RULE 62

G.R. No. L-41818 February 18, 1976

ZOILA CO LIM, petitioner, vs. CONTINENTAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondent
Facts: On November 26, 1973, herein petitioner Continental Development Corporation
filed a complaint for interpleader against the defendants Benito Gervasio Tan and
Zoila Co Lim, and praying that the defendants be directed to interplead and
litigate their respective claims over the aforementioned shares of stock and to
determine their respective rights thereto. The trial judge dismissed the complaint
for lack of cause of action, invoking Section 35 of Act No. 1459, as amended,
otherwise known as the Corporation Law. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not there was an active conflict of interest from the defendants to
make out a complaint for interpleader
Held: YES. The action of interpleader under section 120, is a remedy whereby a
person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render
wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both comes to court and asks that
the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves
entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing.
The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to
protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. It is patent from
the pleadings in the lower court that both defendants Benito Gervasio Tan and
Zoila Co Lim assert conflicting rights to the questioned shares of stock. Precisely
in his motion to dismiss the complaint for interpleader, defendant Benito Gervasio
Tan states that petitioner corporation, through its Vice-President, notified him on
July 23, 1973 "that the shares of stock are in the possession of its treasurer, Mr.
Ty Lim, and urged defendant to directly obtain them from the former, who
allegedly was on vacation at the time. Mr. Ty Lim, on August 30, 1973, through
counsel, replied to the defendant Benito Gervasio Tan that said certificates were
not in his possession but surmised, without reference to any record, that the
same might have been delivered to the deceased So Bi. And, on October 29,
1973, same counsel of Mr. Ty Lim, wrote the corporation, in behalf of defendant
Zoila Co Lim, alleged heir of So Bi, claiming ownership of the stocks". Indeed,
petitioner corporation is placed in the same situation as a lessee who does not
know the person to whom he will pay the rentals due to the conflicting claims
over the property leased, or a sheriff who finds himself puzzled by conflicting
claims to a property seized by him

[G.R. No. 133113. August 30, 2001]
EDGAR H. ARREZA, petitioner, vs. MONTANO M. DIAZ, JR., respondent

Facts: Bliss Development Corporation is the owner of a housing unit located at Lot 27,
Block 30, New Capitol Estates I, Barangay Matandang Balara, Quezon City. In
the course of a case involving a conflict of ownership between petitioner Edgar
H. Arreza and respondent Montano M. Diaz, Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 94-
2086 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, Bliss Development
Corporation filed a complaint for interpleader. The trial court had denied
petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint filed against him on grounds of res
adjudicate to which the CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Diazs claims for reimbursement against petitioner
Arreza are barred by res adjudicata.
Held: The elements of res adjudicata are: (a) that the former judgment must be final;
(b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be
between the first and second causes of action identity of parties, subject matter,
and cause of action. Worthy of note, the prior case for interpleader filed with
Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 94-2086, was
settled with finality with this Courts resolution in G.R. No. 128726. The judgment
therein is now final. When the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 146)
rendered judgment, it had prior acquired jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter.








October 10, 1924
G.R. No. L-22807
GREGORIO R. SY-QUIA, petitioner, vs. THE SHERIFF OF ILOCOS SUR and
FILADELFO DE LEON, respondents
Facts: Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco and Feliciano Reyes Cheng-Kiangco executed a
chattel mortgage in favor of the petitioner, Gregorio R. Sy-Quia on their
mercantile, establishment, with all the merchandise therein contained, as security
for a debt of P6,000. The chattel mortgage was duly recorded on the date of its
execution and fell due on February 3, 1917. From its terms it may be inferred that
it was the intention of the parties that the mortgagors were to be permitted to sell
the merchandise replenishing their stock from time to time and that the new stock
brought in should also be subject to the mortgage. On May 5, 1924, Miguel
Aglipay Cheng-Laco executed another chattel mortgage on the same
establishment and all its contents in favor of the respondent Filadelfo de Leon as
security for the sum of P4,900, which mortgage was recorded on May 4, 1924.
The sheriff seized the establishment in question as well as its contents and fixed
the date of the sale at June 2, 1924. In the meantime Filadelfo de Leon
presented an adverse claim to the property by virtue of his chattel mortgage,
alleging that all the goods on which the chattel mortgage of Gregorio R. Sy-Quia
was given had been sold long before the chattel mortgage in favor of De Leon
was executed and that, therefore, the earlier chattel mortgage was of no effect.
The sheriff being in doubt as to the priority of the conflicting claims, suspended
the foreclosure proceedings and brought an action under section 120 of the Code
of Civil Procedure requiring the two claimants to interplead.
Issue: Whether or not mandamus may lie to compel the sheriff to proceed with the
foreclosure
Held: NO. Though it, perhaps, would have been better practice for the sheriff to sell the
property and hold the proceeds of the sale subject to the outcome of the action of
interpleader, the Court, nevertheless, is of the opinion that the facts shown do not
justify our interference by mandamus. The sheriff might lay himself open to an
action for damages if he sold the goods without the consent of the holder of the
last mortgage, and it does not appear that the petitioner offered to give bond to
hold him harmless in such an event. In these circumstances, his action in
suspending the sale pending the determination of the action of interpleader
seems justified. Also that in cases such as the present, the petition for
mandamus should be addressed to the Courts of First Instance rather than to the
SC.
RULE 72:
Nazareno vs. CA
Facts: Before Seniors death and Aureas, they acquired real properties in Quezon City.
The six lots in Quezon City were allegedly sold by Senior, with the consent of Aurea, to
Natividad. One of the lots was Lot 3-B which at the time had been occupied by Romeo,
his wife Eliza (respondent) and Junior. Natividad sold Lot 3-B to Junior. When Romeo
found out about the sale to Junior, Romeo and Eliza locked Junior out of the house.
Junior brought an action for the recovery of possession and damages against Romeo
and Eliza, and the RTC ruled favorably for him. CA affirmed this decision, and has
attained finality. Romeo, in behalf of Seniors estate, filed the present case seeking the
annulment of the sale made by Senior to Natividad and the sale thereafter made by
Natividad to Junior. Romeo argued that Senior and Aurea never intended to sell the QC
lots to Natividad but only to have her hold the lots in trust for her siblings. The RTC
ruled for Seniors estate, declaring the nullity of the two sales. CA modified the ruling,
restoring the title over Lot 3-B to Seniors estate, among others. In this appeal by
certiorari, Natividad and Junior make capital of the fact that in the previous case filed by
Junior against Romeo and Eliza, the right of Junior to recover possession based on
ownership of Lot 3-B has been upheld and this has attained finality.

Issues: (1) May Seniors estate contest the validity of the sale made by Senior to
Natividad though Aureas estate has yet to be settled?
(2) Did the CA err in holding that the sale by Senior to Natividad is void in the
light of the previous final decision upholding the right of Junior to recover possession
based on ownership of Lot 3-B?

Held: 1) YES. The validity of the contract can be questioned by anyone affected by it.
A void contract is inexistent from the beginning. Hence, even if Seniors estate alone
contests the validity of the sale, the outcome of the suit will bind Aureas estate as if no
sale took place at all.
(2) NO. That previous case was for recovery of possession based on ownership
of Lot 3-B. The parties in that case were Junior as plaintiff, and the Sps. Romeo and
Eliza, as defendants. On the other hand, the parties in the present case for annulment
of sale are Seniors estate, as plaintiff, and Natividad and Junior, as defendants.
The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own.
Though Romeo represented at one time Seniors estate, the latter has a separate and
distinct personality from the former. Hence, the prior judgment regarding the ownership
of Junior over Lot 3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only, and not the Seniors estate, which
also has a right to recover properties which were wrongfully disposed.























RULE 74
VDA. DE LOPEZ v. LOPEZ
GR. No. L-23915 September 28, 1970
Facts: Judicial administratrix Saturnina M. Vda.de Lopez of the estate of the deceased
filed with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and her
legitimate children with the deceased. The lower court approved the project of partition
and declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal purposes."
Thereafter, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez, represented by their
mother, Lolita B. Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a
petition claiming that they were illegitimate children of, the deceased Emilio Lopez, born
out of his extra-marital relations with Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that their rights as
such be recognized and their shares in the estate given to them. The motion was
opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground that the proceeding had already
been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was already in the hands of the
distributees; and that the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper
remedy.

Issue: Whether or not such motion was the proper remedy.

Held: In Arroyo vs. Gerona, 54 Phil. 909, the Court said, taking up the question of
jurisdiction of the court to entertain the appellants' motion (to annul the deed of partition
and the order approving it) filed on July 9, 1929. Moreover, in Benedicto vs. Javellana
(10 Phil. 197) the Court held that demands and claims filed by any heir, legatee or party
in interest to a testate or intestate succession, shall be acted upon and decided in the
same special proceedings, and not in a separate action, and the judge who has
jurisdiction over the administration of the inheritance, and who, when the time comes,
will be called upon to divide and adjudicate it to the interested parties, shall take
cognizance of all such questions.
The order of the trial court sought to be reviewed cites the case of Tomias, et al. vs.
Tomias, et al., 89 Phil. 216. That case is not here applicable, since it involved the
annulment of the decision in ordinary action for partition, which had already become
final. The alleged natural child's remedy, said the court, was to file a separate action
against the children to whom the estate had been adjudicated.
The Court ruled in Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, the only instance that we can think
of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set
aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to
secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary
period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as
in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already
final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.






















MANOTOK REALTY INC. V. CA
(149 SCRA 174)
Facts: The Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a probate court in the special
proceedings of the testate estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda, authorized Vicente
Legarda, as special co-administrator, to sell the Legarda Tambunting Subdivision.
On December 10, 1952, Vicente Legarda as co-administrator allegedly sold an area of
about 280 square meters of the subdivision to Abelardo Lucero. The sale was on an
installment basis and Lucero paid an initial amount of P200.00 by virtue of which a
receipt was issued by Legarda. On the same day, Lucero took possession of the lot.
In 1953, Lucero leased the lot to six persons, one of whom is herein private respondent.
Like the other tenants, respondent constructed a house on the lot and paid monthly
rentals.
On July 31, 1956, the probate court issued another order authorizing the Philippine
Trust Company as administrator, to sell the subdivision at the earliest possible time at
the best obtainable price.
Sometime in 1957, the lessees of Lucero, including the private respondent, defaulted in
their payment of rentals. Separate actions for ejectment were filed against them
However, a compromise agreement was concluded and the tenants resumed the
payment of rentals.
In the meantime, Lucero accordingly awaited the sending by Legarda of the formal
contract but as none came, he could not make further payments. In 1957-58, he,
therefore, went to the Philippine Trust Company to make further payments, showing it
the receipt evidencing the down payment but the latter refused either to receive
payment or to issue a formal contract because the Legarda-Tambunting Subdivision
was involved in litigation.
The petitioner was subsequently awarded the sale of the entire subdivision. On March
13, 1959, the deed of sale was executed by and between petitioner and Philippine Trust
Company and the same was approved by the probate court.
On January 1966, the petitioner caused to be published in the Manila Times and Taliba
notices addressed to "all squatter-occupants" of the subdivision advising them to
surrender the material and actual possession of the portions occupied by them
otherwise judicial action would be taken. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the petitioner.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and held that the
sale made by Legarda to Lucero was valid because the former acted within his authority
as special co-administrator and that there was no need for the approval of the probate
court of such sale.

Issues: (1)Whether the contract of sale is valid between Legarda and Lucero
(2)Whether the approval of the probate court is necessary for the validity of the
said sale

Held: (1) The alleged sale made by Legarda to Lucero should have been embodied in
a public instrument in accordance with Article 1358 of the Civil Code and should have
been duly registered with the Register of Deeds to make it binding against third
persons. The authority given by the probate court to Legarda specifically required the
execution of necessary documents. Lucero not only failed to obtain a deed of sale from
Legarda but also failed to secure any kind of writing evidencing the contract of sale
other than the receipt issued by Legarda acknowledging the amount of P200.00.
It was only after about five years that Lucero allegedly went to the administrator and
offered to pay the balance. By this time, Philippine Trust Company was already the
administrator of the Legarda-Tambunting estate and it refused to accept further
payments from Lucero who had only the receipt in the amount of P200.00 and nothing
more as proof that more than five years earlier a piece of real property was sold to him
by a special administrator acting under court orders.
It was therefore held that the alleged sale made by Legarda to Lucero did not bind the
Legarda-Tambunting estate, much less, the petitioner who acquired the property in
dispute with the approval of the probate court and in a sole reliance on the clean title of
the said property.
(2) Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable
property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made
with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a
probate court.
In the case of Estate of Olave v. Reyes (123 SCRA 767, 772), the Court ruled: Section
1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts."
The law is clear that where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a
testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction
involving it without prior approval of the probate court.
Also, in Vda. de Gil v. Cancio (14 SCRA 796, 800), the Court ruled: When it appears
that the sale of the whole or a part of the real or personal estate will be beneficial to the
heirs, devisees, legatees, and other interested persons, the court may, upon application
of the executor or administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, and
legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold, authorize the executor or
administrator to sell the whole or a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay
debts, legacies. or expenses of administration.


















RULE 75
PASTOR, JR. VS. CA
GR. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983
Facts: Sps. Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate
children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate child,
Lewellyn Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an
alleged holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the CFI which contained only one
testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor
Sr.s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS. Thereafter, the probate court appointed
Quemada as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr.
Consequently, Quemada instituted against Pastor Jr., and his wife an action for
reconveyance of alleged properties of estate which included the properties subject of
the legacy which were in the names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who claimed
to be the owners in their own rights, and not by inheritance.
The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. The order was affirmed
by CA and on petition for review, the SC dismissed the petition and remanded the same
to the probate court after denying reconsideration. The probate court set the hearing on
the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on the ground
of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the probate court
required the parties to submit their respective position papers. While the reconveyance
suit was still pending in another court, the probate court issued Order of Execution and
Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS
and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. The oppositors
sought reconsideration thereof. Pending motion, Pastor Jr. and his wife filed with the CA
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction
assailing the writ of execution and garnishment issued by the probate court. However,
said petition was denied as well as their motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Did the Probate Order resolve with finality the questions of ownership and
intrinsic validity?

Held: NO. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is
restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in
the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title.
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate
Order allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties.
However, nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of
specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifested therein that ownership was not
resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the
need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and
approved the holographic will with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been
duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. It
declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed subject to the
outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal
properties.
The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in
the estate inventory, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of
controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending. It was, therefore, error for
the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with
finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties.













REYES VS. DIAZ
Issues: (1)Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to show that the protestant has
duly filed his certificate of candidacy.
(2) Whether the trial court has or has no authority to pass upon the validity of the
ballots adjudicated to the protestant which have not been challenged by the protestee in
his counter-protest.

Held: Both parties agree that if the due filing of the protestants certificate of candidacy
is proven, the trial court has jurisdiction, but that if such fact is not proven the trial court
has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is, therefore, no question between
the parties as to what the jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law in either case.
The real question between them is one of fact whether or not the protestants
certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. And not until this fact is proved can the
question of jurisdiction be determined. Whether certain ballots are or are not pertinent to
the issue raised in the pleadings, is merely a question of relevancy of evidence. It may
be true that the court by an erroneous ruling on such question may encroach upon
issues completely foreign to those defined in the pleadings, but in such case the
question of jurisdiction that may arise would not be one of jurisdiction over the subject-
matter but of jurisdiction over the issue. In order that a court may validly try and decide
a case, it must have jurisdiction over the subject-matter and jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties. But in some instances it is said that the court should also have
jurisdiction over the issue, meaning thereby that the issue being tried and decided by
the court be within the issues raised in the pleadings. But this kind of jurisdiction should
be distinguished from jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the latter being conferred by
law and the former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over
the subject-matter, may be conferred by consent either express or implied of the parties.
(Rule 17, sec. 4, Rules of Court.) Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be
tried and decided if no timely objection is made thereto by the parties. This cannot be
done when jurisdiction over the subject-matter is involved. In truth, jurisdiction over the
issue is an expression of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons of
the parties. Where, for instance, an issue is not duly pleaded in the complaint, the
defendant cannot be said to have been served with process as to that issue. At any
rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question that
requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this function is without
such importance as to call for the intervention of this Court.

RULE 76
SUMILANG VS. RAGAMOSA (21 SCRA 1369)

Facts: Mariano Sumilang filed petition for the probate of the will of Hilarion Ramagosa
which instituted Sumilang as the sole heir. This was opposed by Saturnina Ramagosa
alleging that the will was executed under duress and later on alleging that the will was
revoked by implication when the testator sold the parcels of land subject of the will to
Sumilang. The CFI denied the motion to dismiss of the oppositors on the ground that it
goes into the intrinsic validity of the will hence the case at bar.

Issue: W/N the probate be denied

Held: NO. The petition for probate is limited to the extrinsic validity that is the testators
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of
the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature. The alleged sale in the case
at bar is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing, the
validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the
document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent
and distribution.










RULE 78-90
OCAMPO VS OCAMPO
GR. No. 187879. July 5, 2010

Facts: Leonardo died and was survived by his wife (Dalisay), and his children (Vince,
Melinda, Leonardo, Jr.)the petitioners. June 2004, or 5 months from his death,
petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings of the Estate of the Spouses. It
prayed for the appointment of an administrator. October 2005, respondents moved for
their appointment as joint special administrators and prayed for their exemption to post
a bond should they be so appointed.
June 2006, RTC appointed petitioner Dalisay and respondent Renato as special
joint administrators of the Estate, requiring them to post bond. Respondents opposed
Dalisays appointment in a motion for reconsideration. Pending resolution of this MR,
petitioners moved for an inventory and accounting of the Estate. Respondents insisted
they could not be compelled to submit an inventory and render an accounting pending
the resolution of their MR.
February 2007, RTC revoked Dalisays appointment and substituted her with
respondent Erlinda. Petitioners again moved for the submission of an inventory and
accounting of the Estate. May 2007, respondents again filed a motion for exemption to
file the administrators bond. They alleged, among others, that, considering they could
not produce the money themselves and that petitioners do not object to their
appointment, it would be best for the interest of all heirs that the Estate be spared from
the unnecessary expense for paying the bond premiums.
October 2007, or 8 months after the RTC appointed respondents as joint special
administrators, petitioners moved to terminate/revoke the special administration and to
proceed to judicial partition or appointment of regular administrator. The motion also
prayed for the appointment of petitioner Melinda as regular administratrix. March 2008,
respondents filed their Opposition and Comment to the motion. They did not specifically
traverse the appointment of Melinda as regular administrator therein. No hearing on the
motion was conducted.
RTC terminated/revoked the appointment of respondents as joint special administrators
on the ground of failure to comply with its order (to post a bond) and to enter their duties
and responsibilities as special administrator (to submit an inventory and render an
accounting the income of the estate). RTC also appointed Melinda as regular
administratrix.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA granted the petition. CA
ruled that the posting of the bond is a prerequisite before the special administrator could
enter his duties and responsibilities so that it was grave abuse of discretion to revoke
respondents appointment without first ruling on their motion for exemption from bond.
CA also found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it appointed Melinda as
regular administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to determine her competency.
Meanwhile, Melinda has already posted the administrators bond by virtue of which,
Letters of Administration have already been issued to her. She has also already filed an
inventory of the estate.

Issues: 1) Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion when it appointed Melinda as
regular administratrix?
(2) Is the posting of the administrators bond prerequisite to the administrators
entering into the duties and responsibilities of its office so that it was grave abuse of
discretion to revoke respondents appointment as special administrators without first
ruling on their motion for exemption from bond?

Held: (1) Yes. On the matter of contest for the issuance of letters of administration,
Secs. 2-5, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court are pertinent.
Case at bar, there was no petition for letters of administration with respect to Melinda.
Despite the filing by respondents of their Opposition and Comment to the motion to
revoke the special administration, the prayer for the appointment of Melinda as regular
administratrix of the estate was not specifically traversed in the said pleading. Thus, the
capacity, competency, and legality of Melindas appointment as such was not properly
objected to by respondents despite being the next of kin to the decedent spouses, and
was not threshed out by the RTC acting as a probate court in accordance with [Rule 79
of the Rules of Court].
However, having in mind the objective of facilitating the settlement of the Estate with a
view to putting an end to the squabbles of the heirs and taking into account that Melinda
has already posted a bond and filed the inventory of the estate which acts clearly
manifest her intention to serve willingly as administratrix, her appointment should be
converted into one of special administration pending proceedings for regular
administration.
,
(2) No. [It may be gathered from Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court that]
the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the
administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge
the obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the
properties of the decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of
the necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included among the
acts constituting the care, management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover, the
ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of administration.




















HEIRS OF PEDRO ESCANLAR VS CA
GR. No. 119777 October 23, 1997

Facts: Spouses Guillermo Nombre and Victoriana Cari-an died without issue in 1924
and 1938, respectively. Nombres heirs include his nephews and grandnephews.
Victoriana Cari-an was succeeded by her late brothers son, Gregorio Cari-an. The
latter was declared as Victorianas heir in the estate proceedings for Nombre and his
wife. After Gregorio died in 1971, his wife, Generosa Martinez, and children, Rodolfo,
Carmen, Leonardo and Fredisminda, all surnamed Cari-an, were also adjudged as heirs
by representation to Victorianas estate. Leonardo Cari-an passed away, leaving his
widow, Nelly Chua vda. de Cari-an and minor son Leonell, as his heirs.
Gregorio Cari-ans heirs, herein collectively referred to as private respondents Cari-an,
executed the Deed of Sale of Rights, Interests and Participation in favor of Pedro
Escanlar and Francisco Holgado. The vendees, were concurrently the lessees of the
lots referred to. They stipulated that the balance of the purchase price shall be paid.
Petitioners were unable to pay the Cari-an heirs individual shares, amounting to
P55,000.00 each,by the due date. However, said heirs received at least 12 installments
from petitioners.
Being former lessees, petitioners continued in possession of Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617.
Interestingly, they continued to pay rent based on their lease contract. Petitioners
moved to intervene in the probate proceedings of Nombre and Cari-an as the buyers of
private respondent Cari-ans share in Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617. Petitioners motion for
approval of the sale before the same court was opposed by private respondents Cari-
an.
The probate court approved a motion filed by the heirs of Cari-an and Nombre to sell
their respective shares in the estate. Private respondents Cari-an, in addition to some
heirs of Guillermo Nombre, sold their shares in eight parcels of land including Lot Nos.
1616 and 1617 to the spouses Ney Sarrosa Chua and Paquito Chua. One week later,
the vendor-heirs, including private respondents Cari-an, filed a motion for approval of
sale of hereditary rights.
Private respondents Cari-an instituted this case for cancellation of sale against
petitioners (Escanlar and Holgado). They complained of petitioners failure to pay the
balance of the purchase price. Petitioners replied that the Cari-ans, having been paid,
had no right to resell the subject lots; that the Chuas were purchasers in bad faith; and
that the court approval of the sale to the Chuas was subject to their existing claim over
said properties.
Petitioners also sold their rights and interests in the subject parcels of land (Lot Nos.
1616 and 1617) to Edwin Jayme and turned over possession of both lots to the latter.
The probate court approved the September 21, 1982 sale without prejudice to
whatever rights, claims and interests over any of those properties of the estate which
cannot be properly and legally ventilated and resolved by the court in the same intestate
proceedings. The certificates of title over the eight lots sold by the heirs of Nombre and
Cari-an were later issued in the name of respondents Ney Sarrosa Chua and Paquito
Chua.
Meanwhile, the probate court concluded that since all the properties of the estate were
disposed of or sold by the declared heirs of both spouses, the case is considered
terminated and the intestate estate of Guillermo Nombre and Victoriana Cari-an is
closed.
The seminal case at bar was resolved by the trial court in favor of cancellation of the
first sale. Said transaction was nullified because it was not approved by the probate
court as required by the contested deed of sale of rights, interests and participation and
because the Cari-ans were not fully paid. Consequently, the Deed of Sale executed by
the heirs of Nombre and Cari-an in favor of Paquito and Ney Chua, which was approved
by the probate court, was upheld. Petitioners raised the case to the Court of Appeals.
Respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied by respondent court on April 3, 1995.Hence, these
petitions.

Issue: Whether the deed of sale is null and void for not having been approved by the
probate court.

Held: NO. Petitioners are correct in saying that the need for approval by the probate
court exists only where specific properties of the estate are sold and not when only ideal
and indivisible shares of an heir are disposed of.
In the case of Dillena v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person
by his prospective heirs before final adjudication. It is settled that court approval is
necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedents estate. However,
reference to judicial approval cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of the heirs
to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership among the heirs. It
must be recalled that during the period of indivision of a decedents estate, each heir,
being a co-owner, has full ownership of his part and may therefore alienate it. But the
effect of the alienation with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.






















BRIONES VS HENSON-CRUZ
GR. No. 159139 August 22, 2008

Facts: Respondent Ruby J. Henson filed a petition for the allowance of the will of her
late mother, Luz J. Henson, with the RTC of Manila. Lilia Henson-Cruz, one of the
deceased's daughters and also a respondent in this petition, opposed Ruby's petition.
Lilia subsequently moved for the appointment of an Interim Special Administrator of the
estate of her late mother. The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S.
Briones as Special Administrator of the estate. Atty. Briones submitted the Special
Administrator's Final Report for the approval of the court. He prayed that he be paid a
commission of P97,850,191.26 representing eight percent (8%) of the value of the
estate under his administration.
The respondents opposed the approval of the final report and prayed that they be
granted an opportunity to examine the documents, vouchers, and receipts mentioned in
the statement of income and disbursements. The respondents filed an audit request
with the trial court. Atty. Briones filed his comment suggesting that the audit be done by
an independent auditor at the expense of the estate.
The trial court granted the request for audit and appointed the accounting firm Alba,
Romeo & Co. to conduct the audit. The respondents moved for the reconsideration
alleging that in view of the partition of the estate there was no more need for a special
administrator. They also clarified that they were not asking for an external audit; they
merely wanted to be allowed to examine the receipts, vouchers, bank statements, and
other documents in support of the Special Administrator's Final Report and to examine
the Special Administrator under oath.
The trial court ordered (1) the designation of the accounting firm of Alba, Romeo & Co.
to conduct an audit of the administration of Atty. George S. Briones of the estate of Luz
J. Henson, at the expense of the estate; (2) the payment of the petitioner's commission
as the estate's Special Administrator; and (3) the directive to the petitioner to deliver the
residue of the estate to the heirs in their proportional shares.
Respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus (CA-
G.R. SP No. 70349) assailing the appointment of an accounting firm to conduct an
external audit. They subsequently filed their record on appeal assailing the same Order
insofar as it directed the payment of Atty. Briones' commission. The trial court, however,
denied the appeal and disapproved the record on appeal on the ground of forum
shopping.
Respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus with the appellate court, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 71844. They claimed that the trial court unlawfully refused to comply with
its ministerial duty to approve their seasonably-perfected appeal. They refuted the trial
court's finding of forum shopping by declaring that the issues in their appeal and in their
petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 70349) are not identical, although both stemmed
from the same Order .
CA granted respondents' petition for Mandamus (CA-G.R. SP No. 71844)directing
respondent Judge to give due course to the appeal of petitioners from the Order insofar
as it directed the payment of commission to private respondent. [Emphasis supplied.]
Atty. Briones seasonably filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari on the
ground that the CA refused to resolve the issue of forum shopping.
In the interim, the CA granted respondents petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus (CA-G.R. SP No. 70439): Public respondent Judge Artemio S. Tipon is
hereby COMMANDED to allow petitioner-heirs: 1) to examine all the receipts, bank
statements, bank passbook, treasury bills, and other documents in support of the
Special Administrator's Final Report, as well as the Statement of the Income and
Disbusement Made from the Estate; and 2) to cross-examine private respondent
Briones, before finally approving the Special Administrator's Final Report.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the respondents'
petition for mandamus (CA-G.R. SP No. 71844) on the ground of forum shopping

Held: NO. An examination of the RTC Order of April 3, 2002 shows that it resolved
three matters, namely: (1) the designation of the accounting firm of Alba, Romeo & Co.
to conduct an audit of the administration of Atty. George S. Briones of the estate of Luz
J. Henson, at the expense of the estate; (2) the payment of the petitioner's commission
as the estate's Special Administrator; and (3) the directive to the petitioner to deliver the
residue of the estate to the heirs in their proportional shares. Of these, only the first two
are relevant to the present petition as the third is the ultimate directive that will close the
settlement of estate proceedings.
The first part of the Order (the auditor's appointment) was the subject of the petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus that the respondents filed before the appellate
court (CA-G.R. SP No. 70349). Given that the subject matter of the audit is Atty.
Briones' Final Report in the administration of the estate of the decedent, its preparatory
character is obvious; it is a prelude to the court's final settlement and distribution of the
properties of the decedent to the heirs. It is only for purposes of confirming the accuracy
of the Special Administrator's Final Report, particularly of the reported charges against
the estate. In other words, the designation of the auditor did not resolve Special
Proceedings No. 99-92870 or any independently determinable issue therein, and left
much to be done on the merits of the case. Thus, the April 3, 2002 Order of the RTC is
interlocutory in so far as it designated an accounting firm to audit the petitioner's special
administration of the estate.
In contrast with the interlocutory character of the auditor's appointment, the second part
is limited to the Special Administrator's commission which was fixed at 1.8% of the
value of the estate. To quote from the Order: the court hereby. . . 2. Suspends the
approval of the report of the special administrator except the payment of his
commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate." Under these
terms, it is immediately apparent that this pronouncement on an independently
determinable issue - the special administrator's commission - is the court's definite and
final word on the matter, subject only to whatever a higher body may decide if an appeal
is made from the court's ruling.
From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrator's commission is no
less a claim against the estate than a claim that third parties may make. Section 8, Rule
86 of the Rules recognizes this when it provides for "Claim of Executor or Administrator
Against an Estate." Under Section 13 of the same Rule, the action of the court on a
claim against the estate "is appealable as in ordinary cases." Hence, by the express
terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent of the Special Administrator's commission -
effectively, a claim by the special administrator against the estate - is the lower court's
last word on the matter and one that is appealable.
The twist in the present case is that the losing party took two available recourses from
the same Order of the lower court. It was under these circumstances that the petitioner
posited that forum shopping had been committed. While the petitioner's position may be
legally correct as a general rule, it is not true in the present case considering the unique
nature of the case that gave rise to the present petition. The petitioner is the special
administrator in a settlement of estate. The rationale behind allowing more than one
appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a
separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. In this multi-
appeal mode, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter of the
appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the appeal was
taken for purposes of further remedies the parties may avail of.
Where multi-appeals are allowed, we see no reason why a separate petition for
certiorari cannot be allowed on an interlocutory aspect of the case that is separate and
distinct as an issue from the aspect of the case that has been adjudged with finality by
the lower court. To reiterate, the matter appealed matter was the special administrator's
commission, a charge that is effectively a claim against the estate under administration,
while the matter covered by the petition for certiorari was the appointment of an auditor
who would pass upon the special administrator's final account.






















FIGURACION-GERILLA VS VDA. DE FIGURACION
GR. No. 154322 August 22, 2006
Facts: In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, which
dismissed her complaint for partition. The properties involved are two parcels of land
which belonged to her late father, Leandro Figuracion.
Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion (now both deceased) had
six children: petitioner and respondents Elena Figuracion-Ancheta (now deceased),
HilariaFiguracion, FelipaFiguracion-Manuel, QuintinFiguracion and Mary Figuracion-
Ginez.
On August 23, 1955, Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real
properties in favor of his six children. When he died in 1958, he left behind two parcels
of land: (1) Lot 2299 consisting of 7,547 square meters with Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 4221-P in the name of "Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento"
and (2) Lot 705 with an area of 2,900 sq. m. with TCT No. 4220-P also in the name of
"Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento." Leandro had inherited both lots
from his deceased parents,as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos.
16731 and 16610, respectively.
Leandro sold a portion of Lot 2299 to LazaroAdviento, as a result of which TCT
No. 4221-P was cancelled and TCT No. 101331 was issued to "LazaroAdviento,
married to RosendaSagueped" as owner of the 162 sq. m. and "Leandro Figuracion,
married to Carolina Adviento" as owner of 7,385 sq. m. This lot continued to be in the
name of Leandro in Tax Declaration No. 616 for the year 1985.
What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however, was a dispute between petitioner
and her sister, respondent Mary, over the eastern half of Lot 707 with an area of 3,164
sq. m.
Lot 707 belonged to EulalioAdviento, as evidenced by OCT No. 15867. When
Adviento died, his two daughters, AgripinaAdviento (his daughter by his first wife) and
respondent Carolina (his daughter by his second wife), succeeded him to it. In
November 1961, Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor of petitioner over the one-half
eastern portion of Lot 707. Agripina died single and without any issue. Before her half-
sister's death, however, respondent Carolina adjudicated unto herself the entire Lot 707
which she later sold to respondents Felipa and Hilaria. The latter two immediately had
OCT No. 15867 cancelled and a new title, TCT No. 42244, was then issued in the
names of Felipa and Hilaria for Lot 707.
In February 1971, petitioner and her family went to the United States where they
stayed for ten years. Returning in 1981,she built a house made of strong materials on
the eastern half-portion of Lot 707. She continued paying her share of the realty taxes
thereon.
It was sometime later that this dispute erupted. Petitioner sought the extrajudicial
partition of all properties held in common by her and Respondents. Petitioner filed a
complaint in the RTC of Urdaneta City, for partition, annulment of documents,
reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against respondents, praying, among
others, for: (1) the partition of Lots 2299 and 705; (2) the nullification of the affidavit of
self-adjudication executed by respondent Carolina over Lot 707, the deed of absolute
sale in favor of respondents Felipa and Hilaria, and TCT No. 42244; (3) a declaration
that petitioner was the owner of one-half of Lot 707 and (4) damages.
On the other hand, respondents took the position that Leandro's estate should
first undergo settlement proceedings before partition among the heirs could take place.
And they claimed that an accounting of expenses chargeable to the estate was
necessary for such settlement.
The RTCrendered judgment nullifying Carolina's affidavit of self-adjudication and
deed of absolute sale of Lot 707. It also declared Lots 2299 and 705 as exclusive
properties of Leandro Figuracion and therefore part of his estate. The RTC, however,
dismissed the complaint for partition, reconveyance and damages on the ground that it
could not grant the reliefs prayed for by petitioner without any (prior) settlement
proceedings wherein the transfer of title of the properties should first be effected.
On appeal, the CA upheld the dismissal of petitioner's action for partition for
being premature. The CA reversed the decision, however, with respect to the
nullification of the self-adjudication and the deed of sale. Upholding the validity of the
affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of sale as to Carolina's one-half pro-indiviso
share, it instead partitioned Lot 707. Dissatisfied, respondents elevated the CA decision
to this Court.

Issue: Whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandro's intestate estate
(that is, an accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment of expenses,
liabilities and taxes, plus compliance with other legal requirements, etc.) before the
properties can be partitioned or distributed.

Held: In any event, there appears to be a complication with respect to the partition of
Lot 705. The records refer to a case entitled Figuracion, et al. v. Alejocurrently pending
in the CA. The records, however, give no clue or information regarding what exactly this
case is all about. Whatever the issues may be, suffice it to say that partition is
premature when ownership of the lot is still in dispute.
There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by
agreement under Section 2 and through commissioners when such agreement cannot
be reached, under Sections 3 to 6.Neither method specifies a procedure for determining
expenses chargeable to the decedent's estate. While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that
there shall be an accounting of the real property's income (rentals and profits) in the
course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for
which property belonging to the decedent's estate may be answerable, such as funeral
expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90
of the Rules of Court.
In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the
estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly
without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion's only legal heirs,
she does not dispute the finding of the CA that "certain expenses" including those
related to her father's final illness and burial have not been properly settled.Thus, the
heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father's estate to settlement
because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.