PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT INDUSTRIES: DISRUPTION OR DIVERSIFICATION?
Submitted to the Industry Studies Association annual conference 2012, Pittsburgh. Disruptive Technologies in the U.S. Film and Photographic Equipment Industry: Disruption or Diversification? John Clarry, Rutgers University
Innovation is an essential process of competition in many industries, but different types of innovation can have distinct effects mediated by industry structures. Normal or sustaining innovation focuses on current customers, while disruptive innovation can create new technologies and customer segments. The concept of disruptive technology does not explain when or why there is disruption, but requires more industry and corporate research to discover patterns of market change or strategic responses. This paper examines the recent history of two sectors of the photographic equipment industry, which exhibit different rates and processes of change in response to the adoption of digital cameras over film cameras. Industry factors of market structure concentration and related diversification strategies are emphasized as moderating variables to explain the different patterns of disruptive and sustaining innovations. A resource based strategy of sustainable innovation explains disruptive technologies more than static industry structures. Key words: disruptive technologies; innovation; digital photography; diversification strategies
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Innovation is an essential competitive process in many industries, but there are also different types of innovation with distinct consequences. Normal or incremental innovation may be oriented to needs of existing customers, and has been characterized as sustaining innovation based on current technologies; but such sustaining strategies with established technologies may not be effective in sustaining long-term growth or returns. By contrast, disruptive or radical innovation is not oriented to current customers, but can develop new technologies and entrepreneurial opportunities for customers that disrupt the existing market structures of industries (Christensen, 2000; Dyer et al., 2011; Anthony et al., 2008). Hence, an innovators dilemma or paradox is whether to focus on current customers or create inferior new products. The concepts of disruptive innovation and technologies have challenged the theories of new product development and innovation management; but the validity and applicability of disruptive concepts raises new research questions. What makes a new technology disruptive, and when do disruptive innovations actually disrupt markets (Adner, 2002; Schmidt and Druehl, 2008; Govindarajan et al., 2006)? How can firms with older technologies respond to new technology threats (Adner and Snow, 2010), or adapt their strategies to a world of constant disruption and continuous innovation (Hagel et al., 2008)? How are the processes and effects of disruptive innovation affected by corporate level strategies to diversify revenue streams or create new industry segments that cannibalize their existing markets (Lange et al., 2009)? In this paper, we will address some of these questions of disruptive technologies and innovations in more specific industry contexts. We contend that industry settings and market structures matter in analyzing the potential and competitive strategies of disruptive innovation; many examples of disruptive technologies cited by Christensen (2000) and others are from research oriented industries, where technological change is normal, and even intentional. The transition from film to digital photography is the first industry cited by Christensen (2000: xxv) as an example of disruption; cases about the problems of Eastman Kodak are also mentioned as disruptive (Gavetti et al., 2004). However, in this paper, we compare two segments of the photographic equipment industry to analyze the variations in patterns, timing, and direction of digital
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technology disruptions; the motion picture sector was slower to adopt or respond to digital cameras than the professional photography sector. We conclude that industry factors and diversification strategies have affected the forms and responses to disruptive technologies, thus moderating the processes of disruption. Innovation and Disruptive Technologies Innovation can represent normal or incremental product development to sustain established customers, or radical and disruptive technologies that attract new customers or create new market segments (Yu and Hang, 2011; 2010). The definition of a disruptive technology or innovation can vary by authors, but the distinction from sustaining technologies that just add new features is one indication of radical innovation. As defined by Christensen (2000; 2006), disruptive technologies correspond to new products that might be simpler, smaller, less complicated, or better performing on some marketing criteria. However, some new disruptive technology products, like disk drives or welding equipment, are initially sold to smaller market niches, or novel and emerging markets of non-customers that have been ignored or neglected. The initial quality of disruptive technologies may be quite different from and inferior to existing products, and hence be less appealing to established customers or even to conventional stock market investors. New products that are disruptive may also be more expensive to produce initially, at least until production is scaled up when or if the disruptive innovations are diffused and accepted by larger market segments. But in the uncertain transition, disruptive innovations can be risky or unprofitable investments for many firms. There are also questions of how disruptive technologies are diffused throughout existing product markets. How can a product performance be defined to appeal to a broader or newer customer base? If disruption is successful, the established firms sustaining technologies may be rendered inferior or obsolete, but the big companies that have economies of scale may still be able to compete and survive with older technologies. Nonetheless, the processes of disruptive innovation may require new management or leadership (Tellis, 2006; Sood and Tellis, 2011), or a development of new corporate resources to support new technologies.
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Technological Disruption or Diversification? The imagery of technological disruption is powerful, but may be difficult to measure or explain without reference to other strategic and industry variables. The potential for disruption may occur if the product technologies are simpler, smaller, cheaper to produce, more convenient to use, and possibly even better performing; but initially, disruptive technologies may be associated with inferior products that dont meet the needs or demand of existing customers for traditional products. Hence, there are risks in offering any disruptive technologies that may lack a current demand or be rejected by existing distribution channels. A management problem is how to define valid metrics that evaluate the market potential for any disruptive technologies, such as online music media (Ganguly et al., 2010), or timing decisions (Govindarajan et al). Christensen (2006) and his colleagues (Dyer et al., 2011) tend to use unique or historical cases of good companies that failed to stay on top of the leading positions in their industries. Examples from the disk drive, electronic, chemical, and retail service industries were cited as illustrations of the general pattern of leading incumbent firms which were oriented to sustaining technologies that served existing customers. However, the competitive situation of many firms in these industries may be threatened with disruption, regardless of their aggressive innovation strategies or technological trajectories. Hence, the entire set of incumbent firms in an industry can be threatened by innovations from outside the boundaries of their own current industry structure, or be trying to reduce their mutual risks by investing in continuous innovation that will deliberately threaten to disrupt or cannibalize their current market structures and positions. Some leading firms in technologically oriented industries may also be affected by the corporate level strategies of diversification into multiple businesses, whether related or not. For example, Lange et al. (2009) found that corporate parents can endorse or support disruptive technologies into new industries, such as personal computers, yet fail to support or promote their own offspring sufficiently. The parent firm may have a portfolio of new and mature businesses with different cash flow qualities; if the profits from a mature business are invested into a new emerging business, the corporate diversification may
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create a disruptive technology for their offspring that is not adequately supported, but cannibalizes the cash flows from their mature business. Hence, disruption is a paradoxical effect of such diversification. P1. Diversified firms are more likely to create disruptive technologies than are stand-alone firms. Another alternative explanation is that innovative firms in certain industries deliberately and intentionally disrupt markets by continuous new product development, which anticipates strategic imitation and their eroding effects. Some industries, like electronics, may have the inherent technological potential and cost necessity to diversify into related markets. The leading firms in such R&D oriented industries tend to have high fixed costs, and incentives to diversify into new products by constant innovation. Hence, the managers of innovative firms may be motivated to identify revenue gaps and harness disruptive potential disruptive technologies and opportunities (Anthony et al., 2008). Hence, disruption is a firms leverage. P2. Disruption is a normal process of new product development in industries with high R&D spending. The choice of industry to analyze is important to study the potential strategies and trajectories of any disruptive technologies. There have been previous studies of the transition to digital technologies in the photographic industry, but some disagreement on the processes and responses to potential disruption. For example, many observers have concluded that Eastman Kodak was a victim of disruptive technologies in their film camera business, even though the company developed and sold digital cameras (Gavetti et al., 2004; Nohria et al., 2002). Other camera and imaging companies besides Kodak have been challenged by disruptive digital technologies, but managed to respond and survive, or to diversify into related markets. The Swedish high-end camera firm Hasselblad also struggled to adapt to the same disruptive threats of emerging digital technologies, but had limited resources and capabilities to respond effectively (e.g. Sandstrom, 2011; Sandstrom et al., 2009). Nonetheless, in industries with many product segments and constant new product innovations as normal, we would expect variations in the responses and outcomes.
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A Case Study of the Photographic Equipment Industry Industry matters in the study of disruptive technologies; but the exact delineation, scope, structure and boundaries of industries may be difficult to define. The more technologically complex or dynamic an industry is, the more challenging and longitudinal should be the research methodology. In this paper, we focus on the photographic equipment industry, which can be defined as comprising the total sales of cameras, camcorders, photographic equipment, optical instruments and accessories (Datamonitor, 2010). A broader definition includes related products and retail channels, but we focus on equipment suppliers. When photographic processes were based on traditional analog technologies and chemically developed films, earlier photo equipment suppliers relied on related chemical or electronic suppliers for processing materials in the U.S. and Europe (e.g. Jenkins, 1975). However, as digital imaging technologies emerged in the 1950s, the optical and electronic industries became more involved in photographic equipment, and diffused their new devices; but photographic markets have also been shaped by corporate diversification. The overlapping cluster of optical and electronic industries combined with a large supply of electrical engineers and demanding consumers to foster the development of a digital photography industry in Japan; the intense rivalry amongst entrants added to the competitiveness and technological innovation of Japanese firms (Porter, 1990; Porter et al. 2000). There was still rivalry between analog film camera makers like Eastman Kodak and Fuji, which often dominated consumer market segments at the lower end of individual camera users (Gavetti et al., 2004; Swasy, 1997). Older Japanese camera makers made the transition from initial optical products to analog cameras, then to digital technologies and applications faster than other firms; many firms are still changing their corporate strategic focus (Cavasin, 2006). For example, the Japan Camera Industry Association (JCIA) changed its name to the Camera & Imaging Products Association in 2002, to reflect the diversified industries of their related electronic members.
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The current oligopolistic structure of the photographic equipment industry is relatively concentrated, and dominated by a small number of large diversified firms, often based in Japan, but operating at a global scale. Most German (except Leica) and non-Japanese camera firms have been disrupted or displaced. Table 1 lists the leading global digital camera vendors in 2010; Canon and Nikon were the market leaders, and dominated the sale of DSLR reflex cameras in 2010. Yet other firms were slowly losing market shares from the growth of Koreas Samsung chaebol, and the decelerations of 2008 and 2009. Global markets had grown at over 4% annually in 2006-2007; but growth slowed to only 1.8% in 2009. ******** Table 1 here ********** Digital cameras were only one product in the portfolio of many diversified equipment firms; their own corporate strategies had identified new technologies and related market opportunities, to be financed by revenues from maturing businesses, such as older analog cameras. The camera sector was the largest product segment of the $22 billion global photographic industry, accounting for 65% of market value in 2009. But there are many segmented product and national markets downstream in the global camera market, which were also being disrupted. Sales growth was shifting from the maturing Europe and U.S. markets to emerging Asia-Pacific markets, such as China. Hence, the landscapes for camera technologies and national photographic markets are changing; but do such technological changes constitute disruption, sustainability, or another form of corporate diversification in a discontinuous innovation environment? In order to address these technological questions, we will shift our focus from the broad level of global vendors to the specific changes within narrower sectors of the photographic equipment industry. Camera demand historically has often been heterogeneous, as market segments have evolved with industry growth and more technological innovation. However, we need to distinguish diversification from disruption. Rather than focus on the larger end-market segment of individual photographic consumers, we will examine two specialized, more professionally oriented segments of the U.S. camera equipment industry:
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motion pictures and the commercial photography markets. While the sophisticated cameras in these two segments tend to be more specialized and expensive than most consumer cameras, they also exhibit different forms of technological disruption and change from distinct sources of industry innovation. Hence, we expect the impact and diffusion of digital technologies to vary between these two segments. Motion Picture Photography (Cinematography) The motion picture sector is likely to be a more professionally oriented and technologically specialized photography business; but this sector has been impacted by the increased costs of movie production, a decline in film projects, and the diffusion of digital cameras. The demand for specialized film making equipment is often a function of the number and types of creative products being made. Demand for equipment increased since 2001, when the number of new films being made increased. But by 2009-2010, the number of film projects and advertising expenditures were both in decline. 1
Films are a major sector of the movie and entertainment industry; but all of these entertainment industries have been shrinking and changing in 2009-2010. The global movie and entertainment industry shrank -3.7% in 2009, but recovered to shrink -1% in 2010 to $87 billion (Datamonitor, 2011a). The U.S. and North America are the biggest national and regional markets of the global industry; but they also shrank by -8% and -6.8% respectively in 2010, to only $30 billion and $33 billion. The U.S. movie industry had been in decline from 2006 to 2010, with a compound annual rate of change (CARC) of -5%, and forecast to shrink -4% by 2014 (Datamonitor, 2011b). The motion picture equipment market is only a small segment within a larger U.S. photographic industry, but had been somewhat insulated from problems of the camera equipment industry. The motion picture cameras tended to be more complex than consumer cameras, based on film, and often sold or leased to large enterprises in markets where quality and reliability outweighed cost.
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The market leader in a vertically integrated Hollywood film industry was Panavision, which had a majority market share in the equipment segment, leasing their 35mm analog film cameras and bundles of related supplies (Jonson and Ollivier, 2007). Panavisions position was based on close business ties and long-term relationships with the television and motion picture industries in Hollywood. 2 Panavision also developed the Genesis digital cameras in partnership with Sony; but Panavision has still been at a competitive disadvantage from their legacy of traditional film camera equipment, inventories, and high debt levels. 3 Private owners (Perlman) were forced to sell Panavision to settle huge debts; new top management emerged in 2011 for strategic changes against more digital camera rivals, but the firm has struggled to restructure to digital cameras. 4
Other established film camera makers also had problems competing in the motion picture and TV industries, after the diffusion of digital cameras. The Germany based Arnold & Richter Cine Technik GmbHs ARRI subsidiary claims to be the worlds largest motion picture equipment and camera supplier. 5 ARRIs business model and vertical integration resembles Panavisions own strategy; but ARRI buys some of their camera lenses from another German imaging firm (Carl Zeiss), rather than manufacturing their own, and has also been one of Panavisions better customers for other filming equipment. However, ARRI is trying to make the digital transition. ARRIs ALEXA digital movie camera is their fastest selling state-of-the-art product, and has added the Cypress CMOS image sensor portfolio to outperform ARRIs more traditional CCD and other rivals in this growing market segment. 6 Thus, ARRI has diversified their product lines. A third film camera rival is the French owned Technicolor (formerly known as Thomson S.A.), which acquired electronic brands and the Grass Valley digital film equipment business, but was also as globally and technologically diversified as Panavision in the entertainment media sector.
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However, like Panavision, Technicolor suffered financial problems in 2008-2009, and decided to sell their digital film equipment product line from Grass Valleys division. Technicolor is still involved in the film technologies industry, but more as a service provider than a camera maker. New rivals have been entering the once concentrated structure of the U.S. film camera industry. A private sun glass maker founded Red Digital Cinema in 1999 to reinvent the camera industry. 7
Their Red One is an affordable digital video camera, which matches the detail and richness of traditional analog camera film. The Red One is much cheaper and easier to use, which threatens to make the 35-mm movie film obsolete; it is now being used in many movie productions for higher resolution, and can be adapted for interchangeable lens with similar control over focus. Another new camera start-up is P&S Technik, based in Germany and started by a former ARRI designer. P&S introduced its new PS-Cam X35-mm digital camera in California in 2011, and hopes to compete against the Red One and other professional cameras for TV or advertising. 8
There are also other digital movie cameras offered by diversifying Japanese based imaging firms, as extensions of their smaller camcorders. Sony developed its first Mavica video camera in the 1980s, and has a variety of professional motion picture cameras (F23, F65) to complement their other electronic products. Sony is now one of the leading U.S. vendors of High Definition (HD) video cameras at upper segments, and an inexpensive Webbie camcorder at lower ends. 9 But when Cisco acquired Pure Digitals rival portable Flip video camera to diversify their markets and compete on lower segments, they realized that profits were limited and closed the business. 10
Canon offers several high definition video cameras as well, and recently upgraded their EOS 5D Mark II digital SLR to capture more multi-media digital still imagery. 11 Panasonic has developed
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some of the industrys first affordable high-definition video cameras, the AG-AF100, and the handheld HXP-250 for professional film makers. 12 JVC developed another affordable 4K camera for film and TV production. 13 Fujinon offers a line of professional digital cameras, and has also developed a more cost-effective HD telephoto lens (XA 50X9.5B ESM-D) for smaller venues. 14
Nikon and South Koreas Samsung have also been developing digital cameras for professional motion pictures, which are more flexible in video projects and post-production editing (Lelyveld and Jonson, 2009). Hence, there are many digital video cameras and camcorders competing on the motion picture market now, but disruptive effects on motion picture markets were delayed. While digital cameras have become cheaper and more technologically sophisticated, the firms that previously supplied traditional film cameras for U.S. motion pictures have tried to adapt by developing their own digital cameras, with uneven success. In the meantime, Panavision, Arri, Aaton, and other analog vendors stopped production of film cameras in 2011, as uneconomical. 15
Commercial Photographers Commercial photography is a large $6 billion eclectic and fragmented market of over 13,000 companies and many self-employed professionals in the U.S.; most professional photographers now use digital cameras. 16 The U.S. commercial photography market could grow to $10.7 billion globally by 2015, and advertising is one of the key drivers of the industry at higher ends, in a variety of media (GIA, 2010). There are also many other commercial U.S. photography niche segments, such as weddings and portraits, which have switched faster to mainly digital cameras. While the commercial photography market growth slowed in 2008-2009, the competition and innovation pressures among vendors have increased. The market recovered in 2010, as the mean number of digital images pros captured increased (Infotrends, 2011). However, the commercial
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camera markets tend to be segmented by megapixels (details) and special applications, and there are no dominant vendors or brands across all U.S. market segments. Professional photo markets in the U.S. are larger than the motion picture industry discussed above, but are also more fragmented and competitive for technology vendors, who must offer many new camera models. Canon, Sony and Nikon are the market leaders in many professional segments; but they also face stiff competition at the lower ends of the market from other rivals. The technological change to adopt digital cameras has occurred faster and sooner than in the motion picture industry, but the newer camera models and constant innovation have often reduced prices and profit margins across most professional market segments. Some lower share digital camera makers have diversified into other technologically related imaging businesses, such as the Olympus expansion into medical devices. Other imaging companies have merged to become more competitive, as Konica and Minolta did in 2003, before deciding to exit the camera business entirely in 2006, diversifying into photocopiers. Electronic and computer companies, such as Hewlett-Packard, Kyocera and Sanyo Electric, also decided to exit the camera business and refocus their strategies. The patterns of technological change in the U.S. professional photography market have varied from the shifts in motion picture and television production industries. The shift to more digital cameras was sooner and faster, as price competition and constant product innovation drove the professional market to adopt the new technologies for easier development and editing. However, digital cameras did tend to disrupt the lower end segments of professional photography as more amateurs and part-time photographers could increase their own capabilities and image quality. The NPD Groups surveys (PMA, 2010) found that professionals and consumers could now buy higher megapixel cameras for lower prices, and can continue to upgrade their digital cameras.
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The traditional film camera makers like Eastman Kodak and Fuji have not been able to adapt as well to the digital camera transition, either for professionals or for consumers. While both firms tried to compete in digital markets, their strategies and legacy investments were still based more on silver halide film or copier paper. 17 Kodak has tried to survive by selling its last technological patents, and by expanding their printing businesses; online and home printing increased in 2010. Other camera firms have increased their sales of professional photographic accessories and more interchangeable lenses, or by selling cheaper disposable cameras for one-time use (OTU); but OTU sales have also declined in 2010 (PMA). Thus, the professional photography equipment market has been changing in the U.S. and globally; but the disruptive patterns are different from the motion picture camera segment, and associated more with diversification or cannibalization.
New Informal Technological Threats: Disruption or Diversification? Apple was one of the earlier computer makers to diversify into photography markets when it developed the first mass-market color digital cameras in 1994, the QuickTake 100. Apples early cameras were relatively expensive and had limited functionality, but they did complement their own Mac computers and pointed the way for future opportunities. By the mid-1990s, Apple and other diversifying electronic companies began to develop and market a variety of smart phones with photographic capabilities. With the exception of Finlands Nokia, most of the cell phone cameras were developed by Japanese companies that were diversifying from electronics, such as Sharp and Kyocera, or camera firms diversifying into phones, such as Canon. In any case, the sales of camera phones grew faster than most separate cameras, reaching over 1 billion globally in 2010, and smart phones are beginning to displace or erode the shares of compact cameras at the lower photo market segments (NPD Group). Thus, the disruption associated with
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digital technologies is continuing beyond the photographic equipment markets, but often lead by the same incumbent firms diversifying and cannibalizing their own product lines through continuous innovations. Discussion and Conclusions Innovation is an essential competitive process in many industries, but there are different forms of innovation with distinct patterns and consequences. Normal or sustaining innovation is defined as focusing on existing customers and needs, whereas radical or disruptive innovation can create new technologies that disrupt market structures or reinvent entire industries (e.g. Christensen, 2000; 2006). Despite the imagery and appeal of the disruptive technology theory, there are still questions of what constitutes a disruptive technology, when does disruption occur, which firms are likely to be more involved, and what strategic responses or alternatives are possible in potentially disrupted industries? Some less innovative firms may be able to survive by a bold retreat to niches (Adner and Snow, 2010). Most examples of disruptive technologies are cited in research oriented industries, but there has been insufficient study of the effects of industry structure or diversification strategies on disrupted markets. This paper examined the effects of digital cameras on the photographic equipment industry, but argues that structural and corporate strategic factors moderated the disruption processes and responses to the adoption and diffusion of digital technologies. We compared the impact of digital cameras on the motion picture and professional photography segments, but found that adoption rates and disruption timing were later and slower in the more concentrated and vertically integrated U.S. motion picture market segments. We proposed and showed that diversified firms were more likely to introduce disruptive digital cameras, but were not always willing to support their subsidiary offspring or continue to compete in the newly emerging industry niches; this pattern confirms the effects of corporate strategies argued by Lange et al. (2009), but in a somewhat different industry than computers. Hence, while there is ample and recent evidence of disruptive technologies in the photographic equipment industry, the pace and patterns of disruption seem to vary by industry segment, customer base and product demand.
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There is a need for more cross-industry and longitudinal study of disruptive innovation and technological change, beyond the specific photographic equipment segments we focused on. A comparative framework would be able to analyze the moderating effects of different industry structures and corporate strategies in a larger sample. There are also questions about the diffusion rate and disruptive processes of technologies from different countries and corporate parent nationalities; Japanese firms may respond differently than large U.S. or smaller firms. Thus, a general theory of disruptive technologies may be less useful and valid than a series of more detailed industry case studies, with industry and strategic level variables interacting.
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TABLE 1 Global Digital Camera Market Shares, By Vendors Corporate Parent 2010 2009 DSLR Reflex Share Canon 19% 19% 44.5% Sony 16.4% 17.9% 11.9% Nikon 12.6% 11.1% 29.8% Samsung 11.1% 10.9% na Panasonic 7.6% 7.6% na Kodak 7.4% 8.5% na Others 6.7% 6.7% na Olympus 6.1% 6.2% na Fuji 4.9% 5.1% na Casio 4.0% 4.5% na Pentax 1.5% 1.6% na Vivitar 1.2% 1.0% na Leica >1.0% >1.0% na
Source: International Data Corporation (2010) (na= not available)
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Footnotes 1 T.L. Stanley (2010). 2010 forecast: Studio/entertainment ad forecast, MediaWeek, Vol. 20, 1 (Jan. 4). 2 www.fundinguniverse.com. (2010). Panavision, Inc.: Company history. 3 Richard Verrier (2009). Panavisions future is in need of focus, Los Angeles Times (July 20). 4 Los Angeles Times (2011). Panavision replaces CEO with former chief operating officer, (June 22). 5 www.arri.com. 6 R. Singh Chaudhary (2010). GadgetsARRI ALEXA digital movie camera includes Cypress CMOS image sensor, Gadgets (Dec. 22). www.tmcnet.com. 7 Michael Behar (2008). Analog meets its match in Red Digital Cinemas ultrahigh-res camera, Wired (Aug. 18). 8 Anonymous (2011). Broadcast Engineer. 9 David Birdy (2008). High-def video cameras come of age, Broadcast Engineering (January), pp. 63-67. 10 Sam Grobart and Evelyn M. Rusli (2011). For Flip video camera, four years from hot start-up to obsolete, New York Times (April 12). 11 Broadcast Engineering. (2010). Canon upgrades EOS digital SLR cameras for multimedia use. (May 14). 12 The Pak Banker (2010). Panasonic delivers AG-AF100, the affordable larger imager cinema camera, (Dec. 28). 13 George Winslow (2011). As technology improves, camera prices retreat, Broadcasting & Cable (Jan. 2), p. 29. 14 Robert Goldrich (2009). HD essentials, SHOOT, Vol. 50, Issue 7 (August 14). 15 Devin Coldewey (2011). The worlds movie camera makers have all quietly stopped production of film cameras, (October 14) www.techcrunch.com. 16 TrendWatch Graphic Arts (2010). U.S. Photo Studios and Commercial Photography. www.infotrends.com. 17 Tony Jackson (2011). Kodak fell victim to disruptive technology, Financial Times (October 2).