CRUZ vs YOUNGBERG

This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory
injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to
issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner
attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign
countries into the Philippine Islands, preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands from
foreign countries.
Respondent contends that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the petitioner in his
complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155
were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 (prohibiting importation of animals) would automatically become
effective. Petitioner claims that the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the
legislative powers, and argues that Act No. 3155 amends section 3 of the Tariff Law.
HELD: We are of the opinion that Act No. 3155 is entirely valid. As shown in paragraph 8 of the amended petition, the
Legislature passed Act No. 3155 to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle
diseases through importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting
the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police
power. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was
promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in
passing the Act.
Not an unlawful delegation. The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
Also, Act No. 3155 is not an absolute prohibition of the importation of cattle and it does not add any
provision to section 3 of the Tariff Law. As stated in the brief of the Attorney-General: "It is a complete statute in itself.
It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. It does not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is
prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not a tariff measure but a quarantine measure, a statute adopted under the police
power of the Philippine Government. It is at most a `supplement' or an `addition' to the Tariff Law.
ARANETA VS. GATMAITAN
San Miguel Bay is considered as the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol region. Sometime in
1950, trawl
1
operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to this region. Sustenance fishermen that the
operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor
among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay. In
response to these pleas, the President issued on April 5, 1954, Executive Order No. 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in
San Miguel Bay. A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint for
injunction and/or declaratory relief with preliminary injunction praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to
restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive
order; to declare the same null and void..
W/N E.O 22, 60 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly
delegated to the Pres.
Held: VALID! Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the
waters of the Phil and b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources to provide regulations/ restrictions as may
be deemed necessary. The Act was complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect its legislative intent.
The Pres. did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of gen.
concern w/c were in consonance and strict conformity with law.
Distinction bet:
Delegation of Power to Legislate - involves discretion of what law shall be
Execution of Law authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of law.
PEOPLE vs MACEREN
This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law
and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. Private respondents were charged by a Constabulary investigator in
the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 after resorting to
electro fishing.
LowerCourt: electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as
contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or
transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the
executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. (section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of
any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing)
HELD: We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not
warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512 since the Fisheries Law DOES NOT EXPRESSLY
PROHIBIT ELECTRO FISHING. Hence, the Secretary and the Commissioner are powerless to penalize it. In other words,
A.O. Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.Had the lawmaking body intended to
punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
Originally, A.O. No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against electro fishing was confined to fresh
water fisheries. The amendment created the impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be
tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of
electro fishing.
BAUTISTA vs. JUINIO
Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in 1979 which classified vehicles into Heavy and Extra Heavy
in response to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 197. The LOI further banned these vehicles during weekends
and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am Monday. Purpose of this law is to curb down petroleum consumption
as bigger cars consume more oil. Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications and respondent Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation
Commission, issued Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and
cancellation of registration on owners of the above-specified vehicles" found violating such LOI. Bautista claimed the
LOI to be discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars are heavy on petroleum consumption when in fact
there are smaller cars which are also big on oil consumption and that it restricts their freedom to enjoy their car while
others who have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. It would follow, so they contend that M.C. No. 39 imposing penalties of
fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the
doctrine of "undue delegation of legislative power."
HELD: The regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of
course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the
provisions of the law, they are valid.
It follows that while the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is
valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To
apply that portion of Memorandum Circular No. 39 would be ultra vires. It must likewise be made clear that a penalty
even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required by law.(petition dismissed kasi
constitutional ung LOI. The impounding part nung MC, void)
MACEDA vs. ERB
The petitioners pray for injunctive relief, to stop the Energy Regulatory Board from implementing its Order, mandating a
provisional increase in the prices of petroleum and petroleum products. It appears that Caltex, Shell and Petron
proferred separate applications with the Board for permission to increase the wholesale posted prices of petroleum
products. Among others, petitioners contend that the Board's Order was issued without notice and hearing, and
hence, without due process of law.
HELD: The Court finds no merit in these petitions.
Senator Maceda and Atty. Lozano, in questioning the lack of a hearing, have overlooked the provisions of Section 8 of
Executive Order No. 172. As the Order itself indicates, the authority for provisional increase falls within the said
provision. What must be stressed is that while under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not
preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase, as it did here, subject to its final disposition of
whether or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or (3) to deny the application.
Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other, or otherwise, operate exclusively of the
other, in that the Board may resort to one but not to both at the same time. Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the
Board and the grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing.
Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing,
subject to the final outcome of the proceeding. In the light of Section 8 quoted above, public respondent Board need
not even have conducted formal hearings in these cases prior to issuance of its Order of 14 August 1987 granting a
provisional increase of prices. The Board, upon its own discretion and on the basis of documents and evidence
submitted by private respondents, could have issued an order granting provisional relief immediately upon filing by
private respondents of their respective applications.
Philippine Consumers Foundation vs. DECS
Respondent issued an Order authorizing the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by its Task Force. The
petitioner sought a reconsideration of the said Order, apparently on the ground that the increases were too
high. Thereafter, the DECS issued D.O. No. 37 modifying its previous Order and reducing the increases to a lower ceiling
of 10% to 15%, accordingly. Despite this reduction, the petitioner still opposed the increases, and filed a Petition for
prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional, since it
was issued without any legal basis and in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution in asmuch as the
petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before it was issued. PETITIONER: while the DECS is authorized by law
to regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include the power to increase
school fees. Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested parties
that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased. RESPONDENT: the increase in
tuition and other school fees is urgent and necessary, and that the assailed Department Order is not arbitrary in
character
HELD: Petition denied. The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an
adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not
a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid
down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they
may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party,
based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.
Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We believe so. The assailed
Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for
schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.
CIR vs. CA & FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP
Respondent FTC is a domestic corporation that manufactures cigarettes packed by machine under several brands. Prior
to January 1, 1997, Section 142 of the 1977 Tax Code subjected said cigarette brands to ad valorem tax. Annex D of R.A.
No. 4280 prescribed the cigarette brands tax classification rates based on their net retail price. On January 1, 1997, R.A.
No. 8240 took effect. Sec. 145 thereof now subjects the cigarette brands to specific tax and also provides that: (1) the
excise tax from any brand of cigarettes within the next three (3) years from the effectivity of R.A. No. 8240 shall not be
lower than the tax, which is due from each brand on October 1, 1996; (2) the rates of excise tax on cigarettes
enumerated therein shall be increased by 12% on January 1, 2000; and (3) the classification of each brand of cigarettes
based on its average retail price as of October 1, 1996, as set forth in Annex D shall remain in force until revised by
Congress.
The Secretary of Finance issued RR No. 17-99 to implement theprovision for the 12% excise tax increase. RR No. 17-99
added the qualification that the new specific tax rate xxx shall not be lower than the excise tax that is actually being
paid prior to January 1, 2000. In effect, it provided that the 12% tax increase must be based on the excise tax actually
being paid prior to January 1, 2000 and not on their actual net retail price.

FTC filed 2 separate claims for refund or tax credit of its purportedly overpaid excise taxes for the month of January
2000 and for the period January 1-December 31, 2002. It assailed the validity of RR No. 17-99 in that it enlarges Section
145 by providing the aforesaid qualification. In this petition, petitioner CIR alleges that the literal interpretation given by
the CTA and the CA of Section 145 would lead to a lower tax imposable on 1 January 2000 than that imposable during
the transition period, which is contrary to the legislative intent to raise revenue
Petitioner opines that RMC 37-93 is merely an interpretative ruling of the BIR which can thus become
effective without any prior need for notice and hearing, nor publication, and that its issuance is not discriminatory since
it would apply under similar circumstances to all locally manufactured cigarettes
HELD: the BIR did not simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due
observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored. (check
book, nakakatamad n basahin to ugggh.)
TAXICAB OPERATORS vs. BOARD OF TRANSPO (BOT)
Petitioner 1 is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of
Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other
place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Respondent issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-
42 which seeks to adopt a program to phase out and Replace Old and Dilapidated Taxis (more
than 6yrs old). Petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or
to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years
of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided
that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. They contend that
fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because the roadworthiness of
taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and,
therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of
registration.
HELD: No. It is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to
speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible
collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an
vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable
standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their
cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated
and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are
in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With
that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process
has been met. MC valid.



HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOC. vs DEFENSOR




OPLE vs TORRES

PSDSA vs. DE JESUS