MACALINTAL, petitioner VS.

COMELEC, ROMULO, and BONCODIN, respondents

(Digest by Tish Bahjin Sourced from Class Digest)
FACTS:
Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of R.A.
No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioners right to file
the instant petition, stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of
transcendental significance to the Filipino people, considering that public funds are to be used and appropriated for
the implementation of said law.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:
(1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents
in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines,
violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;
(2) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national
offices and party list representatives, including the President and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional
mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall
be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and
(3) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art.
IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
3) Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
HELD:
1) NO. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2) YES. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the votes of the President and Vice-President, and not
to the votes of the Senators and party-list representatives, is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
3) YES. Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the second sentence in its second paragraph allowing
Congress to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the IRR that the COMELEC shall promulgate,
is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
REASONS:
1) Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified
Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualifications.The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:
xxx xxx xxx
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes,
upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration
under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to
return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry
of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional in that it violates the requirement that the voter must be a
resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election, as provided under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution which reads: Sec. 1.
Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein
they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.
For the resolution of this instant issue, the Court has relied on, among others, the discussions of the members of the
Constitutional Commission on the topics of absentee voting and absentee voter qualification, in connection with Sec.
2, Art. V of the Constitution, which reads: Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It was clearly shown from
the said discussions that the Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino
citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the Philippines. The Commission even
intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the
Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 immediately after the residency
requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in
construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission
provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad.
The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to
vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the
same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which later became R.A. No. 9189, was
deliberated upon on the Senate floor, further weakening petitioners claim on the unconstitutionality of Section 5(d) of
R.A. No. 9189.
2)Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for president, vice-president,
senators, and party-list representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:
Sec. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.
xxx xxx xxx
18.5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of the
election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to
order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a
particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and
circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the
control or influence of the Commission.
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order the
proclamation of winning candidates for President and Vice-President is unconstitutional and violative of the following
provisions of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:
Sec. 4.
xxx xxx xxx
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open
all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass
the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an
equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members
of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it
necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency, granting
merit to petitioners contention that said Section appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the
winning candidates for the positions of President and Vice-President.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated
by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and the
power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.
3) Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC), as follows:
Sec. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby created,
composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws,
and seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of the House Committee on
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House of Representatives designated by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives: Provided, that of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House
of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three (3) from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the implementation of
this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission.
All the parties, petitioner and respondents alike, are unanimous in claiming that Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is
unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue forged on this question raised by petitioner. However, the Court finds it
expedient to expound on the role of Congress through the JCOC vis--vis the independence of the COMELEC as a
constitutional body, as aptly provided for under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1, which reads Section 1. The Constitutional
Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit.
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional provisions,
one of which is the aforementioned provision on the independence of constitutional commissions. The Court has held
thatwhatever may be the nature of the functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the
Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other departments of the Government.
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our
scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be
fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this court also. It
should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the
great objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of
means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere.
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically not from the standpoint of pure
theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its
knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous
position to decide complex political questions.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body except those
specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not
correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may
intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In
line with this, this Court holds that Section 25 of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be stricken off from
the said law.
SECTION 8.
In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-
President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or,
in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the
President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
Macalintal vs COMELEC
[G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003]
Facts:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo Macalintal, a memer of the Philippine Bar, seeking a
declaration that certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional
infirmity. He claimed that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that
public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed this petition as a taxpayer and as lawyer.
R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the
Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, appropriates funds under Section 29
thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into
law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions.
Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:
That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters, who are immigrants or permanent residents in
other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines,
violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;
That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national
offices and party list representatives, including the President and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional
mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall
be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and
That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created
in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A,
Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution
Ruling:
1. No, Sec 5(d) is valid. The Court has relied on the discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission on
the topics of absentee voting and absentee voter qualification, in connection with Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution,
which reads:
Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system
for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

It was clearly shown from the said discussions that the Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much
as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the Philippines.
The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of
origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. That Section 2 of Article V of the
Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the
subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which later became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate
floor, further weakening petitioners claim on the unconstitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189.

2. Yes, Section 18.5 is unconstitutional. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes
the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency, granting merit to petitioners
contention that said Section appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said
Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for
the positions of President and Vice-President.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated
by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and the
power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.

3. Yes, Section 25 creating the JCOC is unconstitutional. The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is
intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should
not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization.

The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its
knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous
position to decide complex political questions.

The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body except those
specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not
correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may
intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In
line with this, this Court holds that Section 25 of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be stricken off from
the said law

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party GO! GO Philippines, et al
[G.R. No. 147589. G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001]

Facts:

On the registration period, the COMELEC approved the accreditation of 154 parties and organizations but denied
those of several others in its assailed Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

Moreover, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a petition to delete from the Certified List of
Political Parties/ Sectoral Parties/ Organizations/ Coalitions and that said certified list be accordingly amended. Bayan
Muna and Bayan Muna- Youth also filed a petition for cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some
herein respondents.

Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party filed a petition assailing the COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. Also,
Bayan Muna filed a petition challenging the said resolution.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections
3. Whether or not party-list system is exclusive to marginalized sectors.

Ruling:
1. From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, COMELEC failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the
Constitution in connection with the due process clause. Basic rudiments of due process require that the organizations
or parties should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated before they
can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-list system.

2. Yes, political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."Furthermore, under
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system.

For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party
or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

3. No, the state policy focused mainly on proportional representation by means of Filipino-style party-list system.

Proportional representation here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list
election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather,
it refers to the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as exemplified by the enumeration in
Section 5 of the law; namely, labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent
of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by
reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related.

BANAT vs COMELEC
[G.R. No. 179271]

Facts:

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full
Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because
the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have announced in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty
bound to and shall iomplement the Veterans Ruling, applying the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.
NBC denied the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic. BANAT did not file a motion for
reconsideration of NBC resolution instead it filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
resolution.

Moreover, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to
use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution because the Veterans formula is violative of the
Constitution and of R.A. No. 7941. On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings
of the NBC.

Issues:

1. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
2. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the
major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

Ruling:
1. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following
procedure shall be observed:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional
seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

2. The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the
party-list elections. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue
the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly.

UTUTALUM vs. COMELEC Case Digest
UTUTALUM vs. COMELEC
181 SCRA 335

Facts: Petitioner Untalum obtained 482 votes while respondent Anni received 35,581 votes out of the 39,801 voters.
If the returns of Siasi were excluded, petitioner would have lead of 5,301 votes. Petitioner filed written objections to
the returns from Siasi on the ground that they appear to be tampered with or falsified owing to the great excess of
votes appearing in the said returns.

COMELEC issued annulling the Siasi List of Voters on the ground of massive irregularities committed in the
preparation and being statistically improbable, and ordering a new registration of voters for the local elections.

Petitioner contends that the issue he raised referred to obvious manufactured returns, a proper subject matter for a
pre-proclamation controversy and therefore cognizable by the COMELEC; that election returns from Siasi should be
excluded from the canvass of the results since its original List of Voters had already been finally annulled.

Issue: Whether or not the election returns from Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of the results since the
original List of Voters had been finally annulled.

Held: The Siasi returns, however, do not show prima facie that on the basis of the old List of Voters, there is actually
a great excess of votes over what could have been legally cast considering that only 36,000 persons actually voted
out of the 39,801 voters.

Petitioners cause of action is not a listed ground for a pre-proclamation controversy. To allow the COMELEC to do so
retroactively would be to empower it to annul a previous election because of the subsequent annulment of a
questioned registry. The list must then be considered conclusive evidence of persons who could exercise the right of
suffrage in a particular election. The preparation of a voters list is not a proceeding before the Board of Canvassers.
A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers, not the Board of
Election Inspectors and such challenge should relate to specified election returns against which the petitioner should
have made verbal elections.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC
BILL OF RIGHTS
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELECG.R. No. 190582April 8, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with
the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization under Republic Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial
membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was
dismissed on moral grounds.

Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that the party-list
system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations.
Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is
beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that. That the
Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts
espoused by said religions have sipped into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms. COMELEC
reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national poltical agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA 7941.

HELD:

The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It also directed the
COMELEC to grant petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of
the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements
for accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to
register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent
with this policy of neutrality.
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the
party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be applied to
all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec


Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785
,
which approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to
the Supreme Court.


Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.


Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue raised
is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case
rendered it justiciable.

2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely
on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the
House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the party list applicants
so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not
being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution, the Court
decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court
ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

Atong Paglaum v. Commission on Elections
April 9, 2013 by 1inareformina
The Decision courtesy of the Supreme Court website
Background of the case
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to
reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-
list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among
others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and underrepresented
sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the
organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some of the petitioners
application for accreditation and cancelling the existing accreditation of the rest. They also lamented the poll bodys
denial to accord them due process in the evaluation proceedings.
The high court consolidated these cases; Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio was tasked as the Member-in-
charge of the case.
Status quo ante orders (SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which restored the status quo prior to the
disqualification of petitioners. However, only 39 of the 52 petitioners or only 41 petitions were able to secure a
mandatory injunction, directing the Comelec to include their names in the printing of official ballots.
THE RULING
In a Decision promulgated on April 2, 2013, the high court, through Carpios ponencia, ruled in favor of the 54
petitions and remanded these petitions to the Comelec. The party-list groups and organizations covered by the 41
petitions that obtained mandatory injunction orders from the high court still stand a chance to make it to the 2013
party-list race as the high court ordered the poll body to determine whether petitioners are qualified to register under
the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters set forth in
the Decision. The rest, meaning, the 13 other petitions, were remanded to the poll body merely for purposes of
determining whether they may be granted accreditation under the new parameters but may not participate in the May
2013 elections.
The Decision, however, clarified that the poll body may not be faulted for acting on the basis of previous rulings (Ang
Bagong Bayani, BANAT) of the high court regarding the party-list system. These earlier rulings enumerated
guidelines on who may participate in the party-list system.
New parameters set forth in the Decision on who may participate in the May 2013 party-list race and
subsequent party-list elections
The Decision identified three groups that may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
On the part of national parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations which intend to participate in the
party-list race, the new guidelines state that these parties do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not
need to represent any marginalized or underrepresented sector.'
As for political parties, they may participate in the party-list race by registering under the party-list system and no
longer field congressional candidates. These parties, if they field congressional candidates, however, are not barred
from participating in the party-list elections; what they need to do is register their sectoral wing or party under the
party-list system. This sectoral wing shall be considered an independent sectoral party linked to a political party
through a coalition.
The question is: where does representation of marginalized and underrepresented sectors come in?
The answer: on the sectoral parties or organizations that intend to participate in the party-list system.
The high court held that purely sectoral parties or organizations may either represent marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies or those lacking well-defined political constituencies. The high court went on to
enumerate marginalized and underrepresented sectors, as follows: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined
political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
The rule on nominees and members coming from the sector they intend to represent also applies only to the sectoral
parties or organizations. The high court ruled that it is enough that [a] majority of the members of the sectoral parties
or organizations must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent.' The same is true
for those who lack well-defined political constituencies.
As for the nominees of these sectoral parties and organizations, the new guidelines provide that they must either be
members of the sector or have a track record of advocacy for their sector.
Should some of the nominees of these national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations be disqualified, the
party or organization itself will not be disqualified provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
The party-list system, according to the Decision
Quoting Christian Monsod, the main proponent of the party-list system, the high court stated that it is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. The high court stressed that the framers of the 1987
Constitution did not intend to leave out non-sectoral parties in the party-list system and exclusively limit it to sectoral
groups.
The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system In fact,
the framers voted down , 19-22, a proposal to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make
the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to
include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties, the Decision read.
To amplify its position, the high court pointed out Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
The Decision also pointed out pertinent provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, also known as the Party-list
System Act, specifically from Sec. 3 (Definition of Terms):
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies
for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector
Again, the high court noted that defining these parties or groups, one from the others, could only mean that they are
not one and the same.
Previous rulings reversed by Atong Paglaum
As earlier stated, there are previous rulings on the party-list system in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/147589_decision.htm) and BANAT v. Comelec
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/179271.htm).
In Ang Bagong Bayanis parameters for the party-list system, guideline 2 states that while even major political parties
are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with
the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors
to be elected to the House of Representatives.'
However, in its latest Decision, in Atong Paglaum, the high court pointed out that there was an inherent
inconsistency in the Ang Bagong Bayani guidelines since the requirement that the major political parties should
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors essentially automatically disqualified these major parties
from the party-list system.
As for BANAT, incidentally also penned by Carpio, the high court said that the guidelines in this ruling merely
formalized the prevailing practice when it prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list elections
even if through their allied sectoral organizations.
My 2-cents
Flip-flopped as it may have in the case of Atong Paglaum, I agree with the Supreme Court in this Decision. No less
than the Constitution provides in Sec. 5(1), Art. VI that national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations
may participate in the party-list system a fact that may not be denied in spite of where public discourse and
sentiment tend to sway in as far as the party-list system is concerned.
If we want the party-list system to truly represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors and party-list groups
to come from the non-traditional political parties, then what needs to be done is amend the law. The Supreme Court
cannot go beyond its duty of interpreting the law and may not perform a constitutional function and mandate which is
solely that of the legislative branch. Doing so would be tantamount to judicial legislation.
I totally agree that allowing national and major political parties to participate in the party-list elections does not make
any sense if there were no distinction or requirement that the marginalized and underrepresented should be the
constituency. Why then create a separate system if it is, in fact, free for all?
But this is an issue best left to Congress to resolve, heart-wrenching as this may sound to those whose desire is to
provide a platform for a truly non-traditional mode of politics. For now, let us accept that we cannot go beyond what
the law provides.
PNOC EDC vs NLRC
Posted on March 14, 2013
FACT:
PNOC-Energy Development Corporation, to augment its need for manpower hired persons on varying dates and for
varying purposes. The earliest person who was contracted for the purpose was Roberto Renzal, as a pipe fitter, in
January 1995, and like the others concerned, his contract was renewed or extended every time his contract expires.
Later, PNOC-EDC informed DOLE, Regional Sub-branch No. VII in Dumaguete City, that 6 of its employees will be
terminated. Subsequently, Roberto Renzal and 5 others were furnished with letters stating that their employment will
be terminated on June 1998.
Renzal, et. al., filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against PNOC.
The Labor Arbiter found the group of Renzals, claim to lack merit, hence their termination legal on the ground that
they were dismissed because their contract with PNOC expired.
The NLRC, upon Renzals appeal, adjudged contrary to the decision of the Labor Arbiter stating among others that
Renzal and the others were regular non-project employees for having worked for more than one year in positions that
required them to perform activities necessary and desirable in the normal business or trade of petitioner. The CA
affirmed the NLRCs decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Renzal, et.al., were project employees or regular employees.
2. Whether or not they were illegally dismissed from employment.
HELD:
1. Renzal, et.al, are Regular Employees.
2. Yes, Renzal, et.al, being Regular Employees are entitled to security of tenure, were unjustly dismissed from
work.
RATIO:
1. PNOCs act of repeatedly and continuously hiring respondents to do the same kind of work belies its
contention that respondents were hired for a specific project or undertaking. The absence of a definite
duration for the project/s has led the Court to conclude that Renzal, et.al, are, in fact, regular employees.
2. In termination cases, it is incumbent upon the employer to prove by the quantum of evidence required by law
that the dismissal of an employee is not illegal; otherwise the dismissal would be unjustified. In the case at
bar, PNOC failed to discharge the burden.
The notices of termination indicated that PNOC services were terminated due to the completion of the
project. However, this allegation is contrary to the statement of petitioner in some of its pleadings that the
project was merely substantially completed. There is likewise no proof that the project, or the phase of
work to which respondents had been assigned, was already completed at the time of their dismissal.
QUINTO vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
PUNO, C.J .:
ETO DIGEST NG CASE PRIOR TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. RESOLUTION YUNG
ASSIGNED CASE SA ATIN
Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of
Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners
Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to
run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-
quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No.
9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be
harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from
their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their
CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly
discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional
norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated
differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and
substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled
vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirementif it is not
germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the
problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at
promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of
official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also
justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to
their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally
rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane
to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that
matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in
the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare
development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices,
there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present
state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position
during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the
inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven
by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification
simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the
second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal
protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section
13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier
decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369,
the basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The
resolution provides that, Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy. RA 9369 provides that
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the
same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional
Held: No
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth
requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive
officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed
resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the
people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected
officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from
the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words,
complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the
term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For
the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature,
whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet
equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and the intervenors Motions for
Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and
ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678,
(2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
==============
Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or
employee, or those in the civil or military service, including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations,
shall be considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of law, there
would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and
later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the
overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section
13 of RA 9369 must also fail.