FACTS: Private respondent Jesus Anduiza and Quinatana Cano borrowed money from Agricultural and Industrial Bank (now RFC) as evidenced by a promissory note dated October 31, 1941. Under said note, Anduiza promised to pay RFC or order on or before Oct 31 1951, the sum of P13,800 with interest at 6% per annum. Said PN also stipulated that payments were to be made in 10 equal annual installments in accordance with the given schedule of amortizations 1. In July 30 1948, Madrid filed an action to: (a) To declare as paid the P16,425.17 Anduiza owed RFC (b) To order RFC to cancel the mortgage and release the properties (c) To condemn Anduiza to pay Madrid the P16,425.17 with legal interest 2. In their answer, RFC prayed that the complaint be dismissed. The bank argued that in as much as Madrids payment was unauthorized by Anduiza, Madrids deposit in the sum of P16,425.17 was null and void in accordance with EO no 49, series of 1945. 3. Anduiza, on the other hand, alleged that when Madrid paid his debt, the same was not yet due and demandable; hence, he may not be compelled to pay the latter 4. RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, CA reversed the trial court decision and ordered RFC to cancel the mortgage and pay P16,425.17 5. RFC argued that the payments made by Madrid were made against the express will of Anduiza and over the objection of the bank, hence not valid. Moreover the obligation in question was not fully due and demandable at the time of the payments
ISSUE: WON the debtors were entitled to pay the obligation prior to October 15, 1951
HELD: Yes.
At the outset, it should be noted that the makers of the promissory note promised to pay the obligation evidenced thereby on or before October 31, 1951. Although the full amount of said obligation was not demandable prior to October 31, 1951, in view of the provision of the note relative to the payment in 10 annual installments, it is clear that the makers or debtors were entitled to make a complete settlement of the obligation at any time before said date.
VALIDITY OF PAYMENT BY THIRD PERSON Yes, the payment by Madrid was valid. Madrid was entitled to pay the obligation of Anduiza irrespective of the latters will or that of the bank, and even over the objection of either or both.
Art 1158 Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines at the time of the payments under consideration and of the institution of the present case provides: Payment may be made by any person, whether he has an interest in the performance of the obligation or not, and whether the payment is known and approved by the debtor or whether he is unaware of it. One who makes a payment for the account of another may recover from the debtor the amount of the payment, unless it was made against his express will. In the latter case he can recover from the debtor only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to him.
Payments in question were not made against the objection of either Anduiza or RFC. Anduiza impliedly, but clearly, acquiesced in the validity of the payment when he joined Madrid in appealing the decision of CFI Manila. Also, RFC issued receipts acknowledging payment without qualification and demanded a signed statement of Anduiza sanctioning said payments merely as a condition precedent, not to its acceptance, which had already been made, but to the execution of the deed of cancellation of the mortgage constituted in favor of said institution.
This condition was null and void, for the creditor bank had no other right than to exact payment. After such payment, the obligation in question, as regards said creditor, and the latters status and rights as such creditor, become automatically extinguished. Hence, (1) The good or bad faith of the payor is immaterial. the exercise of a right vested by law without any qualification can hardly be legally considered as tainted with bad faith (2) The bank cannot invoke the provision that the payor may only recover from the debtor insofar as the payment has been beneficial to him, when made against his express will. This is a defense that may be availed of by the debtor, not by the creditor bank, for it affects solely the rights of the former.
HENRY V. MADISON AERIE NO 623, FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES OF MADISON (FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MADISON), 212 WIS., 589 NW 422 (1933)
FACTS: Plaintiff Henry sued Madison upon an express contract and in connection garnished the bank, alleging that had in its possession money belonging to the defendant. 1. the trial court ruled against the defendant in the principal action for $1,712.50. during the trial on the garnishment action, the trial court found that the bank, at the time of the garnishment summons upon it, had on deposits of Madison in the amount of $958.02 2. The bank held two notes (PN) of Madison, $3,000 each, payable in installments on specified dates. The notes contained an acceleration clause: Failure to pay any installment as th same becomes due shall render the entire obligation then due and payable 3. An installment of $25o fell on February 1, 1932, the amount of which was paid. Payments of the installments due up to July 1 were made on or before the due dates. But on July 1 $50 of a $150 installment remained unpaid, and the $150 installments due on August 1 were not paid on due dates 4. During the payments, there was nothing said about the default of the installment payments. There was only an acceptance of the amount paid and an endorsement of the payment of the notes.
ISSUE: What is the effect of makers failure to pay the interest on the promissory note
HELD: Under a clause providing that default in payment of interest when due should cause the whole note to immediately become due and collectible. To construe such language (that of the acceleration clause) as merely optional or permissive would destroy the clearly expressed contract which the parties made for themselves and destroy the clearly expressed contract which the parties made for themselves and to force upon them a contract to which neither of them ever gave their consent.
The notes being due immediately upon default, they were due when the subsequent payments were made upon them, acceptance of the payments thereafter tendered merely operated to reduce the amount due thereon just as payments made after the due date specified in a note without an acceleration clause would so operate. It is a general rule that unconditional acceptance of past-due interest upon notes containing a clause accelerating payment for default in interest payments waives the acceleration.
NOTE: The option given to the holder to accelerate the maturity of an installment note upon failure of the maker to pay any installment when due DOES NOT affect the negotiability of the installment. The rule is the same where the acceleration is automatic upon such default.
WETTLAUFER V. BAXTER, 137 KY 362, 125 SW 741, 26 LRA (NS) 804 (1910)
FACTS: The Buffalo Carriage Top Company on July 3, 1905, executed to Baxter the following note: January 15, 1906, after date we promise to pay Baxter $250 at Carroll St., Buffalo New York. 1. Baxter endorsed the note before maturity to Wettlaufer, who discounted it. When the note fell due, the Carriage Top Company refused payment. 2. Wettlaufer filed an action against Baxter. Baxter denied liability on the ground that the note was not a negotiable instrument 3. Wettlaufer contended that although the note may not have been negotiable when first executed and delivered, Baxters subsequent endorsement converted into a negotiable instrument and as such, the liability of Baxter and other parties must be controlled by the Negotiable Instrument Act 4. Pertinent provision: Sec 3720B. An instrument to be negotiable must conform to the following requirements, (4) must be payable to the order of a specified person or to bearer.
ISSUE: WON the note before the endorsement by Baxter a negotiable instrument within the meaning of the Negotiable Instrument Act
HELD: No.
The note which was payable to Baxter alone, and did not contain the words to order or to bearer was NOT a negotiable instrument. These words by Sec 1 and 184 are indispensable to make the paper a negotiable instrument within the meaning of the act.
The contention that Baxters subsequent endorsement in blank did not convert the note into a negotiable instrument. Sec 9 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides that: The instrument is payable to bearerwhen the only or last endorsement is an endorsement in blank. But this does not mean that an endorsement in blank converts a non- negotiable note on its face and by its terms into a negotiable note.
Sec 9 was merely intended to describe or designate the conditions under which a note on its face might become payable to bearer, and was not intended to apply to a note not on its face or by its terms negotiable.
By signing his name on the back of the note, Baxter was merely an assignor and not liable, unless suit was brought on it at the first term of the court against the maker, the Buffalo Carriage Top Co, and it prosecuted to insolvency. In other words, before an assignee (Wettlaufer) can recover from an assignor (Baxter), he must institute his action against the payer of the note at the first term of the court after the note falls due, obtain judgment, have execution issue, and a return of no property found, without unreasonable delay.
ANG TEK LIAN V. COURT OF APPEALS, 87 PHIL 383 (1950)
FACTS: Ang Tek Lian, knowing he had no funds no transfer thereof, drew on November 16, 1946, a check upon the China Banking Corp for the sum of P4,000 payable to the order of cash. 1. He delivered it to Lee Hua Hong in exchange for money which the latter handed in the act. On November 18 (the next business day), the check was presented by Lee Huang Hong to the drawee bank for payment, but it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds, since the balance of Ang Tek Lians deposit on both dates was only P335 2. For having issued a worthless check, Ang Tek Lian was convicted of estafa. CA affirmed the same 3. Ang Tek Lian argues that as the check had been made payable to cash and had not been endorsed by Ang Tek Lian, he is not guilty of the offense charged. Based on the proposition that by uniform practice of all banks in the Philippines a check so drawn is invariably dishonored, the following line of reason is advance in support of the argument: When the offended party accepted the check form defendant, he did so with full knowledge that it would be dishonored upon presentment. In that sense, defendant could not be said to have acted fraudulently because the complaint, in accepting the check as it was drawn, must be considered to have done so fully aware of the risk he was running thereby.
ISSUE: WON Ang Tek Lian is not guilty of estafa since the check had been made payable to cash and had not been endorsed by him
HELD: No. Ang Tek is guilty of estafa.
Under Sec 9(d) of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a check drawn payable to the order of cash is a check payable to bearer, and the bank may it to the person presenting it for payment without the drawers endorsement.
Where a check is made payable to the order of cash, the word cash does not purport to be the name of any person, and hence the instrument is payable to bearer. The drawee bank did not obtain any endorsement of the back but may pay it to the person presenting it without any endorsement.
Since the bank is not sure of the bearers identity or financial solvency, it has the right to demand identification and/or assurance against all possible complications. As such, the bank may require the endorsement of the draweror some other person known to ito be obtained. But where the bank is satisfied of the identity and/or the economic standing of the bearer who tenders the check for collection, it will pay the instrument without further question, and it will not incur any liability to the drawer in so acting.
A check payable to bearer is authority for payment to the holder. Where the check is in the ordinary form, and is payable to bearer, so that no endorsement is required, a bank to which it is presented for payment, need not have the holder identified, and is not negligent in failing to do so.
OSMENA V. CITIBANK, 426 SCRA 159 (2004)
FACTS: In August 1989, petitioner Osmena purchased from Citibank a managers check in the amount of P1,545,000 payable to respondent Frank Tan. The check was later deposited with Associated Bank under the account of a Julius Dizon. 1. Osmena filed an action alleging that the clearing and/or payment by respondents of the check to an improper party and the absence of any endorsement by the payee thereof (Frank Tan), is a clear violation of respondents obligation under the Negotiable Instruments Law and standard banking practice 2. Considering that Tan did not receive the amount of the check, petitioner demanded from Citibank and Associated Bank payment or reimbursement of the value of the check 3. Petitioner later impleaded Frank Tan as an additional defendant. Since Tan did not receive the proceeds of the check, petitioner might have no right to collect from Tan and is consequently left with no recourse but to seek payment or reimbursement from either or both banks 4. In its answer, Associated Bank alleged that petitioner was not a real party-in-interest but Tan who was the payee of the check. Moreover, the check was deposited to the account of Frank Tan aka Julius Dizon and as such, it never committed any violation of its duties and responsibilities 5. On the other hand, Citibank alleged that the check was made by it in the exercise of its regular banking function. Since a managers check is normally purchased in favor of a third party, the identity of whom in most cases is unknown to the issuing bank, its only responsibility when paying the check is to examine the genuineness of the check. It had no way of ascertaining the genuineness of the signature of the payee Tan who was a total stranger to it. 6. The trial court held in favor of Osmena against Tan but the complaints both banks were dismissed. CA affirmed the same 7. Petitioner asserts that the check was payable to the order of the respondent Tan. However, Associated Bank ordered the check to be deposited to the account of a Julius Dizon although the check was not endorsed by Tan.
ISSUE: WON Citibank and Associated Bank are liable to petitioner for the encashment of Citibanks managers check by Julius Dizon
HELD: No.
Based on the evidence on record, the said account where the check was deposited was in the name of Frank Tan Guan Leng, which is the Chinese name of respondent Frank Tan, who also uses the alias Julius Dizon. Associated Bank presented preponderant evidence to support its assertion that respondent Tan, the payee of the check, did receive the proceeds of the check. It adduced evidence that Julius Dizon and Frank Tan are one and the same person.
Petitioner cites the ruling in Associated Bank v. CA where the SC outlined the respective responsibilities and liabilities of a drawee bank (Citibank) and collecting bank (Associated Bank) in the event that payment of a check to a person not designated as a payee, or who is nto a holder in due course, had been made. However, said ruling has no application in this case. Petitioner failed to establish that the proceeds of the check was indeed wrongfully paid by the respondent banks to a person other than the intended payee. In addition the Negotiable Instruments Law was enacted for the purpose of facilitating, not hindering or hampering transactions in commercial paper. Thus, the said statute should not be tampered with haphazardly or lightly. Nor should it be brushed aside in order to meet the necessities in a single case.
Moreover, the chain of events following the purported delivery of the check to respondent Tan renders even more dubious the petitioners claim that respondent Tan had not received the proceeds of the check. Thus, the petitioner never bothered to find out from the said respondent whether the latter received the check from his messenger. If it were to be supposed that Tan did not receive the check, given his urgent need of the money, it seems unlikely that Tan would not make an effort to get in touch with Osmena to inform him that he did not receive the check.