I will
experience a genuine feeling of adventure.
Once again, however, our analysis can help us to
see the strength of the objection. For a desire to be
rational, in any plausible sense, that desire must at
least not be induced by the interference of other
persons with my system of tastes, against my will and
without my knowledge. Can we imagine a person,
asked for a reason justifying their purchase of Pongo
Peach, replying: 'I have an unconscious desire to
experience adventure, and the product has been
linked with this desire through advertising'? If a
desire is to be rational, it is not necessary that all the
facts about the object be known to the agent, but one
of the facts about that desire must be that it has not
been induced in the agent through techniques which
the agent cannot accept. Thus, applying the schema
of Arrington's earlier argument, such a desire will be
repudiated by the agent as non-autonomous and
irrational.
Arrington's claim concerning the subjective effects
of the products we purchase fails to deflect the charge
of overriding autonomy we have made against
persuasive advertising. Of course, very often the
subjective effects will be lacking. If I use Grecian
Formula 16, I am unlikely to find myself being
promoted at work, or surrounded by admiring
members of the opposite sex. This is just straight
deception. But even when the effects do manifest
themselves, such advertisements have still overridden
my autonomy. They have activated desires which lie
beyond my awareness, and over behaviour flowing
from which I therefore have no control. If these
claims appear doubtful, consider whether this ad-
vertisement is likely to be successful: 'Do you have
a feeling of adventure? Then use this brand of
cosmetics'. Such an advertisement will fail, in that it
appeals to a conscious desire, either which we do not
have, or which we realise will not be fulfilled by
purchasing a certain brand of cosmetics. If the adver-
tisement were for a course in mountain-climbing, it
might meet with more success. Our conscious self is
not so easily duped by advertising, and this is why
advertisers make such frequent use of the techniques
of persuasive advertising.
(c) Free choice: One might object to persuasive
advertising that it creates desires so covert that an
agent cannot resist them, and that acting on them is
therefore neither free nor voluntary. Arrington
claims that a person acts or chooses freely if they can
adduce considerations which justify their act in their
416
Roger Crisp
mind;
and
voluntarily
if,
had
they
been aware of
a
reason for
acting
otherwise,
they
could have done so.
Only occasionally,
he
says,
does
advertising
prevent
us
making
free and
voluntary
choices.
Regarding
free
action,
it is sufficient to note
that,
according
to
Arrington,
if I were to be converted
into a human
robot,
activated
by
an Evil Genius who
has
implanted
electrodes in
my
brain,
my
actions
would be free as
long
as I could cook
up
some
justification
for
my
behaviour. I want to dance this
jig
because I
enjoy dancing. (Compare:
I want to
buy
this ice cream because I like ice
cream.)
If
my
argument
is
right,
we are
placed
in an
analogous
position by persuasive advertising.
If we no
longer
mean
by
freedom of action the mere non-obstruc
tion of
behaviour,
are we still
ready
to
accept
that we
are
engaged
in free action? As for whether the
actions of consumers
subjected
to
persuasive
adver
tising
are
voluntary
in
Arrington's
sense,
I am less
optimistic
than he is. It is
likely,
as we have
suggested,
that the
purchasers
of ice cream or
Pongo
Peach would have
gone
ahead with their
purchase
even if
they
had been made aware that their desires
had been induced in them
by persuasive advertising.
But
they
would now claim that
they
themselves had
not made the
decision,
that
they
were
acting
on a
desire
engendered
in them which
they
did not
accept,
and that there was, therefore,
a
good
reason
for them not to make the
purchase.
The unconscious
is not obedient to the commands of the
conscious,
although
it
may
be forced to listen.
In
fact,
it is odd to
suggest
that
persuasive
advertising
does
give
consumers a choice. A choice is
usually
taken to
require
the
weighing-up
of reasons.
What
persuasive advertising
does is to remove the
very
conditions of choice.
(d)
Control
or
manipulation: Arrington
offers the
following
criteria for control:
A
person
C controls the behaviour of another
person
P iff
(1)
Cintends P to act in a certain
way
A
(2)
Os intention is
causally
effective in
bringing
about
A,
and
(3)
C intends
to ensure that all of the
necessary
conditions of A are satisfied.
He
argues
that advertisements tend to induce a
desire for
X,
given
a more basic desire for Y. Given
my
desire for
adventure,
I desire
Pongo
Peach
cosmetics.
Thus,
advertisers do not control con
sumers, since
they
do not intend to
produce
all of
the
necessary
conditions for
our
purchases.
Arrington's analysis appears
to lead to some
highly
counter-intuitive
consequences.
Consider,
again,
my position
as human robot.
Imagine
that the
Evil Genius relies on the fact that I have certain basic
unconscious desires in order to effect his
plan.
Thus,
when he wants me to dance
a
jig,
it is
necessary
that I
have
a more basic
desire,
say, ironically,
for
power.
What the electrodes do is to
jumble
up my practical
reasoning processes,
so that I believe that I am
dancing
the
jig
because I like
dancing,
while,
in
reality,
the desire to dance stems from
a link
between the dance and the fulfilment of
my
desire
for
power, forged by
the electrodes. Are we still
happy
to
say
that I am not controlled? And does
not
persuasive advertising bring
about
a
similar
jumbling-up
of the
practical reasoning processes
of
consumers? When I
buy Pongo
Peach,
I
may
be
unable to offer a reason for
my purchase,
or I
may
claim that I want to look
good.
In
reality,
I
buy
it
owing
to the link made
by persuasive advertising
between
my
unconscious desire for adventure and
the cosmetic in
question.
A more
convincing
account of behaviour control
would be to claim that it occurs when
a
person
causes another
person
to act for reasons which the
other
person
could not
accept
as
good
or
justifiable
reasons for the action. This is how
brain-washing
is
to be
distinguished
from liberal
education,
rather
than on
Arrington's ground
that the brain-washer
arranges
all the
necessary
conditions for belief. The
student
can both
accept
that she has the beliefs she
has because of her education and continue to hold
those beliefs as
true, whereas the victim of brain
washing
could not
accept
the
explanation
of the
origin
of her
beliefs,
while
continuing
to hold those
beliefs. It is worth
recalling
the two cases we
mentioned at the
beginning
of this
paper.
I can
accept my
tastes in
dress,
and do not think that the
fact that their
origin
is unknown to me detracts from
my autonomy,
when I choose to
buy
the
jacket.
The
desire for ice cream, however,
will be
repudiated,
in
that it is the result of
manipulation by
others,
without
good
reason.
It seems, then,
that
persuasive advertising
does
override the
autonomy
of consumers, and
that,
if the
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Persuasive
Advertising
417
overriding
of
autonomy,
other
things being equal,
is
immoral,
then
persuasive advertising
is immoral.
An
argument
has
recently
surfaced which
suggests
that,
in
fact,
other
things
are not
equal,
and that
persuasive advertising, although
it overrides auton
omy,
is
morally acceptable.
This
argument
was first
developed by
Nelson
(1978),
and claims that
persua
sive
advertising
is a
form of informative
advertising,
albeit an indirect form. The
argument
runs at two
levels:
first,
the consumer can
judge
from the mere
fact that a
product
is
heavily
advertised,
regardless
of
the form or content of the
advertisements,
that that
product
is
likely
to be
a market-winner. The reason
for this is that it would not
pay
to advertise market
losers.
Second,
even if the consumer is taken in
by
the content of the
advertisement,
and
buys
the
product
for that reason, he is not
being
irrational.
For he would have
bought
the
product anyway,
since
the
very
fact that it is advertised means that it is a
good product.
As Nelson
says:
It does not
pay
consumers to make
very
thoughtful
decisions about
advertising. They
can
respond
to adver
tising
for the most
ridiculous,
explicit
reasons and still do
what
they
would have done if
they
had made the most
careful
judgements
about their behaviour.
'Irrationality'
is
rational if it is cost-free.
Our conclusions
concerning
the mode of
operation
of
persuasive advertising,
however,
suggest
that
Nelson's
argument
cannot succeed. For the first level
to
work,
it would have to be true that a
purchaser
of
a
product
can evaluate that
product
on its own
merits,
and then decide whether to
purchase
it
again.
But,
as we have seen,
consumers induced to
purchase
products by persuasive advertising
are not
buying
those
products
on the basis of
a
decision founded
upon any
merit the
products happen
to have.
Thus,
if the
product
turns out to be less
good
than less
heavily
advertised
alternatives,
they
will not be
disappointed,
and will continue to
purchase,
if
subjected
to the
heavy advertising
which induced
them to
buy
in the first
place.
For this reason,
heavy
persuasive advertising
is not a
sign
of
quality,
and the
fact that a
product
is advertised does not
suggest
that
it is
good.
In
fact,
if the
advertising
has little or
no informative content,
it
might suggest just
the
opposite.
If the
product
has
genuine
merits,
it should
be
possible
to mention them. Persuasive
advertising,
as the executives on Madison Avenue
know,
can be
used to sell
anything, regardless
of its nature or
quality.
For the second level of Nelson's
argument
to
succeed,
and for it to be in the consumer's interest to
react even
unthinkingly
to
persuasive advertising,
it
must be true that the first level is valid. As the first
level
fails,
there is not even a
prima facie
reason for
the belief that it is in the interest of the consumer to
be
subjected
to
persuasive advertising.
In
fact,
there
are two
weighty
reasons for
doubting
this belief. The
first has
already
been hinted at:
products promoted
through persuasive advertising
may
well not be
being
sold
on their
merits,
and
may,
therefore,
be
bad
products,
or
products
that the consumer would
not desire on
being
confronted with unembellished
facts about the
product.
The second is that this form
of 'rational
irrationality'
is
anything
but cost-free.
We consider it a
great
cost to lose our
autonomy.
If I
were to demonstrate to
you conclusively
that if I
were to take over
your
life,
and make
your
decisions
for
you, you
would have a life
containing
far more of
whatever
you
think makes life worth
living, apart
from
autonomy,
than if
you
were to retain
control,
you
would not surrender
your autonomy
to me even
for these
great gains
in other values. As we men
tioned above in our discussion of autonomous
desire,
we have a
strong
second-order desire not to act on
first-order desires induced in us unawares
by
others,
for no
good
reason, and now we can see
that that
desire
applies
even to cases in which we would
appear
to be better off in
acting
on such first-order desires.
Thus,
we
may
conclude that Nelson's
argument
in favour of
persuasive advertising
is not
convincing.
I should note,
perhaps,
that
my
conclusion concern
ing persuasive advertising
echoes that of Santilli
(1983). My argument
differs from
his, however,
in
centring upon
the notions of
autonomy
and causes
of desires
acceptable
to the
agent,
rather than
upon
the distinction between needs and desires. Santilli
claims that the arousal of a
desire is not a rational
process,
unless it is
preceded by
a
knowledge
of
actual needs.
This,
I
believe,
is too
strong.
I
may
well
have no need of a new
tennis-racket,
but
my
desire
for one, aroused
by
informative advertisements in
the
newspaper,
seems rational
enough.
I would
prefer
to claim that a desire is autonomous and at
least
prima facie
rational if it is not induced in the
agent
without his
knowledge
and for no
good
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Persuasive Advertising 417
overriding of autonomy, other things being equal, is
immoral, then persuasive advertising is immoral.
An argument has recently surfaced which suggests
that, in fact, other things are not equal, and that
persuasive advertising, although it overrides auton-
omy, is morally acceptable. This argument was first
developed by Nelson (1978), and claims that persua-
sive advertising is a form of informative advertising,
albeit an indirect form. The argument runs at two
levels: first, the consumer can judge from the mere
fact that a product is heavily advertised, regardless of
the form or content of the advertisements, that that
product is likely to be a market-winner. The reason
for this is that it would not pay to advertise market-
losers. Second, even if the consumer is taken in by
the content of the advertisement, and buys the
product for that reason, he is not being irrational.
For he would have bought the product anyway, since
the very fact that it is advertised means that it is a
good product. As Nelson says:
It does not pay consumers to make very thoughtful
decisions about advertising. They can respond to adver-
tising for the most ridiculous, explicit reasons and still do
what they would have done if they had made the most
careful judgements about their behaviour. 'Irrationaliry' is
rational if it is cost-free.
Our conclusions concerning the mode of operation
of persuasive advertising, however, suggest that
Nelson's argument cannot succeed. For the first level
to work, it would have to be true that a purchaser of
a product can evaluate that product on its own
merits, and then decide whether to purchase it again.
But, as we have seen, consumers induced to purchase
products by persuasive advertising are not buying
those products on the basis of a decision founded
upon any merit the products happen to have. Thus,
if the product turns out to be less good than less
heavily advertised alternatives, they will not be
disappointed, and will continue to purchase, if
subjected to the heavy advertising which induced
them to buy in the first place. For this reason, heavy
persuasive advertising is not a sign of quality, and the
fact that a product is advertised does not suggest that
it is good. In fact, if the advertisi'ng has little or
no informative content, it might suggest just the
opposite. If the product has genuine merits, it should
be possible to mention them. Persuasive advertising,
as the executives on Madison Avenue know, can be
used to sell anything, regardless of its nature or
quality.
For the second level of Nelson's argument to
succeed, and for it to be in the consumer's interest to
react even unthinkingly to persuasive advertising, it
must be true that the first level is valid. As the first
level fails, there is not even a prima Jacie reason for
the belief that it is in the interest of the consumer to
be subjected to persuasive advertising. In fact, there
are two weighty reasons for doubting this belief The
first has already been hinted at: products promoted
through persuasive advertising may well not be
being sold on their merits, and may, therefore, be
bad products, or products that the consumer would
not desire on being confronted with unembellished
facts about the product. The second is that this form
of 'rational irrationality' is anything but cost-free.
We consider it a great cost to lose our autonomy. IfI
were to demonstrate to you conclusively that if I
were to take over your life, and make your decisions
for you, you would have a life containing far more of
whatever you think makes life worth living, apart
from autonomy, than if you were to retain control,
you would not surrender your autonomy to me even
for these great gains in other values. As we men-
tioned above in our discussion of autonomous desire,
we have a strong second-order desire not to act on
first-order desires induced in us unawares by others,
for no good reason, and now we can see that that
desire applies even to cases in which we would appear
to be better off in acting on such first-order desires.
Thus, we may conclude that Nelson's argument
in favour of persuasive advertising is not convincing.
I should note, perhaps, that my conclusion concern-
ing persuasive advertising echoes that of Santilli
(1983). My argument differs from his, however, in
centring upon the notions of autonomy and causes
of desires acceptable to the agent, rather than upon
the distinction between needs and desires. Santilli
claims that the arousal of a desire is not a rational
process, unless it is preceded by a knowledge of
actual needs. This, I believe, is too strong. I may well
have no need of a new tennis-racket, but my desire
for one, aroused by informative advertisements in
the newspaper, seems rational enough. I would
prefer to claim that a desire is autonomous and at
least prima Jacie rational if it is not induced in the
agent without his knowledge and for no good
418
Roger Crisp
reason, and allows
ordinary processes
of decision
making
to occur.
Finally,
I should
point
out
that,
in
arguing against
all
persuasive advertising,
unlike
Santilli,
I am not to
be
interpreted
as
bestowing
moral
respectability
upon
all informative
advertising.
Advertisers of
any
variety ought
to consider whether the
ideological
objections
often made to their conduct have
any
weight.
Are
they,
for
instance,
imposing
a distorted
system
of values
upon
consumers,
in which the
goal
of our lives is to
consume, and in which success is
measured
by
one's level of
consumption?
Or are
they
entrenching
attitudes which
prolong
the
position
of
certain
groups subject
to
discrimination,
such as
women or homosexuals? Advertisers should also
carefully
consider whether their
product
will be of
genuine
value to
any
Consumers, and,
if so,
attempt
to restrict their
campaigns
to the
groups
in
society
which will benefit
(see
Durham,
1984).
I would
claim,
for
instance,
that all
advertising
of tobacco
based
products,
even of the informative
variety,
is
wrong,
and that some advertisements for alcohol are
wrong,
in that
they
are directed at the
wrong
audi
ence.
Imagine,
for
instance,
a
liquor-store manager
erecting
an informative bill-board
opposite
an alco
holics' rehabilitation centre. But these are
secondary
questions
for
prospective
advertisers. The
primary
questions
must be whether
they
are
intending
to
employ
the
techniques
of
persuasive advertising,
and,
if so, how these
techniques
can be avoided.
Acknowledgement
I should like to thank Dr
James
Griffin for
helpful
discussion
of an earlier draft of this
paper.
References
Arrington,
R.:
1982,
Advertising
and Behaviour
Control',
Journal of
Business Ethics
I,
1
Durham,
T.:
1984, 'Information, Persuasion,
and Control in
Moral
Appraisal
of
Advertising Strategy', Journal of
Business Ethics
HI,
3
Nelson,
P.:
1978,
'Advertising
and
Ethics',
in
Ethics,
Free
Enterprise,
and Public
Policy, (eds.)
R. De
George
and
J.
Pichler,
New York: Oxford
University
Press
Santilli,
P.:
1983,
'The Informative and Persuasive Functions
of
Advertising:
A Moral
Appraisal', Journal of
Business
Ethics
IL,
1.
St. Anne's
College,
Oxford,
England
OX2 6HS.
This content downloaded from 128.91.113.134 on Tue, 14 Jan 2014 12:46:17 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
418 Roger Crisp
reason, and allows ordinary processes of decision-
making to occur.
Finally, I should point out that, in arguing against
all persuasive advertising, unlike Santilli, I am not to
be interpreted as bestowing moral respectability
upon all informative advertising. Advertisers of any
variety ought to consider whether the ideological
objections often made to their conduct have any
weight. Are they, for instance, imposing a distorted
system of values upon consumers, in which the goal
of our lives is to consume, and in which success is
measured by one's level of consumption? Or are they
entrenching attitudes which prolong the position of
certain groups subject to discrimination, such as
women or homosexuals? Advertisers should also
carefully consider whether their product will be of
genuine value to any cOnsumers, and, if so, attempt
to restrict their campaigns to the groups in society
which will benefit (see Durham, 1984). I would
claim, for instance, that all advertising of tobacco-
based products, even of the informative variety, is
wrong, and that some advertisements for alcohol are
wrong, in that they are directed at the wrong audi-
ence. Imagine, for instance, a liquor-store manager
erecting an informative bill-board opposite an alco-
holics' rehabilitation centre. But these are secondary
questions for prospective advertisers. The primary
questions must be whether they are intending to
employ the techniques of persuasive advertising, and,
if so, how these techniques can be avoided.
Acknowledgement
I should like to thank Dr James Griffin for helpful discussion
of an earlier draft of this paper.
References
Arrington, R.: 1982, 'Advertising and Behaviour Control',
Journal of Business Ethics I, 1
Durham, T.: 1984, 'Information, Persuasion, and Control in
Moral Appraisal of Advertising Strategy', Journal of
Business Ethics m, 3
Nelson, P.: 1978, 'Advertising and Ethics', in Ethics, Free
Enterprise, and Public Policy, (eds.) R. De George and J.
Pichler, New York: Oxford University Press
Santilli, P.: 1983, 'The Informative and Persuasive Functions
of Advertising: A Moral Appraisal', Journal of Business
Ethics n, 1.
St. Anne's College,
Oxford,
England OX2 6HS.