CANON KABUSHIKI KAISHA vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120900, July 20, 2000

FACTS:

On January 15, 1985, private respondent NSR Rubber Corporation filed an application for
registration of the mark CANON for sandals in the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and Technology
Transfer (BPTTT). Canon Kabushiki Kaisha filed a Verified Notice of Opposition alleging that it will be
damaged by the registration of the trademark CANON in the name of private respondent since they
were using the same trademark for their footwear line of products. The private respondent will also use
the name Canon for its footwear products.

Based on the records, the evidence presented by petitioner consisted of its certificates of registration
for the mark CANON in various countries covering goods belonging to class 2, paints, chemical products,
toner, and dye stuff. Petitioner also submitted in evidence its Philippine Trademark Registration No.
39398, showing its ownership over the trademark CANON.

The BPTTT, on November 10, 1992, issued its decision dismissing the opposition of petitioner and giving
due course to NSR's application for the registration of the trademark CANON. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals that eventually affirmed the decision of the BPTTT.

ISSUE:

Is the use of trademark, CANON, by the private respondent affects the business of Canon
Kabushiki Kaisha who has an existing ownership of a trademark also known as CANON?

HELD:

The Supreme Court says that ordinarily, the ownership of a trademark or tradename is a property
right that the owner is entitled to protect as mandated by the Trademark Law. However, when a
trademark is used by a party for a product in which the other party does not deal, the use of the same
trademark on the latter's product cannot be validly objected to.

The BPTTT correctly ruled that since the certificate of registration of petitioner for the trademark
CANON covers class 2 (paints, chemical products, toner, dyestuff), private respondent can use the
trademark CANON for its goods classified as class 25 (sandals). Clearly, there is a world of difference
between the paints, chemical products, toner, and dyestuff of petitioner and the sandals of private
respondent.

Converse VS. Universal Rubber

Converse Rubber Corporation is an American corporation while Universal Rubber Product is a
corporation licensed to do business in the country. Converse has been operating since 1946. Universal
Rubber has been operating since 1963. Later, Universal Rubber filed an application for the trademark
Universal Converse and Device before the Philippine Patent Office. Converse Rubber opposed as it
averred that the word Converse which is part of its corporate name cannot be granted as part of
Universal Rubbers trademark or trade name because it will likely deceive purchasers of Universal
Rubbers products as it may be mistaken by unwary customers to be manufactured by Converse Rubber.
The Director of Patents did not grant the opposition by Converse Rubber.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Director of Patents is correct.

HELD: No. From a cursory appreciation of the Converse Rubbers corporate name CONVERSE RUBBER
CORPORATION, it is evident that the word CONVERSE is the dominant word which identifies Converse
Rubber from other corporations engaged in similar business. Universal Rubber, in the stipulation of
facts, admitted Converse Rubbers existence since 1946 as a duly organized foreign corporation engaged
in the manufacture of rubber shoes. This admission necessarily betrays its knowledge of the reputation
and business of petitioner even before it applied for registration of the trademark in question. Knowing,
therefore, that the word CONVERSE belongs to and is being used by Converse Rubber, and is in fact
the dominant word in its corporate name, Universal Rubber has no right to appropriate the same for use
on its products which are similar to those being produced by Converse Rubber.

PUMA vs CA

Petitioner: PUMA
Respondent: Mil-Oro Manufacturing Corporation

Facts: There were 3 admin cases instituted by puma against Mil-oro in the patents office ,(so there is an
admin case)


Petitioner now filed a civil case for injunction against mil-oro against using trademark
On July 31, 1985, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order, restraining the private respondent
and the Director of Patents from using the trademark "PUMA' or any reproduction, counterfeit copy or
colorable imitation thereof, and to withdraw from the market all products bearing the same trademark.


RTC granted Injunction. CA set aside RTC saying rtc should dismiss because of lispendens

ISSUE: WON there was lispendens NO

HELD: CA erred admin case is different from civil case lispendens cannot attach between them.

Philips Export BV vs. CA Gr 96161, 21 February 1992; Second Division , Melencio-Herrera (J)
Facts: Philips Export BV is a foreign corporation organized in Netherlands and not engaged in business in
the Philippines. It is the registered owner of the trademark Phillips and Phillips Shield Emblem.
Philips Electrical Lamp, Inc. and Philips Industrial Development Inc. besides PEBV, are corporations
belonging to the Philips Group of Companies. In 1984, PEVB filed a letter-complaint with the SEC for the
cancellation of the word Phillips from Standard Philips corporate name. The SEC en banc affirmed the
dismissal of PEBUs complaint by one of its hearing officers. The Court of Appeals dismissed PEVBs
petition for review certiorari, as referred by the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether there is confusing similarity between the corporate names to warrant the removal of
Philips in Standard Philips corporate name.
Held: Yes. The right to exclusive use of a corporate name with freedom from infringement by similarity
is determined by priority of adoption. PEBV, et al. have priority in adoption, as Standard Philips was
issued a Certificate of Registration 26 years after Philips Electrical and Philips Industrial acquired theirs.
A reading from said corporate names, it is obvious that Philips is the dominant word in all companies
affiliated with the principal corporation, PEVB. Given that standard Philips primary purpose does not
prevent it from dealing in the same line of business of electrical devices, products or supplies, as that of
Philips Electrical, it can only be said that the subsequent appropriator of the name or one confusingly
similar thereto usually seeks an unfair advantage, a free ride on anothers goodwill. Inasmuch as
Standard Philips has submitted an undertaking to the SEC manifesting its willingness to change its
corporate name in the event another person, firm or entity has acquired a prior right to the use of the
said firm name or one deceptively or confusingly similar to it. Standard Philips must now be held in its
undertaking.

Proline vs CA
Petitioner: Pro line sports center
Prive respondents: UNIVERSAL ATHLETICS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, INC., and MONICO SEHWANI
Facts: PRO LINE, a domestic corporation, is the exclusive distributor of "Spalding" sports products in the
Philippines. Respondent UNIVERSAL, on the other hand, is a domestic corporation engaged in the sale
and manufacture of sporting goods while co-respondent Monico Sehwani is impleaded in his capacity as
president of the corporation.
General Manager of PRO LINE, sent a letter-complaint to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
regarding the alleged manufacture of fake "Spalding" balls by UNIVERSAL. In the course of the search
(search warrant granted), some 1,200 basketballs and volleyballs marked "Spalding" were seized and
confiscated by the NBI.
Three (3) days later, on motion of the NBI, Judge Vera issued another order, this time to seal and
padlock the molds, rubber mixer, boiler and other instruments at UNIVERSAL's factory. All these were
used to manufacture the fake "Spalding" products, but were simply too heavy to be removed from the
premises and brought under the actual physical custody of the court. However, on 28 April 1981, on
motion of UNIVERSAL, Judge Vera ordered the lifting of the seal and padlock on the machineries,
prompting the People of the Philippines, the NBI, together with PRO LINE and QUESTOR, to file with the
Court of Appeals a joint petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction CA issued a
TRO in favor of the petitioners
The Minister of Justice issued on 10 September 1981ordered the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to file an
Information for unfair competition against Monico Sehwani.
After the prosecution rested its case, Sehwani filed a demurrer to evidence arguing that the act of selling
the manufactured goods was an essential and constitutive element of the crime of unfair competition
under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code, and the prosecution was not able to prove that he sold the
products. In its Order of 12 January 1981 the trial court granted the demurrer and dismissed the charge
against Sehwani. The CA in ruled on the other case affirmed judge Veras lifting of seal and padlock.
The respondents after winning their filed a civil case for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
against the petitioners (a) procuring the issuance by the Pasig trial court of Search Warrant No. 2-81
authorizing the NBI to raid the premises of UNIVERSAL; (b) procuring an order from the same court
authorizing the sealing and padlocking of UNIVERSAL's machineries and equipment resulting in the
paralyzation and virtual closure of its operations; (c) securing a temporary restraining order from the
Court of Appeals to prevent the implementation of the trial court's order of 28 April 1981 which
authorized the lifting of the seal and padlock on the subject machineries and equipment to allow
UNIVERSAL to resume operations; (d) securing a temporary restraining order from the High Tribunal
against the Court of Appeals and charging the latter with grave abuse of discretion for holding that the
order of 28 April 1981 was judiciously issued, thus prolonging the continued closure of UNIVERSAL's
business; (e) initiating the criminal prosecution of Monico Sehwani for unfair competition under Art. 189
of the Penal Code; and, (g) appealing the order of acquittal in Crim. Case No. 45284 directly to the
Supreme Court with no other purpose than to delay the proceedings of the case and prolong the
wrongful invasion of UNIVERSAL's rights and interests. (basically they wanted compensation from the
acts of proline in trying to sue them before)
Defendants PRO LINE and QUESTOR denied all the allegations in the complaint and filed a counterclaim
for damages based mainly on the unauthorized and illegal manufacture by UNIVERSAL of athletic balls
bearing the trademark "Spalding."
trial court granted the claim of UNIVERSAL declaring that the series of acts complained of were
"instituted with improper, malicious, capricious motives and without sufficient justification." It ordered
PRO LINE and QUESTOR jointly and severally to pay UNIVERSAL and Sehwani P676,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages, P250,000.00 as moral damages, P250,000.00 as exemplary damages.[5] and
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. The trial court at the same time dismissed the counterclaim of PRO LINE
and QUESTOR.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court but reduced the amount of moral
damages to P150,000.00 and exemplary damages to P100,000.00.
ISSUE: (a) whether private respondents Sehwani and UNIVERSAL are entitled to recover damages for the
alleged wrongful recourse to court proceedings by petitioners PRO LINE and QUESTOR NO; and, (b)
whether petitioners' counterclaim should be sustained. YES
HELD: 1. The complainants were unable to prove two (2) essential elements of the crime of malicious
prosecution, namely, absence of probable cause and legal malice on the part of petitioners.
2. respondents' act may constitute unfair competition even if the element of selling has not been
proved. To hold that the act of selling is an indispensable element of the crime of unfair competition is
illogical because if the law punishes the seller of imitation goods, then with more reason should the law
penalize the manufacturer. the test of unfair competition is whether certain goods have been
intentionally clothed with an appearance which is likely to deceive the ordinary purchasers exercising
ordinary care. In this case, it was observed by the Minister of Justice that the manufacture of the
"Spalding" balls was obviously done to deceive would-be buyers. The projected sale would have pushed
through were it not for the timely seizure of the goods made by the NBI. That there was intent to sell or
distribute the product to the public cannot also be disputed given the number of goods manufactured
and the nature of the machinery and other equipment installed in the factory.

TATAD print PDF

ASIA BREWERY, INC. vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
G.R. 103543 July 5, 1993

Facts:

San Miguel Corporation (SMC) filed a complaint against Asia Brewery Inc. (ABI) for infringement of
trademark and unfair competition on account of the latter's BEER PALE PILSEN or BEER NA BEER product
which has been competing with SMC's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN for a share of the local beer market.

The trial court dismissed SMC's complaint because ABI "has not committed trademark infringement or
unfair competition against" SMC

On appeal by SMC, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision rendered by the trial court, finding the
defendant Asia Brewery Incorporated GUILTY of infringement of trademark and unfair competition. ABI
then filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Are the words PALE PILSEN as part of ABIs trademark constitute infringement of SMCs trademark?

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court said it does not constitute an infringement as the words PALE PILSEN, which are
part of ABIs trademark, are generic words descriptive of the color (pale), of a type of beer (pilsen),
which is a light bohemian beer with a strong hops flavor that originated in the City of Pilsen,
Czechislovakia and became famous in the Middle Ages.

The Supreme Court further said that the words "pale pilsen" may not be appropriated by SMC for its
exclusive use even if they are part of its registered trademark. No one may appropriate generic or
descriptive words. They belong to the public domain.

Petitioner ABI has neither infringed SMC's trademark nor committed unfair competition with the latter's
SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN product.

Justice Cruz Dissenting:

A number of courts have held that to determine whether a trademark has been infringed, we must
consider the mark as a whole and not as dissected. If the buyer is deceived, it is attributable to the
marks as a totality, not usually to any part of it. The court therefore should be guided by its first
impression, for a buyer acts quickly and is governed by a casual glance, the value of which may be
dissipated as soon as the court assumes to analyze carefully the respective features of the mark.

Mirpuri vs CA

FACTS

In 1970, Escobar (predecessor in interest of mirpuri) filed an application with the Bureau of Patents for
the registration of the trademark Barbizon for use in horsiers and ladies undergarments (IPC No. 686).
Private respondent reported Barbizon Corporation, a corporation organized and doing business under
the laws of New York, USA, opposed the application. It was alleged that its trademark is confusingly
similar with that of Escobar and that the registration of the said trademark will cause damage to its
business reputation and goodwill. In 1974, the Director of Patents gave due course to the application.
Escobar later assigned all his rights and interest over the trademark to petitioner. In 1979, Escobar failed
to file with the Bureau the affidavit of use of the trademark required under the Philippine Trademark
Law. Due to this failure, the Bureau cancelled Escobars certificate of registration. In 1981, Escobar and
petitioner separately filed this application for registration of the same trademark. (IPC 2049). Private
respondent opposed again. This time it alleged (1) that the said trademark was registered with the US
Patent Office; (2) that it is entitled to protection as well-known mark under Article 6 bis of the Paris
Convention, EO 913 and the two Memoranda of the Minister of Trade and Industry and (3) that its use
on the same class of goods amounts to a violation of the Trademark Law and Art. 189 of the RPC.
Petitioner raised the defense of Res Judicata.

ISSUE

Whether or not the treaty (Paris Convention) affords protection to a foreign corporation against a
Philippine applicant for the registration of a similar trademark.


HELD

Affirmative. The Philippines and the United States of America have acceded to the WTO Agreement
Conformably, the State must reaffirm its commitment to the global community and take part in evolving
a new international economic order at the dawn of the new millennium.

Thus, the first paragraph of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention is applicable in the instant case:

This Article governs protection of well-known trademarks. Under the first paragraph, each country of
the Union bound itself to undertake to refuse or cancel the registration, and prohibit the use of a
trademark which is a reproduction, imitation or translation, or any essential part of which trademark
constitutes a reproduction, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority
of the country where protection is sought, to be well-known in the country as being already the mark of
a person entitled to the benefits of the Convention, and used for identical or similar goods.

It is a self-executing provision and does not require legislative enactment to give it effect in the member
country.


Trademark in R.A. No. 8293, the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines: defines as any visible sign
capable of distinguishing goods. In Philippine jurisprudence, the function of a trademark is to point out
distinctly the origin or ownership of the goods to which it is affixed; to secure to him, who has been
instrumental in bringing into the market a superior article of merchandise, the fruit of his industry and
skill; to assure the public that they are procuring the genuine article; to prevent fraud and imposition;
and to protect the manufacturer against substitution and sale of an inferior and different article as his
product.

G.R. No. 111155 October 23, 1997

COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNION and PEPITO M.
DE LA CRUZ, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner, Cosmos Bottling Corporation, is a softdrink manufacturer. In February 1982, it
employed private respondent Pepito M. de la Cruz as a driver/salesman, paying him P100.00 a day plus
commission based on his sales. De la Cruz was assigned to cover the Morning Breeze area in Caloocan
City.

On August 3, 1989, De la Cruz was dismissed by the company for serious misconduct and loss of trust
and confidence. It appears that as part of its promotional and marketing strategy, Cosmos Bottling
offered customers, who purchased a specified minimum number of softdrink, so-called "trade deals"
consisting of free softdrink. In the course of the promotion, however, Cosmos Bottling received reports
that some of its salesmen had not been giving free softdrink to entitled customers but had been selling
the softdrink and keeping the proceeds for themselves. Accordingly, sales supervisors were ordered to
check the reports in order to determine who of the salesmen were not giving the so-called "trade deals"
to customers. One of those investigated was private respondent Jose Pepito de la Cruz who admitted to
Rene Gallego, personnel investigation clerk of Cosmos Bottling, that he had not issued receipts to
Nathalia's Store; that he had not given the I.F.S. Store free softdrink to which it was entitled by reason of
its purchases and that he had falsified Sales Invoice No. 093870 to make it appear that it covered only
one case of Super Pop and one case of Super Cheers when the fact was that the sale consisted of five
cases of Crista and five cases of Cheers.

Pepito de la Cruz challenged his dismissal, claiming that it had been made without due process.

The Labor Arbiter found De la Cruz to have been dismissed for cause and accordingly dismissed his
complaint. On appeal, however, the NLRC, with one member dissenting, set aside the Labor Arbiter's
decision and ordered the reinstatement of De la Cruz to his former position, although denying his claim
for backwages. Hence, this petition for certiorari by Cosmos Bottling. Cosmos filed for certiorari.

Private respondent denies the charge and claims that all he did was to divert the softdrink in question to
customers whose purchases did not entitle them to the "trade deals" to make them buy private
respondent's stocks. In that way, it is claimed, private respondent was able to sell all his stocks. Private
respondent claims that he "had no bad intention" and that he did not cause any damage or injury to the
company because he accounted for the proceeds of his sales and in fact private respondent's sales
supervisor certified that private respondent had no accountability. To the contrary, it is asserted, what
private respondent did was for "the benefit and advantage of the company."

ISSUE WON NLRC correct in reinstating Dela Cruz after he did not follow the trade deal promotions NO

HELD: private respondent did not issue receipts to one store, gave no free softdrink to another despite
the fact that the latter was entitled to "trade deals" by reason of its purchases, and falsified a receipt
making it appear that he had sold less number of cases of softdrink to a customer than he had actually
done. Nor is there any question that by means of those manipulations private respondent was able to
conceal the fact that he did not give free softdrink to customers who would otherwise be entitled to it.
What he claims is that he gave the "trade deals" to customers not otherwise entitled to them to make
them buy the stocks he had and that in this way he actually did the company a favor by being able to sell
all the stocks given to him to sell.

Regardless of what private respondent did with the softdrink which he should have given to customers
entitled to the "trade deals" whether he really gave them to customers whose purchases did not
entitle them to have the "trade deals," or whether he misappropriated them the fact is that damage
was caused to the company. Private respondent made a mockery of the petitioner's promotional
campaign, and exposed the company to complaints by those victimized by private respondent. At the
very least, the company's good will and business reputation were ruined.

Kho vs CA

Law on Copyright Proper Subjects of Copyright

Elidad Kho is the owner of KEC Cosmetics Laboratory and she was also the holder of copyrights over Chin
Chun Su and its Oval Facial Cream Container/Case. She also bought the patent rights over the Chin Chun
Su & Device and Chin Chun Su for medicated cream from one Quintin Cheng, who was the assignee of
Shun Yi Factory a Taiwanese factory actually manufacturing Chin Chun Su products.

Kho filed a petition for injunction against Summerville General Merchandising and Company to enjoin
the latter from advertising and selling Chin Chun Su products, in similar containers as that of Kho, for
this is misleading the public and causing Kho to lose income; the petition is also to enjoin Summerville
from infringing upon Khos copyrights.

Summerville in their defense alleged that they are the exclusive and authorized importer, re-packer and
distributor of Chin Chun Su products; that Shun Yi even authorized Summerville to register its trade
name Chin Chun Su Medicated Cream with the Philippine Patent Office; that Quintin Cheng, from home
Kho acquired her patent rights, had been terminated by Shun Yi.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kho has the exclusive right to use the trade name and its container.

HELD: No. Kho has no right to support her claim for the exclusive use of the subject trade name and its
container. The name and container of a beauty cream product are proper subjects of a trademark (not
copyright like what she registered for) inasmuch as the same falls squarely within its definition. In order
to be entitled to exclusively use the same in the sale of the beauty cream product, the user must
sufficiently prove that she registered or used it before anybody else did. Khos copyright and patent
registration of the name and container would not guarantee her the right to the exclusive use of the
same for the reason that they are not appropriate subjects of the said intellectual rights. Consequently,
a preliminary injunction order cannot be issued for the reason that the petitioner has not proven that
she has a clear right over the said name and container to the exclusion of others, not having proven that
she has registered a trademark thereto or used the same before anyone did.

VENANCIO SAMBAR, doing business under the name and style of CVS Garment Enterprises, petitioner,
vs. LEVI STRAUSS & CO., and LEVI STRAUSS (PHIL.), INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 132604. March 6, 2002
Quisumbing, J.

Facts:
1. Levi Strauss & Co., and Levi Strauss Phil, Inc., through a letter from their legal officer, demanded
that CVS Garment Enterprises (CVSGE) desist from using their stitched arcuate design on the Europress
jeans which CVSGE advertised in the Manila Bulletin.
2. Defense: Atty. Benjamin Gruba, counsel of CVSGE: the arcuate design on the back pockets of
Europress jeans was different from the design on the back pockets of Levis jeans.
a. He further asserted that his client had a copyright on the design it was using.
3. Private respondents filed a complaint against Sambar, doing business under the name and style
of CVSGE.
a. Private respondents also impleaded the Director of the National Library.
b. Alleged in their complaint that Levi Strauss and Co. (LS&Co.), an internationally known clothing
manufacturer, owns the arcuate design trademark which was registered under U.S. Trademark
Registration No. 404, 248 and in the Principal Register of trademarks with the Philippine Patent Office
under Certificate of Registration No. 20240
c. CVSGIC and Venancio Sambar, without the consent and authority of private respondents and in
infringement and unfair competition, sold and advertised, and despite demands to cease and desist,
continued to manufacture, sell and advertise denim pants under the brand name Europress with back
pockets bearing a design similar to the arcuate trademark of private respondents, thereby causing
confusion on the buying public, prejudicial to private respondents goodwill and property right.
4. Answer: CVSGIC admitted it manufactured, sold and advertised and was still manufacturing and
selling denim pants under the brand name of Europress, bearing a back pocket design of two double
arcs meeting in the middle.
a. However, it denied that there was infringement or unfair competition because the display
rooms of department stores where Levis and Europress jeans were sold, were distinctively segregated
by billboards and other modes of advertisement.
b. CVSGIC avers that the public would not be confused on the ownership of such known
trademark as Levis, Jag, Europress, etc.. Also, CVSGIC claimed that it had its own original arcuate
design, as evidenced by Copyright Registration No. 1-1998, which was very different and distinct from
Levis design.
5. TC: issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining CVSGIC and petitioner from manufacturing,
advertising and selling pants with the arcuate design on their back pockets.
6. CA: affirmed
Issue: WON there was an infringement of respondents arcuate mark.
Held: Europress use of the arcuate design was an infringement of the Levis design.
Ratio:
1. The backpocket design of Europress jeans, a double arc intersecting in the middle was the same
as Levis mark, also a double arc intersecting at the center.
a. Although the trial court found differences in the two designs, these differences were not
noticeable.
b. Further, private respondents said, infringement of trademark did not require exact similarity.
c. Colorable imitation enough to cause confusion among the public, was sufficient for a trademark
to be infringed.
d. Private respondents explained that in a market research they conducted with 600 respondents,
the result showed that the public was confused by Europress trademark vis the Levis trademark.
2. It must be stressed that it was immaterial whether or not petitioner was connected with
CVSGIC.
a. What is relevant is that petitioner had a copyright over the design and that he allowed the use
of the same by CVSGIC.
3. Private respondents assert that the lower courts found that there was infringement and Levis
was entitled to damages based on Sections 22 and 23 of RA No. 166 otherwise known as the Trade Mark
Law, as amended, which was the law then governing. Said sections define infringement and prescribe
the remedies therefor.
a. Further, private respondents aver it was misleading for petitioner to claim that the trial court
ruled that private respondents did not suffer pecuniary loss, suggesting that the award of damages was
improper.
b. According to the private respondents, the trial court did not make any such ruling. It simply
stated that there was no evidence that Levis had suffered decline in its sales because of the use of the
arcuate design by Europress jeans.
c. They offer that while there may be no direct proof that they suffered a decline in sales,
damages may still be measured based on a reasonable percentage of the gross sales of the respondents,
pursuant to Section 23 of the Trademark law.
4. The cancellation of petitioners copyright was justified because petitioners copyright cannot
prevail over respondents registration in the Principal Register of Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and
Technology Transfer.
a. According to private respondents, the essence of copyright registration is originality and a
copied design is inherently non-copyrightable.
b. They insist that registration does not confer originality upon a copycat version of a prior design.
5. The award of damages and cancellation of petitioners copyright are appropriate.
a. Award of damages is clearly provided in Section 23, while cancellation of petitioners copyright
finds basis on the fact that the design was a mere copy of that of private respondents trademark.
b. To be entitled to copyright, the thing being copyrighted must be original, created by the author
through his own skill, labor and judgment, without directly copying or evasively imitating the work of
another