Working Amid Corporatism and Confusion: Foreign NGOs in China Renee Yuen-Jan Hsia and Lynn T. White III

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Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly
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DOI: 10.1177/0899764002313002
2002 31: 329 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly
Renee Yuen-Jan Hsia and Lynn T. White III
Working amid Corporatism and Confusion: Foreign NGOs in China
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Hsia, White Foreign NGOs in China
Working Amid Corporatism and Confusion:
Foreign NGOs in China
Renee Yuen-Jan Hsia
Harvard Medical School
Lynn T. White III
Princeton University
Foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) face impediments in the Peoples
Republic of China. Many such problems result fromthe NGOs lack of stable connections
to the government. Academic literature on China is rich with data about links between
the state and indigenous civil organizations, but relations between the government
and foreign development NGOs have received less coverage in public. This article
bypasses the widely accepted view of the Chinese state as solely corporatist. It describes
Chinese regulation of foreign assistants in development and then offers two case studies
of recently established NGOs. It concludes that, rather than demonizing the government
for its faults in other areas, foreign development workers in China should be willing to
work with government structures whenever possible. Only by understanding the politi-
cal climate and regulatory structure, as well as the available options, can foreign NGOs
hope to establish a long-term presence in China and effect lasting change.
Recently, civil society has been marketed as the new path to democracy.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
1
have been vital to this movement
andare increasingly suppliedwithbilateral andmultilateral assistance for the
purpose of building civil societies to expedite the democratic process, espe-
cially in crumbling Communist countries. In 1992, for example, NGOs spent
almost $8 billionmore thanthe whole UnitedNations (UN) systeminpro-
viding humanitarian aid, development assistance, and technical support
aroundthe world(WorldBank, 1995). Inits commitment to buildingcivil soci-
ety, the World Bank has increasingly involved more NGOs in its projects.
Whereas the WorldBankcollaboratedwithonlya fewNGOs inthe 1970s, 47%
of the Banks projects in 1997 included NGOs (World Bank, 1998).
Bilateral aid is increasingly distributed through NGOs as well. In 1993, for
instance, the United States distributed 17% of its overseas development aid
through NGOs, a percentage that rose to 30% in a mere 2 years. Clintons
New Partnership Initiative, announced at the 1995 UN National Summit,
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 3, September 2002 329-351
2002 Sage Publications
329
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indicatedthat 40%of the UnitedStates Agencyfor International Development
(USAID) funding would be dispersed through NGOs (USAID, 1995).
Yet comparedto the focus onthe activities of these NGOs, less attentionhas
been given to the actual establishment of these groups and their relationships
with authoritarian states that permit their presence. This information is espe-
cially important in the case of China, where an increasing number of dollars is
invested without a clear sense of how foreign NGOs should interact with the
government.
Since Chinas opening in the 1970s, foreign organizations have rushed into
that country. The desire of contemporary Westerners to rescue China
which resembles the mentality of Europeans andcolonialists fromearlier cen-
turiesis evident in the growing number of foreign entrants to the country.
Now most contacts are through social organizations and business associa-
tions, rather than missionary agencies.
2
The Chinese government, trade associations, other multinational conglom-
erates, and international consulting agencies readily provide information for
businesses that eagerly wait to enter China. Less information is available to
foreign development groups that wonder how to make their way into the
country. How do foreign NGOs function in a regime such as Chinas? In a
country where freedom is meted out sparingly, how do NGOs pursue their
own goals without perturbing a government that feels its power threatened?
Is it possible to work effectively in this type of situation?
Although a foreign NGO cannot simply declare its presence in a country
and begin its work without understanding the context, such knowledge is
often in shortage. The difficulties foreign NGOs experience when dealing
with the government are not, as commonly believed, due only to corporatism
in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). This type of state corporatism (as
opposed to the classic understanding of societal corporatism as seen in Aus-
tralia andBritain, for example) is characterizedbytight political control bythe
state, which creates and controls vertical networks of power to preempt the
growth of horizontally formed class interests. Although indeed corporatist,
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in its many parts is also confused about
the proper way for local authorities to deal with foreign developers.
After a brief discussion about historical and regulatory aspects of foreign
NGOs inChina, this article will illustrate the corporatismandconfusionof the
Chinese government with a case study of one recently established NGO that
has facedpolitical barriers since its inception. Another case describes an NGO
that, because of nonstringent policies in its environment, foundadvantages in
collaborating with government agencies.
The article concludes that foreign NGOs desiring to work in China should
understand the political climate and regulatory structure there, as well as the
options available to them. Truly nongovernmental civil society organizations,
as they are knowninthe West, are not foreseeable inthe near future, especially
for foreign organizations entering the country.
330 Hsia, White
Nevertheless, an effective variant of this is possible, as the government
comes to realize the potential contributions of foreign development organiza-
tions and develops clearer regulations to accommodate them. Foreign groups
in China can learn from current foreign NGOs and can often work with gov-
ernment agencies. This research can serve as a starting point for further study
of political dynamics in Chinas government-NGOrelationship. The aimis to
encourage foreign NGOs to work more wisely in China and for Chinese.
TERMINOLOGY
An early need is to clarify terminology. In the United States, the acronym
NGO brings to mind international relief agencies working in Third World
countries and lobbyists such as environmental groups pressing for forest pro-
tection. NGO activities range from welfare or charity to job training and edu-
cation. Global coalitions on human rights, the environment, economic devel-
opment, and womens issues have burgeoned in Europe and America.
In China, however, NGOs exist under a different set of norms. The some-
what abstract Western term NGO is difficult to translate well into Chinese.
The literal translationof nongovernmental organizationfeiguanfang zuzhican
be understood by PRC conservatives as anti-governmental (Stone, 1998, p. 13).
Many such groups in China therefore refer to themselves as nonprofit organi-
zations, or NPOs. Yet this designation also falls short because many of the
groups traditionallyconsideredNGOs, suchas the AmityFoundation, indeed
run profit-generating subsidiaries to maintain their financial sustainability.
The Chinese termshehui tuanti, or social organization, is most analogous tothe
Western concept of NGO. In China, however, shehui tuanti (or shetuan, for
short) are rarely, if ever, completely separate from government. This article
focuses on foreign development NGOs, which are, in the eyes of state leaders,
more benign than politically oriented groups such as Amnesty Interna-
tional that call for a reduction of human rights abuses.
THE CORPORATISM OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
Whereas foreign NGOs in the United States, Europe, Latin America, and
Africa bear many similarities in their relative autonomy fromstates, the tradi-
tion of a centrist government in many Asian countries does not allow such
independence. Former Vice Minister of Civil Affairs Fan Baojun says the pur-
pose of any social organization in China is twofold: first, to communicate the
ideas of the people to the Party and government and, second, to engage in
activities that serve the public (China: Social Groups Seek Independence,
1997). Sophia Woodman, director of Human Rights in China, comments that
The party-state prefers to view social groups as a transmission belt for its
Foreign NGOs in China 331
policies rather thanas autonomous social actors that canmonitor thegovernment
and ensure that disadvantaged groups are not ignored (China: Social
Groups Seek Independence, 1997, para. 11).
The tendency of the Chinese government toward corporatism is described
by many authors. Jonathan Unger andAnita Chan define corporatismas a sit-
uation in which the state legitimizes organizations at its discretion and exer-
cises a disproportionate amount of power over such organizations (Unger &
Chan, 1995, pp. 29-53). Philippe Schmitter (1974), writing about corporatism
internationally, defines it as
a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are
organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompeti-
tive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories,
recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliber-
ate representational monopoly . . . inexchange for observing certaincon-
trols on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and sup-
ports. (p. 93)
The establishment of the sanzi aiguo yundong, the Three-Self Patriotic Move-
ment (TSPM), a branch of the Religious Affairs Bureau, is a good example of
this corporatism. Whereas religious organizations are considered nongovern-
mental in most of the West, such is not the case in China: All Christian
churches must register withthe TSPM, whichsupposedlyrepresents all Chris-
tian interests in the country. Any Christian church that chooses not to register
is illegal and thus subject to persecution. By such methods, a corporatist state
claims control over every social organization, on the premise that it is the ulti-
mate guardian of the people and their good.
This norm that social organizations should serve government purposes
became stronger after 1949, when the Communist government abolished or
co-opted all independent social groups including religious organizations,
professional societies, and labor unions (Fisher, 1998, p. 49). Until 1978, the
only groups the government termed independent were eight anti-
Kuomintang organizations left over from 1949 that had actually been trans-
formed into government organs. Known as qunzhong zuzhi, or mass organiza-
tions, they include the All-China Womens Federation (ACWF), the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), and the Chinese Communist Youth
League (CCYL) (Ye, 1996, p. 95). Most of these groups have mandatory and
automatic enrollment, however, so they bear little resemblance to Western
NGOs.
Many experts, such as Tony Saich, argue that perceiving the Chinese state
as exclusively corporatist is, in the reformera, no longer accurate (Saich, 2000,
pp. 124-141). The Chinese governments traditional Leninist form of patron-
age has indeed given way to a more flexible and variable legitimacy for social
organizations, which are given more social space as a result of the CCPs
reform programs of the past decade. For foreign NGOs, however, relations
332 Hsia, White
betweenthis sector andthe state remainfundamentally corporatist, as foreign
organizations still lack much power to influence policy.
THE ENTRANCE OF FOREIGN NGOS
In 1978, the PRC central government began to receive international devel-
opment aid from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Before
that time, foreign development projects led by Soviets and other Communists
focusedon industry rather than poverty alleviation. The Chinese government
provided welfare assistance through direct grants and grain subsidies to
counties with certain characteristics, notably old revolutionary bases, minor-
ity areas, and border or poor places (lao, shao, bian, qiong).
By the early 1980s, China had developed a more welcoming attitude to for-
eign aid and was host to more than 200 UN projects. Influenced by develop-
ment ideas fromthese foreign organizations, the State Councils Poverty Alle-
viationOffice designedgrant andloanpackages inthe SeventhFive-Year Plan
(1986-1990). Unlike African and Latin American countries where foreign
donors and organizations actively participate in deciding how funds are
spent, the Chinese government limited contact between foreigners and nation-
als, especially during these early years (Wickeri, 1995, p. 2). By imposing
restrictions, the state prevented Chinese social organizations from forming
partnerships with larger international organizations. National and foreign
social groups experienced parallel growth into the 1990s, but government
regulations kept the two largely separate.
3
Increased toleration of foreign and indigenous social groups resulted from
the Chinese governments desire to achieve greater legitimacy on the interna-
tional front and at home. Beijing leaders were aware that regimes are often
judgedby their ability to provide for the needs of their citizens. So the Chinese
government countenanced a growth of social groups to help tackle the social
needs generatedby its economic reforms. Althoughthe transitionfromsocial-
ism to market principles has led to massive growth, it has also left gaps in
social support that the government hopes to fill partly by accepting help from
foreign donors.
Specifically, Chinas ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) declares that 54 mil-
lion new jobs must be created for the officially unemployed: young people
enteringthe labor force, rural migrants, andthose whowill suffer expectedjob
losses in the state sector. This figure does not include 130 million underem-
ployed, many on involuntary leaves of absence from their state enterprise
jobs (Labor Comes Unstuck, 1998, p. 9). This phenomenon of xia gang, in
which employees of state enterprises have been laid off with minimal social
benefits, has combined with urban immigration to create a new class of Chi-
nese citizensthe urban poor (Solinger, 1999).
Hidden behindthis urban crisis, oppressive poverty remains in rural areas.
Roughly seven tenths of Chinas population lives in rural areas and has not
been immediately affected by the dissolution of state enterprises. Although
the breakup of collectives has dramatically increased agricultural productiv-
ity (despite some decline in the mid-1980s), the countryside has not escaped
some negative consequences of privatization. In the area of health care, for
example, decentralized medical services and decreased state funding have
left many rural Chinese without healthinsurance or care (Bloom&Xing, 1997,
p. 351). Whereas 90% of the rural population had rural cooperative medical
insurance in the 1970s, health insurance coverage in the 1990s plunged below
8%for rural Chinese (Bogg, Dong, Keli, Cai, &Diwan, 1996, p. 238). Less gov-
ernment money and growing inequity in health services has reportedly con-
tributed to the recent increase in death rates, particularly among infants and
children under age 5 (Hossain, 1997). Whereas infant mortality decreased
steadily in China fromthe 1970s to the early 1990s, from69 to 31 per 1,000 live
births, the trend reversed in 1992 and exceeded 34 deaths per 1,000 in 1995
(World Bank, 1997).
Population growth and reductions of arable land have increased the hard-
ships of peasants as surelyas have some effects of privatizationanddecentral-
ization. The rising person-to-land ratio has worsened a labor surplus. A
Beijing economist estimated in the mid-1990s that the migrant worker class at
that time was already 100 million (Yan, 1994). Desperate peasants continue to
flockor as urban Chinese claim, flow blindly (mangliu)
4
to cities hoping
to improve their lot (Kung, 1994). The iron rice bowl is broken in both urban
and rural areas.
Because the Chinese government now lacks the resources to support
human services so much as in the past, NGOs are marshalled to meet the peo-
ples needs. The state has tacitly acknowledged its shortcomings by allowing
pluralism by default. This process began in the late 1970s under Deng
Xiaoping (China: Social Groups Seek Independence, 1997). It continues
today as the number of social groups rises and the government tries to moni-
tor them vigilantly.
GROWTH OF FOREIGN NGOS
Since the 1980s, both foreign and indigenous social groups have prolifer-
ated. Because the government does not provide separate figures for indige-
nous and foreign groups, it is difficult to know whether the growth trend for
local organizations mirrors that for foreign groups.
5
In 1995, Howell sug-
gested that about 15 NGOs (excluding multilateral agencies such as the
United Nations Childrens Fund) existed in China. These included Mdecins
Sans Frontires, the U.S. Peace Corps, Oxfam Hong Kong, and Save the
Children (UK) (Howell, 1995, p. 12). More recently, however, the editor of
Chinabrief (a journal that provides information on the development work of
foreign NGOs in China) estimates that at least 50 registered organizations
have a long-term presence in China. Approximately 150 international NGOs
334 Hsia, White
lack permanent registration but fund development work in China through
local partners.
6
ATTITUDES OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
TOWARD FOREIGN NGOS
Although the government generally assumed in the 1950s that foreign
development groups were unnecessaryanddangerous, risingsocial problems
in the reformera have proved that the first assumption, at least, is wrong. The
current government, to the extent it is unified, retains the belief that foreign
social groups are potentially dangerous, but it also recognizes that a carefully
monitored NGO sector can be beneficial to both the state and the people.
Chinas rockytransitionto a mixedeconomyhas made evident the needfor
nongovernmental groups to contribute their time, money, and experience in
areas such as health care or job retraining. Non-Chinese NGOs have played a
considerable role indeliveringsuchservices. For example, inthe 1998 summer
floods that took an estimated2,500 lives anddestroyed6 million homes, orga-
nizations such as Mdecins Sans Frontires and the International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies responded quickly (Flood Relief,
1998, p. 4; Hillis, 1999, p. 29). ForeignNGOs also provide technical expertise in
many areas and offer diverse services, from teaching English to funding
micro-credit programs. Some groups such as the Ford Foundation are not
involved in implementing programs directly but provide large amounts of
money for development work.
The government views these social organizations as bridges between the
people anditself. The diversificationof ownershipforms has allowedindivid-
uals toescape the holdof the danwei (workunit) systemandthis has beenthe
case for a decade; 57%of the nonagricultural labor force alreadyworkedinthe
nonstate sector by1992 (Xiao&Gao, 1994).
7
Sothe Partymust seekother chan-
nels to impart its policies to individuals, households, and enterprises. Social
groups are a means through which the government tries to transmit its poli-
cies downward by, as a proverb puts it, issuing orders through anothers
bugle and fighting a battle with borrowed soldiers (Howell, 1994, p. 198).
Not only do social groups serve as bridges fromthe government to the peo-
ple, they also convey information from the people to the government. State
leaders clearly believe that social groups, if carefully monitored, canprovide a
politically safe conduit for peoples voices to be heard. This two-way trans-
mission of ideas reinforces the Partys control, at least in the short run, over a
rapidly pluralizing society (Howell, 1994, p. 206).
Finally, the Chinese government can use social groups in attempts to gain
legitimacy andmoney internationally. The presence of foreignsocial groups is
evidence tothe international communitythat China is a stable place for invest-
ment. Foreign organizations often provide direct international funding. For
example, theCanadianInternational Development Agency(CIDA) andJapanese
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in the 1980s both financed pro-
grams for overseas training of professionals from the China Rehabilitation
Research Center in Beijing (Controlling the Flow, 1998, p. 10).
Although recognizing the potential contributions of foreign social groups,
the government still has not relinquished its fear of them. Aconstant concern
of the Chinese government is that members of groups may abuse their visas
inside China and create propaganda against the Party. In January 1996, for
example, Human Rights Watch (Asia) published a report entitled Death by
Default: A Policy of Fatal Neglect in Chinas State Orphanages (1996), which
reported that Chinas orphanages were guilty of neglecting thousands of
unwanted infants, resulting in a massive number of deaths. Almost immedi-
ately after its publication, a television documentary entitled The Dying Rooms,
which portrayedthe appalling conditions of the state orphanages, was shown
in Britain. Entering China as international charity workers, the makers of the
documentaryhadvisitedvarious orphanages suchas the Shanghai Childrens
Welfare Institute and secretly captured footage of the most gruesome situa-
tions. The film painted Chinese government leaders as sitting by passively,
while knowing that thousands of childrendie eachyear fromneglect andstar-
vation (Orphanage Row, 1996, p. 4).
The Amity Foundation criticized the film, stating that it distort[ed] the
reality that one of the basic problems with Chinas welfare work is insufficient
funding from the government (Orphanage Row, 1994, p. 4). The film did
not stress fiscal or communications difficulties facing the Chinese govern-
ment. National leaders in many countries do not emphasize such problems.
Not surprisingly, the documentary sparked mutual denunciations between
PRC spokespeople and international charities. To avoid such incidents and
the official defensiveness they prompt, the Chinese government tries to moni-
tor foreign social groups.
The PRC state long organized provision for many needs of its citizens, and
its leaders are apprehensive at the appearance of NGOs that, loaded with for-
eign funding, can suddenly assume duties seen as belonging to government.
Whereas other countries with more democratic traditions are accustomed to
franchisingthe supplyof public goods tothe private sector or nongovernmen-
tal agencies, this patternis newinChina. Althoughthe traditional danwei that
has servedas a mechanismfor social control andcentralizationof power since
the 1950s is dying, it still influences current conceptions of the relationship
betweenthe individual andthe state. Under the danwei system, anindividual
was assigned to a compulsory work unit that also managed the individuals
housing, food, transportation subsidies, rationed goods, and even organized
recreational activities.
8
The danwei also acted in welfare functions, providing
access to services such as primary education and health care. The comprehen-
sive urban danwei of Maos time, which served both statist and communal
functions, entrenched the traditional official idea that the main needs of indi-
viduals should not be met by foreign relationships.
336 Hsia, White
Non-Chinese NGOs, then, are seenas outsiders andare not always enthusi-
astically received by the government. Moreover, some government officials
see foreign NGOs as usurpers of funding that should, they believe, go directly
to the Chinese government rather than to agencies managed by aliens. Com-
petition for money can breed hostile relations among organizations that may
apparently be trying to reach the same goals.
A long-standing apprehension of infecting Chinese values with foreign
ideas also accounts for close regulation of foreign NGOs by the government.
As China scholar LucianPye has observed, a fear of luan (chaos, disorder) per-
vades the mentality of the government as well as many citizens (Pye, 1999).
Sporadically since 1949, groups outside explicit state controls have become
violent, notablythe RedGuards andworker groups duringthe Cultural Revo-
lution. Increased exposure to the West via foreign organizations, authorities
feel, may exacerbate underlying social tensions and may lead to adoption of
Westernideas of liberty, further endangeringgovernment control of the popu-
lace. Party conservatives attribute the 1989 Democracy Movement to foreign
social groups that espouse a rights mentality. They have similar fears about
the Falungong movement, despite its origins within China.
The state seeks to foster certain types of foreign NGOs and to quell those
with politically sensitive agendas. The government-NGO relationship, as
Frolic writes, is a marriage of convenience rather than a catalyst for citizen
resistance (Frolic, 1997, p. 58). Only foreign groups whose interests coincide
with those of the state are permitted to operate relatively freely within certain
parameters. Even so, the Chinese government often sees development-ori-
entedforeign NGOs as rivals for international funding, andit carefully scruti-
nizes each would-be entrant to the country.
THE REGULATORY STRUCTURE
FOR FOREIGN NGOS IN CHINA
Before 1989, the only code governing the registration or activities of social
groups was the State Councils 1950 InterimProvisions onthe Registrationof
Social Organization (Shehui tuanti dengji zanxing banfa) (Whiting, 1992, p. 17).
After the June Fourth Incident in 1989, however, the State Council issued new
rules to monitor social groups on October 25, 1989, with the goal of maintain-
ing political stability by tightening the reins on them. Two further regulations
came fromthe State Council in1998 to update the previous guidelines: Regu-
lations on the Registration and Management of Social Groups (Shehui tuanti
dengji guanli tiaoli) (Guowuyuan, 1998a) and Provisional Regulations on the
Registration and Management of People-Organized Non-Enterprise Units
(Minban feiqiye danwei dengji guanli zanxing tiaoli) (Guowuyuan, 1998b). None
of the above, however, specificallyaddressedthe case of foreignsocial groups.
Because of the lack of direction, some provinces apply the domestic regula-
tions to international groups as well.
It is necessary to make a clear distinction between written rules and actual
practice. Gordon White provides a thorough discussion of the relationship
between new, indigenous nonstate sectors and the government in a 1993
paper in the Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, and the present article uses a
similar approach. We will followone particular foreign NGOthrough the reg-
istration process and then present a generalized picture of how other groups
have functioned. Research in China shows how the 1998 regulations have
affected the ability of NGOs to work effectively.
DE JURE: NGOS IN THE EYES OF THE LAW
A preliminary question is whether foreign groups are to be considered
under the 1998 regulations at all. Although the regulations specifically state
that foreign organizations must operate under separate rules, thus far the
government has not issued any. So the activities of foreign NGOs are gov-
erned by disparate instructions from the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA)
that have arisen in response to questions from local leaders about foreign
NGOs. The government seems to have adopted an informal policy of no
recognition, yet no prohibition as long as the work of a foreign NGO is not
politically sensitive.
Although no specific regulations have been issued on the subject of foreign
NGOs, a document circulated by the MoCA in 1989 provides the following
guidelines for local civil affairs bureaus (CABs): (a) to remain in contact with
foreign groups operating in the open to maintain a knowledge of their affairs;
(b) not to initiate contact with foreign groups that operate secretly, even if the
local CABs are aware of them; (c) toinformforeigngroups seekingregistration
that regulations are inthe process of beingdrafted; (d) toforbidforeigngroups
from infringing on any governmental affairs, thus also to forbid them from
acting onbehalf of their embassies or consulates; and(e) to ensure that no Chi-
nese citizens participate in the activities of foreign groups without permission
(China: Social Groups Seek Independence, 1997).
Inpractice, foreignNGOs are apparentlyheldbothtothese terms andtothe
1989 and 1998 regulations, which were originally intended for indigenous
social organizations. Althoughthe PRCs 1982 constitutionguarantees all Chi-
nese citizens freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of
procession, and of demonstration (Constitution of the Peoples Republic of
China, 1993, Article 35), the 1989 and 1998 Regulations on the Management
andRegistrationof Social Groups curbthese rights considerably. All organiza-
tions must be registered, and those that work without proper registration are
automatically considered illegal. To become registered, a group must receive
approval from the appropriate professional leading department, or yewu
zhuguan bumen.
9
These agencies are in the government, the CCP, or certain
quasi-governmental bodies such as the China Association of Science and
Technology, the Chinese Writers Association, the Federation of Literary and
338 Hsia, White
Art Circles, or the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (China: Social Groups
Seek Independence). Whereas most foreign NGOs find this requirement
somewhat burdensome, other groups see collaborating with government
agencies as beneficial. In fact, many groups seek out official connections as a
survival strategy.
Once the group has obtained a sponsoring unit (guakao danwei)
sometimes pejoratively referred to as a mother-in-law (Knup, 1998, p. 10)
10
it must register with the MoCAor another department above the county level.
Organizations that wish to operate nationally must receive the ministrys
approval. The rules do not provide criteria for what types of social organiza-
tion are permissible; instead, the overarching principles of protect[ing] the
unityof the state andthe solidarityof the nation andnot harm[ing] the inter-
ests of the state, the society and the collective or the legitimate freedoms and
rights of other citizens govern the activities of social groups (Guowuyuan,
1998a, Article 31).
Violations of these rules are punishable by the MoCAand its departments.
The lack of a formal definitionof state interest opens the possibility of broad
interpretationof this term. Also, multiple groups withsimilar interests are not
supposedtoexist withinthe same administrative area (Whiting, 1992, p. 25). A
profusion of policies constrains social organizations, including rules on bank
accounts (which are a major source of control), financial auditing standards,
membership fees, personnel arrangements, and business activities. Some
guidelines are ambiguous or vague. For example, the regulation that an
NGOs staff must have expertise appropriate to its activities gives govern-
ment officials broad powers of interpretation. The financial requirements of
the regulations are undoubtedly prohibitive for small organizations because
every proposed social group on the local level must have at least 30,000 yuan
of legitimate assets or funding sourcesa phrase that couldbe construedin
arbitrary wayswhereas those seeking national registration must have a
minimum of 100,000 yuan (Guowuyuan, 1998a, Article 10).
Both sets of regulations permit civil affairs departments to impose unspeci-
fied fees for registration and other services. Article 35 of the regulations on
social groups (Guowuyuan, 1998a) and Article 27 of the provisional regula-
tions for nonenterprise units (Guowuyuan, 1998b) state that NGOs initiating
preparatory activities (e.g., finding a sponsor, drafting necessary docu-
ments) without official permissioncanbe subject to prosecution. Finally, there
is no appeal process for denial of a groups registration.
Religious groups andfoundations are governedmore strictly by additional
limits on their registration. The religious affairs bureau, for example, requires
that such groups have a scripture that is historically associated with a religion
that has existed in China.
11
Other foundations are also constrained by special
rules of the MoCA; they must have a minimum endowment of 100,000 yuan,
as well as approval from the Peoples Bank of China (Guowuyuan, 1998c).
DE FACTO: OBSERVATIONS ON THE BUREAUCRATIC MINEFIELD
Although the laws on paper seem somewhat straightforward or merely
strict, actual treatment of social groups depends onthe whims of the responsi-
ble cadres. Many provinces and localities find ways of bending the laws to
their material advantage. Because definitions of state interest and the legal-
ity of various activities canbe appliedarbitrarily, local or central governments
can easily create a repressive environment for NGOs whose interests are
deemed inimical to the state, or whose presence the bureaucrats consider
threatening to Party security.
Development-oriented foreign NGOs, rather than explicitly political NGOs,
are the focus of this analysis. For these groups, the environment is not inten-
tionally repressive so much as it is simply nonconducive. A complex web of
regulations exists to manage NGOs, but many important areas of NGOgover-
nance are still not addressed. The 1989 and 1998 regulations, for example, are
almost completely devoted to what social groups may not do, rather than to
what they may do. They emphasize the needfor a groupto become registered,
but they provide no details about how a group should go about registering,
nor about the benefits of this legal status. Does registration mean an organi-
zation is an entity with certain rights (e.g., tax exemption, the right to rent
property or hire employees) or only that it is authorized to carry out certain
activities for a certain period of time? Perhaps registration of a social group in
China does not give that organizationanyrights whatsoever toworkinChina,
as Steve Juddof the WorldWildlife Fundsuggests, but it onlysignifies that the
Chinese sponsoring units are allowedto work with them(personal communi-
cation, July 31, 1998). Acase study canrecordfieldobservations froma variety
of foreignNGOs inChina, toillustrate problems inthe environment theyface.
ACASE STUDY OF ONE NGO
12
Ahealth-orientedforeignorganizationwithabout 50 staff members received
its registrationin1997 froma recentlyformedsemiofficial agency, a provinces
international nongovernmental organization society. Although all social groups,
including NGOs, are legally under the jurisdiction of CABs, these CABs have
shiftedthe task of dealing with foreign NGOs to the Ministry of Foreign Trade
and Economic Relations (MOFTEC), which is more accustomed to dealing
with foreigners. In 1996, MOFTEC and the CABs together created Provincial
International Non-Governmental Societies (PINGOS), and they have agreed
to refer all foreign social organizations to these joint agencies. Because no spe-
cific regulations yet exist regarding the existence of foreign organizations, the
PINGOS mirror the mixed interests of their parent bureaucracies, whose pur-
pose is to symbolize the authority of government over social groups.
13
The example NGO (which must remain anonymous) is chosen because its
experience in becoming an established foreign organization is typical of what
340 Hsia, White
other NGOs have confronted. It is also representative in its structure as a local
organization staffed by Westerners, as opposed to larger, international devel-
opment groups that are more recognized, have more funding, and are thus
more well received.
In attempting to register, the example NGO was unable to locate a list of
materials legally needed for registration. Its staff could only resort to asking
various cadres what was required. The director submitted the organizations
charter, an application, and financial forms from the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service to the PINGOS. The PINGOS told the NGO that it should obtain the
consent of an additional government department. Accordingly, the NGO
sought and obtained sanction fromthe provincial public health bureau (PHB)
to carry out health-related activities. The NGO needed to secure the approval
of two sponsoring bodiesthe provinces public health bureau in its func-
tional field and the PINGOS representing the governments more general
interests. MOFTEC, not the PINGOS, nonetheless issued the approval paper
(pizhun wenjian), and the Foreign Enterprise Service Corporation (FESCO)
issuedanadditional approval permit (pizhun zhengshu) so that the NGOcould
hire Chinese employees. The application had to be indirect, and it went to
more than one authority that could have vetoed it.
After obtaining its registration and naming the PINGOS as its sponsoring
body, the NGO assumed that it had achieved the proper legal status to begin
other activities, not necessarilyhealthrelated. The director of the PINGOSear-
lier had claimed that registering through his agency would allow the foreign
NGOa general permit to work ina variety of relatedareas (e.g., health, edu-
cation, welfare) rather than health alone. The NGO has since discovered that
registration with the PINGOS does not legally provide these privileges.
Working in health-related areas, for example, requires authorization fromthe
PHBfor eachproject, whereas working ineducationrequires permissionfrom
the education bureau.
The NGO has been frustrated with the bureaucratic hoop jumping to
obtain the necessary legal status. Its director complains, The law says you
needto be registered. But it doesnt say howyoucando it, or what youneedto
be registered, or even what being registered means. His practical incentives
for obtainingofficial registrationwere two: (a) toobtaintax-exempt status and
(b) to open a bank account. Chinese banks in the region refused to start an
account in the name of the NGO without seeing its registration permitbut
this did not solve the problem. After the NGO was finally given its permit in
1997 and granted tax-exempt status through the PINGOS, banks still rejected
the NGOs applicationto openanaccount because the tax revenue service had
not authorized them to do so. Why? Because the NGO, as a nonprofit society,
was not paying taxes.
The most significant debate surrounding the NGOs relationship with its
PINGOS has been a memorandumof understanding that the director of the
PINGOS pressured the NGOto sign. This memo states that all financial trans-
actions and project proposals must receive the approval from the PINGOS
director. The NGO head has been hesitant to sign the memo because this
detailedfiscal approval process limits anddelays his organizations activities.
No national, provincial, or local law requires each NGO to sign such a memo
with the PINGOS. At the same time, the NGO head believes that refusing to
signthe memowouldcreate badrelations withthe PINGOSdirector, threaten-
ingrejectionof the NGOs request for registrationrenewal, as requiredyearly.
The more important question is, Are these difficulties of the registration
process deliberately used by the government to forge a corporatist structure,
or are they simply due to a lack of clear directives by the state, allowing gov-
ernment officials to intervene at their whim? The Chinese translator for the
example foreignNGObelieves that muchof the bureaucratic redtape actually
results fromgovernment ignorance. He acknowledges that the Chinese gov-
ernment does a lot of badthings, but often they do badthings because they do
not knowhowto do things at all. In his view, the lack of clearly defined poli-
cies toward foreign NGOs has led to a situation in which the government
takes one step and looks one step (zou yibu, kan yibu) to see hownext to pro-
ceed (Anonymous, personal communication, July 18, 1998).
AGENERALIZED PICTURE: OTHER NGOS
Because no explicit regulation requires each foreign social group to register
with its provincial NGO sponsor, many overseas organizations choose alter-
native paths (International NGOs Find Their Own Space, 1998). Save the
Children (UK), for example, carries out activities in three different provinces:
Yunnan, Xizang (Tibet), and Anhui. Although the Yunnan branch of Save the
Children is affiliated with the Yunnan PINGOS, the Anhui branch works
under the civil affairs bureau (Y. Lu, personal communciation, July 28, 1998).
The Xizang armof Save the Children is not officially registered at all; it works
under different bureaus for different projects. The sponsoring body (guakao
danwei) of Volunteers Services Overseas (VSO), a British NGO with approxi-
mately 150 volunteers in China, is the Technical Department of the State
Bureau of Foreign Experts (SBFE) (F. Qian, personal communication, July 28,
1998). The Philip Hayden Foundation, which mainly funds operations for
physically deformed orphans in China, is under the government-organized
China Charities Federation (M. Tolstead, personal communication, July 27,
1998).
Interestingly, some organizations have one de jure sponsoring body but
have another state agency as their de facto guarantor. The official guakao
danwei of Oxfam Hong Kong is FESCO, which helps the NGO hire Chinese
citizens (as is otherwise illegal for foreign organizations) and also helps
Oxfam administratively (Y. Zhao, personal communication, July 23, 1998). In
its actual development projects, however, Oxfam works with the Aid-the-
Poor Foundation
14
for its Yunnan projects, the Nationalities Commission for
projects inGuangxi, andthe Department of Agriculture for Guizhouprojects.
342 Hsia, White
An NGO that has a unique relationship with the government is the Ford
Foundation. Ford is frequently singled out as the only NGO in China with
national registration. With a long history of interest in the country, the Ford
Foundation was the first NGO that established an office in China during the
late 1980s. Its guakao danwei, the Chinese Association of Social Sciences,
securedan agreement fromthe State Council that grantedit tax-exempt status
(J. Harkness, personal communication, July 29, 1998).
The Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF)
15
has a somewhat similar status,
originally because of PRCapproval of foreign panda-mania, and WWF has
been issued a tax-exempt permit. Yet Steve Judd, the energy programdirector
of Chinas WWF program office, admits that although this permit solves the
needs of his own organization, it is actually just a short-term solution. Other
NPOs, he suggests, shouldalsohave tax-exempt status (personal communica-
tion, July 31, 1998).
Not every NGO is as lucky as the Ford Foundation or WWF in finding
agreeable Chinese sponsors. It is rumored that the guakao danwei for Wet-
lands International, the China Associationfor International Understanding, is
actually a facade for the public security bureau. Some foreign NGOs select a
completely different survival strategy andchoose not to wager their future on
the whims of government officials who can choose capriciously whether to
applydomestic regulations toforeigngroups. Rather thanregisteringas social
organizations, some NGOs have chosen to register as foreign businesses
instead, because approval policies are more transparent for enterprises. The
Shanxi-based Evergreen Family Foundation Services (Shanxi yongqing zixun
fuwu zhongxin), an American- and Canadian-staffed NGO, has chosen this
mode. It finds that a major advantage of registeringas a whollyownedforeign
business is the privilege to hire Chinese staff members, which foreign social
groups cannot so easily do.
Some organizations are small enough that they can work without register-
ing as social groups at all. One foreign worker who directs an orphanage pro-
gram obtains visas for his volunteers through a local university. Although
only some of the volunteers are actually enrolled at the university, the institu-
tion continues to grant them visas as a personal favor to the director of the
orphanage program, who has taught English at the university for several
years. According to him, There are ways you can do it officially, and then
there are semi-official ways to do things (Anonymous, personal interview,
July 23, 1998).
CORPORATIST GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
Besides the ambiguous environment created by diverse regulations, the
corporatismof the state canbe foundinits top-downstructure of government.
China has longbeenknownfor its vertical (tiaotiao) political structure, derived
partly from the Stalinist model, and for its concurrent horizontal (kuaikuai)
structure (Lieberthal, 1995, p. 169; Schurmann, 1966, pp. 85-90). In the vertical
hierarchy, policies formed by the Party or State Council filter down through
the power structure until they arrive at the intended level, where officials are
supposed to mobilize people together. The chain of command means that
communication between local officials may require involvement of the next
higher level.
One NGO director opines that the vertical bureaucratic structure hinders
cooperation among bureaus at any horizontal level, and this creates problems
for his organizations work. Amedical education bureau andPHBat the same
level, for example, are completely separate and rarely collaborate on issues
that demand their joint attention. So if the NGO needs accreditation of its vil-
lage health doctor training programs, it must negotiate with two bureaus sep-
arately. The medical education bureau is the only body that can recognize the
training program as a legitimate phase of medical certification, and the PHB
oversees this NGOs other health work. In addition, the NGOneeds approval
from the PINGOS, its guakao danwei. Multiple lines of authority are articu-
lated in Chinas complicated tiao/kuai bureaucracy (Lieberthal, 1995, p. 170),
and foreign organizations are expected to obey them all.
CO-OPTING THE CORPORATIST CONFUSION
As more money is directed to NGOs in China and elsewhere, many in the
international community continue to ask how to defend foreign NGOs from
Chinas corporatist hold. Perhaps this question is misdirected. Instead of just
analyzing government attitudes toward foreign NGOs, some attention is also
due the attitude of foreign NGOs toward the Chinese government.
The prevailing notion in many foreign NGO circles is that the government
dilutes or subverts their efforts. This belief is not always true, and it is usually
detrimental to teamwork between the two sides. Foreign NGOs might under-
stand that some PRC leaders remain convinced that some noncitizens in
China threatenthe securityof the state. It maywell take decades before foreign
NGOs and the Chinese government build sufficient mutual trust to adopt a
more laissez-faire model of cooperation. To expect China, with its traditional
pride and recent revolution, already to adhere to Western concepts of civil
society and its forms of social organization is nave.
Foreign NGOs can seek honest government agencies that are willing to
collaborate with them to meet mutual goals. Although purist anti-
governmentalists may abhor even the idea of collaboration with the state,
government-NGOrelationships are often indispensable for progress in coun-
tries such as China. It is well accepted that sustainable projects usually come
from working with existing structures. Most of these in the PRC are govern-
ment owned or influenced, so that maintaining good relations with various
levels of the state is essential. Evergreen, for example, even though its activi-
ties generate no profits, chose to register as a foreignbusiness because of a lack
344 Hsia, White
of clear government directives on foreign NGOs. It is one instance of an NGO
that beganits workat the invitationof provincial officials andhas foundwork-
ing with government officials most effective. It is discussed here as a possible
model for other NGOs that may not desire to register as a foreign business but
can learn from Evergreens experience of maximizing their own organiza-
tional interests while working within a corporatist structure.
Evergreens Well Baby Program illustrates the importance of the principle
of integration, whichenhances a projects prospects for sustainabilityandrep-
lication. Evergreen initiated this venture in 1996, after an exploratory investi-
gation of health conditions in YangquCounty, for which the local government
gave permission. The study revealed that although there were enough health
workers in each village, most of them performed their tasks either perfuncto-
rily or not at all. Maternal and Child Health (MCH) workers, for example,
were requiredto submit annual reports withinformationregarding the health
status of children in their areas. Mark Strand, the director of Evergreen,
observed that MCH workers at the end of the year would feverishly fill in
cards with fabricated information. As a result, the health of hundreds of chil-
dren was not properly monitored.
Rather than initiating an independent program of its own, Evergreens
medical team discussed their ideas to remedy this situation with the Yangqu
CountyPublic HealthBureau. Insteadof employingits owndoctors to visit all
the townships and perform examinations, Evergreen contracted with the
health bureaus MCH department as its partner to carry out this work in the
Nitun and Houcun townships first. Evergreen began the programby training
two MCH workers along with all the village doctors in the townships for the
study. After discovering the inability of village clinics to pay the salaries of
these MCH workers (300 RMB, or U.S.$37.50 per month), Evergreen moti-
vated themby offering a salary of 20 RMB (U.S.$2.50) per half day, which was
gladly accepted by the MCH workers.
Three years later, this project has flourished with the continued involve-
ment of Evergreen. To ensure that MCHworkers successfully graspthe neces-
sary skills, Evergreens medical teamspends half a day in each township once
a month to work side-by-side with the MCHworkers who are examining chil-
dren. Evergreens medical personnel take suchopportunities not only to men-
tor andtutor the MCHworkers but alsotoassess their skills andascertaintheir
effectiveness in parent education. Evergreen also follows up with daylong
refresher courses at each site once every 3 months. To provide an incentive for
monitoring at-risk children, Evergreen pays an extra stipend to workers for
additional home visits to them (Strand, 1998).
The most important result of the Well Baby Programis its replication by the
PHB without any direct influence fromEvergreen staff members. The Yangqu
County PHBhas designeda similar programto monitor the prenatal health of
approximately 300 women in four other townships. Progress in both projects
demonstrates the value of partnership; while Evergreen itself has financial
resources andmedical expertise, the Chinese government provides astructured
health care systemthat facilitates management of staff workers and programs
and provides access to people (Strand, personal communication, August 4,
1998).
If community or government institutions are already in place, it is often
wiser for foreign NGOs to work to improve them rather than create an inde-
pendent structure that will ultimately compete with the existing structure.
Whenever possible, foreign NGOs should, Strand notes, build on islands of
strength that are already there (Keys in Working, 1997). Besides the eco-
nomic benefits of working with programs that are already in place, working
withestablishedstructures usuallyincreases sustainability(Keys inWorking,
1997).
Ideal partnerships do not always exist, however. Often government offi-
cials are more interested in self-gain than in the idealistic goals of a foreign
NGO. The earlier case study of a health-oriented NGO and its PINGOS is an
example. The NGOcommunitycancome together to increase horizontal com-
munication among themselves and share their solutions for solving such
problems. In a particular province, what have other groups done to become
registered? Withwhomdidtheypartner? Didtheyregister as a foreignorgani-
zation, a social organization, or a business? Although foreign NGOs often
fault the vertical nature of the Chinese government for impeding real change,
the NGOs themselves have not emphasized their own horizontal networks.
Almost none of the NGOs interviewed for this study knew how other groups
in the past hadregisteredor hadbeen grantedpermission to work in the same
provinces. NGOs canimpart their experiences toother groups. Theycanbene-
fit from sharing their local links to officials with whom they have earned
mutual trust, andthey can provide suggestions on howto replicate successful
projects in new locations.
Many NGO workersincluding the husband of the director of Save the
Children (UK) in Kunminghave recognized that disseminating such infor-
mation should be a top priority for all NGOs. In 1996, Nick Young initiated a
quarterlynewsletter, China Development Briefing, withseveral colleagues at the
Asia Pacific Social Development Research Centre in Hong Kong. Nownamed
Chinabrief, this newsletter tracks many development projects inChina andhas
increased the awareness in foreign NGOs about similar work being done
around the country. It also includes the names, addresses, telephone and fac-
simile numbers, and e-mail addresses of those in charge of development pro-
jects. By using subscriptions frominternational organizations, Young can also
distribute Chinabrief free of charge to mainland Chinese NPOs, government
agencies, and research institutes.
Well-resourced and well-connected NGOs can make similar efforts at
increasing communication through sponsoring conferences, workshops, and
seminars for NGOs in related activities. NGOs could make their financial
reports, annual reports, and project evaluations readily available to others.
They couldcandidly share mistakes they have made indevelopment work for
the benefit of other NGOs. Publishing this kind of information on the Web or
346 Hsia, White
distributing it through electronic mail would be a relatively inexpensive
option for NGOs that increasingly have these resources available to them.
CONCLUSION
The traditional Party-state structure of corporatist China is not the sole rea-
son for the ills that foreign NGOs face in dealing with the PRC government.
Although still maintaining norms of corporatism, the Chinese bureaucracys
main obstacle in dealing with foreign NGOs is its lack of clear policy for for-
eign social groups. As a result, these NGOs are at the mercy of cadres who
have no unambiguous mandates and decide for themselves whether to help
development agencies that come from abroad. For the NGOs, this combina-
tion of corporatismand confusion allows various levels of the state to become
involved in their daily affairs. As the two case studies show, this relation can
be either a boon or a bane. The latter case of Evergreen is hopeful in the sense
that one sees a trend toward negotiation between the social organization and
the state when their social and development priorities overlap.
What does this tell us of state-society relations? This depends, of course, on
the understanding of civil societywhether as a powerful force against the
state, as it is often seen in the West, or as a powerful force working with the
state, to provide services the state cannot. In either case, the role of foreign
NGOs is minimal. Whether seen fromthe Tocqueville (or more recent Putnam)
model of associationalism or European liberal model of state opposition,
17
political or social space is not yet in view for foreign organizations. Even in
models of the state-led civil society proposed by political scientist Michael
Frolic that incorporates the authoritarian tradition common in many Asian
political cultures (Frolic, 1997, pp. 46-68), foreignNGOs are unlikelyat present
to affect interactions of Chinese citizens with the state or affect the state itself.
The legitimacy and existence of foreign organizations continues to be subject
to the whims of a controlling state that has not yet developed the administra-
tive footing to manage them effectively.
Until the presence of foreign organizations is more secure, Western donors
can benefit by seeing foreign NGOsat least those that are development
orientedand the Chinese government as partners, rather than visualizing
NGOs as development alternatives to government. Abelief that the aims of
NGOs and the government are mutually exclusive will only delay any open-
ing of social space for foreign organizations. Most NGOs in China will fall
under the category of either government-organized NGOs (GONGOS) or
quasi-official NGOs (QUANGOS). Although these terms are often used pejo-
ratively by the development community to indicate a relationship with the
government that is too close for comfort, for development-oriented NGOs,
at least, it is reasonable to assume that the government shares many of their
development objectives.
Foreign NGOs should understand that the historical links of the Chinese
government withsocial organizations is closer thaninthe West. Foreignsocial
groups can recognize that although working in isolation of the government is
scarcely an option, choosing helpful government agencies as partners is
vitally important. They must hone their abilities to identify these associates
anddiscover howto fit into existing structures without creating a competitive
atmosphere. This is not always easy, and in some places even well-laid plans
will not work. For most foreign NGOs, however, government agencies can be
either partners or rivals. The difference is mainly in the eye of the beholder.
Notes
1. Technically, any agency that is not controlled by government can be regarded as a
nongovernmental organization(NGO). This wouldinclude chambers of commerce, trade unions,
clubs, professional associations, and private enterprises. However, the term NGO traditionally
connotes those formal or informal entities that are dedicated to equitable development and the
eradication of poverty. This discussion will be confined to NGOs as development agents who
workwiththe poor. For a discussiononthe taxonomyof NGOs, see SalamonandAnheier (1992).
2. Of course, many mission agencies enter China as nonreligious social groups to evade tight
government surveillance or bans on entry.
3. How was the Chinese government able to implement such corporatist policies? Political
scientist Alfred Stepan, who writes primarily on the state and society in Peru, hypothesizes that
the ability of a state to create co-optive environments is directly related to its organizational
strength and ideological unity. Stepans model suggests that the Chinese Party-state ranked high
in ideological cohesiveness and institutional power. In addition, Chinas elaborate and central-
ized bureaucracy of government departments reinforced the states power. Finally, the states
extensive control over basic resources enabled it to check the power of NGOs. For more on this
topic, see Stepan (1978, pp. 83, 88).
4. The derogatorytermmangliuhas beenrenamedas mingongchao, or tide of civilian(migrant)
workers. Solinger (1999), documents the ambivalent attitude of officials toward this urban
immigration.
5. It could be hypothesized that the growth of foreign social organizations could be extrapo-
lated from the trends of the aggregate. There is, however, little to determine the validity of this
hypothesis. For further readingonthe growthof social organizations inthe aggregate, please refer
to Zhongguo falu nianjian (Law Yearbook of China) (1997, p. 1077) or Minxin Pei (1998, pp. 24,
301).
6. His total estimate of 200 international NGOs does not include small, Christian missionary
groups that engage insmall development andsocial service projects (N. Young, personal commu-
nication, March 5, 1999).
7. The 57%, however, is likely an undercount. Many state workers moonlighted during this
period as well.
8. See Xiaobo and Perry (1997) and many previous books. On the creation of this urban sys-
tem in the 1950s, see Lynn White (1978).
9. These departments are also known as yequ guikou bumen, or guikou, for short. The guikou
bureau that extends approval is not to be confused with the guakao danwei that sponsors an NGO.
See Whiting (1992, p. 25).
10. Mother-in-law (popo) is also used informally for the supervising units of state economic
companies.
11. Only the following religions qualify officially inChina: Daoism, Buddhism, Islam, Catholi-
cism, and Protestantism. See Lynn White (2000, pp. 40-85).
348 Hsia, White
12. The directors of this NGOhave specifically requestedthat their organization remain anon-
ymous in this study.
13. Several NGO workers in China have surmised that the PINGOS are temporary holding
places for surplus government workers and that MOFTECs aim is eventually to make the
PINGOS 100% private to reduce state burdens. This would explain why PINGOS are so eager to
register foreign NGOs because they can generate revenue for themselves by acting as brokers for
management fees.
14. This is different fromthe Foundationfor the Poor, whichis not anofficial state agencybut is
composed of retired government officials.
15. The official name of this organization has been changed to the World Wildlife Fund. In
China, however, the original name of Worldwide Fund for Nature has not been changed.
16. A lengthy discussion of the different concepts of civil society is beyond the scope of this
article. For a fuller description of civil society as nonpolitical autonomous organizations among
citizens, see Tocqueville (1835/1969, pp. 513-517) andPutnam(1993). For more onthe Habermasian
view of civil society as political consciousness, see Foley and Edwards (1996).
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Renee Yuen-Jan Hsia is a graduate of Princetons WoodrowWilson School who is nowstudying at Harvard
Medical School. After most recently having worked for the International Rescue Committee in Rwanda and
serving as a consultant in Senegal to the Harvard AIDS Institute, her current interests include investigat-
ing how donor agencies can be a more effective vehicle for international aid.
Lynn T. White III is a professor in Princetons WoodrowWilson School, where he was exceptionally lucky to
have Renee Hsia as a senior thesis advisee. His most recent book, UnstatelyPower, wonthe Associationfor
Asian Studies Levenson Prize.

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