Amen | Compiled Notes

Civil Law Review 2

NOTES
I. OBLIGATIONS
A. In General
1. Definition
Art. 1156. An obliation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.
Note!"
What is the definition of an obliation# It is best defined by Arias Ramos which reads as
follows, an OBLIGATION i! a $%ri&i'al relation w(ereb) a *er!on +'alle& t(e 're&itor,
-a) &e-an& fro- anot(er +'alle& t(e &ebtor, t(e ob!ervan'e of a &eter-inate 'on&%'t.
an&. in 'a!e of brea'(. -a) obtain !ati!fa'tion fro- t(e a!!et! of t(e latter/. This means
that where there is a right or power to demand, there is a correlative obligation or an
imposition upon a person of a definite conduct.
What are the elements of obligation? It has four definite elements as follows:
1. an active subject, who has the power to demand the prestation, known as the
oblige or creditor;
2. a passive subject, who is bound to perform the prestation, known as the obligor or
debtor;
a. These two, the active and passive subjects are considered as the personal
elements of an obligation.
b. They could be an individual person or juridical persons.
c. They must be determinable in some manner. Exceptions are the following
examples !"# negotiable instrument payable to bearer, !$# promise of a
pri%e or a reward for anyone performing a certain act.
3. an object or the prestation;
a. This may pertain not to a thing but to a particular conduct of the debtor&
hence, a prestation which may consist in ivin (prestation consists in the
delivery of a movable or immovable thing) or &oin (all kinds of services)
or not &oin (abstaining from some act, may include not to give)
something, e.g. it is not the thing which the vendor must deliver, but the
necessary conduct to produce the effects of the sale that is the obect!
"! the efficient cause or the juridical tie (vinculum juris) between the two subjects b
reason of which the debtor is bound in favor of the creditor to perform the
prestation!
a. This pertains to the juridical or legal tie, which is the vinculum, that may
either be a relation established by the following
i! 'aw !relation to give support)
ii! (ilateral acts (contracts giving rise to obligation)
iii! )nilateral acts (crimes and #uasi$delict)
** All the above + elements are agreed upon by commentators as essential elements. The
following two are being debated.
!i# ,ausa debendi- obligationes !,astan# . This is what ma/es the obligation demandable. This
is the proximate why of an obligation.
!ii# 0orm 1 This is controversial. This is acceptable only if form means some manifestation of
the intent of the parties.
What are the re2uisites of a prestation?
%! must be possible, physically and juridically&
&! must be determinable or at least determinable according to pre1established elements or
criteria& and
'! must have a possible e2uivalent in money (need not be for one of the parties because
it could be for the benefit of third persons( t(e 'riterion to &eter-ine w(et(er t(e
obliation (a! a *e'%niar) val%e i! not li-ite& to t(e ob$e't or *re!tation t(ereof.
b%t e0ten&! to t(e !an'tion w(i'( 'orre!*on&! to t(e $%ri&i'al &%t)1 this is
differentiated with creditor)s interest because the latter need not be economic or
patrimonial since it may be sentimental or ideal but the obect of prestation must have
an economic value or in case of nonfulfillment, be susceptible of substitution in money
or something of patrimonial value)
3ow will you distinguish an obliation from nat%ral obliation!# *ince the definition above
only refers to the civil obligation or those which give a right of action to compel their
performance, the same will not include the natural obligation, which are those which cannot be
enforced by court action but which are binding on the party who makes them, in conscience and
according to e#uity and natural ustice! The differences between the two include the following
%! !ivil obligations derive their binding force from positive law while "atural
obligations derive their binding effect from e#uity and natural ustice(
&! !ivil obligations can be enforced by court action or the coercive power of public
authority while the fulfillment of "atural obligations cannot be compelled by court
action but depends e+clusively from conscience!
A''or&in to Balane (oo/ 45 starts w- an inaccuracy. 4t gives the impression that obligations
6 contracts are of the same status, w-c they are not. A contract is only one of the sources of
obligations. (oo/ 45 should have been simply titled 78bligations.7
Et)-olo) 2 two 'atin words, ligare, meaning 7to bind7
6 ob w-c is a proposition used to intensify a verb.
'iterally obligare means 7to bin& !e'%rel).7
3ence, a better definition would be that, An obligation is a uridical relation (because there are
& parties) whereby a person should engage or refrain fr! engaging in a certain activity for the
satisfaction of the private interests of another, who in case of non$fulfillment of such duty may
obtain from the patrimony of the former through proper udicial proceedings the very prestation
due or in default thereof, the economic e#uivalent (damages) that it represents! (#ia$ %iero)
,haracteristics of an 8bligation
". 4t represents an exclusively private interest
$. 4t creates ties that are by nature transitory
9. 4t involves the power to ma/e the juridical tie effective in case of non1fulfillment
through an economic e2uivalent obtained from the debtor:s patrimony.
E!!ential Ele-ent! of an Obliation"
+1, &ctive 'ubject . This refers to the creditor or the obligee.
Amen | Compiled Notes
A 're&itor generally used in an obligation to give
while obliee is used in an obligation to do
+2, %assive 'ubject . This refers to the debtor or the obligor.
&ebtor is used in an obligation to give
while oblior is used in an obligation to do
The first two elements must be &eter-inate or &eter-inable. The following are possible
combinations
(oth parties are determined at the time of the execution of the obligation.
one party is determined at the constitution of the obligation 6 the other to be
determined subse2uently in accordance with a criteria that is previously
established.
the subject is determined in accordance with his relation to a thing 6 therefore it
changes where the thing passes from one person to another. This is a *ro*ert)3
lin4e& obliation.
+5, (bject of the obligation $ the conduct or activity that must be observed by the debtor, this is
always an activity or conduct, the *re!tation.
Re6%i!ite! of an ob$e't"
4t must be licit.
4t must be possible.
4t must be determinate or determinable.
4t must have pecuniary value so that if not performed it is converted into damages.
+7, )inculum juris1 the legal tie, whereby upon default or refusal of the debtor to perform, the
creditor can go to court.
When a person says 74 promise to pay you when 4 li/e to,7 there is no
obligation here because there is no vinculum uris!
8%ri&i'al tie. the efficient cause established by the various sources of
OBLIGATIONS
; by virtue of which the debtor is bound in favor of the creditor to perform
the prestation.
Effi'ient 'a%!e 9 vinculum may either be relation established by
". 'aw !e.g. marital relation giving rise to OBLIGATION for support&
$. (ilateral acts !e.g. contracts give rise to the OBLIGATION! stipulated
therein#
9. )nilateral acts !e.g. crimes and 2uasi1delicts#
** All the above 9-+ elements are agreed upon by commentators as essential elements. The
following two are being debated.
+i, !ausa debendi* obligationes +Ca!tan, 2 This is what ma/es the obligation
demandable. This is the proximate why of an obligation.
+ii, +orm 1 This is controversial. This is acceptable only if form means some
manifestation of the intent of the parties.
TOLENTINO"
OBLIGATION :to ive/ prestation consists in the delivery of a movable or an immovable
thing in order to create a real right, or for the use of the recipient, or for possession, or to return
to its owner& e.g. OBLIGATION to deliver the thing in a contract of sale, deposit, lease,
antichresis, pledge and donation.
OBLIGATION :to &o/ including all /inds of wor4 or !ervi'e!. E.g. contract of
employment or professional services.
OBLIGATION :not to &o/ consists in abstaining from some act, e.g. duty not to create a
nuisance&
Re6%i!ite! of a *re!tation"
". it must be possible, physically and juridically
$. it must be determinate, or at least determinable& and
9. it must have a positive e2uivalent in money. !susceptible of pecuniary appreciation#
;o!itive Law 2 valid legal laws enacted by the legislative department&
Nat%ral OBLIGATION . not sanctioned by any action but have a relative juridical
effect&
do not grant the right of action to enforce their performance but after
voluntary fulfillment by their obligor, they authori%e the retention of what
has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof !Arti'le 1725#&
2. <INDS O= OBLIGATIONS AS TO BASIS > EN=ORCEABILIT?
+a, NAT@RAL OBLIGATIONS
!Arts. "+$9 . "+9< not exclusive enumeration& some others can be#
A. NAT@RAL OBLIGATIONS 2 ARTS. 17253175B. 1155
Arti'le 1725. 8bligations are civil or natural. ,ivil obligations give a right of action to compel their
performance. =atural obligations, not being based on positive law but on e2uity 6 natural law, do not grant a
right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authori%e the
retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof. >ome natural obligations are set forth in the
following articles.
Arti'le 1727. When a right to sue upon a civil obligation has lapsed by extinctive prescription, t(e oblior w(o
vol%ntaril) *erfor-! t(e 'ontra't 'annot re'over w(at (e (a! &elivere& or t(e val%e of t(e !ervi'e (e (a!
ren&ere&.
Arti'le 1725. When without the /nowledge or against the will of the debtor, a t(ir& *er!on *a)! a &ebt w(i'(
t(e oblior is not legally bound to pay because the action thereon has prescribed, b%t t(e &ebtor later vol%n 3
taril) rei-b%r!e! t(e t(ir& *er!on. t(e oblior 'annot re'over w(at (e (a! *ai&.
Arti'le 1726. When a minor between "? and $" years of age who has entered into a contract without the
consent of the parents or guardian, after the annulment of the contract voluntarily returns the whole thing or
price received, notwithstanding the fact that he has not been benefited thereby, t(ere i! no ri(t to &e-an& t(e
t(in or *ri'e t(%! ret%rne&.
Note" When the ground for annulment is the incapacity of the plaintiff, he is not bound to ma/e
restitution e0'e*t to the extent that he was benefited. 3owever, he has nat%ral obliation to !till
&eliver. and he cannot thereby recover what he has delivered.
Amen | Compiled Notes
@atio (ecause a minor at such age is deemed to have sufficient mental and moral development
to be aware of his debt of conscience. This is basically independent on the next provision on
Arti'le 172C below.
Ill%!tration!"
". A filed an action to compel ( to fulfill the latterAs obligation to the former, will the action
prosper? =ot necessarily because in natural obligations no court action can compel
performance because it is an action based on e2uity, conscience and natural justice. =atural
obligations are midway between civil obligations and the purely moral obligations. 4n order
that there may be a natural obligation, there must exist a juridical tie !vinculum juris# which
is not prohibited by law and which in itself could give a cause of action, but because of some
special circumstances is actually without such legal sanction or means of enforcing
compliance by invo/ing the intervention of the court.
,asis: Art! %"&' -bligations are civil or natural! .ivil obligations give a right of action to
compel their performance! /atural obligations, not being based on positive law but on e#uity
performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authori0e the retention of
what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof! *ome natural obligations are set
forth in the following articles!
Arti'le 172C. When a minor between "? and $" years of age, who has entered into a contract without the
consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of money or delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment
of the obligation, there shall be no ri(t to re'over t(e !a-e fro- t(e obliee w(o (a! !*ent or 'on!%-e&
it in oo& fait(.
Note" 4t is not the voluntary payment that prevents recovery under this article, but the fact that
the obligee has consumed or spent the thing or money in B88C 0A4T3. Although it is true that
the contract can be annulled, but until it is so annulled, it e0i!t! a! a 'ivil obliation.
Beneral rule )pon the annulment of the contract, the party who contracted with the minor must
return whatever he may have received under the contract.
Exception 4f the payment was made although by the minor, but the thing or money paid was
consumed or spent in good faith (belief that the debtor has the capacity to deliver the obect(
must e+ist at the time that the thing was consumed or money was spent( can be recovered still by
the debtor if the good faith, even if it e+isted at the time of the delivery, has ceased to e+ist at the
time of consumption or spending).
4s the thing here always have to be consummable? /o, because although non$consummable, the
debtor cannot recover, if the think is no longer in the possession of the creditor who has acted in
good faith, either he has alienated it or it has been lost, without his fault!
Arti'le 172D. When, after an action to enforce a civil obligation has failed, the defendant voluntarily performs
the obligation, he cannot demand the return of what he has delivered or the payment of the value of the
service he has rendered.
Arti'le 172E. When a testate or intestate heir voluntarily pays a debt of the decedent exceeding the value of
the property which he received by will or by the law of intestacy from the estate of the deceased, the payment
is valid 6 cannot be rescinded by the payer.
Arti'le 175B. When a will is declared void because it has not been executed in accordance with the formali1
ties re2uired by law, but one of the intestate heirs, after the settlement of the debts of the deceased, pays a
legacy in compliance with a clause in the defective will, the payment is effective 6 irrevocable.
Note" This article includes ever licit obligation which is unenforceable because of the lac/ of
proper formalities.
&rticle 1,-.! If the borrower pays interest when there has been no stipulation therefor, the provisions of this
.ode concerning solutio indebiti, or natural obligations, shall be applied, as the case may be!
&rticle 1,/-! /o interest shall be due unless it has been e+pressly stipulated in writing!
Why would this =atural 8bligation be allowed in our jurisdiction? Itr It is because e#uality,
morality and natural ustice as the foundations of a positive law makes wisdom to this
obligation so as the so$called moral obligation!
What is the basis of natural obligation? It is from the nature of man and of things, as well as
from law and reason, there arises a natural law, which is immutable and independent of all
human regulations( as sometimes called as rational law.
What are the types of obligations?
In uridical science, four tpes of which include the following:
". 1oral obligation$ duties of conscience completely outside of the field of law
$. /atural obligation$ not sanctioned by any action but have relative juridical effect
9. .ivil obligation$ juridical obligations which apparently in conformity with positive
law but are contrary to juridical principles and susceptible of being annulled
+. 1i+ed obligation$ have full juridical effect
2owever, urisprudence makes only two classifications, as follows:
%! /atural obligation
&! .ivil obligation
Re6%i!ite! of Nat%ral OBLIGATION"
%! there is a juridical tie between two persons !distinguishes it from moral obligation)
&! the tie is not given effect by law (distinguishes it from civil obligation)
an OBLIGATION without a sanction, susceptible of voluntary
performance, but not through compulsion by legal means.
Fol%ntar) f%lfill-ent 2 may be understood as spontaneous, free from fraud or coercion or
it may be understood as meaning without /nowledge or free from error&
1with /nowledge that he cannot be compelled to pay OBLIGATION1
RATIO" DreputationE !clan#
3this is being distinguished from payment by mista/e !solution indebiti) which
constitutes 2uasi1contract because payment by mista/e is not voluntary and hence may
be recovered.
3payment here is voluntary when the debtor /new of the obligation to be a natural one.
Ca!e" An!a) v!. National Develo*-ent Co-*an)
=a't!" 8n Fuly $G, "HGI, appellants filed against appellees in the ,ourt of 0irst 4nstance of Janila a
complaint praying for a $<K ,hristmas bonus for the years "HG+ and "HGG. The court a 2uo does not see
how petitioners may have a cause of action to secure such bonus because:(a) A bonus is an act of liberality
and the court takes it that it is not within its udicial powers to command respondents to be liberal(
(b) 3etitioners admit that respondents are not under legal duty to give such bonus but that they had only ask
that such bonus be given to them because it is a moral obligation of respondents to give that but as this
.ourt understands, it has no power to compel a party to comply with a moral obligation (Art! %"&, /ew
.ivil .ode!)!
I!!%e" Whether the appellees have the legal obligation to give the claimed bonus despite the fact that the
same has been granted arising from a moral obligation or the natural obligation to do the same.
Ael&" No. &rticle 1023 of the =ew ,ivil ,ode classifies obligations into civil or natural. 7,ivil obligations
are a right of action to compel their performance. =atural obligations, not being based on positive law but on
e2uity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary
fulfillment by the obligor, they authori%e the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason
thereof7.
Amen | Compiled Notes
1t is thus readil seen that an element of natural obligation before it can be cogni$able b the court is
voluntar fulfillment b the obligor. !ertainl retention can be ordered but onl after there has been
voluntar performance. 2ut here there has been no voluntar performance. 1n fact, the court cannot
order the performance.
At this point, we would li/e to reiterate what we said in the case of 3hilippine 4ducation .o! vs! .IR and
the 5nion of 3hilippine 4ducation .o!, 4mployees (/56) !H$ Lhil., 9?"& +? 8ff. Ba%., G$M?# N
x x x x x x x x x
=ro- t(e leal *oint of view a bon%! i! not a &e-an&able an& enfor'eable obliation. It i! !o w(en it
i! -a&e a *art of t(e wae or !alar) 'o-*en!ation.
And while it is true that the subse2uent case of 2! 4! 2eacock vs! /ational 6abor 5nion, et al!, 78 3hil!,
88'( 89 -ff! :a0!, "&8', we stated that
3ven if a bonus is not demandable for not forming part of the wage, salar or compensation of an
emploee, the same ma nevertheless, be granted on e4uitable consideration as when it was given in the
past, though withheld in succeeding two ears from low salaried emploees due to salar increases.
still the facts in said Aea'o'4 'a!e are not t(e !a-e a! in t(e in!tant one, and hence the ruling applied
in said case cannot be considered in the present action.
What are imperfect and perfect obligations? %erfect obligation is one where there is a
determination of the creditor, debtor and the nature and value of the obligation while
imperfect obligation has no determination of those above!
What is its implication to natural obligation? 3erfect obligation is natural obligation in a
sense that all those elements have been determined and it is only the performance that is left
to the will of the debtor!
Nat%ral OBLIGATION v!. Goral OBLIGATION"
Nat%ral
OBLIGATION
Goral
OBLIGATION
8%ri&i'al tie Exists =one
;erfor-an'e b)
&ebtor
legal fulfillment of
an OBLIGATION
act of pure
liberality which
springs from blood,
affection or
benevolence
Ba!i! of e0i!ten'e
of OBLIGATION
Within the domain
of law
entirely domain of
morals
Enfor'eabilit) The juridical tie
itself produces
certain civil
effects& True
OBLIGATION
but for certain
causes cannot be
enforced by law
moral duty is
inexistent in the
juridical point of
view
E0a-*le! of nat%ral OBLIGATIONS"
>upport of a natural child
4ndemnification of a woman seduced
>upport of relatives, by consanguinity or affinity
Ca!e" Fillaroel v!. E!tra&a
=a't!" 8n Jay H, "H"$, Alexandra 0. ,allao, mother of defendant Fohn 0. 5illarroel, obtained from the
spouses Jariano Estrada and >everina a loan of L", <<< payable after seven years. Alexandra died,
leaving as the only heir to the defendant. >pouses Jariano Estrada and >everina died too, leaving as the
only heir to the plaintiff (ernardino Estrada. 8n August H, "H9<, the defendant signed a document which
states in duty to the plaintiff the amount of L", <<<, with an interest of "$ percent per year. This action
relates to the collection of this amount. The ,ourt of 0irst 4nstance of 'aguna, which was filed this action,
condemn the defendant to pay the claimed amount of L", <<< with legal interest of "$ percent per year from
the August H, "H9< until fully pay.
I!!%e" Whether the obligation arising from the original contract of loan, being prescribed would still be
demandable from the only heir of the original debtor.
Ael&" ?e! because the prescribed debt of the deceased mother of the debtor was held to be a sufficient
consideration to ma/e valid and effective the promise of the son to pay the same. Although the action to
recover the original debt has prescribed and when the lawsuit was filed in this case, the 2uestion that arises
in this appeal is primarily whether, notwithstanding such prescription is from the action filed. 3owever, this
action is based on the original obligation contracted b the mother of the defendant, who has prescribed,
but in which the defendant contracted on &ugust ,, 1,3. to assume the fulfillment of that obligation, as
prescribed. (eing the only defendant of the primitive heir debtor entitled to succeed him in his inheritance,
that debt legally brought by his mother, but lost its effectiveness by prescription, is now, however, for (i- a
-oral obliation. w(i'( i! 'on!i&eration eno%( to 'reate an& effe'tive an& enfor'eable (i! obliation
vol%ntaril) 'ontra'te& t(e A%%!t E. 1E5B.
CIFIL
OBLIGATIONS
NAT@RAL
OBLIGATIONS
So%r'e of bin&in
for'e > effe't
0rom positive law
from e2uity and
natural justice
Enfor'eabilit)
can be enforced by
court action or the
coercive power of
public authority
cannot be compelled
by court action but
depends upon good
conscience of the
debtor
When can you convert a natural obligation to civil one? ;his can made through( (%) novation:
(&) confirmation or ratification unless contrary to law, morals or public order!
,an you guarantee a natural obligation? In principle, no! because the liability of the guarantor
presupposes that there must be a prior e+haustion of the property of the principal debtor, and
that the guarantor after paying can recover from the principal debtor<and both of these cannot
be legally done when the obligation is natural! The legal conse2uence of having a guaranty for a
natural obligation is to convert the same to a civil obligation because that guaranty will now be
subject to some coercive remedies to be enforced against it.
Illi'it OBLIGATIONS OBLIGATIONS which are contrary to morals and good customs do
not constitute natural OBLIGATIONS. whatever is paid under such OBLIGATIONS can be
recovered, without prejudice to the provisions of Articles "+"" and "+"$, but Article "+"+ may
apply.
Ill%!tration!"
1. Diferentiate civil obligation from natural obligation: In civil
action, the obligation can be enforced by court action; natural
obligations cannot be enforced by court action. Civil obligations are
based on positive law and natural obligations are based on equity.
2. Example: The debt is 10M the value of the estate !M the
natural obligation is" o pay !". The basis of #M" #nder the law,
the heir is liable to the e$tent of the value which they actually received
from the decedent, therefore, if they received %", they will only be liable
for %", the !" will be a natural obligation.
Amen | Compiled Notes
!. Example: Dated feb.1 1$$% & promise to pa' ( the amount of
1M signed b' ). To this da' not a single centavo has been
paid. *hat +ind of obligation is the promissor' note" It may be
considered as a civil obligation when & demanded in writing the
payment from ' before the action prescribes because written demand
will toll the running of prescription of the obligation. (owever, if there
was no demand, since the obligation is a pure obligation, therefore,
demandable at once, the prescriptive period begins to run on feb.),
*++,, *- years has already lapsed, the action already prescribed, the
obligation becomes a natural obligation. &s this promissor' note a
pure obligation" 'es. .hy/ 0ecause there is no period stated in the
promissory note. ,ecause no period is stated in the promissor'
note it is a pure obligation" 0y e$press provision of the law, 1ust
because the parties failed to state the period in the promissory note,
does not necessarily mean that it pertains to a pure obligation,
because from the circumstances it can be inferred that the parties shall
2$ the period, if this is promissory note is a contract of loan it is
possible that there is a period. *hat possible contract ma' the
promissor' note be that indeed this ma' pertain to a pure
obligation" A contract of sale. -o. having said that if this
promissor' note pertains to an obligation .ith a period
therefore toda' the obligation in this promissor' note if no
demand .as made a natural obligation" Not necessarily, the
period of prescription shall be counted from the due date where the
obligation must be paid. 0ecause if this is with a period, and the
agreement is that the obligation should be paid after 2ve years, today
this is still a civil obligation, the prescriptive period shall
commence to run from the time the cause of action accrues.
%. &- /E01T&2- T2 T3E E(1M40E 25 T3E 3E&/ *32 41&D T3E
DE,T 25 T3E 51T3E/: ( died his heirs are 1,6 1,6 paid to )
10M 7ve da's after (8s death after 9 months thereafter the
heirs are tr'ing to recover claiming that the estate is onl' !M
can the heirs recover the value from )" hey cannot recover if the
payment is voluntary. In natural obligation, if the payer voluntarily
paid, the creditor has the right to retain what has been paid. The
:uestion here is that .hether or not the pa'ment is voluntar'"
&ncidentall' in natural obligation if the pa'er paid .ithout
fraud threat or an' vitiation being emplo'ed upon the heirs
the pa'ment is voluntar' pa'ment correct" Not necessarily.
*hen .ill there be pa'ment .ithout vitiation 'et the pa'ment
is not voluntar'" *hat constitutes voluntar' pa'ment in
natural obligation" he payer 3new that he is not compelled to pay
but the payer paid, it is a voluntary payment. The more reasonable
:uestion here is that is there such a person .ho is cra;'
enough to pa' even if he has no obligation to pa'" 'es, .h'
.ould he do that" Conscience. 4recisely because the obligation is
based on 1ustice 5but this is not possible here in the 4hilippines6. he
more reasonable answer is reputation. ,ut under the facts the
pa'ment is voluntar'" Not really, because when they paid it was
only 7 days after the death of &, by that time normally, they do not
3now the estate of the decedent.
<. 2bligation is de7ned under 1rt. 11<9 as an obligation to give to
do or not to do. &s it correct to sa' that the de7nition is not
accurate= there must be another prestation .hich is not to give"
No, the prestation not to give is included in not to do. 2bviousl' in this
de7nition there are onl' three obligations as to prestations
.hich are" *. 8bligation to give; ). 8bligation to do; and %. 8bligation
not to do. ,rie>' this de7nition is critici;ed because it is
incomplete .h' is it incomplete" It pertains only to the part of the
debtor. o the critics, obligation is a concept that would include both the
debt side and the credit side. 1nd 'ou agree to that" 'es sir. The
credit side and the debt side are t.o aspects of an obligation
do 'ou agree to that" 'es. ?o a credit is an obligation" No, they
are actually opposite of each other. he di9erence is that a person who
has a right can compel the other; he cannot be compelled to perform his
right. hus, in 4hilippine law, rights and obligations are di9erent matters.
1n obligation therefore ma' not be .aived but a right ma' be
exercised or not.
9. *hat are obligations .ithout agreement and < situations giving
rise to this obligation" hese are obligations arising from all other
sources besides contract. hus, in answering the second question, you
must cite e$amples: *. 4ayment of damages to the person who was
in1ured by negligence $$$. his is because agreement is required only in
contracts, it is not required in all other obligations, is only an essential
element of a contract.
#. Therefore considered as essential elements of obligations are"
*. Active sub1ect 5creditor or obligee6; ). 4assive ;ub1ect 5debtor or
obligor6; %. <uridical tie; and ,. 4restation. Therefore in a contract of
lease .ho is active sub@ect and .ho is the passive sub@ect" he
obligation is a reciprocal contract, hence, the passive sub1ect is the
lessor in the aspect of delivering the property leased to the lessor, and
the active sub1ect is the lessee in the aspect of demanding for the
delivery of the thing leased. &n a contract of sale .ho is the
passive sub@ect" It depends, the contract of sale is a bilateral contract,
hence as to payment the buyer is the passive sub1ect and the vendor is
the active sub1ect, while as to the delivery of the thing sold, the buyer is
the active sub1ect while the vendor is the passive sub1ect. 6ontract
resulting to a reciprocal obligation is called" A bilateral contract.
The :uestion here is ho. come the debtor is considered as the
passive sub@ect" (e can be compelled to perform the obligation. 3e is
the one to be compelled therefore passive" #nder 4hilippine law,
the creditor is the active sub1ect, because if the creditor does not
demand for the performance of the obligation there will be no
compulsion because if there is no demand, there will be no delay. he
debtor is actually favored by law for instance: *. In an obligation to pay a
sum of money without a stipulation as to the place of payment, the
place of payment will be where/ he place of domicile of debtor.
Amen | Compiled Notes
A. Mentioned as one of the essential re:uisites is the prestation
also +no.n as .hat" he ob1ect. Therefore it pertains to a
thing" No. ,ecause" he ob1ect pertains to conduct.
$. 1nother essential re:uisite is the @uridical tie also +no.n as
ad vinculum @uris or legal tie or eBcient cause. *hen .ould
there be a @uridical tie .hat is its purpose" It binds the party to
the obligation; there is a 1uridical tie when one of the sources of
obligation is present. hese sources of obligations, anyone of them
binds the parties. =i3e for instance, law, it is the law that will bind the
parties. *hat obligation has no @uridical tie" "oral obligations.
;RESCRI;TION O= ACTIONS
What is Dprescription of actionsE means? It is also known as the limitation of actions which
refers to the time within which an action may be brought, or some act done, to preserve a
right!
What are D>tatutes of 'imitationE? ;hese are the acts limiting the time within which actions
shall be brought! ;hey do not confer any right of action but are enacted to restrict the period
within which the right might be asserted! ;hey can be available as defenses but not matters of
substantive right! ;he purpose is to protect the diligent and vigilant not those who sleep on
their rights! ;hey are statutes of repose, the obect of which is to suppress fraudulent and stale
claims from springing up at great distances of time and surprising the parties or their
representatives when all the proper vouchers and evidence are lost or the facts have become
obscure from the lapse of time or the defect memory or death or removal of witnesses! ;hese
contemplate civil actions not criminal actions!
What is the difference between laches and prescription? 6aches is concerned with the effect of
delay while prescription is concerned with the fact of delay! 6aches is principally the #uestion
of ine#uity of permitting a claim to be enforced while prescription is a matter of time! 6aches
applies to e#uity while prescription is statutory=law!
Arti'le 115E. Actions prescribed by the mere lapse of time fixed by law.
Note" 0or example, in computing the prescriptive period if it is a leap year, 0ebruary $? and
$H are two separate days.
What is the effect of lapse of time? It has the effect of e+tinguishing the action! 2owever, this
to be availed of as a defense should be pleaded in the answer! T(e ri(t of *re!'ri*tion
(owever 'an be waive& or reno%n'e&. 4t is deemed waived if not timely raised or pleaded
before or during trial. Exception if it is apparent in the pleading itself.
Ca!e" Develo*-ent Ban4 of t(e ;(ili**ine! v!. S*o%!e! ;atri'io Confe!!or
=a't!" 8n 0ebruary "<, "H+< spouses Latricio ,onfesor and Fovita 5illafuerte obtained an agricultural
loan from the Agricultural and 4ndustrial (an/ !A4(#, now the Cevelopment of the Lhilippines !C(L#, in
the sum of L$,<<<.<<, Lhilippine ,urrency, as evidenced by a promissory note of said date whereby they
bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the account in ten !"<# e2ual yearly amorti%ations. As the
obligation remained outstanding and unpaid even after the lapse of the aforesaid ten1year period,
,onfesor, who was by then a member of the ,ongress of the Lhilippines, executed a second promissory
note on April "", "HI" expressly ac/nowledging said loan and promising to pay the same on or before
Fune "G, "HI". >aid spouses not having paid the obligation on the specified date, the C(L filed a
complaint dated >eptember "", "HM< in the ,ity ,ourt of 4loilo ,ity against the spouses for the payment of
the loan.
I!!%e" Whether the validity of a promissory note which was executed in consideration of a previous
promissory note, the enforcement of which is barred by prescription may still be demandable.
Ael&" ?e!. The right to prescription may be waived or renounced. Arti'le 1112 of Civil Co&e provides
&rt. 1112. %ersons with capacit to alienate propert ma renounce prescription alread obtained, but not
the right to prescribe in the future.
%rescription is deemed to have been tacitl renounced when the renunciation results from acts which
impl the abandonment of the right ac4uired.
There is no doubt that prescription has set in as to the first promissory note of 0ebruary "<, "H+<. Aowever.
w(en re!*on&ent Confe!or e0e'%te& t(e !e'on& *ro-i!!or) note on A*ril 11. 1E61 w(ereb) (e
*ro-i!e& to *a) t(e a-o%nt 'overe& b) t(e *revio%! *ro-i!!or) note on or before 8%ne 15. 1E61. an&
%*on fail%re to &o !o. aree& to t(e fore'lo!%re of t(e -ortae. !ai& re!*on&ent t(ereb) effe'tivel)
an& e0*re!!l) reno%n'e& an& waive& (i! ri(t to t(e *re!'ri*tion of t(e a'tion 'overin t(e fir!t
*ro-i!!or) note.
This ,ourt had ruled in a similar case that .
... when a debt is already barred by prescription, it cannot be enforced by the creditor! ,ut a new contract
recogni0ing and assuming the prescribed debt would be valid and enforceable ... .
Thus, it has been held N
>here, therefore, a party acknowledges the correctness of a debt and promises to pay it after the same has
prescribed and with full knowledge of the prescription he thereby waives the benefit of prescription!
T(i! i! not a -ere 'a!e of a'4nowle&-ent of a &ebt t(at (a! *re!'ribe& b%t a new *ro-i!e to *a) t(e
&ebt. T(e 'on!i&eration of t(e new *ro-i!!or) note i! t(e *re3e0i!tin obliation %n&er t(e fir!t
*ro-i!!or) note. T(e !tat%tor) li-itation bar! t(e re-e&) b%t &oe! not &i!'(are t(e &ebt.
A new e+press promise to pay a debt barred !!! will take the case from the operation of the statute of
limitations as this proceeds upon the ground that as a statutory limitation merely bars the remedy and does
not discharge the debt, there is something more than a mere moral obligation to support a promise, to wit a
? pre$e+isting debt which is a sufficient consideration for the new the new promise( upon this sufficient
consideration constitutes, in fact, a new cause of action!
... 4t is this new promise, either made in express terms or deduced from an ac/nowledgement as a legal
implication, which is to be regarded as reanimating the old promise, or as imparting vitality to the remedy
!which by lapse of time had become extinct# and thus enabling the creditor to recover upon his original
contract.
)nder Article "IG of the ,ivil ,ode, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. As such
administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conugal
partnership, are chargeable to the conugal partnership! G=o doubt, in this case, respondent ,onfesor
signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. 3ence the conjugal
partnership is liable for this obligation.
Arti'le 117B. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe ? years from the time the possession thereof is
lost, unless the possessor has ac2uired the ownership by prescription for a less period, according to Article
""9$ and without prejudice to Articles GGH, "G<G and ""99.
Arti'le 1152. The ownership of movables prescribes through uninterrupted possession for four years in good
faith.
The ownership of personal property also prescribed through uninterrupted possession for ? years, without
need of any other condition.
With regard to the right of the owner to recover personal property lost or of which he has been illegally
deprived, as well as with respect to movables ac2uired in a public sale, fair, or mar/et, or from a merchantAs
store, the provisions of Article GGH and "G<G shall be observed.
Arti'le 1171. @eal actions over immovables prescribe after 9< years. This provision is without prejudice to
what is established for the ac2uisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.
Note" While an action for reformation of instrument, such as a contract of sale with pacto de
retro alleged to be merely an e2uitable mortgage, is an action based upon a written contract
which must be brought within "< years form the time the right of action accrues !&rticle 1100),
where however, the accrual of such right could not be established it is more logical to apply this
provision, Article ""+" because in reality the action see/s to reassert oneAs title of ownership
over the real property, not to recover the same.
Arti'le 1172. A mortgage action prescribes after "< years.
Amen | Compiled Notes
Note" The fact that the mortgage is registered does not ma/e its action to foreclose
imprescriptible.
Arti'le 1175. The following rights, among others specified elsewhere in this ,ode, are not e5tinguished
b prescription
". To demand a right of way, regulated in Article I+H&
$. To bring action to abate a public or private nuisance.
Note" Also included in the list is that provided for in Article +H+ of the ,ivil ,ode which
allows no prescription to run in favor of a co1owner or co1heir against co1owners or co1heirs
so long as he expressly or impliedly recogni%e the co1ownership because the possession of
each of the co$owner or co$heir is in the nature of a subsisting trust and considered to be in
the name of the other!
Exception 4t will prescribe if the co1owner or co1heir has possessed the property as exclusive
owner for a period sufficient to ac2uire the property by prescription.
8ther imprescriptible actions
%! Action by the government or a governmental entity&
&! Action for mandamus&
'! Action to enforce an express trust as long as the trustee does not repudiate the trust&
"! Action to 2uiet title of the property in oneAs possession&
8! Action or defense to declare a contract or judgment void ab initio(
@! Action of the registered owner to recover his land.
Arti'le 1177. The following actions must be brought within "< years from the time the right of action
accrues
". )pon a written contract&
$. )pon an obligation created by law& and
9. )pon a judgment.
Note" @emember that the action for reconveyance of the title to the rightful owner prescribes
in "< years from the issuance of the title! (ut is fraud has been committed, and this is the basis
of action, not implied trust, the action will be barred after four years from the discovery of the
fraudulent act!
Arti'le 1175. The following actions must be commenced within I years
". )pon an oral contract&
$. )pon a 2uasi1contract.
Arti'le 1176. The following actions must be instituted within + years
". )pon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff&
$. )pon a tort or 2uasi1delict.
*An action based on fraud.
Note" Example of inury to the rights of the plaintiff is when there is an unjustified separation
from employment. Example of actions of tort or 2uasi1delict is& where real property belongs in
ownership to A and over which he was and has always been in possession but by mistake of
the cadastral clerk came to be titled in %7'8 in the name of 6, who had never claimed it and
knew all along that he was not the owner but only had a paper title thereto, never bothered to
disturb the possession of A until %7"B when he sought to do so, thereafter filing his
reinvindicatory action to recover the land from A in %7"7, the counterclaim for reconveyance
contained in the answer of A has been filed within the period to recover on a #uasi$delict!
Arti'le 117C. The following actions must be filed within one year
". 0or forcible entry and detainer&
$. 0or defamation.
Arti'le 117D. The limitations of actions mentioned in Articles ""+< to ""+$ and ""++ and ""+M are without
prejudice to those specified in other parts of this ,ode, in the ,ode of ,ommerce, and in special laws.
Arti'le 117E. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this ,ode or in other laws must be brought
within G years from the time the right of action accrues.
Note" The right to collect taxes is imprescriptible.
Arti'le 115B. The time for prescription for all 4in&! of a'tion!, when there is no special provision which
ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the da the ma be brought.
Note" 4t is to be computed from the day on which the corresponding action could have been
instituted. 4t is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determined the starting point for
the computation of the period. T(e *erio& !(o%l& not be -a&e to retroa't to t(e &ate of
e0e'%tion of 'ontra't.
The commencement of cause of actions
%! ,losing of windows1 the period of prescription for the action to close must be counted
from the day they were opened.
&! 8bligation to pay upon receipt of an inheritance by the debtor1 from the date of such
receipt because when the obligation is subect to a suspensive condition, prescription
begins to run from the happening of the condition!
'! 8bligation without maturity date or note payable on demand1 from the date of the note
or obligation =8T from demand.
"! )npaid balance of a subscription to shares of a corporation1 from the date of call or
demand.
8! Layment of money within a year but with privilege of extension1 from the end of the
first year.
@! Action based on fraud1 from the discovery of fraud.
C! Ouasi1delict1 from the day the 2uasi1delict accrued or was committed.
B! Action for partition and reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust1 from the
date of issuance of the original certificate of title because registration is notice to the
world.
7! Leriod to claim inheritance1 until a 9
rd
person claims a right under such instrument.
%9! To set aside simulated written deed of pacto de retro sale1 when the alleged vendees
made /nown their intention by overt acts not to abide by the true agreement =8T from
the date of execution of contract.
Arti'le 1151. The time for the prescription of actions which have for their object the enforcement of
obligations to pay principal with interest or annuity runs from the last payment of the annuity or of the
interest.
Note" This is applicable only when the principal debt is already due. (ut where there exist a past
due mortgage which was recogni%ed by payments of interest, prescription ran only from the past
payment of interest.
Arti'le 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a
judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.
Amen | Compiled Notes
Note" Fudgment will only become final upon the expiration of the period for appeal in the trial
court. (ut in the >, or ,A, the true judgment is that entered by the .lerk of that .ourt
pursuant to the dispositive portion of its decision! T(e *erio& i! 1B )ear! fro- !%'( entr) or
*erio& %n&er Arti'le 1177.
Arti'le 1155. The period for prescription of actions to demand accounting runs fro- t(e &a) t(e *er!on!
w(o !(o%l& ren&er t(e !a-e 'ea!e in t(eir f%n'tion!. The period for the action arising from the result of
the accounting runs fro- t(e &ate w(en !ai& re!%lt wa! re'oniHe& b) aree-ent of t(e intere!te&
*artie!.
Note" The period of prescription begins to run in an action to compel an accounting by a joint
account partner, from the date of the retirement of the members. 0or accounts, the following
rules apply
". 0or mutual current accounts, it begins to run on the date of the last item, no matter
how far bac/ the account commenced.
$. 0or simple current open accounts, it begins to run from the date of each particular
item.
9. ,urrent account guaranteed by mortgage executed in a public instrument, it begins
to run from the date of the last payment.
+. When the accounting has been made between the parties in their current account
dealings, the right of action, and prescription begins to run on the date when the last
balance of prescription was struc/ and =8T when the business relations terminated.
Arti'le 1157. The period during which the obligee was prevented by a fortuitous event from enforcing his
right is not rec/oned against him.
Note" There is only interruption of the running of prescription when the courts cannot be /ept
open and are not within the reach of the people. The >tatute of 'imitations does not operate
against the Bovernment. An example of interruption is the destruction of records of the case.
Arti'le 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted +1, w(en t(e) are file& before t(e 'o%rt. +2,
w(en t(ere i! written e0tra3$%&i'ial &e-an& b) t(e 're&itor!. an& +5, w(en t(ere i! an) written
a'4nowle&-ent of t(e &ebt b) t(e &ebtor.
Note" 0or the first interruption, it lasts during the pendency of the action and runs anew after
the dismissal of the first action to revive judgment. When interruption of action is legally
commenced? It is from the time the complaint is docketed in .ourt! 3ow about if the
prescription is interrupted by a judicial demand? ;he full period for the prescription must be
reckoned from the cessation of the interruption!
When there is no suspension in filing of action in court?
%! >hen the plaintiff desist
&! Amendment of the complaint with new or different cause of action
'! /ew or additional defendants
0or the second interruption, it is so because since the extinctive prescription is based on
presumed abandonment of a right, it is obvious that the running of the period should be
interrupted when a demand is made by the creditor upon the debtor before the lapse of the
period fixed by law, with the burden of proof on the former. 4t must also be written.
0or the third interruption, it is so if the ac/nowledgment is in writing. Coes it always have to
be express? /ot so because it can be implied therein, provided it is written and must apply to a
particular or specific debt! Examples are the following
". A promise to pay a debt.
$. 'isting of mortgage indebtedness by the debtor in his schedule of liabilities filed in
insolvency proceedings.
9. >tatement by one of the ma/er of a L= that he supposed he would have to pay it, if the
amount could not be gotten out of the estate of other drawer.
+. =otation in the handwriting of the ma/er to the effect that such note was renewed.
* ,an be made even by a legal representative.
4nstances that there is no ac/nowledgment of debt
". Jere offer to compromise a suit upon a supposed debt.
$. Cebtor ac/nowledging receipt of a statement of account but declines to recogni%e the
correctness of the account being exorbitant.
9. Ac/nowledgment of the obligation after it has already prescribed. There must be a
new and positive promise to pay in order to nullify prescription.
+. Lart payment of debt.
G. The death of the debtor.
I. The transfer of right to another.
M. The institution of criminal action cannot have the effect of interruption the institution
of civil action based on 2uasi1delict.
?. 8rder to stay execution of judgment.
H. ,onfinement in jail.
What is the effect of ac/nowledgment? It will renew the obligation of the debtor and interrupts
the prescription and make it run only from such acknowledgment! Example, if the decedent
ma/es a will but invalid as to its form but in there he ac/nowledge the debt in favor of A, the
prescription runs against the claim from the date of the ma/ing of invalid will and =8T from the
date of death.
+b, CIFIL OBLIGATIONS"
Arti'le 115C. 8bligations arise from
!"# 'aw& !8('4BAT48=> e+ lege#
!$# ,ontracts&
!9# Ouasi1contracts&
!+# Acts or omissions punished by law& and
!G# Ouasi1delicts.
>8)@,E> 80 OBLIGATIONS"
1. LAI"
Arti'le 115D. 8bligations derived from law are not presumed. 8nly those expressly determined
in this ,ode or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law
which establishes them& and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this (oo/.
an aree-ent i! not ne'e!!ar) in or&er t(at a *art) -a) &e-an& fro-
anot(er t(e f%lfill-ent of an OBLIGATION arising from the application
of a law in the circumstances&
Balane" Law a! a !o%r'e of obliation . 4t is my opinion that there is an overlap in the
enumeration because all obligations arise from law. 'aw is the only source of obligation, in the
ultimate sense. (ut, as a proximate source, there are five sources of obligations. 'aw is both the
ultimate 6 a proximate source of obligations.
So%r'e! of Obliation! a''or&in to San'(eH Ro-an.
'aw 6 Acts. The latter are further classified, as follows
Amen | Compiled Notes
(%) licit acts created by concurrence of wills (contracts)(
(&) licit acts either voluntary or involuntary without concurrence of wills (#uasi$contract)(
(') illicit acts of civil character which are not punishable, voluntary or involuntary (torts D all
damages arising from delay)(
(") illicit acts which are voluntary D are punishable by law (crimes)

,aviera When the source of the obligation is 'aw, there is no need for an act or omission for the
obligation to arise.
,A>E Sara&a Or&en De ;re&i'a&ore! Del Santi!-o Ro!ario De =ili*ina! v!. National Co'on%t
Cor*oration. Fune 9<, "HG$, 8. Labra&or.
=a't!" Llaintiff owned disputed property in Landacan, Janila which was ac2uired during the Fapanese
occupation by Taiwan Te//osho with T,T. When the Lhilippines was ceded to )>A, the same was entrusted
to Alien Lroperty ,ustodian, AL, by the )> government. AL, too/ possession, control and custody under
the Trading with the Enemy Act. AL, allowed ,opra Export Janagement ,o. to occupy the property for a
fee. @L (Republic of the 3hilippines# later made representation with AL, to use the same property with
warehouse which was repaired by =A,8,8 !/ational .oconut .orp!) and was leased to Cioscoro >arile.
The latter failed to pay rentals on the property. 4n an action to recover possession of the property, the court
nullified the sale to Taiwan Te//osho and cancelled its T,T and ordered reversion of title to plaintiff, and
right of recovery from =A,8,8 of rentals to the property.
ISS@E" W8= =A,8,8 is liable to pay bac/ rentals?
AELD" 4f defendant1appellant is liable at all, its obligations must arise from any of the + sources of
obligations, namely, law, contract or 2uasi contract, crime, or negligence. !Article "<?H, 8ld ,ivil ,ode.# To
determine such, the following must be understood
A! to 'ri-e! Cefendant1appellant is not guilty of any offense at all, because it entered into the premises 6
occupied it with the permission of the entity which had the legal control 6 administration thereof, the Alien
Lroperty Administration !ALA#.
A! to J%a!i3Deli't =either was there any negligence on its part.
A! to Contra't There was also no privity !of contract or obligation# between the ALA 6 Taiwan Te//osho,
which had secured the possession of the property from the plaintiff1appellee by the use of duress, such that
the Alien Lroperty ,ustodian or its permittee !defendant1appellant# may be held responsible for the supposed
illegality of the occupation of the property by said Te//osho.
The ALA had the control 6 administration of the property not as successor to the interests of the enemy
holder of the title, the Taiwan Te//osho, but by express provision of law.
=either is it a trustee of the former owner, the plaintiff1appellee herein, but a trustee of the )> Bovt., in its
own right, to the exclusion of, 6 against the claim or title of, the enemy owner. 0rom Aug. "H+I, when def.1
appellant too/ possession, to the date of the judgment on $-$?-+?, the ALA had the absolute control of the
property as trustee of the )> Bovt., with power to dispose of it by sale or otherwise, as though it were the
absolute owner.
Therefore, even if defendant were liable to the ALA for rentals, these would not accrue to the benefit of the
plaintiff the old owner, but the )> Bovt.
Balane" 4s the enumeration in Article ""GM exclusive or merely illustrative?
Do'trine" 6he sense that the case of 'agrada (rden tells us is that the enumeration is
e5clusive.
4n resolving the issue of whether the defendant should be liable to pay rentals, the '! used the
process of e5clusion. 0or there to be an obligation to pay rentals, that obligation must arise from
any of the five !G# sources of obligations. 4f it does not, then there is no obligation. T(e 'lear
i-*li'ation of t(i! r%lin i! t(at. t(e!e five +5, are t(e onl) !o%r'e! of obliation!.
The problem with Article ""GM is that it might not cover all situations. =or e0a-*le ,arale uses
Cove as his soap. 3e then hears an advertisement from Lroctor 6 Bamble that it is offering a
nice tumbler for those who can collect 9< wrappers of Tide before 0eb. $H, "HHI. >o, ,arale
stopped using Cove 6 started using Tide. 3e was able to consume all 9< wrappers on 0eb. $H,
"HHI. 3e then went to Lroctor 6 Bamble !L 6 B# to exchange the 9< Tide wrappers for a
tumbler. (ut L 6 B told ,arale that their tumblers run out of stoc/. ,arale contracted a s/in
allergy as a result of using Tide in ta/ing a bath. The 2uestion is Coes L 6 B have any obligation
to ,arale. 4f we loo/ at Article ""GM, this situation does not fall in any of the five sources. >o, we
/now have a problem. The Berman ,ivil ,ode !(B(# covers this situation. The (B( has a sixth
source of obligation, the Auslobung, which means a %nilateral offer.
2. CONTRACTS"
Article ""GH. 8bligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good faith.
Article "9<G. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself,
with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
Neotiation of contract is initiated by an 800E@&
&utonom of !ontract supposing the contract is valid and enforceable, the terms of contract
not contrary to law, morals, B,, LL or L8, the stipulations therewith should be given effect.
!8ne of fundamental principles of contracts#
Balane There are two parts in Article ""GH.
8bligations derived from contract has the force of law between the contracting
parties !jus civili #
There must be compliance in good faith !jus gentium.#
,A>E ;eo*leK! Car In'. v!. Co--an&o Se'%rit) Servi'e Aen'). Jay $$, "HM9, 8. Tee(an4ee.
=a't!" 8n April G, "HM<, ,ommando >ecurity >ervice AgencyAs security guard on duty at the premises of
LeopleAs ,ar 4nc., without authority, consent, approval, /nowledge or orders from LeopleAs ,ar and-or
,ommando >ecurity brought out from the compound a car belonging to a customer and drove said car for a
place or places un/nown, abandoning his post as such security guard, and while so driving, lost control of said
car, causing the same to fall into a ditch. The customer, Foseph 'uy had to rent another car. LeopleAs ,ar
incurred actual damages of L?, +?H."<. LeopleAs ,ar sued ,ommando >ecurity for reimbursement.
I!!%e" W8= ,ommando security is liable to damages in accordance with provisions of contract
Ael&" ?ES. Llaintiff was in law liable to its customer for the damages caused the customer:s car, which had
been entrusted into its custody. Llaintiff therefore was in law justified in ma/ing good such damages and
relying in turn on defendant to honor its contract and indemnify it for such undisputed damages, which had
been caused directly by the unlawful and wrongful acts of defendant:s security guard in breach of their
contract. As ordained in Article ""GH, ,ivil ,ode, 7obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.7
Llaintiff in law could not tell its customer, as per the trial court:s view, that 7under the Buard >ervice
,ontract it was not liable for the damage but the defendant7 N since the customer could not hold defendant
to account for the damages as he had no privity of contract with defendant. >uch an approach of telling the
adverse party to go to court, notwithstanding his plainly valid claim, aside from its ethical deficiency among
others, could hardly create any goodwill for plaintiff:s business, in the same way that defendant:s baseless
attempt to evade fully discharging its contractual liability to plaintiff cannot be expected to have brought it
more business. Worse, the administration of justice is prejudiced, since the court doc/ets are unduly
burdened with unnecessary litigation.
%aragraph 0 of the contract, which limits defendant7s liabilit for the amount of loss or damage to an
propert of plaintiff to 8%1,...... per guard post,8 is b its own terms applicable onl for loss or damage
7through the negligence of its guards ... during the watch hours7 provided that the same is duly reported by
plaintiff within $+ hours of the occurrence and the guard:s negligence is verified after proper investigation
with the attendance of both contracting parties. >aid paragraph is manifestly inapplicable to the stipulated
facts of record, which involve neither property of plaintiff that has been lost or damaged at its premises nor
mere negligence of defendant:s security guard on duty.
3ere, instead of defendant, through its assigned security guards, complying with its contractual underta/ing
7to safeguard and protect the business premises of (plaintiff) from theft, robber, vandalism and all other
unlawful acts of an person or persons,8 defendant:s own guard on duty unlawfully and wrongfully drove
Amen | Compiled Notes
out of plaintiffs premises a customer:s car, lost control of it on the highway causing it to fall into a ditch,
thereby directly causing plaintiff to incur actual damages in the total amount of L?,+?H."<.
#efendant is therefore undoubtedl liable to indemnif plaintiff for the entire damages thus incurred,
since under paragraph / of their contract it 8assumed the responsibilit for the proper performance b
the guards emploed of their duties and (contracted to) be solel responsible for the acts done during
their watch hours8 and 8specificall released (plaintiff) from an and all liabilities ... to the third
parties arising from the acts or omissions done b the guards during their tour of dut.8 As plaintiff had
duly discharged its liability to the third party, its customer, Foseph 'uy, for the undisputed damages of
L?,+?H."< caused said customer, due to the wanton and unlawful act of defendant:s guard, defendant in
turn was clearly liable under the terms of paragraph G of their contract to indemnify plaintiff in the same
amount.
,ase 8o!e*( Sal%&aa v!. far Ea!tern @niver!it) an& E&ilberto De 8e!%! +%resident of +39), April 9<,
$<<?, 8. ?nare!3Santiao.
=a't!" Letitioner Foseph >aludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent 0ar Eastern )niversity
when he was shot by Alejandro @osete, one of the security guards on duty at the school premises on
August "?, "HHI. @osete was brought to the police station where he explained that the shooting was
accidental. 3e was eventually released considering that no formal complaint was filed against him.
@espondents, in turn, filed a Third1Larty ,omplaint against Balaxy Cevelopment and Janagement
,orporation !Balaxy#, the agency contracted by respondent 0E) to provide security services within its
premises and Jariano C. 4mperial !BalaxyAs Lresident#, to indemnify them for whatever would be
adjudged in favor of petitioner.
Letitioner is suing respondents for damages based on the alleged breach of student1school contract for a
safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning.
I!!%e" Whether or not 0E) could be held liable.
Ael&" ?ES. :hen an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a
contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to compl with.
0or its part, the school underta/es to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice
to e2uip him with the necessary tools and s/ills to pursue higher education or a profession. 8n the other
hand, the student covenants to abide by the schoolAs academic re2uirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
@espondent 0E) failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in providing a
safe learning environment for their students. 4t failed to show that they undertoo/ steps to ascertain and
confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the 2ualifications re2uired in the
>ecurity >ervice Agreement. 1t was not proven that the e5amined the clearances, pschiatric test
results, 2.1 files, and other vital documents enumerated in its contract with ;ala5. 6otal reliance on
the securit agenc about these matters or failure to check the papers stating the 4ualifications of the
guards is negligence on the part of respondents. A learnin in!tit%tion !(o%l& not be allowe& to
'o-*letel) relin6%i!( or ab&i'ate !e'%rit) -atter! in it! *re-i!e! to t(e !e'%rit) aen') it (ire&. To
do so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its
students.
Re!*on&ent =E@ i! liable to *etitioner for &a-ae!.
+39 cannot be held liable for damages under &rt. 21<. of the !ivil !ode because respondents are not
the emploers of =osete. 6he latter was emploed b ;ala5. The instructions issued by respondents
>ecurity ,onsultant to Balaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than re2uests commonly
envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be
construed as the element of control as to treat respondents as the employers of @osete. 4t had no hand in
selecting thesecurity guards. Thus, the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family cannot be
demanded from the said client
=ALLO
D0or these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent 0E) with an un2ualified security guard,
which resulted to the latters breach of obligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold Balaxy liable to
respondent 0E) for such damages e2uivalent to the above1mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner.
)nli/e respondent Ce Fesus, we deem 4mperial to be solidarily liable with Balaxy for being grossly
negligent in directing the affairs of the security agency.E
,ase =a%!tino Cr%H v!. 8.G. T%a!on > Co-*an). In'. an& Greorio Araneta. In'.. April $H, "HMM, 8.
Barre&o.
=a't!" Llaintiff1appellant:s complaint below shows that he alleged two separate causes of action, namely
!"# that upon re2uest of the Ceudors !the family of Telesforo Ceudor who laid claim on the land in 2uestion
on the strength of an 7informacion posesoria7# plaintiff made permanent improvements valued at L9<,+<<.<<
on said land having an area of more or less $< 2uinones and for which he also incurred expenses in the
amount of LM,M?".M+, and since defendants>appellees are being benefited b said improvements, he is
entitled to reimbursement from them of said amounts and
!$# that in "HG$, defendants availed of plaintiff:s services as an intermediary with the Ceudors to wor/ for
the amicable settlement of ,ivil ,ase =o. O1"9G, then pending also in the ,ourt of 0irst 4nstance of Oue%on
,ity, and involving G< 2uinones of land, of Which the $< 2uinones aforementioned form part, and
notwithstanding his having performed his services, as in fact, a compromise agreement entered into on
Jarch "I, "HI9 between the Ceudors and the defendants was approved by the court, the latter have refused
to conve to him the 3,... s4uare meters of land occupied b him, (a part of the 2. 4uinones above)
which said defendants had promised to do 8within ten ears from and after date of signing of the
compromise agreement8, as consideration for his services.
I!!%e" Whether or not 0austino ,ru% can claim reimbursement for the expenses and services rendered.
Ael&" NO. We hold that the allegations in his complaint do not sufficiently Appellants: reliance on Article
$"+$ of ,ivil ,ode is misplaced. >aid article provides
.ertain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the uridical relation of #uasi$contract to the end
that no one shall be unustly enriched or benefited at the e+pense of another!
0rom the very language of this provision, it is obvious that a presumed 2auasi1contract cannot emerge as
against one party when the subject mater thereof is already covered by an existing contract with another
party. Lredicated on the principle that no one should be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another, Article $"$+ creates the legal fiction of a 2uasi1contract precisely because of the absence of any
actual agreement between the parties concerned. ,orollarily, if the one who claims having enriched
somebody has done so pursuant to a contract with a third party, his cause of action should be against the
latter, who in turn may, if there is any ground therefor, see/ relief against the party benefited. 4t is essential
that the act by which the defendant is benefited must have been voluntary and unilateral on the part of the
plaintiff. As one distinguished civilian puts it, 86he act is voluntar because the actor in 4uasi>contracts is
not bound b an pre>e5isting obligation to act. 1t is unilateral, because it arises from the sole will of the
actor who is not previousl bound b an reciprocal or bilateral agreement. 6he reason wh the law
creates a juridical relations and imposes certain obligation is to prevent a situation where a person is able
to benefit or take advantage of such lawful, voluntar and unilateral acts at the e5pense of said actor.8
!Ambrosio Ladilla, ,ivil 'aw, 5ol. 54, p. M+?, "HIH ed.# 4n the case at bar, !in'e a**ellant (a! a 'learer
an& -ore &ire't re'o%r!e aain!t t(e De%&or! wit( w(o- (e (a& entere& into an aree-ent rear&in
t(e i-*rove-ent! an& e0*en&it%re! -a&e b) (i- on t(e lan& of a**ellee! it Cannot be !ai&. in t(e
!en!e 'onte-*late& in Arti'le 2172. t(at a**ellee! (ave been enri'(e& at t(e e0*en!e of a**ellant.
,ase G%tierreH Aer-ano! v!. Enra'io Oren!e. Cecember +, "H"+, 8. Torre!.
=a't!" Engracio 8rense is the owner of a parcel of land situated in Albay. 8n 0ebruary "+, "H<M, Fose Curan,
8renseAs nephew, with the latterAs /nowledge and consent, sold and conveyed to 3ermanosA company for
L",G<< the aforementioned land with the reservation of the former the right to repurchase it for the same price
within a period of + years. (ut the same land was not repurchased by Fose Curan, being insolvent, which
correspondingly caused damage to the firm of 3ermanos. Cespite repeated demand upon Fose Curan, the latter
never vacated nor transferred ownership to 3ermanosAs firm, the said land. ?is refusal was based on the
allegations that he had been and was then the owner of the said propert, which was registered in his
name in the propert registr; that he had not e5ecuted an written power of attorne to @ose #uran, nor
had he given the latter an verbal authori$ation to sell the said propert to the plaintiff firm in his name;
and that, prior to the e5ecution of the deed of sale, the defendant performed no act such as might have
induced the plaintiff to believe that @ose #uran was empowered and authori$ed b the defendant to effect
the said sale.
The plaintiff firm, therefore, charged @ose #uran, in the !ourt of +irst 1nstance of the said province, with
estafa, for having represented himself in the said deed of sale to be the absolute owner of the aforesaid land
and improvements, whereas in reality they did not belong to him, but to the defendant 8rense. 3owever, at
the trial of the case Engracio 8rense, called as a witness, being interrogated by the fiscal as to whether he
and consented to Curan:s selling the said property under right of redemption to the firm of Butierre%
3ermanos, replied that he had. 1n view of this statement b the defendant, the court ac4uitted @ose #uran
of the charge of estafa.
As a result of the ac2uittal of Fose Curan, based on the explicit testimony of his uncle, Ena'io Oren!e. t(e
owner of t(e *ro*ert). to t(e effe't t(at (e (a& 'on!ente& to (i! ne*(ew D%ranL! !ellin t(e *ro*ert)
%n&er ri(t of re*%r'(a!e to G%tierreH Aer-ano!. counsel for this firm filed a complainant praying,
Amen | Compiled Notes
among other remedies, that the defendant 8rense be compelled to execute a deed for the transfer and
conveyance to the plaintiff company of all the right, title and interest with 8rense had in the property sold,
and to pay to the same the rental of the property due from 0ebruary "+, "H"".
I!!%e" Whether or not 8rense can be compelled to deliver the property to 3ermanos as premised above.
Ael&" ?ES. 4t having been proven at the trial that he gave his consent to the said sale, it follows that the
defendant conferred verbal, or at least implied, power of agency upon his nephew Curan, who accepted it
in the same way by selling the said property. The principal must therefore fulfill all the obligations
contracted by the agent, who acted within the scope of his authority. !,ivil ,ode, arts. "M<H, "M"< and
"M$M.#
3ven should it be held that the said consent was granted subse4uentl to the sale, it is un4uestionable
that the defendant, the owner of the propert, approved the action of his nephew, who in this case acted
as the manager of his uncle7s business, and (rense7r ratification produced the effect of an e5press
authori$ation to make the said sale. !,ivil ,ode, arts. "??? and "?H$.#
Article "$GH of the ,ivil ,ode prescribes MNo one 'an 'ontra't in t(e na-e of anot(er wit(o%t bein
a%t(oriHe& b) (i- or wit(o%t (i! leal re*re!entation a''or&in to law.
A contract executed in the name of another by one who has neither his authori%ation nor legal
representation shall be void, unless it should be ratified by the person in whose name it was
executed before being revo/ed by the other contracting party.
T(e !worn !tate-ent -a&e b) t(e &efen&ant. Oren!e. w(ile te!tif)in a! a witne!! at t(e trial of
D%ran for e!tafa. virt%all) 'onfir-! an& ratifie! t(e !ale of (i! *ro*ert) effe'te& b) (i! ne*(ew.
D%ran. an&. *%r!%ant to arti'le 1515 of t(e Civil Co&e. re-e&ie! all &efe't! w(i'( t(e 'ontra't -a)
(ave 'ontaine& fro- t(e -o-ent of it! e0e'%tion.
The sale of the said property made by Curan to Butierre% 3ermanos was indeed null and void in the
beginning, but afterwards became perfectly valid and cured of the defect of nullity it bore at its execution
by the confirmation solemnly made by the said owner upon his stating under oath to the judge that he
himself consented to his nephew Fose Curan:s ma/ing the said sale. Joreover, pursuant to article "9<H of
the ,ode, the right of action for nullification that could have been brought became legally extinguished
from the moment the contract was validly confirmed and ratified, and, in the present case, it is
un2uestionable that the defendant did confirm the said contract of sale and consent to its execution.
1f the defendant (rense acknowledged and admitted under oath that he had consented to @ose #uran7s
selling the propert in litigation to ;utierre$ ?ermanos, it is not just nor is it permissible for him
afterward to den that admission, to the prejudice of the purchaser, who gave %1,/.. for the said
propert.
The contract of sale of the said property contained in the notarial instrument of 0ebruary "+, "H<M, is
alleged to be invalid, null and void under the provisions of paragraph G of section 99G of the ,ode of ,ivil
Lrocedure, be'a%!e t(e a%t(orit) w(i'( Oren!e -a) (ave iven to D%ran to -a4e t(e !ai& 'ontra't
of !ale i! not !(own to (ave been in writin an& !ine& b) Oren!e. b%t t(e re'or& &i!'lo!e!
!ati!fa'tor) an& 'on'l%!ive *roof t(at t(e &efen&ant Oren!e ave (i! 'on!ent to t(e 'ontra't of !ale
e0e'%te& in a *%bli' in!tr%-ent b) (i! ne*(ew 8o!e D%ran. >uch consent was proven in a criminal
action by the sworn testimony of the principal and presented in this civil suit by other sworn testimony of
the same principal and by other evidence to which the defendant made no objection. Therefore the
principal is bound to abide by the conse2uences of his agency as though it had actually been given in
writing !,onlu vs. Araneta and Buan/o, "G Lhil. @ep., 9?M& Ballemit vs. Tabiliran, $< Lhil. @ep., $+"&
Puen%le 6 >treiff vs. Fiongco, $$ Lhil. @ep., ""<.#
T(e re*eate& an& !%''e!!ive !tate-ent! -a&e b) t(e &efen&ant Oren!e in two a'tion!. w(erein (e
affir-e& t(at (e (a& iven (i! 'on!ent to t(e !ale of (i! *ro*ert). -eet t(e re6%ire-ent! of t(e law
an& leall) e0'%!e t(e la'4 of written a%t(orit). an&. a! t(e) are a f%ll ratifi'ation of t(e a't!
e0e'%te& b) (i! ne*(ew 8o!e D%ran. t(e) *ro&%'e t(e effe't! of an e0*re!! *ower of aen').
5. J@ASI3CONTRACTS"
Arti'le 116B. 8bligations derived from 2uasi1contracts shall be subject to the provisions of
,hapter ", Title Q544, of this (oo/.
J@ASI3CONTRACT is a juridical relation which arises from certain unlawful, voluntary and
unilateral acts to the end that no one may be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of
another.
T(e a't -%!t be"
!"# Lawf%l . thus different from delict which is unlawful&
!$# Fol%ntar) . thus different from 2uasi1delict which is based on fault or
negligence or lac/ of foresight&
!9# @nilateral . thus different from contract, in which parties agree.
e.. in Neotior%- Ge!tio"
(enefits ,onferred 5oluntarily
0or preservation of Lroperty or (usiness
ENTRA3CONTRACT@AL OBLIGATIONS
!8('4BAT48=> without an agreement - based in 4JL'4EC ,8=>E=T#
O 38W JA=R?
A 4n =,,, $, nominate and DsomeE innominate Ouasi ,ontract.
a. J%a!i3'ontra't!
Arti'le 2172. ,ertain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of
2uasi1contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of
another.
Arti'le 2175. The provisions for 2uasi1contracts in this ,hapter do not exclude other 2uasi1
contracts which may come within the purview of the preceding article.
b. "egotiorum ;estio
Arti'le 2177. Whoever voluntarily ta/es charge of the agency or management of the business or
property of another, without any power from the latter, is obliged to continue the same until the
termination of the affair and its incidents, or to re2uire the person concerned to substitute him, if
the owner is in a position to do so.
T(i! $%ri&i'al relation &oe! not ari!e in eit(er of t(e!e in!tan'e!" ELEGENTS 2
!"# When the property or business is not neglected or abandoned&
!$# 4f in fact the manager has been tacitly authori%ed by the owner.
4n the first case, the provisions of articles "9"M, "+<9, =o. ", and "+<+ regarding
unauthori%ed contracts shall govern.
4n the second case, the rules on agency in Title Q of this (oo/ shall be applicable.
NEGOTIOR@G GESTIO . juridical relation which arises whenever a person
voluntarily ta/es charge of an agency or management of the business or property of
another without any power or authority from the latter.
Ill%!tration"
". >cenario 'umubog na bar/o, what if this one of the missing persons landed on a remote island and only
one resident is present there or only one family is living there in the island. Anyway this resident found the
dead body of the missing person, and he found it necessary to bury the dead and he spent a sum of money of
+<<php. At any rate this resident, met the aunt of the decease, and demanded reimbursement for the burial, is
the residentAs demand valid? Well if you read the provisions of the 2uasi1contract, there is an obligation to
reimburse the person. 4n other words, you have the obligation to reimburse. (ut bac/ to the 2uestion, is there
a valid demand? =8. if you /now, because the law on 2uasi1contract would tell you that he has the right to
see/ reimbursement from anyone who is oblige to give support and an aunt 4s not oblige under the law to
give support. ThereAs no civil obligation to give support.
,ase R%!ti'o A&ille v!. CA. A!e$oK!. Fanuary $H, "H??, 8. Sar-iento.
Amen | Compiled Notes
=a't!" 0eli%a A%ul owns a parcel of land. >he married twice in her lifetime& the first, with one (ernabe Adille
with whom she had as an only child, herein defendant @ustico Adille& in her second marriage with one Lrocopio Asejo,
her children were herein plaintiffs. >ometime in "H9H, said 0elisa sold the property in pacto de retro to certain 9rd
persons, period of repurchase being 9 years, but she died in "H+$ without being able to redeem and after her death, but
during the period of redemption, herein defendant repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he executed a deed of
extra1judicial partition representing himself to be the only heir and child of his mother 0elisa with the conse2uence that
he was able to secure title in his name alone also, so that 8,T. =o. $""9M in the name of his mother was transferred to his
name, that was in "HGG& that was why after some efforts of compromise had failed, his half1brothers and sisters, herein
plaintiffs +T(e A!e$o !iblin!,, filed present case for partition with accounting on the position that he was only a trustee
on an implied trust when he redeemed,1and this is the evidence, but as it also turned out that one of plaintiffs, Emeteria
Asejo was occupying a portion, defendant counterclaimed for her to vacate that.
I!!%e" Whether or not Adille can ac2uire exclusive ownership over the land.
Ael&" NO. 4t is the view of the respondent ,ourt that the petitioner, in ta/ing over the property, did so
either on behalf of his co1heirs, in which event, he had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under
&rticle 2100 of the !ivil !ode, or for his e5clusive benefit, in which case, he is guilt of fraud, and
must act as trustee, the private respondents being the beneficiaries, under the &rticle 10/-. The
evidence, of course, points to the second alternative the petitioner having asserted claims of exclusive
ownership over the property and having acted in fraud of his co1heirs. Ae 'annot t(erefore be !ai& to
(ave a!!%-e t(e -ere -anae-ent of t(e *ro*ert) aban&one& b) (i! 'o3(eir!. t(e !it%ation Arti'le
2177 of t(e Co&e 'onte-*late!. 4n any case, as the respondent ,ourt itself affirms, the result would be
the same whether it is one or the other. The petitioner would remain liable to the Lrivate respondents, his
co1heirs.
'. 'olutio indebiti
Arti'le 2157. 4f something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly
delivered through mista/e, the obligation to return it arises.
SOL@TIO INDEBITI 2 juridical relation which arise whenever person unduly
delivers a thing through or by mista/e of another who has no right to demand it.
,ase Do-etila An&re!. doing business under the name and stle AIRENEKS IEARING A;;AREL/ v!.
Gan%fa't%rer! Aanover > Tr%!t Cor*oration. CA. >eptember "G, "H?H, 8. Corte!.
=a't!" Letitioner, using the business name 74rene:s Wearing Apparel,7 was engaged in the manufacture of ladies
garments, children:s wear, men:s apparel and linens for local and foreign buyers. Among its foreign buyers was 0acets
0unwear, 4nc. !hereinafter referred to as 0A,ET># of the )nited >tates. 4n the course of the business transaction between
the two, 0A,ET> from time to time remitted certain amounts of money to petitioner in payment for the items it had
purchased. >ometime in August "H?<, 0A,ET> instructed the 0irst =ational >tate (an/ of =ew Fersey, =ewar/, =ew
Fersey, ).>.A. !hereinafter referred to as 0=>(# to transfer S"<,<<<.<< to petitioner via Lhilippine =ational (an/, >ta.
,ru% (ranch, Janila !hereinafter referred to as L=(#.
Acting on said instruction, 0=>( instructed private respondent Janufacturers 3anover and Trust ,orporation to effect
the above1 mentioned transfer through its facilities and to charge the amount to the account of 0=>( with private
respondent. Although private respondent was able to send a telex to L=( to pay petitioner S"<,<<<.<< through the
Lilipinas (an/, where petitioner had an account, the payment was not effected immediately because the payee designated
in the telex was only 7Wearing Apparel.7 )pon 2uery by L=(, private respondent sent L=( another telex dated August
$M, "H?< stating that the payment was to be made to 74rene:s Wearing Apparel.7 8n August $?, "H?<, petitioner received
the remittance of S"<,<<<.<< through Cemand Craft =o. $$GIG+ of the L=(.
Jeanwhile, on August $G, "H?<, after learning about the delay in the remittance of the money to petitioner, 0A,ET>
informed 0=>( about the situation. 8n >eptember ?, "H?<, unaware that petitioner had already received the remittance,
0A,ET> informed private respondent about the delay and at the same time amended its instruction by as/ing it to effect
the payment through the Lhilippine ,ommercial and 4ndustrial (an/ !hereinafter referred to as L,4(# instead of L=(.
Accordingly, private respondent, which was also unaware that petitioner had already received the remittance of
S"<,<<<.<< from L=( instructed the L,4( to pay S"<,<<<.<< to petitioner. 3ence, on >eptember "", "H?<, petitioner
received a second S"<,<<<.<< remittance.
Lrivate respondent as/ed petitioner for the return of the second remittance of S"<,<<<.<< but the latter refused to pay.
I!!%e" Whether or not Jantrust can recover the second remittance worth S"<,<<<.
Ael&" ?ES. The contract of petitioner, as regards the sale of garments and other textile products, was with 0A,ET>. 4t
was the latter and not private respondent which was indebted to petitioner. 8n the other hand, the contract for the
transmittal of dollars from the )nited >tates to petitioner was entered into by private respondent with 0=>(. Letitioner,
although named as the payee was not privy to the contract of remittance of dollars. =either was private respondent a party
to the contract of sale between petitioner and 0A,ET>. There being no contractual relation between them, petitioner has
no right to apply the second S"<,<<<.<< remittance delivered by mista/e by private respondent to the outstanding account of
0A,ET>.
Art! &%8"! If something received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the
obligation to return it arises!
This provision is ta/en from Art. "?HG of the >panish ,ivil ,ode which provided that
Art! %B78! If a thing is received when there was no right to claim it and which, through an error, has been unduly delivered,
an obligation to restore it arises!
4n 5ele% v. (al%ar%a, M9 Lhil. I9< !"H+$#, the ,ourt, spea/ing through Jr. Fustice (ocobo explained the nature of this article
thus
Article "?HG Tnow Article $"G+U of the ,ivil ,ode above2uoted, is therefore applicable. This legal provision, which
determines the 2uasi1contract of solution indebiti, is one of the concrete manifestations of the ancient principle that no one
shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. 4n the @oman 'aw Cigest the maxim was formulated thus 7Fure
naturae ac2uum est, neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem.7 And the Lartidas declared 7=inguno
non deue enri2uecerse torti%eramente con dano de otro.7 >uch axiom has grown through the centuries in legislation, in the
science of law and in court decisions. The lawma/er has found it one of the helpful guides in framing statutes and codes.
Thus, it is unfolded in many articles scattered in the >panish ,ivil ,ode. !>ee for example, articles, 9I<, 9I", +I+, I+M, I+?,
MHM, ""G?, ""I9, "$HG, "9<9, "9<+, "?H9 and "?HG, ,ivil ,ode.# This time1honored aphorism has also been adopted by
jurists in their study of the conflict of rights. 4t has been accepted by the courts, which have not hesitated to apply it when
the exigencies of right and e2uity demanded its assertion. 4t is a part of that affluent reservoir of justice upon which judicial
discretion draws whenever the statutory laws are inade2uate because they do not spea/ or do so with a confused voice. Tat p.
I9$.U
0or this article to apply the following re2uisites must concur 7!"# that he who paid was not under obligation to do so& and,
!$# that payment was made by reason of an essential mista/e of fact7 T,ity of ,ebu v. Liccio, ""< Lhil. GG?, GI9 !"HI<#U.
4t is undisputed that private respondent delivered the second S"<,<<<.<< remittance. 3owever, petitioner contends that the
doctrine of solutio indebiti, does not apply because its re2uisites are absent.
0irst, it is argued that petitioner had the right to demand and therefore to retain the second S"<,<<<.<< remittance. 1t is
alleged that even after the two B1.,...... remittances are credited to petitioner7s receivables from +&!36', the latter
allegedl still had a balance of B0,,320.... 3ence, it is argued that the last S"<,<<<.<< remittance being in payment of a
pre1existing debt, petitioner was not thereby unjustly enriched.
Letitioner invo/es the e2uitable principle that when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the wrongful act of a third
person, the loss must be borne by the one whose negligence was the proximate cause of the loss.
The rule is that principles of e2uity cannot be applied if there is a provision of law specifically applicable to a case. ... The
common law principle that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law
imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied
in a case which is covered by an express provision of the new ,ivil ,ode, specifically Article GGH. (etween a common law
principle and a statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction. Tat p. "9G.U
?aving shown that &rt. 21/0 of the !ivil !ode, which embodies the doctrine of solutio indebiti, applies in the case at bar,
the !ourt must reject the common law principle invoked b petitioner.
,ase GonHalo ;%)at > Son!. In'. v!. Cit) of Ganila an& Gar'elo Sar-iento. a! Cit) Trea!%rer. April 9<,
"HI9, 8. ;are&e!.
=a't!" Bon%alo Luyat 6 >ons, 4nc. is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling all /inds of furniture
at its factory in Janila. Lursuant to 8rdinance =o. 99I+, Janila assessed from Luyat retail dealerAs tax which
the latter paid without protest in the erroneous belief that it was liable therefore. Luyat subse2uently found that it
was exempt from said taxes as provided under 8rdinance =o. 9?"I, Luyat claimed for refund.
I!!%e" Whether the taxes paid without protest are refundable.
Ael&" ?ES. Appellants do not dispute the fact that appellee1companyis exempted from the payment of the
tax in 2uestion.This is manifest from the reply of appellant ,ity Treasurer stating that sales of manufactured
products at the factory site are not taxable either under the Wholesalers 8rdinance or under the @etailers:
8rdinance. With this admission, it would seem clear that the taxes collected from appellee were paid, thru an
error or mista/e, which places said act of payment within the pale of the new ,ivil ,ode provision on
solutio indebiti. The appellant ,ity of Janila, at the very start, notwithstanding the 8rdinance imposing the
@etailer:s Tax, had no right to demand payment thereof..
71f something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was undul delivered through
mistake, the obligationto retun it arises8 !Art. $"G+, =,,#..
Amen | Compiled Notes
A**elle 'ateori'all) !tate& t(at t(e *a)-ent wa! not vol%ntaril) -a&e. +a fa't fo%n& al!o b) t(e
lower 'o%rt,.b%t on t(e errono%e! belief. t(at t(e) were &%e. @n&er t(i! 'ir'%-!tan'e. t(e a-o%nt
*ai&. even wit(o%t *rote!t i! re'overable. MIf t(e *a)er wa! in &o%bt w(et(er t(e &ebt wa! &%e. (e
-a) re'over if (e *rove! t(at it wa! not &%eM +Art. 2156. NCC,. A**ellee (a& &%l) *rove& t(at ta0e!
were not lawf%ll) &%e. There is, therefore, no doubt that the provisions of solutio indebtiti, the new ,ivil
,ode, apply to the admitted facts of the case.
With all, appellant 2uoted Janresa as saying 7x x x Ce la misma opinion son el >r. >anche% @oman y el
>r. Balcon, et cual afirma 2ue si la paga se hi%o por error de derecho, ni existe el cuasi1contrato ni esta
obligado a la restitucion el 2ue cobro, aun2ue no se debiera lo 2ue se pago7 !Janresa, Tomo "$, paginas
I""1I"$#. This opinion, however, has already lost its persuasiveness, in view of the provisions of the ,ivil
,ode, recogni%ing 7error de derecho7 as a basis for the 2uasi1contract, of solutio indebiti. .
8%ament b reason of a mistake in the contruction or application of a doubtful or difficult 4uestion of
law ma come within the scope of the preceding article8 !Art. $"GGG#..
There is no gainsaying the fact that the payments made by appellee was due to a mista/e in the
construction of a doubtful 2uestion of law.
7. ACTS OR OGISSIONS ;@NISAED B? LAI +DELICT or CRIGES but not
Eelony which is limited only to those punished under R3.)
Arti'le 116C. 4f a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same shall be executed at
his cost. This same rule shall be observed if he does it in contravention of the tenor of the
obligation. 0urthermore, it may be decreed that what has been poorly done be undone.
Balane Cri-e a! a !o%r'e of obliation 2 There are many crimes from which, civil liability
arises in their commission, in addition to the criminal penalty attached to them. This underlines
the two aspects in a crime one, as an offen!e aain!t t(e !tate, 6 two as an offen!e aain!t
t(e vi'ti-. 4t is in the latter case that civil liability is recoverable.
A! far a! 'ri-e i! 'on'erne&. 'ivil law i! not 'on'erne& wit( t(e *enal liabilit) b%t
onl) wit( t(e 'ivil liabilit).
;erfor-an'e at &ebtorK! 'o!t non1compliance with 8('4BAT48= to do, creditor may do
it himself or get a 9
rd
person at the expense of the debtor&
when 8('4BAT48= to do can only be performed by debtor he cannot compelled to
do so by force, the only remedy is damages&
Arti'le 21CC. @esponsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Lenal ,ode. (ut
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
TITLE F 3 Civil Liabilit). R;C" CAA;TER ONE 3 ;er!on! Civill) Liable for =elonie!
Arti'le 1BB. .ivil liability of a person guilty of felony! $ Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
OCAA;TER 2. R;C" I(at Civil Liabilit) In'l%&e!P
Arti'le 1B7. :hat is included in civil liabilit! ? The civil liability established in articles "<<,
"<", "<$, and "<9 of this ,ode includes
1. Re!tit%tion1
2. Re*aration of t(e &a-ae 'a%!e&1
5. In&e-nifi'ation for 'on!e6%ential &a-ae!.
Baviera @e2uisites of enforcing the subsidiary obligation of the employer under the @L,
$criminal case was filed against the employee
$the act or negligence arose during or in connection with the performance of the latter)s
employment
$the employee is found guilty of criminal negligence
$a writ of e+ecution has been returned unsatisfied, i!e! employee has been found to be insolvent!
There is no res judicata as regards the Employer as there is a difference in the ,ause of Action.
Ouasi1delict !OC# differs from an action based on delict on the following grounds
J@ASI DELICT DELICT
it is subsidiary !imputed# E@As liability is primary in @L,
Ciligence of good father of the family
may be set up by the E@ as a defense
4n @L,, such defense of B00 is not
available
A *er!on w(ile not 'ri-inall) liable -a) !till be 'ivill) liable 0ailure of the plaintiff to
reserve in the criminal case his right to file a separate civil action is not fatal to the civil action
after the ac2uittal of the accused.
When the ac2uittal is based on ground that the guilt of the accused has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, plaintiff has the right to institute a civil action for damages
!culpa a4uiliana#.
O 4s it possible that even if there is a contract between the parties, a 2uasi1delict can still be
committed by one against the other regarding the area covered by the contract?
A" Res, according to the case of Araneta v. &e 8o)a. 5C SCRA 5E. The same act can give rise to
obligations arising from different sources. 0or example, Alinea is the owner of a bus co!, the Alinea
,us .o!, 1olina is a driver of one of the buses of Alinea ,us .o! 6agdameo rode the bus being
driven by 1olina! As a result of the reckless driving of 1olina, 6agdameo suffered inuries! In
this case, 6agdameo has a choice$$ he can sue on either contract, #uasi$delict or on crime! If he
decided to sue on the breach of the contract of carriage, all he has to prove is the (e+istence of the
contract) D that it was not performed! In this case, he can sue the common carrier but not the
driver because he has no contract with the driver! If he sues on #uasi$delict, he can sue both the
common carrier D the driver! ;he defense of the driver would be diligence in driving (or
fortuitous event!) ;he defense of the common carrier would be diligence in the selection D
supervision of employees! If he sues under crime, he has to sue the driver! In case the driver is
convicted D has been sentenced to pay civil liability, the employer (Alinea ,us .o!) is subsidiarily
liable! If 1olina is insolvent, Alinea ,us .o! will pay!
=otice that the choice of cause of action will determine three things the theor of the
plaintiff, the defense of the defendant C the 4uestion of whom to sue.
Again, remember that in this case, the victim has a choice. Lrovided that he is consistent
with his theory 6 provided, further, that (e 'annot re'over &a-ae! twi'e for t(e
!a-e in$%r).
Baviera" The terms of the contract cannot be against mandatory 6 prohibitive laws. And if the
contract is valid, it shall have the force of law between the contracting parties.
5. J@ASI3DELICTS" +culpa a4uiliana 9 nelien'e 9 tort!Q,
ONCC. CAA;TER 2 3 J%a!i3&eli't!P
Amen | Compiled Notes
Arti'le 21C6. :hoever b act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pa for the damage done. 'uch fault or negligence, if there is no
pre>e5isting contractual relation between the parties, is called a 4uasi>delict and is governed
b the provisions of this !hapter. (memori$eD)
Arti'le 1162. Obliation! &erive& fro- 6%a!i3&eli't! !(all be overne& b) t(e *rovi!ion!
of C(a*ter 2. Title NFII of t(i! Boo4. an& b) !*e'ial law!.
F ;orts is seldom used by *. in this urisdiction, it is broader term for actionable wrong which
may not be negligence, may be malicious tortuous act which is not anymore Guasi Aelict!
J@ASI3DELICTS . the fault or negligence of a person who, by his act or omission
connected or not with, but independent from any contractual relation, causes damage
to another person&
The omission to do something which ordinarily reasonable men guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do& or
doing something which prudent and reasonable men would not do.
'iability on Ouasi Celict is based on e2uity, man is responsible not only for acts
conscious and intentional acts but also for his lac/ of foresight, care and diligence
which may cause harm to another.
ELEGENTS"
(%) A duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from the inury of
which the latter complains(
(&) A failure to perform that duty, and
(') An inury to the plaintiff through such failure!
TEST O= NEGLIGENCE" Would a prudent man, in the position of the person on
who negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
conse2uence of the course about to be pursued?
<INDS O= NEGLIGENCE"
!"# !ulpa a4uiliana, also /nown as culpa e5tra>contractual, or nelien'e as a
source of 8('4BAT48=, J@ASI3DELICT&
Boverned by Arts. $"MI1$"H+
=8 contractual relation at all
!$# !ulpa contractual, or negligence in the performance of a contractual
8('4BAT48=.
Boverned by Article 11CE !common carrier#, 6 all on contracts
LE@>8=> '4A('E !4JL)TEC-vicarious '4A(4'4TR, $"?<#
%! father = mother
&! guardians
'! owners=managers
"! employers
8! the *tate
@! teachers
The responsibility shall cease if they can prove that they have observed &ilien'e of
oo& fat(er of t(e fa-il) to *revent &a-ae1
REJ@ISITES O= LIABILIT? +IG;@TED,"
%! the fault of negligence of the defendant
&! the damage suffered or incurred by the plaintiff
'! the relation of the fault or negligence and damage incurred by the plaintiff
Balane"
The ,ode ,ommission did not choose to use tort. This is because tort does not exactly have the
same meaning as 2uasi1delict. Tort OBROADERP 'over! intentional tort! which in 2uasi1delict is
considered as civil liability arising from acts or omissions punishable by law. There are some OC
which are not covered by tort. Cean (ocobo suggested the ancient term culpa a4uiliana. (ut this
did not merit the approval of the ,ode ,ommission.
A 6(=6 is a civil wrong (an actionable wrong) consisting of a violation of a right or a breach
of duty for which the law grants a remedy in damages or other relief! ;he right is created by law
in favor of a person called a creditor to compel another called a debtor to observe duty or a
prestation either to render what is due him or to refrain from causing him inury.
Cla!!e! of Tort! A''or&in to Ganner of Co--i!!ion
1. Intentional Tort!
a. tortfeasor desires to cause the conse2uences of his act, or
b. tortfeasor believes that the conse2uences are substantially certain to
result from it
c. ex. Article $I, 9$ 6 99 !,,#
2. Nelient Tort!"
d. tortfeasorAs conduct merely creates a forseeable ris/ of harm which
may or may not occur
e. Article $"MI !,,#
3. Stri't Liabilit) Tort!"
f. Ex. Article $"?9 6 $"?M !,,#
O 4f there is a contract between the parties, can there be a 2uasi1delict committed by one against
the other regarding the area covered by the contract?
A" 4f you loo/ at Article $"MI, you get the impression that if there is a contract between the parties,
they cannot be liable for 2uasi1delict on an area covered by the contract. The case of ,angco has
not really resolve this controversy.
,ase 8o!e Can'o v!. Ganila Railroa& Co.. 8ctober "+, "H"?, 8. =i!(er.
=a't!" ,angco was an employee of Janila @ailroad ,o. 3e ta/es the train going home from wor/. That day he
alighted from the train while it was still slightly in motion. 3e landed on the elevated platform on top of some
sac/s of watermelon which made him fall violently, rolled away from the platform under the moving train
where he badly crashed and lacerated his right arm. 4t happened at night between M1?pm and the station was
poorly lit. @esulting from such incident, ,angcoAs arm was amputated twice. The seriousness of his injury made
him file a case for damages against J@@ ,o. The latter then interposed the defense that the direct and
pro5imate cause of the injur suffered b the plaintiff was his own contributor negligence in failing to wait
until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting.
I!!%e" Whether or not the conduct of ,angco was characteri%ed by imprudence so as to hold him liable because
of his contributory negligence.
Ael&" NO. can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in
piling these sac/s on the platform in the manner above stated& that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall
as he alighted from the train& and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff. 4t necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby
occasioned %nle!! re'over) i! barre& b) t(e *laintiffL! own 'ontrib%tor) nelien'e.
4t is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the 'ontra't of
'arriae, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from
the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That
is to say, its liabilit) i! &ire't an& i--e&iate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that
Amen | Compiled Notes
presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, T=3'%("#3&6 '9%3=1(=E, which can be
rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. !presumption uris tantum,
rebuttable#. 4mputed liability in =,, is not applicable to obliation! ari!in e5 contractu, but only to
extra1contractual obligations, or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa
a6%iliana and not to culpa contractual.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra1contractual or contractual. E0tra3'ontra't%al
obliation (a! it! !o%r'e in t(e brea'( or o-i!!ion of t(o!e -%t%al &%tie! w(i'( 'iviliHe& !o'iet)
i-*o!e! %*on it -e-ber!, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members
of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status.
The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract,
rests upon the fact that in cases of non1contractual obligation it i! t(e wronf%l or nelient a't or
o-i!!ion it!elf w(i'( 'reate! t(e vinculum juris. whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists
independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the
contractual relation.
T(e 'ontra't of &efen&ant to tran!*ort *laintiff 'arrie& wit( it. b) i-*li'ation. t(e &%t) to 'arr)
(i- in !afet) an& to *rovi&e !afe -ean! of enterin an& leavin it! train! !contract of carriage#. That
duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non1performance could not be excused by proof
that the fault was morally imputable to defendant:s servants.
The railroad company:s defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent
conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual
obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, t(e &ire't an& *ro0i-ate 'a%!e
of t(e in$%r) !%ffere& b) *laintiff wa! (i! own 'ontrib%tor) nelien'e in failing to wait until the train
had come to a complete stop before alighting !Do'trine of 'o-*arative nelien'e, Rakes doctrine#. 4f
the accident was caused by plaintiff:s own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant:s negligence
and plaintiff:s negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. 4t is,
therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
T(e te!t b) w(i'( to &eter-ine w(et(er t(e *a!!ener (a! been %ilt) of nelien'e
in atte-*tin to ali(t fro- a -ovin railwa) train. i! t(at of or&inar) or rea!onable
'are. 4t is to be considered w(et(er an or&inaril) *r%&ent *er!on. of t(e ae. !e0 an&
'on&ition of t(e *a!!ener. wo%l& (ave a'te& a! t(e *a!!ener a'te& %n&er t(e
'ir'%-!tan'e! &i!'lo!e& b) t(e evi&en'e. This care has been defined to be, not the care which
may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary
prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury.7 !Thompson, ,ommentaries
on =egligence, vol. 9, sec. 9<"<.#
@)'4=B Vthat the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact
that it came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight
from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has
/ept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have
suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant:s negligent failure to
perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
Balane There are two important principles that we learn from this case
The difference in concept between contract 6 2uasi1delict is that in a contract, t(ere i! a
*re3e0i!tin $%ri&i'al tie between t(e *artie!. 5iolation of the contract gives rise to
liability but not to the juridical tie. Furidical tie is not borne by a violation. 4n 2uasi1
delict, it is precisely t(e wronf%l a't w(i'( ive! ri!e to t(e $%ri&i'al tie. 'iability 6
juridical tie are simultaneous.
Contra't! > 6%a!i3&eli't! 'reate two 'on'entri' 'ir'le! wit( 6%a!i3&eli't a! t(e bier 'ir'le.
T"ote There is a little mista/e in ,angco. The >, said that the driver can be sued under culpa
contractual. This is wrong. The driver cannot be sued as he has no privity of contract with the
passenger.U
CASE DOCTRINE" >here there could still be Guasi Aelict even when there is contract of
carriage!
,A>E Nar'i!o G%tierreH v!. Bonifa'io G%tierreH. et al.. >eptember $9, "H9", 8. Gal'ol-.
=ACTS 8n 0ebruary $, "H9<, a passenger truc/ and an automobile of private ownership collided while
attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Janila >outh @oad in the municipality of 'as
LiWas, Lrovince of @i%al. The truc/ was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo 5elasco, and was owned by
>aturnino ,orte%. The automobile was being operated by (onifacio Butierre%, a lad "? years of age, and was
owned by (onifacio:s father and mother, Jr. and Jrs. Januel Butierre%. At the time of the collision, the
father was not in the car, but the mother, together will several other members of the Butierre% family, seven
in all, were accommodated therein. A passenger in the autobus, by the name of =arciso Butierre%, was en
route from >an Lablo, 'aguna, to Janila. The collision between the bus and the automobile resulted in
=arciso Butierre% suffering a fracture right leg which re2uired medical attendance for a considerable period
of time, and which even at the date of the trial appears not to have healed properly.
I!!%e" Whether or not (onifacioAs father, not present during the incident could be held liable for damages to
=arciso.
AELD" The court found both drivers negligent. The owner of the truc/ was made liable for culpa contractual,
under the contract of carriage. The owner of the car was made liable under Article $"?<, imputed liability for
culpa a4uiliana. 4n amplification of so much of the above pronouncement as concerns the Butierre% family,
it may be explained that the youth (onifacio was in incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an
excessive rate of speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the truc/, he lost his head and so
contributed by his negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was
granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son. (ased on
these facts, pursuant to the provisions of article 1,.3 of the !ivil !ode, the father alone and not the minor
or the mother, would be liable for the damages caused b the minor.
The liabilit) of Sat%rnino CorteH, the owner of the truc/, an& of (i! '(a%ffe%r Abelar&o Fela!'o rests on
a different basis, namely, that of contract which, we thin/, has been sufficiently demonstrated by the
allegations of the complaint, not controverted, and the evidence. The reason for this conclusion reaches to
the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the truc/ on the bridge, the speed in operating the
machine, and the lac/ of care employed by the chauffeur. While these facts are not as clearly evidenced as
are those which convict the other defendant, we nevertheless hesitate to disregard the points emphasi%ed by
the trial judge. 4n its broader aspects, the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from
opposite directions, with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other, with the
inevitable result of a collision and an accident.
The defendants 5elasco and ,orte% further contend that there existed contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff, consisting principally of his /eeping his foot outside the truc/, which occasioned his injury. 4n
this connection, it is sufficient to state that, aside from the fact that the defense of contributory negligence
was not pleaded, the evidence bearing out this theory of the case is contradictory in the e+treme and leads
us far afield into speculative matters!
=RA@D NEGLIGENCE
dolo .ulpa
=ature of Act involves willfulness or
deliberate intent to
cause damage or injury
to another
mere want of care or
diligence, not voluntary
act or omission
Bives rise to
8('4BAT48=
the act itself the want or care or
diligence
A !inle a't may be a crime and a OC at the same time& !Article "<<,
@L,#
4njured party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of defendant& !must choose " @emedy#
J@ASI3DELICT CRIGE
A! to nat%re of Ri(t
violate&
private right public right
I! a Iron aain!t the individual the >tate
Cri-inal Intent not needed =ecessary
Leal Ba!i! for (road penal law necessary
Amen | Compiled Notes
liabilit)
Liabilit) for Da-ae! every OC gives rise to
liability for damages
there are crimes without civil
liability
=or- of Re&re!! reparation for injury
suffered-indemnification-co
mpensation
punishment-fine-imprisonment
J%ant%- of Evi&en'e Lreponderance (eyond reasonable doubt
Co-*ro-i!e can be compromised criminal liability can never be
compromised
REJ@ISITES =OR LIABILIT?" +onus)
!"# Wrongful act or omission imputable to the defendant by reason of his fault or
negligence&
!$# Camage or injury proven by the person claiming recovery&
!9# A direct causal connection between the negligent act and the injury.
DOCTRINE O= ;RONIGATE CA@SE is that which, in natural and continuous
se2uence, unbro/en by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury and without which the
result would not have occurred.
The exemplification by the ,ourt in one case is simple and explicit& vi% 7!T#he *ro0i-ate
leal 'a%!e is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.7
Ill%!tration!"
1. ?ources of obligations: **7!: 1re there other sources of
obligations aside from those provided b' la." No. Art. **7! is
e$clusive based on the case of ;agrada.
2. *ho ma' be considered priv' to the contract" (eirs, successors
in interest.
!. here are certain facts which need not be proven, there is no need to
allege such facts because the law presumes the e$istence of a right
and presumes the e$istence of a fact, hence, it is not always true that
whoever alleges the fact must prove the e$istence of such fact.
%. 6ontracts: 3o. .ould 'ou +no. if there are obligations arising
from a contract" 0y considering the terms and conditions of contract,
by reading the terms and conditions of the contract, you will determine
whether or not there is an obligation arising from such contract.
Incidentally, does it mean that there is no stipulation therefore
an agreement is not part of the contract" Not necessarily, an
obligation may arise even without a stipulation li3e warranty against
eviction. 1 limitation provided b' la. as to terms and
conditions" It must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy. ,ut
before an obligation arises .hat transpires" Negotiation.
-egotiation is initiated b' .hat" 89er. During the negotiation
the oferor .ithdre. the ofer .ill there be an obligation" 'es.
*hat source" It depends if there is bad faith, if there is negligence on
the part of the o9eror in not communicating as soon as possible the
same is :uasiCdelict. If bad faith, Art. *+, )-, and )* I which is la. but
the ?6 generall' .ould consider the source of obligation as tort.
<. 4eople8s car 6ase: &ssue: .hether or not commando is liable for the
entire amount of damages instead of only *,---.--
9. The o.ner of the house left the house for a short vacation the
ver' night the' left their house .as burned the neighbors
saved some of their appliances .hat is the relationship"
Negotiorum gestio, do 'ou agree" No, these appliances are not
managed; this will fall under quasi>delict because in negotiorum gestio
there must be abandonment or neglect of the property. Another reason
why this is not negotiorum gestio, this falls under the other quasi>
contracts. 1n obligation arising from :uasiCcontract even if the
obligor .as not un@ustl' enriched or is it re:uired that he must
be un@ustl' enriched if he .ill not perform an obligation under
:uasiCcontract" ?espite )*,), is it possible that in a :uasiC
contract there .ill be no un@ust enrichment" 'es, read the
provisions on negotiorum gestio, e$pressly provided by law, even if the
owner is not enriched or un1ustly enriched, if he has an obligation. &t .ill
appear therefore that the principles behind :uasiCcontracts are
not reall' the principle of un@ust enrichment. Thus in other
countries the principle behind this obligations is li+e in the D.?.
la. and :uasiCcontracts are considered to fall under one source
onl' implied contracts from that alone the basis is consent
given b' the obligor.
#. 1 bought a sac+ of rice from , 492< 1 gave 1E to , , gave the
sac+ of rice to 1 , gave %#< to 1 .hat relationship .as
created" ;olutio indebiti. *hat is the obligation" o return the
e$cess 4*--.
A. The :uasiCcontracts are provided for in article 219<C21#< is this
exclusive" No. it is not e$clusive as provided for in article )*,%.
$. 1ct or omission punishable b' la." hese are crimes or delicts. 1s
to this source once a person in criminall' liable he is also civill'
liable" Not necessarily, because are crimes that does not ma3e the
criminal civilly liable such as treason and rebellion. The +inds of civil
liabilit' arising from this source" @estitution, reparation, and
indemni2cation. Ever' time there is this civil liabilit' all of these
are present" Not necessarily. Example: what will be lac3ing/
@estitution is lac3ing in rape. *hen is restitution present" heft. ,ut
even in murder or homicide restitution is not possible. &f a
person committed an act punished b' la. and there is suBcient
evidence to prove such fact be'ond reasonable doubt
nonetheless is it possible for him not to be committed" 'es, if the
law e$empts him from liability, when there is an e$empting
Amen | Compiled Notes
circumstance, such as minority, so if there is exempting
circumstance there is civil liabilit'" 'es. 2f those enumerated
generall' is there civil liabilit'" 'es, .hen .ill there be no civil
liabilit' and .hat .ill be the basis thereof" Auasi>delict, .h'
not delict" 0ecause there is no conviction. If there is no conviction,
there is no civil liability under delict. &n @ustif'ing circumstance can
there be civil liabilit'" As a rule no civil liability, e$cept paragraph ,.
10. Torts culpa ac:uiliana culpa extra contractual :uasi delict:
Dnder 21#9 is simpl' 5ault or -egligence is there a
diference" 'es. 6ulpa extra contractual is a good name for
:uasi delict" his is outside of the contract, if CBC, quasi delict/ his
does not seem right, culpa e$tra contractual, outside of the contract,
outside of the contract there are how many sources of obligations,
four, necessarily quasi delict/ -o. Can there be negligence in the
performance of an obligation arising from law, 'es, can a gestor be
negligent, 'es, but is that negligence quasi delict/ -2 because it .ill
fall under :uasiCcontract. The use of the .ord torts is critici;ed
because" torts is not the same as quasi>delict, torts is a much broader
term that quasi delict, because torts include intentional, malicious,
while quasi>delict includes negligence only, is this correct" )*!C 2rst
article in quasi>delict, it provides for fault or negligence, it did not
mention negligence only. he ne$t article )*!!, from this article, may
an act be the basis of liability under two sources of obligation, )es. the
onl' obligation provided b' la. is" (e cannot recover twice. ?o if
1 .as able to recover from one case he .ill not have the right
to recover in an' other case correct" )es he ;upreme Court
held that he can recover the di9erence if the second award is greater
for instance in case * *--D Case ) *7-D, he has the right to recover
7-D, but not 2<0E. Dltimatel' the claim of the author that quasi
delict should be limited to negligent act, has not been supported by
the 1ustices of the ;C, the ;C would always claim, that a single act may
be a basis of an action under delict, under quasi delict, may be even
under contract if there is a pre>e$isting contract, it is up to the
aggrieved party to choose his cause of action, however, if he chooses
one cause of action, he must comply to the requirements of the cause
of action, for e$ample he chose delict, then he has to have the accused
convicted. 0ut if contract, the law already presumes that there is
negligence in case of non performance. This recommendation that
:uasi delict should be limited to negligent act has no basis
under the la. and has no application here in our countr' the
best arguments to this issue is this if the act is punished b'
la. 'ou should have the right to recover civil liabilit' onl' be
ensuring that the accused .ill be convicted other.ise that
.ill encourage the people to commit crime people .ill thin+
that it is o+a' to commit a crime because the' can pa' their
.a' out of it ho.ever in the situation .here the husband is
+illed the mother is the onl' one left .ith 7ve +ids .ill 'ou
fault them b' accepting the damages" I thin3 not.
11. 1 man buried a victim of princess of the stars the relative of
the victim appeared the man demanded pa'ment from the
relative 4!00 can he demand from the relative pa'ment for
bur'ing the victim" he obligation created here is quasi delict,
however, the man cannot demand payment from the relative because
the persons who may be compelled is the persons who is liable to give
the victim support.
C. COG;LIANCE IITA OBLIGATIONS"
Arti'le 1E. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, a't wit( $%!ti'e. ive ever)one (i! &%e. an& ob!erve (one!t) an& oo& fait(.
Arti'le 1165. Every person obliged to give something is also obliged to ta/e care of it with the
*ro*er &ilien'e of a oo& fat(er of a fa-il), unless the law or the stipulation of the parties
re2uires another standard of care.
Arti'le 1167. The creditor has a ri(t to t(e fr%it! of t(e t(in from the time the obligation to
deliver it arises. 3owever, he shall ac2uire no real right over it until the same has been
&elivere& to him.
Arti'le 1165. When what is to be delivered is a &eter-inate t(in, the creditor, in addition to
the right granted him by article 11CB, may compel the debtor to ma/e the delivery.
4f the thing is in&eter-inate or eneri', he may as/ that the obligation be complied with at
the expense of the debtor.
4f the oblior &ela)!, or has promised to deliver the same thing to two or more persons who do
not have the same interest, he shall be responsible for any fort%ito%! event until he has
effected the delivery.
Arti'le 1166. The obligation to give a determinate thing includes that of delivering all its
a''e!!ion! an& a''e!!orie!, even though they may not have been mentioned.
A''or&in to Balane"
T(ree t)*e! of obliation!3 !"# obligation to give& !$# obligation to do& 6 !9# obligation not to do.
4. 8bligation to give
A. >pecific thing
(. Beneric thing
44. To do
444. =ot to do !this includes all negative obligations li/e obligation not to give.#
<in&! of *erfor-an'e.33
". specific performance 3 performance by the debtor himself !applies only to
8('4BAT48= to give #
$. substitute performance 3 performance at the expense of the debtor
9. e4uivalent performance 3 grant of damages
Arti'le! 1165 3 1166 cover obligation to give.
T(ree A''e!!or) Obliation!"
". Article ""I91 To ta/e care of the thing with the diligence of a good father of a family
until actual delivery.
$. Article ""I+1 To deliver the fruits to the creditor !fruits produced after obligation to
deliver arises.#
9. Article ""II1 To deliver accessions 6 accessories.
Amen | Compiled Notes
Balane
0rom the time the obligation arises, the creditor has a *er!onal ri(t against the
debtor as to the fruits. (ut he has no real right over them %ntil a't%al &eliver).
Real ri(t i! a ri(t w(i'( i! enfor'eable aain!t t(e w(ole worl&. 3e has only
the personal right against the debtor with regard to the undelivered fruits.
This is because of the principle "on nudis pactis, sed traditione, dominia rerum
transferentur !4t is not by mere agreement, but by delivery, is ownership
transferred.#
Lersonal right arises from the time the obligation to deliver arises whereas the real
right does not arise until actual delivery.
Arti'le! 1165 2 116C3 Re-e&ie! Available to t(e Cre&itor !specific performance, substitute
performance, e2uivalent performance.#
A. In obliation! to give
". A &eter-inate thing
a. >pecific performance
b. E2uivalent performance
$. A eneri' thing, all remedies are available
B. In an obliation to do . -a4e a &i!tin'tion"
4n obligation to do, which is purely personal only e2uivalent performance is available
4n an obligation to do which is not personal
a. substitute performance
b. e2uivalent performance
Note" In obliation! to &o. !*e'ifi' *erfor-an'e i! not available. The reason for this is
that specific performance will give rise to involuntary servitude.
C. Obliation not to do
". substitute performance
$. e2uivalent performance.
4n all these cases, the creditor has the option of re!ol%tion or re!'i!!ion %n&er Arti'le
11E1. 4n addition, he can also claim &a-ae!.
Arti'le 1277. The debtor of a thing cannot compel the creditor to receive a different one,
although the latter may be of the same value as, or more valuable than that which is due.
4n obligations to do or not to do, an act or forbearance cannot be substituted by another act or
forbearance against the obligee:s will.
Arti'le 1275. Dation in *a)-ent, whereby property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of
a debt in money, shall be governed by the law of sales.
Arti'le 1276. When the obligation consists in the delivery of an indeterminate or generic thing,
whose 2uality and circumstances have not been stated, the creditor cannot demand a thing of
superior 2uality. =either can the debtor deliver a thing of inferior 2uality. The purpose of the
obligation and other circumstances shall be ta/en into consideration.
Arti'le 176B. A thing is determinate when it is particularly designated or physical segregated
from all others of the same class.
The re2uisite that a thing be determinate is satisfied if at the time the contract is entered into, the
thing is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement
between the parties
Arti'le 772. Nat%ral fr%it! are the spontaneous products of the soil, and the young and other
products of animals.
In&%!trial fr%it! are those produced by lands of any /ind through cultivation or labor.
Civil fr%it! are the rents of buildings, the price of leases of lands and other property and the amount
of perpetual or life annuities or other similar income
NAT@RE AND E==ECTS O= OBLIGATIONS
OB8ECT O= TAE OBLIGATION"
1. to give real OBLIGATION &eter-inate +!*e'ifi', or in&eter-inate +eneri',
2. to &o
5. not to &o *er!onal OBLIGATION *o!itive +to &o, or neative +not to &o,
REAL OBLIGATION"
a. DETERGINATE OBLIGATION 2 particularly designated from a particular class&
;RINCI;AL OBLIGATION 2 to give !to deliver# a determinate thing&
ACCESSOR? OBLIGATION . exists even when not expressly stipulated&
+1, Arti'le 1165 2 to ta/e care of the thing with proper diligence of a good
father of the family&
+2, Arti'le 1167 . to deliver the fruits&
!++"# natural - industrial - civil
the 8('4BAT48= to deliver arises only if the creditor is
entitled&
+5, Arti'le 1166 . delivery of the accessions and of the accessories !Art
++<#&
b. GENERIC TAING is one that is indicated only by its /inds, without being distinguished
from others of the same /ind. !in&eter-inate,
4n an 8('4BAT48= to deliver a generic thing, the object is &eter-inable1 w(en
&elivere& it be'o-e! &eter-inate.
DELIGITED GENERIC not totally generic nor specific& obligation to deliver one of
>E5E@A' things& does not have designation nor physical segregation& @ule re 0ortuitous
Events still apply.
DETERGINATION O= DILIGENCE REJ@IRED"
+1, LAI e.g. extra ordinary diligence re2uired in ,ommon carriers
+2, Sti*%lation of ;artie!
+5, ;re!%-e&" diligence of a Bood father of the 0amily if none is specified-expressed by law
or agreement.
REAL RIGAT is the power by a person over a specific thing, susceptible of being exercised
against the whole world.
;ERSONAL RIGAT belongs to a person who may demand from another, as a definite
passive subject, the fulfillment of a prestation.
0rom the moment the 8('4BAT48= to deliver a determinate thing arises, the
creditors earns a personal right over the thing and its fruits, but only &eliver) or
tra&ition transfers ownership that is a real right over the thing against the whole
world.
0or failure to deliver, the creditorAs remedy is not reivindicacion but specific
performance.
OCAA;TER 2" Ri(t of A''e!!ion 2 GENERAL ;ROFISIONSP
Amen | Compiled Notes
Arti'le 77B. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is
produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.
<in&! of =r%it!1
1, CIFIL 2 derived by virtue of juridical relation
$# Nat%ral . spontaneous products of the soil and the young and other products of animals&
9# In&%!trial . produced by lands of any /ind through cultivation or labor or by reason of
human labor.
Ill%!tration!"
1. Which article is enshrined with the compliance of the obligation? Article "H of the ,ivil ,ode.
2. 3ow should an obligation be complied with? To answer, 4 would as/ you after reading &rticle
1,, to /now what is the source of the obligation. (ecause if you /now the source then you will
/now how such obligation should be complied with. 4f the source of obligation is a contract,
then may be the party has already stipulated as to how the obligation should be complied with.
3. 8bligation arising from law, the law itself will provide the manner of compliance of the
obligation. (ut in recent years, thus the common law specially on economic matters, is that
congress will just set the policies, and the 4@@ will have to be formulated by the executive
dept., and as a rule you should /now the 4@@. Even if we /now the source of the obligation, we
may still not /now on how to comply the obligation, because the parties did not stipulate or the
law did not provide, so how should we perform? 0inally, the civil code will tell us on how to
comply in relation to the /ind of obligation as to prestation. (ut most of the provision is on the
prestation to give so 4 will focus on that. 4n relation to this obligations, how should this
obligations be complied with, first you should /now as to what /ind of thing is to be delivered.
1f it is a determinate thing or a generic thing.
0. Generi' T(in 3ow should this obligation be complied with? There is a rule that should be
followed. What a debtor cannot compel the creditor to accept a thing that is inferior of 2uality.
A thing of such /ind the debtor also cannot demand which is of superior 2uality. 4n other
words, the thing that is to be delivered to the creditor is not of inferior nor superior 2uality.
What should be delivered depends on the purpose of the constitution of the obligation.
/. Deter-inate T(in if A has an obligation to deliver to (, P4A L@4CE "HHI, but instead of
delivering that car, the creditor offered to deliver a brand new (JW, series H blac/ convertible.
Jay the obligation be extinguished? Res. 4f the creditor accepts the (JW. Why? (ecause
when the law said that the creditor cannot be compelled to accept but he may want to accept. 4n
fact if the creditor accepts, what is the mode of extinguishment? The mode of extinguishment
is Cacion En Lago, an act of thing was delivered by the debtor to the creditor in satisfaction of
his death.
-. 'ast 2uestion, why would anyone refuse to accept the (JW? Jaybe there are gems in the old
car.
F. T(e a''e!!or) obliation!. t(e &ebtor !(o%l& *re!erve t(e t(in. This obligation starts from
the constitution of the obligation until the delivery of the thing. =ot all obligations have this
accessory the obligations. 3.g. to deliver a generic thing.
<. A! to t(e fr%it! of t(e t(in. Who is entitled to the fruits of the thing accrued after the
constitution of the obligation? The ,ode provides he will be entitled to the fruits of the thing
from the time the obligation to deliver arises. Art 1167